## INTRODUCTION — 2012 ARTICLE IV REPORT AUSTRIA

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---

### Recent economic developments
- Macro and policy context:
  - Austria has relatively strong macroeconomic fundamentals but deep ties with the euro area and legacy of an overly ambitious eastward financial sector expansion create substantial challenges.
  - Policy responses in late 2011–early 2012: introduction of a fiscal rule; strengthening of medium-term consolidation plans; increased capital requirements for banks; stepped-up monitoring of funding sources of large banking groups’ subsidiaries. ECB LTROs provided relief.
  - A partial nationalization of the fourth-largest bank occurred after these measures.
- Growth and labor market (2011–Q1 2012):
  - Growth in 2011: 2.7 percent (year as a whole).
  - Q4 2011: flat; Q1 2012: 0.3 percent q-o-q broad-based growth.
  - Unemployment in 2011: 4.2 percent.
  - Wage growth in 2011: 2.7 percent; negotiated wage growth in early 2012: above 3 percent.
  - Housing prices: accelerated in Q1 2012 after long stagnation (hot spots such as Vienna).
- Inflation:
  - 2011 inflation: 3.6 percent.
  - June 2012 inflation: 2.2 percent.
  - Drivers: excise tax increases and pass-through of commodity price hikes; effects subsided in H1 2012.
- External sector and capital flows:
  - Current account: peaked in 2008 at 5 percent of GDP; narrowed to 1.9 percent of GDP in 2011.
  - Staff estimate: cyclical factors lowered the CA surplus by 1.2 percentage points of GDP.
  - Exports as share of GDP remained below 2008 record; trade balance decline in 2011 mainly against the rest of the euro area.
  - Real and nominal exchange rates broadly stable in 2011; unit labor cost growth accelerated but in line with trading partners.
  - Global export market share: continued trend decline.
  - Capital flows: outward FDI and cross-border lending increased; some Austrian portfolio investment abroad withdrawn while foreigners resumed portfolio investment in Austria; capital flows into CESEE remain depressed with timid improvement tied to Austrian banks’ support to subsidiaries.
- Public finances:
  - 2011 deficit: 2.6 percent of GDP.
  - 2012 expected deficit: some 3 percent of GDP (slowing growth and higher support to troubled medium-sized banks).
  - General government gross debt: 72 percent of GDP (up from pre-crisis 60 percent of GDP).
- Banking sector (2011):
  - Consolidated banking assets: 380 percent of GDP.
  - Profitability suffered from deterioration of loan quality in several CESEE countries and losses on securities portfolios (including Greek PSI).
  - Banks increased reliance on central bank funding and cut external positions in H2 2011; cuts focused on markets other than Austria and CESEE (notably euro area periphery; exposure to Italy remains significant).
  - Return on assets fell sharply in 2011; large write-downs on goodwill and continued provisioning for growing NPLs were necessary.
  - Hungary’s scheme to help borrowers indebted in foreign currency caused sizable losses for Austrian banks.

### Staff outlook and assessment
- Growth projections:
  - 2012: some ¾ percent annual growth expected despite projected mid-year slowdown.
  - 2013: 1¾ percent projected, assuming growth revival mainly from domestic demand.
- Inflation:
  - Annual average inflation: close to 2 percent in 2012 and around that level thereafter.
- External balance:
  - Current account (2011): 1.9 percent of GDP.
  - Staff view: real effective exchange rate close to a level consistent with fundamentals; current account expected to continue downward trend as growth becomes more driven by domestic demand.
- Key risks (from Risk Assessment Matrix):
  - Strong intensification of euro area crisis — Relative likelihood: Medium; Impact: High. Mechanism: higher sovereign and bank spreads, pressure on wholesale funding, capital flow reversals in CESEE; euro depreciation could stimulate growth; CHF/EUR peg limits adverse balance-sheet effects for CHF mortgages.
  - Fiscal adjustment off-track — Relative likelihood: Medium; Impact: High. Mechanism: additional bank support outlays, lower-than-expected tax yield, subnational non-compliance.
  - Adverse developments in individual CESEE countries — Relative likelihood: Medium; Impact: Medium.
  - Global GDP growth slowdown — Relative likelihood: Medium; Impact: Medium.
  - Sharp increase in oil prices — Relative likelihood: Low; Impact: Medium.
- Severe scenario note:
  - Extreme contagion affecting Italy could cause severe spillovers given trade links, direct banking exposure (some 5 percent of GDP), and subsidiary links to an Italian bank.
- Authorities’ views:
  - Broad concurrence with staff projections and risk assessment.
  - OeNB June forecast deviates marginally from staff baseline for 2012–2013 (a bit more sanguine in 2014).
  - IHS and WIFO projections: WIFO forecasts 0.6 percent in 2012 and 1.3 percent in 2013.
  - Authorities emphasized role of private collective wage negotiations and non-price factors in export performance.

### Recommendation on Article IV cycle
- It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation with Austria be held on the usual 12-month cycle.

---

### Implementing and anchoring structural fiscal consolidation
- Medium-term fiscal framework:
  - Strengthened in March 2012; targets a balanced general government budget by 2016 (Box 2).
  - Net of capital transfers to banks, average annual structural adjustment of almost ½ percent of GDP.
  - Additional bank restructuring costs may push up debt, but strict implementation and adherence to new fiscal rule framework should ultimately put debt on a downward trajectory.
- Uncertainties and implementation gaps:
  - Significant parts of consolidation plan have high yield uncertainty or lack specific measures:
    - 2012: anticipated taxation of corporate pensions (high yield uncertainty).
    - 2013: tax treaty with Switzerland (high yield uncertainty).
    - 2014–2016: measures underlying almost a quarter of consolidation unspecified or depend on subnational cooperation (examples: financial transaction tax, subsidy and health care reform, expenditure consolidation by states and municipalities).
  - Unspecified measures not reflected in staff baseline; if fully implemented, authorities’ fiscal targets would be achieved under staff baseline.
- Fiscal costs and longer-term pressures:
  - Bank support (2008–2011): government injected € 7½ billion (2½ percent of GDP), one third capital transfers.
  - 2012 so far: € 2.3 billion in bank support, mainly capital transfers.
  - Crisis-related federal government guarantees at end-2011: € 17.2 billion; a state provided a similar-sized guarantee to a nationalized bank.
  - Medium-sized banks with significant public ownership likely to cause further fiscal needs.
  - Aging-related fiscal pressures: European Commission projects increase in Austria’s aging-related expenditure of some 4½ percent of GDP between 2015 and 2050 from already one of the highest levels in the EU.

- Staff recommendations (selection):
  - Strictly implement planned structural consolidation.
  - Rapidly underpin planned savings in health care, subsidies, and by states/municipalities with specific measures.
  - Design contingency plans to offset underperformance of consolidation or additional bank support needs.
  - Calibrate offsets to ensure debt-to-GDP can be brought back to about 60 percent of GDP by decade end.
  - Pursue additional pension reforms soon to contain aging cost pressures.

---

### 18. Improvements in the fiscal governance framework have advanced but not on all fronts

### Fiscal rules and governance developments
- Federal “debt brake” rule: limits federal structural deficit (including social security) to 0.35 percent of GDP from 2017.
- May 2012 revamped Domestic Stability Pact: extends the “debt brake” to sub-national governments, restricting their overall structural deficit to 0.1 percent of GDP from 2017.
- These fiscal rules have not been enshrined in the constitution.
- Limited progress reforming intra-governmental financial arrangements; contingent liabilities exist in non-financial public enterprises.

### Macro-fiscal scenarios (percent of GDP unless indicated)
- Staff Baseline Scenario (2011–2016):
  - Headline balance: -2.6, -3.0, -1.8, -1.5, -1.1, -0.8
  - Structural balance: -2.0, -1.6, -1.3, -1.2, -0.9, -0.8
  - Debt: 72.3, 74.6, 74.3, 73.6, 72.4, 71.3
  - Output gap: -0.8, -1.5, -1.2, -0.8, -0.4, -0.2
  - Real GDP (percentage change): 2.7, 0.8, 1.8, 1.8, 1.8, 1.7
- Authorities' Adjustment Scenario (2011–2016):
  - Headline balance: -2.6, -3.0, -2.1, -1.5, -0.6, 0.0
  - Structural balance: -2.4, -2.1, -1.7, -1.3, -0.7, -0.4
  - Debt: 72.2, 74.7, 75.3, 74.6, 72.8, 70.6
  - Output gap: 0.0, -0.9, -1.0, -0.4, 0.3, 0.7
  - Real GDP (percentage change): 3.1, 0.4, 1.4, 2.0, 2.2, 2.1

### Authorities' consolidation program 2012–16 — design and composition
- Composition highlights:
  - Almost 2/3 of measures on expenditure side; pensions account for more than a third of estimated impact (limiting pension increases below inflation in 2013/14).
  - Cuts in subsidies, health care expenditure, and consolidation by states/municipalities are back-loaded and still unspecified.
  - Revenue measures targeted at wealthier households: tax treaty with Switzerland, anticipated taxation of corporate pensions, capital gains tax on real estate sales, tax increase for high-income earners.
  - Social contribution measures: harmonization of occupational pension systems, raised ceilings on contribution bases, lifting exemption for older workers from unemployment insurance contributions.

### Authorities' consolidation package — key quantitative figures (In million euro; cumulative against authorities' baseline)
- (1) Revenue increases (2012–2016 total): 10,490
  - Annual: 2012: 1,198; 2013: 2,270; 2014: 2,157; 2015: 2,268; 2016: 2,597
  - Examples: Social contributions total: 1,295; Capital gains tax (real estate sales) total: 2,060; Financial transaction tax total: 1,500; Tax treaty w/ Switzerland total: 1,150; Anticipation of pension taxation total: 600; Tax increase for high incomes total: 440
- (2) Expenditure reductions (2012–2016 total): 17,376
  - Annual: 2012: 503; 2013: 1,719; 2014: 3,426; 2015: 5,211; 2016: 6,517
  - Examples: Public administration wages total: 1,081; Public administration other total: 1,463; Pensions moderate increases 2013/14 total: 2,560; Other pension expenditure total: 2,948; Subsidy reform total: 1,000; Health care reform (social insurance) total: 1,372; Expenditure consolidation states and municipalities total: 2,652
- (1)+(2) Sum of revenue and expenditure measures (2012–2016 total): 27,866
  - Annual sums: 1,701; 3,989; 5,583; 7,479; 9,114

### Staff assessment of consolidation path
- Medium-term structural consolidation (net of capital transfers to banks) for 2013–16: average annual adjustment of almost ½ percent of GDP.
- If fiscal rules adhered to and consolidation locked in post-planning horizon, debt should trend downward even with additional bank restructuring costs.
- In 2012–2013, roughly half of measures fall on wealthier households and likely have modest consumption effects.
- If cyclical conditions deteriorate, let automatic stabilizers work but consider credibility effects on fiscal rules; any relaxation only in deep recession and should be temporary and targeted.

