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### Mission, scope, and context
- Prepared by the Monetary and Capital Markets and Middle East and Central Asia Departments; Approved by José Viñals and Masood Ahmed; dated June 30, 2011.
- FSAP Update mission visited Riyadh during April 16–30, 2011; findings discussed further during Article IV consultation mission in May 2011.
- Focus: potential threats to financial system stability (banking and capital markets), effectiveness of regulatory and supervisory framework, and the financial safety net.
- Fund team: Karl Habermeier (mission chief), Åke Lönnberg, Étienne Yèhoué, Tahsin Saadi Sedik, Niklas Westelius; external experts Peter Hayward and Martin Kinsky. Assessment conducted jointly with a World Bank team. Main authors: Karl Habermeier and Åke Lönnberg.

### Key findings
- Saudi Arabia confronted the global financial crisis from a position of strength and took decisive steps to manage the impact.
- Authorities strengthened the government balance sheet and enhanced financial sector resilience before the crisis, leaving sufficient fiscal space to reduce crisis impact.
- The initial effect of regional political instability has been contained.
- Progress implementing 2004 FSAP recommendations: substantial steps to strengthen bank and securities regulation and supervision.
- Banking sector: well capitalized; aggregate solvency ratio remains above 8 percent for almost all individual shocks considered.
- Vulnerability: banking system could be vulnerable to a large and prolonged oil price decline, especially if accompanied by a slowdown in domestic activity; such a scenario could leave the banking system insolvent, though recapitalization cost would be modest in macroeconomic terms.
- Compliance with standards and codes: generally high; SAMA introduced Basel II, used Pillar 2 requirements, introduced risk-based approaches in supervision, and has been active in introducing new Basel III requirements.
- Capital Market Authority (CMA): strong regulatory program implementing most international standards rapidly.
- Payments/securities settlement: many critical aspects covered in existing legal frameworks, though no comprehensive payment systems law.
- Substantial reforms underway to promote mortgage and SME lending while maintaining financial stability.

### Key recommendations (summary)
- Bank and securities regulation
  - Update the Banking Control Law (BCL) and remove requirement for ministerial approval of certain SAMA decisions.
  - No longer allow large exposures up to 50 percent of banks’ own funds.
  - Broaden the definition of related parties in bank lending.
  - Strengthen CMA transparency by fully disclosing all enforcement actions, interpretations, and funding rules.
- Systemic stability
  - Introduce a formal liquidity forecasting framework.
  - Enhance data on cross-border financial activities of banks and corporates.
  - Maintain a stable stock of government securities and regular issues to anchor a robust yield curve.
  - Introduce a payment systems law.
  - Conduct stress tests with a wider range of shocks, including liquidity shocks, regularly and incorporate lessons into supervision.
  - Establish a formal early warning system for the banking sector.
  - Develop a more formal and transparent macroprudential policy framework.
  - Strengthen legal framework for bank resolution.
- Expanding access to finance and preserving financial stability
  - For housing finance: ensure loan soundness via strong prudential measures, notably lowering permissible loan-to-value and debt service ratios.
  - Contract banks to manage existing and new Real Estate Development Fund (REDF) portfolios.
  - Complement mortgage reform with a housing market observatory, consumer guidance, and stronger developer industry.
  - Prepare long-term funding solutions for mortgage finance, starting with a refinance facility.
  - Create a modern, electronic, and unified registry for movable collateral.
  - Enact and implement the draft Enforcement Law introducing specialized enforcement courts with strict time-bound procedures.
  - Closely supervise quality of SME units in banks, including robustness of internal rating systems and automated procedures.
- Insurance, institutional investors, and capital markets
  - Finalize and issue outstanding functional regulations for insurance.
  - Improve enforcement of mandatory motor third party liability insurance.
  - Disclose investment policies, portfolios, and portfolio performance of the Public Pension Agency (PPA) and General Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI).
  - Further outsource management of PPA and GOSI portfolios.
  - Permit foreign institutional investors to invest directly in domestic equities.

### Risk assessment (selected highlights)
- A large and prolonged decline in the oil price
  - Likelihood (staff assessment): Low.
  - Expected impact (staff assessment): High.
  - Channels/effects: cuts in public expenditures, negative spillovers to non-oil growth, depressed potential output, lower growth, deterioration in corporate and banking sectors (increase in NPLs), possible bank insolvencies.
- A slowdown in non-oil GDP growth
  - Likelihood (staff assessment): Medium.
  - Expected impact (staff assessment): Medium.
  - Channels/effects: reduced credit demand and net interest margins, lower fee and trading income, weaker corporate and SME profits and employment, undermined loan quality, harder for banks to rebuild capital buffers.
- Deposit run
  - Likelihood (staff assessment): Low.
  - Expected impact (staff assessment): Medium.
  - Context: demand and short-term time deposits represent a large share of Saudi banks’ funding; in August 1990 the banking system lost 11 percent of customer deposits in one week after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
  - Effects: fire sale of assets, SAMA liquidity injections, foreign reserves losses due to increased demand for foreign currency.
- Regulatory uncertainty
  - Likelihood (staff assessment): Medium.
  - Expected impact (staff assessment): Medium.
  - Concerns: regulatory reform might proceed slowly or be poorly coordinated across sectors, potentially slowing lending or pushing activities into less well managed channels.

### Institutional and legal priorities
- Legal framework, notably the BCL, needs revisions to provide SAMA formal independence envisaged in international standards.
- Authorities may prefer issuing regulations to clarify SAMA’s powers rather than amending law.
- Stronger regulation and supervision needed for bank lending to large corporate groups (large exposures and related party lending).
- Formalizing and strengthening systemic liquidity management, safety nets, and resolution frameworks recommended; establish a formal legal framework for bank resolution.
- Strengthen stress testing and macroprudential policies: increase technical staff, conduct regular stress tests including liquidity shocks, and develop a formal, transparent macroprudential framework.

### Implementation horizon
- Most recommendations could be implemented over a horizon of a year or two.
- Recommendations requiring law amendments may take longer.
- Developing a more formal macroprudential framework may require more time as understanding evolves.
- Maintain SAMA’s capacity to ensure sound and efficient operation of the financial system.

### Pre-crisis fiscal and external strength
- Public debt declined from 104 percent of GDP in 1999 to about 13 percent in 2008.
- Net foreign asset position strengthened from 23 percent of GDP to 92 percent during the same period.
- During the oil boom, provisions for loan losses averaged 165 percent of NPLs and capital adequacy ratios (CARs) averaged 19 percent.
- Statutory minimum level of capital is 8 percent.

### SAMA crisis operations and liquidity measures (selected)
- Repo rate: cut by a cumulative 350 bps to 2 percent between October 2008 and January 2009.
- Reverse repo rate: cut by a cumulative 175 bps to 0.25 percent between December 2008 and June 2009.
- Reserve requirements on demand deposits: cut by a cumulative 600 bps in October and November 2008.
- Liquidity injection: Beginning in late 2008, $3 billion in local and foreign currency were placed in banks, and about $4 billion in swaps. Government agencies injected $4.8 billion in long-term time deposits.
- Liquidity withdrawal: SAMA withdrew its time deposits and government entities’ deposits with domestic banks, mostly by mid-2009.
- Authorities announced continued assurance of the safety of local banks and bank deposits, while indicating the statement should not be interpreted as an open-ended blanket guarantee.

### Macroeconomic impact and recovery
- Fiscal response: front-loaded large fiscal stimulus package in 2009.
- Real GDP: increased from 0.1 percent in 2009 to 4.1 percent in 2010.
  - Non-oil GDP growth: 3.5 percent in 2009; 4.9 percent in 2010.
- Oil prices fell by 36 percent in 2009.
- Oil production cuts of 8.7 percent in 2009.
- Inflation: peaked at 11.1 percent in July 2008; decelerated to 4.2 percent by end-2009; inflation increased to 4.8 percent in April 2011.

### Recent fiscal packages and implications (2011)
- Large fiscal packages announced on February 23, 2011 and March 18, 2011.
- Estimated total of packages: about SR 400 billion or $110 billion (19 percent of 2011 GDP).
  - Of this, an estimated SR 117 billion or $31 billion (5.5 percent of GDP) would likely be spent in 2011.
- Capital expenditures, particularly housing-related, expected to pick up slowly and be spread over several years.
- Fiscal indicators:
  - Non-oil primary deficit increased from 40 percent of non-oil GDP in 2004 to 71 percent in 2010; projected to reach 81 percent in 2011.
  - Break-even oil price for 2011 estimated at $80/barrel (higher if oil production is below the 9.3 million barrels per day projected), rising to $98/barrel by 2016.

### Inflation and liquidity drivers
- Global food prices expected to increase by 22 percent in 2011.
- U.S. monetary policy remains accommodative; under the exchange rate peg this creates a low interest rate environment in Saudi Arabia.
- Housing prices continue to rise due to supply shortages and pent up demand.
- Recent cash transfers (two month salary bonuses for public servants, matched by some private firms) injected additional liquidity: reflected in a sharp decline in the loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio and continued high level of deposits (particularly demand deposits) held by commercial banks at SAMA.

