## _cr14145 - 1. Stand-By Arrangements in 2008–12

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### Context
- Incomplete transition to a market economy weighs on growth: extensive state presence, large state budget, distorting price regulation, and pervasive governance deficiencies.
- Recovery from the global crisis in 2008–09 lagged peers; progress with structural reforms has been slow.
- Policy mix and vulnerabilities:
  - Long reliance on an effectively pegged exchange rate as a nominal anchor, accompanied by loose fiscal policy and sizable quasi-fiscal losses.
  - The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) holds over 60 percent of domestic government debt.
  - Resulting imbalances: overvalued exchange rate, large twin deficits, rising indebtedness, recurrent external financing difficulties, and low international reserves.
- Political constraints: ruling coalition led by the Party of Regions remained in power after the parliamentary elections in October 2012; presidential elections scheduled for March 2015. Political polarization and vested interests (notably in the energy sector) limit reform implementation.

### Recent developments (selected indicators and events)
- Output and labor market:
  - GDP contracted by 1.3 percent y-o-y in January–September 2013.
  - Unemployment was 7.5 percent in mid-2013.
  - Economy in recession since mid-2012; exit from recession expected in 2013:Q4 driven by agriculture.
- Prices and external balances:
  - Consumer prices stayed flat in 2013.
  - The 12-month rolling current account deficit was 8 percent of GDP by end-September 2013.
  - Natural gas imports fell by 22 percent in January–September 2013.
- Monetary and banking developments:
  - Tight monetary policy and heavy NBU FX interventions in late 2012 squeezed bank liquidity.
  - Real hryvnia interest rates remained in double digits; hryvnia deposits rose by 30 percent in the year to September 2013.
  - Credit to the economy expanded by 7 percent y-o-y.
  - Banks mainly used deposit inflows to buy government securities and repay loans to the NBU.
  - NBU lowered main policy rate from 7.5 percent to 6.5 percent over the summer and raised reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits by several percentage points.
- Market access and reserves:
  - Two Eurobond issues in early 2013 raised US$2.25 billion at yields of about 7½ percent; since late May yields hovered in the 8½–15 percent range.
  - Sovereign downgrades: Moody’s to Caa1; S&P and Fitch to B-.
  - By end-October, reserves fell to about 2.5 months of imports and 36 percent of debt service in 2014.
- Fiscal and quasi-fiscal developments:
  - General government deficit widened to 4½ percent of GDP in 2012; structural expansion of 1½ percent of GDP.
  - Combined structural deficit of the government and Naftogaz rose to 6¾ percent.
  - State guarantees in 2012 exceeded 5 percent of GDP; could reach up to 3.5 percent of GDP in 2013 according to the budget law, although only about 0.7 percent of GDP allocated by end-October.
  - Parliament approved promissory notes for about 1¼ percent of GDP for repayment of overdue VAT refunds and expenditure arrears; notes would be accepted as payments to Naftogaz.
- Naftogaz and contingent liabilities:
  - Despite lower gas imports, Naftogaz’s losses in 2013:H1 more than doubled.
  - Gazprom announced an US$7 billion claim on Naftogaz for 2012 (no legal steps taken to collect as of report issuance).
- External relations uncertainty:
  - Tensions over trade and potential Customs Union exclusion amid EU association/free trade agreement deliberations.
  - On November 21, the authorities suspended preparations for signing the agreement with the EU, citing need to sort out relations with Russia and the Customs Union.

### Stand-By Arrangements in 2008–12 (summary)
- November 2008 SBA:
  - Two-year, SDR 11 billion SBA (802 percent of quota).
  - Objectives: macroeconomic stabilization and adjustment amid the 2008–09 crisis; stabilize banking system; allow exchange rate to find market-driven equilibrium.
  - Two reviews completed; SDR 7 billion disbursed before arrangement went off track and was cancelled in mid-2010 upon approval of next arrangement.
- July 2010 SBA:
  - 29-month, SDR 10 billion SBA (729 percent of quota).
  - Objectives: set public finances on sustainable path, eliminate energy sector quasi-fiscal losses, transition to flexible exchange rate, strengthen financial sector.
  - Achievements: pension reform in 2011, initial energy tariff adjustments, restored international market access.
  - Only one review completed; two purchases totaling SDR 2.25 billion made before program went off track in 2011 and expired in December 2012.

### External stability assessment: competitiveness, external financing, and reserves
- Competitiveness and exchange rate:
  - REER overvalued by 14–16 percent (Annex I).
  - High real wage growth amid slow productivity growth eroded gains from 2009 devaluation; ULC-based REER exceeded high 2008 levels.
  - Staff estimate: significant devaluation need would persist even if fiscal gaps were closed while maintaining current exchange rate.
- External financing risks:
  - External debt above 75 percent of GDP.
  - Gross external financing requirement of 37 percent of GDP in 2014.
  - NBU international reserves low against several common metrics (Annex I).
- Reserve adequacy (selected figures):
  - Gross official reserves (billions of U.S. dollars): 2010 34.6; 2011 31.8; 2012 24.5; 2013 18.5; 2014 11.2; 2015 9.1.
  - Months of imports: 2010 4.2; 2011 3.7; 2012 3.0; 2013 2.2; 2014 1.3; 2015 1.0.
  - Percent of IMF composite measure: 2010 92.6; 2011 75.7; 2012 52.8; 2013 38.6; 2014 21.3; 2015 16.5.

### Outlook and risks (baseline under currently planned policies)
- Baseline outlook:
  - GDP to decline by ¼ percent in 2013; modest growth of about 1 percent expected in 2014.
  - Inflation to modestly rise to about 2 percent in 2014.
  - Current account deficit to remain elevated above 8 percent of GDP in 2013–14.
- Medium-term risks and implications:
  - Current policy mix (overvalued exchange rate, large fiscal/quasi-fiscal deficits) would keep current account deficit above 7 percent of GDP over the medium term and deplete NBU reserves.
  - Tight monetary policy supporting the exchange rate would constrain private investment; public investment displaced by high wage and pension spending.
  - High labor costs relative to productivity would limit employment growth and depress actual and potential growth.
- Major downside risks that could trigger a market-forced adjustment:
  - Decline in international reserves could trigger a run for foreign exchange, leading to disruptive exchange rate shock, compressed demand, higher inflation, and banking sector stress.
  - Exacerbating factors: (i) sustained loss of market access; (ii) a more restrictive trade regime with Russia causing sizable export losses; (iii) loss of confidence as government policy focus alternates between integration with the EU and Russia.
- Upside potential:
  - Signing of an association agreement with the EU could help exports and spur FDI over time, especially if competitiveness and the business climate are improved.

### Adjustment scenario: main effects and rationale
- Exchange rate adjustment would significantly improve external position and help rebuild international reserves.
- Energy tariff increases and fiscal restraint would raise public savings and make space for public investment.
- Reduced vulnerabilities, regained market access, structural reforms, and higher competitiveness would promote higher private savings and investment, including FDI.
- Overall path: after an initial dip caused by tightening policies to support external adjustment and contain inflation, growth should recover, led by exports and investment.