---

### Financial sector risks, supervisory guidance, and banking system vulnerabilities

### Macroprudential and supervisory measures
- Large banks met June 2012 EBA capital requirements using retained earnings, conversion of non-EBA-eligible liabilities into common equity, improved collateralization, RWA optimization, asset reclassification, and accounting changes.
- Austrian macroprudential guidelines (March 2012) for three largest Austria-based banks include:
  - Early implementation of Basel III capital requirements by January 1, 2013 without transitional provisions (private and government participation capital initially included in Core Tier I).
  - Core Tier I capital surcharge up to 3 percentage points from January 1, 2016.
  - Promotion of stable local funding for subsidiaries via Loan-to-Local-Stable-Funding-Ratio (LLSFR); stock-LLSFR above 110 percent requires a sustainable flow-LLSFR to reduce it below 110 percent unless conditions agreed with host supervisors.
  - Recovery and resolution plans required by end-2012.
- Domestic banking overcapacity signs:
  - Number of banks (head offices) remained large at 824 at end-2011.
  - Branches increased by 6 percent during 2011; branch and bank employee density high internationally.
  - Profitability of domestic banking activities low; banks relied on foreign operations for ROE.
- Swiss franc exposure:
  - End-2011: 28.4 percent of credit to households denominated in foreign currency (mostly CHF).
  - Among these loans, 75 percent of loans to households and 18 percent to businesses are associated with repayment vehicles (RPVs).
  - Survey indicates funding gap in RPVs around EUR 4 billion for CHF-denominated RPV-loans, or 19 percent of outstanding volume.
- Staff view:
  - Intensive monitoring and contingency planning warranted.
  - Welcome macroprudential guidelines; encourage supervisory colleges’ involvement.
  - Early Basel III implementation and surcharges increase loss-absorption capacity.
  - LLSFR important monitoring tool; enforcement should not be mechanistic and corrective measures discussed in supervisory colleges.
  - Warned about circumvention via cross-border lending by parent banks.

---

### Box 4. Funding of Austrian Banks’ Subsidiaries and Associated Risks

### Evidence and implications
- Empirical finding: in sample of CESEE banks, change in loan-loss provisions (2008–10) is positively and significantly associated with banks’ loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) at end-2008, controlling for aggregate factors and bank loan growth.
- LDR is a close proxy for LLSFR (monitored by Austrian supervisors), which cannot be computed from public data.
- Implication: using LLSFR as vulnerability indicator related to credit risk in supervision is warranted.

### Thresholds, monitoring and timing
- Dispersion in asset-quality deterioration is large for any LDR level; credit risk can build up at low LDR.
- Jump in average asset-quality deterioration occurs at somewhat higher level than LLSFR threshold of 110 percent.
- Monitoring started in 2012Q1; first full assessment at year-end based on year-on-year data.
- Supervisory action under new guidelines to emerge from supervisory colleges with host supervisors’ consultation where deviations occur.
- Authorities increased ECB-eligible collateral and conduct regular macro stress tests; cross-border stability group expected to hold crisis simulation exercise in early July.

### Risks from foreign-currency loans and RPVs
- Banks’ capital allocation for foreign-currency loans with RPVs should be conservative.
- While loans currently perform well, funding gap in RPVs indicates problems may arise at maturity.
- Recommendation: review internal risk model parameters and prepare for persistent funding gaps.
- Authorities plan to strengthen risk management for CHF loans to unhedged borrowers by publishing detailed guidelines and reviewing 2003/2010 guidance by year-end; considering Pillar 2 supervisory measures next year.
- Banks can build capital buffers gradually as first large vintage of CHF mortgages matures only in 2017.
- Authorities note CHF borrowers have higher average income, limiting downside risk.

### Staff policy recommendations (selected)
- Intensive monitoring of systemic banks via regular stress tests.
- Close monitoring of foreign subsidiaries’ funding structure to encourage local funding, in cooperation with host supervisors.
- Develop strategy for efficient disposal of legacy assets in government-supported banks to minimize fiscal costs; provide for rapid and flexible balance-sheet cleanup and consider overbanking.
- Prioritize new early intervention and bank resolution framework; stronger intervention tools, revamped deposit insurance, and ex ante funding mechanism under consideration.
- Adopt early legislation consistent with FSB recommendations and June 2012 EC proposal.

### Key timing and numeric references
- Period of credit-risk analysis: 2008–10.
- LLSFR supervisory threshold cited: 110 percent.
- Monitoring start: 2012Q1; first full assessment: year-end.
- First large vintage of CHF mortgages maturity: 2017.
- OeNB survey funding-gap estimate for CHF RPVs: EUR 4 billion (19 percent of amount due at maturity).
- Early retirement penalty references: raised to 4.2 percent per year in mid-2000s and slated for further rise to 5.1 percent in 2017.
- Model simulation reference: reducing labor taxes by one percentage point of GDP (budget-neutral) can increase output in the long run by as much as ¾ percent.

---

### Annex I. Financial Sector Performance and Vulnerabilities (selected facts)
- Aggregate balance sheet and profitability:
  - Total consolidated banking sector assets at end-2011: EUR 1.17 trillion, or 380 percent of GDP.
  - Share of fully consolidated subsidiaries (mostly CESEE): 23.2 percent.
  - Loan-to-deposit ratio: close to 128 percent.
  - Loans and deposits grew by 3-4 percent y-o-y.
  - Aggregate ROA declined from 0.46 percent in 2010 to 0.11 percent in 2011.
  - Interest margin in Austria: slightly above 1 percent (about 0.5 percentage points below EA average).
- Capital adequacy:
  - Tier I ratio improved to 10.3 percent at end-2011.
  - Largest banks met end-EBA capital exercise via business run-downs, capital clean-up, accounting changes, retained earnings, and capital conversions.
- Asset quality:
  - 2011Q4 aggregate NPL ratio in CESEE subsidiaries: 15 percent.
  - At end-2012Q1, foreign-currency loans to Austrian non-banks: EUR 56 bn (18.7 percent of GDP): EUR 38 billion households; EUR 12 billion nonfinancial corporations; EUR 3 billion public sector.
  - FCLs to households: almost 30 percent of loans to that category; 73 percent mortgages; mostly CHF.
  - OeNB June 2011 survey: funding gap for CHF-denominated RPV loans to households of EUR 4bn (19 percent).
- Funding and liquidity:
  - Aggregate liquidity comfortable; net financing gap largely covered by cumulated counterbalancing capacity.
  - LTRO participation: total allotted LTRO volume at end-May 2012 represented 1.3 percent of EA-wide allotted volume.
  - Intra-group liquidity transfers to CESEE subsidiaries declined by about EUR 7 billion from peak of EUR 48 billion at end-June 2011 to end-2012Q1.
- LLSFR monitoring:
  - First LLSFR exercise (end-2012Q1 data): 15 subsidiaries out of 42 had stock-LLSFR above 110 threshold; these 15 represented 22 percent of total assets in subsidiaries.
- Stress testing:
  - OeNB macro stress test adverse scenario over 2011Q4–2013Q4: Core Tier I would fall from 9.9 percent to 8.5 percent without add-ons; with add-ons remain significantly above phased-in Basel III minimum of 4.5 percent. Each of three largest banks would remain above 7 percent full implementation Basel III minimum.

---

### Labor market participation gaps and policy simulations

### Key findings on participation
- Groups less involved: older workers, unskilled workers, lower-income women with family responsibilities.
- Employment of older workers rose from 28.8 percent in 2004 to 41.5 percent in 2011 but remains low internationally.
- Average effective retirement age 2004–09: males 58.9 years; females 57.5 years.
- 2010 exits to pensions: 28 percent standard retirement; 41 percent early retirement; 31 percent disability pension.
- Female employment high in OECD ranking but more part-time and lower participation with small children.

### Institutional drivers
- Generous pension benefits and easy early retirement reduce incentives for older workers.
- High tax wedges and treatment of secondary earners and child care costs discourage participation.
- High employer contributions and minimum wages may price low-skilled out of jobs.
- Early retirement and disability regimes are relatively lax.

### Reforms and recommendations
- Restrict early retirement avenues and raise statutory retirement age; tighten disability criteria; enhance rehabilitation and workplace suitability.
- Equalize statutory retirement age for women with men sooner; link to longevity.
- Reduce labor tax wedges (especially for low-skilled): rebalance taxation away from labor toward less distortionary taxes (e.g., consumption or property), consider targeted payroll tax cuts and in-work benefits.
- Smooth spikes in marginal tax rates that create high disincentives.

### Quantified simulation results
- OECD analysis: employment rate could be raised by 2.4 percent within 10 years by reducing average labor tax wedge to level of six OECD economies with highest employment.
- IMF GIMF simulation:
  - Experiment: labor tax reduced permanently by one percent of GDP, financed by equivalent government transfer cuts (approx. a 3 percentage point cut in social security contributions).
  - Main outcomes: steady-state potential output higher by 0.8 percent; private consumption increases; trade and current account improve marginally.
  - Financing variations: if financed by cutting government consumption or raising consumption tax, long-term GDP gain declines by about one third to about 0.5 percent.
- Joint OECD/Institute for Advanced Studies: halving employer social security contributions for bottom quintile (offset by spending cuts) increases low-skilled employment by about 1 percent and GDP by about 0.25 percent.