### Financial system structure and key indicators
- Banking sector
  - As of December 2010: 23 licensed banks, of which 20 were active.
  - 12 Saudi incorporated banks whose assets account for 98 percent of banking system assets, or more than half of total financial system assets and 85 percent of GDP.
  - Three largest banks together have a share of assets and deposits of about 45 percent; each of the next four has a share exceeding 5 percent.
  - Two new banks licensed in mid-2000s account for only 3 percent of banking assets; foreign branches have a 2 percent market share.
- Specialized Credit Institutions (SCIs)
  - Five public SCIs owned by the Ministry of Finance; not supervised by SAMA or the CMA.
  - SCI assets account for 14 percent of total financial system assets; their loan portfolios represent 24 percent of bank credit to the private sector.
  - Government injections: SR 10 billion into one SCI in 2010; subsequently announced additional SR 70 billion into two SCIs (close to 20 percent of total SCI assets).
- Public pension funds
  - Two public pension funds with combined assets of 46 percent of GDP.
  - PPA manages public workers scheme; GOSI manages private workers scheme. Both operate defined-benefit plans financed primarily on a pay-as-you-go basis and partially pre-funded.
- Other NBFIs and capital markets
  - Insurance sector: premia and assets of 1 percent and 1.5 percent of GDP in 2010.
  - Mutual funds combined assets: 6 percent of GDP (60 percent money market funds).
  - Listed companies: 146 listed companies with market capitalization of about 80 percent of GDP as of end-2010.
    - Market capitalization dominated by financial companies (27.6 percent), petrochemicals (36.6 percent), telecoms (9.9 percent).
  - Fixed income markets remain undeveloped; outstanding government debt low (10 percent of GDP in 2010); sporadic corporate bond and sukuk issues; mortgage finance package pending.

### Selected macro-financial figures (selected)
- Crude oil production (million of barrels per day): 2005: 9.4; 2006: 9.2; 2007: 8.8; 2008: 9.2; 2009: 8.4; 2010: 8.4; 2011 (Proj.): 9.3.
- Average oil export price (in U.S. dollars per barrel): 2005: 50.96; 2006: 61.46; 2007: 68.09; 2008: 93.05; 2009: 59.27; 2010: 75.8; 2011 (Proj.): 101.9.
- Nominal GDP (in billions of Saudi riyals): 2005: 1,182.5; 2006: 1,335.6; 2007: 1,442.6; 2008: 1,786.1; 2009: 1,412.6; 2010: 1,679.1; 2011 (Proj.): 2,137.9.
- Nominal GDP (in billions of U.S. dollars): 2005: 315.8; 2006: 356.6; 2007: 385.2; 2008: 476.9; 2009: 377.2; 2010: 448.4; 2011 (Proj.): 570.9.
- Real GDP (percent change): 2005: 5.6; 2006: 3.2; 2007: 2.0; 2008: 4.2; 2009: 0.1; 2010: 4.1; 2011 (Proj.): 6.5.
- Consumer price index (all cities index): 2005: 0.6; 2006: 2.3; 2007: 4.1; 2008: 9.9; 2009: 5.1; 2010: 5.4; 2011 (Proj.): 6.0.
- Current account balance (in percent of GDP): 2005: 28.5; 2006: 27.8; 2007: 24.3; 2008: 27.8; 2009: 5.6; 2010: 14.9; 2011 (Proj.): 20.1.
- SAMA's total net foreign assets (in billions): 2005: 150.5; 2006: 221.4; 2007: 301.3; 2008: 438.5; 2009: 405.9; 2010: 441.0; 2011 (Proj.): 535.4.
- SAMA's net foreign assets in months of imports of goods and services (Next 12 months): 2005: 15.7; 2006: 18.1; 2007: 20.1; 2008: 31.9; 2009: 27.5; 2010: 25.1; 2011 (Proj.): 27.3.
- Central government's gross domestic debt (in percent of GDP): 2005: 38.9; 2006: 27.3; 2007: 18.5; 2008: 13.2; 2009: 15.9; 2010: 9.9; 2011 (Proj.): 7.0.
- Non-oil primary deficit/Non-oil GDP: 2005: -46.2; 2006: -48.2; 2007: -55.8; 2008: -57.7; 2009: -67.6; 2010: -70.8; 2011 (Proj.): -80.7.

### Openness and cross-border financial linkages
- Foreign assets of the financial system (including SAMA) amount to over 130 percent of GDP.
- Foreign liabilities—almost exclusively in the banking system—are relatively small at 6 percent of GDP.
- Detailed data on cross-border financial linkages are not available; recommendation: develop better data on cross-border financial linkages.

### Banking sector performance and risks (selected indicators)
- Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets: 20.6 (2007), 16.0 (2008), 16.5 (2009), 17.7 (2010).
- Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets: 15.9 (2007), 14.1 (2008), 14.9 (2009), 15.3 (2010).
- Capital (net worth) to assets: 12.6 (2007), 13.3 (2008), 14.0 (2009), 14.5 (2010).
- NPLs to gross loans: 2.0 (2007), 1.3 (2008), 3.2 (2009), 3.0 (2010).
- Provisioning coverage of NPLs: about 116 percent in December 2010 (authorities’ statistical definition); raw data from SAMA shows a provisioning ratio of 90 percent.
- Loans accounted for 54 percent of banks’ aggregate balance sheet at end-2010; government bonds and treasury bills about 14 percent.
- Sectoral loan shares (2010): Manufacturing 12.1; Trade and Services 27.8; Energy and Minerals 3.3; Construction and Property 7.2; Households 30.7; Government 4.2; Other 8.4.
- Aggregate loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio: about 71 percent in December 2010. SAMA requires LTD below 85 percent (limit increased from 60 percent in September 2006).
- Liquid assets to total assets: 21.7 (2007), 22.8 (2008), 25.3 (2009), 24.7 (2010).
- Liquid assets to short-term liabilities: 41.4 (2007), 41.6 (2008), 40.0 (2009), 52.0 (2010).
- Customer deposits to total (noninterbank) loans: 124.4 (2007), 121.0 (2008), 128.6 (2009), 136.0 (2010).
- Profitability: ROA: 2.8 (2007), 2.7 (2008), 1.9 (2009), 2.0 (2010). ROE: 22.3 (2007), 20.5 (2008), 13.7 (2009), 13.6 (2010).

### Regulation and supervision — findings and recommendations
- Progress: introduction of Basel II, Pillar 2, risk-based supervision, expanded supervisory staffing to around 200 people, steps toward Basel III requirements.
- Legal changes suggested:
  - Remove requirement for government approval to license banks and impose sanctions, issue regulations, and conduct inspections.
  - Provide legal protection to supervisors.
  - Require SAMA approval for transfer of significant ownership.
  - Create a bank resolution framework.
  - Provide clear mandate for consolidated supervision.
  - Lift confidentiality requirements when necessary for supervisory information exchange.
- Licensing and contestability: publish detailed criteria for licensing new banks; withdraw requirement that new licensees should “add value.”
- Large exposures and related parties: consolidate risk management requirements; update market risk and internal control requirements; strengthen definition of related parties to include close family relationships; cap large exposures (suggested cap at 25 percent of capital; current practice allowed up to 50 percent and one large exposure stands at 38 percent of capital).
- Supervisory approach: complete transition to risk-based supervision (RBA); better define full-scope examination schedules; increase attention to branches of foreign banks; verify off-site reporting systematically; finalize draft MOU with CMA and develop written understandings with foreign supervisors.

### Stress tests — methodology and selected results
- Coverage: 12 Saudi incorporated banks representing 98 percent of banking sector total assets.
- Bank groups by size: large banks (4) assets more than SR 170 billion to less than SR 300 billion; medium-sized banks (3) assets above SR 100 billion but less than SR 130 billion; small banks (5) assets less than SR 60 billion.
- Aggregate pre-shock solvency ratio (All banks): 17.8 percent (de facto SAMA target 12 percent; regulatory minimum CAR 8 percent).
- Selected solvency outcomes (All banks solvency ratio in percent):
  - 1a Uniform 50 percent increase in NPLs: 16.8
  - 1b Uniform 100 percent increase in NPLs based on SAMA provisioning rate 100 percent: 15.8
  - 1c NPLs "category shift" (10 percent from "pass" to "doubtful and loss"): 16.5
  - 2a Single biggest corporate obligor default: 15.2
  - 2b Five biggest corporate obligors shift from "pass" to "NPL": 13.8
  - 3a 3 percent decline in non-oil growth: 17.2
  - 3b Oil prices decline by one standard ($25) deviation with a GDP growth rate of 1.5 percent: 17.5
  - 3c Oil prices decline to historical average of $40 with a GDP growth of 0 percent: 16.2
  - 3d Shock in (3c) permanent over 4 year horizon: 5.2 (8) — Capital gap to bring CAR to 8 percent as a percentage of GDP: 3.5
  - 3e Shock in (3c) permanent over 5 year horizon: -1.9 (9) — Capital gap to bring CAR to 8 percent as a percentage of GDP: 6.6
  - 3f Oil prices decline $17 with GDP growth rate of - 0.7 percent: 14.6 (1)
  - 3g Shock in (3d) permanent over 2 year horizon: 5.1 (8) — Capital gap to bring CAR to 8 percent as a percentage of GDP: 3.6
  - 4a Others or Consumer loans sector: Threshold default for systemic solvency risk (58 percent): 7.9 (5)
  - 4b General commerce sector: Threshold default for systemic solvency risk (77 percent): 7.9 (5)
  - 5a 200 basis point upward parallel shift of yield curve: 19.1
  - 5b 200 basis point downward parallel shift of yield curve: 17.7
  - 5c 400 basis point downward parallel shift of yield curve: 17.2
- Liquidity and combined shock results (All banks):
  - Initial liquidity ratios: LR(1) 55.0; LR(2) 33.5 (LR(2) minimum required 20 percent).
  - 6a General deposit run threshold for systemic risk: 17 percent.
    - LR(1) after shock: 37.6
    - LR(2) after shock: 19.9 (8)
    - LR(2) liquidity gap requiring SAMA's liquidity injection (millions SR): 63,282.0
    - Depletion of SAMA's net foreign exchange reserves due to increased foreign exchange demand (millions): $24,139.4
  - 6b General deposit run of 25 percent:
    - LR(1) after shock: 23.7
    - LR(2) after shock: 11.3 (9)
    - LR(2) liquidity gap requiring SAMA's liquidity injection (millions SR): 104,204.0
    - Depletion of SAMA's net foreign exchange reserves (millions): $35,499.2
  - 6c Short-term deposit run of 40 percent:
    - LR(1) after shock: 29.8
    - LR(2) after shock: 14.9 (7)
    - LR(2) liquidity gap requiring SAMA's liquidity injection (millions SR): 87,368.6
    - Depletion of SAMA's net foreign exchange reserves (millions): $31,037.7
- Profitability under market shocks (All banks):
  - Initial ROA: 2.0; ROA after 200 bps upward shift: 3.1; after 200 bps downward shift: 0.8; after 400 bps downward shift: -0.3.
  - Initial ROE: 13.6; ROE after 200 bps upward shift: 21.5; after 200 bps downward shift: 5.7; after 400 bps downward shift: -2.2.
- Combined macro scenarios:
  - Macro scenario A (shocks 3d, 6a, and 5a): CAR after scenario (All banks): 15.9 (1)
  - Macro scenario B (shocks 3e, 6a, and 5a): CAR after scenario (All banks): 6.4 (8)
- Interpretation: high capitalization allows withstanding most single-year shocks; prolonged and deep oil-price declines (permanent over multi-year horizons) and large deposit runs could produce multiple banks with CAR below 8 percent and sizable liquidity gaps requiring SAMA intervention.