### Projections: Ukraine — Baseline and Adjustment Scenarios, 2013–18 (values by year)
- Real GDP growth (percent)
  - Baseline: 2013-0.3 2014-1.0 2015-1.5 2016-1.5 2017-1.5 2018-1.5
  - Adjustment: 2013-0.3 2014-0.5 2015-3.5 2016-4.0 2017-4.5 2018-4.5
- CPI inflation (end of period)
  - Baseline: 2013-0.2 2014-2.3 2015-3.8 2016-4.0 2017-4.0 2018-4.0
  - Adjustment: 2013-0.2 2014-12.9 2015-5.9 2016-5.2 2017-5.0 2018-5.0
- Overall fiscal balance (including Naftogaz, percent of GDP)
  - Baseline: 2013-7.7 2014-6.6 2015-6.3 2016-8.0 2017-7.7 2018-7.6
  - Adjustment: 2013-7.7 2014-4.0 2015-3.2 2016-2.8 2017-2.2 2018-2.0
- Public and publicly guaranteed debt (end of period)
  - Baseline: 2013-41.3 2014-44.7 2015-48.0 2016-53.4 2017-57.5 2018-60.2
  - Adjustment: 2013-41.3 2014-41.5 2015-40.7 2016-39.7 2017-37.8 2018-34.6
- Current account balance (percent of GDP)
  - Baseline: 2013-8.3 2014-8.2 2015-7.7 2016-7.4 2017-7.1 2018-7.1
  - Adjustment: 2013-8.3 2014-5.0 2015-4.1 2016-3.8 2017-3.8 2018-3.6
- External debt (end of period)
  - Baseline: 2013-76.7 2014-75.3 2015-74.7 2016-75.1 2017-75.2 2018-75.2
  - Adjustment: 2013-76.7 2014-84.6 2015-80.8 2016-79.9 2017-78.6 2018-77.8
- Gross external financing requirements (USD billion)
  - Baseline: 2013-72.5 2014-67.6 2015-71.2 2016-78.0 2017-85.1 2018-88.9
  - Adjustment: 2013-72.5 2014-61.8 2015-64.5 2016-71.0 2017-78.9 2018-84.6
- Gross international reserves (percent of IMF composite measure)
  - Baseline: 2013-38.6 2014-21.3 2015-16.5 2016-14.1 2017-11.8 2018-10.2
  - Adjustment: 2013-38.6 2014-50.5 2015-62.2 2016-81.2 2017-105.9 2018-137.5

### Key policy recommendations (staff)
- Allow the exchange rate to adjust, eliminating overvaluation, and increase its flexibility.
- Strengthen the financial system’s resilience to shocks, including developing comprehensive contingency plans to cover potential capital and liquidity shortfalls under various scenarios.
- Launch fiscal consolidation to support external adjustment and reduce financing risks.
- Raise energy tariffs as part of a comprehensive plan to reduce quasi-fiscal losses.
- Persevere with deep structural reforms to improve the business climate and raise growth.

### Banking sector assessment and staff recommendations
- Current condition and vulnerabilities
  - Banking system appears stable but vulnerabilities persist.
  - Capital adequacy ratio of 18 percent; NPL ratio of 14 percent (NBU definition).
  - Specific provisions cover 81 percent of impaired loans and 45 percent of doubtful loans.
  - Including substandard loans would raise NPL ratio to over 25 percent.
  - NBU’s Resolution 109 forces a large negative foreign exchange position of about 20 percent of capital by end-September 2013.
- Staff proposals regarding Resolution 109 and FX exposure
  - Unwind Resolution 109 over three years by allowing provisions against foreign currency loans back into foreign currency position calculation.
  - Allow all banks to include government exchange rate-indexed securities in foreign currency assets calculation; limit issuance to mitigate devaluation impact on banks.
  - Remove tax, administrative, and legal obstacles to NPL resolution and corporate debt restructuring.
- Contingency planning and audits
  - Develop contingency and recovery plans; require systemically important banks to prepare recovery plans.
  - NBU, Deposit Guarantee Fund, and Ministry of Finance to develop specific resolution plans for vulnerable banks.
  - Launch independent diagnostic audits of vulnerable systemic banks focusing on asset quality and related party lending.
- Supervisory strengthening and resolution
  - Strengthen enforcement of consolidated supervision, improve early warning systems, accelerate resolution of three intervened banks in state possession.

### Fiscal consolidation: targets, composition, and rationale
- Staff recommended general government deficit target:
  - 2¾ percent of GDP in 2014, falling to 1¾ percent of GDP in the medium term.
- Including energy sector reform effects, combined budget-Naftogaz structural deficit would fall by 2¾ percent of GDP in 2014 and 4 percent by 2018.
- Frontloading fiscal adjustment is necessary to:
  - support external adjustment;
  - contain inflation;
  - reduce budget financing needs and vulnerability.
- Composition of consolidation:
  - Brunt on reducing current expenditure.
  - 2014 priorities: rationalize public procurement; reduce subsidies; restrain public sector wages and hiring; index pensions only with inflation (remove wage-linked indexation).
  - Medium-term: current expenditure cuts of some 6¾ percent of GDP through wage and employment restraint, pension reforms focusing on privileged pensions, and deeper subsidy cuts enabled by energy sector reform.
- Expected outcomes:
  - Return current expenditure just below its 2011 level.
  - Allow doubling capital outlays to 3 percent of GDP.

### Tax policy guidance and cautions
- Tax code envisages cuts: VAT 20 to 17 percent and CIT 19 to 16 percent.
- Staff cautions:
  - Postpone tax cuts until current expenditure adjustment is well under way and budget deficit reduced.
  - Support postponing CIT cut to 2016.
  - Advise abandoning VAT cut given budget constraints.
  - Recommend phasing out VAT exemptions, especially in agriculture.
  - Support a five-year schedule for raising excise taxes starting in 2014.

### On promissory notes and arrears settlement
- Staff cautioned against using promissory notes to settle arrears.
- Recommended settling arrears through conventional methods: cash payments and netting due refunds against VAT liabilities.
- Issuing promissory notes would undermine future budget and Naftogaz revenue and impose deep haircuts on legitimate business receivables.

### Energy sector: scale of problem and reform prescriptions
- Energy subsidies:
  - Overall energy subsidies estimated at 7½ percent of GDP in 2012.
  - Very low tariffs for residential gas and district heating (20–30 percent of economic costs).
- Staff prescription:
  - Ambitious, comprehensive energy sector reform aimed at eliminating Naftogaz’s operational losses.
  - Reform objective: gradually eliminate Naftogaz’s operational losses over the medium term, limiting its deficit to interest paid on its debt.
  - Support authorities’ intention to cut Naftogaz’s deficit to 1¼ percent of GDP in 2014 and urged credible policies to achieve this.
- Tariff strategy:
  - Gradual, but upfront and broad-based tariff increases—start with meaningful gas and heating tariff increases for a broad household customer base in 2014.
  - Protect the poor by increasing targeted social assistance to the poorest 40 percent of households by expanding means-tested programs.
- Complementary measures:
  - Accelerate gas and heat metering and energy-saving efforts.
  - Diversify gas imports toward cheaper sources.
  - Create enabling pricing and business climate to attract investment into domestic gas production.
- Authorities’ stance:
  - Agreed need for reforms and announced intention to cut Naftogaz’s deficit to 1¼ percent of GDP in 2014, but reluctant to raise current gas and heating tariffs; working on converting in-kind energy benefits into cash and raising domestic gas production.

