## 1. Dealing with the Problem Banks

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### Background: pre-crisis imbalances and sovereign-bank links
- Banking sector grew to over eight times GDP prior to the global financial crisis.
- Current account deficits peaked at 15 percent of GDP in 2008.
- Household and corporate sector gross indebtedness rose to one of the largest levels in the euro area.
- Public debt rose rapidly following eurozone entry in 2008.
- By end-2011: bank loans to Greek residents reached 130 percent of Cyprus‘ GDP; holdings of Greek government bonds reached 30 percent of GDP.
- Public debt: under 70 percent of GDP in mid-2011; climbed to 86 percent of GDP in 2012 after recession and banking losses.
- Authorities requested a 3-year Extended Fund Facility arrangement:
  - SDR 891 million (563 percent of quota, about €1 billion);
  - SDR 74.25 million (about €86 million) to be made available upon Board approval, and a similar amount to be disbursed in eleven installments, subject to quarterly reviews.
- Additional financial support from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) of about €9 billion.

### Recent economic developments (key outcomes and indicators)
- Output contracted by 2½ percent in 2012, with the decline accelerating toward the end of the year.
  - Investment plunged by 23 percent in 2012.
  - Consumption fell by 2.7 percent in 2012.
- Unemployment rate reached 14 percent in February (2013 context).
- Inflation declined to 1.3 percent in March (2013 context).
- Trade deficit narrowed to 2.5 percent of GDP in 2012 from 4 percent of GDP in 2011 (down from 11.4 percent of GDP in 2008).
- Current account deficit increased to close to 12 percent of GDP in 2012.
  - Net income balance moved from a surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP in 2011 to a deficit of 8.2 percent of GDP in 2012.
- Fiscal deficit declined to an estimated 5.6 percent of GDP in 2012 from 6.3 percent of GDP in 2011.
  - Government financing relied on remaining disbursements from a €2.5 billion Russian loan contracted in 2011 and t-bills purchased by banks and pension funds of state-owned enterprises.
- Banking system liquidity pressures and deposit outflows:
  - Since early 2012, banking system lost 10 percent of domestically raised deposits.
  - The second largest bank (nationalized mid-2012) lost 1/3 of deposits.
  - Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) by the Central Bank of Cyprus reached 60 percent of GDP in late 2012 (largely concentrated in one bank).
  - PIMCO due diligence (February 2013) revealed capital needs for the banks of around 60 percent of GDP.

### Dealing with the problem banks: strategy and measures
- PIMCO finding: the two largest banks (Bank of Cyprus (BoC) and Cyprus Popular Bank (CPB)) were economically insolvent; projected to accumulate large losses through 2015.
  - Under an adverse stress scenario (recession close to 10 percent in 2012-14; NPLs nearly 70 percent of gross loans by 2015; provisioning of 50 percent), achieving a Core Tier 1 (CT1) capital ratio of 6 percent would require a total of 44 percent of GDP (close to €8 billion).
  - Private funds not available; public capital injection would render public debt unsustainable.
- Strategy: resolve, downsize, and recapitalize the two banks at no additional fiscal cost.
- Key actions taken on March 25 (Central Bank of Cyprus intervention):
  - Sale of the CPB and BoC Greek operations to Greece’s Piraeus bank.
    - Reduced the two banks’ balance sheets by 1/3 and cut contingent liabilities to cover almost €9 billion of insured Greek deposits.
  - Transfer of CPB’s UK branch deposits to BoC-UK in exchange for equal cash reserves at the Bank of England.
  - Resolution of CPB:
    - Assets, insured deposits, interbank liabilities, and ELA transferred to BoC.
    - Uninsured deposits and remaining assets left in CPB under liquidation; the liquidating unit to receive BoC shares in exchange for the positive net asset position transferred.
    - The transferred CPB balance sheet had a CT1-ratio of 9 percent under PIMCO‘s stress scenario.
  - Recapitalization of BoC with participation of bank creditors, including uninsured depositors:
    - Creditors’ claims converted into equity in order of seniority: uninsured deposits → A-shares; senior debt → B-shares; subordinated debt → C-shares; convertible capital instruments → D-shares; rights of ordinary shares suspended.
    - A-shares holders must recover full initial capital plus interest through dividends before other shares collect dividends or voting rights.
    - Preliminary conversion ratio on uninsured deposits: 37.5 percent (based on preliminary valuation under PIMCO stress scenario).
    - Remaining 62.5 percent: 22.5 percent frozen pending independent valuation; the last 40 percent subject to withdrawal restrictions to be lifted gradually.
- Systemic outcome:
  - Banking system effectively shrunk by about 200 percent of GDP as a result of the resolution and sales.
- PIMCO due diligence (September 2012 data) capital shortfall (PIMCO adverse) entries include: 22.2; 21.5; 1.9; 0.8; 3.3; 49.8 (percent of GDP as presented in table).

### Temporary administrative measures to safeguard financial stability
- Implemented a 6-day "bank holiday" while bank restructuring was clarified and executed.
- Authorities temporarily froze uninsured deposits in BoC and imposed restrictions on cash withdrawals and transfers both domestically and across borders.
- As of April 24 (2013 context), main restrictions included:
  - Cash:
    - Withdrawals limited to a maximum of €9,000 per month.
    - Export of bank notes abroad restricted to €2,000 per person and journey.
  - Checks, credit, and debit cards:
    - Cashing of checks prohibited; checks can be used for payments and transfers within Cyprus consistent with wire transfer rules.
    - Credit and debit cards usable for domestic payments and transfers to the same extent as wire transfers.
    - Usage abroad restricted to €5,000 per accountholder per month.
  - Wire-transfers:
    - Exemptions: businesses—domestic up to €300,000 and cross-border up to €20,000.
    - Individuals may transfer up to €3,000; legal persons up to €50,000 to another domestic bank.
    - Salary payments not subject to restrictions.
  - Prohibition to open new accounts except for funds received from abroad or with Committee approval.
  - Extension of term deposits: maturing term deposits extended for one month except for an amount of €5,000 or 20 percent of the deposit.

### Spillovers and market reaction
- Spillovers were limited in magnitude.
  - Triggered flight to safety and a sell-off in some euro area bank stocks, strongest impacts in assets directly exposed to Cyprus: Greek government bonds, Greek and Russian bank stocks, subordinated debt in some periphery country banks, and Slovenian government bonds.
  - Other financial assets largely unscathed.
- Market reaction largely temporary; after initial sell-off most markets stabilized and some regained ground.
- Possible explanations for muted response:
  - Cyprus circumstances viewed as unique: outsized banking system relative to fiscal capacity funded by a large share of non-resident uninsured deposits.
  - Inventory of European policy tools to mitigate widespread bank and sovereign funding stress (monetary policy, ECB collateral/easing, LTROs, OMT).

### Follow-up and valuation
- Independent fair value assessment of BoC and CPB assets and liabilities required (structural benchmark for end-June 2013) to finalize balance sheets and determine additional capital needs to ensure CT1 ratio of 9 percent by end-program.
- Completion of valuation could permit BoC to re-access normal Eurosystem refinancing facilities (structural benchmark for end-September).

---

### Program objectives, financing, and macro framework

### Program objectives and strategy
- Two key objectives:
  - Restoring financial sector stability: complete financial sector recapitalization, gradually restore normal financial flows, reform supervision and regulation.
  - Achieving sustainable public finances: ambitious and well-paced fiscal adjustment, protect vulnerable groups, complement fiscal adjustment with structural fiscal reforms, privatization, and COLA reform.
- Rationale for chosen strategy / Alternatives considered:
  - Public recapitalization would have produced unsustainable debt, peaking at close to 150 percent of GDP.
  - Non-debt creating strategies (direct recapitalization by the ESM, ELA restructuring, outright sale) were not available.
  - Exit from the euro-zone would only partially address problems and would have led to devaluation, default, and large losses.
  - A proposed large one-off levy on insured and uninsured deposits was rejected.

### Program financing and size
- Fund contribution: SDR 891 million (about €1 billion), or 563 percent of quota, equally phased.
- Estimated external financing package required over 2013Q2-2016Q1: €10 billion.
- European partners’ pledge: about €9 billion.
- Financing assurances are in place for the program (MEFP ¶34).

### Official financing and program coverage
- Program designed to cover:
  - debt amortization falling due,
  - financing of the fiscal deficit,
  - recapitalization of banks other than the two institutions being restructured,
  - buffers from official sources and bank creditors to cover residual risks.
- IMF disbursement schedule (availability dates and amounts, millions of SDR and percent of quota):
  - May 15, 2013: 74.25 = 46.93% of quota — Approval of arrangement.
  - Repeating 74.25 = 46.93% on scheduled review dates through March 15, 2016.
  - Total: 891.00 (millions of SDR) = 563.21% of quota.

### Macro framework — activity and outlook (selected projections)
- Growth:
  - Real GDP: 2013 -8.7; 2014 -3.9; 2015 1.1; 2016 1.9; 2017 2.3; 2018 2.2; 2019 1.9; 2020 1.8
- Demand and components (Percent change):
  - Consumption: 2013 -11.5; 2014 -5.1; 2015 0.8; 2016 1.9; 2017 2.5; 2018 2.5; 2019 2.2; 2020 2.2
    - Private consumption: 2013 -12.3; 2014 -5.6; 2015 1.6; 2016 2.9; 2017 3.4; 2018 3.3; 2019 2.6; 2020 2.4
    - Public consumption: 2013 -8.9; 2014 -3.7; 2015 -1.7; 2016 -1.3; 2017 -0.6; 2018 -0.1; 2019 0.9; 2020 1.5
  - Fixed investment: 2013 -29.5; 2014 -12.0; 2015 2.3; 2016 3.5; 2017 5.5; 2018 4.3; 2019 4.2; 2020 4.0
  - HICP (period average): 2013 1.0; 2014 1.2; 2015 1.6; 2016 1.7; 2017 1.7; 2018 1.8; 2019 1.9; 2020 2.0
  - Unemployment rate EU standard (percent): 2013 15.5; 2014 16.9; 2015 14.6; 2016 13.7; 2017 12.9; 2018 12.0; 2019 11.1; 2020 10.2

### Channels and quantified contraction contributors (Box 4)
- Fiscal adjustment: frontloaded consolidation of 6.6 percent of GDP in 2013-14 assumed to have a one-for-one impact on growth.
- Deposit-to-equity swap estimated to cut growth by about 3 percentage points.
- Banks‘ deleveraging expected to reduce growth by about 2.8 percentage points in 2013-14.
- Administrative controls expected to lower growth in 2013-14 by about 0.5 percentage point.
- Cumulative output loss relative to trend for 2013-16 estimated at around 50 percent of potential output.

---

### Financial sector policy, recapitalization, and restructuring

### Immediate and medium-term actions
- Immediate actions: resolution, restructuring, and recapitalization of the two largest insolvent banks with contributions from bank creditors, including uninsured depositors; domestically-owned sector downsized from 550 to 350 percent of GDP.
- CBC to increase minimum CT1 capital requirement to 9 percent by end-2013.
- Remaining banks covered in PIMCO due diligence instructed to meet regulatory requirements under PIMCO‘s stress scenario by end-September; if not, state recapitalization per state aid rules with dilution of existing shareholdings and junior debt but without depositors’ contributions.
- For private banks and CCIs (assessed as a whole) found solvent overall — uninsured depositors will not be expected to participate in recapitalization; recapitalization via private or public funds.

### Bank of Cyprus (BoC) and Cyprus Popular Bank (CPB) specifics
- 37.5 percent of BoC uninsured deposits converted into equity; further 22.5 percent frozen pending valuation; remaining 40 percent subject to withdrawal restrictions to be lifted gradually.
- BoC and CPB independent valuation by end-June 2013 (structural benchmark).
- CT1 target for BoC: 9 percent by end-program under stress.
- Completion of valuation could permit BoC to re-access Eurosystem refinancing (structural benchmark for end-September).

### Restructuring of the credit cooperative sector (CCIs)
- Sector: about 100 CCIs, NPLs averaged 38 percent at end-June 2012.
- PIMCO identified capital shortfall of around €600 million for a sample of 17 CCIs.
- Agreed measures:
  - Assess capital needs for CCIs not covered by PIMCO by end-June 2013 (structural benchmark).
  - CCIs to raise capital in market; those unable to access private capital will be restructured and recapitalized with public funds, without depositor contribution.
  - Public funds for recapitalization/restructuring to be disbursed into a special account at the time of the first review.

### Enhancing preparedness to deal with troubled borrowers
- CBC to assess and modify frameworks to facilitate out-of-court debt workouts; banks to develop NPL strategies for viable borrowers.
- Consider an ombudsman-type institution to mediate between borrowers and banks.
- Consider use of tax exemptions related to voluntary discounts on loan repayments.

### Enhancing regulation and supervision
- Credit quality monitoring:
  - Banks will report NPLs timely and adequately based on internationally-recognized definitions.
  - Establish a central credit register (structural benchmark for end-September 2013).
- Early corrective actions:
  - Empower CBC with supervisory tools (penalties, remove managers, suspend dividends).
- Supervision and regulation of CCIs:
  - Transfer supervisory powers from Ministry to CBC and harmonize standards.
  - Prohibit CCIs from lending to independent board members and remove board members in arrears.
  - Annual audit requirement for largest CCIs.

### Strengthening the AML framework
- AML legal framework amended in December 2012; independent audit agreed in April 2013.
- Further measures (structural benchmark for end-September 2013):
  - Revise legal framework to facilitate international exchange of financial intelligence prior to judicial proceedings.
  - Ensure transparency of legal persons and trusts; business register functional.
  - Strengthen AML supervision: CBC to revise off-site and on-site procedures and request Fund TA.
  - By first review, develop corrective measures to strengthen customer due diligence implementation.

---

### Fiscal policy: consolidation, composition, and structural reforms

### Consolidation path and measures
- 2013 budget and supporting legislation include consolidation measures estimated at about 5 percent of GDP for 2013-2016.
- Two prior-action measures implemented permanently yielding 2.2 percent of GDP (2013-2018):
  - Increase corporate income tax rate from 10 to 12.5 percent.
  - Raise bank levy on deposits from 0.11 to 0.15 percent.
  - Raise withholding tax rate on interest income from 15 to 30 percent.
  - Rationalize housing programs and reform property taxation.
- Additional consolidation needs:
  - An additional 4.7 percent of GDP in measures over 2015-18 will be needed to attain the primary surplus target of 4 percent of GDP.
  - Projected consolidation includes measures of about 1.4 percent of GDP each in 2015 and 2016 and 1 percent of GDP in 2017 and in 2018.
- Fiscal consolidation composition (2013-2018, percent of GDP):
  - Approved Measures total: 5.0
    - Revenues (approved): 2.1
    - Expenditure (approved): 2.8
  - Agreed Measures total: 2.2
    - Revenues (agreed): 2.0
    - Expenditure (agreed): 0.2
  - Unidentified measures: 4.7
  - Total consolidation (2013-2018): 11.8

### Public sector spending and protection of vulnerable groups
- Public sector wage bill (including pensions) and social transfers represented about 67 percent of total expenditure in 2012.
- Reforms proposed:
  - Further reform generous pension scheme for public servants (streamline gratuities, institute career averages).
  - Streamline programs with overlapping objectives; adjust eligibility to better reach those in need.

### Structural fiscal reforms and PFM
- COLA reform implemented: partial indexation and automatic suspension during recessions.
- Parametric pension reform introduced in January 2013.
- MTBF legislated (rolling three-year framework); secondary legislation to be finalized for 2014 budget (structural benchmark).
- Inventory of government assets to form basis for privatization plan aiming to raise €1.4 billion by 2018.
- Revenue administration reforms: finalize reform strategy by end-June (diagnostic assessment).
- Social protection targeting: reform to create safety net and improve means testing (structural benchmark, end-2013).
- Actuarial study for GSIS by end-July 2013; additional pension reform measures may be developed after assessment.

---

### Debt sustainability, external sector, and risks

### Debt dynamics and projections
- Debt-to-GDP ratio expected to peak at 126 percent in 2015.
- With full implementation of program policies, debt ratio projected to fall to around 105 percent of GDP by 2020.
- Macroeconomic risks unusually high; slippages would have profound adverse implications.

### External debt and gross financing needs
- External debt, including deposits by non-residents, estimated at close to 450 percent of GDP at end-2012; net international investment position was -90 percent of GDP.
- External debt expected to fall to under 330 percent of GDP in 2013 reflecting divestment of Greek branches and losses by non-residents on uninsured deposits.
- Long-term external debt-to-GDP expected to decline to under 275 percent of GDP as growth rebounds and non-resident deposit base shrinks.
- Gross financing requirements (millions of euros): 2012: 61,181; 2013: 27,635; 2014: 23,615; 2015: 22,766; 2016: 21,385; 2017: 20,702; 2018: 20,961; 2019: 20,880; 2020: 21,704.
- FINANCING GAP (Table 5): 0 (2012), 5,260 (2013), 2,449 (2014), 1,936 (2015), 352 (2016), 0 (2017 onward).

### Stress tests and downside scenarios
- Stress-test outcomes (selected):
  - Growth risk (permanent one-half std dev decline): debt increases to 132 percent of GDP by 2016.
  - Primary balance risk (reduction by one-half std dev ≈ 1.8 percent): debt ratio rises to 129 percent in 2016.
  - Contingent liabilities shock (one-time 10 percent of GDP in 2013): debt reaches 132 percent in 2016.
  - Tailored shock: 20 percent recession in 2013-2014 brings debt to 149 percent of GDP by 2016 and 143 percent in 2020 after full use of macro buffer.
  - Combination shock: simultaneous growth, interest rate, and primary balance shocks could raise debt to 138 percent in 2016.
- Sensitivity illustrative impacts on debt (percent of GDP):
  - Permanent one percentage point decline in growth: 9.5 (2016), 24.9 (2020).
  - One year contingent liability shock of 10 percent of GDP in 2013: 10.6 (2016), 10.4 (2020).
  - Delaying privatization by one year: raises debt ratio by 3.0 (2016), 0.2 (2020).
  - Absence of privatization: 6.0 (2016), 8.1 (2020).

### Risks to the program and mitigating factors
- Key risks:
  - Banking crisis impact uncertainty; deeper contraction in business and financial service exports; administrative controls and deposit relocations.
  - Renewed pressure on banking system; litigation risks; continued reliance on ELA.
  - Implementation capacity and political resolve; privatization success uncertainty; AML reform implementation challenges.
- Mitigating factors:
  - Financing envelope provides buffers (about 10 percent of GDP included).
  - More stringent capitalization requirements for resolved banks (CT1 of 9 rather than 6 percent).
  - Significant upfront fiscal and financial actions already undertaken.

---

### Monitoring, conditionality, and staff appraisal

### Program monitoring, conditionality, and benchmarks
- Monitoring framework:
  - Quarterly reviews, quarterly and continuous performance criteria, and structural benchmarks.
- Prior actions:
  - Passage of legislation implementing fiscal measures of 2.2 percent of GDP as a prior action.
- Selected quantitative performance criteria (millions of Euros) for end-June and end-September 2013 (examples):
  - Floor on general government primary balance (cumulative): Jun-13 -222; Sep-13 -248
  - Ceiling on general government primary expenditure (cumulative): Jun-13 3230; Sep-13 4911
  - Ceiling on stock of general government debt: Jun-13 17153; Sep-13 17464
  - Ceilings on accumulation of arrears and guarantees specified (continuous/periodic PCs).
- Structural benchmarks focused on financial stability and fiscal institutions (independent valuation of BoC and CPB; transfer of CCIs supervision to CBC; central credit register; AML revisions; fiscal responsibility law; privatization milestones).

### Capacity to repay the Fund and safeguards
- Outstanding credit to the Fund expected to peak in 2016 at about 563 percent of quota.
- Debt service to the Fund as a ratio of exports of goods and services will peak at 1 percent in 2020.
- CBC safeguards assessment to be completed by first review; Fund disbursements to be deposited in a government account at the CBC.

### Staff appraisal — key findings and policy recommendations
- Crisis context and response:
  - Cyprus lost market access almost two years prior as imbalances and oversized contingent liabilities became unsustainable.
  - Authorities intervened in two insolvent banks with assets of around four times GDP; large capital needs covered by conversion into equity of bank claims, including uninsured deposits, avoiding public funding that would have raised public debt to unsustainable levels and protecting insured depositors.
- Remaining challenges and priorities:
  - Stabilize the banking sector: complete recapitalization, complete asset valuation and ensure sufficient capitalization; recapitalize/restructure other banks and the cooperative sector as needed; prioritize communication to rebuild depositor confidence.
  - Eurosystem liquidity support is critical to allow removal of payment restrictions; monitor effects of restrictions and relax them as banks build liquidity buffers.
  - Strengthen supervision and regulation: improve credit quality monitoring, enhance early intervention frameworks, harmonize bank and coop supervision, beef up AML supervision, increase transparency of legal entities and trusts.
  - Put public finances on a sustainable path: adopt remaining fiscal measures to bring the deficit down; securing ambitious long-run primary surplus target requires further measures beyond the program period.
  - Fiscal structural reforms: continue COLA and pension reforms; improve budget processes and revenue administration; better target social welfare programs.
  - Authorities’ commitments to share financing burden are welcome (rollover of domestic debt, Russian loan rescheduling, privatization, allocation of central bank profits, debt-asset swaps).
- Urgency and implementation:
  - Given substantial risks to the outlook and debt sustainability, there is no room for implementation slippages.
  - Timely and comprehensive implementation of the adjustment program is critical to maintain credibility; should risks materialize, additional financing measures may be necessary.

---

*Source: IMF staff report extract "1. Dealing with the Problem Banks" and related sections from content unit _cr13125.*

### 1. Dealing with the Problem Banks _________________________________________________________________7

### 1. Dealing with the Problem Banks

### Background: pre-crisis imbalances and sovereign-bank links
- Banking sector grew to over eight times GDP prior to the global financial crisis.
- Current account deficits peaked at 15 percent of GDP in 2008.
- Household and corporate sector gross indebtedness rose to one of the largest levels in the euro area.
- Public debt rose rapidly following eurozone entry in 2008.
- By end-2011: bank loans to Greek residents reached 130 percent of Cyprus‘ GDP; holdings of Greek government bonds reached 30 percent of GDP.
- Public debt was under 70 percent of GDP in mid-2011 but climbed to 86 percent of GDP in 2012 after recession and banking losses.
- Authorities requested a 3-year Extended Fund Facility arrangement: SDR 891 million (563 percent of quota, about €1 billion); SDR 74  .25 million (about €86 million) to be made available upon Board approval, and a similar amount to be disbursed in eleven installments, subject to quarterly reviews.
- Additional financial support from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) of about €9 billion.

### Recent economic developments (key outcomes and indicators)
- Output contracted by 2½ percent in 2012, with the decline accelerating toward the end of the year.
  - Investment plunged by 23 percent in 2012.
  - Consumption fell by 2.7 percent in 2012.
- Unemployment rate reached 14 percent in February (2013 context).
- Inflation declined to 1.3 percent in March (2013 context).
- Trade deficit narrowed to 2.5 percent of GDP in 2012 from 4 percent of GDP in 2011 (down from 11.4 percent of GDP in 2008).
- Current account deficit increased to close to 12 percent of GDP in 2012.
  - Net income balance moved from a surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP in 2011 to a deficit of 8.2 percent of GDP in 2012.
- Fiscal deficit declined to an estimated 5.6 percent of GDP in 2012 from 6.3 percent of GDP in 2011.
  - Government financing relied on remaining disbursements from a €2.5 billion Russian loan contracted in 2011 and t-bills purchased by banks and pension funds of state-owned enterprises.
- Banking system liquidity pressures and deposit outflows:
  - Since early 2012, banking system lost 10 percent of domestically raised deposits.
  - The second largest bank (nationalized mid-2012) lost 1/3 of deposits.
  - Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) by the Central Bank of Cyprus reached 60 percent of GDP in late 2012 (largely concentrated in one bank).
  - PIMCO due diligence (February 2013) revealed capital needs for the banks of around 60 percent of GDP.

