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### Context and recent developments
- Structural setting and distortions:
  - State-owned enterprises (SOEs) account for more than half of GDP and two-thirds of employment.
  - Administrative price controls cover some 20–30 percent of consumer prices.
  - Weak productivity growth; subsidized energy imports from Russia have masked weaknesses.
- Policy history:
  - Major currency crisis in 2011 following external imbalances from stimulus beyond capacity.
  - Sharp tightening stabilized exchange rate and reduced inflation from over 100 percent (late 2011) to around 20 percent (m-o-m, annualized) in early 2012.
  - Stop-go stimulus in 2012: refinancing rate reduced from 45 to 30 percent (February–September); real wages rose 35 percent in 2012 (Dec/Dec) while productivity gains were about 3½ percent.
- Turn of events in H2 2012 and early 2013:
  - Solvent trade windfall ended in July 2012; balance of payments deteriorated; deposit conversions and heavy NBRB intervention by October.
  - Liquidity tightened via higher reserve requirements and restrictions on banks’ refinancing access.
  - Output contracted in Q4 2012; GDP growth 1.5 percent for full year 2012.
  - Inflation 21.8 percent in December 2012 (authorities’ 22 percent target).
  - January 2013: inflation spiked to annualized monthly rate of 30 percent; later running at 13–16 percent.
  - Q1 2013: GDP growth 3½ percent y-o-y; average wages grew almost 8 percent seasonally adjusted (over 30 percent annualized).
  - NBRB reduced main policy rate by 3 percentage points to 27 percent in March–April 2013.

### External stability assessment and outlook (Box 1; staff baseline)
- Exchange rate and competitiveness:
  - Rubel depreciated by 3 percent in nominal effective terms in 2012.
  - Real effective exchange rate: 14 percent appreciation in 2012.
- CGER-type estimates:
  - Macroeconomic balance (MB) approach: rubel overvaluation of 11 percent.
  - External sustainability (ES) approach: rubel undervaluation of 5.4 percent.
  - Caveat: high state control and administrative interference create considerable uncertainty about exchange rate adjustment effectiveness.
- Outlook and reserves:
  - Authorities plan 8½ percent GDP growth target for 2013 despite closed output gap and high inflation; staff expect repeat of stop-go policies.
  - Staff baseline: growth below and inflation above authorities’ target.
  - Trade balance projected to deteriorate; reserves falling to US$6.9 billion by end-2013—equivalent to less than 1½ months of imports.
- Downside risks (highlights):
  - Stimulus to reach growth target could reignite inflation and exchange rate pressures.
  - Banking sector pressure from deteriorating asset quality; rapid FX loan growth to largely unhedged borrowers.
  - Intensification of euro area turbulence could lower external demand.
  - Upside: successful international debt issuance, privatization, or new bilateral support could alleviate short-term external financing pressures.

### Fiscal policy: directed lending, wages, and budget presentation
- Official fiscal outcomes and definitions:
  - Authorities reported a 0.7 percent general government surplus in 2012 and target a balanced budget for 2013.
  - Budget definition excludes quasi-fiscal operations and does not account for large contingent liabilities from directed lending.
- Directed and subsidized lending (2012):
  - Lending under government programs (LGP): estimated 3 percent of GDP in 2012.
  - Development Bank lending: additional 2 percent of GDP in 2012.
  - Directed and subsidized lending estimated at 5 percent of GDP in 2012.
  - Recapitalizations during 2008–11 averaged 2 percent of GDP per year.
- Wages:
  - Budget sector nominal wages increased 67 percent in 2012 (Dec/Dec), 36 percent in real terms.
  - A further 20 percent increase in the first-grade wage for the public sector envisaged for 2013.
  - Civil service reform package: increase civil servant wages by 30 percent while reducing staff numbers by 30 percent to contain overall wage costs to the budget.
- Staff fiscal recommendations (selected):
  - Reduce directed lending and related interest rate subsidies.
  - Limit 2013 wage increases to 12 percent (in line with authorities’ end-year inflation target).
  - Raise cost-recovery on household utilities to 40 percent.
  - Keep new LGP funded with government deposits limited to 6 trillion rubel (1 percent of GDP) in 2013 and maintain this ceiling over the medium term—with lending exclusively channeled through the Development Bank.
  - Fully phase out directed lending funded by banks’ own resources by 2015.
  - Each of the three fiscal measures (reduce directed lending, limit wages, raise utility cost-recovery) could yield about ½ percent of GDP.
- Authorities’ position:
  - Confident balanced budget for 2013; contingency reserve of 0.8 percent of GDP in the budget.
  - No bank recapitalization in 2012; expect none in 2013.
  - Plan to continue subsidized lending with a budget envelope of 3½ percent of GDP.

### Monetary and exchange rate policy; inflation objective
- Inflation objective and monetary framework:
  - Aim: single-digit inflation by no later than 2014.
  - Authorities aim for 12 percent inflation at end-2013 within an incomplete monetary framework centered on short-term inflation objective and supporting benchmarks.
  - Staff encouraged progress toward an inflation targeting (IT) framework conditional on: consistent macroeconomic policies; enhanced NBRB autonomy; sharply reduced directed lending; strengthening market mechanisms in financial system.
- Policy weaknesses and stance:
  - Weak forward-looking elements; ad hoc use of multiple instruments; large volumes of subsidized credit; increasing foreign currency lending.
  - Recent marked loosening of liquidity and increased NBRB liquidity support raise risks.
- Staff monetary recommendations:
  - Tighten liquidity so the money market rate aligns with the refinancing rate and narrow policy rate corridor.
  - Use macro-prudential policies to rein in high foreign currency lending growth.
  - If recent inflation reductions do not continue, increase policy rates to ensure further disinflation.
  - Raise rates without delay if expansionary wage or directed lending policies jeopardize stability or if downward exchange rate pressures reemerge.
  - Refrain from administrative measures to curb commercial lending rates.

- Exchange rate policy recommendations:
  - Maintain flexible exchange rate to cushion shocks and mitigate external imbalances.
  - Limit intervention to smoothing excessive volatility and seize opportunities to build reserves during appreciation pressures given low reserve levels.
  - Authorities reaffirmed commitment to flexibility but stressed gradual adjustments due to population sensitivity and capital flight risks.

### Banking sector vulnerabilities and Development Bank (DB)
- Supervisory and asset quality indicators and concerns:
  - Banking supervision improving; recent banking code enhancements.
  - Reported NPLs rose and likely overstate true loan quality; reported capital adequacy ratios seemingly comfortable partly due to asset transfers to DB.
  - Intensive supervision required.
- FX lending and prudential risks:
  - Foreign exchange loans to total loans series: 21.7, 39.5, 40.8, 41.9, 42.3, 45.5, 45.7 (timing across 2010–2013 entries).
  - Rapid FX lending growth largely to unhedged borrowers; provisioning requirements and restrictions have limited effectiveness.
  - Staff recommendations: consider higher risk weights for FX loans; maintain prohibition of FX lending to households.
  - Government has called to end NBRB’s ban on FX lending to households to revive mortgage lending.
- Development Bank (DB) role and risks:
  - DB established 2011; presidential decree broadened DB mandate and sources (DB to finance large strategic projects, subsidized export lending, issue debt: 2½ percent of GDP to date, seek eligibility of its debt as collateral for NBRB refinancing).
  - 2012 transfer: US$600 million in outstanding LGP loans transferred out of total stock of US$10 billion (17 percent of GDP); further US$500 million transfer planned by July 2013.
  - DB assumed about 15 percent of flow of new directed lending; no plan to move remainder away from banks.
- Staff DB policy recommendations:
  - Make DB the sole and transparent provider of directed lending.
  - Time-bound plan to transfer all new directed lending from state banks to DB by 2015.
  - Cap DB new lending at 1 percent of GDP per year over medium term.
  - Ensure close oversight and full transparency; adequately reflect DB contingent liabilities in the budget.
  - DB bonds should not be eligible as collateral for NBRB refinancing.
  - DB should avoid debt issuance to finance new subsidized lending.

### Structural reform: progress, reversals, and 1–3 year recommendations (Box 2)
- Progress and setbacks:
  - Progress: tax reform and a new bankruptcy law; partial implementation of “Directive #4”.
  - Reversals: reduction in number of consumer goods subject to price controls was reversed during 2011 crisis.
  - Privatization stalled: NIPA yet to sell eight small companies; some companies nationalized.
  - New centralized modernization project provides subsidized loans without significant business environment change.
- Staff recommended structural measures (selected, next 1–3 years):
  - Financial sector:
    - Complete transfer of existing LGP from state banks to DB by end-2014.
    - Channel all new subsidized and directed lending exclusively through DB and cap total at 1 percent of GDP by end-2015.
  - Product, trade, and labor market:
    - Shorten list of goods subject to price regulation to 2011 level without delay; fully phase out list by mid-2014.
    - Raise household utilities cost recovery from below 30 percent to 40 percent by end-2013 and 55 percent by end-2014.
    - Raise transport tariffs cost recovery from below 50 percent to 90 percent by end-2013 and 100 percent by end-2014.
    - Abolish “price calculation” requirements without delay.
    - Make adherence to “single pay grading system” voluntary for SOEs.
  - Privatization and SOE reform:
    - Privatize all eight NIPA pilot companies by end-2013; create expedited pipeline.
    - Phase out mandatory economic targets, including SOE production targets, by end-2014.
    - Prepare by mid-2014 a time-bound SOE restructuring program to remove soft budget constraints and end line-ministry control.
  - Social safety nets:
    - Increase cap on unemployment benefits, eliminate gaps in targeted assistance, move from quarterly to monthly indexation of benefits.

### Baseline and adjustment scenarios: key projections and indicators (selected series)
- Real GDP (Baseline, percent change): 2011: 5.5; 2012: 1.5; 2013: 2.1; 2014: 2.6; 2015: 2.9; 2016: 3.1; 2017: 3.2; 2018: 3.6.
- Consumer prices (End of period, Baseline): 2011: 108.7; 2012: 21.8; 2013: 16.8; 2014: 18.8; 2015: 20.9; 2016: 20.1; 2017: 20.1; 2018: 20.1.
- Current account balance (Percent of GDP, Baseline): 2011: -9.7; 2012: -2.9; 2013: -5.6; 2014: -5.9; 2015: -6.5; 2016: -6.6; 2017: -6.6; 2018: -6.6.
- Gross external debt (Percent of GDP, Baseline): 2011: 57.7; 2012: 55.4; 2013: 52.7; 2014: 48.9; 2015: 48.3; 2016: 48.9; 2017: 49.5; 2018: 50.2.
- Official reserves (billions of U.S. dollars, memorandum): 2011: 7.9; 2012: 8.1; 2013: 6.9; 2014: 5.3; 2015: 3.7; 2016: 3.2; 2017: 2.6; 2018: 1.9.
- Months of imports of goods and services (memorandum): 2011: 1.9; 2012: 1.9; 2013: 1.5; 2014: 1.1; 2015: 0.7; 2016: 0.5; 2017: 0.4; 2018: 0.3.
- Key public finance baseline series:
  - Augmented general government balance: 2011: -2.9; 2012: 0.5; 2013: -2.6; 2014: -3.5; 2015: -3.7; 2016: -4.0; 2017: -4.2; 2018: -4.2.
  - Augmented general government balance including new directed lending: 2011: -11.4; 2012: -4.4; 2013: -5.1; 2014: -6.0; 2015: -6.2; 2016: -6.5; 2017: -6.7; 2018: -6.7.
  - New directed lending (incl. Development Bank), net changes (percent of GDP): 2011: 8.6; 2012: 5.0; 2013–2018: 2.5 each year.
  - Gross public debt (percent of GDP): 2011: 43.4; 2012: 36.9; 2013: 35.6; 2014: 33.6; 2015: 33.4; 2016: 34.7; 2017: 36.0; 2018: 37.2.