### Structural reforms, business climate, and AML/CFT
- Structural reform priorities:
  - Strengthen judicial system;
  - Simplify or repeal burdensome regulations;
  - Step up anti-corruption measures;
  - Improve implementation and execution of laws and regulations.
- Recommended actions:
  - Improve judicial efficiency and governance for timely commercial dispute resolution.
  - Establish independent business ombudsman.
  - Strengthen property rights protection and tax administration consistency.
  - Make corporate insolvency framework operational.
- AML/CFT:
  - Expedite draft amendments to AML/CFT law in line with FATF recommendations.
  - NBU to set requirements to check source of wealth/funds of founders and beneficial owners of banks.
- Authorities expect Moneyval assessment scheduled for May 2014.

### Public debt, external risks, and contingent liabilities (selected figures)
- Public debt projections:
  - Public debt projected to exceed 40 percent of GDP in 2013 and approach 60 percent of GDP in the medium term.
  - Gross nominal public debt (percent of GDP): 2011: 25.4; 2012: 36.8; 2013: 37.4; 2014: 41.3; 2015: 44.7; 2016: 48.0; 2017: 53.4; 2018: 57.5; 2019: 60.2.
- External debt baseline:
  - External debt (percent of GDP): 2010: 86.0; 2011: 77.2; 2012: 76.6; 2013: 76.6; 2014: 76.7; 2015: 75.3; 2016: 74.7; 2017: 75.1; 2018: 75.2.
- Stress-test notable outcomes:
  - Combined shocks and a one-time real depreciation of 30 percent raise external debt ratios substantially (example: a 30 percent depreciation with no policy change would raise debt-to-GDP to 108.2 percent at 2018).

### Capacity to repay the Fund
- Ukraine’s capacity to repay the Fund remains adequate, but risks are emerging.
- On the obligation basis, outstanding Fund credit to Ukraine would decline below 200 percent of quota by February 2014 and below 100 percent of quota by September 2014.
- Risks: declining reserves and difficulties obtaining external financing pose risks for large repurchases in 2014 (SDR 2.4 billion) and 2015 (SDR 1 billion).
- Projected payments to Fund (SDR Million):
  - Forthcoming Principal by year: 2013 609.38; 2014 2,390.63; 2015 968.75.
  - Charges/Interest by year: 2013 14.68; 2014 26.47; 2015 7.90; 2016 1.37; 2017 1.16.

### IMF Executive Board assessment and staff statement (December 2013 highlights)
- Board assessment:
  - Current macroeconomic policy mix generated large external and fiscal imbalances and contributed to deepening the recession.
  - Directors recommended comprehensive package: curtail fiscal and current account deficits; phase out energy subsidies; strengthen banking sector; improve competitiveness.
  - Advise allowing greater exchange rate flexibility and accelerating transition to inflation targeting.
- Staff statement (December 16, 2013):
  - Gross output in agriculture expanded by 43 percent y-o-y in October; industrial production decline slowed to -4.9 percent y-o-y.
  - Naftogaz continued to accumulate liabilities to Gazprom (about US$2 billion as of end-November).
  - Decision not to sign Association Agreement with EU led to mass protests and political crisis; authorities seek external financing from Russia and China; 2014 budget adoption uncertain.
- Authorities’ views:
  - Agree corrections are needed but prefer gradual approach within comprehensive adjustment, preferably with Fund financial support.
  - NBU favors gradual exchange rate flexibility increase; expressed concerns about market disruptions and emphasized FX controls.
  - Authorities view a current account deficit of about 5–6 percent of GDP as acceptable; favor gradual tariff increases and staged reforms.

### Monetary policy framework reforms and role of devaluation expectations
- Monetary framework reforms proposed:
  - Increase role of NBU policy rate via operational instruments linked to policy rate.
  - Create automatic standing facilities for borrowing and lending to NBU to form an interest-rate corridor.
  - Introduce a reserve averaging period and give banks more liquidity management flexibility.
- Impact of devaluation expectations (Annex IV):
  - Deposit-rate spread regression: every additional 1 percent of expected devaluation adds about 0.26–0.30 percent to the interest-rate spread (preferred specifications).
  - VAR pass-through: a 1 percentage point increase in implied devaluation increases deposit spreads eventually by about 0.29 percentage points (peak about 0.35 in seven months).
  - Policy implication: reducing devaluation expectations is critical to lower hryvnia deposit rates and thus credit rates.

### Structural fiscal consolidation options (Annexes VII and related)
- Expenditure diagnostics:
  - Government expenditures close to 50 percent of GDP; revenues close to 45 percent of GDP.
  - Current expenditures about 45 percent of GDP; capital expenditures about 3 percent of GDP in 2013 and averaging 2 percent over the last decade.
  - Social benefits 22 percent of GDP; pension expenditures ~17 percent of GDP in 2012; total pension expenditure in 2013 budget 17.8 percent of GDP.
- Pension recommendations:
  - Reduce accrual rate back to 1 percent (from 1.35 percent).
  - Repeal indexation of pensions by 20 percent of average wage growth and keep only CPI indexation.
  - Delink minimum pension benefits from minimum subsistence and introduce means testing.
  - Reduce privileged/special pensions via longer contribution periods, raise retirement age, converge accrual and indexation to general system.
- Public wage bill recommendations:
  - Contain public sector wage growth below CPI for a couple of years; aim to reduce wage bill to 10 percent of GDP in medium term.
  - Functional analysis, public employment census, and performance-based budgeting to improve efficiency.
- Fiscal magnitude highlights:
  - Target medium-term savings from 2011 pension reform: 1.8 percent of GDP annually; initial fiscal gains ~0.5 percent of GDP annually in first three years.
  - VAT refund automation: 50 percent of VAT receipts refunded via automated system.

### Energy subsidy reform (Annex VIII) — core prescriptions and social protection
- Energy inefficiency and subsidy scale:
  - Ukraine energy intensity twice Russia’s and ten times OECD; post-tax energy subsidies 7.6 percent of GDP by 2012 (only 1.3 percent on-budget).
  - Utilities receive gas at 28 percent of full import pass-through price; average household pays about 19 percent.
- Reform pillars:
  1. Adjust energy tariffs to cost-recovery and eliminate Naftogaz losses while protecting the most vulnerable.
  2. Accelerate metering and energy saving.
  3. Diversify gas imports away from Russia.
  4. Increase domestic gas exploration and production.
- Tariff adjustment recommendation:
  - Tariffs for households and utilities should increase immediately by at least 40 percent.
  - Schedule to raise tariffs to cost recovery over next three years through semiannual increases of 20 percent until mid-2016.
- Social protection:
  - Scale up targeted social assistance to protect bottom two quintiles; refocus on income-based targeting and consolidate into a single cash-transfer system such as GMI.
  - World Bank believes GMI and housing utility subsidy programs can be scaled up within six months.
- Short-term options:
  - Scale up GMI, restructure housing utilities benefits to cost-sharing, one-off cash transfers linked to tariff increases, lifeline tariff contingent on meters and payment performance.
- Public communication and institutional measures:
  - Emphasize transparency, protect vulnerable groups (poorest 40 percent), and strengthen regulators’ independence and automatic price adjustment mechanisms.