### Dealing with the problem banks: strategy and measures (Box 1)
- Issue identified by PIMCO: the two largest banks (Bank of Cyprus (BoC) and Cyprus Popular Bank (CPB)) were economically insolvent; projected to accumulate large losses through 2015.
  - Under an adverse stress scenario (recession close to 10 percent in 2012-14; NPLs nearly 70 percent of gross loans by 2015; provisioning of 50 percent), achieving a Core Tier 1 (CT1) capital ratio of 6 percent would require a total of 44 percent of GDP (close to €8 billion).
  - Such funds were not available privately and public capital injection would render public debt unsustainable.
- Strategy: resolve, downsize, and recapitalize the two banks at no additional fiscal cost.
- Key actions taken on March 25 (Central Bank of Cyprus intervention):
  - Sale of the CPB and BoC Greek operations to Greece’s Piraeus bank.
    - Reduced the two banks’ balance sheets by 1/3 and cut contingent liabilities to cover almost €9 billion of insured Greek deposits.
  - Transfer of CPB’s UK branch deposits to BoC-UK in exchange for equal cash reserves at the Bank of England.
  - Resolution of CPB:
    - Assets, insured deposits, interbank liabilities, and ELA transferred to BoC.
    - Uninsured deposits and remaining assets left in CPB under liquidation; the liquidating unit to receive BoC shares in exchange for the positive net asset position transferred.
    - The transferred CPB balance sheet had a CT1-ratio of 9 percent under PIMCO‘s stress scenario.
  - Recapitalization of BoC with participation of bank creditors, including uninsured depositors:
    - Creditors’ claims converted into equity in order of seniority: uninsured deposits → A-shares; senior debt → B-shares; subordinated debt → C-shares; convertible capital instruments → D-shares; rights of ordinary shares suspended.
    - A-shares holders must recover full initial capital plus interest through dividends before other shares collect dividends or voting rights.
    - Preliminary conversion ratio on uninsured deposits: 37.5 percent (based on preliminary valuation under PIMCO stress scenario).
    - Remaining 62.5 percent: 22.5 percent frozen pending independent valuation; the last 40 percent subject to withdrawal restrictions to be lifted gradually.

- Systemic outcome:
  - Banking system effectively shrunk by about 200 percent of GDP as a result of the resolution and sales.

- PIMCO due diligence tabulated indicators (September 2012 data):
  - CT1 2015 (percent of RWAs) under PIMCO baseline and adverse scenarios provided for institutions in the due diligence.
  - Capital shortfall (PIMCO adverse) entries include: 22.2; 21.5; 1.9; 0.8; 3.3; 49.8 (percent of GDP as presented in table).

### Spillovers and market reaction (Box 2)
- Spillovers from Cyprus were limited in magnitude.
  - The Cyprus developments triggered a flight to safety and a sell-off in some euro area bank stocks, with the strongest impacts in assets directly exposed to Cyprus: Greek government bonds, Greek and Russian bank stocks, subordinated debt in some periphery country banks, and Slovenian government bonds.
  - Other financial assets remained largely unscathed.
- Market reaction was largely temporary; after initial sell-off most markets stabilized and some regained ground.
  - Peripheral government bond prices posted gains relative to their month-end lows.
  - Peripheral bank stocks were more sluggish.
- Possible explanations for muted response:
  - Cyprus circumstances viewed as unique: an outsized banking system relative to fiscal capacity funded by a large share of non-resident uninsured deposits is uncommon.
  - Inventory of European policy tools to mitigate widespread bank and sovereign funding stress:
    - Monetary policy options (rate cuts and/or generalized quantitative easing).
    - ECB actions: i) relax collateral eligibility rules; ii) announce another wave of LTRO; iii) activate the OMT facility.

### Temporary administrative measures to safeguard financial stability (Box 3)
- A 6-day "bank holiday" was implemented while bank restructuring was clarified and executed.
- To prevent a run when banks reopened, the authorities temporarily froze uninsured deposits in BoC and imposed restrictions on cash withdrawals and transfers both domestically and across borders.
- As of April 24 (2013 context), main restrictions included:
  - Cash:
    - Withdrawals limited to a maximum of €9,000 per month.
    - Export of bank notes abroad restricted to €2,000 per person and journey.
  - Checks, credit, and debit cards:
    - Cashing of checks prohibited to prevent circumvention of cash restrictions; checks can be used for payments and transfers within Cyprus consistent with wire transfer rules.
    - Credit and debit cards usable for domestic payments and transfers to the same extent as wire transfers.
    - Usage abroad restricted to €5,000 per accountholder per month.
  - Wire-transfers:
    - Exemptions: businesses—domestic up to €300,000 and cross-border up to €20,000.
    - Payments exceeding these limits subject to approval of the Restrictions Committee (including CBC and MoF) after verification of normal business activity.
    - Individuals may transfer up to €3,000; legal persons up to €50,000 to another domestic bank.
    - Salary payments not subject to restrictions.
  - Prohibition to open new accounts:
    - Banks may not open accounts for new customers except for funds received from abroad or with Committee approval.
  - Extension of term deposits:
    - Maturing term deposits extended for one month except for an amount of €5,000 or 20 percent of the deposit.
    - Term deposits may be used to offset existing loans within the same bank to prevent increases in nonperforming loans.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt "1. Dealing with the Problem Banks".*

### 10. The authorities’ program focuses on two key objectives aimed at achieving sustainable

### _cr13125 - 10. The authorities’ program focuses on two key objectives aimed at achieving sustainable

### Program objectives and strategy
- Two key objectives:
  - Restoring financial sector stability: place the banking system on a sustainable footing to restore financial intermediation and support economic activity; complete financial sector recapitalization; gradually restore normal financial flows; reform supervision and regulation.
  - Achieving sustainable public finances: ambitious and well-paced fiscal adjustment balancing short-run cyclical concerns and long-run sustainability, while protecting vulnerable groups; complement fiscal adjustment with structural fiscal reforms, privatization, and reforms to the public wage indexation mechanism to strengthen efficiency and competitiveness.

### Rationale for chosen strategy / Alternatives considered
- Recapitalization of insolvent banks with public money would have produced unsustainable debt, peaking at close to 150 percent of GDP, with significant risk of increasing further.
- Non-debt creating strategies (direct recapitalization by the ESM, ELA restructuring, outright sale of troubled banks) were not available.
- Exit from the euro-zone would only partially address problems and would have led to devaluation, default, and large losses for taxpayers and insured depositors.
- A proposed large one-off levy on insured and uninsured deposits was rejected because it failed to differentiate solvent vs. insolvent institutions and conflicted with deposit insurance aims.
- Outcome: protected status of insured deposits and an institution-based approach to bank resolution.

### Official financing and program coverage
- With no prospects for access to international debt markets, financing needs over the next few years will need to be covered mainly through official sources.
- Program designed to cover:
  - debt amortization falling due,
  - financing of the fiscal deficit,
  - recapitalization of banks other than the two institutions being restructured,
  - buffers from official sources and bank creditors to cover residual risks.
- Compliance expected to allow a gradual rebuilding of market access at reasonable terms over the long run.

### Macro framework — activity and outlook
- Activity contraction and medium-term recovery:
  - Negative growth of about 9 and 4 percent is projected for 2013 and 2014, respectively.
  - A gradual recovery starting in 2015; growth projected to stabilize at 1¾ percent by 2020 (authorities expected somewhat higher long-run growth pending gas investment prospects).
- Channels and contributors to contraction:
  - Conversion of uninsured deposits into equity will severely affect private sector balance sheets, impairing consumption and investment.
  - Administrative restrictions likely to disrupt payment system.
  - Banking sector deleveraging will compress financial and related services.
  - Fiscal consolidation will have a strong negative impact; fiscal multipliers assumed larger during recessions.
- Selected economic indicator projections (Percent change, unless otherwise indicated):
  - Real GDP: 2013 -8.7; 2014 -3.9; 2015 1.1; 2016 1.9; 2017 2.3; 2018 2.2; 2019 1.9; 2020 1.8
  - Consumption: 2013 -11.5; 2014 -5.1; 2015 0.8; 2016 1.9; 2017 2.5; 2018 2.5; 2019 2.2; 2020 2.2
    - Private consumption: 2013 -12.3; 2014 -5.6; 2015 1.6; 2016 2.9; 2017 3.4; 2018 3.3; 2019 2.6; 2020 2.4
    - Public consumption: 2013 -8.9; 2014 -3.7; 2015 -1.7; 2016 -1.3; 2017 -0.6; 2018 -0.1; 2019 0.9; 2020 1.5
  - Fixed investment: 2013 -29.5; 2014 -12.0; 2015 2.3; 2016 3.5; 2017 5.5; 2018 4.3; 2019 4.2; 2020 4.0
  - Foreign balance (Contribution to growth): 2013 5.2; 2014 1.6; 2015 0.2; 2016 -0.1; 2017 -0.3; 2018 -0.3; 2019 -0.4; 2020 -0.4
  - HICP (period average): 2013 1.0; 2014 1.2; 2015 1.6; 2016 1.7; 2017 1.7; 2018 1.8; 2019 1.9; 2020 2.0
  - Unemployment rate EU standard (percent): 2013 15.5; 2014 16.9; 2015 14.6; 2016 13.7; 2017 12.9; 2018 12.0; 2019 11.1; 2020 10.2

### Inflation and competitiveness
- Core inflation projected to decline to 0.4 percent due to depressed activity; increased excise taxes will keep headline inflation close to 1 percent.
- A negative inflation differential with the euro area over the next few years will contribute to a small improvement in Cyprus‘ competitiveness; a larger competitiveness adjustment could require a more negative inflation differential.

### Box 4 — Impact of the Crisis on Economic Activity (key quantified channels)
- Fiscal adjustment: a frontloaded consolidation of 6.6 percent of GDP in 2013-14 is assumed to have a one-for-one impact on growth.
- Deposit-to-equity swap estimated to cut growth by about 3 percentage points.
- Banks‘ deleveraging expected to reduce growth by about 2.8 percentage points in 2013-14 (based on assumption that a 100 percent decline in bank's assets results in a 2.5 percent reduction in GDP growth).
- Administrative controls on payments and withdrawals expected to lower growth in 2013-14 by about 0.5 percentage point.
- Cumulative output loss relative to trend for 2013-16 estimated at around 50 percent of potential output.

### External sector and financing
- Current account deficit projected to narrow to close to 2 percent of GDP in 2013 due to import compression and correction in net income balance.
- Exports of financial and business services expected to be severely affected; tourism receipts expected to remain resilient.
- Long-term current account deficit expected to stabilize at around 2 percent of GDP.
- Official funds expected to be the largest source of external financing; FDI projected to boost financing once privatizations materialize; private sector will continue to draw down foreign portfolio assets to meet financing needs.

### Risks to the outlook
- Risks substantial and tilted to the downside:
  - Deeper contraction in professional business and financial service exports if foreign banks and large deposits relocate faster/larger than assumed.
  - Domestic vicious cycles: bankruptcies, real estate price corrections, prolonged payment restrictions, bank losses, and unemployment could deepen the slump and feed back onto fiscal accounts and public debt.
- Upside risks:
  - Faster banking stabilization could rebuild confidence, allow earlier removal of controls, and faster recovery.
  - Potential support from larger investments in the energy sector.

### Debt sustainability
- Debt-to-GDP ratio expected to peak at 126 percent in 2015 given continued fiscal deficits and weak growth.
- With full implementation of program policies, debt ratio projected to fall to around 105 percent of GDP by 2020.
- Macroeconomic risks unusually high; a worse-than-expected outlook or implementation slippages would have profound adverse implications and could require additional financing measures.

### External debt
- External debt, including deposits by non-residents, estimated at close to 450 percent of GDP at end-2012; net international investment position was -90 percent of GDP.
- External debt expected to fall to under 330 percent of GDP in 2013, reflecting divestment of Greek branches and losses incurred by non-residents on uninsured deposits.
- Long-term external debt-to-GDP ratio expected to decline to under 275 percent of GDP as growth rebounds, non-resident deposit base shrinks, and sizeable non-interest current account surpluses materialize.

### Financial sector policy — recapitalization and restructuring
- Immediate actions: resolution, restructuring, and recapitalization of the two largest insolvent banks with contributions from bank creditors, including uninsured depositors, averted system collapse and reduced contingent sovereign liabilities; domestically-owned sector downsized from 550 to 350 percent of GDP.
- Remaining challenges: restrictions remain in place, depositor uncertainty, recession effects on bank balance sheets; need to complete restructuring/recapitalization to rebuild confidence, normalize flows, and set conditions for sustained growth.
- Policy directions:
  - Distinguish between solvent and insolvent institutions; insured depositors protected.
  - In intervened insolvent banks, part of uninsured deposits converted into shares; additional uninsured deposit buffer set aside pending independent asset valuation of BoC.
  - Staff cautioned against exemptions from conversion into equity to avoid unequal treatment among uninsured depositors.
  - For private banks and coop sector (assessed as a whole), found solvent overall — uninsured depositors will not be expected to participate in recapitalization; recapitalization via private or public funds.
  - Viable commercial banks given six months to raise capital (guided by PIMCO adverse scenario); if not, state recapitalization per state aid rules with dilution of existing shareholdings and junior debt holdings but without depositors’ contributions; publicly recapitalized banks to submit business plans with clear downsizing targets (divestiture of non-core activities, reduction of operational costs).

### Specific measures for Bank of Cyprus (BoC) and Cyprus Popular Bank (CPB)
- Independent fair value assessment of BoC and CPB assets and liabilities required (structural benchmark for end-June 2013) to finalize balance sheet and determine additional capital needs to ensure CT1 ratio of 9 percent by end-program.
- In addition to 37.5 percent of BoC uninsured deposits converted into equity, a further 22.5 percent will remain frozen and subject to potential conversion after valuation.
- Completion of valuation could permit BoC to re-access normal Eurosystem refinancing facilities (structural benchmark for end-September).

### Restructuring of the credit cooperative sector (CCIs)
- Sector comprised of about 100 Credit Cooperative Institutions, NPLs averaged 38 percent at end-June 2012.
- PIMCO identified capital shortfall of around €600 million for a sample of 17 CCIs (more than half of sector assets), with some CCIs’ capital needs exceeding 15 percent of own assets.
- Authorities’ agreed measures:
  - Assessment of capital needs for individual CCIs not covered by PIMCO to be finalized by end-June 2013 (structural benchmark).
  - CCIs given opportunity to raise capital in the market.
  - CCIs unable to access sufficient private capital will be orderly and gradually restructured and recapitalized with public funds, without contribution by depositors; a restructuring strategy is a structural benchmark for end-July.
  - Public funds for recapitalization/restructuring to be disbursed into a special account at the time of the first review, to be drawn on over time as CCIs are restructured, subject to minimum governance and operational criteria.

*Source: IMF staff estimates.*

### 24. Discussions focused on the tradeoff between freeing payment flows and preserving

### 24. Discussions focused on the tradeoff between freeing payment flows and preserving

### Tradeoff between freeing payment flows and preserving financial stability
- Authorities concerned about significant costs to economic activity from restrictive measures: inability of working capital to flow freely within the economy and abroad, given the small island's heavy dependence on imports.
- Concerns that subjecting international banks to overall restrictions could be detrimental to other business services affiliated to the offshore activity of these banks.
- Recognition that eliminating restrictions too abruptly could lead to disruptive outflows and liquidity problems in the banking sector.
- Agreed strategy:
  - Relax restrictions gradually, based on close monitoring of trends and of banks’ liquidity buffers.
  - Lift restrictions on domestic transactions before lifting those on international payments as conditions ameliorate.
  - Consider exempting offshore operations of foreign banks from restrictions to preserve affiliated business services, while noting staff concerns about the effectiveness of ring-fencing.
  - Risks from failure to prevent outflows from domestic to foreign banks: domestic liquidity pressures.
- Conditions for lifting restrictions:
  - Completing restructuring process expected to restore confidence and gradually stabilize funding.
  - Availability of euro-system liquidity will be critical.
  - Sufficient availability of ELA and a resumption of ECB counterparty status for BoC will be needed to allow for a lifting of restrictions.

### Enhancing preparedness to deal with troubled borrowers
- Framework for debt workouts to be enhanced to facilitate cleanup of banks’ portfolios (MEFP ¶19).
- Rationale: already high and likely rising NPLs; tools to address overdue loans expeditiously help banks and borrowers.
- Agreed actions:
  - CBC will assess and modify existing frameworks to facilitate out-of-court debt workouts according to international best practice.
  - Banks to develop strategies to deal with NPLs of viable, but temporarily troubled borrowers while minimizing moral hazard; these strategies to be carefully monitored.
  - Authorities to consider an ombudsman-type institution to mediate between borrowers and banks.
  - Consider use of tax exemptions related to voluntary discounts on loan repayments.

### Enhancing regulation and supervision
- Identified deficiencies that allowed rapid banking sector expansion and risk buildup: monitoring of credit quality (including nonstandard NPL definitions), lack of an early supervisory framework, heterogeneous supervisory standards and responsibilities for banks and CCIs.
- Agreed regulatory strengthening along three dimensions:
  - Credit quality monitoring:
    - Banks will: (i) report NPLs timely and adequately, based on internationally-recognized definitions; (ii) comply with materially enhanced risk-management practices, including proper underwriting and loan-collection standards, as well as appropriate collateral valuation and provisioning practices; and (iii) be able to obtain credit information from individuals and corporates from a credit register that will need to be established to effectively monitor large exposures and troubled borrowers (structural benchmark for end-September 2013).
  - Early corrective actions:
    - Empower CBC with supervisory tools (including the ability to impose penalties, remove bank managers, and suspend dividend payments) to address vulnerabilities before they threaten financial stability.
  - Supervision and regulation of CCIs:
    - Transfer supervisory and regulatory powers of the sector from the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism to the CBC and harmonize standards with those of commercial banks.
    - Prohibit CCIs from lending to independent board members and remove all board members in arrears on existing loans.
    - Require an annual audit performed by a recognized and independent auditing firm for the largest CCIs.

### Strengthening the anti-money laundering (AML) framework
- Despite a relatively positive Moneyval evaluation in 2011, more recent evaluation shows significant weaknesses, especially in implementation, which may have contributed to the attractiveness and unsustainable growth of Cyprus‘ financial sector.
- Actions taken and agreed:
  - AML legal framework amended in December 2012 to incorporate tax and other fiscal-related elements.
  - Agreed in April 2013 to an independent audit of the implementation of the AML framework by credit institutions.
  - Going forward, additional measures to improve transparency and effectiveness of AML framework:
    - Further revise the legal framework in line with international standards and best practice (structural benchmark for end-September 2013). Changes to facilitate international exchange of financial intelligence prior to judicial proceedings and enable authorities to obtain adequate, accurate, and timely information on legal persons and trusts registered in Cyprus or subject to Cyprus law.
    - Ensure transparency of legal persons and trusts is properly implemented: business register is currently dysfunctional and supervision of lawyers, accountants and trusts and company service providers will need to be stepped-up.
    - Strengthen AML supervision of financial institutions: CBC will revise off-site and on-site supervisory procedures to implement a risk-based approach to AML supervision, and has requested Fund TA. By the time of the first review, develop corrective measures to strengthen implementation of customer due diligence measures by banks to address issues raised in the independent audit.

### Fiscal Policy: consolidation path and measures
- Understanding reached on fiscal consolidation path:
  - 2013 budget and supporting legislation include consolidation measures estimated at about 5 percent of GDP for 2013-2016: scaled public sector wage cuts of 10-15 percent, rationalization of social benefits and pensions, and increases in the VAT, excise taxes, and social security contributions.
  - Mission advice: (1) limit additional fiscal measures beyond those already in train; (2) provide more time to reach authorities' long-term primary balance target of 4 percent of GDP; (3) be ready to identify and implement additional measures taking effect during 2015-  2018 required to reach the long-term target.
  - Pace of consolidation comparable to other European programs.
- New measures (prior action), expected to permanently yield 2.2  percent of GDP, include:
  - Increase corporate income tax rate from 10 to 12.5 percent.
  - Raise bank levy on deposits from 0.11 to 0.15 percent.
  - Raise withholding tax rate on interest income from 15 to 30 percent.
  - Rationalize housing programs.
  - Reform property taxation by amending rates and/or thresholds.
  - Expenditure measures account for about 40 percent of the total implemented and agreed consolidation package for 2013-16.
  - Program targets for 2013 could be adjusted to allow compensation of pension funds in CPB to ensure equal treatment with those in BoC (expected before September).
- Additional consolidation needs:
  - An additional 4.7 percent of GDP in measures over 2015-18 will be needed to attain the primary surplus target of 4 percent of GDP.
  - Public debt projected to reach 126 percent by the end of the program period; a 4 percent of GDP primary surplus is needed to place debt on a downward path toward close to 100 percent of GDP.
  - Projected consolidation path includes measures of about 1.4 percent of GDP each in 2015 and 2016 and 1 percent of GDP in 2017 and in 2018.
  - To buttress credibility, fiscal targets will be defined and included in binding medium-term ceilings for future budgets, in line with the new medium-term budget framework.
- Fiscal consolidation composition (excerpted figures from table “Fiscal Consolidation, 2013-18 (percent of GDP)”):
  - Approved Measures total: 5.0 (2013-2018 sum)
  - Revenues (approved): 2.1 (2013-2018)
    - Increase in the VAT standard and reduced rates: 0.6 (2013-2018)
    - Increases in excise rates: 0.7 (2013-2018)
    - Increase in pension contributions: 0.4 (2013-2018)
  - Expenditure (approved): 2.8 (2013-2018)
    - Nominal wage cuts: 1.2 (2013-2018)
    - Rationalization of social transfers: 1.1 (2013-2018)
  - Agreed Measures total: 2.2 (2013-2018)
    - Revenues (agreed): 2.0 (2013-2018)
      - Increase in the corporate income tax rate from 10 to 12.5 percent: 0.5 (2013-2018)
      - Increase in the withholding tax rate on interest from 15 to 30 percent: 0.8 (2013-2018)
      - Increase in the bank levy rate from 0.11 to 0.15: 0.1 (2013-2018)
      - Increased property taxation: 0.5 (2013-2018)
    - Expenditure (agreed): 0.2 (2013-2018)
  - Unidentified measures: 4.7 (2013-2018)
  - Total consolidation (2013-2018): 11.8 (percent of GDP, sum across items)

### Scope to streamline public spending and protect vulnerable groups
- Public sector wage bill (including public pensions) and social transfers represented about 67 percent of total expenditure in 2012.
- Public sector wage bill remains significantly higher than EU average even after cuts; public sector employees receive additional benefits including generous pensions, favorable working hours, and overtime payments.
- Potential reforms:
  - Further reform generous pension scheme for public servants by streamlining gratuities and instituting career averages for pension calculations.
  - Streamline programs with overlapping objectives or poor targeting and adjust eligibility criteria to better reach those in need.