### Balance of payments and external sector (selected baseline figures, US$ millions)
- Current account balance (2011–18): -5,775; -1,819; -3,902; -4,449; -5,174; -5,461; -5,777; -6,039.
- Exports (total, 2011–18): 41,410; 45,506; 45,671; 47,724; 49,989; 58,051; 60,696; 63,525.
  - Energy exports: 14,078; 16,110; 13,055; 13,493; 13,870; 13,202; 12,964; 12,778.
  - Nonenergy exports: 27,332; 29,397; 32,616; 34,230; 36,120; 44,849; 47,732; 50,747.
- Imports (total, 2011–18): -45,126; -45,009; -47,445; -50,036; -52,737; -61,798; -65,051; -68,554.
  - Energy imports: -18,629; -17,756; -16,087; -15,547; -15,545; -15,152; -14,946; -14,841.
  - Nonenergy imports: -26,497; -27,253; -31,358; -34,489; -37,192; -46,646; -50,105; -53,713.
- Gross official reserves (end-of-period, US$ millions): 7,916; 8,095; 6,899; 5,336; 3,741; 3,180; 2,607; 1,919.

### Debt sustainability, risks, and scenario outcomes (Appendix II highlights)
- Baseline external-debt profile and headline shock outcomes:
  - Baseline historical comparison: Historical: 38; Baseline: 50.
  - Peak scenario values:
    - Interest rate shock: 51
    - Growth shock: 54
    - Noninterest current account shock: 62
    - Combined shock: 58
    - Real depreciation shock (one-time real depreciation of 30 percent in 2012): 76
- Public sector debt (percent of GDP, 2008–2018):
  - 2008: 21.7; 2009: 34.9; 2010: 42.0; 2011: 43.4; 2012: 36.9; 2013: 35.6; 2014: 33.6; 2015: 33.4; 2016: 34.7; 2017: 36.1; 2018: 37.3.
- Gross financing need (billions of U.S. dollars, 2008–2018): 0.5; 0.8; 3.1; 4.9; 2.1; 4.4; 5.8; 6.1; 4.9; 5.3; 6.3.
- Debt dynamics drivers (selected):
  - Primary deficit (percent of GDP, 2008–2018): -14.6; -0.1; 1.1; -3.9; -2.1; -1.6; -1.0; -0.7; -0.5; -0.3; -0.4.
  - Contribution from exchange rate depreciation (2008–2018): 0.0; 2.1; 1.2; 23.7; 0.4; 2.7; 2.0; 2.9; 2.5; 2.5; 2.5.

### Risk Assessment Matrix — key risks and policy responses (selected)
- Loosening of macroeconomic policies
  - Relative Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized: High — stimulus to reach 8½ percent GDP growth target would endanger stability, boost demand, reignite inflation, and pressure the exchange rate.
  - Policy Response: Tighten macroeconomic policies including monetary, wage and exchange rate policies.
- External financing shortfalls
  - Relative Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized: High — very high gross financing needs in 2013–14; shortfalls would reduce reserves and raise exchange rate risks.
  - Policy Response: Tighten macroeconomic policies; continue flexible exchange rate policy.
- Weakening economic environment could reduce banks’ asset quality
  - Relative Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized: Medium — slowdown could increase problem loans and require renewed bank recapitalization.
  - Policy Response: Increase supervision and oversight over large banks, including more frequent onsite monitoring.

### Staff appraisal and consolidated policy prescriptions
- Macroeconomic diagnosis:
  - Belarus’ economic model described as increasingly untenable; least reformed in Europe with high state control restraining productivity and competitiveness.
  - Short-term stimuli beyond capacity caused large external imbalances (2011 crisis) and volatility in 2012.
  - Authorities’ 8½ percent growth target for 2013 jeopardizes attainment of 12 percent inflation target and risks repeating stop-go pattern.
- Core staff prescriptions:
  - Strong and predictable macroeconomic policies: focus 2013 policies on reducing inflation and containing reemerging external imbalances via steady policies and tight domestic demand management with close fiscal-monetary coordination.
  - Sharp reduction in directed and subsidized lending: reduce to below 1 percent of GDP over medium term; channel remaining directed lending through DB with adequate budget reflection; phase out directed lending through commercial banks.
  - Wage guidance: nominal wage growth should not exceed targeted inflation in 2013; contain nominal wage growth to no more than 12 percent.
  - Monetary stance: NBRB should tighten liquidity and be prepared to increase policy rate if disinflation falters; maintain exchange rate flexibility to buffer shocks and discourage dollarization.
  - Banking supervision: consider higher risk weights on FX loans; maintain prohibition of FX lending to households.

*Source: IMF staff report on the Republic of Belarus (excerpt).*

### 1. External Stability Assessment _____________________________________________________________________  6

### 1. External Stability Assessment

### Context
- Structural deficiencies: economy heavily centralized; state-owned enterprises (SOEs) account for more than half of GDP and two-thirds of employment.
- Pervasive use of quantitative targets for SOEs and administrative price controls—some 20–30 percent of consumer prices are regulated—distorts resource allocation.
- Weak productivity growth masked by subsidized energy imports from Russia; windfall gains reduced after the 2008 crisis.
- Policy efforts to boost the economy beyond capacity resulted in external imbalances and a major currency crisis in 2011.
- Following an initially successful stabilization, stop-go stimulus policies in 2012 resulted in significant volatility and persistent high inflation.

### Recent developments
- Stabilization after 2011 crisis:
  - Sharp policy tightening helped stabilize the exchange rate and reduce inflation from over 100 percent in the last months of 2011 to around 20 percent (m-o-m, annualized) in early 2012.
  - GDP grew about 3 percent (y-o-y) in the first half of 2012.
  - Reserves were rebuilt and bolstered by disbursements under Belarus’ program with the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund (ACF).
- Premature policy easing in 2012:
  - NBRB reduced the refinancing rate from 45 to 30 percent (February–September).
  - Subsidized directed lending under government programs revived; excessive wage increases raised real wages by 35 percent in 2012 (Dec/Dec), while productivity gains were estimated at about 3½ percent.
- Return of pressures in second half of 2012:
  - End of solvent trade windfall in July led to rapid deterioration of the balance of payments.
  - Deposit conversions picked up; NBRB intervened heavily in forex market by October.
  - Liquidity tightened via higher reserve requirements and restrictions on banks’ access to refinancing.
  - Output contracted in Q4; GDP growth reduced to 1.5 percent for full year 2012.
  - Inflation stood at 21.8 percent in December—just within the authorities’ 22 percent target.
- Early 2013 mixed signals:
  - Inflation spiked to an annualized monthly rate of 30 percent in January (partly on administrative price increases), then fell and was running at 13–16 percent.
  - GDP growth rebounded: 3½ percent y-o-y in Q1 2013.
  - Average wages grew by almost 8 percent in seasonally adjusted terms (over 30 percent annualized) during the first three months of 2013.
  - Liquidity eased; NBRB reduced main policy rate by 3 percentage points to 27 percent in March–April 2013 and signaled further reductions.
  - Exchange rate relatively stable in early 2013 but at risk of being overvalued after a 14 percent real appreciation in 2012.

### Box 1 — External Stability Assessment (CGER-type findings)
- Rubel depreciation in 2012: depreciated by 3 percent in nominal effective terms in 2012.
- Real effective exchange rate: 14 percent appreciation in real effective terms in 2012, indicating deterioration of price competitiveness.
- CGER-based estimates:
  - Macroeconomic balance (MB) approach implies rubel overvaluation of 11 percent (increasing gap compared to 2012 Article IV).
  - External sustainability (ES) approach suggests undervaluation of 5.4 percent (positive gap has shrunk).
- Caveat: high degree of state control and administrative interference with price formation introduce considerable uncertainty in exchange rate adjustment effectiveness.

### Outlook and risks
- Authorities plan an 8½ percent GDP growth target for 2013 despite a largely closed output gap and continued high inflation; staff expect a repeat of stop-go policies.
- Staff baseline: growth below and inflation above the authorities’ target.
- External position projection: trade balance projected to deteriorate; reserves falling to US$6.9 billion by end-2013—equivalent to less than 1½ months of imports.
- Key downside risks (Appendix I):
  - Economic stimulus to reach growth target could reignite inflation and exchange rate pressures.
  - Banking sector pressure from deteriorating asset quality; rapid FX loan growth to largely unhedged borrowers.
  - Intensification of euro area turbulence lowering euro area growth, affecting Belarus via Russia and lower external demand.
  - Upside: successful international debt issuance, privatization, or new bilateral support could alleviate short-term external financing pressures.

### Policy discussions — overview
- Staff’s adjustment scenario: consistent macroeconomic policies plus deep structural reform would raise medium-term growth and reduce external vulnerabilities (Figure 4). Policy package includes reduced directed lending, wage moderation, tighter liquidity, control of FX lending growth, and a flexible exchange rate.
- Expected outcomes under adjustment scenario: improved current account, inflation brought to single digits by 2014, positive confidence effects spur capital inflows, reserves increase to equivalent of 4 months of imports by 2018.
- Authorities and staff broadly agreed on situation assessment but differed substantially on necessary policy actions.

### A. Ensuring Sound Fiscal Policies: Containing Directed Lending and Wages
Findings:
- Official fiscal outcomes:
  - Authorities achieved a 0.7 percent general government surplus in 2012 (over-performing zero-balance objective).
  - Authorities target a balanced budget for 2013.
  - Budget definition excludes quasi-fiscal operations and does not account for large contingent liabilities from directed lending.
- Directed lending and Development Bank operations:
  - Lending under government programs (LGP) estimated 3 percent of GDP in 2012.
  - Development Bank lending additional 2 percent of GDP in 2012.
  - Directed and subsidized lending remained high at an estimated 5 percent of GDP in 2012.
  - Recapitalizations during 2008–11 averaged 2 percent of GDP per year.
- Wages:
  - Budget sector nominal wages increased 67 percent in 2012 (Dec/Dec), 36 percent in real terms.
  - A further 20 percent increase in the first-grade wage for the public sector is envisaged for 2013.
  - Civil service reform package: increase civil servant wages by 30 percent while reducing staff numbers by 30 percent to contain overall wage costs to the budget.
Policy recommendations (staff):
- Reduce directed lending and related interest rate subsidies.
- Limit wage increases; recommend 2013 wage increases be limited to 12 percent (in line with authorities’ end-year inflation target).
- Raise cost-recovery on household utilities to 40 percent.
- Keep new LGP funded with government deposits limited to 6 trillion rubel (1 percent of GDP) in 2013 and maintain this ceiling over the medium term—with lending exclusively channeled through the Development Bank.
- Fully phase out directed lending funded by banks’ own resources by 2015.
- Each of the three fiscal measures (reduce directed lending, limit wages, raise utility cost-recovery) could yield about ½ percent of GDP.
Authorities’ position:
- Confident balanced budget target for 2013 will be achieved; cite a contingency reserve of 0.8 percent of GDP in the budget.
- No bank recapitalization in 2012; expected none in 2013.
- View subsidized lending as central to social protection and development strategies; plan to continue subsidizing lending with budget envelope of 3½ percent of GDP.

### B. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy: Focusing on Price Stability
Findings and risks:
- Authorities aim for 12 percent inflation at end-2013 within an incomplete monetary framework centered on a short-term inflation objective, supporting benchmarks for monetary aggregates, and a flexible exchange rate.
- Weaknesses: lack of forward-looking elements; ad hoc use of multiple instruments (policy rates, reserve requirements, administrative measures); presence of large volumes of subsidized credit; increasing foreign currency lending.
- Current policy stance difficult to assess amid sharp inflation volatility in early 2013; marked loosening of liquidity conditions and increased NBRB liquidity support raise risks.
Policy recommendations (staff):
- Tighten liquidity to align the money market rate with the refinancing rate and narrow the policy rate corridor to reduce interest rate volatility.
- Use macro-prudential policies to rein in high foreign currency lending growth.
- If recent inflation reductions do not continue, increase policy rates to ensure further disinflation.
- Raise rates without delay if expansionary wage or directed lending policies jeopardize stability, or if significant downward exchange rate pressures reemerge.
- Refrain from administrative measures to curb commercial lending rates, as these obscure policy stance and unduly inhibit bank operations.