### Key vulnerabilities and final implications
- Large gross external financing needs and falling reserves expose Ukraine to rollover and exchange rate risks.
- Current account deficits persistently large; under unchanged policies reserves projected to be further depleted in 2014.
- Public debt and contingent liabilities (guarantees, promissory notes, Naftogaz obligations) present substantial fiscal risks.
- Policy package required: exchange rate flexibility combined with tight fiscal policy, banking sector strengthening, energy tariff reform, and structural reforms to restore external sustainability and revive growth.

*International Monetary Fund staff report content: "_cr14145 - 1. Stand-By Arrangements in 2008–12"_*

### 1. Stand-By Arrangements in 2008–12 ____________________________________________________________ 7

### 1. Stand-By Arrangements in 2008–12

### Context
- Incomplete transition to a market economy weighs on growth: extensive state presence, large state budget, distorting price regulation, and pervasive governance deficiencies.
- Recovery from the global crisis in 2008–09 lagged peers (Figure 1); progress with structural reforms has been slow (Figure 7).
- Policy mix and vulnerabilities:
  - Long reliance on an effectively pegged exchange rate as a nominal anchor, accompanied by loose fiscal policy and sizable quasi-fiscal losses.
  - The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) holds over 60 percent of domestic government debt.
  - Resulting imbalances: overvalued exchange rate, large twin deficits, rising indebtedness, recurrent external financing difficulties, and low international reserves.
- Political constraints: ruling coalition led by the Party of Regions remained in power after the parliamentary elections in October 2012; presidential elections scheduled for March 2015. Political polarization and vested interests (notably in the energy sector) limit reform implementation.

### Recent Developments (selected indicators and events)
- Output and labor market:
  - GDP contracted by 1.3 percent y-o-y in January–September 2013.
  - Unemployment was 7.5 percent in mid-2013.
  - The economy in recession since mid-2012; exit from recession expected in 2013:Q4 driven by agriculture.
- Prices and external balances:
  - Consumer prices stayed flat in 2013 (Figure 3).
  - The 12-month rolling current account deficit was 8 percent of GDP by end-September 2013.
  - Natural gas imports fell by 22 percent in January–September 2013.
- Monetary and banking developments:
  - Tight monetary policy and heavy NBU FX interventions in late 2012 squeezed bank liquidity, prompting higher deposit and lending rates and tightening credit conditions.
  - Real hryvnia interest rates remained in double digits; hryvnia deposits rose by 30 percent in the year to September 2013.
  - Credit to the economy expanded by 7 percent y-o-y.
  - Banks mainly used deposit inflows to buy government securities and repay loans to the NBU.
  - To relax monetary conditions while safeguarding reserves, the NBU lowered its main policy rate from 7.5 percent to 6.5 percent over the summer but raised reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits by several percentage points.
- Market access and reserves:
  - Two Eurobond issues in early 2013 raised US$2.25 billion at yields of about 7½ percent; since late May yields hovered in the 8½–15 percent range.
  - Sovereign downgrades: Moody’s to Caa1; S&P and Fitch to B-.
  - By end-October, reserves fell to about 2.5 months of imports and 36 percent of debt service in 2014.
- Fiscal and quasi-fiscal developments:
  - Fiscal loosening in 2012: general government deficit widened to 4½ percent of GDP in 2012; structural expansion of 1½ percent of GDP.
  - Combined structural deficit of the government and Naftogaz rose to 6¾ percent.
  - State guarantees in 2012 exceeded 5 percent of GDP; could reach up to 3.5 percent of GDP in 2013 according to the budget law, although only about 0.7 percent of GDP allocated by end-October.
  - Parliament approved promissory notes (government IOUs) for about 1¼ percent of GDP for repayment of overdue VAT refunds and expenditure arrears; the notes would be accepted as payments to Naftogaz.
- Naftogaz and contingent liabilities:
  - Despite lower gas imports, Naftogaz’s losses in 2013:H1 more than doubled.
  - Gazprom announced an US$7 billion claim on Naftogaz for 2012 (no legal steps taken to collect as of report issuance).
- External relations uncertainty:
  - Tensions over trade and potential Customs Union exclusion amid EU association/free trade agreement deliberations.
  - On November 21, the authorities suspended preparations for signing the agreement with the EU, citing need to sort out relations with Russia and the Customs Union.

### Stand-By Arrangements in 2008–12 (Box 1 summary)
- November 2008 SBA:
  - Two-year, SDR 11 billion SBA with Ukraine (802 percent of quota).
  - Objectives: macroeconomic stabilization and adjustment amid the 2008–09 crisis; stabilize banking system; allow exchange rate to find market-driven equilibrium.
  - Two reviews completed; SDR 7 billion disbursed before the arrangement went off track and was cancelled in mid-2010 upon approval of next arrangement.
- July 2010 SBA:
  - 29-month, SDR 10 billion SBA (729 percent of quota).
  - Objectives: set public finances on sustainable path, eliminate energy sector quasi-fiscal losses, transition to flexible exchange rate, strengthen financial sector.
  - Achievements: pension reform in 2011, initial energy tariff adjustments, restored international market access.
  - Only one review completed; two purchases totaling SDR 2.25 billion made before program went off track in 2011 and expired in December 2012.

### External Stability Assessment
- Competitiveness and exchange rate:
  - Competitiveness weak; REER overvalued by 14–16 percent (Annex I).
  - High real wage growth amid slow productivity growth eroded gains from 2009 devaluation; ULC-based REER exceeded high 2008 levels.
  - Staff estimate: significant devaluation need would persist even if fiscal gaps were closed while maintaining current exchange rate.
- External financing risks:
  - External debt above 75 percent of GDP.
  - Gross external financing requirement of 37 percent of GDP in 2014 (Table 4).
  - NBU international reserves low against several common metrics (Annex I).

### Outlook and Risks
- Baseline outlook (under currently planned policies):
  - GDP to decline by ¼ percent in 2013; modest growth of about 1 percent expected in 2014.
  - Inflation to modestly rise to about 2 percent in 2014.
  - Current account deficit to remain elevated above 8 percent of GDP in 2013–14.
- Medium-term risks and implications:
  - Current policy mix (overvalued exchange rate, large fiscal/quasi-fiscal deficits) would keep current account deficit above 7 percent of GDP over the medium term and deplete NBU reserves (Table 3).
  - Tight monetary policy supporting the exchange rate would constrain private investment; public investment displaced by high wage and pension spending.
  - High labor costs relative to productivity would limit employment growth and depress actual and potential growth.
- Major downside risks that could trigger a market-forced adjustment:
  - Decline in international reserves could trigger a run for foreign exchange, leading to a disruptive exchange rate shock, compressed demand, higher inflation, and banking sector stress.
  - Exacerbating factors: (i) sustained loss of market access due to reappraisal of emerging market risk and deteriorating fundamentals; (ii) a more restrictive trade regime with Russia causing sizable export losses; (iii) loss of confidence as government policy focus alternates between integration with the EU and Russia.
- Upside potential:
  - Signing (even if postponed) of an association agreement with the EU could help exports and spur FDI over time, especially if competitiveness and the business climate are improved.