### Structural fiscal reforms
- Recent reforms:
  - Reform of cost of living adjustment (COLA) public wage indexation system: allows partial (rather than full) indexation and automatic suspension during recessions.
  - Parametric pension reform introduced in January 2013 improving long-term viability.
- Agreed further efforts:
  - Strengthen management of public resources.
  - Enhance revenue collections.
  - Improve targeting of social welfare programs.
  - Further improve viability of pension system.
  - Rationalize and privatize state-owned enterprises.
- Public financial management (PFM) actions:
  - Medium-term budget framework (MTBF): rolling three-year framework; MTBF law compliant with EU requirements approved in December 2012.
  - Authorities agreed to finalize secondary legislation and regulations to have the MTBF fully in place for the 2014 budget, and to submit to Parliament a fiscal responsibility and budget systems law (structural benchmark for end-December 2013).
  - Framework to manage natural resources to be developed in line with best practice; to be discussed in future reviews.
  - Public-private partnerships (PPPs): authorities agreed to put in place institutional and legal framework to manage PPPs and improve reporting on fiscal risks from PPPs, semi-government entities, SOEs, and local governments.
- Revenue administration:
  - Organizational fragmentation weakens taxpayer compliance; Cyprus‘ informal economy larger than the OECD average (26 versus 14 percent of GDP).
  - Declared income for more than 3/4 th of self-employed taxpayers (about 15 percent of the tax base) was under the taxable threshold at end-2011.
  - Authorities agreed to finalize a reform strategy by end-June based on a diagnostic assessment of the Inland Revenue Department and the VAT Services.
- Social protection targeting:
  - Significant leakage to richer groups: for child benefits and student grants, less than 15 and 10 percent of the benefits reach the 20 poorest percent of the population.
  - Agreed reform of social benefits aims to create a safety net, consolidate benefits, and provide more consistent means testing with binding income thresholds (structural benchmark, end-2013).
- Pensions:
  - An actuarial study agreed to assess effects of recent pension reforms on financial viability of the general pension system and expected net budgetary cost of public pension system.
  - Based on assessment, additional reform measures may be developed in future reviews to ensure financial viability through 2060.
- Privatization:
  - Inventory of government assets, including SOEs and real-estate, to form basis for a privatization plan aiming to raise €1.4 billion by 2018.
  - Identify public assets that could be swapped for debt currently held by the central bank of about €1 billion.
  - Streamlining public sector by divesting nonessential entities can reduce fiscal risks and minimize budget transfer costs (1.5 percent to GDP at end-2012).

_International Monetary Fund_

### 39. The authorities’ program will be supported by a three-year EFF arrangement for SDR

### 39. The authorities’ program will be supported by a three-year EFF arrangement for SDR

### Program financing and size
- Fund contribution: SDR 891 million (about €1 billion), or 563 percent of quota, equally phased (Table 7).
- Estimated external financing package required (after authorities’ measures) over 2013Q2-2016Q1: €10 billion (Table 5).
- European partners’ pledge: about €9 billion.
- Financing assurances are in place for the program (MEFP ¶34).

### Assurances and authorities’ commitments
- Authorities committed to a number of measures to ensure financing needs under the program will be met:
  - (i) rolling-over and extending maturity of at least €1 billion of domestic debt held by residents and rolling-over the €1.9 billion recapitalization bond injected in CPB in 2012 (end-June structural benchmark);
  - (ii) privatizing public assets worth at least €500 million by end-program;
  - (iii) rescheduling and lowering the interest rate (from 4.5 percent to 2.5 percent) on a Russian bond falling due in 2016;
  - (iv) using the allocation of future central bank profits (including from sales of gold reserves, if needed) of €0.4 billion, in line with CBC rules.
- Additional measure: government will swap approximately €1 billion of debt held by the central bank with state-owned assets not slated for privatization, in accordance with CBC rules and European Treaties.
- Firm commitments from creditors on (i) and (iii) expected at the time of the first review; program financing buffers considered sufficient in the interim.

### Program monitoring, conditionality, and benchmarks
- Monitoring framework:
  - Quarterly reviews, quarterly and continuous performance criteria, and structural benchmarks.
- Prior actions:
  - Authorities agreed to pass legislation to implement fiscal measures of 2.2 percent of GDP as a prior action.
- Quantitative performance criteria (Table 1 MEFP) for end-June and end-September 2013 include:
  - (i) the general government primary balance;
  - (ii) the general government primary expenditure;
  - (iii) the stock of general government debt;
  - (iv) the accumulation of new general government guarantees;
  - (v) the accumulation of domestic arrears;
  - (vi) the accumulation of VAT refund arrears by the general government;
  - (vii) the accumulation of external payments arrears.
- Indicative targets included for end-December 2013 and end-March 2014 given uncertainty.
- Continuous performance criterion: non-imposition and non-intensification of exchange restrictions.
- Structural benchmarks (Table 2 MEFP) focused on financial stability and fiscal institutions:
  - Financial stability benchmarks include completion of an independent valuation of BoC and CPB assets and liabilities; adoption of legislation transferring supervision responsibility of CCIs to the CBC; completion of an assessment of viability and capital needs for CCIs not covered by the PIMCO exercise; development of a strategy to restructure and recapitalize the CCI sector; requiring the BoC board to prepare a restructuring plan defining the bank‘s business objectives; adoption of a legal framework for a central credit register; and revision of the anti-money laundering legal framework.
  - Fiscal structural benchmarks include submission of a law on fiscal responsibility and budget systems; adoption of measures to improve targeting of social assistance, consolidate welfare programs, and streamline administration costs.
  - A benchmark on the rollover of domestic debt and the recap bond in CPB has been included.

### Capacity to repay the Fund and debt dynamics
- Outstanding credit to the Fund expected to peak in 2016 at about 563 percent of quota.
- Debt service to the Fund as a ratio of exports of goods and services will peak at 1 percent in 2020.
- Under the baseline scenario, government debt would peak at 126 percent of GDP in 2015 and is expected to decline thereafter as activity recovers, the government registers primary surpluses, and privatization receipts materialize.

### Risks to the program and scenarios
- Key risks identified:
  - Banking crisis impact uncertainty: program assumes a sharp contraction in output, but the decline could be deeper given the importance of the financial and business service sector and administrative controls; significantly lower growth would raise fiscal financing needs and threaten debt sustainability.
  - Renewed pressure on the banking system: despite controls, outflows and leakage cannot be ruled out; premature lifting of controls could exacerbate liquidity pressures; asset quality could deteriorate sharply; the newly restructured bank remains heavily reliant on emergency liquidity assistance; litigation risks related to resolution and restructuring of the two large banks are high.
  - Implementation capacity and political resolve: social and political tensions could weaken program ownership; lack of coordination and unclear communication could complicate the process; need for additional fiscal measures and structural reforms could cause reform fatigue; privatization success depends on market conditions; reforming the AML framework will test capacity to reform the business model.
- Mitigating factors:
  - Financing envelope provides buffers to accommodate increased needs and these are accounted for in the debt sustainability analysis.
  - More stringent capitalization requirements for resolved banks (CT1 of 9 rather than 6 percent under a stress scenario) provide margin for deterioration of bank asset quality.
  - Significant upfront actions already undertaken in fiscal and financial areas.
  - Approval of fiscal measures taking effect in future years and planned reform implementing the new multi-year budget framework strengthen credibility of post-program fiscal targets.

### Safeguards and safeguards assessment
- CBC has provided required information to undertake a safeguards assessment, expected to be completed by the time of the first review.
- Because IMF funds will be used for budgetary financing, safeguards requirements for a framework agreement between the central bank and government for servicing obligations to the Fund will be necessary, including that Fund disbursements be deposited in a government account at the CBC.
- Staff confirmed that the CBC publishes its annual financial statements, which are independently audited in accordance with international standards.

### Staff appraisal — key findings and policy recommendations
- Crisis context and authorities’ response:
  - Cyprus lost market access almost two years prior as imbalances and oversized contingent liabilities from banks became unsustainable.
  - Authorities intervened in two insolvent banks with assets of around four times GDP; large capital needs were covered by conversion into equity of bank claims, including uninsured deposits, avoiding public funding that would have raised public debt to unsustainable levels and protecting insured depositors.
- Remaining challenges and priorities:
  - Stabilize the banking sector: complete recapitalization, complete asset valuation and ensure sufficient capitalization of the newly restructured bank; recapitalize and restructure other banks and the cooperative sector as needed; prioritize communication to clarify strategy and rebuild depositor confidence.
  - Eurosystem liquidity support is critical to allow removal of payment restrictions; monitor effects of restrictions carefully and relax them in line with banks’ ability to build liquidity buffers; adequate Eurosystem liquidity backstop is key to restore depositor confidence; staff supports authorities’ request for approval of exchange restrictions identified in Annex III in line with Fund policy.
  - Strengthen supervision and regulation: correct supervisory deficiencies by strengthening monitoring of credit quality, enhancing early intervention frameworks, harmonizing bank and coop supervision; beef up AML supervision and preventive measures; increase transparency of legal entities and trusts.
  - Put public finances on a sustainable path: adopt remaining fiscal measures to bring the deficit down over the medium term; securing ambitious long-run primary surplus target will require further measures beyond the program period focusing on expenditure and embedded in the new multi-year budget framework.
  - Fiscal structural reforms: reforms to the COLA wage indexation mechanism and pensions already implemented; further improvements in budget processes and revenue administration and better targeting of social welfare programs are important.
  - Authorities’ commitments to share financing burden are welcome: extension of maturities of domestic debt and rescheduling of the Russian loan at lower interest rates; privatization to reduce financing needs and enhance efficiency; allocation of central bank profits and swap of debt held by the central bank with high quality assets to reduce financing needs and public sector debt.
- Urgency and implementation:
  - Given substantial risks to the outlook and debt sustainability, there is no room for implementation slippages.
  - Timely and comprehensive implementation of the adjustment program is critical to maintain credibility; should risks materialize, additional financing measures may be necessary.

*From IMF staff report: Cyprus — content unit _cr13125 — paragraphs 39–55.*

### 56. Nevertheless, Fund support is warranted.  The government has demonstrated its strong

### 56. Nevertheless, Fund support is warranted.

### Justification for Fund support
- The government has demonstrated its strong determination by addressing insolvent banks upfront, implementing an ambitious fiscal consolidation at end-2012, and taking bold fiscal structural reforms.
- Significant co-financing by the ESM, including covering for additional financing buffers, provides reassurances on the adequacy of financing.
- Given these factors, Cyprus‘ balance of payments need, and the comprehensive reform package proposed by the authorities, staff supports the authorities‘ request for an EFF-supported program amounting to SDR 891 million.

### Financing needs and official financing package
- Gross financing requirement including a buffer (May–December 2013): 6,646.24 (millions of euros).
- Net financing requirement (2013): 5,260.4 (millions of euros).
- Program financing (Table 3): Official financing sources total 5,260.4 (millions of euros) for 2013.
- IMF contribution (Table 3): 258.4 (millions of euros) in 2013; IMF total prospective disbursement schedule shown in Table 6 (see schedule below).
- ESM contribution (Table 3): 5,002.1 (millions of euros) in 2013.
- Market financing planned for 2013: 1,385.7 (millions of euros).
- Government recapitalization/support included: 1,200.0 (millions of euros) in 2013.

### Schedule of Fund reviews and purchases (Indicators of Fund Credit)
- Availability dates and amounts (millions of SDR and percent of quota):
  - May 15, 2013: 74.25 (millions of SDR) = 46.93% of quota — Approval of arrangement.
  - September 15, 2013: 74.25 = 46.93% — First review based on end-June 2013 performance criteria.
  - December 15, 2013: 74.25 = 46.93% — Second review based on end-September 2013 performance criteria.
  - March 15, 2014: 74.25 = 46.93% — Third review based on end-December 2013 performance criteria.
  - June 15, 2014: 74.25 = 46.93% — Fourth review based on end-March 2014 performance criteria.
  - September 15, 2014: 74.25 = 46.93% — Fifth review based on end-June 2014 performance criteria.
  - December 15, 2014: 74.25 = 46.93% — Sixth review based on end-September 2014 performance criteria.
  - March 15, 2015: 74.25 = 46.93% — Seventh review based on end-December 2014 performance criteria.
  - June 15, 2015: 74.25 = 46.93% — Eighth review based on end-March 2015 performance criteria.
  - September 15, 2015: 74.25 = 46.93% — Ninth review based on end-June 2015 performance criteria.
  - December 15, 2015: 74.25 = 46.93% — Tenth review based on end-September 2015 performance criteria.
  - March 15, 2016: 74.25 = 46.93% — Eleventh review based on end-December 2015 performance criteria.
  - Total: 891.00 (millions of SDR) = 563.21% of quota.

### Key macroeconomic projections and indicators (selected)
- Real GDP growth (annual percent change, selected years from Table 1 projections): 3.6 (2008), -1.9 (2009), 1.3 (2010), 0.5 (2011), -2.4 (2012), -8.7 (2013), -3.9 (2014), 1.1 (2015), 1.9 (2016), 2.3 (2017), 2.2 (2018), 1.9 (2019), 1.8 (2020).
- Unemployment rate EU standard (percent): 3.7 (2008), 5.4 (2009), 6.2 (2010), 7.8 (2011), 11.9 (2012), 15.5 (2013), 16.9 (2014), 14.6 (2015), 13.7 (2016), 12.9 (2017), 12.0 (2018), 11.1 (2019), 10.2 (2020).
- HICP (period average): 4.4 (2008), 0.2 (2009), 2.6 (2010), 3.5 (2011), 3.1 (2012), 1.0 (2013), 1.2 (2014), 1.6 (2015), 1.7 (2016), 1.7 (2017), 1.8 (2018), 1.9 (2019), 2.0 (2020).
- General government balance (percent of GDP): 0.9 (2008), -6.1 (2009), -5.3 (2010), -6.3 (2011), -5.6 (2012), -5.9 (2013), -7.7 (2014), -5.6 (2015), -2.4 (2016), -0.7 (2017), 0.2 (2018), 0.2 (2019), -0.2 (2020).
- General government debt (percent of GDP): 48.9 (2008), 58.5 (2009), 61.3 (2010), 71.1 (2011), 86.2 (2012), 109.1 (2013), 123.3 (2014), 125.7 (2015), 121.7 (2016), 115.9 (2017), 111.7 (2018), 108.1 (2019), 105.0 (2020).
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): -15.6 (2008), -10.7 (2009), -9.8 (2010), -4.7 (2011), -11.7 (2012), -2.0 (2013), -0.6 (2014), -0.9 (2015), -1.0 (2016), -1.3 (2017), -1.5 (2018), -1.7 (2019), -2.0 (2020).

### Financial sector stresses and vulnerabilities (selected)
- Total Banking System Assets, 2012: substantial values reported as percent of GDP with Malta (MLT), Cyprus (CYP), Ireland (IRL) among high entries in the figure.
- Domestic banking sector liabilities composition (February 2013, totals 86 billion): Nonresident deposits, 36; Resident deposits, 30; Due to Central Bank, 10; Junior debt, 2; Other liabilities and equity, 8 (units: billions of euros).
- Banking System Nonperforming Loans and Provisions (percent): NPLs to Total Loans and Provisions to NPLs time series shown increasing through Sep-12 to Sep-13.
- Capital shortfall estimates under adverse scenario (billions of euro) for individual banks presented in Figure 4 with required core tier 1 capital at 6 percent and already realized losses noted.

### External financing requirements and sources (selected)
- Table 5: Gross financing requirements (2012–2020) (millions of euros) example rows:
  - GROSS FINANCING REQUIREMENTS (2012): 61,181; (2013): 27,635; (2014): 23,615; (2015): 22,766; (2016): 21,385; (2017): 20,702; (2018): 20,961; (2019): 20,880; (2020): 21,704.
- FINANCING GAP (Table 5): 0 (2012), 5,260 (2013), 2,449 (2014), 1,936 (2015), 352 (2016), 0 (2017 onward).
- ESM financing in Table 5 (labeled ESM): 5,002 (2013), 2,104 (2014), 1,591 (2015), 266 (2016), 0 thereafter.
- IMF financing in Table 5: 0 (2012), 258 (2013), 344 (2014), 344 (2015), 86 (2016), 0 thereafter.
- Rollover rates (Table 5): General government 236% (2012), 0% (2013), 0% (2014), 0% (2015), 100% (2016–2020); Central bank 93% (2012), 91% (2013), 88% (2014), 86% (2015), 85% (2016), 85% (2017), 84% (2018), 84% (2019), 83% (2020); Private 92% (2012), 82% (2013), 87% (2014), 100% (2015), 102% (2016), 103% (2017), 105% (2018), 105% (2019), 107% (2020).

### Policy and program implications (implicit in source)
- Fund staff supports an EFF-supported program of SDR 891 million backed by sizable ESM co-financing to address balance of payments needs and support the comprehensive reform package.
- The financing package is structured with multiple scheduled Fund purchases tied to performance criteria through March 2016, and substantial ESM financing concentrated in early program years to cover financing gaps and buffers.

*Source: IMF staff report extract and tables contained in the Cyprus program documentation (selected tables and figures as provided).*

### Annex 1. Public Sector Debt Sustainability Analysis

### Annex 1. Public Sector Debt Sustainability Analysis

### Overview
- Full implementation of the program can place Cyprus’ debt on a sustainable trajectory, but high baseline debt levels and significant downside risks leave the trajectory vulnerable, particularly to growth.  
- A potential upside risk not included in the projections is the exploitation of natural gas, which is difficult to quantify at this point.

### Historical context and recent developments
- General government public debt:
  - Reached 86 percent of GDP in 2012 from close to 50 percent of GDP in 2008.
- Drivers of the rapid increase since 2008:
  - Expansionary fiscal policy in 2009 and injection of 10 percent of GDP into the second largest bank found deeply undercapitalized in mid-2012.
  - 2009 developments produced a primary fiscal deficit of 4 percent of GDP (from a surplus of 4 percent of GDP in 2008) due to a 4 percent of GDP stimulus package, revenue erosion from the global financial crisis, and correction of a real estate boom.
  - Sovereign spreads rose sharply in June 2011 and market access was lost amid concerns about banking sector problems and fiscal inaction.

### Baseline projections (2013–2020)
- Debt path:
  - Debt-to-GDP is expected to peak at 126 percent in 2015 and fall to 116 percent of GDP by end-2017, and to 105 percent of GDP by 2020.
  - The path reflects program financing needs of 56 percent of GDP and a 12.5 percent recession in 2013-14, followed by gradual recovery and moderate long-run growth of under 2 percent of GDP.
  - A buffer of about 10 percent of GDP is included in the baseline.
- Prices and inflation:
  - GDP deflator expected to decline to close to 1 percent in the next two years, returning to 2 percent over the long term.
- Primary balance:
  - Improves from a primary deficit of 2.1 percent of GDP in 2012 to a primary surplus of 1.2 percent in 2016.
  - Continues improving to 4 percent of GDP by 2018.
- Other baseline statistics (selected):
  - Public sector debt (percent of GDP): 86.2 (2012) → 109.1 (2013) → 123.3 (2014) → 125.7 (2015) → 121.7 (2016) → 115.9 (2017) → 111.7 (2018) → 108.1 (2019) → 105.0 (2020).
  - Primary deficit (percent of GDP): 2.1 (2012) → 2.4 (2013) → 4.3 (2014) → 2.1 (2015) → -1.2 (2016) → -3.0 (2017) → -4.0 (2018) → -4.0 (2019) → -4.0 (2020).
  - Revenue and grants (percent of GDP): 40.1 (2012) → 40.6 (2013) → 39.0 (2014) → 39.8 (2015) → 41.2 (2016) → 41.6 (2017) → 42.0 (2018) → 42.1 (2019) → 42.3 (2020).
  - Gross financing need (percent of GDP): 20.4 (2012) → 25.7 (2013) → 20.8 (2014) → 20.4 (2015) → 12.3 (2016) → 10.7 (2017) → 9.0 (2018) → 9.0 (2019) → 14.0 (2020).

### Assumed measures to reduce financing and/or debt (baseline assumptions)
- Privatization:
  - Total of EUR 1.4 billion expected: €500 million by end-2015, €500 million by end-2016, €400 million by end-2017.
- Asset swap of part of an outstanding pre EU-accession loan by the Central Bank of Cyprus:
  - Outstanding amount at end-December 2012 was €1.4 bn; real estate and other fixed assets valued at €1 billion will be swapped for an equal reduction in the loan amount in Q3 2013.
- Allocation of central bank profits:
  - Central bank profits of €400 million will be paid to the government in 2014; currently included as a financing transaction reducing debt but not affecting the deficit.
- Rescheduling and reduction of interest rate on existing loan from Russia:
  - Loan falling due in 2016 assumed rescheduled to 5 equal installments starting in 2018 at annual interest rate of 2.5 percent (current rate 4.5 percent).
  - Reduction in interest rate leads to savings of about 2 percent of GDP over the long run.
- Rollover of maturing domestic debt via voluntary sovereign bond exchange:
  - Rollover of €1 billion maturing domestic debt assumed: €400 million in 2013, €300 million in 2014, €300 million in 2015.
- Rollover of the recapitalization bond injected in Cyprus Popular Bank in 2012:
  - €1.9 billion bond assumed rolled over annually at interest rate of €5.15 percent, with interest capitalized rather than paid (interest included in debt stock but not in the interest bill under program cash fiscal accounting).

### Stress tests and downside risks
- Stress tests indicate vulnerability to downside risks; key scenario impacts:
  - Growth risk:
    - Simulated permanent decline of growth by one-half historical standard deviation (~1 percentage point) during 2013-20.
    - This leads to debt increasing to 132 percent of GDP by 2016, staying broadly unchanged thereafter.
  - Primary balance risk:
    - Shock reducing primary balance by one-half standard deviation (~1.8 percentage points of GDP) each year during 2013-20.
    - Debt ratio rises to 129 percent of GDP in 2016, falling to 119 percent of GDP by 2020.
  - Interest rate risk:
    - Shock increasing interest rate by one-half standard deviation (~0.75 percentage points) each year during 2013-20.
    - Debt reaches 125 percent of GDP in 2016 and 112 percent of GDP in 2020.
  - Contingent liabilities risk:
    - One-time 10 percent of GDP contingent liability shock in 2013 results in debt reaching 132 percent in 2016 and 115 percent of GDP by 2020.
    - Tailored shock: 20 percent recession in 2013-2014 (with growth recovering to projected long-term average) brings debt to 149 percent of GDP by 2016 and 143 percent in 2020 after full use of the macroeconomic buffer.
  - Combination shock:
    - Simultaneous growth, interest rate, and primary balance shocks could raise debt to 138 percent of GDP in 2016 and broadly unchanged thereafter.

### Sensitivity analysis and illustrative numerical impacts (selected)
- Impact on debt in years 2016 and 2020 (percent of GDP) for selected shocks:
  - Permanent one percentage point increase in the interest rate: 4.6 (2016), 9.1 (2020).
  - Permanent one percentage point decline in growth: 9.5 (2016), 24.9 (2020).
  - Permanent one percentage point decline in the primary balance: 4.0 (2016), 8.0 (2020).
  - One year contingent liability shock of 10 percent of GDP in 2013: 10.6 (2016), 10.4 (2020).
  - Delaying one year privatization receipt flows: 3.0 (2016), 0.2 (2020).
  - Absence of Privatization: 6.0 (2016), 8.1 (2020).
- Delays in privatization:
  - Delaying privatization by one year raises debt ratio by 3 percent of GDP in 2016.
  - Absence of privatization beyond projection period yields debt of 128 percent of GDP in 2016 and 113 percent by 2020.