*Source: IMF — 1. External Stability Assessment*

### 19.      The aim should be for single-digit inflation by no later than 2014. In this context, staff

### 19.      The aim should be for single-digit inflation by no later than 2014. In this context, staff

### Inflation objective and monetary policy
- Aim: single-digit inflation by no later than 2014.
- Staff encouraged the NBRB to make progress toward adoption of an inflation targeting (IT) framework, noting that a successful transition to IT requires:
  - consistent macroeconomic policies;
  - enhanced NBRB autonomy;
  - sharply reduced directed lending;
  - strengthening of market mechanisms in the financial system.
- Policy position and outlook:
  - Authorities conceded inflation outlook is uncertain and bringing inflation down to 12 percent by year-end would be a challenge.
  - NBRB plans a cautious approach to further monetary policy loosening and did not see a need for policy tightening in the near future given recent low investment and GDP growth.
  - Government proposed postponing planned administrative price increases to help keep inflationary pressures in check and was preparing to do so.

### Exchange rate policy
- Flexible exchange rate should be maintained to cushion against shocks and mitigate external imbalances.
- Intervention guidance:
  - Intervention should generally be limited to smoothing excessive exchange rate volatility, while not obstructing the underlying trend in the exchange rate.
  - Given low reserve levels and absence of indications of rubel undervaluation, authorities should seize opportunities to build reserves during periods of appreciation pressures.
- Authorities’ stance:
  - Reaffirmed commitment to a flexible exchange rate.
  - Acknowledged exchange rate had been more stable than inflation-differential warranted and competitiveness had deteriorated.
  - Attributed deterioration to increase in FX supply related to high FX borrowing for rubel spending needs.
  - Emphasized need for gradual exchange rate adjustments due to heightened population sensitivity to sharp rubel movements and attendant risk of capital flight.

### Banking sector vulnerabilities
- Supervisory framework and asset quality:
  - Banking supervision is improving; recent improvements in the banking code enhance supervision and corporate governance.
  - Reported NPLs have risen considerably and likely overstate true loan quality; reported capital adequacy ratios remain at seemingly comfortable levels partly owing to transfers of assets to the Development Bank (DB).
  - Intensive supervision is required given asset quality deterioration.
- FX lending risks:
  - Rapid FX lending growth is driven by a large interest rate differential on rubel loans.
  - Much of the FX lending is to unhedged borrowers, posing prudential concerns.
  - NBRB measures taken: provisioning requirements and restrictions on banks’ short-term FX lending; effectiveness limited.
  - Government has called to end NBRB’s ban on FX lending to households to revive mortgage lending.
- Staff recommendations:
  - Consider further measures to curb FX lending growth, including higher risk weights for FX loans.
  - Maintain prohibition of FX lending to households to avoid exposing households to large FX risks.
- Authorities’ positions:
  - NBRB deeply concerned about FX lending growth and would consider further steps despite concerns about circumvention.
  - Government more sanguine, concerned about stifling effect on growth of high domestic interest rates and viewing increased FX exposure risks as acceptable to boost lending and spur growth.

### Financial Soundness Indicators (selected figures from National Bank of the Republic of Belarus)
- Capital adequacy ratio: 20.5, 24.7, 23.8, 23.0, 22.1, 20.8, 21.1 (timing across 2010–2013 entries)
- Tier I capital adequacy ratio: 14.9, 18.8, 17.2, 16.5, 15.5, 14.6, 14.1
- Foreign exchange loans to total loans: 21.7, 39.5, 40.8, 41.9, 42.3, 45.5, 45.7
- Non-performing loans to gross loans: 3.5, 4.2, 3.7, 3.9, 4.8, 5.5, 5.2
- Watch loans 1/: 3.6, 10.6, 13.1, 13.4, 13.1, 12.6, 13.4
- Recapitalization costs (SOBs, percent of GDP): 1.3, 5.3, ............    ...
- Note: 1/ Watch loans include loans with delinquencies, negative information on the borrower or insufficient collateral.

### Financial sector reform and the Development Bank (DB)
- Risks and current course:
  - DB establishment (2011) offered potential to contain directed lending by consolidating it.
  - Recent presidential decree broadened DB mandate and sources of financing: DB to finance large strategic investment projects, provide subsidized lending to export sector, issue debt (2½ percent of GDP to date), and seek eligibility of its debt as collateral for NBRB refinancing.
  - Current course risks increasing directed lending rather than containing it.
- Transfers and scale of directed lending:
  - 2012 transfer: US$600 million in outstanding LGP loans transferred out of total stock of US$10 billion (17 percent of GDP).
  - Transferred loans exchanged at par value effectively entail recapitalization of state banks.
  - A further loan transfer of US$500 million planned by July 2013; expected to complete transfer, leaving close to 90 percent of past LGPs with the banks.
  - DB has assumed about 15 percent of the flow of new directed lending under government programs; no plans to move remainder away from banks.
- Staff policy recommendations for DB (summary):
  - Make DB the sole and transparent provider of directed lending.
  - Develop and adopt a time-bound plan to transfer all new directed lending from state banks to the DB by 2015.
  - Cap total new lending by the DB at 1 percent of GDP per year over the medium term.
  - Ensure close oversight and full transparency of DB operations and contingent liabilities; adequately reflect these in the budget.
  - DB bonds should not be eligible as collateral for NBRB refinancing.
  - DB should avoid debt issuance to finance new subsidized lending to prevent large contingent risks to the government.
- Authorities’ position:
  - View DB as critical to provide long-term financing given underdeveloped financial markets.
  - Abandoned idea of DB as sole provider of directed lending; DB would compete with commercial banks for government resources through deposits or interest rate subsidies.
  - Authorities stressed DB lending would be provided to good quality projects with high returns.

### Other structural reforms and progress
- Progress and reversals:
  - Welcome progress: tax reform and a new bankruptcy law.
  - Partial implementation of “Directive #4” (adopted 2010) which aimed to improve business environment.
  - Reduction in number of consumer goods subject to price controls reversed during 2011 crisis.
  - Privatization agenda stalled: NIPA has yet to sell any of eight small companies it was tasked to privatize; other companies have been nationalized.
  - New centralized modernization project provides enterprises with subsidized loans based on government-approved, enterprise-specific modernization proposals without significant changes to the overall business environment.
- Staff urged ambitious and comprehensive reforms including:
  - Price liberalization, progressive reduction of controls with aim to fully eliminate controls on an ambitious timetable.
  - Raise cost recovery in utilities and transport (current levels cited as around 22 and 43 percent, respectively).
  - Allow SOEs to set wages without reference to public sector pay grades and abolish “price calculation” requirements.
  - Speed up privatization of small- and medium-size enterprises and create an expedited pipeline of enterprises for privatization.
  - WTO accession support; recent resumption of work of WTO working party on Belarus’ accession noted.
  - Strengthen social safety nets.
- Authorities’ stance on reform:
  - Agree in principle but emphasize trade-offs and risks; prefer gradual approach.
  - Concern that price liberalization could conflict with efforts to reduce still-high inflation.
  - Prefer best-practice procedures for privatization that secure broad worker support over speed.

### Box 2 — Recommended Structural Reform Measures (specific measures for next 1-3 years)
- Financial sector reform
  - Complete transfer of existing LGP from state banks to the DB by the end of 2014.
  - Channel all new subsidized and directed lending exclusively through the DB, and cap total amount of such lending at 1 percent of GDP, by end 2015.
- Product, trade, and labor market reform
  - Shorten the list of socially important goods subject to price regulation to the 2011 level without delay, and fully phase out the list by mid-2014.
  - Raise cost recovery on household utilities from below 30 percent at present to 40 percent by end-2013 and 55 percent by end-2014.
  - Raise cost recovery on transport tariffs from below 50 percent at present to 90 percent by end-2013 and 100 percent by end-2014.
  - Abolish “price calculation” requirements without delay.
  - Phase out price regulation for various services by repealing relevant acts by end 2014.
  - Make adherence to the government’s “single pay grading system” voluntary for SOEs.
  - Make efforts toward changing Belarus’ status to that of a market economy to facilitate WTO accession.
- Privatization and enterprise reform
  - Complete the NIPA pilot privatization project by privatizing all eight currently shortlisted companies by end-2013; create a pipeline of companies to be privatized expeditiously.
  - Phase out mandatory economic targets, including SOE production targets, by end 2014.
  - Prepare, by mid-2014, a time-bound program for SOE restructuring, including removal of soft budget constraints and end of line-ministry control over SOEs.
- Social safety nets
  - Increase the cap on unemployment benefits, eliminate gaps in the provision of targeted social assistance, and move from quarterly to monthly indexation of benefits.

### Capacity to repay and funding relations
- Capacity and risks:
  - Belarus’ capacity to repay remains strained due to increasing debt ratios, deteriorating current account, low forex reserves, and a peak in external debt service in 2013–15.
  - Repayments to the Fund: US$1.7 billion in 2013 and US$1.4 billion in 2014 highlighted in the external debt service peak.
  - On staff baseline, Belarus should be able to meet external obligations in short run, but without additional external financing reserves would be on a downward trend leaving Belarus vulnerable to negative shocks.
- Authorities’ financing options:
  - Under the ACF program authorities committed to privatize state-owned assets for US$2½ billion, but assets to meet this condition are yet to be identified.
  - Authorities discussing new bilateral arrangements with Russia for potential large external financing.
  - Government considering floating a euro bond; held two road shows in recent months.

### Staff appraisal and final policy recommendations
- Macroeconomic assessment:
  - Belarus’ economic model is increasingly untenable; the economy is the least reformed in Europe with high state control restraining productivity and competitiveness.
  - Short-term policy efforts to boost growth beyond capacity resulted in large external imbalances and a crisis in 2011 and caused new volatility in 2012.
  - Authorities’ 8½ percent growth target for 2013 jeopardizes attainment of the 12 percent inflation target and risks repeating stop-go policy pattern of 2012.
- Key recommendations and prescriptions:
  - Strong and predictable macroeconomic policies are essential; policies in 2013 should focus on further reducing inflation and containing reemerging external imbalances via steady policies and tight management of domestic demand with close fiscal-monetary coordination.
  - Further sharp reduction in directed and subsidized lending operations is needed; reduce to below 1 percent of GDP over the medium term and channel remaining directed lending fully through the DB with adequate budget reflection; phase out directed lending through commercial banks.
  - Wage guidance: nominal wage growth should not exceed targeted inflation in 2013; nominal wage growth should be contained to no more than 12 percent (in line with authorities’ official end-year inflation target). Government plans to raise the first grade wage by over 20 percent should be reconsidered.
  - Monetary stance: NBRB should tighten liquidity and stand ready to take further measures to ensure disinflation. Specific actions:
    - Tighten liquidity conditions to align the market rate with the main policy rate.
    - If recent inflation gains are not continued, a policy rate increase will be needed to ensure further disinflation.
    - Raise rates if expansionary wage or directed lending policies jeopardize stability or if exchange rate pressures reemerge.
    - Maintain exchange rate flexibility to buffer shocks and discourage dollarization.
  - Banking supervision: while improved, high FX lending growth poses risks. Consider additional measures including higher risk weights on FX loans and maintain prohibition of FX lending to households.

*International Monetary Fund — Selected excerpts and staff recommendations from the Belarus staff report.*

### 42.      Deep structural reform remains critical to achieving higher sustainable growth. The

### 42.      Deep structural reform remains critical to achieving higher sustainable growth.

### Structural reform: findings and recommendations
- Findings:
  - The government has made progress with tax reform and a new bankruptcy law, but there have been setbacks in price liberalization and privatization.
  - The government’s modernization initiative, while containing useful elements, is unlikely to bring the needed change in the absence of deeper reforms.
- Policy recommendations:
  - Implement a comprehensive and ambitious reform agenda to boost productivity and competitiveness and unleash Belarus’ growth potential. This agenda would include:
    - Price liberalization.
    - Privatization and state-owned enterprise restructuring.
    - Targeted social safety nets.