### Report on Discussions — Policy Mix and Medium-Term Outlook
- Staff recommendation for a decisive and comprehensive policy turnaround to maintain stability and revive growth:
  - Allow the exchange rate to adjust, eliminating overvaluation, and increase its flexibility.
  - Strengthen the financial system’s resilience to shocks, including developing comprehensive contingency plans to cover potential capital and liquidity shortfalls under various scenarios.
  - Launch fiscal consolidation to support external adjustment and reduce financing risks.
  - Raise energy tariffs as part of a comprehensive plan to reduce quasi-fiscal losses.
  - Persevere with deep structural reforms to improve the business climate and raise growth.
- Historical note: Several recommendations were discussed during the 2012 Article IV consultation (Box 2).

*International Monetary Fund staff report content: "_cr14145 - 1. Stand-By Arrangements in 2008–12"_*

### 18.      The adjustment scenario outlined by staff would substantially reduce Ukraine’s

### _cr14145 - 18.      The adjustment scenario outlined by staff would substantially reduce Ukraine’s

### Adjustment scenario: main effects and rationale
- The exchange rate adjustment would significantly improve the external position of Ukraine and help rebuild international reserves.
- Energy tariff increases and fiscal restraint would help raise public savings and make space for public investment in infrastructure.
- Reduced vulnerabilities, regained access to international capital markets, structural reforms, and higher international competitiveness would promote higher private savings and investment, including FDI.
- Overall path: after an initial dip caused by tightening policies to support external adjustment and contain inflation (¶21), growth should recover, led by exports and investment.

### Projections: Ukraine — Baseline and Adjustment Scenarios, 2013–18 (values by year)
- Real GDP growth (percent)
  - Baseline: 2013-0.3 2014-1.0 2015-1.5 2016-1.5 2017-1.5 2018-1.5
  - Adjustment: 2013-0.3 2014-0.5 2015-3.5 2016-4.0 2017-4.5 2018-4.5
- CPI inflation (end of period)
  - Baseline: 2013-0.2 2014-2.3 2015-3.8 2016-4.0 2017-4.0 2018-4.0
  - Adjustment: 2013-0.2 2014-12.9 2015-5.9 2016-5.2 2017-5.0 2018-5.0
- Overall fiscal balance (including Naftogaz, percent of GDP)
  - Baseline: 2013-7.7 2014-6.6 2015-6.3 2016-8.0 2017-7.7 2018-7.6
  - Adjustment: 2013-7.7 2014-4.0 2015-3.2 2016-2.8 2017-2.2 2018-2.0
- Public and publicly guaranteed debt (end of period)
  - Baseline: 2013-41.3 2014-44.7 2015-48.0 2016-53.4 2017-57.5 2018-60.2
  - Adjustment: 2013-41.3 2014-41.5 2015-40.7 2016-39.7 2017-37.8 2018-34.6
- Current account balance (percent of GDP)
  - Baseline: 2013-8.3 2014-8.2 2015-7.7 2016-7.4 2017-7.1 2018-7.1
  - Adjustment: 2013-8.3 2014-5.0 2015-4.1 2016-3.8 2017-3.8 2018-3.6
- External debt (end of period)
  - Baseline: 2013-76.7 2014-75.3 2015-74.7 2016-75.1 2017-75.2 2018-75.2
  - Adjustment: 2013-76.7 2014-84.6 2015-80.8 2016-79.9 2017-78.6 2018-77.8
- Gross external financing requirements (USD billion)
  - Baseline: 2013-72.5 2014-67.6 2015-71.2 2016-78.0 2017-85.1 2018-88.9
  - Adjustment: 2013-72.5 2014-61.8 2015-64.5 2016-71.0 2017-78.9 2018-84.6
- Gross international reserves (percent of IMF composite measure)
  - Baseline: 2013-38.6 2014-21.3 2015-16.5 2016-14.1 2017-11.8 2018-10.2
  - Adjustment: 2013-38.6 2014-50.5 2015-62.2 2016-81.2 2017-105.9 2018-137.5

*Sources: Ukrainian authorities; and staff estimates.*

### Box 2 (2012 Article IV): Key recommendations and implementation progress
- Fiscal recommendations (aim: meet 1.8 percent of GDP deficit in 2012)
  - Recommended: (i) raise tax rates and eliminate exemptions; (ii) remove special tax treatment of offshore tax havens; (iii) cut current spending; (iv) apply strict limits on state guarantees.
  - Progress: Some progress in closing transfer pricing loopholes, amending tax treaty with Cyprus, and automating VAT refunds; general government deficit reached 4.5 percent of GDP in 2012; government guarantees exceeded 5 percent of GDP.
- Energy sector recommendations
  - Recommended: Raise household gas and heating tariffs (mitigated by better-targeted social assistance) and articulate broader energy sector reform strategy.
  - Progress: Tariffs remained essentially unchanged; energy reforms very slow.
- Monetary/exchange rate recommendations
  - Recommended: Increase exchange rate flexibility; gradually unwind crisis-era policies including Resolution 109.
  - Progress: NBU continued defending effective exchange rate peg; official exchange rate UAH/US$ remained fixed; unwinding Resolution 109 limited to pilot project allowing several banks to include government FX-linked bonds in net open FX position calculation.
- Financial sector recommendations
  - Recommended: Review contingency plans, strengthen monitoring, create dedicated financial stability unit, close supervision to ensure prudential compliance.
  - Progress: Financial stability indicators point to gradual strengthening; financial stability unit in the NBU created and operational with IMF technical assistance.
- Structural reform recommendations
  - Recommended: Promote growth, improve business climate, attract investment through global integration, deregulation, stronger governance, privatization.
  - Progress: Ukraine advanced in World Bank’s Doing Business ranking; business climate still challenging with declining domestic investments and FDI; governance issues persist, particularly in public procurement and opaque energy sector.

### Authorities’ views (summary)
- Authorities agreed corrections are needed and are elaborating policy adjustments, but differed with staff on degree and speed of changes in monetary, fiscal, and energy policies.
- Preferred gradual approach within a comprehensive macroeconomic adjustment program, preferably with Fund financial support; viewed outlook more positively citing good grain harvest effects on output and exports.
- NBU favored gradual exchange rate flexibility increase but expressed concerns about market disruptions and emphasized foreign exchange controls to maintain supply; viewed a current account deficit of about 5–6 percent of GDP as acceptable.
- NBU agreed with benefits of interest-rate-based monetary policy and gradual transition to inflation targeting.

### Moving towards a sustainable exchange rate regime and monetary framework
- Staff view:
  - Essential to allow exchange rate to move to level that corrects estimated real overvaluation (accounting for adjustment’s effect on inflation) and enable NBU to replenish international reserves through market purchases.
  - Introduce a wide band around new parity for free float; widen band over time and eventually introduce inflation targeting (¶23).
- Policy complement:
  - Exchange rate adjustment should be accompanied by tight policies to contain inflation: strict limits on NBU’s NDA, adequate early liquidity provision to banks, positive policy interest rates in real terms, and tight fiscal policy (¶21).
- Controls:
  - Staff advised against extensive use of administrative foreign exchange controls; recommended not intensifying existing controls and beginning gradual dismantling once adjustment package in place; advised NBU to eliminate two remaining multiple currency practices described in Informational Annex.
- Transition to inflation targeting:
  - NBU has narrowed interest rate corridor, introduced automatic overnight deposit facility, and built macroeconomic modeling and inflation forecasting capacities.
  - Staff assesses IT framework could become operational within 12–18 months once high-level commitment is made; recommended enhancing tools for managing short-term interest rates and allowing banks additional liquidity flexibility (Annex V).