### Box A1 — Debt tolerance (summary)
- High debt implications:
  - Depresses growth; requires sustaining large primary surpluses for prolonged periods; increases vulnerability to growth shocks and inhibits countercyclical fiscal policy; imposes large financing requirements and sensitivity to interest-rate changes and market sentiment.
- Factors determining sustainable/tolerable debt level:
  - Ability to generate primary surpluses; growth prospects; cost of borrowing and market perceptions; history of meeting debt obligations; vulnerability to shocks; nature of investor base.
- Cyprus-specific considerations:
  - Cyprus lost market access with debt close to 70 percent of GDP, reflecting concerns about contingent liabilities and sustainability.
  - Debt climbed to 86 percent of GDP; banking crisis weakened the main growth engine and increased uncertainty.
  - Banking sector remains large with risks; deposit-to-equity conversion likely lowered tolerance threshold.
  - Cyprus lacks history of sustaining high debt and maintaining high primary surpluses.
  - Conclusion: A medium-term debt level of around 100 percent of GDP could be consistent with debt sustainability, albeit at the upper range.

### Key alternative scenarios and bound tests (selected table entries)
- Alternative scenarios (public sector debt, percent of GDP):
  - A1. Key variables at historical averages (2012-2020): 86.2 (2012) → 94.3 (2013) → 96.9 (2014) → 96.6 (2015) → 94.7 (2016) → 93.2 (2017) → 93.5 (2018) → 93.9 (2019) → 94.2 (2020).
  - A2. No policy change (constant primary balance) 2012-2020: 86.2 (2012) → 108.8 (2013) → 120.9 (2014) → 126.4 (2015) → 128.7 (2016) → 130.2 (2017) → 132.1 (2018) → 134.6 (2019) → 137.6 (2020).
- Bound tests (selected):
  - B1. Real interest rate at baseline plus one-half standard deviation: 86.2 (2012) → 109.8 (2013) → 124.9 (2014) → 128.2 (2015) → 125.1 (2016) → 120.2 (2017) → 116.8 (2018) → 114.0 (2019) → 111.7 (2020).
  - B2. Real GDP growth at baseline minus one-half standard deviation: 86.2 (2012) → 110.8 (2013) → 127.6 (2014) → 132.8 (2015) → 131.7 (2016) → 129.2 (2017) → 128.9 (2018) → 129.6 (2019) → 131.3 (2020).
  - B4. Combination of B1–B3 (1/2 standard deviation shocks): 86.2 (2012) → 112.8 (2013) → 131.3 (2014) → 137.9 (2015) → 137.8 (2016) → 136.0 (2017) → 135.8 (2018) → 136.4 (2019) → 137.5 (2020).
  - B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2013: 86.2 (2012) → 119.1 (2013) → 133.9 (2014) → 136.4 (2015) → 132.3 (2016) → 126.4 (2017) → 122.1 (2018) → 118.5 (2019) → 115.3 (2020).

### External sector debt (summary)
- External debt:
  - At around 450 percent of GDP at end-2012, extremely high, largely reflecting oversized banking sector (~¾ of external debt).
  - Under the baseline, external debt expected to decline markedly but remain elevated over the projection period:
    - Expected contraction in 2013 from 450 percent of GDP to less than 350 percent of GDP following divestiture of Cypriot banks’ Greek branches and expected losses by non-residents on uninsured deposits in CPB and BoC.
    - External debt-to-GDP ratio expected to fall to about 280 percent by 2020.

*International Monetary Fund — Annex 1. Public Sector Debt Sustainability Analysis (content unit).*

### 3.      The external debt dynamics remain vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks.

### 3.      The external debt dynamics remain vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks.

### Key vulnerabilities and scenario findings
- A lack of external adjustment, exemplified by the historical scenario, due to weaker external competitiveness or significant fiscal slippages would lead to an unsustainable external debt.
- Higher interest rates on external debt (200 basis points above baseline assumptions) would significantly slowdown the reduction in external debt.
- Continued external adjustment is critical to ensure external sustainability going forward.
- A continued decline in the size of the financial system and its use of non-resident deposits would help improve external sustainability and reduce gross financing needs.

### Scenario and stress-test outcomes (selected)
- Baseline and historical scenario marker values from Figure A2:
  - Historical: 345 (External debt in percent of GDP)
  - Baseline: 292 (External debt in percent of GDP)
- Scenario box averages (as presented in figure annotations):
  - Baseline: 292
  - CA shock: 301
  - Combined shock: 323
  - Growth shock: 312
  - Interest rate shock: 325
- Individual shocks are permanent one-half standard deviation shocks. Permanent 1/4 standard deviation shocks applied to real interest rate, growth rate, and current account balance (figure notes).

### Quantitative dynamics and decompositions (selected table extracts)
- Baseline: External debt (percent of GDP) time series (selected projection years and changes):
  - 2008: 447.4
  - 2009: 544.1
  - 2010: 491.9
  - 2011: 465.6
  - 2012: 451.8
  - 2013: 332.0
  - 2014: 335.3
  - 2015: 329.5
  - 2016: 317.0
  - 2017: 303.5
  - 2018: 291.9
  - 2019: 282.2
  - 2020: 273.2
- Change in external debt (selected years):
  - 2008→2009: 100.3
  - 2009→2010: 96.7
  - 2010→2011: -52.3
  - 2011→2012: -26.3
  - 2012→2013: -13.8
  - 2013→2014: -119.8
  - 2014→2015: 3.3
  - 2015→2016: -5.8
  - 2016→2017: -12.5
  - 2017→2018: -13.6
  - 2018→2019: -11.6
  - 2019→2020: -9.7
- Identified external debt-creating flows (4+8+9) (selected years):
  - 2008: -12.2
  - 2009: 51.6
  - 2010: 20.6
  - 2011: -41.5
  - 2012: 35.3
  - 2013: 40.5
  - 2014: 12.6
  - 2015: -6.2
  - 2016: -8.9
  - 2017: -8.4
  - 2018: -7.4
  - 2019: -7.0
  - 2020: -6.4
- Current account deficit, excluding interest payments (percent of GDP):
  - 2008: 6.6
  - 2009: 2.1
  - 2010: 0.8
  - 2011: -4.0
  - 2012: 0.6
  - 2013: -5.0
  - 2014: -7.1
  - 2015: -6.8
  - 2016: -6.7
  - 2017: -6.4
  - 2018: -6.2
  - 2019: -5.8
  - 2020: -5.4
- Deficit in balance of goods and services (percent of GDP):
  - 2008: 11.4
  - 2009: 5.5
  - 2010: 6.2
  - 2011: 4.2
  - 2012: 2.5
  - 2013: -2.4
  - 2014: -3.9
  - 2015: -3.8
  - 2016: -3.4
  - 2017: -3.1
  - 2018: -2.8
  - 2019: -2.4
  - 2020: -2.1
- Exports (percent of GDP):
  - 2008: 45.0
  - 2009: 40.2
  - 2010: 41.3
  - 2011: 42.7
  - 2012: 42.5
  - 2013: 44.6
  - 2014: 45.4
  - 2015: 45.7
  - 2016: 45.9
  - 2017: 46.4
  - 2018: 46.8
  - 2019: 47.5
  - 2020: 48.2
- Imports (percent of GDP):
  - 2008: 56.4
  - 2009: 45.7
  - 2010: 47.5
  - 2011: 46.9
  - 2012: 45.0
  - 2013: 42.2
  - 2014: 41.5
  - 2015: 41.9
  - 2016: 42.5
  - 2017: 43.2
  - 2018: 44.0
  - 2019: 45.1
  - 2020: 46.1
- Net non-debt creating capital inflows (negative) (percent of GDP):
  - 2008: 20.0
  - 2009: 7.0
  - 2010: 1.8
  - 2011: -8.5
  - 2012: -17.1
  - 2013: -2.9
  - 2014: -1.5
  - 2015: -3.6
  - 2016: -4.0
  - 2017: -2.4
  - 2018: -2.4
  - 2019: -3.4
  - 2020: -3.5
- Automatic debt dynamics (percent of GDP), contribution components (selected):
  - Automatic debt dynamics total (2008): -38.8
  - Contribution from nominal interest rate (2008): 9.0; (2009): 8.6; (2010): 9.0; (2011): 8.7; (2012): 11.1; (2013): 7.0; (2014): 7.7; (2015): 7.8; (2016): 7.7; (2017): 7.7; (2018): 7.6; (2019): 7.5; (2020): 7.3
  - Contribution from real GDP growth (2008): -10.7; (2009): 8.9; (2010): -7.2; (2011): -2.4; (2012): 12.3; (2013): 41.4; (2014): 13.5; (2015): -3.5; (2016): -6.0; (2017): -7.2; (2018): -6.4; (2019): -5.3; (2020): -4.9
  - Contribution from price and exchange rate changes (2008): -37.1; (2009): 24.9; (2010): 16.1; (2011): -35.3; (2012): 28.4
- Residual, including change in gross foreign assets (2-3) (selected years):
  - 2008: 112.5
  - 2009: 45.1
  - 2010: -72.8
  - 2011: 15.3
  - 2012: -49.1
  - 2013: -160.3
  - 2014: -9.3
  - 2015: 0.4
  - 2016: -3.6
  - 2017: -5.2
  - 2018: -4.2
  - 2019: -2.7
  - 2020: -2.6
- External debt-to-exports ratio (in percent) (selected years):
  - 2008: 993.1
  - 2009: 1352.6
  - 2010: 1191.3
  - 2011: 1091.0
  - 2012: 1062.4
  - 2013: 743.9
  - 2014: 738.4
  - 2015: 721.1
  - 2016: 690.6
  - 2017: 654.6
  - 2018: 623.3
  - 2019: 594.0
  - 2020: 566.5
- Gross external financing need (in billions of US dollars) (selected years):
  - 2008: 52.1
  - 2009: 77.2
  - 2010: 108.3
  - 2011: 81.5
  - 2012: 80.4
  - 2013: 44.8
  - 2014: 31.3
  - 2015: 29.9
  - 2016: 27.9
  - 2017: 26.8
  - 2018: 27.0
  - 2019: 26.7
  - 2020: 27.8
- Gross external financing need (in percent of GDP) (selected projections shown as multi-year averages):
  - 206.5, 329.1, 468.8, 325.8, 349.4, 5-Year 205.4, 148.7, 139.8, 126.7, 117.7, 114.4, 109.1, 109.2 (as presented in table rows)

### Key macroeconomic assumptions underlying the baseline (selected)
- Real GDP growth (in percent) time series and assumptions (selected):
  - Key historical and projection values include: 3.6, -1.9, 1.3, 0.5, -2.4, 0.2, 2.4, -8.7, -3.9, 1.1, 1.9, 2.3, 2.2, 1.9, 1.8
- GDP deflator in US dollars (change in percent) (selected): 12.0, -5.3, -2.9, 7.7, -5.8, 1.2, 8.2, 3.9, 0.3, 0.8, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.9, 2.0
- Nominal external interest rate (in percent) (selected): 3.0, 1.8, 1.6, 1.9, 2.2, 2.1, 0.5, 1.5, 2.2, 2.4, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.7
- Growth of exports (US dollar terms, in percent) (selected): 10.5, -17.0, 1.0, 11.9, -8.4, -0.4, 12.4, -0.4, -1.9, 2.5, 3.4, 4.4, 4.5, 5.3, 5.4
- Growth of imports (US dollar terms, in percent) (selected): 21.5, -24.6, 2.2, 7.0, -11.7, -1.1, 17.7, -11.0, -5.3, 2.9, 4.2, 5.3, 5.3, 6.3, 6.2
- Current account balance, excluding interest payments (percent of GDP) (selected):
  - -6.6, -2.1, -0.8, 4.0, -0.6, -1.2, 3.8, 5.0, 7.1, 6.8, 6.7, 6.4, 6.2, 5.8, 5.4
- Net non-debt creating capital inflows (selected): -20.0, -7.0, -1.8, 8.5, 17.1, -0.7, 14.3, 2.9, 1.5, 3.6, 4.0, 2.4, 2.4, 3.4, 3.5

### Policy implications and recommendations (as reflected in the text)
- Maintain continued external adjustment to secure external sustainability.
- Reduce the size of the financial system and its reliance on non-resident deposits to improve external sustainability and reduce gross financing needs.
- Address weaker external competitiveness and prevent significant fiscal slippages to avoid unsustainable external debt paths.
- Monitor and guard against increases in external interest rates, as a 200 basis point increase would slow debt reduction materially.

*Source: _cr13125 - 3.      The external debt dynamics remain vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks.*

### 7. We are committed to restoring the health of our financial sector and reducing

### 7. We are committed to restoring the health of our financial sector and reducing contingent risks from the banks to the sovereign

### Strategy and overall commitment
- Five-pillar strategy to address large losses and liquidity pressures in an oversized banking sector:
  - (i) resolving one insolvent bank and restructuring another at least cost to the Cypriot taxpayer, and restructuring and recapitalizing remaining financial institutions;
  - (ii) normalizing financial flows;
  - (iii) deleveraging core and non-core operations of deposit-taking institutions to reduce the size of the domestic banking sector to the EU average by end-2018;
  - (iv) upgrading the supervisory and regulatory framework;
  - (v) enhancing preparedness to deal with troubled borrowers.
- Commitment to strengthen the AML framework.

### Identified capital needs and independent due diligence
- PIMCO due diligence (late 2012, covering about ¾ of banking system assets) findings:
  - Overall capital shortfall close to €9 billion required to reach a Core Tier I ratio of 6 percent under a stress scenario.
  - The two largest banks faced solvency problems with negative capital of close to €6 billion and overall capital needs of about €8 billion.
  - A sample of 17 cooperatives and the third largest bank were undercapitalized by about €1 billion.

### Resolving, recapitalizing, and restructuring weak institutions — actions taken
- Intervention and restructuring of the two largest Cypriot banks:
  - On March 25, 2013 the CBC intervened CPB and BoC; the Greek branches of the two banks were sold to Piraeus Bank.
  - CPB was split under a “good bank—bad bank” strategy:
    - Insured deposits were fully protected by separating them, together with central bank liabilities (ELA) and sufficient assets to attain a Core Tier I capital ratio of 9 percent under PIMCO‘s stress scenario by end-program, and were immediately folded into BoC.
    - Shareholders and other bank creditors, including uninsured depositors and remaining assets, were kept in CPB, which is to be liquidated over time.
    - Resolution executed under the new bank resolution law passed on March 22, which provides for burden sharing to minimize fiscal costs.
- Completion of BoC’s recapitalization:
  - On March 29, 2013 the resolution authority initiated recapitalization with participation of equity and bond holdings and subsequent conversion of 37.5 percent of uninsured deposits into shares with preferred voting and dividend rights to attain a CT1 capital ratio of 9 percent under PIMCO‘s stress scenario by end-program.
  - Immediate increase in the CT1 ratio to well above 9 percent; part of remaining uninsured deposits was temporarily frozen pending independent valuation.

### Planned follow-up measures for intervened banks
- Complete an independent valuation of BoC and CPB assets by end-June 2013 (structural benchmark); agree terms of reference with EC/ECB/IMF staff no later than end-April 2013.
- Finalize recapitalization of BoC:
  - If needed after valuation, additional conversion of uninsured deposits into shares with preferred voting and dividend rights to meet CT1 target of 9 percent under stress by end-program.
  - If overcapitalized relative to the target, undertake a share-reversal process to refund depositors by the amount of over-capitalization.
- Ensure BoC operational safeguards during transition:
  - Appoint a Board of Directors in accordance with the resolution law to take over after the special administrator.
  - Require the board to prepare a restructuring plan defining business objectives by end-September-2013 (structural benchmark).
  - Establish institutional arrangements by end-June 2013 to insulate BoC from reputational and governance risks.

### Recapitalization of other banks and CCIs
- CBC to increase minimum CT1 capital requirement to 9 percent by end-2013.
- Remaining banks covered in PIMCO due diligence instructed to meet regulatory requirements under PIMCO‘s stress scenario by end-September; program public funds may be used if needed.
- CCI sector actions:
  - Sufficient program resources provided at the time of the first review in a dedicated account at the central bank to support recapitalization and restructuring of the CCI sector.
  - CCIs covered by PIMCO due diligence instructed to meet capital requirements by end-July; if unable, they will be recapitalized and/or restructured.
  - For CCIs not covered by PIMCO, CBC and CCI supervisor to complete assessment of capital needs and viability by end-June 2013 (structural benchmark) with terms of reference prepared in consultation with EC/ECB/IMF by end-April.
  - By end-July 2013, CBC will develop a strategy to recapitalize and restructure the sector with public money as needed (structural benchmark).

### Normalizing financial flows and ensuring adequate liquidity
- Temporary administrative measures implemented:
  - Bank holiday of six days following interventions; banks reopened on March 28, 2013 with temporary capital controls and deposit withdrawal restrictions.
  - Cash withdrawals, electronic payments and transfers abroad temporarily restricted; measures differentiated across transactions to minimize payment-system disruption.
- Commitment to gradually lift deposit restrictions and capital controls:
  - Monitor liquidity conditions and impacts daily; review and relax restrictions as needed in consultation with EC/ECB/IMF.
  - Request IMF approval for any measures requiring such approval under Article VIII.
- Ensure adequate liquidity:
  - CBC, in close cooperation with the ECB, stands ready to take appropriate measures in accordance with Eurosystem rules and procedures.
  - CBC and ECB will require banks to submit funding plans and closely monitor progress toward a sustainable funding model.
  - Restrictions to be lifted as funding conditions normalize.
  - Commitment not to impose any new restrictions or intensify existing restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions, nor to introduce any new multiple currency practices.

### Deleveraging of the banking sector — size-reduction targets and actions
- Objective: reduce domestic banking sector from more than 500 percent of GDP at end-2012 to the EU average by end-2018.
- Actions already taken and planned:
  - March 25, 2013: CPB, BoC, and Hellenic Bank transferred assets and liabilities of their branches in Greece to Piraeus, reducing the size of banks by about 130 percent of GDP and transferring responsibility to cover €9 billion of insured Greek deposits from Cyprus to Greece.
  - Independent valuation and recognition of fair value losses on asset portfolios in CPB and BoC anticipated to further reduce domestic banking sector size to about 350 percent of GDP.
  - Encourage banks to deleverage non-core assets and downsize the CCI sector to meet the target of reducing the system to the euro-area average by end-2018.

### Enhancing the supervisory and regulatory framework
- Loan classification and provisioning:
  - By end-May, CBC to amend regulations to classify as nonperforming (NPL) all loans past due by more than 90 days; reclassified historical NPL series to be promptly published.
  - Provisioning for NPLs to follow international accounting standards and conservative practices.
  - By end-September 2013 complete, with support of an international accounting firm, a technical comparison of Cypriot banks’ accounting practices against those of other international financial institutions in relevant jurisdictions.
- Credit-risk management and governance:
  - New prudential regulations on underwriting standards, loan-collection practices, and collateral valuation to enter into force by end-March 2014.
  - Legislation by end-September 2013 to prohibit commercial banks from lending to independent board members (including related parties) and to remove any board members in arrears on existing debts to their banks.
- Central credit register:
  - Legal framework to be established by end-September 2013 (structural benchmark).
  - Register operational by end-September 2014.
- Early corrective measures:
  - By end-March 2014 pass a law establishing mandatory supervisory action frameworks based on capitalization levels, requiring prompt supervisory remedial action upon deterioration (e.g., suspension of dividend payments).

### Supervision and regulation of CCIs
- Transfer supervisory responsibility to CBC:
  - Submit legislation by end-June 2013 to establish CBC as supervisor of CCIs; complete transfer of powers by end-July 2013.
  - Harmonize regulatory and supervisory frameworks for CCIs with those of commercial banks by end-March 2014.
- Transparency and audits:
  - By end-September 2013 the largest CCIs (threshold to be determined by CBC in consultation with EC, ECB and IMF) to be required to have an annual audit by a recognized independent auditing firm, starting with 2013 annual accounts.
- Lending governance:
  - Legislation to be submitted by end-September 2013 to strengthen governance of CCIs, including limits on lending to non-member natural persons, independent board members and related parties, and removal of board members in arrears.

### Enhancing preparedness to deal with troubled borrowers
- Framework for targeted private sector debt restructuring to follow bank resolution and recapitalization.
- Measures under development:
  - Temporary moratorium: CBC directive before end-April, 2013 recommending a 60-day grace period without penalties for borrowers to pay interest only on loans coming due.
  - Tax incentives: By end-May, 2013 amend legislation if needed to eliminate tax deterrents to loan restructurings, including elimination of tax deterrents related to voluntary early loan repayments or discounts for problematic but viable borrowers.
  - Market-based voluntary workouts: By end-June 2013 identify measures to address legal, administrative, or other impediments to restructuring viable borrowers while preserving credit discipline.
    - Implement central credit registry and, macroeconomic conditions permitting, a framework for seizure and sale of loan collateral by end-2014.
    - Amendments to reduce built-in costs (fees, requisites) for credit institutions and clients during restructuring to be introduced.
    - Establish a mediation service by end-June 2013 to intermediate between banks and clients for fair debt restructuring.

### Strengthening the AML framework
- Commitment to align with FATF standards; independent audit of AML implementation in credit institutions agreed.
- Legal and implementation steps (finalize by end-September 2013, structural benchmark):
  - Ensure exchange by the financial intelligence unit of financial intelligence on money laundering, associated predicate offenses and terrorist financing with foreign counterparts without need for a court order.
  - Ensure all trustees of trusts under Cyprus law are regulated or registered.
  - Ensure adequate and accurate information on beneficial ownership of legal entities registered in Cyprus can be obtained timely by competent authorities.
  - Ensure nominee directors or nominee shareholders do not obstruct timely access to information on beneficial ownership and control of companies.
- Implementation measures:
  - Conduct a third-party assessment of the functioning of the Registrar of Companies and appropriately resource the department; strengthen AML/CFT supervision of lawyers, accountants and trust and company service providers by end-December 2013 (adequate staffing, risk-based supervision, revised methodology).
  - CBC supervision department to revise off-site and on-site supervisory procedures to implement a risk-based approach to AML supervision by end-December 2013.
  - If independent audit reveals need, corrective actions in preventive measures by financial institutions to be agreed by end-June 2013.

### Fiscal policy targets and path
- Government commitment: achieve a primary fiscal surplus of 4 percent of GDP by 2018.
- Planned fiscal trajectory:
  - 2013 target: primary balance of -2.4 percent of GDP (may be revised down to incorporate compensation for pension funds in CPB with program funds).
  - 2014 target: primary balance of -4.3 percent of GDP if economy continues to contract and no additional one-off revenues.
  - 2015 target: primary deficit of -2.1 percent of GDP.
  - 2016 target: primary surplus of 1.2 percent of GDP.
  - 2017 target: primary surplus of 3 percent of GDP.
  - 2018 and beyond: primary surplus of 4 percent of GDP.

*International Monetary Fund — Cyprus: program measures to restore financial-sector health and reduce contingent sovereign risks (text excerpt).*

### 22. In a first step toward fiscal consolidation, last December we legislated a

### _cr13125 - 22. In a first step toward fiscal consolidation, last December we legislated a

### Fiscal consolidation package and near-term measures
- A comprehensive package of measures for 2013-15 is estimated to yield about 5 percent of GDP under the revised macroeconomic framework.
- Expenditure-side measures implemented:
  - Permanent wage cuts applying to the broad public sector.
  - Abolished and/or reduced a number of overlapping benefits.
  - Increased the mandatory retirement age in the public pension scheme.
  - Implemented an early retirement penalty, while preserving acquired rights.
- Revenue-side measures implemented:
  - Increased excise taxes and VAT rates.
  - Extended existing extraordinary contributions on wages scheduled to expire in 2014.
  - Increased the contribution rate to the general pension system by both employees and employers.