### Development Bank and financial sector reform
- Findings:
  - The authorities are aiming to turn the Development Bank (DB) into a vehicle for yet more directed lending.
- Staff view and recommendations:
  - The Development Bank should be used to facilitate broader financial sector reform.
  - Make the DB the sole provider of directed lending and allow the banking system to operate on fully commercial terms to improve the efficiency of the financial sector and the allocation of credit.
  - DB debt should not be eligible as collateral for NBRB refinancing so as to preclude effective monetization of DB lending.

### Consultation scheduling
- Proposal:
  - The next Article IV consultation be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

### Real sector and labor market developments (high-level findings drawn from figures)
- Real GDP and demand:
  - Real GDP exhibited volatile quarter-on-quarter and year-on-year growth; the recovery after the 2011 balance of payments crisis has been rocky, with an acceleration in growth in the first quarter of 2013.
  - Consumption and investment remain volatile; consumption and investment series show large swings across 2008–13.
  - Output gap estimates (HP Filter, CF Filter, SVAR Model) indicate the economy remains broadly at potential, suggesting stronger growth measures will increase inflation risks.
- Wages and inflation:
  - Consumer and producer price inflation have been slowing down (2010–13).
  - Wage policy resulted in a rapid recovery in real wages; wage indices (2010 = 100) show a strong rebound through Mar-13.
  - Inflation in Belarus remains significantly higher than in its main trading partners (Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Euro area).
  - Inflation expectations remain persistently high (Expected Change in Inflation in Next Three Months: shares reporting "Will grow", "Will fall", "Stay the same").

### External sector and reserves (high-level findings)
- Exchange rate and trade:
  - The exchange rate unification in 2011 contributed to the realignment of the REER with fundamentals; the rubel has been slowly appreciating since then.
  - Merchandise trade showed a strong positive turnaround in H1 2012 that reversed as solvent exports stopped in H2 2012.
- Current account and reserves:
  - The turnaround in trade helped reduce the current account deficit in 2012.
  - Net reserves continued to grow; gross reserves stabilized as the NBRB reversed fx swaps with commercial banks.
  - Gross official reserves (end-of-period, Table 2 memorandum): 7.9, 8.1, 6.9, 5.3, 3.7, 3.2, 2.6, 1.9 (billions of U.S. dollars for 2011–18).

### Baseline and adjustment scenarios (2011–18) — scenario structure
- Scenarios presented for key aggregates: GDP Growth; Domestic Demand Growth; Inflation (End of period, percent); Current Account Balance (Percent of GDP); External Debt (Percent of GDP); Reserves/Months of Imports.
- Note on external debt in the baseline:
  - "The broadly constant external debt-to-GDP ratio in the baseline scenario is explained by an assumption that the gaps in the balance of payments are financed by drawdown of foreign exchange reserves rather than by external borrowing."

### Monetary and credit developments (high-level findings)
- Policy rates and liquidity:
  - Following a pause, the NBRB reduced its policy rate in early 2013 and allowed looser liquidity conditions.
  - Despite NBRB's mopping-up operations excess bank liquidity remains significant.
- Credit and dollarization:
  - Credit to the economy has been slowing down since end 2012.
  - The NBRB's credit to banks has leveled off.
  - FX loans index (January 2012 = 100) indicates the dollarization of loans is rising fast.
  - Household FX deposits (percent share) show deposit dollarization are slowing down.

### Key baseline projections and indicators (Table 1: Selected Economic Indicators, Baseline Scenario, 2011–18)
- National accounts (Real GDP, percentage change):
  - 2011: 5.5
  - 2012: 1.5
  - 2013: 2.1
  - 2014: 2.6
  - 2015: 2.9
  - 2016: 3.1
  - 2017: 3.2
  - 2018: 3.6
- Total domestic demand (percentage change): 3.4, 3.7, 4.8, 3.6, 3.0, 3.2, 3.2, 3.4 (2011–18)
- Consumer prices (End of period): 108.7, 21.8, 16.8, 18.8, 20.9, 20.1, 20.1, 20.1 (2011–18)
- Current account balance (Percent of GDP): -9.7, -2.9, -5.6, -5.9, -6.5, -6.6, -6.6, -6.6 (2011–18)
- Gross external debt (Percent of GDP): 57.7, 55.4, 52.7, 48.9, 48.3, 48.9, 49.5, 50.2 (2011–18)
- Augmented general government balance: -2.9, 0.5, -2.6, -3.5, -3.7, -4.0, -4.2, -4.2 (2011–18)
- Augmented general government balance including new directed lending: -11.4, -4.4, -5.1, -6.0, -6.2, -6.5, -6.7, -6.7 (2011–18)
- New directed lending (incl. Development Bank), Of which (net changes in stock at current exchange rate): 8.6, 5.0, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5 (2011–18)
- Official reserves (billions of U.S. dollars, memorandum): 7.9, 8.1, 6.9, 5.3, 3.7, 3.2, 2.6, 1.9 (2011–18)
- Months of imports of goods and services (memorandum): 1.9, 1.9, 1.5, 1.1, 0.7, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3 (2011–18)
- Nominal GDP (billions of U.S. dollars, memorandum): 60, 63, ... (Table shows truncated series)

### Balance of Payments — selected baseline figures (Table 2, 2011–18, in millions of U.S. dollars)
- Current account balance: -5,775; -1,819; -3,902; -4,449; -5,174; -5,461; -5,777; -6,039 (2011–18)
- Trade balance (goods): -3,716; 498; -1,774; -2,312; -2,747; -3,746; -4,355; -5,029 (2011–18)
- Exports (total): 41,410; 45,506; 45,671; 47,724; 49,989; 58,051; 60,696; 63,525 (2011–18)
  - Energy exports: 14,078; 16,110; 13,055; 13,493; 13,870; 13,202; 12,964; 12,778 (2011–18)
  - Nonenergy exports: 27,332; 29,397; 32,616; 34,230; 36,120; 44,849; 47,732; 50,747 (2011–18)
- Imports (total): -45,126; -45,009; -47,445; -50,036; -52,737; -61,798; -65,051; -68,554 (2011–18)
  - Energy imports: -18,629; -17,756; -16,087; -15,547; -15,545; -15,152; -14,946; -14,841 (2011–18)
  - Nonenergy imports: -26,497; -27,253; -31,358; -34,489; -37,192; -46,646; -50,105; -53,713 (2011–18)
- Overall FDI, net: 3,928; 1,343; 1,683; 2,228; 2,453; 2,725; 2,950; 3,027 (2011–18)
- Gross official reserves (end-of-period): 7,916; 8,095; 6,899; 5,336; 3,741; 3,180; 2,607; 1,919 (2011–18)

### Public finances (selected items, percent of GDP)
- State (republican and local) budget revenue: 28.8, 30.0, 30.2, 29.0, 29.0, 29.0, 29.0, 29.0 (2011–18)
  - Personal income tax: 3.1, 3.7, 3.8, 3.3, 3.3, 3.3, 3.3, 3.3 (2011–18)
  - VAT: 8.9, 8.6, 8.9, 8.5, 8.5, 8.5, 8.5, 8.5 (2011–18)
- State budget expenditure (economic classification): 26.7, 29.4, 30.1, 29.4, 29.6, 29.8, 29.9, 29.8 (2011–18)
  - Wages and salaries: 6.3, 6.6, 6.8, 6.8, 6.8, 6.8, 6.8, 6.8 (2011–18)
  - Subsidies and transfers: 7.3, 7.7, 6.8, 7.1, 7.1, 7.1, 7.1, 7.1 (2011–18)
  - Capital expenditures: 5.1, 6.5, 7.1, 6.6, 6.8, 7.0, 7.0, 6.9 (2011–18)
- State Budget Balance: 2.1, 0.5, 0.1, -0.4, -0.6, -0.8, -0.9, -0.8 (2011–18)
- General government revenue: 38.8, 40.8, 40.8, 39.6, 39.6, 39.6, 39.6, 39.6 (2011–18)
- General government expenditure: 36.0, 40.1, 40.5, 40.3, 40.6, 40.9, 41.1, 41.1 (2011–18)
- General government balance: 2.8, 0.7, 0.2, -0.7, -1.0, -1.3, -1.5, -1.5 (2011–18)
- Off-Balance sheet operations: -5.6, -0.2, -2.8, -2.8, -2.7, -2.7, -2.7, -2.7 (2011–18)
- Augmented balance (general government plus outlays for bank recapitalizations and called guarantees): -2.9, 0.5, -2.6, -3.5, -3.7, -4.0, -4.2, -4.2 (2011–18)

*Source: IMF staff report on the Republic of Belarus (excerpt).*

### 3. Financing (cash)2.9-0.52.63.53.74.04.24.2

### _cr13159 - 3. Financing (cash)2.9-0.52.63.53.74.04.24.2

### Financing (cash) — headline flows (percent of annual GDP unless otherwise indicated)
- Privatization: 7.3, 0.0, 0.1, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0
- Foreign financing, net: 3.1, -0.7, 0.6, -0.9, 0.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.9
- Domestic financing, net (3/ Includes unidentified financing that is assumed to be filled by government domestic borrowing): 3/ -7.5, 0.2, 1.9, 3.3, 2.7, 2.0, 2.2, 2.3
  - Central bank (including IMF): -14.6, -0.6, 2.4, 1.8, 0.1, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0
  - Deposit money banks (including SPF): 0.9, -0.7, 0.1, -0.3, -0.4, -0.5, -0.6, -0.7
  - Commercial bank net purchases of domestic debt: 6.2, 1.5, -0.6, 1.8, 3.0, 2.5, 2.8, 3.0

### Memorandum fiscal items (percent of GDP and rubel levels)
- Augmented general government balance with new directed lending: -11.4, -4.4, -5.1, -6.0, -6.2, -6.5, -6.7, -6.7
- Of which: new directed lending (incl. Development Bank) 4/: 8.6, 5.0, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5
- Gross public debt 5/: 43.4, 36.9, 35.6, 33.6, 33.4, 34.7, 36.0, 37.2
- GDP (trillions of Belarusian rubels): 297, 527, 663, 818, 1,009, 1,237, 1,521, 1,859

### General government accounts (GFSM2001 presentation, percent of GDP)
- Revenues: 52.0, 47.2, 43.0, 39.8, 42.6
  - Taxes: 37.7, 30.1, 27.3, 24.7, 26.2
    - Taxes on income, profits & capital gains: 8.6, 7.0, 7.2, 6.2, 7.5
    - Taxes on property: 1.5, 1.2, 1.1, 0.9, 1.0
    - Taxes on goods and services: 16.0, 14.7, 14.1, 11.8, 12.1
    - Taxes on Intl trade and transactions: 8.2, 5.8, 3.5, 5.1, 4.8
    - Other taxes: 3.3, 1.4, 1.3, 0.7, 0.7
  - Social contributions: 11.2, 11.5, 11.7, 9.7, 10.8
  - Other revenue: 3.2, 5.7, 4.0, 5.4, 4.8
- Expense: 42.7, 42.7, 40.3, 33.8, 36.9
  - Compensation of employees: 9.0, 9.1, 9.4, 8.4, 9.0
    - Wages and salaries: 7.0, 7.1, 7.4, 6.6, 7.0
    - Social contributions: 1.9, 1.9, 2.0, 1.8, 1.9
  - Uses of goods and services: 9.2, 7.8, 7.4, 6.4, 6.8
  - Interest: 0.6, 0.8, 0.7, 1.1, 1.4
  - Subsidies: 9.1, 8.9, 5.4, 4.6, 5.1
  - Grants: 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2
  - Social benefits: 11.9, 13.0, 13.6, 11.4, 12.9
  - Other expense: 2.9, 3.1, 3.7, 1.8, 1.5
- Gross operating balance: 9.3, 4.5, 2.7, 6.0, 5.7
- Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets: 5.8, 4.8, 4.5, 3.0, 4.5
- Net borrowing/lending: 3.5, -0.3, -1.8, 3.0, 1.2