---

### New information since the Staff Report (post-circulation)
- Revised quarterly GDP series:
  - Growth in 2012Q1 revised from 0.3 percent (qoq) to 0.5 percent (qoq).
  - Q2 flash estimate: 0.2 percent (qoq).
- Outlook implications:
  - Weak external environment suggests deceleration in H2 2012 may continue; 2012 annual growth likely somewhat higher than 0.8 percent in staff report.
  - Growth prospects for 2013 may have worsened due to external conditions.
- July inflation reading: 2.1 percent (down from 2.2 percent in June).
- Authorities’ short-term growth view:
  - First half 2012 growth: 0.5% in Q1 and 0.2% in Q2 (qoq).
  - Authorities’ current estimate for 2012 growth: 0.6% for the year.

---

### Selected key macroeconomic indicators (selected, 2007–13 and projections)
- Basic country facts:
  - Total area: 83,850 square kilometers
  - Total population (2011): 8.4 million
  - GDP per capita (2011): US$ 49,818  (35,868 Euro)
- GDP growth (annual): 2007: 3.7; 2008: 1.4; 2009: -3.8; 2010: 2.1; 2011: 2.7; 2012: 0.8; 2013: 1.8
- Output gap (percent of potential GDP): 2007: 3.7; 2008: 3.3; 2009: -2.3; 2010: -2.0; 2011: -0.8; 2012: -1.5; 2013: -1.2
- CPI (period average): 2007: 2.2; 2008: 3.2; 2009: 0.4; 2010: 1.7; 2011: 3.6; 2012: 2.3; 2013: 1.9
- Current account (percent of GDP): 2007: 3.5; 2008: 4.9; 2009: 2.7; 2010: 3.0; 2011: 1.9; 2012: 1.7; 2013: 1.7
- General government gross debt (end of period, percent of GDP): 2007: 60.2; 2008: 63.8; 2009: 69.2; 2010: 71.8; 2011: 72.3; 2012: 74.6; 2013: 74.3
- Medium-term projections (selected):
  - GDP growth: 2014: 1.8; 2015: 1.8; 2016: 1.7; 2017: 1.6
  - CPI inflation (pa): 2014–2017: 1.9 each year
  - Unemployment rate: 2014: 4.2; 2015: 4.1; 2016: 4.0; 2017: 4.0
  - Current account (percent of GDP): 2014: 1.6; 2015: 1.5; 2016: 1.4; 2017: 1.2
  - Gross debt (percent of GDP): 2014: 73.6; 2015: 72.4; 2016: 71.3; 2017: 69.8
  - GDP (current prices, in billion euro): 2012: 308.5; 2013: 319.8; 2014: 331.4; 2015: 343.5; 2016: 355.4; 2017: 367.4

*Source: _cr12251 - INTRODUCTION — 2012 ARTICLE IV REPORT AUSTRIA (INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND)_*

### INTRODUCTION __________________________________________________________________________________  4

### INTRODUCTION

### Recent economic developments

- Austria has relatively strong macroeconomic fundamentals, but deep ties with the rest of the euro area and the legacy of an overly ambitious eastward financial sector expansion are creating substantial challenges.
- Policy responses in late 2011–early 2012 included: introduction of a fiscal rule; strengthening of medium-term consolidation plans; increased capital requirements for banks; stepped-up monitoring of funding sources of large banking groups’ subsidiaries. The ECB’s LTROs also provided relief.
- A partial nationalization of the fourth-largest bank occurred after these measures, underscoring ongoing challenges.

- Growth and labor market (2011–Q1 2012):
  - Growth in 2011: 2.7 percent (year as a whole), mainly driven by strong investment.
  - Q4 2011: flat; Q1 2012: broad-based growth of 0.3 percent q-o-q.
  - Unemployment in 2011: 4.2 percent (post-2009 low; lowest rate in the euro area).
  - Wage growth in 2011: 2.7 percent.
  - Negotiated wage growth in early 2012: accelerated to above 3 percent.
  - Housing prices: accelerated in Q1 2012 after a long period of stagnation (except for a few “hot spots” such as Vienna).

- Inflation:
  - 2011 inflation: 3.6 percent (highest level in decades).
  - June 2012 inflation: 2.2 percent.
  - Drivers: excise tax increases and pass-through of commodity price hikes opened a gap to Germany and the rest of the euro area; these effects subsided in the first half of 2012.

- External sector and capital flows:
  - Current account: peaked in 2008 at 5 percent of GDP; narrowed to 1.9 percent of GDP in 2011.
  - Staff estimate: cyclical factors lowered the CA surplus by 1.2 percentage points of GDP.
  - Exports as a share of GDP remained below their 2008 record.
  - Decline in the trade balance in 2011 was mainly against the rest of the euro area.
  - Real and nominal exchange rates: broadly stable in 2011.
  - Unit labor cost growth: accelerated, but in line with trading partners.
  - Global export market share: continued its trend decline.
  - Outward FDI and cross-border lending increased; some Austrian portfolio investment abroad was withdrawn while foreigners resumed portfolio investment in Austria.
  - Capital flows into CESEE: remain depressed, with only timid signs of improvement, related in part to Austrian banks’ support to their subsidiaries.

- Public finances:
  - 2011 deficit: 2.6 percent of GDP (improved).
  - 2012 expected deficit: some 3 percent of GDP (partly due to slowing growth and significantly higher support to troubled medium-sized banks).
  - General government gross debt: 72 percent of GDP (up from pre-crisis level of 60 percent of GDP).

- Banking sector (2011):
  - Consolidated banking assets: 380 percent of GDP.
  - Profitability suffered from deterioration of loan quality in several CESEE countries and losses on securities portfolios (including Greek PSI).
  - Banks increased reliance on central bank funding and cut external positions in the second half of 2011.
  - Cuts focused on markets other than Austria and CESEE, most notably the euro area periphery (exposure to Italy remains significant).
  - Return on assets fell sharply in 2011.
  - Large write-downs on goodwill and continued provisioning for growing NPLs were necessary.
  - Hungary’s scheme to help borrowers indebted in foreign currency caused sizable losses for Austrian banks.

### Staff outlook and assessment

- Growth projections:
  - 2012: some ¾ percent annual growth should still be in the offing despite a projected slowdown around mid-year.
  - 2013: 1¾ percent growth is projected, assuming a continued growth revival mainly on the back of domestic demand.
- Inflation:
  - Annual average inflation: close to 2 percent in 2012 and remain around that level thereafter.
- External balance:
  - Current account (2011): 1.9 percent of GDP — somewhat stronger than predicted by standard models.
  - Staff view: real effective exchange rate close to a level consistent with fundamentals; current account expected to continue downward trend as growth becomes more driven by domestic demand.

- Key risks (summarized in Box 1: Risk Assessment Matrix):
  - Strong intensification of euro area crisis:
    - Relative likelihood: Medium.
    - Impact if realized: High.
    - Mechanism: Re-intensified financial instability would raise sovereign and bank risk spreads, pressure wholesale funding markets, and cause capital flow reversals in CESEE; feedback loops between sovereign and bank creditworthiness could amplify the shock. Euro depreciation would stimulate growth; CHF/EUR peg would limit adverse balance sheet effects for Swiss franc–denominated mortgages.
  - Fiscal adjustment off-track:
    - Relative likelihood: Medium.
    - Impact if realized: High.
    - Mechanism: Additional bank support outlays not offset by other measures; lower-than-expected yield of new taxes; non-compliance at subnational level could erode fiscal discipline, raise sovereign and bank spreads, and prompt banks to reduce exposures including to CESEE.
  - Adverse developments in individual CESEE countries:
    - Relative likelihood: Medium.
    - Impact if realized: Medium.
    - Mechanism: Destabilizing policies in CESEE would hurt Austrian banks’ loan portfolios and could affect sovereign creditworthiness.
  - Global GDP growth slowdown:
    - Relative likelihood: Medium.
    - Impact if realized: Medium.
    - Mechanism: Lower export demand (notably from Germany and CESEE) and deterioration in CESEE loan portfolios.
  - Sharp increase in oil prices:
    - Relative likelihood: Low.
    - Impact if realized: Medium.
    - Mechanism: Higher energy prices would increase inflation and could depress demand.

- Potential severe scenario:
  - Extreme contagion affecting Italy could cause severe spillovers given close trade links, direct banking sector exposure (some 5 percent of GDP), and the subsidiary relationship of Austria’s second largest banking group to an Italian bank.

- Authorities’ views:
  - Broad concurrence with staff projections and risk assessment.
  - June forecast of the Austrian Central Bank (OeNB): deviates only marginally from staff baseline for 2012–2013 (a bit more sanguine in 2014).
  - IHS projections marginally different; WIFO forecasts growth of 0.6 percent in 2012 and 1.3 percent in 2013.
  - Authorities agreed the external position was strong and did not necessarily foresee further near-term weakening; acknowledged that euro area adjustment may require higher-than-average inflation in surplus countries and emphasized the role of private collective wage negotiations and non-price factors (e.g., first-mover advantage in CESEE) in export performance.

### Policy discussions — Implementing and anchoring structural fiscal consolidation

- Authorities’ medium-term fiscal framework:
  - Strengthened in March 2012 and targets a balanced budget for general government by 2016 (Box 2).
  - Net of capital transfers to banks, this amounts to an average annual adjustment of almost ½ percent of GDP in structural terms.
  - Additional bank restructuring costs may push up debt, but strict implementation of the adjustment path and adherence to the new fiscal rule framework should ultimately put debt back on a downward trajectory.

- Uncertainties and implementation gaps:
  - Significant parts of the consolidation plan have high yield uncertainty or are not yet underpinned by specific measures.
  - Main measures:
    - 2012: anticipated taxation of corporate pensions (high yield uncertainty).
    - 2013: tax treaty with Switzerland (high yield uncertainty).
    - 2014–2016: measures underlying almost a quarter of the consolidation are unspecified, not yet implemented, or depend on cooperation of subnational governments (examples: financial transaction tax, subsidy and health care reform, expenditure consolidation by states and municipalities).
  - Not yet implemented or unspecified measures are not reflected in the staff’s baseline scenario.
  - If the authorities’ plans are fully implemented, their fiscal targets would be achieved under staff’s baseline macroeconomic scenario.