- Additional consolidation required:
  - Additional consolidation measures amounting to about 7 percent of GDP during 2013-2018.
  - Implement an additional 2.2 percent of GDP in measures in 2013 (prior action).
  - Identify an additional 4.7 percent of GDP of measures to be implemented during 2015-2018 to secure a long-term primary fiscal target of 4 percent of GDP.
  - Ensure at least 60 percent of total specified yields for 2013-18 come from expenditure rationalization.

### Prior actions and measures for 2013 (amounting to 2.2 percent of GDP)
- Revenue measures (expected to yield 2 percent of GDP):
  - Increase the corporate income tax rate from 10 to 12.5 percent.
  - Raise the bank levy rate from 0.11 to 0.15 percent.
  - Raise the withholding tax rate on interest received to 30 percent.
  - Reform the property tax.
  - Other unspecified measures.
- Expenditure measure:
  - Rationalize housing benefits, saving 0.2 percent of GDP.

### Medium-term fiscal commitment and contingency rules
- Commit to identifying an additional 4.7 percent of GDP in measures to attain a primary balance target of 4 percent of GDP by 2018; include these in annual budgets for 2015-18 and medium-term frameworks.
- Fiscal structural reforms in expenditure rationalization and revenue administration will support budget savings.
- Government readiness:
  - Stand ready to take additional measures if revenue shortfalls or higher social spending needs emerge, including reducing discretionary spending.
  - If over-performance is permanent, it will reduce the need for additional measures.
  - One-off windfall revenues will not be used to increase spending.

### Structural fiscal reforms (objectives and actions)
- Objectives:
  - Support fiscal consolidation and ensure sustainability of the pension system.
  - Limit growth of the public sector wage bill and improve pension system equity and viability.
- Actions:
  - Review the system of social insurance and social welfare schemes to contain spending while protecting the vulnerable and preserve long-run viability.
  - Improve public financial management by strengthening the budget framework and enhancing management of fiscal risks and future revenues from natural resources.
  - Reform revenue administration to fight tax evasion and improve revenue collection.
  - Rationalize the public sector by discontinuing non-core activities and privatizing public assets.

### Social insurance and social welfare reforms
- Pensions (GSIS and GEPS):
  - Continue reforms to enhance intra- and inter-generational fairness and financial viability.
  - By end-July 2013: conduct an actuarial analysis to determine options to ensure GSIS viability until 2060 without government transfers beyond credited contributions.
  - Separate in accounting terms the non-contributory pension benefit from the contributory GSIS pension scheme.
  - Reforms resulting from the actuarial analysis will be adopted by end-December 2013 and enter into force by end-March 2014.
  - Reform tools may include benefit reduction, statutory retirement age increases, and/or contribution rate increases.
  - Recent GEPS pension reforms to be extended to the broader public sector.
- Social welfare:
  - By end-June 2013: prepare an action plan based on a review covering all social programs (social assistance, housing benefits, family benefits, education allowances, and any other transfer schemes) provided by all public entities.
  - Plan to include proposals to consolidate welfare programs, improve targeting, and streamline administration to attain budget savings while protecting poor and vulnerable groups.
  - Implement reform by end-2013 (structural benchmark).

### Public financial management (PFM)
- MTBF and legal framework:
  - Legislated a medium-term budget framework (MTBF) including a rolling three-year budget framework.
  - Ensure MTBF is fully effective starting with the 2014 budget through regulations (expanded budget circular) in consultation with the EC/ECB/IMF.
  - By end-June 2013: complete a broad review of the PFM system and develop a new comprehensive Law on Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Systems with supplementary secondary legislation; submit to parliament by end-December 2013 (structural benchmark).
  - New law to provide framework for a medium-term PFM reform program.
- Natural resources management:
  - Establish a framework for management of natural resources in line with best practices, with legal basis and governance structure based on internationally recognized best practices.
  - Plan to establish a resource fund with clear rules governing inflows and outflows as part of the budgetary framework.
  - Submit both a draft legal framework and a strategy to the EC/ECB/IMF by end-September 2013.
- PPPs:
  - Strengthen management and reporting on fiscal risks from public-private partnerships (PPPs).
  - Put in place a legal and institutional framework for assessing, entering into, and monitoring PPPs or concession agreements by end-2013 through:
    - Establishing an effective “gateway process” that verifies fiscal affordability.
    - Adapting fiscal management laws to formalize the role of the Ministry of Finance in reviewing and approving PPPs at critical gateway points.
    - Developing financial reporting and accounting rules for timely and transparent communication of PPP-related obligations.
  - No new PPPs or concessions to be entered into (except projects commercially closed by end October 2012) until the new framework is in place.

### Revenue administration reform
- Modernize revenue administration to increase efficiency, improve taxpayer compliance, and boost revenue collection.
- Challenges identified:
  - Lack of modern and harmonized systems and procedures.
  - Insufficient information sharing between tax agencies.
  - Misaligned filing and payment arrangements and inadequate enforcement tools.
- Actions and timing:
  - Present by end-June 2013 a comprehensive reform agenda to improve efficiency and effectiveness of revenue collections, taxpayer services, and compliance in line with best international practices.

### Rationalization of broader public sector and privatization
- Extra-budgetary entities:
  - Extra-budgetary entities receive almost 2 percent of GDP in transfers.
  - Assess all extra-budgetary entities based on functionality to determine need to reclassify, restructure, or divest them; classify entities according to functionality.
  - Entities performing necessary public functions may be integrated into the budget; others will be restructured or divested by the end of the program period.
- Privatization plan and targets:
  - By end-June 2013: create an inventory including assets with the highest commercial value and at least one third of SOEs.
  - Full inventory to be completed by end-December 2013.
  - Develop a privatization plan by end-September 2013 with the aim of achieving proceeds of at least €1.4 billion by end-2018.
  - Implement a legal and institutional framework by end-December 2013 to support privatization.
- SOE monitoring:
  - Starting with the 2014 budget, include a “Statement of SOEs and semi-government entities” as an Appendix I to the annual budget law and annual financial reports.
  - Non-viable SOEs will be restructured or closed.

### Program financing measures and commitments
- Measures to reduce financing needs and impact on public debt:
  - Roll over and extend the maturity of at least €1 billion of domestic debt held by residents through a voluntary sovereign bond exchange covering bonds maturing in 2013-15; exchange for new sovereign bonds with maturities between 5 and 10 years, par for par and no change in annual interest cost.
  - Roll over the €1.9 billion recapitalization bond injected in CPB in June 2012 (both rollovers are an end-June 2013 structural benchmark).
  - Realize privatization receipts of at least €500 million for financing purposes.
  - Intensify efforts to obtain financing assurances from the Russian authorities to reschedule the Russian bond falling due in 2016 and extend its maturity to be paid in 5 equal installments starting in 2018 and lower the interest rate to 2 ½ percent.
  - Use the allocation of future central bank profits of EUR €0.4, in line with the CBC duties under the Treaties and the Statute; balance sheet adjustments by the central bank decided by the Board of Directors of the CBC and in accordance with the Treaty will also contribute approximately €1.4 billion in terms of debt reduction.
- Official financing needs and external support:
  - Remaining balance of payments financing needs of about €10 billion will need to be covered through official financing.
  - Request to the Fund for a three-year EFF in an amount of SDR891 million, equivalent to about €1 billion, or 563 percent of quota.
  - Euro area partners committed a total of €9 billion over May 2013–March 2016.
  - New lending committed at an average maturity of 10 -15 years and at favorable interest rates (2.5-3 percent), using the ESM as a financing vehicle.
  - If fiscal consolidation proceeds faster than expected or market conditions improve significantly, authorities would refrain from drawing on IMF support on an as needed basis.

### Program monitoring, conditionality, and safeguards
- Monitoring:
  - Progress monitored through quarterly (and continuous) quantitative performance criteria (PCs) and indicative targets, and structural benchmarks; detailed in Tables 1 and 2 and defined in the Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU).
  - Quantitative targets up to September 2013 are PCs; remaining targets for end-2013 and 2014 are indicative. Quarterly targets for the remainder of 2013 will be converted into PCs at the time of the first review.
  - A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the EC, on behalf of the ESM, specifies additional structural policies and timeframes.
- Safeguards:
  - A safeguards assessment of the CBC will be completed by the first review; the CBC will receive a safeguards mission and provide information required to complete the assessment by the first review.
  - Establish a framework agreement between the government and the CBC on their respective responsibilities for servicing financial obligations to the IMF; Fund disbursements will be deposited into the government‘s account at the CBC.

### Selected quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets (millions of Euros)
- Performance criteria (cumulative since January of the corresponding year unless noted):
  - Floor on the general government primary balance 2/: Jun-13 -222; Sep-13 -248; Dec-13 -395; Mar-14 -54
  - Ceiling on the general government primary expenditure 2/: Jun-13 3230; Sep-13 4911; Dec-13 7069; Mar-14 1576
  - Ceiling on the stock of general government debt: Jun-13 17153; Sep-13 17464; Dec-13 17917; Mar-14 18076
  - Ceiling on the accumulation of new general government guarantees 2/ 3/: Jun-13 145.3; Sep-13 145.3; Dec-13 145.3; Mar-14 0
  - Ceiling on the accumulation of external arrears 4/: Jun-13 0; Sep-13 0; Dec-13 0; Mar-14 0 (continuous performance criterion)
  - Ceiling on the accumulation of domestic arrears 2/: Jun-13 0; Sep-13 0; Dec-13 0; Mar-14 0
  - Ceiling on the accumulation of new VAT refund arrears by the general government 5/: Jun-13 10; Sep-13 10; Dec-13 10; Mar-14 10
  - Notes:
    - 1/ As defined in the technical memorandum of understanding.
    - 2/ Cumulative since January of the corresponding year.
    - 3/ The figures for 2013 reflect guarantees already approved by the government on loans not yet drawn.
    - 4/ Continuous performance criterion.
    - 5/ Cumulative since March 2013.

### Structural conditionality timing (selected benchmarks and prior actions)
- Prior action (Before Board meeting):
  - Adopt legislation and Council of Minister decisions, as needed, implementing measures consistent with program targets, including:
    - Increasing the CIT rate from 10 to 12.5 percent.
    - Raising the bank levy rate from 0.11 to 0.15 percent.
    - Raising the tax rate on interest from 15 to 30 percent.
    - Reforming the property tax.
    - Rationalizing housing benefits (savings of 0.2 percent of GDP).
- Structural benchmarks (selected):
  - Complete due diligence valuation of CPB and BoC assets in accordance with agreed terms of reference: End-June 2013.
  - For individual CCIs not covered by PIMCO due-diligence, CBC and CCI supervisor to complete assessment of capital needs and viability: End-June 2013.
  - Develop a strategy to recapitalize and restructure the CCI sector with public money as needed: End-July 2013.
  - Revise the anti-money laundering legal framework (TMU ¶15): End-September 2013.
  - Adopt the legal framework for a central credit register (TMU ¶16): End-September 2013.
  - Roll over and extend at least €1 billion of domestic debt held by residents through a voluntary debt exchange and roll over the €1.9 billion recapitalization bond of CPB: End-June 2013.
  - Submit to Parliament a law on fiscal responsibility and budget systems (TMU ¶17): End-December 2013.
  - Adopt measures to improve targeting of social assistance, consolidate welfare programs, and streamline administration costs: End-December 2013.

*Source: IMF staff report content in the provided PDF excerpt.*

### 37.5 percent of uninsured deposits into preferred shares

### 37.5 percent of uninsured deposits into preferred shares

### Fiscal consolidation and structural reforms
- COLA reform:
  - Implemented a reform of the COLA wage indexation mechanism in the public sector by extending its freeze to the end of the program and limiting its application to 50 percent of the price index thereafter.
- Pension reform:
  - Introduced reforms to the General Social Insurance Scheme, including freezing pensions under the Social Security Fund until end-2016 and raising employee and employer contributions in 2014.
  - Also introduced reforms to the government pension scheme and froze public sector pensions.
- Medium-term budget framework:
  - Legislated a framework in line with EU directives, including a rolling three-year budget framework.
- 2013 budget measures (implemented for 2013-15):
  - Reduced outlays for social transfers through the abolition of a number of redundant and overlapping schemes.
  - Introduced a graduated reduction of the remuneration of the public and broader public sector employees (6.5-12.5%) and legislated a 3% flat reduction for 2014.
  - Extended the freeze of general wage increases in the public and broader public sector and temporary contribution in the public, broader public and private sectors on gross earnings and pensions until end-2016.
  - Took steps with a view to reducing the number of public sector employees by at least 4,500 over the period of 2012-16.
  - Reduced transfers to SOEs and semi-public institutions.
  - Increased excise duties on tobacco products, alcoholic beverages, and oil products with effect in 2013; and legislated an additional increase for energy products in 2014.
  - Increased the standard VAT rate from 17 to 18% in 2013 and to 19% in 2014, and the reduced rate from 8 to 9% starting in 2014.
  - Increased fees for public services by at least 17%.
  - Abolished all exceptions for paying the annual company levy of EUR 350.

### Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU) — program definitions and quantitative targets
- Program exchange rates (prevailing on April 15):
  - €1 = U.S. 1.308099 dollar
  - €1 = 129.0309 Japanese yen
  - €1.15222 = 1 SDR
- General government definition (for program purposes) includes:
  - The central government (Constitutional Powers, Constitutional Services, Independent services, Independent offices, Ministries and departments, 21 special purpose funds, and 14 semi government organizations).
  - The local governments (39 municipalities, 356 village authorities, and all agencies and institutions attached thereto).
  - The social security funds (medical treatment scheme, regular employees‘ provident fund, social insurance fund, holiday fund, redundancy fund, and protection of the rights of employees‘ fund).
  - Any newly created institution defined as general government under ESA 95.
- General Government Primary Cash Balance (GGPCB) — performance criterion:
  - GGPCB = general government cash balance (GGCB) minus general government interest receipts plus general government interest payments.
  - GGCB = total revenue (tax revenue, social security contributions, grants and other revenue) minus total expenditure.
  - Payment of called guarantees recorded as cash expenditures.
  - Privatization receipts and proceeds from sale of land and buildings excluded from revenue.
  - Floor on GGPCB measured cumulatively from start of calendar year.
  - Privatization receipts definition: receipts associated with disposal to private owners by a government unit of the controlling equity of a public corporation or quasi-corporation.
- Adjustments to the floor on GGPCB (downwards) include:
  - Payments related to bank support under the program‘s banking sector support and restructuring strategy (loans to financial institutions and investments in equity of financial institutions (requited recapitalization); unrequited recapitalization and purchases of troubled assets).
  - Payments to compensate pension funds for the losses related to the resolution of Cyprus Popular Bank.
- Ceiling on General Government Primary Expenditure (GGPE):
  - GGPE includes compensation of employees, goods and services, subsidies, social benefits, other recurrent expenditure, and capital expenditure.
  - Ceiling on GGPE adjusted upwards by payments related to bank support under the program and by payments to compensate pension funds for losses related to the resolution of Cyprus Popular Bank.
- Ceiling on the stock of General Government Debt:
  - General government debt = total outstanding gross liabilities as defined by ESA95; measured at nominal value.
  - Program exchange rate applies to non-euro denominated debt.
  - Ceiling adjusted upward (downward) by upward (downward) revision to end-March 2013 general government debt.
  - Ceiling adjusted upward by debt arising from payments for bank restructuring under the program and by payments to compensate pension funds for losses related to the resolution of Cyprus Popular Bank.
- Ceiling on the accumulation of new general government guarantees:
  - Includes domestic and external guarantees granted during the test period and guarantees whose maturity is extended beyond initial contractual provisions.
  - Excludes guarantees under a risk sharing instrument of the EU structural funds (COM (2011) 655 final) that do not create contingent liabilities for the Cypriot State.
  - Government entities outside general government are not permitted to grant guarantees.
  - Stock of guarantees at end March 2013 was €3.1 billion.
- Ceiling on accumulation of external arrears (continuous performance criterion):
  - External payment arrears defined as payments on debt to non-residents contracted or guaranteed by general government not made within seven days after falling due.
  - Stock of external payment arrears as of end-March 2013 was €0.
- Ceiling on accumulation of domestic arrears (performance criterion):
  - Domestic expenditure arrears = unpaid invoices past due date by 90 days (or 90 days after initiation of invoice if no due date).
  - Stock of domestic expenditure arrears as of end March 2013 was €0 million.
- Ceiling on accumulation of new VAT refund arrears:
  - VAT refund arrears = unpaid VAT refunds past due date established in tax legislation and/or corresponding regulations.
  - Stock of VAT refund arrears as of end March 2013 was €140 million.

### Monitoring of structural benchmarks
- Revision of the anti-money laundering legal framework (end-September 2013) — specification includes:
  - Ensure financial intelligence unit can exchange adequate information with foreign counterparts on money laundering, associated predicate offenses and terrorist financing in its analytical function without securing a court order.
  - Ensure all trustees of trusts created under and governed by Cyprus law are regulated or otherwise registered; registers kept by relevant supervisory authorities with adequate, accurate and current information on the name of a trust and the name and address of its trustee(s).
  - Ensure adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on the beneficial ownership of legal entities registered in Cyprus can be obtained in a timely manner by competent authorities.
  - Ensure nominee directors/shareholders do not create obstacles to timely access to beneficial ownership information by requiring nominee directors and nominee shareholders be authorized or otherwise regulated (lawyers, accountants or TCSPs) and maintain information on the identity of their nominator; a record of nominee status will be accessible through registers under the TCSP Law listing all regulated persons.
- Adopt legal framework for a central credit register (end-September 2013) — specification includes:
  - Framework to allow credit institutions to keep in a centralized manner critical information on household and corporate borrowers (including consolidated debt exposure, past due and performing loans, collateral, etc.), while safeguarding sensitive and/or confidential information.
- Submit to Parliament a law on fiscal responsibility and budget systems (end-December 2013) — specification includes:
  - Comprehensive coverage of the general government sector and the government‘s financial relationships with state enterprises and other public entities outside the general government boundary.
  - Incorporate provisions on fiscal transparency and accountability requiring a comprehensive, legally based and independently monitored fiscal strategy consistent with EU requirements.
  - Provide for development of a disciplined and policy-oriented approach to budget decision-making: reduce number of appropriations, adopt top-down approach to budget preparation closely linked to fiscal policy-making, and provide more flexibility to ministries and semi-governmental organizations.

### Reporting requirements — selected data, frequency, and maximum time lags
- Detailed execution of revenues, expenditure and financing provided in EDP reporting format:
  - Frequency: Monthly
  - Institution: MOF. Budget Department/Cystat Government Financial Statistics.
  - Maximum time lag: 25 days after the end of the month, except end-December data which will be provided 30 days after the end of the month.
- Debt issuance, amortization, and interest cost details by type of debt instrument, maturity, currency, type of debt holder (resident, non-resident):
  - Frequency: Monthly
  - Institution: MOF. Public Debt Management Unit.
  - Maximum time lag: 25 days after the end of the month.
- Details on any financial balance sheet transactions:
  - Frequency: Monthly
  - Institution: MOF. Treasury Department.
  - Maximum time lag: 25 days after the end of the month except December data which will be provided 30 days after the end of the year.
- Central government debt stock by type, and interest bill details through 2020:
  - Frequency: Monthly
  - Institution: MOF. Public Debt Management Unit.
  - Maximum time lag: 25 days after the end of the month.
- Budgetary Central Government deposits in the Consolidated Fund and in the Banking System:
  - Frequency: Monthly
  - Institution: MOF. Public Debt Management Unit.
  - Maximum time lag: 5 days after the end of the month.
- Stock of expenditure arrears of the Budgetary Central Government and corresponding monthly flows:
  - Frequency: Monthly
  - Institution: MOF. Treasury Department.
  - Maximum time lag: 15 days after the end of the month.
- Stock of VAT refund arrears and corresponding quarterly flows:
  - Frequency: Quarterly
  - Institution: MOF. Customs and Excise Department, VAT service.
  - Maximum time lag: 15 days after the end of the quarter.
- Stock of government guarantees and quarterly flows by institution:
  - Frequency: Quarterly
  - Institution: MOF. Treasury Department.
  - Maximum time lag: 25 days after the end of the quarter.
- Stock of external arrears:
  - Frequency: Monthly
  - Institution: MOF. Treasury Department.
  - Maximum time lag: 15 days after the end of the month.
- Assets and liabilities of the central bank:
  - Frequency: Weekly
  - Institution: Central Bank of Cyprus
  - Maximum time lag: 1 working day after the end of the week.
- Assets and liabilities of the domestic operations of the banking system — aggregate monetary balance sheet of credit institutions by institutional category:
  - Frequency: Monthly
  - Institution: Central Bank of Cyprus
  - Maximum time lag: 30 days after the end of the month.
- Assets and liabilities of the banking system (consolidated group balance sheets, including foreign operations) by institutional category:
  - Frequency: Quarterly
  - Institution: Central Bank of Cyprus
  - Maximum time lag: 45 days after the end of the reporting period.
- Individual operational balance sheet of the domestic operations of the largest banks and coops with detailed information on deposits (by maturity, currency, and type of depositor), central bank funding, interbank funding, debt securities, loans, liquid assets, liquidity position, other assets and liabilities:
  - Frequency: Monthly
  - Institution: Central Bank of Cyprus
  - Maximum time lag: 30 days after the end of the month.
  - Note: Reporting requirements for cooperative banks will be revisited after the CBC becomes their supervisor.
- Deposits by institution, currency, and residency and end-of-day liquidity buffers:
  - Frequency: Daily
  - Institution: Central Bank of Cyprus
  - Maximum time lag: Next working day.
- Financial soundness indicators—core set, deposits, NPLs, profitability, asset quality, balance sheet and capital adequacy ratios:
  - Frequency: Quarterly
  - Institution: Central Bank of Cyprus
  - Maximum time lag: 90 days after the end of the month.
  - Note: The scope and frequency of reporting of financial soundness indicators will be revised at the time of the first review.

*Source: _cr13125 - 37.5 percent of uninsured deposits into preferred shares (March 2013), Technical Memorandum of Understanding and related sections.*

### Appendix 2. CyprusȵLetter of Intent to the European

### Appendix 2. CyprusȵLetter of Intent to the European

### Memorandum of Understanding — context and legal basis
- Parties: The European Commission acting on behalf of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Republic of Cyprus, in liaison with the ECB and the IMF.
- Purpose: Mobilise funding and provide stability support to ESM members experiencing, or threatened by, severe financial problems.
- Forms of assistance envisaged: loan disbursements under precautionary conditioned credit lines or enhanced conditions credit lines; loans under macro-economic adjustment programmes; facilities to finance the recapitalisation of financial institutions; facilities for purchases of bonds in primary or secondary markets — all subject to strict conditionality.
- Conditionality and governance:
  - Release of Financial Assistance is conditional upon ESM Board of Directors' decision, based on reports from the European Commission (in liaison with the ECB) under Article 13(7) of the ESM Treaty, that the Beneficiary Member State has complied with the conditionality, including the measures set out in the Memorandum.
  - The Memorandum may be amended by mutual agreement, with addenda becoming integral parts upon signature.
- Formalities noted: Document executed in five (5) originals in the English language; signatures include representatives Harris Georgiades (Minister of Finance), Panicos O. Demetriades (Governor of Central Bank of Cyprus), and Olli Rehn (Vice-President of the European Commission).

### Key programme objectives
- Restore soundness of the Cypriot banking sector and rebuild depositors' and market confidence by:
  - Thoroughly restructuring and downsizing financial institutions.
  - Strengthening supervision and addressing expected capital shortfalls, in line with the political agreement of the Eurogroup of 25 March 2013.
- Continue fiscal consolidation to correct the excessive general government deficit as soon as possible by:
  - Reducing current primary expenditure.
  - Maintaining medium-term fiscal consolidation via measures to increase efficiency of public spending within a medium-term budgetary framework, enhance revenue collection, and improve public sector functioning.
- Implement structural reforms to support competitiveness and sustainable, balanced growth, including:
  - Reforming the wage indexation system.
  - Removing obstacles to the smooth functioning of services markets.