### Monetary authorities' accounts (end-of-period, trillions of Belarusian rubels and percent of GDP)
- Reserve money (percent of GDP): 18.8, 30.3, 39.2, 53.3, 74.9, 105.3, 148.0, 207.9
  - Rubel reserve money: 16.9, 29.9, 38.8, 52.8, 74.3, 104.7, 147.2, 207.0
  - Currency outside banks: 6.7, 11.3, 14.1, 19.2, 26.9, 37.8, 53.2, 74.8
  - Required reserves: 7.4, 13.8, 16.4, 24.8, 36.2, 51.8, 74.3, 108.7
  - Time deposits, NBB securities, and nonbank deposits: 2.8, 4.8, 8.3, 8.8, 11.2, 15.0, 19.7, 23.5
  - Foreign currency reserve money: 1.9, 0.4, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9
- Net foreign assets (percent of GDP): 36.7, 43.7, 53.4, 57.7, 48.8, 48.8, 47.1, 41.1
  - Billions of U.S. dollars: 4.4, 5.1, 5.6, 5.4, 3.8, 3.3, 2.7, 2.0
- Foreign assets (percent of GDP): 83.7, 78.3, 75.8, 68.6, 60.6, 62.6, 63.3, 60.0
  - Billions of U.S. dollars: 10.0, 9.1, 7.9, 6.4, 4.8, 4.2, 3.6, 3.0
  - Of which gross international reserves (percent of GDP): 66.1, 69.4, 65.9, 57.4, 47.4, 47.2, 45.3, 39.0
    - Billions of U.S. dollars: 7.9, 8.1, 6.9, 5.3, 3.7, 3.2, 2.6, 1.9
- Foreign liabilities (percent of GDP): 47.0, 34.5, 22.5, 10.9, 11.8, 13.8, 16.2, 18.9
- Net domestic assets (percent of GDP): -17.9, -13.4, -14.1, -4.4, 26.1, 56.5, 100.8, 166.8
- Net domestic credit (percent of GDP): -29.5, -29.9, -13.4, 13.4, 49.1, 84.1, 132.2, 201.4
  - Net credit to general government: -62.9, -56.0, -40.1, -25.5, -24.5, -24.5, -24.5, -24.5
  - Credit to economy: 33.4, 26.1, 26.8, 38.9, 73.6, 108.6, 156.6, 225.8
    - Credit to banks: 19.1, 12.0, 13.4, 26.2, 61.5, 97.1, 145.7, 215.5
      - National currency: 13.5, 9.7, 10.7, 22.1, 55.4, 88.5, 134.0, 199.7
      - Foreign currencies: 5.6, 2.4, 2.6, 4.1, 6.0, 8.6, 11.8, 15.8
    - Credit to nonbanks: 14.2, 14.1, 13.4, 12.7, 12.1, 11.5, 10.9, 10.4
- Other items, net: 11.6, 16.4, -0.8, -17.8, -23.0, -27.6, -31.3, -34.6
- Memorandum: 12-month percent change in reserve money: 84.1, 61.6, 29.4, 35.9, 40.5, 40.6, 40.5, 40.5

### Monetary survey (end-of-period, trillions of Belarusian rubels)
- Broad money (M3): 111.2, 160.8, 218.4, 319.6, 461.3, 656.9, 936.4, 1,354.3
- Rubel broad money (M2): 43.4, 68.1, 88.3, 120.2, 169.5, 238.7, 335.7, 472.1
  - Currency in circulation: 6.7, 11.3, 14.1, 19.2, 26.9, 37.8, 53.2, 74.8
  - Domestic currency deposits: 34.5, 54.3, 70.9, 96.6, 136.4, 192.0, 270.0, 379.7
  - Domestic currency securities: 2.2, 2.5, 3.3, 4.5, 6.3, 8.9, 12.5, 17.6
- Foreign currency deposits: 64.1, 88.6, 124.4, 190.7, 279.0, 400.0, 574.5, 843.8
- Bank securities in foreign currency: 3.7, 4.0, 5.7, 8.7, 12.7, 18.2, 26.2, 38.5
- Net foreign assets (trillions): 5.8, 4.7, 6.5, 8.8, 0.0, -4.9, -11.0, -21.1
  - Billions of U.S. dollars: 0.7, 0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 0.0, -0.3, -0.6, -1.0
- NFA of central bank (percent of GDP): 36.7, 43.7, 53.4, 57.7, 48.8, 48.8, 47.1, 41.1
- NFA of deposit money banks (percent of GDP): -30.9, -39.0, -46.8, -48.9, -48.8, -53.7, -58.1, -62.2
- Net domestic assets (percent of GDP): 105.4, 156.1, 211.9, 310.8, 461.3, 661.8, 947.3, 1,375.4
- Net domestic credit (percent of GDP): 104.6, 159.3, 230.4, 326.8, 461.5, 638.4, 893.6, 1,280.7
- Memorandum: 12-month percent change of credit to economy excl. valuation effect: 37.0, 32.4, 17.6, 21.3, 25.4, 22.8, 22.6, 23.2

### Selected economic indicators and projections (percent changes and ratios)
- Real GDP: 5.5, 1.5, 1.2, 2.5, 3.1, 4.0, 4.7, 4.8 (2011–2018)
- Consumer prices (end of period): 108.7, 21.8, 12.0, 9.6, 8.9, 8.1, 7.0, 6.0
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): -9.7, -2.9, -4.0, -2.8, -2.6, -1.7, -0.9, -0.2
- Gross external debt (percent of GDP): 57.7, 55.4, 52.8, 47.6, 46.5, 46.2, 43.8, 41.5
  - Public: 25.0, 23.8, 22.4, 18.9, 16.5, 16.5, 15.6, 14.6
  - Private (mostly state-owned-enterprises): 32.7, 31.6, 30.4, 28.7, 30.0, 29.6, 28.2, 26.9
- Gross domestic investment (percent of GDP): 37.6, 34.5, 36.3, 40.4, 40.6, 41.0, 43.5, 45.8
- National saving (percent of GDP): 28.0, 31.6, 32.4, 37.6, 38.0, 39.4, 42.6, 45.6
- Public sector finance:
  - General government balance: 2.8, 0.7, 0.2, -0.8, -1.0, -1.3, -1.5, -1.5
  - Augmented general government balance 4/: -2.9, 0.5, -2.7, -2.4, -2.3, -2.3, -2.3, -2.3
  - Augmented general government balance incl. new directed lending: -11.4, -4.4, -4.7, -3.9, -3.3, -3.3, -3.3, -3.3
  - Revenue: 38.8, 40.8, 41.9, 39.9, 39.9, 39.9, 39.9, 39.9
  - Expenditure 6/: 41.6, 40.2, 44.6, 42.3, 42.2, 42.2, 42.2, 42.2
  - Gross public debt 7/: 43.4, 36.9, 36.1, 32.4, 30.9, 30.7, 29.6, 28.6

### Indicators of external vulnerability (2009–12)
- CPI inflation (end year): 10.1, 9.9, 108.7, 21.8 (2009–2012)
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): -12.6, -15.0, -9.7, -2.9
- Gross official reserves (millions of U.S. dollars): 5,653; 5,031; 7,916; 8,095
  - Months of imports of goods and services: 1.8, 1.2, 1.9, 1.9
  - Percent of broad money: 22.7, 16.3, 59.4, 43.8
- Gross total external debt (millions U.S. dollars): 22,439; 28,770; 34,454; 35,071
  - Percent of GDP: 45.6, 52.2, 57.7, 55.4
  - Percent of exports of goods and services: 90.2, 96.2, 73.8, 67.8
- Gross short-term external debt (millions of U.S. dollars): 9,342; 12,155; 14,113; 13,091
  - Percent of gross total external debt: 42, 41, 37 (2009–2011)
  - Percent of gross official reserves: 165, 242, 178, 162
- Debt service ratio (percent): 6.0, 6.0, 5.7, 6.1
- Capital adequacy ratio (percent): 19.8, 20.5, 24.7, 20.8
- Nonperforming loans (percent of total): 4.2, 3.5, 4.2, 5.5
- Banks' net open FX position (percent of regulatory capital): -11.6, -1.4, 9.4, 9.0

### Capacity to repay the Fund (Baseline Scenario), 2012–18 (selected items)
- Fund repurchases and charges (Millions of SDRs): 350, 1,058, 893, 550, 0, 0, 0
  - Millions of U.S. dollars: 538, 1,603, 1,349, 830, 0, 0, 0
  - Percent of exports of goods and services: 132, 0, 0, 0, 0
  - Percent of total debt service 2/: 16, 28, 22, 100, 0
  - Percent of quota: 91, 274, 231, 1400, 0
  - Percent of gross international reserves: 72, 32, 52, 0, 0
- Fund credit outstanding (Millions of SDRs): 1,966, 941, 550, 0, 0
  - Millions of U.S. dollars: 3,025, 1,425, 830, 0, 0

### External debt sustainability framework (selected dynamics and projections)
- Baseline: external debt (percent of GDP): 25.0, 45.6, 52.1, 57.7, 55.4, 52.7, 48.9, 48.3, 48.9, 49.5, 50.2
- Change in external debt: -1.5, 20.6, 6.5, 5.6, -2.2, -2.8, -3.7, -0.6, 0.7, 0.6, 0.7
- Identified external debt-creating flows (4+8+9): -1.8, 14.9, 7.7, -0.5, -2.2, 2.3, 1.8, 2.2, 1.9, 1.8, 1.7
  - Current account deficit, excluding interest payments: 7.4, 11.5, 13.9, 8.0, 1.1, 3.3, 3.9, 4.7, 5.3, 5.1, 5.0
  - Net non-debt creating capital inflows (negative): -3.3, -3.5, -2.3, -6.2, -1.8, -2.3, -2.8, -3.0, -3.2, -3.3, -3.2
  - Automatic debt dynamics 2/: -5.9, 6.9, -3.8, -2.3, -1.4, 1.3, 0.7, 0.4, -0.2, 0.0, -0.1
    - Contribution from nominal interest rate: 0.8, 1.0, 1.1, 1.7, 1.8, 2.3, 1.9, 1.8, 1.2, 1.5, 1.6
    - Contribution from real GDP growth: -2.0, -0.1, -3.1, -2.7, -0.8, -1.0, -1.2, -1.4, -1.4, -1.5, -1.7
    - Contribution from price and exchange rate changes 3/: -4.7, 5.9, -1.8, -1.3, -2.4, ... (projection line includes the impact of price and exchange rate changes)
- External debt-to-exports ratio (percent): 40.9, 90.2, 96.2, 73.8, 67.8, 69.5, 67.9, 67.3, 62.1, 62.9, 63.5
- Gross external financing need (billions of U.S. dollars) 5/: 13.4, 14.7, 18.8, 19.6, 18.0, 21.1, 22.9, 24.2, 23.5, 24.7, 26.8
  - Percent of GDP: 22.0, 30.0, 34.0, 32.8, 28.4, 30.5, 30.1, 30.4, 28.2, 28.2, 29.3

### Key macroeconomic assumptions underlying baseline (selected)
- Real GDP growth (percent): 10.2, 0.2, 7.7, 5.5, 1.5, 2.1, 2.6, 2.9, 3.1, 3.2, 3.6
- GDP deflator in U.S. dollars (percent change): 21.7, -19.1, 4.2, 2.5, 4.3, 7.4, 6.8, 1.8, 1.5, 1.7, 1.0
- Nominal external interest rate (percent): 4.3, 3.3, 2.8, 3.5, 3.3, 4.6, 4.0, 3.8, 2.7, 3.3, 3.3
- Growth of exports (U.S. dollar terms, percent): 34.2, -32.9, 20.3, 56.1, 10.9, 1.5, 4.2, 4.4, 14.9, 5.0, 5.0
- Growth of imports (U.S. dollar terms, percent): 37.0, -27.0, 22.8, 29.3, 1.1, 5.5, 6.0, 5.6, 16.6, 5.1, 5.2
- Current account balance, excluding interest payments: -7.4, -11.5, -13.9, -8.0, -1.1, -3.3, -3.9, -4.7, -5.3, -5.1, -5.0
- Net nondebt creating capital inflows: 3.3, 3.5, 2.3, 6.2, 1.8, 2.3, 2.8, 3.0, 3.2, 3.3, 3.2