### Maintaining financial stability: banking sector assessment and staff recommendations
- Current condition and vulnerabilities
  - Banking system appears stable but vulnerabilities persist.
  - High average capital adequacy ratio of 18 percent; elevated NPL ratio of 14 percent (Table 6).
  - Specific provisions cover 81 percent of impaired loans and 45 percent of doubtful loans.
  - Including substandard loans would raise NPL ratio to over 25 percent.
  - NBU’s Resolution 109 forces a large negative foreign exchange position of about 20 percent of capital by end-September 2013, keeping banks vulnerable to large exchange rate moves.
  - Banks face uncertainty about macro outlook and NBU liquidity access, maintain high deposit rates and high lending rates which limit credit demand and capital accumulation.
- Staff proposals regarding Resolution 109 and FX exposure
  - Unwind Resolution 109 over three years by allowing provisions against foreign currency loans back into foreign currency position calculation.
  - Allow all banks to include government exchange rate-indexed securities in foreign currency assets calculation; limited issuance of such securities to mitigate devaluation impact on banks at minor government cost.
  - Remove tax, administrative, and legal obstacles to NPL resolution and corporate debt restructuring (e.g., VAT on selling NPLs; lack of out-of-court insolvency procedures).
- Contingency planning and audits
  - Develop contingency and recovery plans; require systemically important banks to prepare recovery plans.
  - NBU, Deposit Guarantee Fund, and Ministry of Finance to develop specific resolution plans for vulnerable banks.
  - Launch independent diagnostic audits of vulnerable systemic banks focusing on asset quality, loan classification, provisioning, adequacy of loan collateral, and related party lending.
- Supervision and resolution
  - Strengthen enforcement of consolidated supervision, improve early warning systems, accelerate resolution of three intervened banks in state possession.
- Authorities’ responses
  - NBU agreed to repeal Resolution 109 and phase out restrictions over three years, preferring to start within a comprehensive adjustment program.
  - NBU envisaged expanding pilot allowing banks to count government exchange rate-indexed securities and include provisions in foreign currencies up to the amount of indexed bonds in FX position calculation; staff cautioned this is not international best practice.
  - NBU set up a working group to identify impediments to NPL resolution and recommend removals.
  - NBU agreed independent audits would be useful and has developed terms of reference with Fund and World Bank staff.

### Fiscal outlook and need for consolidation
- Under current policies, combined general government-Naftogaz deficit projected to rise sharply in 2013 and remain elevated in 2014.
- Staff projects the budget deficit at 5¾ percent of GDP in 2013, including 1¼ percent of GDP in recognized tax refund and expenditure arrears to be covered by promissory notes (Table 2).
- The combined general government-Naftogaz deficit will expand to 7¾ percent of GDP in 2013.
- Large tax cuts envisaged in the tax code would have raised the combined deficit to 8½ percent of GDP in 2014, had authorities not decided to reconsider them.

*Sources: Ukrainian authorities; and staff estimates.*

### 33.      While the current level of public debt is still moderate, it is projected to rise further

### _cr14145 - 33.      While the current level of public debt is still moderate, it is projected to rise further

### Public debt, external risks, and contingent liabilities
- Public debt is projected to exceed 40 percent of GDP in 2013 and approach 60 percent of GDP in the medium term (Annex III).
- Substantial gross external financing requirements expose Ukraine to significant rollover and exchange rate risks.
- Large contingent liabilities arise from generous use of government guarantees, promissory notes, and Naftogaz’s actual and potential obligations and present substantial risks.

### Fiscal consolidation: targets and rationale
- Staff recommended a general government deficit target of 2¾ percent of GDP in 2014, falling to 1¾ percent of GDP in the medium term.
- Including the effects of the energy sector reform, the combined budget-Naftogaz structural deficit would fall by 2¾ percent of GDP in 2014 and 4 percent by 2018.
- Frontloading fiscal adjustment is necessary to:
  - support the external adjustment;
  - contain inflation;
  - reduce the budget’s acute financing needs and vulnerability.
- In the medium term, a moderate deficit would:
  - stop crowding out bank lending to the economy;
  - reduce pressures on the NBU balance sheet;
  - help stabilize public debt below the generally accepted for emerging markets benchmark of 40 percent of GDP, opening fiscal space for countercyclical policies.

### Fiscal balances (selected figures from baseline and adjustment scenarios)
- General government balance (baseline): 2011 -2.8; 2012 -4.5; 2013 -5.7; 2014 -4.6; 2015 -4.7; 2016 -6.5; 2017 -6.3; 2018 -6.3 (percent of GDP).
- Overall balance (including Naftogaz's deficit) (baseline): 2011 -4.3; 2012 -5.5; 2013 -7.7; 2014 -6.6; 2015 -6.3; 2016 -8.0; 2017 -7.7; 2018 -7.6 (percent of GDP).
- Structural general government balance (baseline): 2011 -3.0; 2012 -4.5; 2013 -4.1; 2014 -4.1; 2015 -4.5; 2016 -6.4; 2017 -6.3; 2018 -6.3 (percent of GDP).
- General government balance (adjustment scenario): 2011 -2.8; 2012 -4.5; 2013 -5.7; 2014 -2.7; 2015 -2.3; 2016 -2.2; 2017 -2.0; 2018 -1.7 (percent of GDP).
- Overall balance (including Naftogaz's deficit) (adjustment scenario): 2011 -4.3; 2012 -5.5; 2013 -7.7; 2014 -4.0; 2015 -3.2; 2016 -2.8; 2017 -2.2; 2018 -2.0 (percent of GDP).
- Structural general government balance (adjustment scenario): 2011 -3.0; 2012 -4.5; 2013 -4.1; 2014 -1.9; 2015 -1.9; 2016 -2.0; 2017 -2.0; 2018 -1.7 (percent of GDP).
- Structural general government and Naftogaz balance (adjustment scenario): 2011 -4.6; 2012 -6.8; 2013 -6.0; 2014 -3.2; 2015 -2.9; 2016 -2.6; 2017 -2.2; 2018 -2.0 (percent of GDP).
- Note: The general government includes the central and local governments and the social funds. In 2013, the general government deficit includes recognized arrears (1.3 percent of GDP). (Sources: Ukrainian Authorities; and IMF staff estimates.)

### Composition of the consolidation: expenditure focus and targets
- Staff advised that the brunt of consolidation should fall on reducing current expenditure.
- 2014 priority measures: rationalize public procurement; reduce subsidies; restrain public sector wages and hiring; index pensions only with inflation (removing the recently introduced wage-linked indexation component).
- Medium-term staff recommendation: current expenditure cuts of some 6¾ percent of GDP through wage and employment restraint, pension reforms focusing on privileged pensions, and deeper subsidy cuts enabled by energy sector reform.
- Expected outcomes:
  - Return current expenditure just below its 2011 level.
  - Allow doubling capital outlays to 3 percent of GDP—the minimum necessary to maintain public infrastructure.