### 1. Financial sector reform — overview and diagnosis
- Size and vulnerabilities:
  - The domestic banking sector, including the cooperative credit institutions, represented until recently 550% of GDP.
  - Sector problems: exposure to Greece, overexpansion in the property market, poor risk management, sensitivity of collateral valuations to property prices, under-provisioning of loan losses, and the sector’s large size relative to the domestic economy.
- Policy objective: considerable downsizing and restructuring to restore solvency, reinforce resilience, and regain public confidence.

### Progress to date (as reported)
- Legislative and resolution framework:
  - House of Representatives adopted legislation on 22 March 2013 establishing a comprehensive framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions, drawing on the relevant proposal of the European Commission.
  - Under that legislation, the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) is the single resolution authority for banks and cooperative credit institutions.
- Actions implemented:
  - Carve-out of the Greek operations of the largest Cypriot banks.
  - Resolution of Cyprus Popular Bank and absorption of selected assets and liabilities by the Bank of Cyprus.
  - Recapitalisation of the Bank of Cyprus through a debt to equity conversion, without the use of public money.
- Immediate effects:
  - Banking sector downsized to 350% of GDP.
  - Bank of Cyprus fully recapitalised to regain eligible counterparty status for regular Eurosystem monetary policy operations.
  - Further downsizing planned via restructuring of cooperative credit institutions.
  - Administrative measures imposed to preserve banking sector liquidity.

### A. Regulation and supervision — measures and commitments

- Maintaining liquidity in the banking sector:
  - Temporary restrictions on cash withdrawals, electronic payments and transfers abroad were implemented to prevent large deposit outflows and preserve solvency and liquidity; these were designed to minimise payment-system disruptions and ensure execution of transactions essential for the economy.
  - Government committed to managing restrictions in line with Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union rules on free movement of capital; impact to be monitored daily with full information sharing with the EC, ECB and IMF.
  - Restrictions on capital movements will be gradually relaxed after consultation with the EC, the ECB and the IMF and will remain in place no longer than strictly necessary to mitigate serious risks to domestic financial stability.
  - A Monitoring Board comprising the EC, the EBA and the Cypriot authorities is being established to monitor and assess implementation of the temporary capital controls.
  - The CBC, in consultation with the ECB, will continue to closely monitor liquidity and stand ready to take measures to maintain sufficient liquidity in line with Eurosystem rules.
  - Cypriot authorities will encourage banks to strengthen collateral and liquidity buffers.
  - Domestic banks relying on central bank funding or receiving state aid will be required to establish and submit, quarterly, medium-term funding and capital plans, to be communicated at the end of each quarter, starting from June 2013, to the CBC, which will transmit them to the ECB, the EC, the ESM and the IMF. Plans should reflect anticipated deleveraging and reduce dependency on central bank borrowing while avoiding asset fire sales and a credit crunch. The reporting template and macroeconomic scenario will be provided by the CBC in coordination with the ECB.
  - The CBC will update liquidity regulations by December 2014, after consultation with the ECB, the EC and the IMF, to address the lack of concentration limits that allowed concentrated exposure to Greek sovereign debt.

- Regulation and supervision for banks and cooperative credit institutions:
  - Maximise bank recovery rates for non-performing loans while minimising incentives for strategic defaults.
  - Administrative hurdles and the legislative framework constraining seizure and sale of loan collateral will be amended so that property pledged as collateral can be seized within a maximum time-span of [text cut off in source].

*Memorandum of Understanding (Attachment 1): Cyprus — Memorandum Of Understanding On Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (European Commission).*

### 1.5 years from the initiation of legal or administrative proceedings. In the case of primary residences,

### 1.5 years from the initiation of legal or administrative proceedings. In the case of primary residences,

### Legal and legislative timetable
- Time-span for procedures: "1.5 years from the initiation of legal or administrative proceedings. In the case of primary residences, this time-span could be extended to 2.5 years."
- Necessary legislative changes: to be submitted to the House of Representatives by mid-2014 and implemented by end-2014, "macroeconomic conditions permitting."
- Specific legislative deadlines:
  - Amendment to classification of loans as non-performing (include all loans past due by more than 90 days): to be introduced by 30 May 2013.
  - Legal framework for the central credit register: to be set up by 30 September 2013; central credit register operational by 30 September 2014.
  - Review of regulatory framework for loan origination, asset impairment, provisioning, and treatment of collateral: by end-September 2013; new prudential regulations to enter into force by end-March 2014.
  - Legislation to strengthen banks' governance (prohibiting lending to independent board members, removing board members in arrears, disclosure requirements, independent majority on boards): to be passed by end-September 2013.
  - Mandatory supervisory action based on capitalisation levels: to be introduced by end-March 2014.
  - Unified data reporting system for banks and cooperative credit institutions: to be implemented by end-June 2013; publication of aggregate data for cooperative credit institutions to cover same elements as for banks.
  - Supervisory stress-tests: annual frequency; first exercise to be completed before end-June 2014.
  - Supervision of cooperative credit institutions detached from the Ministry and integrated into the CBC: supervision detached and integrated by end-July 2013; legislation to be passed by end-June 2013; time-bound plan to be presented for assessment by end-June 2013; legislation to authorize CBC to instruct current supervisor to intervene at individual institution level: introduced by end-May 2013.
  - Independent annual audit requirement for cooperative credit institutions above a size to be decided by the CBC (CBC may overturn auditor selection): timing tied to CBC decisions after consultation.

### Banking sector supervision, prudential measures, and data
- Non-performing loans (NPLs):
  - CBC guidance amended to include all loans past due by more than 90 days (see deadline above).
  - Time series for NPLs to be published including historical observations "reaching as far back as possible."
- Central credit register:
  - Will list all borrowers and beneficial owners from commercial banks and cooperative credit institutions.
  - Will identify borrowers who are or were in arrears and help monitor credit risk and large exposures.
  - Legal framework and operational deadlines as above.
- Prudential and supervisory upgrades:
  - Review and regulatory amendments on loan origination, asset impairment, provisioning, and treatment of collateral following due diligence; new prudential regulations by end-March 2014.
  - Mandatory supervisory action linked to capitalisation levels by end-March 2014.
  - Unified data reporting by end-June 2013; extension of statistical publication to cooperative credit institutions.
  - Stress-testing integrated into off-site supervision, annual frequency, first by end-June 2014.
  - Supervisory off-site tool to include monthly reporting by credit institutions on breakdown by country of origin of main depositors and main beneficiaries of loans (and their beneficial owners) as part of AML supervisory enhancements by Q4-2013.

### Cooperative credit institutions: regulation, supervision, and governance
- Rationale: significant role in domestic economy, legal specificities, deficiencies in risk assessment; need to align regulation and supervision with commercial banks.
- Institutional changes and deadlines:
  - Supervision of cooperative credit institutions detached from Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Tourism and integrated into the CBC by end-July 2013; legislation to be passed by end-June 2013.
  - Time-bound actionable plan to be presented for assessment by the EC, the IMF and the ECB by end-June 2013.
  - Legislation to authorize CBC to instruct current cooperative credit sector supervisor to intervene at the level of individual cooperative credit institutions by end-May 2013.
- Audit and oversight:
  - Accounts of cooperative credit institutions above a size to be decided by the CBC will be subject to an independent annual audit by an external, recognised and independent auditing firm.
  - CBC will have the right to overturn the selection of an auditor by any cooperative credit institution.

### Corporate and household indebtedness monitoring and borrower support
- Monitoring enhancements (to be put in place by end-June 2013):
  - Step up monitoring of corporate and household indebtedness; prepare quarterly reports including distribution of assets and liabilities across households, assessment of debt-servicing capacity and refinancing activities.
  - Use survey data until credit register fully operational.
  - Financial Stability Report to be published yearly as of December 2013 and will include extended analysis on corporate and household indebtedness.
- Measures to deal with troubled borrowers (timing and actions):
  - Directive circulated by the CBC by end-April 2013 recommending banks provide a grace period of 60 days without penalties to pay interest only on loans coming due.
  - Legislation to eliminate tax deterrents to loan restructurings, including elimination of tax deterrents regarding losses of income associated with voluntary early loan repayments or discounts for such repayments to problematic but viable borrowers (timing: "if needed").
  - Framework and legislation to address legal, administrative or other impediments affecting restructuring of viable borrowers by end-June 2013; approach based on market-based voluntary workouts, strengthened legal framework for debt restructuring.
  - Implementation of a framework for seizure and sale of loan collateral as part of measures.
  - Amendments to ensure reduction of built-in costs (fees, requisites) for credit institutions and clients during restructuring.
  - Establishment of a mediation service between banks and their clients to achieve fair debt restructuring by end-June 2013.

### Anti-money laundering (AML) and entity transparency
- Commitment to strengthen AML framework in line with best practice and IMF staff recommendations.
- Planned actions and deadlines:
  - Revision of legal framework to enable widest possible range of cooperation to foreign counterparts (including laundering of proceeds of tax crimes involving fraudulent activity) and to give precision to scope of cooperation by the financial intelligence unit.
  - Enhancement of customer due-diligence and suspicious-transaction reporting procedures following April 2013 audit and recommendations in MONEYVAL and auditor reports by Q2-2013.
  - Action plan on entity transparency to revise legal framework and ensure dutiful implementation so adequate, accurate and timely information on beneficial ownership of Cypriot legal persons and arrangements can be provided to foreign counterparts in response to requests related to money laundering and tax matters.
    - Specific planned revisions by Q2-2013: Trust and Company Services Provider law and the Anti-Money Laundering law; revision of directives and circulars issued by supervisory authorities (CBC, Cyprus Bar Association, and Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Cyprus) to lay down clear implementing procedures by Q2-2013.
  - Establishment of trust registers with supervisory authorities for all trusts established under Cyprus law; registers to contain name of the trust and name and address of the trustee.
  - Third-party assessment of the functioning of the Registrar of companies (timing within the action plan).
  - CBC supervision department to review off-site and on-site supervisory procedures to further implement a risk-based approach to AML supervision by Q4-2013.
  - Monthly reporting by credit institutions (as above) on country breakdown of main depositors and main beneficiaries of loans and their beneficial owners to be included in off-site supervisory tool.

### Governance, coordination, and recapitalisation
- Coordination Committee:
  - A Coordination Committee with representatives from the CBC and the Ministry of Finance will be set up to oversee implementation of the financial sector reform programme and monitor banking sector developments.
- Capitalisation and due diligence:
  - CBC will increase the minimum Core Tier 1 capital ratio from "the present level of 8% to 9% by 31 December 2013."
  - Due diligence review:
    - An international consultant conducted an accounting and economic value assessment (due diligence review) of credit portfolios of Bank of Cyprus, Cyprus Popular Bank, Hellenic Bank and a sample representing about 63% of the cooperative credit institutions' assets, as well as Alpha Bank Cyprus and Eurobank Cyprus.
    - Assessment overseen by a Steering Committee including representatives of the Cypriot authorities, the EC, the ECB, the EBA and the ESM (as members) and the IMF (as observer).
    - Assessment formally started on 4 October 2012 with selection of external consultant.
    - Review included both an accounting review and an assessment of the economic value of banks' assets; results formed basis for bank-by-bank stress tests.
  - Stress-test outcome excerpt:
    - Bank-by-bank stress tests conducted by the CBC resulted in "an overall capital shortfall of EUR 6 billion under a baseline scenario with a Core Tier 1 target ratio of 9% and a shortfall of EUR" (text ends mid-sentence in provided content).

*Source: Excerpt from the provided IMF document content.*

### 8.9  billion  under the adverse  macroeconomic  scenario with  a  Core  Tier  1  target ratio of  6%.  These

### _cr13125 - 8.9  billion  under the adverse  macroeconomic  scenario with  a  Core  Tier  1  target ratio of  6%.  These

### Banking sector: due diligence results and immediate actions
- The due diligence identified capital needs totalling "8.9  billion under the adverse macroeconomic scenario with a Core Tier 1 target ratio of 6%."  
- The above numbers include one foreign bank, but exclude:
  - "the EUR 1.8 billion of capital already injected by the Cypriot State in Cyprus Popular Bank in June 2012, which will be rolled over", and
  - "the capital needs of those credit cooperative institutions that were not covered by the due diligence exercise."
- "The specific capital needs were communicated to each participating bank on 18 March 2013."
- Regulatory timetable and requirements:
  - "Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank have been intervened and restructured using the recently-adopted resolution law."
  - "Other commercial banks will be instructed by the CBC to take the necessary steps to ensure that they meet regulatory requirements in a stress scenario by end-September 2013."
  - "Cooperative credit institutions will be instructed to meet capital regulatory requirements by July 2013."
  - "If necessary, public programme funds will be used to recapitalize these institutions in accordance with EU state-aid rules."

### Restructuring and resolution of Bank of Cyprus (BoC) and Cyprus Popular Bank (CPB)
- Core findings:
  - "The accounting and economic value assessment ... revealed that the two largest banks of Cyprus were insolvent."
  - A "fourfold strategy" was adopted to restore sector viability "which does not involve the use of taxpayer money."
- Greek carve-out:
  - "All Greek-related assets (including shipping loans) and liabilities were carved-out, estimated in the adverse scenario at EUR 16.4 billion and EUR 15.0 billion, respectively."
  - "The carve-out was based on an agreement signed on 26 March 2013."
  - "With the book value of the assets at EUR 19.2 billion, the carve-out has substantially reduced the cross exposures between Greece and Cyprus."
- UK branch and asset transfers:
  - "With respect to the UK branch of Cyprus Popular Bank, all the deposits were transferred to the UK subsidiary of the Bank of Cyprus. The associated assets were folded into the Bank of Cyprus."
  - "Bank of Cyprus is taking over -via a purchase and assumption procedure- almost the entire Cypriot assets of Cyprus Popular Bank at fair value, as well as the latter's insured deposits and Emergency Liquidity Assistance exposure at nominal value."
  - "The uninsured deposits of Cyprus Popular Bank will remain in the legacy entity."
  - "The aim is for the value of the transferred assets to be higher than the transferred liabilities with the difference corresponding to the recapitalisation of Bank of Cyprus by Cyprus Popular Bank amounting to 9% of the risk-weighted assets transferred."
- Recapitalisation targets and measures:
  - "Bank of Cyprus is being recapitalised to reach a core tier one ratio of 9% under the adverse scenario of the stress test by the end of the programme."
  - "The conversion of 37.5% of the uninsured deposits in Bank of Cyprus into class A shares with full voting and dividend rights provides the largest part of the capital needs with additional equity contributions from the legacy entity of Cyprus Popular Bank."
  - "Part of the remaining uninsured deposits of Bank of Cyprus will be frozen temporarily until the completion of the independent valuation referred to in the paragraph below."
- Valuation and potential additional conversion:
  - "A more detailed and updated independent valuation of the assets of Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank will be completed ... by end June 2013."
  - "No later than mid-April 2013, the terms of reference of the independent valuation exercise will be agreed in consultation with the EC, the ECB, and the IMF."
  - "Following that valuation, and if required, an additional conversion of uninsured deposits into class A shares will be undertaken to ensure that the core tier one capital target of 9 % under stress by end-programme can be met."
  - "Should Bank of Cyprus be found to be overcapitalised relative to the target, a share-reversal process will be undertaken to refund depositors by the amount of over-capitalisation."
- Governance and operational safeguards:
  - "The CBC, following consultation with the Ministry of Finance, will appoint a new Board of Directors and an acting Chief Executive Officer until Bank of Cyprus' new shareholders are organised in a general meeting."
  - "The CBC will require the Board of Directors to prepare a restructuring plan defining the bank's business objectives and credit policies by end-September 2013."
  - "Institutional arrangements will be designed by end-June 2013 in accordance with Cypriot law to insulate Bank of Cyprus from reputational and governance risks."

### Restructuring and recapitalisation of other commercial banks
- Process and timing:
  - "Commercial banks with a capital shortfall, which are deemed viable, can, if other measures do not suffice, ask for recapitalisation aid from the State."
  - "The Cypriot authorities should submit by 30 November 2013 restructuring plans for these banks to the EC, which are drawn up in compliance with EU state-aid rules, while also informing the ECB and the IMF."
- Financing and conditionality:
  - "Capital should, to the largest extent possible, be raised from private sources including internal measures, asset disposals and liability management exercises."
  - "Banks in need of aid from the State will not be recapitalised before their restructuring plans have been formally approved under state-aid rules."
  - "The credit institutions benefiting from capital injections will be subject to specific management rules and restrictions, including on pay levels of executive and supervisory board members, and to a restructuring process in line with EU competition and state-aid requirements, which will be scrutinised by an external monitoring trustee."
  - "If the recapitalisation takes the form of state aid, funds for the recapitalisation of these banks will be made available in the context of the programme."

### Restructuring and recapitalisation of cooperative credit institutions
- Timetable and strategy:
  - "Cooperative credit institutions requiring recapitalisation should seek private sector participation no later than 31 July 2013."
  - "The CBC, assisted by the current supervisor and in consultation with the EC, the ECB and the IMF, will ascertain the viability of individual cooperative credit institutions and design a strategy for restructuring and recapitalising the sector."
  - "This strategy ... will be submitted to the EC, also informing the ECB and the IMF by end-July 2013 based on an assessment of capital needs and viability to be finalised by June 2013."
  - "The terms of reference for this assessment will be finalised in consultation with the EC, the ECB and the IMF by April 2013."
  - "The restructuring plans for the cooperatives will be submitted to the EC by September 2013."
  - "Implementation of the strategy should be completed by 30 June 2015."
- Funding and governance:
  - "Sufficient funds for the recapitalisation of the cooperative credit institutions will be made available from the programme following the first programme review and will be deposited in a dedicated account with the Central Bank to boost confidence in the system."
  - "The amounts will be injected following the identification of the capital needs and in accordance with the agreed strategy, after approval of the restructuring plans."
  - "A new governance structure will be established, which allocates clear levels of continued accountability and provides for proper incentives to avoid moral hazard, having regard to a two-tier supervisory system applied in other EU Member States."
- Conditionality:
  - "Cooperative credit institutions in need of aid from the State will not be recapitalised before their restructuring plans have been formally approved under state-aid rules."
  - "The terms of the state aid will comply with the EU state-aid rules, with due consideration for financial stability."

### Time span and conditionality overview (selected milestones cited)
- "26/3/13: signature of Greek carve-out (1.24)"
- "end-Jun 13: independent valuation exercise (1.27)"
- "end-Sep 13: authorities submit restructuring plans (1.33)"
- "end-September 2013: review of loan origination, asset impairment, provisioning (1.8)"
- "end-December 2013: increase minimum of Core Tier 1 capital ratio from 8 % to 9 % (1.19)"
- Implementation completion target: "unti l 30/6/15 : implementation of the strategy (1.33)"

### Fiscal policy: objectives and programmed targets
- Overarching fiscal objectives:
  - Achieve "a 3% of GDP primary surplus in 2017, 4% of GDP in 2018 and maintain at least such a level thereafter."
  - "Correct the excessive general government deficit as soon as possible."
  - "Fully implement the fiscal consolidation measures listed in Annex 1 and the fiscal consolidation measures for 2013 listed in paragraphs 2.2 – 2.11."
  - "Achieve the annual budgetary targets ... through high-quality permanent measures, and additional measures in the outer years, in particular to reduce the growth in expenditure on the public sector wage bill, social benefits and discretionary spending, while minimising the impact of consolidation on vulnerable groups."
  - "Maintain fiscal consolidation over the medium term, converging towards Cyprus' medium-term budgetary objective of a balanced budget in structural terms."
- Adopted consolidation baseline:
  - "The adopted bills amounted to consolidation measures of about 5.0% of GDP for 2012-2016, in particular 0.3% of GDP in 2012, 2.3% of GDP in 2013, and 1.9% of GDP in 2014, and ½% of GDP in 2015-2016 based on the macro-economic projections of 23 November 2012."

### Fiscal policy in 2013: targets and measures
- 2013 primary deficit target:
  - "The Cypriot authorities will achieve a general government primary deficit of no more than EUR 395 million (2.4% of GDP) in 2013."
  - "The 2013 deficit target may be revised to incorporate compensation for provident and retirement funds in Cyprus Popular Bank to ensure equal treatment with such funds in Bank of Cyprus following the conversion of deposits into equity."
  - "Given the social welfare nature of provident and retirement funds, the Cypriot authorities will use the necessary amount out of programme financing for such compensation."
- Consolidation requirement:
  - "Over 2013, the Cypriot authorities will rigorously implement the 2013 Budget Law with additional permanent measures of at least EUR 351 million (2.1% of GDP)."
  - "Additional permanent measures for 2013 will be adopted ... prior to the granting of the first disbursement of financial assistance (applicable to the measures outlined in 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11)."
  - "The Cypriot authorities will amend the 2013 Budget Law, which will contain the additional consolidation measures, and, accordingly, the revised general government primary deficit."
- Specific additional revenue measures (to be applicable retroactively from 1 January 2013 where legally possible):
  - "2.2. Ensure additional revenues from property taxation of at least EUR 75 million by: (i) updating the 1980 prices through application of the CPI index for the period 1980 to 2012; and/or (ii) amending tax rates and/or (iii) amending value bands."
  - "2.3. Increase the statutory corporate income tax rate to 12.5%."
  - "2.4. Increase the tax rate on interest income to 30%."
  - "2.5. Increase the bank levy on deposits raised by banks and credit institutions in Cyprus from 0.11% to 0.15% with 25/60 of the revenue earmarked for a special account for a Financial Stability Fund."
  - "2.6. Undertake by June 2013 a reform of the tax system for motor vehicles ... with a view to raising additional revenues, through the annual road tax, the registration fee and excise duties, including motor fuel duties."
  - "2.7. Complete the increase in fees for public services by at least 17% of the current values."
- Specific expenditure and benefit measures for 2013:
  - "2.8. Introduce measures to control healthcare expenditure (see 3.2, measures a), b), c), d) and e)."
  - "2.9. Reduce the expenditure on various housing schemes by at least EUR 36 million ..."
  - "2.10. Further streamline the Easter allowance to pensioners by limiting the benefit to pensioners with a monthly per household income of at most EUR 500."
  - "2.11. Implement a scaled reduction in emoluments of public and broader public sector pensioners and employees as follows: EUR 0-2.000: 0.8%; EUR 2.001-3.000: 1%; EUR 3.001-4.000: 1.5%; above EUR 4001: 2.0%."
- Education structural reforms (from budget year 2014 onward):
  - "2.12. Introduce as of the budget year 2014 structural reform measures in the educational system, notably, a reduction of the number of teachers seconded to the Ministry of Education and Culture, the removal of 1:1.5 teaching time ratio from evening schools of general and technical and vocational education, the elimination of teaching time concession to teachers for being placed in two or more educational districts, the elimination of mentoring components for pre-service and in-service training for newly appointed teachers and the reduction of the cost of afternoon and evening programmes."