### Risk Assessment Matrix — key risks, likelihood, impacts, and policy responses
- 1. Stalled or incomplete delivery of Euro area policy commitments and/or protracted period of slower European growth
  - Relative Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized: Medium — slowdown of global demand; negative spillovers mainly through trade
  - Policy Response:
    - Continue flexible exchange rate policy.
    - Speed up structural reform to increase competitiveness.
- 2. Loosening of macroeconomic policies
  - Relative Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized: High — stimulus to reach 8½ percent GDP growth target would endanger stability, boost demand, reignite inflation, and pressure the exchange rate
  - Policy Response:
    - Tighten macroeconomic policies including monetary, wage and exchange rate policies.
- 3. External financing shortfalls
  - Relative Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized: High — Belarus has very high gross financing needs in 2013–14; shortfalls would reduce reserves and raise exchange rate risks
  - Policy Response:
    - Tighten macroeconomic policies.
    - Continue flexible exchange rate policy.
- 4. Weakening economic environment could reduce banks’ asset quality
  - Relative Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized: Medium — slowdown could increase problem loans and require renewed bank recapitalization, raising public debt pressures
  - Policy Response:
    - Increase supervision and oversight over large banks, including through more frequent onsite monitoring.
- 5. Terms of trade shock
  - Relative Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized: High — negative shock would weaken the balance of payments and further raise external financing needs
  - Policy Response:
    - Tighten macroeconomic policies to avoid a sharp weakening of the current account.
    - Speed up structural reform to increase competitiveness.
    - Continue flexible exchange rate.

*Source: Ministry of Finance; SPF; and IMF staff estimates.*

### Appendix II. Belarus: External Debt Sustainability: Bound Tests of the

### _cr13159 - Appendix II. Belarus: External Debt Sustainability: Bound Tests of the

### Baseline external-debt profile and headline shock outcomes
- Baseline and historical averages shown in charts: Historical: 38; Baseline: 50.
- Peak scenario values (boxes in figures):
  - Interest rate shock: 51
  - Growth shock: 54
  - Noninterest current account shock: 62
  - Combined shock (permanent 1/4 standard deviation shocks applied to real interest rate, growth rate, and current account balance): 58
  - Real depreciation shock (one-time real depreciation of 30 percent occurs in 2012): 76
- Gross financing need under baseline (trend shown on right scale in charts).

### Public sector debt trajectory (Baseline: public sector debt 1/, percent of GDP)
- Public sector debt levels (2008–2018):
  - 2008: 21.7
  - 2009: 34.9
  - 2010: 42.0
  - 2011: 43.4
  - 2012: 36.9
  - 2013: 35.6
  - 2014: 33.6
  - 2015: 33.4
  - 2016: 34.7
  - 2017: 36.1
  - 2018: 37.3
- Of which foreign-currency denominated (percent of GDP, 2008–2018):
  - 2008: 6.8
  - 2009: 18.9
  - 2010: 22.6
  - 2011: 25.0
  - 2012: 23.8
  - 2013: 22.1
  - 2014: 19.2
  - 2015: 16.9
  - 2016: 17.2
  - 2017: 17.2
  - 2018: 17.2

### Changes in public sector debt and identified debt-creating flows (percent of GDP)
- Change in public sector debt (2008–2018):
  - 2008: 3.4
  - 2009: 13.1
  - 2010: 7.2
  - 2011: 1.4
  - 2012: -6.5
  - 2013: -1.3
  - 2014: -2.0
  - 2015: -0.3
  - 2016: 1.4
  - 2017: 1.3
  - 2018: 1.2
- Identified debt-creating flows (4+7+12) (2008–2018):
  - 2008: -15.4
  - 2009: -0.1
  - 2010: -1.6
  - 2011: 0.4
  - 2012: -3.9
  - 2013: -5.8
  - 2014: -5.1
  - 2015: -4.4
  - 2016: -3.9
  - 2017: -4.0
  - 2018: -4.1

- Primary deficit (percent of GDP) (2008–2018):
  - 2008: -14.6
  - 2009: -0.1
  - 2010: 1.1
  - 2011: -3.9
  - 2012: -2.1
  - 2013: -1.6
  - 2014: -1.0
  - 2015: -0.7
  - 2016: -0.5
  - 2017: -0.3
  - 2018: -0.4

- Revenue and grants (percent of GDP) (2008–2018):
  - 2008: 50.7
  - 2009: 45.8
  - 2010: 41.6
  - 2011: 38.8
  - 2012: 40.8
  - 2013: 40.8
  - 2014–2018: 39.6 (each year)

- Primary (noninterest) expenditure (percent of GDP) (2008–2018):
  - 2008: 36.1
  - 2009: 45.7
  - 2010: 42.7
  - 2011: 34.9
  - 2012: 38.7
  - 2013: 39.1
  - 2014: 38.6
  - 2015: 38.8
  - 2016: 39.1
  - 2017: 39.3
  - 2018: 39.2

### Automatic debt dynamics and contributions (percent of GDP)
- Automatic debt dynamics 2/ (2008–2018):
  - 2008: -4.1
  - 2009: 1.7
  - 2010: -3.9
  - 2011: 6.0
  - 2012: -17.5
  - 2013: -6.1
  - 2014: -5.1
  - 2015: -4.6
  - 2016: -4.4
  - 2017: -4.6
  - 2018: -4.7

- Contribution from interest rate/growth differential 3/ (2008–2018):
  - 2008: -4.0
  - 2009: -0.4
  - 2010: -5.1
  - 2011: -17.7
  - 2012: -17.5
  - 2013: -6.1
  - 2014: -5.1
  - 2015: -4.6
  - 2016: -4.4
  - 2017: -4.6
  - 2018: -4.7

  - Of which contribution from real interest rate (2008–2018):
    - 2008: -2.6
    - 2009: -0.4
    - 2010: -2.8
    - 2011: -16.4
    - 2012: -17.2
    - 2013: -5.5
    - 2014: -4.3
    - 2015: -3.9
    - 2016: -3.5
    - 2017: -3.7
    - 2018: -3.6

  - Of which contribution from real GDP growth (2008–2018):
    - 2008: -1.4
    - 2009: 0.0
    - 2010: -2.3
    - 2011: -1.3
    - 2012: -0.4
    - 2013: -0.6
    - 2014: -0.7
    - 2015: -0.8
    - 2016: -0.9
    - 2017: -0.9
    - 2018: -1.0

- Contribution from exchange rate depreciation 4/ (2008–2018):
  - 2008: 0.0
  - 2009: 2.1
  - 2010: 1.2
  - 2011: 23.7
  - 2012: 0.4
  - 2013: 2.7
  - 2014: 2.0
  - 2015: 2.9
  - 2016: 2.5
  - 2017: 2.5
  - 2018: 2.5

- Other identified debt-creating flows (2008–2018):
  - 2008: 3.2
  - 2009: -1.6
  - 2010: 1.2
  - 2011: -1.7
  - 2012: 15.8
  - 2013: 2.0
  - 2014: 1.0
  - 2015: 1.0
  - 2016: 1.0
  - 2017: 1.0
  - 2018: 1.0

  - Privatization receipts (negative) (2008–2018):
    - 2008: -1.7
    - 2009: -1.6
    - 2010: -1.3
    - 2011: -7.3
    - 2012: 0.0
    - 2013: -0.1
    - 2014: -1.0
    - 2015: -1.0
    - 2016: -1.0
    - 2017: -1.0
    - 2018: -1.0

  - Recognition of implicit or contingent liabilities:
    - 2008–2018: 0.0 (all years except 2012 where an entry appears separately under “Other identified debt-creating flows”)

  - Other (e.g., bank recapitalization) (2008–2018):
    - 2008: 4.9
    - 2009: 0.0
    - 2010: 2.5
    - 2011: 5.6
    - 2012: 0.0
    - 2013: 2.1
    - 2014–2018: 2.0 (each year)

- Residual, including asset changes (2-3) 5/ (2008–2018):
  - 2008: 18.8
  - 2009: 13.2
  - 2010: 8.7
  - 2011: 0.9
  - 2012: -2.7
  - 2013: 4.5
  - 2014: 3.1
  - 2015: 4.1
  - 2016: 5.2
  - 2017: 5.3
  - 2018: 5.3

### Additional public-debt indicators
- Public sector debt-to-revenue ratio (2008–2018):
  - 2008: 42.9
  - 2009: 76.2
  - 2010: 101.1
  - 2011: 112.0
  - 2012: 90.5
  - 2013: 87.4
  - 2014: 85.0
  - 2015: 84.3
  - 2016: 87.7
  - 2017: 91.0
  - 2018: 94.1

- Gross financing need 6/ (percent of GDP) (2008–2018):
  - 2008: 0.8
  - 2009: 1.7
  - 2010: 5.6
  - 2011: 8.2
  - 2012: 3.4
  - 2013: 6.3
  - 2014: 7.6
  - 2015: 7.6
  - 2016: 5.9
  - 2017: 6.0
  - 2018: 6.8

- Gross financing need in billions of U.S. dollars (2008–2018):
  - 2008: 0.5
  - 2009: 0.8
  - 2010: 3.1
  - 2011: 4.9
  - 2012: 2.1
  - 2013: 4.4
  - 2014: 5.8
  - 2015: 6.1
  - 2016: 4.9
  - 2017: 5.3
  - 2018: 6.3

### Scenario exercises and counterfactuals
- Scenario with key variables at their historical averages 7/ (selected levels shown):
  - Values in chart: 36.9, 33.0, 28.0, 24.5, 22.6, 20.6, 18.9, -1.1 (sequence presented in source).
- Scenario with no policy change (constant primary balance) in 2011 (values shown in source):
  - –, 16, 36.9, 16.0, 10.4, 5.7, 2.8, 0.1, -2.6, -3.0 (sequence presented in source).

### Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions underlying the baseline (selected series, percent unless noted)
- Real GDP growth (percent) (2008–2018):
  - 2008: 10.2
  - 2009: 0.2
  - 2010: 7.7
  - 2011: 5.5
  - 2012: 1.5
  - 2013: 2.1
  - 2014: 2.6
  - 2015: 2.9
  - 2016: 3.1
  - 2017: 3.2
  - 2018: 3.6

- Average nominal interest rate on public debt (percent) 8/ (2008–2018):
  - 2008: 4.2
  - 2009: 3.8
  - 2010: 2.3
  - 2011: 4.8
  - 2012: 5.8
  - 2013: 4.8
  - 2014: 5.9
  - 2015: 6.4
  - 2016: 6.6
  - 2017: 6.5
  - 2018: 6.3

- Average real interest rate (nominal rate minus change in GDP deflator, percent) (2008–2018):
  - 2008: -17.0
  - 2009: -1.9
  - 2010: -8.8
  - 2011: -66.4
  - 2012: -68.9
  - 2013: -18.3
  - 2014: -14.4
  - 2015: -13.6
  - 2016: -12.3
  - 2017: -12.6
  - 2018: -11.7

- Nominal appreciation (increase in U.S. dollar value of local currency, percent) (selected values shown in source):
  - 2008: 0.5
  - 2009: -23.5
  - 2010: -6.9
  - 2011: -64.1
  - ... (series continues in source)

- Inflation rate (GDP deflator, percent) (2008–2018):
  - 2008: 21.2
  - 2009: 5.7
  - 2010: 11.1
  - 2011: 71.2
  - 2012: 74.8
  - 2013: 23.1
  - 2014: 20.3
  - 2015: 20.0
  - 2016: 18.9
  - 2017: 19.0
  - 2018: 18.0

- Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, percent) (2008–2018):
  - 2008: 3.7
  - 2009: 26.8
  - 2010: 0.7
  - 2011: -13.6
  - 2012: 12.7
  - 2013: 3.4
  - 2014: 1.2
  - 2015: 3.6
  - 2016: 3.8
  - 2017: 3.7
  - 2018: 3.5

- Primary deficit (repeated from above for completeness):
  - 2008: -14.6; 2009: -0.1; 2010: 1.1; 2011: -3.9; 2012: -2.1; 2013: -1.6; 2014: -1.0; 2015: -0.7; 2016: -0.5; 2017: -0.3; 2018: -0.4

### Notes and methodological definitions (as presented in source)
- Shaded areas in figures represent actual data.
- Individual shocks are permanent one-half standard deviation shocks (unless otherwise noted).
- Figures in the boxes represent average projections for the respective variables in the baseline and scenario being presented. Ten-year historical average for the variable is also shown.
- Projections are shown at the official exchange rate.
- Footnotes in source:
  - 2/ Permanent 1/4 standard deviation shocks applied to real interest rate, growth rate, and current account balance.
  - 3/ One-time real depreciation of 30 percent occurs in 2012.
  - 4/ The exchange rate contribution is derived from the numerator in footnote 2/ as ae(1+r).
  - 5/ For projections, residual includes exchange rate changes.
  - 6/ Gross financing need defined as public sector deficit, plus amortization of medium and long-term public sector debt, plus short-term debt at end of previous period.
  - 7/ The key variables include real GDP growth; real interest rate; and primary balance in percent of GDP.
  - 8/ Average nominal interest rate derived as nominal interest expenditure divided by previous period debt stock.
  - 9/ Debt-stabilizing primary balance (referenced in Appendix III).