- Fiscal costs and longer-term pressures:
  - Bank support (2008–2011): government injected € 7½ billion (2½ percent of GDP), one third of which were or became capital transfers.
  - 2012 so far: € 2.3 billion in bank support, mainly capital transfers.
  - Crisis-related federal government guarantees at end-2011: € 17.2 billion; a state provided a guarantee of similar magnitude to one of the nationalized banks.
  - Medium-sized banks with significant public ownership are likely to cause further fiscal needs.
  - Aging-related fiscal pressures: European Commission projects an increase in Austria’s aging-related expenditure of some 4½ percent of GDP between 2015 and 2050 from already one of the highest levels in the EU.

*Source: _cr12251 - INTRODUCTION — 2012 ARTICLE IV REPORT AUSTRIA (INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND)_*

### 18.      Improvements in the fiscal governance framework have advanced but not on all fronts.

### 18.      Improvements in the fiscal governance framework have advanced but not on all fronts.

### Fiscal rules and governance developments
- Parliament adopted a federal “debt brake” rule limiting the federal structural deficit (including social security) to 0.35 percent of GDP from 2017 onwards.
- In May 2012 a revamped domestic stability pact was approved that extends the “debt brake” to sub-national governments and restricts their overall structural deficit to 0.1 percent of GDP, also starting in 2017.
- These fiscal rules have not been enshrined in the constitution, as a sufficient parliamentary majority could not be mustered.
- Limited progress in reforming intra-governmental financial arrangements (Annex II).
- Contingent liabilities exist in non-financial public enterprises (as described in the 2011 IMF Staff Report).

### Staff and authorities macro-fiscal scenarios (percent of GDP unless indicated otherwise)
- Staff Baseline Scenario (2011–2016):
  - Headline balance: -2.6, -3.0, -1.8, -1.5, -1.1, -0.8
  - Structural balance: -2.0, -1.6, -1.3, -1.2, -0.9, -0.8
  - Debt: 72.3, 74.6, 74.3, 73.6, 72.4, 71.3
  - Output gap: -0.8, -1.5, -1.2, -0.8, -0.4, -0.2
  - Real GDP (percentage change): 2.7, 0.8, 1.8, 1.8, 1.8, 1.7
- Authorities' Adjustment Scenario (2011–2016):
  - Headline balance: -2.6, -3.0, -2.1, -1.5, -0.6, 0.0
  - Structural balance: -2.4, -2.1, -1.7, -1.3, -0.7, -0.4
  - Debt: 72.2, 74.7, 75.3, 74.6, 72.8, 70.6
  - Output gap: 0.0, -0.9, -1.0, -0.4, 0.3, 0.7
  - Real GDP (percentage change): 3.1, 0.4, 1.4, 2.0, 2.2, 2.1
- Sources: Austrian Stability Program 2011–16; and IMF staff projections.

### The Authorities' Consolidation Program 2012–16 — design and composition
- The federal coalition’s May 2012 package reflected in the 2013–2016 medium-term fiscal framework; numerous legislative changes and amendments to the 2012 budget.
- Composition highlights:
  - Almost 2/3 of measures taken on the expenditure side with a clear focus on pensions (more than a third of estimated impact from limiting pension increases below inflation in 2013/14).
  - Cuts in subsidies, health care expenditure, and consolidation contributions by states and municipalities are back-loaded and still unspecified.
  - Revenue-side measures targeted at wealthier households: tax treaty with Switzerland, anticipated taxation of corporate pensions, capital gains tax on real estate sales, tax increase for high-income earners.
  - Social contribution measures: harmonization of pension systems of different occupational groups, raised ceilings on contribution bases, lifting exemption for older workers from unemployment insurance contributions.

### Authorities' consolidation package — key quantitative figures (In million euro, unless indicated otherwise; cumulative against authorities' baseline)
- (1) Revenue increases (2012–2016 total): 10,490
  - Annual and category detail:
    - 2012: 1,198
    - 2013: 2,270
    - 2014: 2,157
    - 2015: 2,268
    - 2016: 2,597
  - Examples:
    - Social contributions total: 1,295
    - Capital gains tax (real estate sales) total: 2,060
    - Financial transaction tax total: 1,500
    - Tax treaty w/ Switzerland total: 1,150
    - Anticipation of pension taxation total: 600
    - Tax increase for high incomes total: 440
- (2) Expenditure reductions (2012–2016 total): 17,376
  - Annual and category detail:
    - 2012: 503
    - 2013: 1,719
    - 2014: 3,426
    - 2015: 5,211
    - 2016: 6,517
  - Examples:
    - Public administration: wages total: 1,081; other total: 1,463
    - Pensions: moderate pension increases 2013/14 total: 2,560
    - Other pension expenditure total: 2,948
    - Subsidy reform total: 1,000
    - Health care reform (social insurance) total: 1,372
    - Expenditure consolidation states and municipalities total: 2,652
- (1)+(2) Sum of revenue and expenditure measures (2012–2016 total): 27,866
  - Annual sums: 1,701; 3,989; 5,583; 7,479; 9,114

### Staff assessment of the consolidation path and recommendations
- Staff view:
  - The envisaged medium-term structural consolidation (net of capital transfers to banks) for 2013–16 would amount to an average annual adjustment of almost ½ percent of GDP, broadly in line with staff’s recommendation in the 2011 Art IV consultation.
  - If new fiscal rules are adhered to and consolidation is locked in after the authorities’ planning horizon, the path should put debt on a downward trajectory even if pushed up by additional bank restructuring cost.
  - In 2012 and 2013, roughly half of consolidation measures fall on wealthier households and thus likely have modest effects on consumption.
  - If cyclical conditions deteriorate more than expected, it would be desirable to let automatic stabilizers work, though adverse effects on the credibility of the fiscal rules would need to be considered.
  - Any relaxation of the structural consolidation path should be considered only in case of a deep recession (e.g., strong intensification of the euro area crisis); such measures should be strictly temporary and targeted.
- Specific staff recommendations:
  - Strictly implement the planned consolidation in structural terms.
  - Rapidly underpin planned savings in health care, subsidies, and by states and municipalities with specific measures.
  - Design contingency plans to offset potential underperformance of consolidation measures or cope with likely additional bank support needs.
  - Calibrate offsets to ensure debt-to-GDP can be brought back to pre-crisis level of about 60 percent of GDP by the end of the decade.
  - Legislatively pursue additional pension reforms soon to contain rising aging cost pressures and long implementation lags.

### Authorities’ views on implementation and fiscal federalism
- Authorities assured full implementation of the envisaged consolidation path and were confident in budgetary projections; noted macroeconomic outlook somewhat better than budget assumptions.
- For 2012, authorities viewed offsetting automatic stabilizers as likely moot; for later years priority is ensuring credibility of new fiscal rules.
- Authorities skeptical about stimulus measures in a deeper crisis due to limited fiscal multipliers in a small open economy and difficulty of finding suitable measures.
- Further reforms of fiscal federalism viewed as difficult in the short run; authorities expected subnational governments to contribute via the revamped domestic stability pact but saw low feasibility for deeper reforms such as granting meaningful tax autonomy to states.

### Financial sector risks, supervisory guidance, and banking system vulnerabilities
- Large banks met the June 2012 capital requirements set by the European Banking Authority (EBA) using a mix of retained earnings, conversion of non-EBA-eligible liabilities into common equity, improved collateralization, risk-weighted assets optimization, asset reclassification, and accounting changes.
- Compared to European peers, large Austrian banks’ capital adequacy remains on the low side, but leverage is below the median. State capital injections received in 2009 still need to be repaid.
- Austrian supervisory authorities introduced macroprudential guidelines (March 2012) for the three largest Austria-based banks:
  - Early implementation of Basel III capital requirements by January 1, 2013 without transitional provisions (private and government participation capital initially included in the Core Tier I base).
  - Core Tier I capital surcharge of up to 3 percentage points from January 1, 2016 (exact amount to be determined).
  - Promotion of stable local funding of subsidiaries using the Loan-to-Local-Stable-Funding-Ratio (LLSFR); a stock-LLSFR above 110 percent requires achieving a sustainable flow-LLSFR to reduce LLSFR over time to below 110 percent unless conditions agreed with host supervisors.
  - Recovery and resolution plans required to be submitted by end-2012.
- Domestic banking sector signs of overcapacity:
  - Number of banks (head offices) remained large at 824 at end-2011 despite a recent declining trend.
  - Branches increased by 6 percent during 2011; branch and bank employee density high in international comparison.
  - Profitability of domestic banking activities consistently low; banks relied on foreign operations for return on equity.
- Swiss franc exposure vulnerability:
  - At end-2011, 28.4 percent of credit to households was denominated in foreign currency (mostly Swiss franc).
  - Among these loans, 75 percent of loans to households and 18 percent of loans to businesses are associated with repayment vehicles (RPVs).
  - A survey indicates a funding gap in RPVs of around EUR 4 billion for Swiss-franc-denominated RPV-loans, or 19 percent of the outstanding volume.
- Staff’s view on financial stability:
  - Intensive monitoring warranted given fragile European market situation; contingency planning for an escalating euro-area crisis emphasized.
  - Welcomed macroprudential guidelines and encouraged involvement of supervisory colleges in implementation.
  - Early Basel III implementation and capital surcharges will increase loss-absorption capacity for systemic banks.
  - Recovery and resolution plans are important crisis management tools.
  - LLSFR seen as an important monitoring tool; enforcement of 110 percent threshold should not be mechanistic and corrective measures should be discussed in supervisory colleges.
  - Warned about risk of circumvention via cross-border lending by parent banks.

*Source: _cr12251 - 18.      Improvements in the fiscal governance framework have advanced but not on all fronts.*

### Box 4. Funding of Austrian Banks’ Subsidiaries and Associated Risks

### Box 4. Funding of Austrian Banks’ Subsidiaries and Associated Risks

### Evidence on funding metrics and credit risk
- In a sample of CESEE banks, including many foreign bank subsidiaries, a measure of credit risk (the change in banks’ loan-loss provisions) in the two years following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (2008–10) is positively and significantly associated with the banks’ loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) at the end of 2008, even after controlling for aggregate factors and individual bank loan growth.
- The LDR is a close proxy for the loan-to-local-stable-funding ratio (LLSFR), the ratio monitored by the Austrian supervisors, which cannot be computed based on publicly available data.
- This evidence suggests that the use of the LLSFR as a vulnerability indicator related to credit risk in a supervisory context is warranted.