### Tax policy guidance and cautions
- The tax code envisages cuts in the VAT rate from 20 to 17 percent and corporate income tax (CIT) rate from 19 to 16 percent.
- Staff strongly cautioned against unaffordable and untimely tax cuts and distortionary substitutions.
- Recommended sequencing:
  - Postpone tax cuts until needed current expenditure adjustment is well under way and the budget deficit is reduced to a sustainable level.
  - Support postponing the cut in the CIT rate to 2016.
  - Advise abandoning the plan to cut the VAT rate given budget constraints.
  - Advise against re-introduction of a tax on non-cash foreign exchange purchases (abolished in 2011).
  - Recommend phasing out existing VAT exemptions, especially in agriculture.
  - Support plans for a five-year schedule for raising excise taxes, starting in 2014.
- Other revenue measures:
  - Recent revision of Ukraine’s tax treaty with Cyprus and the introduction of a law on transfer pricing have some revenue-raising potential, although estimated gains seem optimistic.

### On promissory notes and arrears settlement
- Staff cautioned against using promissory notes to settle arrears.
- Recommended settling arrears through conventional methods: cash payments and netting due refunds against VAT liabilities.
- Issuing promissory notes to clear arrears would undermine future budget and Naftogaz revenue and impose deep haircuts on legitimate business receivables.

### Institutional reforms and limiting fiscal risks
- Staff recommended reforms to modernize fiscal institutional framework, including:
  - (i) a fiscal rule to anchor the budget deficit consistent with medium-term macroeconomic stability;
  - (ii) a medium-term budget framework with binding expenditure ceilings;
  - (iii) a rigorous and transparent process for selecting public investment projects—both on-budget and state-guaranteed—with the highest economic rate of return.
- Recommendation to limit state guarantees to 1 percent of GDP per year to curb contingent liabilities and upward pressure on government borrowing costs.
- Authorities noted a special committee to oversee investment projects seeking state guarantees has strengthened project selection, but noted practical difficulties adopting a medium-term budget framework given macroeconomic uncertainty.

### Energy sector: scale of problem and reform prescriptions
- Overall energy subsidies in Ukraine, on- and off-budget, are estimated at 7½ percent of GDP in 2012.
- Very low tariffs for residential gas and district heating (20–30 percent of economic costs) drive high consumption, quasi-fiscal losses by Naftogaz, balance of payments weakness, and governance problems.
- Staff position:
  - An ambitious, comprehensive energy sector reform aimed at eliminating Naftogaz’s operational losses is indispensable.
  - Reform objective: gradually eliminate Naftogaz’s operational losses over the medium term, limiting its deficit to the interest paid on its debt.
  - Support authorities’ intention to cut Naftogaz’s deficit to 1¼ percent of GDP in 2014 and urged adoption of credible policies to achieve this.
- Tariff strategy:
  - Gradual, but upfront, meaningful, and broad-based tariff increases—start with meaningful gas and heating tariff increases for a broad household customer base in 2014.
  - Such adjustments would reduce Naftogaz’s deficit, enable cuts of budget subsidies already in 2014, strengthen incentives to save energy, and improve governance by reducing arbitrage opportunities.
  - To protect the poor: increase targeted social assistance to the poorest 40 percent of households by expanding existing means-tested programs (Annex VIII).
- Complementary measures:
  - Accelerate gas and heat metering and energy-saving efforts.
  - Diversify gas imports toward cheaper sources.
  - Create an enabling pricing and business climate to attract investment into domestic gas production.
- Authorities agreed on the need for reforms and announced intention to cut Naftogaz’s deficit to 1¼ percent of GDP in 2014, but were reluctant to raise current gas and heating tariffs. Authorities are working on converting in-kind energy benefits into cash via voucher-like electronic cards and on raising domestic gas production, with notable gains expected only in the medium term.

### Structural reforms, business climate, and AML/CFT
- Structural reform priorities to unlock growth:
  - Strengthen the judicial system;
  - Simplify or repeal burdensome government regulations;
  - Step up anti-corruption measures;
  - Improve implementation and execution of laws and regulations.
- Recommended actions to boost productivity and private investment:
  - Ensure timely and fair resolution of commercial disputes by improving judicial efficiency and governance;
  - Establish an independent business ombudsman to address unfair business practices;
  - Strengthen capacity to protect property rights;
  - Impose clear and consistent rules in tax administration and address VAT refund delays through conventional measures;
  - Make the recently reformed corporate insolvency framework operational.
- AML/CFT recommendations:
  - Expedite draft amendments to the AML/CFT law in line with FATF recommendations and ensure prompt adoption and implementation.
  - NBU should set up specific requirements to check the source of wealth/funds of founders and owners of qualifying holdings of banks, including beneficial owners.
- Authorities: agree on need to improve business climate and are incorporating FATF requirements; expect Moneyval assessment scheduled for May 2014.

### Capacity to repay the Fund
- Ukraine’s capacity to repay the Fund remains adequate, but risks are emerging.
- On the obligation basis, outstanding Fund credit to Ukraine would decline below 200 percent of quota by February 2014 and below 100 percent of quota by September 2014 (Table 9).
- Risks: declining reserves and difficulties obtaining external financing pose risks for large repurchases in 2014 (SDR 2.4 billion) and 2015 (SDR 1 billion).
- Authorities noted prior repurchases of SDR 2.2 billion in 2012 and SDR 3.7 billion in 2013 and reaffirmed commitment to repay outstanding Fund credit, expecting reserves, prospective financing opportunities, and other buffers to ensure scheduled repurchases in 2014–15.

*Source: Ukrainian Authorities; and IMF staff estimates.*

### 53.      The Ukrainian authorities maintained macroeconomic stability in 2012–13 amid

### 53.      The Ukrainian authorities maintained macroeconomic stability in 2012–13 amid

### Macroeconomic performance and stabilization measures (2012–13)
- Authorities steered the economy through market tensions at the end of 2012; households’ precautionary demand for foreign exchange has considerably eased since then.
- Confidence in the banking system has improved; high capital adequacy ratios provide a cushion against risks.
- Large negative foreign exchange positions have been reduced, although further progress is needed.
- Naftogaz managed to reduce expensive gas imports, which kept in check the external current account deficit despite the decline in exports.
- The authorities began to close some tax loopholes with the passage of the law on transfer pricing and amendments in the tax treaty with Cyprus.

### Economic costs and evolving risks
- Stability was maintained at a high economic price: policies to maintain the effective exchange rate peg and raise public wages and pensions in 2012 led to large twin deficits and depletion of international reserves.
- As access to external debt markets became more difficult in 2013, the government increasingly resorted to the NBU and state-controlled banks for financing the ballooning budget deficit.
- To calm devaluation expectations and sterilize excess bank liquidity, the NBU maintained tight monetary policy stance and intensified foreign exchange controls.
- Consequences of that stance included:
  - Banks offering very high deposit rates, which moderated households’ demand for foreign exchange but raised the cost of credit during the recession.
  - A policy mix that contributed to deepening the recession in 2012–13.
- Under unchanged policies, the NBU’s international reserves and other buffers will be further depleted during 2014, making the country particularly vulnerable to disruptive shocks and raising the risk to repayments to the Fund.
- Rising risk perception reflected in sovereign rating downgrades by all major rating agencies makes external market financing much more difficult for the sovereign and corporates; domestic financing sources are limited.
- Tight monetary policy to support the exchange rate, low public investment, and tough business climate keep growth depressed.