*Source: IMF staff estimates; REPUBLIC OF BELARUS — 2013 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION AND FOURTH POST-PROGRAM MONITORING DISCUSSIONS—INFORMATIONAL ANNEX.*

### 3. The World Bank Group (WBG) is currently preparing a new Country Partnership Strategy (CPS)

### 3. The World Bank Group (WBG) is currently preparing a new Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for Belarus which will replace the previous CAS and cover the period of 2014–17

### WBG CPS objectives and engagement approach
- WBG consulting with the government, development partners, civil society and other stakeholders to identify priorities for WBG assistance for the coming four years.
- Through the new CPS the WBG will continue to support Belarus in the implementation of structural reforms to:
  - promote inclusive growth,
  - enhance economic competitiveness,
  - facilitate the integration into the world economy,
  - improve public services, including social protection of the most vulnerable.
- Annual lending envelope, specific projects and range of instruments will be determined in the context of the CPS.
- Analytic and advisory work will continue to be a core element of the WBG engagement.
- The Bank will continue to deepen its analytical program, including programmatic analytical and technical assistance in:
  - fiscal policies,
  - structural reforms,
  - private and financial sector development,
  - trade, including support for Belarus’s WTO accession.

### Areas in which the World Bank Group Leads — key activities and projects
- Structural reforms, social issues, and private business development:
  - Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) presented to authorities in July 2012 outlined priorities: liberalization of factor and product markets, transformation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), enhancing private sector growth including services.
  - Programmatic structural reform technical assistance to support design and implementation of reforms.
  - Privatization TA (largely funded through a donor Trust Fund) to advise on legal and institutional instruments and implementation capacities for enterprise privatization.
  - IFC advisory programs on private sector challenges and international “best practices” for improving business regulatory environment and investment climate.
  - Programmatic Public Expenditure Review to improve efficiency of public spending; technical assistance to support improved medium-term fiscal planning and debt management.
  - Use of newly available Labor Market Survey to expand and deepen labor market reform work initiated in the CEM.
  - Targeted analytical and technical assistance to support Belarus’ WTO accession.
- Energy sector projects (World Bank financial support):
  - Post Chernobyl Recovery Project (PCRP) (US$50 million)
  - Additional Financing to PCRP (US$30 million)
  - Energy Efficiency Project (EEP) (US$125 million)
- Road Transport:
  - Road Upgrading and Modernization Project (US$150 million) aimed at developing transport infrastructure on Trans-European Transport Corridor IX.
- Environment:
  - GEF Grant Project (US$5.5 million) for Persistent Organic Pollutant (POPs) Stockpile Management and Technical/Institutional Capacity Upgrading (TA project under implementation).
  - Water Supply and Sanitation Project (US$60 million) progressing toward improved water, wastewater and solid waste management services.
  - Solid Waste Management Project (US$42.5 million).

### Areas of shared responsibility with the IMF
- Macroeconomic development:
  - Bank and Fund consult in preparation of macroeconomic framework and debt sustainability analysis and on analytical pieces on macro-growth issues.
- Public expenditure management:
  - Bank focus on improving efficiency of public spending.
  - First volume of programmatic Public Expenditure Review focused on spending efficiency in agriculture, energy, social assistance and pension sectors.
  - Bank to deliver Public Expenditure Review 2 in FY 2013, focusing on intergovernmental fiscal relations and efficiency in health and education.
  - Fund, jointly with Bank, supporting authorities in fiscal consolidation including technical assistance on expenditure rationalization.
- Debt management:
  - Bank conducted a Debt Management Performance Assessment (DeMPA) in FY 2011 and a Debt Management Reform Plan in FY 2012.
  - Joint World Bank and IMF technical assistance mission supported development of a Medium-Term Debt Strategy (MTDS).
  - Bank and Fund will continue joint support in debt management.
- Financial sector:
  - Joint support to address key vulnerabilities and design needed reforms.
  - Collaboration in financial sector monitoring, including on the newly established Development Bank.
  - World Bank will maintain active dialogue on state bank governance, restructuring and privatization, financial consumer protection and financial literacy, and reforms in securities and insurance sectors.

### Areas in which the IMF leads
- IMF engagement:
  - Discussing macroeconomic program, providing technical assistance and support on economic and financial statistics, tax policy, monetary operations, and fiscal transparency.
  - Leading dialogue on setting objectives for monetary and exchange rate policies, overall budget envelope, and tax policy.
  - IMF analysis serves as input to Bank policy advice; Bank staff participates in IMF Article IV Consultations to ensure consistency of policy recommendations.

*Questions may be referred to Sebastian Eckardt (Senior Economist, ECSPE, 202-458-7954), and Kiryl Haiduk (Country Economist, ECSPE, 375-17-2265284).*

### Belarus: Bank and Fund Planned Activities in Macro-Critical Structural Reform Areas in 2012–13 — highlights
- Bank Work Program (products and timing / expected delivery):
  - Regular Macro-Economic Monitoring — Ongoing — Through 2012/2013
  - Programmatic Public Expenditure Review (PER)–phase 2 — Ongoing — April 2013
  - Public Financial Management TA, including debt management — Ongoing — TA through 2012/2016
  - Programmatic Structural Reform Dialogue — Ongoing — TA through 2012/2016
  - WTO Accession Technical Assistance — Ongoing — TA through 2013/2016
  - Financial Sector Monitoring TA — Ongoing — TA through 2012/2013
  - Privatization TA — Ongoing — TA through 2012/2013
  - Statistical Capacity Building — Ongoing — TA through 2012/2013
  - IFC Investment Climate Advisory Services — Ongoing — TA through 2012/2013
  - IFC Standards Advisory Services — Ongoing — TA through 2012/2013
- IMF Work Program:
  - Peripatetic advisor on bank supervision — Ongoing — Through April 2013
  - Developing of capacity and instruments of the NBRB — Planned — June 2013
  - Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy — Planned — June 2013
- Joint Work Program:
  - Joint Policy Dialogue with Structural Reform Working Group — Ongoing — Through 2012/2013

### Statistical issues (as of April 1, 2013) — assessment and standards
- General assessment:
  - Data provision has some shortcomings, but is broadly adequate for surveillance. The most affected area is external debt data.
- National Accounts:
  - NSC compiles and disseminates quarterly and annual GDP estimates at current and constant prices following the 1993 System of National Accounts.
  - Timeliness and periodicity exceed the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) requirements.
  - A monthly GDP is compiled 15 days after the end of the reference month.
  - NSC compiles annually a full set of accounts (up to the financial accounts), institutional sector accounts, and input-output tables.
  - Compilation of experimental estimates of regional GDP at current and constant prices—monthly, quarterly and annual—has started.
  - Estimates are internally consistent and consistent with other macroeconomic statistics.
- Price statistics:
  - CPI covers 31 towns; PPI covers approximately 1,700 industrial organizations; published monthly.
  - CPI and PPI are based on weights from 2011.
- Government finance statistics:
  - Compiled in broad compliance with GFSM 2001.
  - Areas needing improvement: classification of some expenses (e.g. subsidies to corporations, social benefits to households, capital transfers to corporations); inconsistency between GFS and monetary data; valuation of assets and liabilities; compilation for public corporations.
- Monetary statistics:
  - Monetary and Financial Statistics compiled by NBRB, broadly following IMF’s MFSM.
  - NBRB has implemented most STA recommendations regarding monetary statistics.
- External sector statistics:
  - NBRB publishes quarterly balance of payments and international investment position statements in BPM5 format (for 1996–2011) and BPM6 format since 2012 (revised data available from 2005).
  - Timeliness and serviceability satisfactory, although gaps exist in external debt data, in particular gross external debt statistics.
  - While BPM6 requires debt statistics to be reported in net terms, compiling gross external debt statistics remains important.
- Data standards and quality:
  - Belarus subscribed to the Special Data Dissemination System (SDDS) on December 22, 2004 and met all SDDS requirements at the time of subscription.
  - A data ROSC report was published on February 1, 2005.

### Supplementary information: Article VIII mission preliminary findings and authorities’ response
- Article VIII mission identified exchange restrictions and multiple currency practices (MCPs) subject to the Fund’s jurisdiction:
  - Exchange restrictions arising from requirement of an NBRB permit for (i) advance payments for imports and (ii) payments for imports with delivery outside of Belarus.
  - MCPs arising from (i) potential deviation by more than two percent of exchange rates in the over-the-counter (OTC) market and the BCSE exchange, and (ii) potential deviation by more than two percent of exchange rate in the OTC market and the exchange rate determined at the BCSE and/or the official exchange rate in the mandatory sale by resident legal entities of unused FX and FX amounts subject to the surrender requirement not exceeding US$1,000.
- Staff continues to analyze other features of Belarus’ foreign exchange system and will provide a further update once assessment is finalized.
- Authorities have indicated intention to remove the identified measures, are studying preliminary findings and awaiting final report of the Article VIII mission.
- Authorities indicated commitment to elimination of the measures in a careful manner to minimize risk of unexpected adverse effects on the balance of payments.
- Authorities expect to be in full compliance with their Article VIII obligations by end-2014.

*Source: IMF staff report content provided in the document.*

### 4. At this time, the authorities do not request, and the staff does not recommend,

### _cr13159 - 4. At this time, the authorities do not request, and the staff does not recommend,

### Background and context
- IMF Executive Board concluded the 2013 Article IV Consultation with Belarus and Fourth Post-Program Monitoring discussions on May 24, 2013; Public Information Notice issued June 12, 2013.
- Following the 2011 crisis, the economy stabilized in early 2012 after sharp policy tightening that stabilized the exchange rate and achieved a rapid reduction of inflation, supported in part by a temporary large-scale trade in solvents and related products.
- Subsequent stop-go stimulus in 2012 led to renewed volatility, return of price and exchange rate pressures in fall 2012, and tightening of liquidity conditions (increased reserve requirements, restrictions on banks’ access to refinancing).
- Early 2013 developments: monthly inflation fell, GDP growth rebounded, average wages grew briskly in Q1, banking system liquidity eased substantially, and the NBRB further reduced its main policy rate.