### Vulnerability to severe and prolonged oil price declines (detailed)
- Scenario: 1999 shock (average oil price $17, GDP contraction -0.7 percent) lasting two years
  - Aggregate solvency ratio declines to 5.1 percent (below 8 percent minimum).
  - CAR for eight banks would decline below 8 percent.
  - Small banks most vulnerable.
- Scenario: oil prices decline to $40 with stagnant GDP lasting four years
  - Aggregate CAR declines to 5.2 percent.
  - Capital needed to bring CAR back to 8 percent: about 3.5 percent of GDP.
- Same shock lasting five years
  - Aggregate CAR declines to -1.9 percent.
  - New capital required to reestablish 8 percent minimum: about 6.6 percent of GDP.
  - Recapitalization costs manageable if macro policies are otherwise sound.
  - Small banks and domestic private banks most vulnerable.
- Sectoral thresholds:
  - “Other” (mainly consumer) loans: threshold nonperforming rate for systemic solvency risk: 58 percent.
  - General commerce loans: threshold nonperforming rate for systemic risk: 77 percent.
- Liquidity stress test thresholds:
  - Only when 17 percent of general deposits are withdrawn does regulatory liquidity ratio drop below 20 percent minimum for systemic risk.
  - For short-term deposits, threshold is 31 percent.
  - Historical benchmark: August 1990 deposit withdrawal was 11 percent of total customer deposits in one week.
- SAMA liquidity injection estimates:
  - 25 percent run on overall deposits requires liquidity injection about SR 104.2 billion; assuming 50 percent conversion to FX, SAMA’s net foreign assets decline about 8 percent (or $35.5 billion).
  - 40 percent run on short-term deposits corresponds to SAMA net foreign assets decline about 7 percent (or $31 billion).

### Liquidity management and market infrastructure
- System features: system-wide excess liquidity; limited interbank market activity; no primary dealer system; virtually no secondary market in government securities; no private repo market.
- Banks manage liquidity through global money markets and SAMA’s repo and reverse repo facilities.
- Central bank bills issued at maturities up to 52 weeks.
- SAMA lacks liquidity targets or a formal liquidity forecasting framework.
- Recommendations:
  - Develop deeper interbank market and formal liquidity forecasting framework.
  - Develop private interbank repo market, helped by sufficient supply of government securities and high quality private securities (e.g., covered bonds).
  - Coordinate debt management with MOF to maintain stable and adequate stock of government securities and anchor a robust yield curve.
  - MOF to provide SAMA timely and comprehensive cash flow projections.

### Payment and settlement systems
- National payment system: core RTGS is Saudi Arabian Riyal Interbank Express; high compliance with Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems.
- Legal framework covers many critical aspects but lacks a comprehensive payment systems law.
- Recommendation: enact a comprehensive payment systems law to provide explicit legal basis for emergency liquidity assistance to financial market infrastructures.

### Early warning, stress tests, and macroprudential policies
- Agencies lack formal early warning systems; recommendation: SAMA establish formal early warning system assembling multiple information sources.
- Stress testing recommendations:
  - More closely monitor banks’ risk management; develop contingency plan for prolonged oil price decline; conduct regular stress tests with wider range of shocks; add technical staff for stress testing.
- Macroprudential framework:
  - SAMA has history of macroprudential measures (restrictions on personal loans for stock purchases, debt service to income ratios, LTD ratio, reserve requirements).
  - Recommendation: elaborate macroprudential framework covering objectives, analytical methods, policy toolkit, and transparency; consider financial stability department and regular financial stability reports.

### Safety net arrangements and bank resolution
- Current approach: implicit but strong commitment to deposit safety and rigorous prevention of bank failures by SAMA; no explicit deposit insurance scheme nor formal bank resolution rules.
- Historical practice: no bank has ever failed; depositors and creditors have not suffered losses.
- Recommendation: review safety net and bank resolution approach in medium run; introduce formal bank resolution framework aligned with international initiatives to empower authorities to continue core operations temporarily, have shareholders absorb losses, pay off senior creditors at estimated recovery value, change management, and provide conservator flexibility; consider explicit deposit insurance with limited coverage.
- Emergency liquidity assistance (ELA): no ELA provided to any bank since 2002; SAMA determines ELA case-by-case and could consider specifying some terms in advance (e.g., ELA to solvent banks against adequate collateral) to limit moral hazard.

### Housing finance and mortgage-package reforms
- REDF portfolio SR 78 billion; REDF plagued by high delinquencies (half of the portfolio).
- Banks and mortgage finance companies grew housing portfolios at an annual rate of 22 percent from 2008 to 2010.
- Annual housing needs estimated at around 250,000 units over the medium term, compared to 80,000 permits delivered on a commercial basis.
- The five draft laws in the mortgage package expected to be approved in 2011 would:
  - lay the foundation for an efficient mortgage system;
  - create a consumer protection framework;
  - empower SAMA to regulate and supervise nondepository lenders;
  - establish framework for development of funding instruments (mortgage refinance facility, securitization, covered bonds).
- Additional measures needed:
  - new prudential norms (capital, provisioning);
  - housing market observatory including a price index;
  - consumer protection norms;
  - regulatory facilitation of new products and strengthening developer industry.
- REDF policy recommendations:
  - outsource servicing of REDF old and new loans to banks;
  - combine public resources with new bank lending under suitable risk-sharing arrangements;
  - explore ways to provide banks with long term funding matching maturity of new housing loans rather than guarantees.
  - Monitor asset-liability mismatches; consider cooperative structure; avoid creating distorted incentives like those in examples such as Fannie Mae.

### Finance to SMEs
- SME loans account for only 2 percent of total bank loans.
- 2010: government increased SIDF resources by SR 10 billion and made regulatory changes to make SME lending more attractive.
- Recommended policy steps:
  - SAMA supervise quality of banks’ new SME units and robustness of rating models, especially where automated loan processing is planned.
  - Strengthen financial infrastructure, notably develop registry for movable collateral.
  - Enforcement Law (part of mortgage package) will improve enforcement procedures, allow creation of special enforcement courts in major cities, and introduce time-bound foreclosure procedures.

### Securities markets, insurance, and pensions
- CMA regulation fully or broadly implements most of the IOSCO Principles. Capital Markets Law (CML) provides comprehensive regulatory authority.
- Recommendations for CMA: strengthen independence by amending CML to specify board members can be removed only for good cause; publish detailed annual report and financial statement; make all regulatory actions and disciplinary actions public; adopt IFRS as single national accounting standard for listed companies; amend Company Act and CML to establish single set of standards for listed companies.
- Limits on foreign investment: most foreigners may only invest in Saudi mutual funds, in the two listed ETFs, or purchase an equity swap from a Saudi broker. Recommendation: permit large qualified foreign institutional investors to register as direct investors.
- Insurance sector: small (premia 1 percent of GDP; assets 1.5 percent of GDP in 2010); regulatory framework improved; five functional regulations issued since 2008; four key regulations in consultation and three being drafted.
- Public pension funds: recommend disclose investment policies, total assets, portfolio composition, and returns; increase number of independent expert members on investment committees, especially PPA; share of short-term domestic assets may be excessive: 10 percent (PPA) and 15 percent (GOSI); further outsource management, especially for GOSI; consider introducing private defined contribution pension funds for expatriates.