### Fiscal policy in 2014 and 2015-2016: targets and process
- 2014 target:
  - "The Cypriot authorities will achieve a deficit of the general government primary balance of no more than EUR 678 million (4¼% of GDP) in 2014."
  - "After review by and consultation with the programme partners by mid-September 2013, the 2014 Budget Law will be adopted by mid-December 2013."
  - "The 2013-2015 expenditure ceilings will be updated for the period 2014-2016 and will accompany the 2014 Budget Law document."
- 2015-2016 targets:
  - "The Cypriot authorities will achieve a deficit in the 2015 general government primary balance of no more than EUR 344 million (2.1% of GDP) and a surplus in the 2016 general government primary balance of at least EUR 204 million (1.2% of GDP)."
  - "After review by and consultation with the programme partners the 2015 and 2016 Budget Laws will be adopted, respectively, by mid-December 2014 and mid-December 2015."
  - "The 2014-2016 expenditure ceilings will be updated for the period 2015-2017 and will accompany the 2015 Budget Law document."
  - "In Q2-2016, the Cypriot authorities will present the programme partners with a provisional list of measures to attain a primary surplus of 3% of GDP in 2017 and 4% of GDP in 2018. The measures required will be included in the draft 2017 Budget Law."

*Source: _cr13125 (extracted content).*

### 3.   Fiscal-structural measures

### 3.   Fiscal-structural measures

### Key objectives
- Improve the efficiency of public spending and the budgetary process by means of an effective Medium-Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF) fully compliant with the Directive on requirements for budgetary frameworks and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG).
- Implement further reforms of the pension system to address the high projected increase in pension spending.
- Take further steps to control the growth of health expenditure.
- Enhance tax revenues by improving tax compliance and collection.
- Reform public administration to improve functioning and cost-effectiveness by reviewing size, employment conditions and functional organisation of public services.
- Reform the overall benefit structure to produce efficient use of resources and ensure balance between welfare assistance and incentives to take up work.
- Elaborate a programme to improve efficiency of state-owned and semi-public enterprises and initiate a privatisation programme.

### Pension reform
- Overarching objectives:
  - reduce the increase in pension spending;
  - ensure the long-term financial viability of the pension system through 2060;
  - limit the fiscal subsidy to the General Social Insurance Scheme for credited contributions for current and future pensioners and for the non-contributory pension.
- Measures implemented/agreed:
  - separate in accounting terms the non-contributory pension benefit from the insurance-based (contributory) pension scheme by 30 June 2013; the non-contributory part will be tax financed;
  - for the General Social Insurance System (GSIS):
    - increase the minimum age for entitlement to an unreduced pension by 6 months per year to be brought in line with the statutory retirement age;
    - introduce an early retirement penalty of 0.5% per month of early retirement so as to make early retirement actuarially neutral;
    - introduce an automatic adjustment of the statutory retirement age every 5 years in line with changes in life expectancy at the statutory retirement age, to be applied for the first time in 2018;
    - gradually (1 year per year) extend the minimum contributory period in the system from the current 10 years to at least 15 years over the period 2013-17 (in place since December 2012);
  - for the Government Employee Pension Scheme (GEPS):
    - increase the statutory retirement age by 2 years for the various categories of employees;
    - increase the minimum age for entitlement to an unreduced pension (by 6 months per year) to be in line with the statutory retirement age;
    - while preserving acquired rights, introduce an early retirement penalty of 0.5% per month of early retirement so as to make early retirement actuarially neutral;
    - introduce an automatic adjustment of the statutory retirement age every 5 years in line with changes in life expectancy at the statutory retirement age, to be applied for the first time in 2018;
    - introduce a change of indexation of all benefits from wages to prices;
    - pension benefits will be calculated on a pro-rata basis taking into account life-time service as of January 2013 (in place since January 2013);
  - ensure total annual public pension benefits for public sector employees and state officials do not exceed 50% of the annual pensionable salary earned at the time of retirement from the post with the highest pensionable salary of the official's career in the public sector and broader public sector (in place since January 2013);
  - ensure that pension entitlements that will accrue after 1 January 2013 are considered as personal income, thus becoming fully taxable also in the case in which they are received as a lump-sum payment; employees will be granted the option of converting all or part of the lump-sum into an actuarially neutral annuity (in place since January 2013);
  - ensure that all of the above measures aimed at the GEPS will apply also to pension schemes in the broader public sector and to pension schemes for hourly-paid public employees.
- Actuarial study:
  - an actuarial study for the GSIS will be carried out and submitted for peer review in the Ageing Working Group of the Economic Policy Committee by end-July 2013.
  - study objectives: project the scheme‘s finances on a cash basis; exclude government subsidy on the revenues side (except credited contributions and contributions made by the government as an employer) and exclude costs related to the top-up for the minimum pension on the expenditures side; analyse impact of additional reform options such as benefit reductions, an increase in the statutory retirement age and increases in contribution rates or combinations thereof, taking into account impact on labour costs.
  - following review and consultation with programme partners, if needed, a comprehensive reform establishing long-run viability will be carried out, adopted by end-December 2013 and enter into force in Q1-2014.

### Health care expenditure
- Measures to be adopted prior to the granting of the first disbursement of financial assistance:
  - abolish the category of beneficiaries class "B" and all exemptions for access to free public health care based on all non-income related categories except for persons suffering from certain chronic diseases depending on illness severity;
  - introduce a compulsory health care contribution for public servants and public servant pensioners of 1.5% of gross salaries and pensions as a first step towards a system of universal coverage; participation for families with three or more dependent children will be voluntary; the measure will be reviewed by Q2-2014 with the programme partners;
  - increase fees for medical services for non-beneficiaries by 30% to reflect the associated costs of medical services and create a co-payment formula with zero or low admission fees for visiting general practitioners; increase fees for using higher levels of care for all patients irrespective of age;
  - introduce effective financial disincentives for using emergency care services in non-urgent situations;
  - introduce financial disincentives (co-payment) to minimise provision of medically unnecessary laboratory tests and pharmaceuticals;
  - adopt a decision by the Council of Ministers concerning a restructuring plan for public hospitals, improving quality and optimising costs and redesigning the organisational structure of hospital management, by implementing recommendations from the 2009 "Public Hospital Roadmap".
- Measures to be reviewed and consulted with programme partners before implementation:
  - assess and publish, before parliamentary discussion, the potential risks and benefits of the planned introduction of the National Health System (NHS) in an updated actuarial study, taking into account possible proposals for implementing NHS in stages by Q2-2013;
  - make the award of the tender for the IT-infrastructure conditional upon the results of the study and the decision for implementing the NHS;
  - review income thresholds for free public health care in comparison to the eligibility criteria for social assistance while ensuring co-payments protect individuals/households effectively from catastrophic health expenditures by Q4-2013;
  - create protocols for laboratory tests and the prescription of pharmaceuticals based on thorough scientific evidence;
  - introduce a coherent regulatory framework for pricing and reimbursement of goods and services based on the actual level of costs incurred in accordance with Article 7 of Directive 2011/24/EU; an interim report will be ready by Q3-2013;
  - conduct an assessment of the basket of the top 4 publicly reimbursable healthcare products in terms of annual spending and prepare a report to establish an integrated system for health-technology assessment; prepare implementation of 10 new clinical guidelines focusing on high annual volume and high cost diseases by Q2-2013;
  - start coding inpatient cases by the system of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) with the aim of replacing the current hospital payment system by payments based on DRGs by Q3-2013;
  - establish working time in the Health Service and modify starting time and flexibility period: move starting time by half an hour (from 7.30 to 8.00) and extend the flexibility period from a half to one hour, keeping weekly working hours unchanged at 37 1/2 hours per week, 7 1/2 hours per day, daily (Monday to Friday): 8.00/9.00 to 15.30/16.30; the transitional period of 1.1.2013-31.8.2013 will keep starting time at 7:30 and move ending time back by half an hour (15:00/16:00); following review, in a second step, revise regular working hours and stand-by shifts of healthcare staff, including rules to increase mobility of staff; revise current regulations on overtime pay and fully implement existing laws on recording/monitoring overtime payments by Q1-2014;
  - define a basket of publicly-reimbursable medical services based on objective, verifiable criteria, including cost-effectiveness criteria by Q2-2013.
- Additional consideration:
  - authorities will consider establishing a system of family doctors acting as gate-keepers for access to further levels of care.

### Budgetary framework
- Actions and timelines:
  - provide for the establishment of a Fiscal Council with a statutory regime, functions, nomination procedures for its governing body and funding arrangements grounded in law by Q2-2013;
  - complete adoption of the law transposing Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks, and provisions pertaining to the fiscal compact of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG), with implementing texts ensuring adopted measures are fully effective by Q2-2013;
    - integrate presentation of existing multi-annual budgetary objectives (MoU fiscal targets and the rolling three-year expenditure ceilings) into a comprehensive Fiscal Strategy Statement in compliance with MTBF requirements in the sense of Directive 2011/85/EU to guide preparation of the 2014 budget by Q2-2013;
  - submit to the House of Representatives a draft high-level Fiscal Responsibility and Budget System Law applicable to the entire general government sector; the draft law will encompass macro-fiscal policy-making, and budget formulation and approval, address remaining gaps and inconsistencies and codify existing good budget practices by Q4-2013.

### Public private partnerships (PPPs)
- Required actions and timelines:
  - create an inventory of PPPs including objectives of current and planned PPPs and detailed information on signed contracts (nature, private partner, capital value, future service payments, size and nature of contingent liabilities, amount and terms of financing); compile an inventory of contingent liabilities with detailed information on nature, intended purpose, beneficiaries, expected duration, payments made, reimbursements, recoveries, financial claims established against beneficiaries, waivers, guarantee fees or other revenues received, indication of amount and form of allowance in the budget for expected calls, and forecast and explanation of new contingent liabilities in the budget year; inventories to be shared by Q3-2013 with the programme partners; as of 2014, inventories updated annually and included as "Statement of PPPs" and "Statement of Contingent Liabilities" in appendices to the annual budget law and to the annual financial report;
  - put in place an adequate legal and institutional framework for PPPs designed according to best practices, including ex-ante assessment and monitoring of fiscal risks of engaging in PPPs and concessions compared to other public investments; a proposal for such a strengthened framework should be drafted by Q3-2013 and implemented by Q4-2013;
  - commit not to enter into any new tendering process and not to sign any new PPP contract before implementation of the legal and institutional PPP framework, excluding any project having reached commercial close by end-October 2012.

### State-owned enterprises and privatisation
- Inventory and governance actions:
  - establish an inventory of assets owned by central government, municipalities and regional administrations, including real estate and land; priority to assets with highest commercial value, including at least one third of SOEs by Q2-2013 and the remaining SOEs by Q3-2013; inventory will indicate which SOEs could be subject to divestment, restructuring or liquidation; inventory of the largest and most valuable real estate and land assets will be ready by Q3-2013; full inventory of all assets (SOEs, real estate and land) to be completed by Q4-2013; the inventory will be gradually submitted to the programme partners;
  - prepare a plan to strengthen the governance of SOEs in accordance with international best practices and draft a report reviewing the operations and finances of SOEs by Q3-2013.

*International Monetary Fund — Cyprus: Fiscal-structural measures (section 3).*

### 2013. The report will assess these companies' business prospects, the potential exposure of

### _cr13125 - 2013. The report will assess these companies' business prospects, the potential exposure of

### SOE review and privatisation plan
- The report will assess these companies' business prospects, the potential exposure of the government to the SOEs and the scope for orderly privatisation. The Cypriot authorities will adopt the necessary legal changes to fulfil this requirement by Q4-2013. No additional SOEs will be created throughout the duration of the Programme.
- Submit to the House of Representatives a draft law to regulate the creation and the functioning of SOEs at the central and local levels and enhance the monitoring powers of the central administration, including reporting on SOEs in the context of the annual budgetary procedure by Q4-2013.
- The Cypriot authorities will initiate a privatisation plan to help improving economic efficiency through enhanced competition and encouragement of capital inflows, and to help restoring debt sustainability:
  - Consider privatisation prospects of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and semi-governmental organisations (SGOs), including, inter alia, CyTA (telecom), EAC (electricity), CPA (ports), as well as real estate/land assets. For privatisation of natural monopolies, an appropriate regulatory framework is a prerequisite. Provision of basic public goods and services by privatised industries will be fully safeguarded, in line with national policy goals and in compliance with the EU Treaty and appropriate secondary legislation rules.
  - The privatisation plan will be based on the report reviewing the operations and finances of SOEs, as well as the inventory of assets. The privatisation plan will be created after consultation with the programme partners, including asset-specific timelines and intermediate steps by Q3-2013.
  - In parallel, the specific legal and institutional framework for the privatisation process will be drafted by Q3-2013 and implemented by Q4-2013, after consultation with the programme partners.
  - The privatisation plan identified by the Government after consultation with the programme partners will raise at least EUR 1 billion by the end of the programme period and an additional EUR 400 million by 2018 at the latest.

### Revenue administration, tax compliance, and international tax cooperation
- The Cypriot authorities will propose a comprehensive reform plan to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of tax collection and administration by Q4-2013, for implementation as of the budget year 2014. The reform shall encompass the following elements:
  - Attribute personal responsibility for payment of company taxes to those, who -in the case of non-listed companies- truly and effectively control a company.
  - Attribute personal responsibility to the responsible manager for fraudulent filing of company taxes.
  - Strengthen powers by the tax authorities to ensure payment of outstanding tax obligations, e.g. by having authority to seize corporate assets, prohibiting alienation or use of assets, including property and bank accounts, by the taxpayer.
  - Harmonise the legislation among tax types so that not paying taxes is a criminal offense regardless of the type of tax and that there is an administrative appeals process for all of these taxes before going to the courts.
  - Increase staff mobility between different tax administration entities in order to ensure appropriate staffing of entities with high revenue collection capacities.
  - Where not in place, establish clear performance objectives, including on revenue collection results, for each revenue administration entity, and improved transparency regarding the performance of revenue administration entities, e.g. via publication of the tax gap for main revenue categories (the difference between the tax owed and the amount actually collected).
  - Optimise use of IT systems in the tax administration based on: (i) facilitating information exchange between tax administration entities; (ii) enhancing the use of e-filling of tax returns and e-payment (e.g. by allowing payment through bank transfers); (iii) improving the exchange of information, including data on natural and legal persons, between relevant authorities for tax collection purposes, taking into account legal provisions for data protection; (iv) enhancing reporting capabilities in relation to obligations under Council Directive 2003/48.
  - Enhance the efforts to reduce administrative burden on businesses, with a view to reducing informal activities and achieving voluntary compliance to the widest possible extent. Systematically measure the time and cost for taxpayers to complete revenue administration procedures such as registration or filing.
  - Step up administrative tax fraud investigations and enhance cooperation between the tax and judicial systems, while addressing potential bottlenecks in the tax appeal system.
  - Improve capacity of the Inland Revenue Department to follow-up on tax information received from other countries, e.g. by permitting the department to access databases of other public entities in order to facilitate and expedite the identification of the taxpayer.
  - Remove from the income tax law the Director‘s prerogative to act as deemed necessary in relation to the application of the Law‘s provisions, including the decision on the withdrawal of lawsuit for unpaid taxes.
- The Cypriot authorities will implement reforms building on recommendations from the diagnostic technical assistance mission conducted in February 2013. Authorities will elaborate a comprehensive reform agenda and consult with the programme partners on this agenda by Q2-2013.
- The Cypriot authorities will safeguard the timely and effective exchange of information in regard to tax matters, fully ensuring the applicability of laws and standards governing international exchange of tax information. Measures include:
  - Fully transpose and implement Council Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and abide by Art 7 of the Directive and Art 10, 19 and 21 of Council Regulation 904/2010 on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of value-added tax, which prescribe specific timeframes within which Member States shall provide information to each other.
  - Ensure timely access to information on beneficial ownership of trusts and to an audit trail of financial transactions of trustees. Authorities intend to establish registers of trusts held by the respective competent supervisory authority and note the recently-introduced obligation to have, at any given time, for trusts under Cyprus law at least one trustee who is a resident in Cyprus. Professional trustees should be authorised or otherwise regulated (i.e. as lawyers, accountants or Trust and Company Service Providers) and all trustees, whether regulated or not, should be registered (see paragraph 1.17). Trustees should report information to their respective supervisors on their relation to a trust. Require trustees of trusts under Cyprus law to declare their status to credit institutions when using the financial system in Cyprus, and require credit institutions established in Cyprus to obtain a corresponding declaration of status from trustees of trusts created under and governed by foreign law as a mandatory condition for using the financial system in Cyprus by Q3-2013.
  - Ensure timely access to information on who truly and effectively controls a company established in Cyprus by either: a) requiring nominee directors and nominee shareholders to disclose the identity of their nominator to the company and to the company register; or b) requiring that all nominee directors and nominee shareholders be authorised or otherwise regulated (i.e. as lawyers, accountants or TCSPs) and maintain information on the identity of their nominator, which is to be made available to the competent authorities upon request. A record of director's or shareholder's nominee status will be accessible through the registers under the TCSP Law by Q3-2013.
  - Ensure systematic follow-up and use of information received from other countries about savings income payments received by Cyprus resident individuals and savings income payments received by entities and legal arrangements such as trusts under Cyprus law, notably entities and legal arrangements the beneficial owners of which are resident in other EU Member States.
  - Implement the recommendations put forward in the in-depth review of Cyprus' legal and regulatory framework under the OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes and commit to address any shortcomings to be identified in the forthcoming evaluation of implementation issues.
- In the context of Council Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments (the EUSD), the Cypriot authorities will:
  - Continue to provide to the EC all necessary and available information/statistics extracted from the data exchanged under the FISC153.
  - On an annual basis and starting from the tax year ending on 31 December 2013, provide to the EC a breakdown of the information provided under the EUSD by sector of activity of the paying agents, including possible sanctions actually claimed of paying agents for their application of the EUSD.
  - In 2015, provide to the European Commission a report on the results of audits conducted in 2014.
  - The Cypriot authorities (CBC) will provide on an annual basis detailed sectoral deposit statistics with a breakdown of non-resident deposits by country.

### Immovable Property Tax Reform
- Objective: increase revenue, improve fairness of the tax burden by levying the recurrent property tax on current market values, and reduce overhead cost in tax base administration.
- Measures agreed:
  - Implement a property price index that establishes the average property market valuation in 2013 by square meter of habitable surface and land plot. This index shall be operational to provide imputed market valuations for each non-agricultural cadastral plot by Q2-2014, in time for its application in the calculation of the immovable property tax in 2014. The index shall vary according to location and zoning as well as other building- and plot-related characteristics. Propose and implement a methodology for annual updates of such imputed market valuations.
  - Implement the recurrent immovable property tax based on imputed market valuations of land plots according to a unit tax base established by this property index by Q3-2014. The tax rates shall reflect the progressivity and revenue of the preceding property tax. For co-owned land plots, individual owners shall be taxed according to ownership proportions as provided in the cadastre.
  - Establish the legal basis for a mandatory annual adjustment of the property unit tax base by a competent executive authority by Q3-2014.
  - Provide for an extension of the reduction in property transaction fees until 2016 by Q2-2013 to retain a stimulus to property demand and reduce distortions in property prices.
- Studies to be initiated by mid-2013 and implemented by 1 January 2015 at the latest:
  - A study on refining the parameters of the imputed property market value index within the bounds of administrative and legal simplicity, assessing feasibility of a unit tax base for individual dwellings, and reporting on a mechanism to dampen cyclical variations in the index.
  - A study on the scope of consolidating the collection and administration of the municipal recurrent property tax and sewage tax, reviewing existing exemptions and derogations from property taxation, and reporting on the scope of shifting revenue from transaction fees and taxes to recurrent taxation by early 2015.

### Public administration reform
- Reduce impediments to staff mobility within the public and broader public sector by removing restrictions from the Public/Broader Public Service Laws as to the duration and placement of secondments, as well as the need for employee consent by Q2-2013.
- As of 1.9.2013, establish working time in the Public Service and move the starting time by half an hour (from 7:30 to 8:00) and extend the flexibility period from a half to one hour. Weekly working hours remain unchanged: 37 ½ hours per week, 7 ½ hours per day, daily (Monday to Friday): 8.00/9.00 to 15.30/16.30. The same applies for the transitional period of 1.1.2013-31.8.2013 but the starting time remains the same (7:30) and thus the ending time is moved back by half an hour (15:00/16:00).
- Following part 1 of the review, in a second step, further reduce overtime and related costs to the public sector wage bill by making working time more flexible so as to cover - as a minimum - service hours from 7:00 until 17:00 in the entire public sector and service hours from 7:00 to 19:00 for public sector services with extended operating hours, under regular working time. Working hours outside regular working time shall be limited by enforcing strict controls, including requiring pre-approval of any non-emergency work outside regular working time by Q1-2014.
- Commission an independent external review of possible further reforms of the public administration based on agreed terms of reference. The review comprises two parts:
  - Part 1:
    - Examination of the role, the competences, the organisational structure and the size/staffing of relevant ministries, services and independent authorities.
    - Examination of the possibility of abolishing or merging/consolidating Non-profit Organisations/Companies and publicly owned enterprises.
    - Re-organisation/re-structuring of local government.
  - Part 2:
    - Appropriate system of remuneration and working conditions/conditions of employment in the public sector (e.g. annual vacation leave, sick leave, maternity leave, working time), in relation to the private sector and to other EU countries and based on best practices.
    - Introduction of a new performance based appraisal system in the public sector, for development and promotion purposes, linking performance with the remuneration system/increments.
- Publication and implementation timelines:
  - The first part of the review will be published by Q1-2014. Part 2 will be published by Q3-2014.
  - Based on findings, the Cypriot authorities will agree upon a reform after consultation with the programme partners, submit it to the House of Representatives for approval and implement a reform of the public administration (part 1 by Q2-2014 and part 2 by Q4-2014).

### Welfare system reform
- Reform to be implemented and applied as of 1 January 2014 after review by and consultation with the programme partners (draft reform plan to be submitted by Q2-2013).
- Reform elements:
  - Streamlining the number of benefits available through merging and phasing out.
  - Better targeting of various social transfers to reduce the total number of beneficiaries while protecting the most vulnerable by:
    - Introducing a common definition of income sources, financial assets and movable and immovable property to be taken into account for means-testing, to ensure consistency across different benefit schemes.
    - Introducing or tightening means-testing criteria, based on the above definition, by lowering income thresholds, accounting for wealth such as financial assets, movable and immovable property, and broadening the sources of income to be taken into consideration. As a general principle benefits provided should be fully accounted for in the computation of personal income.
  - A review of the appropriate levels of individual benefits and the index for adjustment of benefit levels.
  - Transferring all relevant competences and responsibilities related to the administration and provision of all social benefits to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, which should be appropriately equipped in terms of financial and human resources, reassigned from other departments of the public administration by Q1-2014.
- The reforms must be consistent with the fiscal targets defined in this MoU.

*International Monetary Fund — Cyprus program measures and timelines as described in the provided content.*

### 4.   Labour market

### 4.   Labour market

### Key objectives
- Prior context: high employment rates and low unemployment prior to the crisis; subsequent rapid rise in unemployment due to unwinding of unsustainable imbalances and worsening macroeconomic conditions and prospects.
- Reform goals:
  - Implement a reform of the system of wage indexation commensurate with ensuring a sustainable improvement in the competitiveness of the economy and allowing wage formation to better reflect productivity developments.
  - Prepare and implement a comprehensive reform of public assistance to: achieve an appropriate balance between public assistance and incentives to take up work; target income support to the most vulnerable; strengthen activation policies; and contain the public finance impact of rising unemployment.
  - Help attenuate adverse competitiveness and employment effects by linking any change in the minimum wage to economic conditions.