### Executive Board assessment and recommendations
- Directors welcomed efforts to regain macroeconomic stability after 2011 but noted premature policy loosening.
- Key concerns:
  - Inconsistent pursuit of growth and inflation targets.
  - Extensive state control restraining productivity growth and competitiveness.
  - Renewed pressures on the exchange rate, inflation and the current account due to policies aimed at boosting growth.
- Main recommendations and views:
  - Improve consistency and predictability of policies; focus on restoring stability, rebuilding policy buffers, and implementing deep structural reforms.
  - Tight management of domestic demand to reduce inflation, contain external imbalances, and ensure capacity to meet external obligations.
  - Further substantial reduction of directed lending to a level below one percent of GDP over the medium term (welcome recent reduction).
  - Reflect fiscal risks from quasi-fiscal operations and directed lending in the budget.
  - Nominal wage growth should not exceed the target inflation rate in 2013.
  - NBRB should tighten liquidity conditions and stand ready to increase the policy rate if the recent declining trend in inflation is not sustained.
  - Maintain exchange rate flexibility and discourage dollarization; note authorities’ commitment to eliminate remaining exchange restrictions and multiple currency practices.
  - Consider additional measures to curb rapid foreign currency lending growth, maintain prohibition on such lending to households.
  - Monitor developments in non-performing loans closely.
  - Development bank should become sole provider of directed lending; development bank debt should not be eligible as collateral for central bank refinancing.
  - Implement a well-sequenced, comprehensive reform agenda: price liberalization, privatization and restructuring of state-owned enterprises, and targeted social safety nets.

### Authorities’ statement (Mr. Prader and Mr. Misyukovets; May 24, 2013)
- Authorities broadly agree with staff’s assessment and recommendations and appreciate IMF technical assistance.
- They emphasize continued commitment to macroeconomic stabilization, balanced budget, conservative monetary policy, and flexible exchange rate.

### Macroeconomic developments in 2012 (authorities’ view)
- Key achievements cited:
  - Inflation reduced to 21.8 percent in 2012 from 108.7 percent in 2011.
  - Rubel depreciation of 2.6 percent against the U.S. dollar in 2012.
  - Official foreign exchange reserves: US$ 8.1 billion as of January 1, 2013.
  - Trade balance improved from a deficit of 2 percent of GDP in 2011 to a surplus of 4.6 percent of GDP in 2012.
  - Current account deficit narrowed from 8.5 percent of GDP at end-2011 to 2.9 percent of GDP in 2012; covered by net FDI inflows of 2.2 percent of GDP and external borrowing.
  - Banking sector: capital adequacy at 20.85 and admissible share of non-performing loans of 5.5 percent as of January 1, 2013.
  - Rubel deposits grew by 58 percent in 2012; household deposits in the national currency grew by 75 percent.
  - Households’ incomes returned to the pre-crisis level.
- External support and market signals:
  - Standard & Poor’s revised its sovereign rating outlook on Belarus (and related outlooks) to positive from stable on April 17, 2013.
  - Eurasian Anti-Crisis Fund disbursed US$ 440 million on April 30, 2013 under a US$ 3 billion stabilization arrangement.

### Developments in 2013 and short-term outlook (authorities’ view)
- Growth and productivity:
  - Economy expanded by 2.5 percent in the first four months of 2013.
  - Labor productivity increased by 4.5 percent; Q1 labor productivity rose 3.5 percent.
  - Balance of trade in goods and services in January-March was positive at US$ 426.4 million, or 3 per cent of GDP.
- Inflation dynamics:
  - Monthly inflation: surge of 3.0 percent in January; reduced to 1.2 percent in February, 1.1 percent in March, and 0.5 percent in April.
  - Authorities expect to meet the 2013 inflation target of 12 percent (December to December).
  - Core inflation: 2.8 percent in January, then 0.6 percent in February and 0.6 percent in March after monetary response.
  - Utility tariff adjustments and excise tax increases under Common Economic Space agreements have been primary inflation drivers; objective to reach full utility cost coverage in 2015 remains unchanged.
- Interest rates, liquidity, and deposits:
  - Real interest rates are firmly positive; real value of the refinancing rate above 10 percent p.a.
  - Very high nominal deposit rates for new deposits at about 40 percent p.a. in February-March.
  - Refinance rate cited as 25 percent (current as of statement) and described as strongly positive in real terms.
  - Rapid growth in household rubel deposits and high foreign exchange supply boosted rubel liquidity; remedial actions to drain excess liquidity have been costly.
  - Authorities stand ready to tighten monetary policy if inflationary pressures resume.
- Fiscal and public debt:
  - General government budget surplus of 2.9 percent of GDP in January-March 2013.
  - Central government budget surplus of 0.7 percent of GDP in the same period.
  - Lending under government programs reduced to about 1 percent of GDP during 2013; plan to transfer such lending to the Development Bank.
  - Budget envisages a 7 percent increase in real wages in the budgetary sector; major restructuring includes reduction of 13,600 civil servant positions to be completed by July 1, 2013.
  - No plans to recapitalize state owned banks in 2013.
  - Gross public debt as of January 1, 2013: 23.8 percent of GDP; external debt accounted for 19 percent of GDP.
  - Gross public debt well below the national economic security threshold of 45 percent of GDP and the Maastricht criterion of 60 percent of GDP.
  - Sovereign bond yields have fallen markedly below pre-crisis levels; issuing foreign exchange denominated bonds in the domestic market since October 2012.

### Reform agenda and priorities (authorities’ stated priorities)
- Objectives to regain competitiveness, diversify and modernize the economic structure, and create sustainable productive jobs.
- Authorities’ priority areas:
  - (i) enhance economic efficiency;
  - (ii) increase investment efficiency and facilitate the growth of FDI;
  - (iii) promote innovations;
  - (iv) increase the GDP share of SMEs;
  - (v) reduce dependence on energy imports and energy intensity;
  - (vi) provide incentives for productive labor;
  - (vii) increase financial efficiency and mobilize resources for modernization in the real sector;
  - (viii) strengthen institutional infrastructure to facilitate public/private interface (property rights, efficient rules, financial intermediation).
- Coordination with World Bank:
  - Actions incorporated into a new World Bank Group Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for Belarus, scheduled for Bank Board consideration in early June 2013.
  - CPS focuses on improving competitiveness through structural transformations: reducing the size of government, transforming the SOE sector, promoting private and financial sector development, and facilitating integration into the global economy.
  - CPS includes financial support, analytical and advisory activities, and a comprehensive results matrix with specific outcomes and milestones.
- Authorities reiterate view that a Fund program could be exceptionally useful to complement and reinforce reforms.

### Selected economic indicators, 2009–13 (percent changes and levels as presented)
- National accounts (percentage change)
  - Real GDP: 2009 = 0.2; 2010 = 7.7; 2011 = 5.5; 2012 = 1.5; 2013 Prel. Proj. = 2.1
  - Total domestic demand: 2009 = -1.1; 2010 = 11.5; 2011 = 3.4; 2012 = 3.7; 2013 = 4.8
  - Consumption: 2009 = 0.0; 2010 = 7.9; 2011 = 1.0; 2012 = 8.2; 2013 = 4.2
  - Nongovernment consumption: 2009 = 0.0; 2010 = 9.3; 2011 = 2.3; 2012 = 10.8; 2013 = 5.2
  - Government consumption: 2009 = -0.1; 2010 = 3.1; 2011 = -3.6; 2012 = -1.2; 2013 = 0.0
  - Investment: 2009 = -2.9; 2010 = 18.4; 2011 = 7.8; 2012 = -3.7; 2013 = 6.0
  - Of which: fixed investment: 2009 = 5.0; 2010 = 17.5; 2011 = 13.9; 2012 = -9.8; 2013 = 6.3
  - Net exports (contribution to growth): 2009 = 1.4; 2010 = -3.7; 2011 = 3.4; 2012 = -1.8; 2013 = -3.4
- Consumer prices
  - End of period: 2009 = 10.1; 2010 = 9.9; 2011 = 108.7; 2012 = 21.8; 2013 = 16.8
  - Average: 2009 = 13.0; 2010 = 7.7; 2011 = 53.2; 2012 = 59.2; 2013 = 20.5
- Monetary accounts
  - Rubel broad money: 2009 = 0.9; 2010 = 27.4; 2011 = 64.1; 2012 = 57.2; 2013 = 29.6
  - Reserve money: 2009 = -11.5; 2010 = 49.5; 2011 = 84.1; 2012 = 61.6; 2013 = 29.4
- External debt and balance of payments (percent of GDP)
  - Current account: 2009 = -12.6; 2010 = -15.0; 2011 = -9.7; 2012 = -2.9; 2013 = -5.6
  - Trade balance: 2009 = -14.1; 2010 = -16.4; 2011 = -6.2; 2012 = 0.8; 2013 = -2.6
  - Exports of goods: 2009 = 43.4; 2010 = 46.0; 2011 = 69.3; 2012 = 71.9; 2013 = 65.9
  - Imports of goods: 2009 = -57.5; 2010 = -62.4; 2011 = -75.5; 2012 = -71.1; 2013 = -68.4
  - Gross external debt: 2009 = 45.6; 2010 = 52.1; 2011 = 57.7; 2012 = 55.4; 2013 = 52.7
  - Public (gross consolidated debt of public sector): 2009 = 18.9; 2010 = 22.6; 2011 = 25.0; 2012 = 23.8; 2013 = 22.1
  - Private (mostly state-owned-enterprises): 2009 = 26.7; 2010 = 29.5; 2011 = 32.7; 2012 = 31.6; 2013 = 30.5
- Savings and investment
  - Gross domestic investment: 2009 = 37.3; 2010 = 41.2; 2011 = 37.6; 2012 = 34.5; 2013 = 37.4
  - National saving: 2009 = 24.7; 2010 = 26.2; 2011 = 28.0; 2012 = 31.6; 2013 = 31.8
- Public sector finance
  - General government balance: 2009 = -0.7; 2010 = -1.8; 2011 = 2.8; 2012 = 0.7; 2013 = 0.2
  - Augmented general government balance: 2009 = -0.7; 2010 = -4.3; 2011 = -2.9; 2012 = 0.5; 2013 = -2.6
  - Revenue: 2009 = 45.8; 2010 = 41.6; 2011 = 38.8; 2012 = 40.8; 2013 = 40.8
  - Expenditure (augmented): 2009 = 46.5; 2010 = 45.9; 2011 = 41.6; 2012 = 40.2; 2013 = 43.4
  - Wages (share of GDP): 2009 = 6.7; 2010 = 7.0; 2011 = 6.3; 2012 = 6.6; 2013 = 6.8
  - Subsidies and transfers (share of GDP): 2009 = 11.7; 2010 = 8.3; 2011 = 7.3; 2012 = 7.7; 2013 = 6.8
  - Investment (share of GDP): 2009 = 8.1; 2010 = 8.3; 2011 = 5.1; 2012 = 6.5; 2013 = 7.1
  - Gross public debt: 2009 = 34.9; 2010 = 42.0; 2011 = 43.4; 2012 = 36.9; 2013 = 35.6
- Memorandum items
  - Nominal GDP (billions of U.S. dollars): 2009 = 49.2; 2010 = 55.2; 2011 = 59.7; 2012 = 63.3; 2013 = ...
  - Nominal GDP (trillions of rubels): 2009 = 137.4; 2010 = 164.5; 2011 = 297.2; 2012 = 527.4; 2013 = 662.5
  - Terms of trade: 2009 = -10.3; 2010 = 0.5; 2011 = 5.9; 2012 = 10.5; 2013 = 1.7
  - Official reserves (billions of U.S. dollars): 2009 = 5.7; 2010 = 5.0; 2011 = 7.9; 2012 = 8.1; 2013 = 6.9
  - Months of imports of goods and services: 2009 = 1.8; 2010 = 1.2; 2011 = 1.9; 2012 = 1.9; 2013 = 1.5
  - Percent of short-term debt: 2009 = 63.2; 2010 = 42.1; 2011 = 56.9; 2012 = 62.8; 2013 = 51.0

*Source: IMF staff report and Public Information Notice for the 2013 Article IV Consultation with Belarus (May 24, 2013; PIN No. 13/66).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/_cr13159.pdf_