### Implementation progress from the 2004 FSAP (selected)
- SAMA introduced detailed Basel II requirements; Saudi banks started implementing Basel II standardized approaches in 2008.
- Securitization, yield curve, and government securities market: recent government securities trading hindered by redemption of government bonds; no yield curve; no primary dealer framework introduced given active redemption of government bonds.
- Market infrastructure: comprehensive mortgage package being finalized; draft laws close to final approval.
- SCIs and public funds: balance sheets disclosed in SAMA’s quarterly bulletin, but disclosure of operations, strategies, and investment policies insufficient.
- SIDF: provides lending at concessional rates, charges fees to cover monitoring costs, does not report NPLs; SIDF follow-up and monitoring considered more intrusive and stricter than for commercial banks.
- Enforcement of collateral: expected to be substantially improved by Enforcement Law (part of mortgage finance package), which needs Council of Ministers approval after Shura Council.

*International Monetary Fund — Financial System Stability Assessment Update: Saudi Arabia (June 30, 2011).*

### 2011. The views expressed in this document are those of the staff team and do not necessarily reflect

### Financial System Stability Assessment Update — Saudi Arabia (June 30, 2011)

### Mission, scope, and context
- Prepared by the Monetary and Capital Markets and Middle East and Central Asia Departments; Approved by José Viñals and Masood Ahmed; dated June 30, 2011.
- The FSAP Update was based primarily on a mission that visited Riyadh during April 16–30, 2011, and findings were discussed further during the Article IV consultation mission in May 2011.
- The mission focused on potential threats to financial system stability, particularly in banking and capital markets, and the effectiveness of the regulatory and supervisory framework and the financial safety net.
- The Fund team comprised Karl Habermeier (mission chief), Åke Lönnberg, Étienne Yèhoué, Tahsin Saadi Sedik, and Niklas Westelius; and Peter Hayward and Martin Kinsky (external experts). The assessment was conducted jointly with a World Bank team. Main authors: Karl Habermeier and Åke Lönnberg.

### Key findings
- Saudi Arabia confronted the global financial crisis from a position of strength and took decisive steps to manage the impact of the crisis.
- The authorities strengthened the government balance sheet and enhanced the financial sector’s resilience in the years before the crisis, leaving sufficient fiscal space to substantially reduce the impact of the crisis.
- The initial effect of the recent political instability in the region has also been contained.
- Progress has been made implementing the 2004 FSAP recommendations, notably substantial steps to strengthen bank and securities regulation and supervision.
- The banking sector as a whole is well capitalized and appears able to withstand severe temporary shocks; the aggregate solvency ratio remains above 8 percent for almost all individual shocks considered.
- The banking system could be vulnerable to a large and prolonged oil price decline, especially if accompanied by a slowdown in domestic economic activity; such a scenario could leave the banking system insolvent, though the cost of recapitalization would be modest in macroeconomic terms.
- Compliance with standards and codes is generally high; SAMA introduced Basel II, used Pillar 2 requirements to foster improvements in banks’ risk management and capital planning, introduced risk-based approaches in supervision, and has been active in introducing new Basel III requirements.
- The Capital Market Authority (CMA) has developed a strong regulatory program that fully implements most international standards in a short period.
- Many critical aspects related to payment and securities settlement systems are covered in existing legal frameworks, though there is no comprehensive payment systems law.
- Substantial reform is underway to promote mortgage and SME lending to expand mortgage and SME lending while maintaining financial stability.

### Key recommendations (summary)
- Bank and securities regulation
  - Update the Banking Control Law (BCL) and remove the need for ministerial approval of certain SAMA decisions.
  - No longer allow large exposures up to 50 percent of banks’ own funds.
  - Broaden the definition of related parties in bank lending.
  - Strengthen the CMA’s regulatory transparency by fully disclosing all enforcement actions, interpretations, and funding rules.
- Systemic stability
  - Introduce a formal liquidity forecasting framework.
  - Enhance data on cross-border financial activities of banks and corporates.
  - Maintain a stable stock of government securities and regular issues to help anchor a robust yield curve.
  - Introduce a payment systems law.
  - Conduct stress tests with a wider range of shocks, including liquidity shocks, on a regular basis and incorporate lessons into supervision.
  - Establish a formal early warning system for the banking sector.
  - Develop a more formal and transparent macroprudential policy framework, drawing on work in international fora.
  - Strengthen the legal framework for bank resolution.
- Expanding access to finance and preserving financial stability
  - As housing finance expands, ensure loan soundness through strong prudential measures, notably lowering permissible loan-to-value and debt service ratios.
  - Contract banks to manage both the existing and the new Real Estate Development Fund (REDF) portfolios.
  - Complement mortgage reform by establishing a housing market observatory, developing consumer guidance options, and strengthening the developer industry.
  - Prepare long-term funding solutions for mortgage finance, starting with a refinance facility.
  - Create a modern, electronic, and unified registry for movable collateral.
  - Enact and implement the draft Enforcement Law that introduces specialized enforcement courts operating with strict time-bound procedures.
  - Closely supervise the quality of SME units in the banks, including the robustness of their internal rating systems and automated procedures.
- Insurance, institutional investors, and capital markets
  - Finalize and issue the outstanding functional regulations for insurance.
  - Improve enforcement of mandatory motor third party liability insurance.
  - Disclose the investment policies, portfolios, and portfolio performance of the Public Pension Agency (PPA) and General Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI).
  - Further outsource the management of the portfolios of the PPA and GOSI.
  - Permit foreign institutional investors to invest directly in domestic equities.

### Risk assessment (selected highlights)
- A large and prolonged decline in the oil price
  - Likelihood (staff assessment): Low.
  - Expected impact (staff assessment): High.
  - Channels and effects: A large decline would lead to cuts in public expenditures, negative spillovers to non-oil growth, depressed potential output, lower growth, deterioration in corporate and banking sectors (increase in NPLs), and could lead to bank insolvencies.
- A slowdown in non-oil GDP growth
  - Likelihood (staff assessment): Medium.
  - Expected impact (staff assessment): Medium.
  - Channels and effects: Slower GDP growth would reduce credit demand and net interest margins, possibly reduce fee and trading income, weaken corporate and SME profits and employment, undermine loan quality, and make it harder for banks to rebuild capital buffers.
- Deposit run
  - Likelihood (staff assessment): Low.
  - Expected impact (staff assessment): Medium.
  - Context and precedent: Demand and short-term time deposits represent a large share of Saudi banks’ funding; in August 1990 the banking system lost 11 percent of customer deposits in one week after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
  - Effects: Fire sale of assets, SAMA liquidity injections, foreign reserves losses due to increased demand for foreign currency consequent to liquidity injections.
- Regulatory uncertainty
  - Likelihood (staff assessment): Medium.
  - Expected impact (staff assessment): Medium.
  - Concerns: Regulatory reform (housing, SME, capital markets) might proceed more slowly than expected or be inadequately coordinated across sectors, potentially slowing needed lending or pushing activities into less well managed channels.

### Institutional and legal priorities
- Although bank supervision and regulation are highly effective in practice, the legal framework (notably the BCL) is not fully up to date; revisions are needed mainly to provide SAMA with the formal independence envisaged in international standards.
- Authorities may prefer issuing new regulations to clarify and solidify SAMA’s powers rather than amending the law given institutional context.
- Addressing bank lending to large corporate groups requires stronger regulation and supervision of large exposures and related party lending.
- Formalizing and strengthening systemic liquidity management, safety nets, and resolution frameworks is needed to enhance market discipline; a formal legal framework for bank resolution should be established.
- Stress testing and macroprudential policies should be further strengthened: increase staff with technical backgrounds, conduct regular stress tests including liquidity shocks, and develop a formal, transparent macroprudential policy framework.

### Implementation horizon
- Most recommendations could be implemented over a horizon of a year or two.
- Recommendations requiring law amendments may take longer.
- Developing a more formal macroprudential framework may require more time as understanding evolves.
- It is crucial to maintain SAMA’s capacity to ensure the sound and efficient operation of the financial system.

*International Monetary Fund — Financial System Stability Assessment Update: Saudi Arabia (June 30, 2011).*

### 1. Saudi Arabia confronted the global financial crisis from a position of strength. In

### 1. Saudi Arabia confronted the global financial crisis from a position of strength. In

### Pre-crisis fiscal and external strength
- Public debt declined from 104 percent of GDP in 1999 to about 13 percent in 2008.
- Net foreign asset position strengthened from 23 percent of GDP to 92 percent during the same period.
- During the oil boom, provisions for loan losses averaged 165 percent of NPLs and capital adequacy ratios (CARs) averaged 19 percent.
- The statutory minimum level of capital is 8 percent.

### SAMA operations to shore up financial confidence
- Liquidity provision consistent with the peg to the U.S. dollar: injections in Saudi Arabian riyals (SR) and in dollars; policy rates and reserve requirements were lowered; authorities announced continued assurance of the safety of local banks and bank deposits.
- As confidence returned, most extraordinary liquidity support was unwound.