### Limitations of mechanistic thresholds
- The dispersion in the change in asset quality after the shock of end-2008 is large for any particular level of the LDR, indicating that significant credit risk can also build up in banks with a low LDR.
- The jump in the average deterioration in asset quality seems to take place at a somewhat higher level than the LLSFR threshold of 110 percent in the Austrian supervisors’ guidelines.
- Concluding implication: while a conservative threshold of 110 will clearly reduce Austrian banking groups’ funding and liquidity risk, from the point of view of curbing credit risk a less conservative threshold may be acceptable.

### Supervisory monitoring and planned processes
- Monitoring of trends in the “sustainability” of subsidiaries’ loan book growth started in 2012Q1; a first full assessment will take place at year-end based on year-on-year data.
- Any supervisory action related to the new guidelines on the funding model of subsidiaries would be the outcome of a process in the context of supervisory colleges, with deeper consultations with host supervisors in case of deviations from the guidelines.
- Authorities indicated stepped-up monitoring of banking sector liquidity, including intra-group exposures, and encouraged banks to pay particular attention to funding and liquidity profiles, in particular in foreign currency.
- Authorities have increased banks’ pool of ECB-eligible collateral and conduct regular macroeconomic stress tests.
- A cross-border stability group formed last year with several CESEE countries was expected to hold its first crisis simulation exercise in early July to discuss burden-sharing issues.

### Risks from foreign-currency loans and repayment vehicles
- Banks’ capital allocation against the risks related to foreign currency loans with repayment vehicles in Austria should be conservative.
- While these loans are currently performing well, the sizable funding gap in repayment vehicles indicates that problems may arise when loans mature.
- Recommendation: review parameters used in banks’ internal risk models to make sure that banks are well prepared for persistent funding gaps.
- Authorities plan to strengthen risk management of Swiss franc loans to unhedged borrowers in Austria through publication of more detailed guidelines and the supervisory process; Austrian guidelines issued in 2003 and 2010 will be reviewed and updated by the end of the year with respect to internal risk pricing and capital allocation.
- Authorities are considering taking supervisory measures through Basel II’s second pillar in the course of next year.
- Banks can build up capital buffers gradually as the first large vintage of Swiss franc mortgages will mature only in 2017.
- Authorities noted that households who borrowed in foreign currency had higher average income, a factor limiting downside risk.

### Staff recommendations and policy implications
- Intensive monitoring of systemic banks, including through regular stress tests, is warranted in light of the fragile European market situation.
- Close monitoring of the funding structure of foreign subsidiaries to encourage reliance on local funding for new lending should help reduce structural vulnerabilities; monitoring will take place in close cooperation with host country supervisors.
- The authorities should develop a strategy for a more efficient disposal of legacy assets in banks with substantial government ownership with the goal of minimizing final fiscal costs; a revised strategy should provide for more rapid and flexible balance sheet clean up and consider overbanking in the Austrian market.
- Putting in place a new early intervention and bank resolution framework should be a priority; stronger intervention tools and a new resolution regime – including revamped deposit insurance and an ex ante funding mechanism under consideration – would provide more flexibility in dealing with insolvent institutions.
- The authorities were encouraged to adopt early legislation consistent with FSB recommendations and the June 2012 EC proposal.

### Key timing and numeric references
- Period of credit-risk association analysis: 2008–10.
- LLSFR supervisory threshold cited: 110 percent.
- Monitoring start: 2012Q1; first full assessment: year-end.
- First large vintage of Swiss franc mortgages maturity: 2017.
- Early retirement penalty raised to 4.2 percent per year in the mid-2000s and slated for a further rise to 5.1 percent in 2017 (contextual cross-reference within the report).
- Model simulation reference: reducing labor taxes by one percentage point of GDP in a budget-neutral manner can increase output in the long run by as much as ¾ percent (contextual cross-reference within the report).

*Source: 2012 Article IV Report — Austria (Box 4).*

### 55.      It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation with Austria be held on the usual

### _cr12251 - 55.      It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation with Austria be held on the usual

### Recommendation
- It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation with Austria be held on the usual 12-month cycle.

### Key macroeconomic indicators (selected, 2007–13)
- Total area: 83,850 square kilometers
- Total population (2011): 8.4 million
- GDP per capita (2011): US$ 49,818  (35,868 Euro)
- GDP growth (annual): 2007: 3.7; 2008: 1.4; 2009: -3.8; 2010: 2.1; 2011: 2.7; 2012: 0.8; 2013: 1.8
- Output gap (percent of potential GDP): 2007: 3.7; 2008: 3.3; 2009: -2.3; 2010: -2.0; 2011: -0.8; 2012: -1.5; 2013: -1.2
- Employment (annual change): 2007: 1.9; 2008: 1.3; 2009: -1.5; 2010: 0.6; 2011: 1.8; 2012: 0.6; 2013: 0.6
- Unemployment rate (registered, national definition): 2007: 6.2; 2008: 5.8; 2009: 7.2; 2010: 6.9; 2011: 6.7; 2012: 6.8; 2013: 6.8
- Unemployment rate (standardized, Eurostat): 2007: 4.4; 2008: 3.8; 2009: 4.8; 2010: 4.4; 2011: 4.2; 2012: 4.3; 2013: 4.3
- CPI (period average): 2007: 2.2; 2008: 3.2; 2009: 0.4; 2010: 1.7; 2011: 3.6; 2012: 2.3; 2013: 1.9

### Demand, supply and external sector (selected)
- Total domestic demand (growth): 2007: 2.5; 2008: 0.7; 2009: -2.0; 2010: 1.8; 2011: 2.5; 2012: 0.9; 2013: 1.9
- Consumption (growth): 2007: 1.2; 2008: 1.6; 2009: 0.9; 2010: 1.3; 2011: 0.5; 2012: 0.8; 2013: 1.2
- Gross fixed capital formation (growth): 2007: 3.6; 2008: 0.7; 2009: -7.8; 2010: 0.8; 2011: 7.3; 2012: 1.5; 2013: 3.2
- Net exports (growth contribution in pp): 2007: 1.4; 2008: 0.8; 2009: -2.3; 2010: 0.4; 2011: 0.4; 2012: 0.0; 2013: 0.1
- Exports of goods and nonfactor services (growth): 2007: 8.9; 2008: 1.4; 2009: -15.6; 2010: 8.7; 2011: 7.2; 2012: 2.0; 2013: 4.0
- Imports of goods and nonfactor services (growth): 2007: 7.1; 2008: 0.0; 2009: -13.3; 2010: 8.8; 2011: 7.2; 2012: 2.1; 2013: 4.3
- Trade balance (goods) (in billion euro): 2007: 1.3; 2008: -0.6; 2009: -2.4; 2010: -3.2; 2011: -7.0; 2012: -8.1; 2013: -8.5
- Current account (in billion euro): 2007: 9.6; 2008: 13.8; 2009: 7.5; 2010: 8.6; 2011: 5.9; 2012: 5.2; 2013: 5.3
- Current account (percent of GDP): 2007: 3.5; 2008: 4.9; 2009: 2.7; 2010: 3.0; 2011: 1.9; 2012: 1.7; 2013: 1.7

### Fiscal accounts and public debt (percent of GDP)
- General government revenue: 2007: 47.6; 2008: 48.3; 2009: 48.5; 2010: 48.1; 2011: 48.0; 2012: 48.6; 2013: 48.7
- General government expenditure: 2007: 48.6; 2008: 49.3; 2009: 52.6; 2010: 52.6; 2011: 50.6; 2012: 51.6; 2013: 50.5
- General government balance (EDP-definition): 2007: -0.9; 2008: -0.9; 2009: -4.1; 2010: -4.5; 2011: -2.6; 2012: -3.0; 2013: -1.8
- Structural balance: 2007: -2.6; 2008: -2.4; 2009: -3.0; 2010: -3.0; 2011: -2.0; 2012: -1.6; 2013: -1.3
- Gross debt (end of period): 2007: 60.2; 2008: 63.8; 2009: 69.2; 2010: 71.8; 2011: 72.3; 2012: 74.6; 2013: 74.3

### Medium-term projections and framework (selected, Table 2, percent of GDP or growth)
- GDP (growth in percent): 2014: 1.8; 2015: 1.8; 2016: 1.7; 2017: 1.6
- CPI inflation (pa; annual percent change): 2014–2017: 1.9 each year
- Unemployment rate (percent): 2014: 4.2; 2015: 4.1; 2016: 4.0; 2017: 4.0
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2014: 1.6; 2015: 1.5; 2016: 1.4; 2017: 1.2
- General government revenue (percent of GDP): 2014–2017: 48.5; 48.5; 48.5; 48.5 (2014–2017 respectively)
- General government expenditure (percent of GDP): 2014: 50.0; 2015: 49.5; 2016: 49.3; 2017: 49.3
- General government balance (percent of GDP): 2014: -1.5; 2015: -1.1; 2016: -0.8; 2017: -0.8
- Gross debt (percent of GDP): 2014: 73.6; 2015: 72.4; 2016: 71.3; 2017: 69.8
- Structural balance: 2014: -1.2; 2015: -0.9; 2016: -0.8; 2017: -0.8
- Potential output (growth in percent): 2014–2017: 1.5 each year
- Output gap (in percent of potential output): 2014: -0.8; 2015: -0.4; 2016: -0.2; 2017: 0.0
- GDP (current prices, in billion euro): 2012: 308.5; 2013: 319.8; 2014: 331.4; 2015: 343.5; 2016: 355.4; 2017: 367.4