### Cost of living adjustment (COLA) of wages and salaries
- Policy commitment: Reform the wage-setting framework for public and private sectors to improve real wage adjustment so wage growth better reflects labour productivity and competitiveness.
- Key elements of the COLA reform (as determined in the budget of 2013 and embedded in the Medium-Term Budget):
  - Lower frequency of adjustment: base period for calculating the indexation (COLA) lengthened from six months to twelve months; indexation would take place on 1st January each year.
  - Automatic suspension mechanism: if in the second and third quarters of a given year negative rates of growth of seasonally adjusted real GDP are registered, no indexation would be effected for the following year.
  - Move from full to partial indexation: rate of wage indexation set at 50% of the rate of increase of the underlying price index over the previous year.
- Additional specifics:
  - Suspension of wage indexation in the wider public sector will remain in place until the end of the programme (as foreseen in section I.2 of the agreement).
  - A tripartite agreement with social partners will be pursued for voluntary application of the reformed system in the private sector by end-2013.
  - Based on the current economic outlook at the time of the document, wage and salary indexation is foreseen not to be applied in the private sector until 2014.

### Minimum wage
- Commitment: Over the programme period, any change in the minimum wage covering specific professions and categories of workers should be in line with economic and labour market developments and will take place only after consultation with the programme partners.

### Public assistance and activation of the unemployed
- Rationale: The increase in unemployment requires an overall assessment of activation policies and income support instruments after expiration of unemployment insurance benefits.
- Reform objectives for public assistance:
  - Ensure social assistance serves as a safety net guaranteeing a minimum income for those unable to support a basic standard of living, while safeguarding incentives to take up work and ensuring consistency with the welfare reform described in section 3.12.
- Specific commitments and timelines:
  - The planned reform of public assistance will include measures aimed at activating benefit recipients by facilitating reinsertion into the labour market, reducing disincentives to work, and imposing job-search requirements for continued benefit receipt. The draft reform plan on public assistance will be submitted to the programme partners by Q2-2013 for review and consultation.
  - Provide an assessment of current activation policies by Q2-2013.
  - Review and enhance cooperation between the public employment service and benefit-paying institutions in the activation of the unemployed.

*Source: IMF staff report chapter "4. Labour market" (content unit: _cr13125 - 4.   Labour market)*

### Appendix IȵBudgetary measures adopted by Cyprus in or

### Appendix I — Budgetary measures adopted by Cyprus in or after December 2012

### Fiscal measures with effect in 2012 — Expenditure measures
- I.1 Implement a scaled reduction in emoluments of public and broader public sector pensioners and employees as follows: EUR 0-1000: 0%; EUR 1001-1500: 6.5%; EUR 1501-2000: 8.5%; EUR 2001-3000: 9.5%; EUR 3001-4000: 11.5%; above EUR 4001: 12.5%.
- I.2 Extend the suspension of the practice of COLA for the public and broader public sector until the end of the programme (Q1-2016) (see section 4.1).
- I.3 Extend the freeze of increments and general wage increases in the public and broader public sector and temporary contribution in the public, broader public and private sectors on gross earnings and pensions by three additional years until 31 December 2016.
- I.4 Reduce the number of public sector employees by at least four thousand five hundred over the period of 2012-16 by: i) freezing the hiring of new personnel on first entry posts in the broader public sector for three additional years until 31 December 2016; ii) implementing a policy of recruiting one person for every four retirees (horizontal); iii) introducing measures to increase the mobility of civil servants within and across line ministries (see 3.11); and iv) implementing a four-year plan aimed at the abolition of at least 1880 permanent posts (see I.16).
- I.5 Freeze the hiring of new hourly paid employees and enforce immediate application of mobility within and across ministries and other government entities. In the case of health and security posts, recruitment of one person for every five retirees will be possible to meet urgent needs.

### Fiscal measures with effect in 2012 — Revenue measures
- I.6 Appropriate a one-off additional dividend income collected from semi-governmental organisations.
- I.7 Increase the bank levy on deposits raised by banks and credit institutions in Cyprus from 0.095% to 0.11% with 25/60 of the revenue earmarked for a special account for a Financial Stability Fund.
- I.8 Introduce a mechanism for a regular review of excise taxes to secure the real value of excise tax revenue. Such a mechanism should be non-recurring and should, by no means lead to an automatic indexation mechanism of excise taxes to price developments.

### Fiscal measures with effect in 2013 — Expenditure measures
- I.9 Ensure a reduction in total outlays for social transfers by at least EUR 113 million through: (a) the abolition of a number of redundant and overlapping schemes such as the mothers allowance, other family allowances and educational allowances; and (b) the abolition of supplementary allowances under public assistance, the abolition of the special grant and the streamlining of the Easter allowance for pensioners.
- I.10 Ensure a reduction of at least EUR 29 million in the total outlays of allowances for employees in the public and broader public sector by: i. taxing pensionable allowances provided to senior government officials and employees (secretarial services, representation, and hospitality allowances) in the public and broader public sector; ii. reducing the allowances provided to broader public sector employees and reducing all other allowances of broader public sector employees, government officials and hourly paid employees by 15%; and iii. reducing the daily overseas subsistence allowance for business trips by 15%. Ensure a further reduction the subsistence allowance of the current allowance when lunch/dinner is offered by 50% (20% - 45% of overseas subsistence allowance instead of 40% - 90% currently paid).
- I.11 Reduce certain benefits and privileges for state officials and senior government officials, in particular by: i. suspending the right to travel first/business class by state officials, senior government officials and employees with the exception of transatlantic travel. The right to business class travel shall be maintained for the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the President of the House of Representatives; ii) abolishing the right to duty free vehicles for employed and retired senior public sector officials; and iii) extending the wage freeze and temporary contribution on gross earnings to cover all state officials and permanent secretaries (129 individuals) for 2013-2016, including members of the House of Representatives. Include pensionable and tax-free allowances of these individuals in the calculation of their taxable income. Introduce a contribution of 6.8% on the pensionable earnings of these individuals.
- I.12 Implement the following measures regarding the Government Pension Scheme (GEPS): i. freeze public sector pensions; ii. increase the statutory retirement age by 2 years for the various categories of employees; increase the minimum age for entitlement to an unreduced pension (by 6 months per year) to be in line with the statutory retirement age; while preserving acquired rights, introduce an early retirement penalty of 0.5% per month of early retirement so as to make early retirement actuarially neutral; iii. reduce preferential treatment of specific groups of employees, like members of the army and police force, in the occupational pension plans, in particular concerning the contribution to the lump-sum benefits; iv. introduce a permanent contribution of 3% on pensionable earnings to Widows and Orphans Fund by state officials who are entitled to a pension and gratuity. Introduce a contribution of 6.8% on pensionable earnings by officials, who are entitled to a pension and gratuity but are not covered by the government's pension scheme or any other similar plan; v. amend Article 37 of the Pensions Law to abolish the provision according to which, in the case of death of an employee, if the deceased had a wife/husband at the time of his/her retirement and thereafter he/she remarried, his/her last wife/husband is considered a widow/widower. With the abolition of this provision, the second wife/husband will not be considered a widow/widower and thus she/he will not be entitled to pension; vi. increase the contribution rate on the pensionable earnings of the members of the Tax Tribunal Council and the Tender Review Authority from 3.4% to 6.8%; and vii. the contributions to the Widows and Orphans Fund will no longer be reimbursable.
- I.13 Implement further reform steps under the General Social Insurance Scheme by: i. actuarially reducing pension entitlements from the General Social Insurance Scheme by 0.5% per month for retirements earlier than the statutory retirement age at the latest from January 2013, in line with the planned increase in the minimum age for entitlement to an unreduced pension to reach 65 (by 6 months per year), between 2013 and 2016; ii. freezing pensions under the Social Security Fund for the period 2013-2016; iii. abolishing the increase of pensions for a working dependent spouse under the General Social Insurance Scheme at the latest from January 2013 onwards.
- I.14 Reduce transfers by EUR 25 million from central government to state-owned enterprises and semi-public institutions.
- I.15 Ensure a targeted reduction of budgetary appropriations for a series of semi-governmental organisations in the 2013 Budget Law, supported by well-defined activity-reducing measures.
- I.16 Implement a four-year plan as prepared by the Public Administration and Personnel Department aimed at the abolition of at least 1880 permanent posts over the period 2013-2016.

### Fiscal measures with effect in 2013 — Revenue measures
- I.17 Increase excise duties on tobacco products, in particular on fine-cut smoking tobacco, from EUR 60/kg to EUR 150/kg. Increase excise duties on cigarettes by EUR 0.20/per packet of 20 cigarettes.
- I.18 Increase excise duties on beer by 25% from EUR 4.78 per hl to EUR 6.00 per hl per degree of pure alcohol of final product. Increase excise duties on ethyl alcohol from EUR 598.01 to EUR 956.82 per hl of pure alcohol.
- I.19 Increase excise duties on energy, i.e., on oil products, by increasing tax rate on motor fuels (petrol and gasoil) by EUR 0.07.
- I.20 Increase the standard VAT rate from 17% to 18%.
- I.21 Introduce a tax of 20% on gains distributed to winners of betting by the Greek Organisation of Football Prognostics S.A. (OPAP) and the National Lottery for winnings of EUR 5,000 or more.
- I.22 Abolish all exceptions currently in place for paying the annual company levy of EUR 350.

### Fiscal measures with effect in 2014 — Expenditure measures
- I.23 Ensure a reduction in total outlays for social transfers by a at least EUR 28.5 million to be achieved through streamlining and better targeting of child benefits and educational grants, and abolition of social cohesion benefits provided by the welfare services.
- I.24 Implement a further reduction in emoluments of public and broader public sector employees and pensioners by a flat rate reduction of 3% on all wages.
- I.25 Introduce a fee on monthly transportation cards for the use of public transportation services by students and pensioners.

### Fiscal measures with effect in 2014 — Revenue measures
- I.26 Extend the application of the temporary contribution on gross earnings and pensions of public and private sector employees up to 31 December 2016 as follows: EUR 0 – 1,500: 0%; EUR 1,501 – 2,500: 2.5%; EUR 2,501 – 3,500: 3.0%; and > EUR 3,501 - : 3.5%.
- I.27 Increase the standard VAT rate from 18% in 2013 to 19% in 2014.
- I.28 Increase the reduced VAT rate from 8% to 9%.
- I.29 Increase excise duties on energy, i.e., on oil products, by increasing the tax rate on motor fuels (petrol and gasoil) by EUR 0.05.
- I.30 Increase the contributions, as of 1.1.2014, of salaried employees and employers to the GSIS by an additional 1 percentage point on pensionable earnings, i.e. 0.5 of a percentage point from employees and 0.5 of a percentage point from employers and 1 percentage point in the case of self-employed persons.

### Supplementary information and recent developments (May 10, 2013)
- 1. This supplement provides information that has become available since the issuance of the staff report on April 30, 2013 (EBS/13/47). This information does not alter the thrust of the staff appraisal.
- 2. The Cypriot authorities have adopted all remaining legislation and decisions required to comply with the prior action specified in the MEFP. Specifically, the House of Representatives approved the necessary bills to implement a reform of property taxation and complete an average increase in fees of public services of 17 percent from current values. The Council of Ministers also approved the rationalization of housing programs.
- 3. Eurostat released final fiscal numbers for 2012 on an ESA95 basis (Tables 1, 2, 3). The 2012 fiscal deficit was revised upward to 6.3 percent of GDP relative to 5.6 percent of GDP estimated by staff based on provisional cash data. This reflects a 0.7 percent of GDP one off inclusion of insurance payments associated with the destruction of the Vassilikos power plant in 2011 that will be paid in 2013-2016 but is recorded upfront under accrual accounting. The composition of revenues and expenditures was also revised. On the revenue side, accrued VAT revenues were larger than estimated on a cash basis, while one-off direct tax revenues were smaller. On the expenditure side, capital outlays were larger than previously estimated, while wages and salaries (including pensions) declined, reflecting a smaller-than-estimated increase in pension outlays and a minor level revision for 2011. Staff projections of components were adjusted to reflect these changes, without impacting the fiscal targets.
- 4. HICP year-on-year inflation in April declined to 0.1 percent from 1.3 in March. This was mainly driven by lower prices of energy and clothing.
- 5. The temporary administrative measures have been eased further. The cash withdrawal limit for legal persons was increased from €300 to €500 per customer per day. The ceiling on wire transfers of businesses for domestic transactions not requiring authorization was raised from €300,000 to €500,000. The limit on the amount that individuals may transfer from one domestic bank to another was raised from €3,000 to €10,000 per month. The export of bank notes abroad per person per journey was raised from €2,000 to €5,000. The €5,000 monthly cap on credit and debit card spending abroad was abolished. Foreign banks have been exempted from restrictions, provided they complete an application process.

*Source: _cr13125 - Appendix I — Budgetary measures adopted by Cyprus in or after December 2012 (May 10, 2013).*

### 6.      The ECB Governing Council decided to readmit market debt instruments

### 6.      The ECB Governing Council decided to readmit market debt instruments

### ECB decision and immediate impact
- The ECB Governing Council decided to readmit market debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Cypriot government for ECB refinancing operations.
- The decision is effective May 9, 2013.
- The decision "will likely contribute to ease bank liquidity pressures further."

### Macroeconomic snapshot and projections (selected figures from Table 1)
- Real GDP: 3.6 (2008); -1.9 (2009); 1.3 (2010); 0.5 (2011); -2.4 (2012); -8.7 (2013); -3.9 (2014); 1.1 (2015); 1.9 (2016); 2.3 (2017); 2.2 (2018); 1.9 (2019); 1.8 (2020).
- Domestic demand: 8.0 (2008); -7.0 (2009); 1.9 (2010); -1.6 (2011); -6.8 (2012); -13.9 (2013); -5.9 (2014); 1.0 (2015); 2.1 (2016); 2.8 (2017); 2.7 (2018); 2.4 (2019); 2.4 (2020).
- Fixed investment: 6.0 (2008); -9.7 (2009); -4.9 (2010); -13.1 (2011); -23.0 (2012); -29.5 (2013); -12.0 (2014); 2.3 (2015); 3.5 (2016); 5.5 (2017); 4.3 (2018); 4.2 (2019); 4.0 (2020).
- Output gap (percent of potential GDP): 2.8 (2008); -0.8 (2009); -1.2 (2010); -2.4 (2011); -3.3 (2012); -3.5 (2013); -3.7 (2014); -2.8 (2015); -1.8 (2016); -0.8 (2017); -0.3 (2018); -0.1 (2019); 0.0 (2020).
- HICP (period average): 4.4 (2008); 0.2 (2009); 2.6 (2010); 3.5 (2011); 3.1 (2012); 1.0 (2013); 1.2 (2014); 1.6 (2015); 1.7 (2016); 1.7 (2017); 1.8 (2018); 1.9 (2019); 2.0 (2020).
- Unemployment rate EU stand. (percent): 3.7 (2008); 5.4 (2009); 6.2 (2010); 7.8 (2011); 11.9 (2012); 15.5 (2013); 16.9 (2014); 14.6 (2015); 13.7 (2016); 12.9 (2017); 12.0 (2018); 11.1 (2019); 10.2 (2020).
- Nominal GDP (billions of euros): 17.2 (2008); 16.9 (2009); 17.4 (2010); 18.0 (2011); 17.9 (2012); 16.4 (2013); 16.0 (2014); 16.4 (2015); 17.0 (2016); 17.7 (2017); 18.4 (2018); 19.1 (2019); 19.8 (2020).

### Public finance and debt dynamics (selected figures from Tables 1–3)
- General government balance (percent of GDP): 0.9 (2008); -6.1 (2009); -5.3 (2010); -6.3 (2011); -6.3 (2012); -5.9 (2013); -7.7 (2014); -5.6 (2015); -2.4 (2016); -0.7 (2017); 0.2 (2018); 0.2 (2019); -0.2 (2020).
- General government debt (percent of GDP): 48.9 (2008); 58.5 (2009); 61.3 (2010); 71.1 (2011); 86.2 (2012); 109.1 (2013); 123.3 (2014); 125.7 (2015); 121.7 (2016); 115.9 (2017); 111.7 (2018); 108.1 (2019); 105.0 (2020).
- Primary balance (percent of GDP): 3.8 (2008); -3.6 (2009); -3.0 (2010); -3.9 (2011); -2.9 (2012); -2.4 (2013); -4.3 (2014); -2.1 (2015); 1.2 (2016); 3.0 (2017); 4.0 (2018); 4.0 (2019); 4.0 (2020).
- Revenue (percent of GDP): 43.1 (2008); 40.1 (2009); 40.9 (2010); 39.7 (2011); 40.0 (2012); 40.6 (2013); 39.0 (2014); 39.8 (2015); 41.2 (2016); 41.7 (2017); 42.1 (2018); 42.1 (2019); 42.4 (2020).
- Expenditure (percent of GDP): 42.1 (2008); 46.2 (2009); 46.2 (2010); 46.1 (2011); 46.3 (2012); 46.6 (2013); 46.7 (2014); 45.4 (2015); 43.6 (2016); 42.4 (2017); 41.9 (2018); 42.0 (2019); 42.5 (2020).
- Debt-stabilizing primary balance (Table 3): 0.1 (2007 baseline in table excerpt).
- Public sector debt (percent of GDP, Table 3 series): 58.8 (2007); 48.9 (2008); 58.5 (2009); 61.3 (2010); 71.1 (2011); 86.2 (2012); 109.1 (2013); 123.3 (2014); 125.7 (2015); 121.7 (2016); 115.9 (2017); 111.7 (2018); 108.1 (2019); 105.0 (2020).
- Gross financing need (percent of GDP, Table 3): 5.7 (2007); 4.9 (2008); 14.2 (2009); 18.9 (2010); 12.7 (2011); 20.4 (2012); 25.7 (2013); 20.8 (2014); 20.4 (2015); 12.3 (2016); 10.7 (2017); 9.0 (2018); 9.0 (2019); 14.0 (2020).

### IMF Executive Board approval and financing package (Press Release No. 13/175, May 15, 2013)
- IMF Executive Board approved a three-year SDR 891 million arrangement (about €1 billion, or US$1.33 billion; 563 percent of the country’s quota) under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for Cyprus.
- Immediate disbursement: SDR 74.25 million (about €86 million, or US$110.7 million).
- The EFF arrangement is part of a combined financing package with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) amounting to €10 billion.
- Program objectives: stabilize the financial system, achieve fiscal sustainability, and support recovery of economic activity.

### Program priorities and fiscal strategy
- Priorities:
  - Stabilize the banking sector: complete bank recapitalization, restructure weak banks, relax temporary payment restrictions gradually, strengthen supervision and regulation, and enhance the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) framework.
  - Achieve sustainable public finances: primary fiscal surplus target of 4 percent of GDP by 2018 to reach close to 100 percent of GDP debt by 2020.
  - Structural reforms: strengthen budget processes, revenue administration, and better target welfare programs; privatization and reforms to public wage indexation mechanism mentioned.
- Fiscal consolidation details:
  - Adjustment of 2¼ percent of GDP during 2013-2015 implemented by authorities, in addition to 5 percent of GDP already underway for the same period.
  - Further effort of 4¾ percent of GDP to be implemented during 2015-18.
  - Authorities expect future consolidation to rely largely on reducing spending, given significant revenue measures already taken.

### Financial sector restructuring, capital needs, and capital controls
- Banking sector size before restructuring: over eight times GDP; domestic banking sector reduced from 550 to 350 percent of GDP after actions.
- PIMCO independent due diligence (completed January 2013) covering 22 institutions (~3/4 of system assets):
  - Capital shortfall identified: €5,980 million in the Base Scenario (to reach Core Tier 1 of 9% by end of programme).
  - Capital shortfall identified: €8,867 million in the Adverse Scenario (to reach Core Tier 1 of 6% by end of programme).
  - Solvency problems of two largest banks translate to a negative capital of €2,060 million under the baseline scenario.
  - Recapitalization targets for restructured institutions: aim to reach 9% under the adverse scenario by end of programme.
  - Preliminary estimates point towards a Core Tier 1 ratio of around 18% for the recapitalized structures.
- Methodology notes: PIMCO used conservative assumptions (discounted recoveries at original loan rates; forced sale discount of 25% on collateral valuation).
- Recapitalization mechanics (as applied to Bank of Cyprus): conversion of uninsured deposits into equity with a minimum conversion ratio of 37.5% and maximum of 60% pending independent evaluation.
- Capital controls and administrative measures imposed to preserve liquidity; authorities signal gradual removal as conditions permit and cite recent significant relaxations in a "latest decree."

### Growth outlook and risks
- Output contractions and projections:
  - Output contracted by 2½ percent in 2012.
  - Activity expected to contract by 9 percent (2013) and 4 percent (2014) per earlier staff note; staff-level projections after Eurogroup agreements project a cumulative real GDP contraction of 12½ percent in 2013-14.
  - Recovery expected to start in 2015, stabilizing at just under 2 percent by 2020.
- Channels depressing GDP in 2013–14 highlighted:
  - Frontloaded banking sector restructuring and large-scale bail-in of uninsured depositors.
  - Loss of working capital for businesses (estimated loss around 50% or close to 100% of deposits over €100,000, depending on bank).
  - Conversion or freezing of 90%-100% of deposits over €100,000.
  - Damage to banking, finance, and related services sector.
  - Fiscal consolidation measures and capital controls reducing domestic demand and international capital flows.
- Uncertainties and buffers:
  - High uncertainty and substantial risks to the program; "no room for implementation slippages."
  - A buffer of about 10 percent of GDP included in baseline analysis to provide space for a larger-than-expected recession.
  - Staff projections assume no impact from potential energy-sector investments or natural gas development; authorities expect higher long-run growth if these materialize.

### Program implementation and policy recommendations (as stated)
- Complete bank recapitalization process, using public funds where necessary for solvent institutions.
- Restructure weak banks and implement measures for private sector debt restructuring.
- Gradually relax temporary payment restrictions at a pace consistent with financial stability.
- Strengthen bank and credit cooperative supervision and regulation.
- Enhance the AML framework.
- Complement fiscal consolidation with structural reforms: strengthen budget processes, revenue administration, better target welfare programs, undertake privatization, and reform public wage indexation.
- Ensure full and timely implementation of the program to maintain credibility and achieve objectives.

*International Monetary Fund, Press Release No. 13/175; IMF staff report excerpts (May 15, 2013).*

### Conclusion

### Conclusion

### Commitment and social cohesion
- The authorities accepted the agreement with international partners reluctantly given the constraints conditioning support, but they are fully committed to ensure its resolute implementation.
- The degree of social cohesion in the face of the adjustment so far has been described as "impressive and commendable," and is characterized as a powerful assurance of engagement and ownership of the programme.
- Cyprus faces an extremely difficult and challenging path ahead through an extended period of consolidation and repair, but "after a long and tiring period of uncertainty, there is at last a paved path."

### External support and financing choices
- The financial support and expertise of Cyprus’s international partners are expected to help see Cyprus through this difficult time.
- Commitments by the Russian Government on softer terms for the loan repayment are acknowledged and the authorities are grateful for these commitments.
- The choice of financing carried inherent risks, including the potential creation of a vicious cycle of bankruptcies and unemployment given the systemic nature of these banks, as well as remaining banking sector risks such as litigation risks or risks of longer lasting lack of confidence in the banking sector.

### Bank recapitalization, buffers, and growth prospects
- The bank recapitalization exercise was completed under a more conservative methodology relative to those applied in similar exercises in the euro zone.
- Given uncertainty surrounding the macroeconomic outlook, a buffer of about 10 percent of GDP has been included in the baseline analysis, leaving space for a larger than expected recession.
- No impact has been assumed in staff projections from investment projects related to the energy sector and the prospects of exploitation of natural gas, which "should contribute significantly and increasingly to economic growth in the coming years."
- The authorities expect a higher long-run growth than that envisaged by staff.

*Source: _cr13125 - Conclusion*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/_cr13125.pdf_