Box 1 — Measures in Response to Global Crisis (selected)
- Interest rate cuts and reduction in reserve requirements
  - Repo rate: cut by a cumulative 350 bps to 2 percent between October 2008 and January 2009.
  - Reverse repo rate: cut by a cumulative 175 bps to 0.25 percent between December 2008 and June 2009.
  - Reserve requirements on demand deposits: cut by a cumulative 600 bps in October and November 2008.
- Liquidity injections/withdrawals
  - Liquidity injection: Beginning in late 2008, $3 billion in local and foreign currency were placed in banks, and about $4 billion in swaps. Government agencies injected $4.8 billion in long-term time deposits.
  - Liquidity withdrawal: SAMA withdrew its time deposits and government entities’ deposits with domestic banks, mostly by mid-2009.
- Safety of bank deposits
  - Authorities announced continued assurance of the safety of local banks and bank deposits, while indicating the statement should not be interpreted as an open-ended blanket guarantee.

### Macroeconomic impact and recovery
- Fiscal response: Authorities front-loaded a large fiscal stimulus package in 2009.
- Real GDP: increased from 0.1 percent in 2009 to 4.1 percent in 2010.
  - Non-oil GDP growth: 3.5 percent in 2009; 4.9 percent in 2010.
- Oil sector effects:
  - Oil prices fell by 36 percent in 2009.
  - Oil production cuts of 8.7 percent in 2009.
- Inflation:
  - Peaked at 11.1 percent in July 2008; decelerated to 4.2 percent by end-2009.
  - Inflation increased to 4.8 percent in April 2011.

### Financial system impact of the crisis
- Banks’ exposure to mortgage backed securities and other securitized assets: 3 percent of total assets at the onset of the crisis.
- Saudi interbank market stress: spread between the Saudi interbank offered rate and the reverse repo rate increased to over 200 basis points in October 2008; confidence restored after swift SAMA action.
- Main impact via banking sector exposure to defaults of two family conglomerates; banks absorbed losses without signs of significant impairment, but episode highlighted need for greater transparency and stricter auditor accountability.
- Dubai World spillovers (November 2009): negligible for Saudi Arabia
  - Saudi banking sector exposure estimated at 0.2 percent of total assets.

### Recent fiscal packages and implications (2011)
- Large fiscal packages announced on February 23, 2011 and March 18, 2011: include public sector wage increases, expansion in public employment, unemployment benefits, and measures to improve access to housing.
- Estimated total of packages: about SR 400 billion or $110 billion (19 percent of 2011 GDP).
  - Of this, an estimated SR 117 billion or $31 billion (5.5 percent of GDP) would likely be spent in 2011.
- Capital expenditures, particularly housing-related, expected to pick up slowly and be spread over several years.
- Fiscal vulnerabilities and sustainability:
  - Non-oil primary deficit increased from 40 percent of non-oil GDP in 2004 to 71 percent in 2010; projected to reach 81 percent in 2011.
  - Break-even oil price for 2011 estimated at $80/barrel (higher if oil production is below the 9.3 million barrels per day projected), rising to $98/barrel by 2016.

### Inflation and liquidity risks (drivers)
- Global food prices expected to increase by 22 percent in 2011.
- U.S. monetary policy remains accommodative; with the exchange rate peg this creates a low interest rate environment in Saudi Arabia.
- Housing prices continue to rise due to supply shortages and pent up demand.
- Recent cash transfers (two month salary bonuses for public servants, matched by some private firms) injected additional liquidity: reflected in a sharp decline in the loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio and continued high level of deposits (particularly demand deposits) held by commercial banks at SAMA.

### Financial system structure and key indicators
- Banking sector
  - As of December 2010: 23 licensed banks, of which 20 were active.
  - 12 Saudi incorporated banks whose assets account for 98 percent of banking system assets, or more than half of total financial system assets and 85 percent of GDP.
  - Three largest banks together have a share of assets and deposits of about 45 percent; each of the next four has a share exceeding 5 percent.
  - Two new banks licensed in mid-2000s account for only 3 percent of banking assets; foreign branches have a 2 percent market share.
- Specialized Credit Institutions (SCIs)
  - Five public SCIs owned by the Ministry of Finance; not supervised by SAMA or the CMA.
  - SCI assets account for 14 percent of total financial system assets; their loan portfolios represent 24 percent of bank credit to the private sector.
  - Government injections: SR 10 billion into one SCI in 2010; subsequently announced additional SR 70 billion into two SCIs (close to 20 percent of total SCI assets).
- Public pension funds
  - Two public pension funds with combined assets of 46 percent of GDP.
  - PPA manages public workers scheme; GOSI manages private workers scheme. Both operate defined-benefit plans financed primarily on a pay-as-you-go basis and partially pre-funded.
- Other NBFIs and capital markets
  - Insurance sector: premia and assets of 1 percent and 1.5 percent of GDP in 2010.
  - Mutual funds combined assets: 6 percent of GDP (60 percent money market funds).
  - Listed companies: 146 listed companies with market capitalization of about 80 percent of GDP as of end-2010.
    - Market capitalization dominated by financial companies (27.6 percent), petrochemicals (36.6 percent), telecoms (9.9 percent).
  - Fixed income markets remain undeveloped; outstanding government debt low (10 percent of GDP in 2010); sporadic corporate bond and sukuk issues; mortgage finance package pending to provide legal basis for development.

### Selected macro-financial figures (from Table 3, selected)
- Crude oil production (million of barrels per day): 2005: 9.4; 2006: 9.2; 2007: 8.8; 2008: 9.2; 2009: 8.4; 2010: 8.4; 2011 (Proj.): 9.3.
- Average oil export price (in U.S. dollars per barrel): 2005: 50.96; 2006: 61.46; 2007: 68.09; 2008: 93.05; 2009: 59.27; 2010: 75.8; 2011 (Proj.): 101.9.
- Nominal GDP (in billions of Saudi riyals): 2005: 1,182.5; 2006: 1,335.6; 2007: 1,442.6; 2008: 1,786.1; 2009: 1,412.6; 2010: 1,679.1; 2011 (Proj.): 2,137.9.
- Nominal GDP (in billions of U.S. dollars): 2005: 315.8; 2006: 356.6; 2007: 385.2; 2008: 476.9; 2009: 377.2; 2010: 448.4; 2011 (Proj.): 570.9.
- Real GDP (percent change): 2005: 5.6; 2006: 3.2; 2007: 2.0; 2008: 4.2; 2009: 0.1; 2010: 4.1; 2011 (Proj.): 6.5.
- Consumer price index (all cities index): 2005: 0.6; 2006: 2.3; 2007: 4.1; 2008: 9.9; 2009: 5.1; 2010: 5.4; 2011 (Proj.): 6.0.
- Current account balance (in percent of GDP): 2005: 28.5; 2006: 27.8; 2007: 24.3; 2008: 27.8; 2009: 5.6; 2010: 14.9; 2011 (Proj.): 20.1.
- SAMA's total net foreign assets (in billions): 2005: 150.5; 2006: 221.4; 2007: 301.3; 2008: 438.5; 2009: 405.9; 2010: 441.0; 2011 (Proj.): 535.4.
- SAMA's net foreign assets in months of imports of goods and services (Next 12 months): 2005: 15.7; 2006: 18.1; 2007: 20.1; 2008: 31.9; 2009: 27.5; 2010: 25.1; 2011 (Proj.): 27.3.
- Central government's gross domestic debt (in percent of GDP): 2005: 38.9; 2006: 27.3; 2007: 18.5; 2008: 13.2; 2009: 15.9; 2010: 9.9; 2011 (Proj.): 7.0.
- Non-oil primary deficit/Non-oil GDP: 2005: -46.2; 2006: -48.2; 2007: -55.8; 2008: -57.7; 2009: -67.6; 2010: -70.8; 2011 (Proj.): -80.7.

*Source: IMF staff analysis and Saudi Arabian authorities as presented in the content unit.*

### 16. Saudi Arabia is an open economy with a broadly liberalized financial account.

### 16. Saudi Arabia is an open economy with a broadly liberalized financial account.

### Openness and cross-border financial linkages
- Foreign assets of the financial system (including SAMA) amount to over 130 percent of GDP.
- Trade and payments related to the petroleum sector are significant, as are remittances of the large number of foreign workers.
- Foreign liabilities—almost exclusively in the banking system—remain relatively small at 6 percent of GDP.
- Detailed data on cross-border financial linkages are not available; foreign assets and liabilities of the private nonfinancial sector, including nonlisted corporates, are likely to be significant but data are not available.
- Recommendation / priority: Developing better data on cross-border financial linkages should be a priority.

### SAMA, central government foreign assets, and state-owned entities
- SAMA manages most foreign assets of the central government; SAMA effectively oversees more than 90 percent of total foreign financial assets of the central government, including of the two pension funds and the five SCIs.
- There are no sovereign wealth funds.
- The finances of Saudi Aramco are not publicly disclosed.