### Balance of payments projections (Table 3, percent of GDP)
- Current account: 2012: 1.7; 2013: 1.7; 2014: 1.6; 2015: 1.5; 2016: 1.4; 2017: 1.2
- Trade (goods and services balance): 2012: 2.2; 2013: 2.2; 2014: 2.1; 2015: 2.0; 2016: 1.9; 2017: 1.7
- Exports (percent of GDP): 2012: 57.2; 2013: 58.2; 2014: 59.4; 2015: 60.7; 2016: 62.0; 2017: 63.6
- Imports (percent of GDP): 2012: 55.0; 2013: 56.0; 2014: 57.3; 2015: 58.6; 2016: 60.2; 2017: 61.9
- Balance on factor income: 2012–2017: 0.2 each year (2012 onward)
- Capital and financial accounts (percent of GDP): 2012: -1.7; 2013: -1.7; 2014: -1.6; 2015: -1.5; 2016: -1.4; 2017: -1.2
- FDI, net (percent of GDP): 2012: -4.3; 2013: -4.2; 2014: -4.1; 2015: -4.0; 2016: -4.0; 2017: -4.0
- Portfolio investment, net (percent of GDP): 2012: 5.4; 2013: 5.9; 2014–2017: 5.9 each year
- Reserves (percent of GDP): 2012–2017: 0.0 each year (projection)

### General government operations (Table 4, percent of GDP)
- Revenue: 2007: 47.6; 2008: 48.3; 2009: 48.5; 2010: 48.1; 2011: 48.0; 2012: 48.6; 2013: 48.7
- Taxes (percent of GDP): 2007: 27.3; 2008: 28.1; 2009: 27.4; 2010: 27.2; 2011: 27.3; 2012: 27.8; 2013: 28.0
  - Indirect taxes: 2007: 13.9; 2008: 14.1; 2009: 14.6; 2010: 14.5; 2011: 14.3; 2012: 14.4; 2013: 14.4
  - Direct taxes: 2007: 13.3; 2008: 14.0; 2009: 12.7; 2010: 12.7; 2011: 13.0; 2012: 13.4; 2013: 13.6
- Social contributions: 2007: 15.7; 2008: 15.9; 2009: 16.5; 2010: 16.3; 2011: 16.2; 2012: 16.3; 2013: 16.3
- Expense: 2007: 48.7; 2008: 49.4; 2009: 52.7; 2010: 52.7; 2011: 50.6; 2012: 51.6; 2013: 50.5
  - Compensation of employees: 2007: 9.0; 2008: 9.2; 2009: 9.8; 2010: 9.7; 2011: 9.4; 2012: 9.5; 2013: 9.3
  - Interest: 2007: 2.9; 2008: 2.7; 2009: 2.8; 2010: 2.6; 2011: 2.6; 2012: 2.7; 2013: 2.7
  - Social benefits: 2007: 23.2; 2008: 23.6; 2009: 25.4; 2010: 25.3; 2011: 24.6; 2012: 25.0; 2013: 24.8
- Net lending / Net borrowing (percent of GDP): 2007: -1.0; 2008: -1.0; 2009: -4.1; 2010: -4.5; 2011: -2.6; 2012: -3.0; 2013: -1.8
- Primary balance (memorandum): 2007: 1.9; 2008: 1.7; 2009: -1.3; 2010: -1.8; 2011: 0.0; 2012: -0.4; 2013: 0.9

### Banking sector financial soundness indicators (Table 5, 2008–11)
- Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets: 2008: 12.9; 2009: 15.0; 2010: 15.4; 2011: 15.8
- Regulatory Tier I capital to risk-weighted assets: 2008: 9.3; 2009: 11.1; 2010: 11.7; 2011: 12.0
- Capital to assets (percent): 2008: 6.3; 2009: 7.0; 2010: 7.5; 2011: 7.2
- Nonperforming loans to total gross loans (percent): 2008: 1.9; 2009: 2.3; 2010: 2.8; 2011: 2.7
- Return on assets: 2008: 0.1; 2009: 0.1; 2010: 0.5; 2011: 0.1
- Return on equity: 2008: 2.6; 2009: 1.5; 2010: 7.9; 2011: 1.4
- Liquid assets to total assets: 2008: 26.8; 2009: 21.6; 2010: 23.5; 2011: 25.4
- Foreign currency-denominated loans to total loans: 2008: 25.6; 2009: 22.4; 2010: 22.1; 2011: 21.4
- Foreign currency-denominated liabilities to total liabilities: 2008: 19.4; 2009: 14.4; 2010: 11.3; 2011: 12.0

### Authorities’ response to past IMF policy recommendations (Table 6)
- Fiscal policy I: Implement consolidation measures of at least ½ percent of GDP annually, mainly through expenditure rationalization in three areas: pensions, health care and subsidies. — Authorities’ response: Broadly consistent. Notes: New medium-term fiscal framework envisages average annual structural adjustment of almost ½ percent of GDP. Focus on pension area, but more needs to be done. Health care and subsidy measures still need to be specified.
- Fiscal policy II: Strengthen Domestic Stability Pact. — Authorities’ response: Broadly consistent. Notes: Comprehensive new fiscal rule framework, including revamped Domestic Stability Pact.
- Fiscal policy III: Streamline intergovernmental fiscal relations and create stronger nexus between spending and financing responsibilities at the subnational level. — Authorities’ response: Marginally consistent. Notes: No substantial progress.
- Financial sector policy I: Take macroprudential measures to address risks posed by systemically important banks. — Authorities’ response: Broadly consistent. Notes: New macroprudential guidelines for internationally active banks have been issued. EBA capital exercise also leading to stronger capital for systemically important banks.
- Financial sector policy II: Strengthen early intervention powers for bank supervisors and revisit the institutional framework for bank supervision and regulation, including with respect to macro-prudential policy. — Authorities’ response: Marginally consistent. Notes: Consultations have begun on a reform of early intervention and bank resolution. No plans yet for other reforms.
- Structural reforms: Increase labor market participation of low-skilled, older and female workers and strengthen human capital formation through reforms of the education system. — Authorities’ response: Broadly consistent. Notes: Pension reforms to rein in early retirement have been strengthened but more needs to be done. Tax wedges and major education reforms still to be addressed.

### Selected qualitative findings from figures and captions
- "Macroeconomic conditions are relatively healthy. Indicators point to a modest upswing. Inflation is falling......but house prices are picking up."
- "The current account surplus is declining... ....and the real exchange rate is stable. Trade ties with the Euro area are strong... ....but export market shares are declining. The net foreign assets position is improving......and financial flows have picked up."
- Fiscal narrative: "During the crisis, fiscal deficits... ...ratcheted up debt. The authorities' consolidation plans .... ...could bring debt on a steep downward trajectory. However, measures implemented so far .......would decrease debt much less."

*Source: AUSTRIA: 2012 ARTICLE IV REPORT (IMF staff report excerpts provided in the content unit).*

### Annex I. Financial Sector Performance and Vulnerabilities

### Annex I. Financial Sector Performance and Vulnerabilities

### Aggregate balance sheet structure and profitability
- Total consolidated banking sector assets amounted to EUR 1.17 trillion at end-2011, or 380 percent of GDP.
- Share of fully consolidated subsidiaries (mostly in CESEE) stable at 23.2 percent.
- Banking system structure dominated by classic commercial banking activities.
- Loan-to-deposit ratio remained close to 128 percent.
- Loans and deposits grew by 3-4 percent year-on-year.
- Aggregate ROA declined from 0.46 percent in 2010 to 0.11 percent in 2011.
  - Drivers of the profitability slump: goodwill write-offs in CESEE (notably Hungary, Romania and Ukraine), losses on sovereign bond portfolios (including through the Greek PSI), new provisioning charges for asset impairment, and losses associated with a Hungarian government-sponsored scheme capping exchange rates on foreign currency mortgage repayments.
- Share of operating profits from CESEE subsidiaries rose to 66 percent.
- Interest margin in Austria remained low at a level slightly above 1 percent, about 0.5 percentage points below the Euro Area (EA) average.

### Capital adequacy
- Tier I ratio improved for the banking system as a whole to 10.3 percent despite deteriorating performance and implementation of Basel 2.5 at end-2011.
- Two Austrian-owned banks subject to the end-EBA capital exercise met requirements by:
  - running down or selling capital-intensive businesses;
  - taking capital clean-up measures (including updating collateral appraisals);
  - moving from local to international accounting standards in some countries;
  - retaining earnings; and
  - buying back or converting some non-EBA-eligible capital into common equity.
- Austrian macroprudential guidance introduced in 2012 expected to require little extra capital in the baseline scenario, partly due to grandfathering provisions making private and state participation capital eligible as Core Tier I.
- The largest banking group indicated potential institutional changes and deconsolidation of part of its Austrian activities if minority interest treatment in CRD IV proves penalizing.
- Medium-sized banks:
  - One bank nationalized in 2009 reported a turnaround in 2011 but remains weakly capitalized; a restructuring plan is under examination by the European Commission and the bank is seeking buyers and strategic options for a large wind-down portfolio.
  - Another troubled medium-sized bank, already reliant on government capital support, was semi-nationalized in early 2012 after losing 50 percent of its equity; it serves as a central institution for a large group of smaller Austrian banks (its main private shareholders). Following government support, these shareholders agreed to strengthen and formalize their association with the central institution, expected to create a more robust banking group.

### Asset composition and quality
- At 2011Q4 the aggregate NPL ratio reached 15 percent (CESEE subsidiaries), with NPLs increasing throughout 2011; banks anticipated further deterioration in several CESEE countries during the remainder of 2012.
- Low coverage ratios (provisions/NPLs) in some subsidiaries indicate potential need for continued provisioning even as NPL growth turns negative.
- Concerns about asset quality in some CESEE loan books due to risk of evergreening and difficulties valuing collateral.
- Foreign currency loans in CESEE subsidiaries:
  - Declined for households, increased significantly for corporations (notably Romania and Russia).
  - Share of FX loans in CESEE declined by 1 percentage point to 47.5 percent in exchange-rate-adjusted terms in 2011.
- Exposures booked in Austria:
  - NPLs remain low domestically, but large share of Swiss franc-denominated loans to unhedged borrowers is a persistent concern.
  - At end-2012Q1, foreign-currency loans (FCLs) to Austrian non-banks amounted to EUR 56 bn (18.7 percent of GDP):
    - EUR 38 billion attributable to households;
    - EUR 12 billion to nonfinancial corporations;
    - EUR 3billion to the public sector.
  - FCLs to households represented almost 30 percent of loans to that category, consisted mostly of mortgages (73 percent), and were mostly denominated in Swiss francs.
  - Many of these loans are linked to repayment vehicles (RPV) and have bullet maturity; sizable loan vintages begin maturing in 2017, so full impact of Swiss franc appreciation will be felt later.
  - Stock of household foreign-currency loans (adjusted for exchange rate movements) is on a declining trend following supervisory measures and unfavorable exchange rate movements.
- OeNB June 2011 survey: funding gap for CHF-denominated RPV loans to households of EUR 4bn (or 19 percent of the amount due at maturity).
- Exposures of Austrian-owned banks to peripheral Euro Area countries with high risk premia amounted to 6.4 percent of GDP at end-2012Q1, concentrated in Italy.