### Banking sector stability — Performance and risk
- Solvency and capital
  - Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets: 20.6 (2007), 16.0 (2008), 16.5 (2009), 17.7 (2010).
  - Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets: 15.9 (2007), 14.1 (2008), 14.9 (2009), 15.3 (2010).
  - Capital (net worth) to assets: 12.6 (2007), 13.3 (2008), 14.0 (2009), 14.5 (2010).
  - Securitization: In practice, SAMA targets a CAR of 12 percent; all banks have a CAR above the regulatory 8 percent minimum.
  - Tier 1 capital ratio is about 15 percent, well above the 4 percent required by Basel II and the 4.5 percent required by Basel III.
- Asset quality and credit
  - NPLs to gross loans: 2.0 (2007), 1.3 (2008), 3.2 (2009), 3.0 (2010).
  - NPLs net of provisions to capital: -3.7 (2007), -3.8 (2008), 1.4 (2009), -2.7 (2010).
  - Provisioning coverage of NPLs: about 116 percent in December 2010 based on the authorities’ statistical definition; raw data from SAMA shows a provisioning ratio of 90 percent.
  - Credit flows: credit declined by 1 percent over the 12 months to December 2009, then increased by 5 percent over the following 12 months; credit growth expected to pick up further but remained in single digits in 2011.
- Composition and concentrations
  - Loans accounted for 54 percent of banks’ aggregate balance sheet at end-2010; government bonds and treasury bills accounted for about 14 percent.
  - Sectoral loan shares (Table 5 / Figure 1): Manufacturing 12.1 (2010), Trade and Services 27.8 (2010), Energy and Minerals 3.3 (2010), Construction and Property 7.2 (2010), Households 30.7 (2010), Government 4.2 (2010), Other 8.4 (2010). (Historical series also reported for 2007–2009 in Table 5.)
  - “Other” (mainly consumer loans) is the largest sectoral exposure in Figure 1 at 31 percent.
- Liquidity
  - Aggregate loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio: about 71 percent in December 2010.
  - SAMA requires LTD below 85 percent (limit increased from 60 percent in September 2006); all banks but one meet the requirement (the exception is a new bank which has yet to develop its deposit base).
  - Liquid assets to total assets: 21.7 (2007), 22.8 (2008), 25.3 (2009), 24.7 (2010).
  - Liquid assets to short-term liabilities: 41.4 (2007), 41.6 (2008), 40.0 (2009), 52.0 (2010).
  - Customer deposits to total (noninterbank) loans: 124.4 (2007), 121.0 (2008), 128.6 (2009), 136.0 (2010).
- Profitability
  - Return on assets (ROA): 2.8 (2007), 2.7 (2008), 1.9 (2009), 2.0 (2010).
  - Return on equity (ROE): 22.3 (2007), 20.5 (2008), 13.7 (2009), 13.6 (2010).
  - Profitability weakened during the crisis but appears to be recovering in 2010.

### Regulation and supervision — findings and recommendations
- Progress and capacity
  - Improvements since the 2004 FSAP: introduction of Basel II, Pillar 2, RBA (risk-based supervision), expanded supervisory staffing to around 200 people (a doubling over the past five years), and steps toward Basel III requirements.
  - SAMA introduced International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International Standards on Auditing, and Pillar 3 disclosure requirements in 2008.
- Legal framework
  - The legal framework needs updating to formalize independence and powers SAMA already exercises in practice. Specific legal changes suggested:
    - Remove requirement for government approval to license banks and impose sanctions, issue regulations, and conduct inspections.
    - Provide legal protection to supervisors.
    - Require SAMA’s approval in case of transfer of significant ownership.
    - Create a bank resolution framework.
    - Provide clear mandate for consolidated supervision.
    - Lift confidentiality requirements when necessary for supervisory information exchange.
  - Authorities considered amending the law difficult; they might prefer issuing new regulations to clarify and further solidify SAMA’s independence.
- Licensing and contestability
  - Only two banks have been licensed in the last decade. Recommendation: SAMA should publish detailed criteria for licensing new banks, align them with objectives focused on safety and soundness, and withdraw the requirement that new licensees should “add value.”
- Large exposures, connected parties, and risk management
  - Recommendation: issue a framework circular consolidating risk management requirements, update market risk and internal control requirements, strengthen definition of related parties to include close family relationships, and cap large exposures (suggested example cap at 25 percent of capital; current practice allowed large exposures up to 50 percent of capital and one large exposure stands at 38 percent of capital).
  - The 2009 failure of two large family groups highlighted potential weaknesses in credit risk management; SAMA ensured losses were fully provisioned and led industry dialogue on lessons.
- Supervisory approach
  - SAMA has adopted RBA and should complete this transition: better define full-scope examination schedules, focus examinations on actual risks and banks’ risk management capacity, increase attention to branches of foreign banks, and more systematically verify off-site reporting.
  - SAMA’s exercise of consolidated supervision has been effective, but cross-border expansion by some banks could challenge group management and supervisors; recommendations include finalizing the draft MOU with the CMA and developing written understandings with foreign supervisors to facilitate exchange of supervisory information and cross-jurisdiction on-site inspections.

### Stress tests — methodology and results
- Coverage and grouping
  - Stress tests focused on the 12 Saudi incorporated banks representing 98 percent of the banking sector’s total assets.
  - Bank groups by size: large banks (4) with assets more than SR 170 billion to less than SR 300 billion; medium-sized banks (3) with assets above SR 100 billion but less than SR 130 billion; small banks (5) with assets less than SR 60 billion.
  - Large banks represent 59 percent of total assets, medium-sized banks 26 percent, and small banks 13 percent.
  - A macro-financial model derived Saudi-specific elasticities linking macroeconomic variables, especially oil prices, to NPL ratios.
- Solvency stress-test results (Table 6)
  - Aggregate pre-shock solvency ratio (All banks): 17.8 percent (de facto SAMA target 12 percent; regulatory minimum CAR 8 percent).
  - Selected solvency outcomes after shocks (All banks solvency ratio in percent):
    - 1a Uniform 50 percent increase in NPLs: 16.8
    - 1b Uniform 100 percent increase in NPLs based on SAMA provisioning rate 100 percent: 15.8
    - 1c NPLs "category shift" (10 percent from "pass" to "doubtful and loss"): 16.5
    - 2a Single biggest corporate obligor default: 15.2
    - 2b Five biggest corporate obligors shift from "pass" to "NPL": 13.8
    - 3a 3 percent decline in non-oil growth: 17.2
    - 3b Oil prices decline by one standard ($25) deviation with a GDP growth rate of 1.5 percent: 17.5
    - 3c Oil prices decline to historical average of $40 with a GDP growth of 0 percent: 16.2
    - 3d Shock in (3c) permanent over 4 year horizon: 5.2 (number of banks with CAR falling below minimum in parentheses: (8))
      - Capital gap to bring the CAR to 8 percent as a percentage of GDP: 3.5
    - 3e Shock in (3c) permanent over 5 year horizon: -1.9 (9)
      - Capital gap to bring the CAR to 8 percent as a percentage of GDP: 6.6
    - 3f Oil prices decline $17 with GDP growth rate of - 0.7 percent: 14.6 (1)
    - 3g Shock in (3d) permanent over 2 year horizon: 5.1 (8)
      - Capital gap to bring the CAR to 8 percent as a percentage of GDP: 3.6
    - 4a Others or Consumer loans sector: Threshold default for systemic solvency risk (58 percent): 7.9 (5)
    - 4b General commerce sector: Threshold default for systemic solvency risk (77 percent): 7.9 (5)
    - 5a 200 basis point upward parallel shift of yield curve: 19.1
    - 5b 200 basis point downward parallel shift of yield curve: 17.7
    - 5c 400 basis point downward parallel shift of yield curve: 17.2
  - Notes: Number of banks with CAR falling below the minimum shown in parentheses. For solvency tests, horizons are one year unless otherwise noted; no dividend distributions assumed during stress periods.
- Liquidity, market, and combined shock results (Table 7)
  - Initial liquidity ratios (All banks): LR(1) 55.0; LR(2) 33.5 (LR(2) minimum required 20 percent).
  - LR definitions: LR(1) = liquid assets / short term liabilities; LR(2) = liquid assets / deposit liabilities.
  - Selected liquidity shock outcomes (All banks):
    - 6a General deposit run threshold for systemic risk: 17 percent.
      - LR(1) after shock: 37.6
      - LR(2) after shock: 19.9 (number of banks with LR(2) falling below minimum in parentheses: (8))
      - LR(2) liquidity gap requiring SAMA's liquidity injection (millions SR): 63,282.0
      - Depletion of SAMA's net foreign exchange reserves due to increased foreign exchange demand resulting from the deposit run (millions): $24,139.4
    - 6b General deposit run of 25 percent:
      - LR(1) after shock: 23.7
      - LR(2) after shock: 11.3 (9)
      - LR(2) liquidity gap requiring SAMA's liquidity injection (millions SR): 104,204.0
      - Depletion of SAMA's net foreign exchange reserves (millions): $35,499.2
    - 6c Short-term deposit run of 40 percent:
      - LR(1) after shock: 29.8
      - LR(2) after shock: 14.9 (7)
      - LR(2) liquidity gap requiring SAMA's liquidity injection (millions SR): 87,368.6
      - Depletion of SAMA's net foreign exchange reserves (millions): $31,037.7
  - Profitability under market shocks (All banks):
    - Initial ROA: 2.0; ROA after 200 bps upward shift: 3.1; after 200 bps downward shift: 0.8; after 400 bps downward shift: -0.3.
    - Initial ROE: 13.6; ROE after 200 bps upward shift: 21.5; after 200 bps downward shift: 5.7; after 400 bps downward shift: -2.2.
  - Combined macro scenarios:
    - Macro scenario A (combination of shocks 3d, 6a, and 5a): CAR after scenario (All banks): 15.9 (1)
    - Macro scenario B (combination of shocks 3e, 6a, and 5a): CAR after scenario (All banks): 6.4 (8)
- Overall interpretation
  - Reflecting high capitalization, the banking sector appears able to withstand severe shocks for most single-year shocks; the aggregate solvency ratio remains above 8 percent for almost all individual shocks.
  - However, prolonged and deep oil-price declines (permanent over multi-year horizons) and large deposit runs could materially dent capital and liquidity, producing multiple banks with CAR below the 8 percent minimum and sizable liquidity gaps requiring SAMA intervention.

*Source: IMF staff summary of chapter "16. Saudi Arabia is an open economy with a broadly liberalized financial account."*

### 34. However, the banking sector could be vulnerable to severe and prolonged oil

### _cr1292 - 34. However, the banking sector could be vulnerable to severe and prolonged oil

### Vulnerability to severe and prolonged oil price declines
- Two scenarios (with one variation) were considered to assess impact on banking-sector solvency:
  - If the 1999 shock (average oil price at $17, GDP contraction by 0.7 percent) were to last for two years:
    - Aggregate solvency ratio declines to 5.1 percent, below the 8 percent minimum.
    - CAR for eight banks—covering a wide range in terms of size and ownership—would decline below 8 percent.
    - Small banks appear to be the most vulnerable.
  - If a decline of oil prices to $40 (their average in real terms between 1960 and 2010) with stagnant GDP were to last four years:
    - Aggregate CAR declines to 5.2 percent.
    - Capital needed to bring CAR back to 8 percent represents about 3.5 percent of GDP.
    - If this shock lasts five years, the banking sector would become insolvent:
      - Aggregate CAR declines to -1.9 percent (Figure 3).
      - New capital required to reestablish the 8 percent minimum is about 6.6 percent of GDP.
    - Recapitalization costs should be manageable if macroeconomic policies are otherwise sound.
    - Small banks and domestic private banks are the most vulnerable.

### Sectoral risk concentration
- Default threshold analysis for key lending sectors:
  - “Other” (mainly consumer) loans:
    - Only when more than 58 percent of “other” loans become nonperforming does the aggregate solvency ratio decline below the 8 percent minimum.
  - General commerce loans:
    - Threshold for systemic risk is 77 percent nonperforming.
- Shocks of these magnitudes are characterized as highly improbable.

### Liquidity stress tests and central bank support
- Regulatory liquidity ratio thresholds and withdrawal shocks:
  - Only when 17 percent of general deposits are withdrawn does the regulatory liquidity ratio (liquid assets to deposit liabilities) drop below the 20 percent minimum — threshold for systemic risk.
  - For short-term deposits, the threshold is 31 percent.
  - Historical benchmark: deposit withdrawal in August 1990 was 11 percent of total customer deposits in one week.
  - Thresholds are sensitive to liquid asset and liability composition.
- Estimated SAMA liquidity injections and foreign reserve impact:
  - A 25 percent run on overall deposits:
    - Reduces liquidity ratio to about 11 percent.
    - Requires a liquidity injection from SAMA of about SR 104.2 billion.
    - Assuming 50 percent of withdrawn deposits are converted into foreign exchange, SAMA’s net foreign assets would decline by about 8 percent (or $35.5 billion).
  - A 40 percent run on short term deposits (only):
    - Reduces liquidity ratio to about 15 percent.
    - Corresponding decline in SAMA’s net foreign assets would be 7 percent (or $31 billion).
  - Conclusion: banks’ own adequate liquidity combined with SAMA’s large foreign assets should allow the system to withstand even large liquidity shocks.

### Resilience to market risk (single factor shocks)
- Interest rate shocks:
  - A 200 basis point upward parallel shift in the yield curve increases the banking sector’s net income and reinforces capital via retained earnings or general reserves.
  - A 200 basis point downward parallel shift decreases net income, but not enough to generate overall net losses requiring provisions from capital, except for two small banks; no significant impact on aggregate solvency ratio.
- Foreign exchange income and exchange rate shocks:
  - A 100 percent decline in foreign exchange income is not large enough to generate overall net losses sufficient to affect the aggregate solvency ratio.
  - The exchange rate peg (at SR 3.75 per dollar since 1986) is underpinned by vast foreign assets and oil revenues.
  - An exchange rate depreciation would have a positive effect on the banking sector owing to its long combined open FX position.
  - An exchange rate appreciation of 20 percent would reduce banks’ net income but would not significantly affect solvency.

### IV. Key policies affecting systemic stability — A. Liquidity Management
- Current system features and operational tools:
  - System-wide excess liquidity leads commercial banks to rely heavily on operations with SAMA.
  - Interbank market activity (foreign exchange spot and swap transactions, unsecured deposit trading) is limited.
  - No primary dealer system, virtually no secondary market in government securities, and no private repo market.
  - Banks predominantly manage liquidity through global money markets and SAMA’s repo and reverse repo facilities.
  - Central bank bills have been a key instrument in absorbing liquidity; SAMA issues bills at maturities up to 52 weeks.
  - SAMA adjusts required reserve ratio (increased in November 2007; lowered in October and November 2008).
  - SAMA occasionally uses foreign exchange swaps and deposit placements to manage liquidity.
- Policy constraints and operational posture:
  - SAMA is strongly committed to the fixed exchange rate and monitors banking system liquidity on a day-to-day basis.
  - Under the peg, little room exists for changes in domestic policy interest rates due to international arbitrage and cross-border flows.
  - SAMA accommodates banks’ excess supply or demand for liquidity daily and lacks liquidity targets or a formal liquidity forecasting framework.
- Recommendations to deepen liquidity management:
  - Develop a deeper interbank market and a formal liquidity forecasting framework.
  - Development of a private interbank repo market would be helped by a sufficient supply of government securities; high quality private securities (such as covered bonds) could also help.
  - Coordinate debt management with the MOF to maintain a stable and adequate stock of government securities and anchor a robust yield curve.
  - A liquidity forecasting system would strengthen SAMA’s short-horizon liquidity management and smooth short-term market rates.
  - MOF should provide SAMA with timely and comprehensive cash flow projections, given SAMA’s role as banker to the government.

### IV. Key policies affecting systemic stability — B. Payment and Settlement Systems
- System assessment and legal framework:
  - National payment system efficiently serves a broad set of users; Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems assessment shows a high level of compliance.
  - Infrastructure concentrated on payments in riyals, with the Saudi Arabian Riyal Interbank Express RTGS system at its core.
  - Existing legal framework covers many critical aspects but lacks a comprehensive payment systems law.
  - SAMA’s power to oversee payment systems derives from central bank and banking laws, but powers to operate, regulate, and oversee payment, settlement, and clearing systems are not detailed in law.
- Recommendation:
  - Enact a comprehensive payment systems law that could also provide an explicit legal basis for emergency liquidity assistance to financial market infrastructures.

### IV. Key policies affecting systemic stability — C. Early Warning System, Stress Tests, and Macroprudential Policies
- Early warning systems:
  - Supervisory/regulatory agencies lack formal early warning systems; SAMA and the CMA rely mainly on frequent dialogue with banks and market participants.
  - Recommendation: SAMA should establish a formal early warning system assembling information from multiple sources and better utilizing accounting, auditing, and offsite supervisory data.
  - Several banks have sophisticated internal systems for detecting unusual quantitative trends that could be incorporated into a SAMA-led system.
- Stress testing recommendations:
  - SAMA should (i) more closely monitor risk management practices of banks; (ii) develop a contingency plan for a prolonged decline in oil prices; (iii) conduct regular stress test exercises with a wider range of shocks and incorporate lessons into prudential rules and supervision; and (iv) add staff with technical background needed for stress testing.
- Macroprudential policy framework:
  - SAMA has a long history of macroprudential measures (regulations on personal loans for stock purchases, debt service to income ratios, the LTD ratio, and reserve requirements).
  - Recommendation: further elaborate the macroprudential policy framework covering objectives, analytical methods, policy toolkit, and transparency.
  - Consider establishing a more transparent and structured process for setting capital and provisioning buffers, refine coordination with MOF and CMA without impinging on SAMA’s independence, consider establishing a financial stability department, and regularly publish financial stability reports.

### IV. Key policies affecting systemic stability — D. Safety Net Arrangements
- Current approach:
  - Implicit but strong commitment to deposit safety combined with rigorous prevention of bank failures by SAMA.
  - No explicit deposit insurance scheme nor formal and specific bank resolution rules.
  - Approach has ensured no bank has ever failed and no bank depositors and creditors have suffered losses.
- During the global financial crisis:
  - Authorities announced deposits would be safe; perceived by some as a blanket guarantee but contributed to stability.
  - Authorities consider strong prudential policies as a form of depositor protection.
  - Introduction of explicit deposit insurance combined with formal resolution rules is not under consideration.
- Costs and recommendation:
  - Current approach reduces incentives for private monitoring and increases supervisory burden, weakening market discipline and diluting the role of Pillar 3 under Basel II.
  - Recommendation: review the approach to safety nets and bank resolution in the medium run.
  - On emergency liquidity assistance (ELA): no ELA provided to any bank since 2002; SAMA determines ELA case-by-case and could consider specifying some terms in advance (e.g., ELA normally only to banks deemed solvent and against adequate collateral) to limit moral hazard and communicate policy to the public.