### Funding and liquidity
- Aggregate liquidity situation comfortable; net financing gap largely covered by cumulated counterbalancing capacity.
- Banks’ liquidity position became more conservative recently, reflecting increased reliance on Euro system operations through two 3-year LTROs (December 2011 and February 2012).
  - Total allotted LTRO volume at end-May 2012 represented 1.3 percent of the EA-wide allotted volume.
- OeNB survey motives for LTRO participation: (i) increasing liquidity buffers amid funding market uncertainty; (ii) substituting more expensive funding sources; (iii) funding lending activities.
- Banks improved net position on the unsecured interbank market and shifted issuances from unsecured funding towards covered bonds.
- Foreign-currency liquidity:
  - US dollar position well covered by USD/EUR swap arrangement between ECB and US Federal Reserve.
  - Unbalanced CHF positions are legacy of past Swiss franc lending growth financed by short-term FX-swaps.
  - Banks, pressured by authorities, lengthened funding tenors in EUR/CHF swap market, diversified counterparties and instruments, sought access to Swiss National Bank tender operations, and posted sufficient collateral to withstand FX-swap funding shocks.

### Intra-group funding and deleveraging in CESEE
- Intra-group liquidity transfers to CESEE subsidiaries declined by about EUR 7 billion from a peak of EUR 48 billion at end-June 2011 to the end-2012Q1 level.
- Local deposits attracted by subsidiaries increased by a similar amount, leaving loan portfolio size stable in aggregate; no aggregate reduction in credit supplied by subsidiaries in the region.
- Recent exposure reductions concentrated on Hungary and largely driven by the foreign currency loan early redemption scheme.
- Supervisory tool: Loan-to-Local-Stable-Funding-Ratio (LLSFR) monitoring introduced for sustainability of three large Austrian banks’ growth model in CESEE.
  - First LLSFR exercise (end-2012Q1 data): 15 subsidiaries out of 42 had a stock-LLSFR above the 110 threshold.
  - These 15 subsidiaries represented 22 percent of total assets in subsidiaries.
  - Flow-LLSFR sustainability to be determined using year-on-year data; follow-up for subsidiaries above threshold to take place via supervisory colleges.

### Stress testing
- OeNB performs regular stress tests; liquidity indicators monitored and stress-tested frequently via weekly forward-looking liquidity reporting since late 2008.
- Macroeconomic stress tests conducted twice a year for the consolidated Austrian banking system.
- Latest adverse scenario included: very severe recession plus risk-factor add-ons (haircuts on sovereign holdings of EA program countries, frontloaded Basel III risk-weights, greater profit distribution, small shock to cost of funding).
  - Over projection horizon 2011Q4-2013Q4, Core Tier I ratio of the banking system would fall from 9.9 percent to 8.5 percent without the add-ons.
  - With the add-ons, the Core Tier I ratio would remain significantly above the new phased-in Basel III minimum of 4.5 percent.
  - Each of the three largest banks would remain above the 7 percent full implementation Basel III minimum.

*Source: Annex I. Financial Sector Performance and Vulnerabilities (IMF staff).*

### 2.      Certain population groups are less involved in the labor market than their peers in Austria or

### _cr12251 - 2.      Certain population groups are less involved in the labor market than their peers in Austria or

### Labor market participation gaps — key findings
- Certain groups are less involved in the labor market than their peers in Austria or in other countries: older workers, unskilled workers, and lower-income women with family responsibilities.
- The employment rate of older workers increased from 28.8 percent in 2004 to 41.5 percent in 2011, but remains relatively low compared with most OECD countries.
- The average effective retirement age during the 2004–09 period was 58.9 years for males and 57.5 years for females—both the second lowest ages in the OECD.
- In 2010:
  - 28 percent of new pensioners took “standard” retirement,
  - 41 percent benefited from an early retirement scheme,
  - 31 percent were granted a disability pension.
- Unemployment rates of low-skilled workers are high; low-skilled workers are concentrated among older workers, immigrants, women, and workers on non-standard contracts. The share of the low-skilled in the working-age population is diminishing.
- Female employment rate is in the top half of the OECD, but women are relatively more often working part time and are less likely to work when they have small children.

### Reasons — tax/benefit and institutional drivers
- Generous pension benefits and easy avenues to early retirement make work unattractive to older workers.
- High tax wedges curtail the financial benefit from entering employment from inactivity, especially for low-wage earners.
- The tax treatment of secondary wage earners and child care costs discourages participation.
- Low-income workers do not pay income taxes but are still subject to social security contributions (except for those at the very bottom of the wage distribution).
- Given relatively generous unemployment benefits and social assistance, the monetary gain from taking up employment is low, or even negative, for many people with low earning potential.
- The tax wedge on secondary earners is one of the highest in the OECD, partly because of sole-earner tax credits which are lost if a spouse takes up more than marginal employment.
- On the demand side, high minimum wages in many sectors and high employer contributions to social security may price low-skilled workers out of jobs.
- Labor supply of low-skilled, older workers, married women and single mothers is particularly sensitive to after-tax earnings.

### Pension and early retirement features
- Both gross and net replacement rates for average earners are among the highest across advanced economies.
- The statutory retirement age for women is 60 years—five years younger than for men and than what is typical for both males and females in the OECD.
- The early retirement penalty was raised from 3 percent to 4.2 percent in 2004 but remains below actuarially neutral adjustment.
- Several avenues facilitate early retirement, including a lax disability regime and the Hacklerregelung scheme (allows long-term contributors to retire earlier and permits purchasing contribution years under certain conditions).
- Disability pension criteria are relatively lax; a disproportionately large number of Austrians qualify.

### Recent reforms to discourage early retirement
- Price for purchasing contribution years under Hacklerregelung has been raised significantly.
- Starting with 2014:
  - ex post purchases of secondary and tertiary education years will no longer be counted as eligibility-creating contribution months,
  - eligibility for early retirement under Hacklerregelung will be raised by 2 years to 57 for women and 62 for men (largely eliminating its advantages relative to the standard corridor pension).
- The early retirement penalty under the corridor pension will be raised in 2017.
- Disability criteria have been tightened, with stricter evaluation (expanding beyond fitness only for the previous occupation) and mandatory rehabilitation before filing for a pension.
- Despite these reforms, a number of alternative avenues into early retirement remain open and incentives for older workers to stay in the labor force still appear lower than in most advanced economies.
- Note: The early retirement penalty under Hacklerregelung will remain at 4.2 percent.

### Possible solutions — policy recommendations
- Restrict avenues into early retirement and raise statutory retirement age:
  - Tighten eligibility criteria for disability pensions, including a stricter obligation to look for jobs in alternative occupations; complement with enhanced rehabilitation and workplace suitability improvements.
  - Continue reforms to reduce access to and generosity of various early retirement schemes; allow Hacklerregelung to expire.
  - Reevaluate rationale and eligibility for other early retirement avenues (e.g., for heavy working conditions, subsidized old-age part-time arrangements with front-loading).
  - Recognize that the early retirement penalty (and late retirement premium) under the corridor pension will remain below the actuarially neutral value even after planned increases in 2017.
  - Equalize the statutory retirement age for women with that of men sooner than current law envisages; link statutory retirement age to longevity.
  - Eliminate employment obstacles for older workers, e.g., collective bargaining practices stipulating higher wages for older employees.
- Reduce labor tax wedges, particularly for the low-skilled:
  - Rebalance taxation away from labor taxes toward less distortionary revenue sources; lower payroll taxes is the most direct approach.
  - Consider increasing consumption or property taxes (VAT or property taxation), noting Austria’s relatively low property taxes and some low excises (e.g., on alcohol).
  - Use expenditure cuts for compensation; over time consider lowering pension benefits commensurately with reductions in contributions given relatively high pension replacement rates.
  - Reduce social security costs for low-skilled workers (targeted cuts); increase in-work benefits for low-income workers to lower welfare traps.
  - Smooth very uneven distribution of marginal tax rates that can spike near 100 percent in some situations.

### Quantified impacts and simulations
- OECD analysis: employment rate in Austria could be raised by 2.4 percent within 10 years following a reduction of the average labor tax wedge to the level observed in the six OECD economies with the highest employment rate.
- IMF GIMF simulation experiment:
  - Experiment design:
    - The labor tax is reduced permanently by one percent of GDP.
    - Government transfers are lowered by the equivalent amount to keep the experiment budget-neutral.
    - The reduction in the labor tax corresponds approximately to a cut in the rate of social security contributions by 3 percentage points.
  - GIMF model description: micro-founded, non-Ricardian, multi-country, dynamic general equilibrium model; features optimizing consumers, realistic trade and production structure, and a variety of fiscal instruments.
  - Main simulation outcomes:
    - Real GDP increases relative to the baseline, with potential output higher by 0.8 percent in the steady state.
    - Private consumption increases above the baseline over time.
    - Trade and current account balances improve marginally, mostly thanks to stronger exports.
    - Long-run impact varies by financing option:
      - If financed by a cut in government transfers (baseline experiment): steady-state real GDP gain about 0.8 percent.
      - If instead financed by an increase in property taxes: results would likely not change materially.
      - If government consumption is cut or the consumption tax is raised to finance the labor tax cut: the long-term impact of the labor tax reduction declines by about a third to about 0.5 percent of GDP.
- Joint OECD/Institute for Advanced Studies study:
  - Halving employer social security contributions for workers in the bottom quintile of wage distribution (with budgetary impact offset by spending cuts) would increase low-skilled employment by about 1 percent and GDP by about a quarter percent.