### IV. Key policies affecting systemic stability — E. Bank Resolution
- Legal and operational gaps:
  - No specialized legal framework for bank resolution; SAMA has strong preventive supervisory powers but limited powers to deal with actual failures.
  - General corporate bankruptcy provisions apply to failed banks, so SAMA would not lead resolution of an insolvent bank.
  - This has incentivized SAMA’s forceful preventive approach.
- Authorities’ principles:
  - Insolvent banks are speedily resolved (normally through acquisition by other banks), no bailouts for owners or managers, and depositors are protected.
- Recommendation:
  - Introduce a formal bank resolution framework aligned with international initiatives (including Financial Stability Board work) to empower authorities to:
    - Continue temporarily core operations of an institution;
    - Have shareholders absorb losses, pay off senior creditors only at estimated recovery value, and change management to minimize moral hazard;
    - Provide the conservator with flexibility to minimize economic damage and taxpayer cost.
  - Complementary measure: consider introducing an explicit deposit insurance scheme with limited coverage.

### V. Financial development and soundness — Housing finance
- Context and challenges:
  - Saudi Arabia must generate housing and employment for a young and growing population; specialized public credit institutions alone cannot meet these demands.
  - REDF has historically been main provider of housing finance with a portfolio of SR 78 billion, stable in recent years.
  - REDF facilitated access to housing but cannot meet growing demand (waits up to 18 years) and has adversely affected development of commercial housing finance (e.g., interest free loans for nationals).
- Recent trends and capacity:
  - Banks and mortgage finance companies grew housing portfolios at an annual rate of 22 percent from 2008 to 2010.
  - Annual housing needs estimated at around 250,000 units over the medium term, compared to 80,000 permits delivered on a commercial basis.
  - Housing demand expected to increase further due to young and growing population and declining household size.

*Source: IMF staff report content provided in the content unit.*

### 59. The five draft laws in the mortgage package that are expected to be approved in

### _cr1292 - 59. The five draft laws in the mortgage package that are expected to be approved in

### Mortgage-package reforms and housing finance framework
- The five draft laws in the mortgage package that are expected to be approved in 2011 would:
  - lay the foundation for an efficient mortgage system;
  - create a consumer protection framework;
  - empower SAMA to regulate and supervise nondepository lenders;
  - establish a framework for the development of funding instruments (mortgage refinance facility, securitization, covered bonds).
- Additional measures needed given risks inherent to residential real estate lending:
  - (i) new prudential norms (capital, provisioning) to support stronger creditor rights;
  - (ii) setting up of a housing market observatory, including a price index;
  - (iii) consumer protection norms;
  - (iv) regulatory facilitation of new products, including notably steps to strengthen the developer industry.

### REDF policy and financial soundness
- The new policy governing the REDF needs to keep a strong focus on financial soundness.
- Current problems:
  - The REDF has been plagued by high delinquencies (half of the portfolio).
- Policy aims:
  - broaden the range of eligible projects;
  - better target the lower income population;
  - set prioritization criteria.
- Measures to maximize budgetary impact and ensure sound lending:
  - (i) outsource the servicing of the REDF old and new loans to banks to improve recovery rates and the quality of loan origination;
  - (ii) combine public resources with new bank lending under suitable risk-sharing arrangements;
  - (iii) explore ways to provide banks with long term funding matching the maturity of the new housing loans, a more efficient solution than the contemplated guarantees.
- Monitoring and institutional design:
  - Asset and liability mismatches should be closely monitored, and new funding instruments established to facilitate adequate risk management.
  - Authorities should consider a cooperative structure and avoid creating distorted incentives that led to problems in examples like Fannie Mae in the United States.

### Finance to Small- and Medium-Scale Enterprises (SMEs)
- Current state and recent measures:
  - SME loans account for only 2 percent of total bank loans.
  - In 2010, the government increased the resources of the SIDF by SR 10 billion and made regulatory changes to make SME lending more attractive to banks.
- Recommended policy steps to maintain financial soundness in SME lending:
  - SAMA should supervise the quality of banks’ new SME units and the robustness of the rating models adopted, especially where automated loan processing is planned.
  - Strengthen financial infrastructure, especially by developing a registry for movable collateral.
  - The Enforcement Law (one of the five draft laws in the mortgage package) will improve enforcement procedures for all types of collateral and will:
    - allow the creation of special enforcement courts in all the major cities;
    - introduce time bound procedures for the foreclosure of collateral.

### Securities markets and capital markets development
- Regulatory framework:
  - Regulation of securities markets by the CMA fully or broadly implements most of the IOSCO Principles.
  - The Capital Markets Law (CML) provides the CMA with comprehensive regulatory authority.
  - CMA independence can be strengthened by amending the CML to specify that CMA board members can be removed only for good cause.
- Transparency and governance recommendations:
  - CMA should publish a detailed annual report and financial statement describing how the agency funds its operations (and how it sets fees).
  - All CMA regulatory actions, interpretive guidance, and advisory statements should be made public on its website; disciplinary actions should be public information.
  - The CMA should have no discretion to retain money fines that it imposes to fund its operations.
  - Amend the Company Act and the CML to establish a single set of standards for listed companies under the authority of the CMA.
  - Adopt IFRS as a single national accounting standard for listed companies.
- Market development constraints and proposals:
  - Individual investors are the largest group by numbers; state institutional investors (GOSI, PPA, PIF) are the largest domestic investors.
  - Private institutional investors (mutual funds, insurance companies, private pension funds, and brokers) are too small to play a meaningful role.
  - Limits on foreign investment are a key impediment; most foreigners may only invest in Saudi mutual funds, in the two listed ETFs, or purchase an equity swap from a Saudi broker.
  - Recommendation: CMA adopt a rule to permit large qualified foreign institutional investors to register as direct investors.
  - There is considerable scope to develop sukuk issues and corporate debt markets, conditional on additional infrastructural and regulatory initiatives.
- Relevant numeric and factual items:
  - CMA took enforcement actions: 22 in 2010.

### Insurance and pensions
- Insurance sector:
  - The insurance sector is small and poses no obvious financial stability risks.
  - Regulatory and supervisory framework has improved significantly; the 2003 Law and 2004 Implementing Regulations provide broad powers; SAMA has established an effective supervisory function.
  - Five important functional regulations (including risk management, reinsurance, and market conduct) have been issued since 2008.
  - Four key regulations (including investments, intermediaries, and outsourcing) are in the consultation stage and three (actuarial services, governance, and audit committee) are being drafted and should be issued as soon as possible.
  - Poor compliance with mandatory insurance requirements has constrained the growth of the nonlife sector; enforcement needs to be stepped up.
- Public pension funds:
  - The two large public pension funds have implemented adequate governance structures, operating procedures, and investment policies.
  - Recommended enhancements:
    - disclose investment policies, total assets, portfolio composition, and returns to members and the public;
    - increase the number of independent and expert members on investment committees, especially for the PPA.
  - Portfolio composition concerns:
    - share of short-term domestic assets may be excessive: 10 percent and 15 percent in PPA and GOSI, respectively.
    - management of domestic portfolios should be further outsourced, especially for GOSI.
  - Exercise of ownership rights in bank equity holdings should entail appointment of independent experts in bank boards.
  - Consider introducing private defined contribution pension funds for expatriates.

### Implementation progress from the 2004 FSAP and selected recommendations status
- Overall assessment:
  - The 2004 FSAP found the banking sector to be sound, with substantial capital, reserves, and liquidity buffers providing resilience to a range of simulated shocks.
  - Despite aggregate resilience, one systemically important bank underperformed in the stress tests.
- Progress highlights and outstanding items:
  - SAMA introduced detailed Basel II requirements; Saudi banks started implementing Basel II standardized approaches in 2008.
  - SAMA has issued circulars enhancing connected lending regulations, consolidated supervision, and country and transfer risks.
  - SAMA updated anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism manuals for banking and insurance.
  - Market infrastructure: a comprehensive mortgage package is being finalized and is expected to dramatically improve secured lending and the enforcement of collateral; draft laws are said to be close to final approval.
  - Securitization, yield curve, and government securities market:
    - Recent government securities trading was hindered by the redemption of government bonds; there is no yield curve.
    - No primary dealer framework has yet been introduced given active redemption of government bonds.
  - SCIs and public funds:
    - Balance sheets of the SCIs are disclosed in SAMA’s quarterly bulletin, but disclosure of operations, strategies, and investment policies remains insufficient.
    - The PIF has listed several companies via IPOs in recent years.
  - SIDF:
    - The SIDF still provides lending at concessional rates, charges fees to cover monitoring costs, and does not report NPLs; SIDF follow-up and monitoring is considered more intrusive and stricter than for commercial banks.
  - Access to housing finance and enforcement:
    - Ongoing implementation with the five draft law package expected to deeply overhaul and strengthen the mortgage system.
    - Recommend linking the REDF to formal finance through the banking sector to catalyze a market-based mortgage finance system and potentially alleviate budgetary demands.
    - Reliable market information on the housing sector is not yet being disclosed.
    - Banks were exempt from the lending restrictions on consumer loans that SAMA passed in October 2005; capital adequacy and provisioning rules have not been adjusted to reflect collateralization and should be considered once the new mortgage framework is in place.
    - A legal status for appraisers is included in the mortgage package.
    - The mortgage package includes a provision covering social implications of foreclosures.
  - SME access to finance:
    - Enforcement of collateral is expected to be substantially improved by a new enforcement law which is part of a broad mortgage finance package recently approved by the Shura Council, but the package needs to be approved by the Council of Ministers.

*Source: _cr1292 - 59. The five draft laws in the mortgage package that are expected to be approved in*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/_cr1292.pdf_