### Simulation figures and model implications
- A permanent reduction in labor taxes by one percent of GDP (offset by transfer cuts) corresponds approximately to a 3 percentage point cut in social security contribution rates and raises steady-state real GDP by 0.8 percent.
- Financing the labor tax cut by raising consumption taxes or cutting government consumption reduces the long-term GDP gain by about one third (to about 0.5 percent).
- Lower payroll taxes stimulate investment and work effort, increasing saving, investment, exports, and private consumption relative to baseline over time.

*Source: IMF staff report text (2012 Article IV Report — Austria).*

### 1.      This statement provides information that has become available since the Staff

### _cr12251 - 1.      This statement provides information that has become available since the Staff

### New information since the Staff Report
- The information became available after the Staff Report (SM/12/207) was circulated to the Executive Board on August 2, 2012 and does not alter the thrust of the staff appraisal.
- Revised quarterly GDP series:
  - Growth in 2012Q1 revised from 0.3 percent (qoq) to 0.5 percent (qoq).
  - Q2 flash estimate: 0.2 percent (qoq), driven by a reduction of the external growth contribution to zero and somewhat weaker domestic consumption.
- Outlook implications:
  - Weak external environment suggests deceleration in the second half of 2012 may continue and could be stronger than originally envisaged.
  - Annual growth for 2012 is likely somewhat higher than the 0.8 percent in the staff report.
  - Growth prospects for 2013 may have worsened given the overall external environment.
- Inflation:
  - July inflation reading: 2.1 percent (down from 2.2 percent in June).

### Economic performance and outlook
- 2011 performance and labor market:
  - Growth in 2011: 2.7 percent (year as a whole), mainly driven by investment.
  - Employment growth and limited slack; unemployment reached 4.2 percent in 2011 (lowest rate in the euro area).
  - Negotiated wage growth accelerated to above 3 percent.
- External sector and exchange rates:
  - Current account after peaking in 2008 at 5 percent of GDP narrowed to 1.9 percent of GDP in 2011.
  - Imports boosted by high energy prices; exports as share of GDP remained below 2008 record.
  - Real and nominal exchange rates broadly stable in 2011.
  - Global export market share continued its trend decline.
- Short-term outlook (authorities’ view):
  - First half 2012 growth: 0.5% in Q1 and 0.2% in Q2 (qoq).
  - Authorities’ current estimate for 2012 growth: 0.6% for the year as a whole.
  - Main risks: further intensification of the euro area crisis and spillovers to CESEE; upward risk if uncertainty abates more quickly.
  - Austrian sovereign bonds regarded as a safe haven; spreads over German Bunds declining since start of year; long-term interest rates at historically low levels.

### Fiscal position and consolidation
- Recent fiscal outcomes:
  - 2011 deficit: 2.6 percent of GDP.
  - 2012 deficit likely partly reversed to some 3 percent of GDP due to slowing growth and significantly higher support to troubled medium-sized banks.
  - General government gross debt: 72 percent of GDP (2011), up from a pre-crisis level of 60 percent of GDP.
- Policy framework and reforms:
  - Adoption of a strong medium-term consolidation strategy balancing fiscal prudence and growth considerations.
  - Introduction of a “debt brake” restricting general government structural deficit to 0.45% of GDP from 2017.
  - Consolidation package aimed at reducing structural deficit to 0.4% of GDP by 2016 and placing debt ratio on a strictly downward path from 2013 onwards.
  - Authorities commit to implement necessary reforms in health care and subsidies with regional governments from 2014 onwards.
  - Strengthening of sanctioning mechanism in the Domestic Stability Pact; extension of the “debt brake” and main elements of reformed EU fiscal surveillance to state and local levels.
- Fiscal risks and margins:
  - Baseline scenario close to Stability Program projections; yield of some revenue measures in 2012 and 2013 uncertain.
  - Safety margins in budget plans (e.g., interest expenditure in 2012 likely lower than budgeted) that could compensate possible revenue shortfalls.
  - Authorities emphasize fair burden distribution without increasing mass taxes; where taxes raised, focus on broadening base and high-income groups to avoid increasing labor taxes.

### Banking sector, external exposures, and macroprudential policy
- Bank performance and pressures:
  - Banks’ profitability in 2011 suffered from deterioration of loan quality in several CESEE countries and losses on securities portfolios.
  - Return on assets fell sharply during 2011, including losses from the Greek private sector involvement.
  - Large write-downs on goodwill and continued provisioning for non-performing loans were necessary.
  - Hungary’s scheme to help borrowers indebted in foreign currency caused sizable losses for Austrian banks.
- Funding and exposures:
  - In 2011 Austrian banks increased reliance on central bank funding and cut external positions, focusing cuts on markets other than Austria and CESEE (notably euro area periphery), though exposure to Italy remains significant.
  - Wholesale funding dependence is low in European comparison; sector exhibits below-average reliance on central bank funding compared to other euro area banks.
  - Recent trends: reduced exposures to euro area high-risk-premium countries; large and diversified foreign exposure to CESEE remained broadly stable and increased in many countries on an FX- and provisions-adjusted basis.
  - Large Austrian banks continue commitment to CESEE, but CESEE has become increasingly heterogeneous in risks and returns.
- Capital, prudential measures, and guidance:
  - Large banks that participated in the EBA recap exercise were able to meet Core Tier 1 capital requirements as of end-June 2012, but capital position remains below average compared to international peers.
  - Priority: further strengthen risk-bearing capacity before engaging in further growth.
  - Authorities agree further CESEE expansion should be funded more by local stable funding sources.
  - “Sustainability Package” (macro-prudential guidelines) published March 2012 by FMA and OeNB aims to strengthen capital base, liquidity, and business model sustainability.
  - Specific measures based on guidelines to be set only after consulting host authorities in supervisory college cooperation.
  - Plans to strengthen early intervention and resolution tools in banking system in line with international best practices.
- Credit risk:
  - Credit risks continue to exert significant drag on profitability; NPL ratios in many CESEE parts continued to increase during second half of 2011, particularly in foreign-currency loan segment.
  - In Austria, large stock of foreign currency loans and repayment vehicle loans poses a medium-term challenge, conditional on EUR-CHF exchange rate behavior.
  - Guiding principles on foreign-currency lending being harmonized with respective ESRB recommendations.
  - From 2013 onwards, Pillar 2 measures may be applied to cover risks from existing funding gaps in repayment vehicle loans.

### Executive Board assessment and recommendations
- Executive Directors’ appraisal:
  - Commended authorities for strong economic performance and for wage growth and low unemployment supporting domestic demand.
  - Agreed that intensification of the euro area crisis is the main risk to the economy.
  - Policies should focus on preserving market confidence, increasing resilience against adverse external spillovers, and boosting long-term growth.
- Recommendations and priorities:
  - Clearly identify measures underlying envisaged structural adjustment and prepare contingency plans in case further support is needed for nationalized or partly nationalized medium-sized banks.
  - Encourage additional steps to contain aging costs due to long implementation lags of related reforms.
  - Comprehensive reform of fiscal federalism needed to streamline intra-governmental financial arrangements and provide stronger incentives for rule compliance to sub-national governments.
  - Prompt definition of a strategy for more efficient disposal of legacy assets in government-supported medium-sized banks.
  - Use macroprudential guidelines: capital surcharge, recovery and resolution plans, and greater reliance on local stable funding by foreign subsidiaries.
  - Monitor compliance with guidelines in close cooperation with host supervisors.
  - Encourage reforms to strengthen work incentives, including equalization of male and female retirement ages and reduction of tax burden on labor; potential fiscal revenue losses could be compensated by increasing less distortionary taxes.

### Key statistics and selected indicators (2007–13, as presented)
- Basic country figures:
  - Total area: 83,850 square kilometers
  - Total population (2011): 8.4 million
  - GDP per capita (2011): US$ 49,818  (35,868 Euro)
- GDP and demand (change in percent):
  - GDP: 2007: 3.7; 2008: 1.4; 2009: -3.8; 2010: 2.1; 2011: 2.7; 2012: 0.8; 2013: 1.8
  - Total domestic demand: 2.5; 0.7; -2.0; 1.8; 2.5; 0.9; 1.9
  - Consumption: 1.2; 1.6; 0.9; 1.3; 0.5; 0.8; 1.2
  - Gross fixed capital formation: 3.6; 0.7; -7.8; 0.8; 7.3; 1.5; 3.2
  - Net exports (growth contribution in pp): 1.4; 0.8; -2.3; 0.4; 0.4; 0.0; 0.1
  - Exports of goods and nonfactor services: 8.9; 1.4; -15.6; 8.7; 7.2; 2.0; 4.0
  - Imports of goods and nonfactor services: 7.1; 0.0; -13.3; 8.8; 7.2; 2.1; 4.3
  - Output gap (percent of potential GDP): 3.7; 3.3; -2.3; -2.0; -0.8; -1.5; -1.2
- Employment and unemployment:
  - Employment growth: 1.9; 1.3; -1.5; 0.6; 1.8; 0.6; 0.6
  - Registered unemployment (national definition): 6.2; 5.8; 7.2; 6.9; 6.7; 6.8; 6.8
  - Standardized (Eurostat) unemployment rate: 4.4; 3.8; 4.8; 4.4; 4.2; 4.3; 4.3
- Prices:
  - Consumer price index (period average): 2.2; 3.2; 0.4; 1.7; 3.6; 2.3; 1.9
- General government finances (percent of GDP):
  - Revenue: 47.6; 48.3; 48.5; 48.1; 48.0; 48.6; 48.7
  - Expenditure: 48.6; 49.3; 52.6; 52.6; 50.6; 51.6; 50.5
  - Balance (EDP-definition): -0.9; -0.9; -4.1; -4.5; -2.6; -3.0; -1.8
  - Structural Balance: -2.6; -2.4; -3.0; -3.0; -2.0; -1.6; -1.3
  - Gross debt (end of period): 60.2; 63.8; 69.2; 71.8; 72.3; 74.6; 74.3
- Balance of payments:
  - Trade balance (goods) (in billion euro): 1.3; -0.6; -2.4; -3.2; -7.0; -8.1; -8.5
  - Current account (in billion euro): 9.6; 13.8; 7.5; 8.6; 5.9; 5.2; 5.3
  - Current account (In percent of GDP): 3.5; 4.9; 2.7; 3.0; 1.9; 1.7; 1.7

*Source: IMF staff report and PIN materials as presented in the content unit.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/_cr12251.pdf_