### Policy adjustments recommended to resolve imbalances and revive growth
- Overall aims:
  - Curtail the fiscal and external current account deficits.
  - Phase out unaffordable and distortive energy subsidies.
  - Strengthen the banking sector.
  - Improve external competitiveness of the economy.
- Exchange rate and monetary policy:
  - Allow the exchange rate to adjust and eliminate overvaluation.
  - Shift to a new monetary policy framework to correct external imbalances and avoid future policy traps.
  - A more flexible exchange rate would boost exports and economic growth and allow more room for independent monetary policy.
  - In the medium term, inflation targeting is the appropriate monetary framework for Ukraine; preparations for its introduction should be accelerated.
- Banking sector resilience:
  - Strengthen the banking system to increase resilience to shocks and widen policy options.
  - Independent diagnostic audits proposed by IMF and World Bank staff should help clear doubts about asset quality and reporting standards in a number of systemic banks.
  - Allow all banks to reduce their negative foreign exposure and remove impediments to NPL resolution to strengthen balance sheets.
  - Develop contingency plans to keep systemic banks sufficiently capitalized and the whole system liquid to mitigate adverse shocks.
- Fiscal consolidation and public investment:
  - A sizeable expenditure-reducing fiscal consolidation is needed to curtail the budget deficit and make room for public investment.
  - Reduce high budget expenditure by rationalizing public procurement, restraining public sector wages and employment, and limiting pension indexation to inflation.
  - Over the medium term, these policies will return current expenditure broadly to its 2011 level and allow proper investment in public infrastructure.
  - To anchor fiscal adjustment, the authorities could adopt a rule-based approach to setting budget deficit targets and spending limits over the medium term.
- Energy sector reform:
  - Comprehensive reform centered on upfront, meaningful, and broad-based tariff increases is indispensable.
  - Upfront gas and heating tariff increases would:
    - Strengthen incentives to save energy.
    - Reduce budget transfers to Naftogaz and enable cuts of budget subsidies.
    - Incentivize domestic gas production and improve governance by reducing arbitrage opportunities created by existing tariff differentials.
  - To offset effects on the most vulnerable, staff advises increasing targeted social assistance to the poorest 40 percent of households.
  - Energy-saving reforms and import diversification toward cheaper sources should complement, but not substitute for, tariff hikes.
- Business climate and structural reforms:
  - Improving the business climate is imperative for higher growth.
  - Progress has been mixed; Ukraine advanced in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2014 report, but business feedback indicates operational constraints remain.
  - Reforms should be accelerated to relax binding constraints on growth, particularly where Ukraine lags regional peers.

### Medium-term potential and growth model implications
- The existing growth model based on public sector-driven expansion of domestic consumption has reached its limits; current policy mix and difficult business climate deter investment and impair competitiveness.
- Ukraine’s potential strengths:
  - Agriculture has been developing well and has much more room to grow given some of the best arable land in Europe.
  - With the right prices and investment climate, production of natural gas could expand significantly over time.
  - Ukraine’s well-educated labor force can substantially raise total factor productivity.
  - Deeper integration with the EU could help exports and spur FDI, with potential gains magnified once competitiveness and business climate improve.
- Conclusion: Sound policies, resolute macroeconomic adjustment, and decisive structural reforms can substantially raise actual and potential growth over the medium term, boosting living standards and general well-being.

*From: _cr14145 - 53.      The Ukrainian authorities maintained macroeconomic stability in 2012–13 amid*

### 63.      It is proposed that the next Article IV Consultation with Ukraine be held on the

### _cr14145 - 63.      It is proposed that the next Article IV Consultation with Ukraine be held on the

### Macroeconomic performance and real sector (2000–13)
- Real GDP growth: Ukraine experienced a sharp contraction in 2009 (panel data show negative growth) and the economy "slipped into recession in H2 2012" (Figure 2).
- Real GDP (selected years and projections, Table 1):
  - Nominal GDP (billions of Ukrainian hryvnias): 913 (2009), 1,083 (2010), 1,302 (2011), 1,409 (2012), 1,432 (2013), 1,503 (2014 proj), 1,611 (2015 proj), 1,724 (2016 proj), 1,846 (2017 proj), 1,977 (2018 proj).
  - Real GDP (percent change): -14.8 (2009), 4.1 (2010), 5.2 (2011), 0.2 (2012), -0.3 (2013), 1.0 (2014 proj), 1.5 (2015 proj), 1.5 (2016 proj), 1.5 (2017 proj), 1.5 (2018 proj).
- Contributions to growth (Table 1):
  - Domestic demand: -25.8 (2009), 7.7 (2010), 12.6 (2011), 5.5 (2012), -0.6 (2013), 0.9 (2014 proj), 1.7 (2015 proj), 1.7 (2016 proj), 1.9 (2017 proj), 1.9 (2018 proj).
  - Net exports: 11.0 (2009), -3.6 (2010), -7.4 (2011), -5.3 (2012), 0.3 (2013), 0.1 (2014 proj), -0.1 (2015 proj), -0.2 (2016 proj), -0.4 (2017 proj), -0.4 (2018 proj).
- Labor market (Figure 2 / Table 1):
  - ILO unemployment rate (NSA, percent): graphical series shows decline into 2013; Table 1 unemployment rate (ILO definition): 8.8 (2009), 8.1 (2010), 7.9 (2011), 7.5 (2012), 8.0 (2013), 8.0 (2014 proj), 7.8 (2015 proj), 7.8 (2016 proj), 7.6 (2017 proj), 7.5 (2018 proj).
- Sectoral developments (Figure 2):
  - Construction output plummeted; agricultural output remained strong in 2013.
  - Industrial Production Index and main export industries contracted through 2012–13, with later partial steel recovery.

### Inflation, monetary policy, and exchange rate (2009–13)
- CPI inflation (Table 1):
  - Consumer prices (period average): 15.9 (2009), 9.4 (2010), 8.0 (2011), 0.6 (2012), -0.3 (2013), 1.6 (2014 proj), 3.3 (2015 proj), 3.9 (2016 proj), 4.0 (2017 proj), 4.0 (2018 proj).
  - Consumer prices (end of period): 12.3 (2009), 9.1 (2010), 4.6 (2011), -0.2 (2012), 0.2 (2013), 2.3 (2014 proj), 3.8 (2015 proj), 4.0 (2016 proj), 4.0 (2017 proj), 4.0 (2018 proj).
- Core inflation:
  - Core inflation (period average, Table 1, excludes unprocessed food, fuel, administrative services): 19.4 (2009), 8.6 (2010), 7.7 (2011), 3.3 (2012), 0.2 (2013), 1.4 (2014 proj), 3.2 (2015 proj), 3.8 (2016 proj), 4.0 (2017 proj), 4.0 (2018 proj).
- Exchange rate regime and monetary indicators (Figure 3 / Table 5):
  - NBU official exchange rate in Figure 3: 7.993 UAH/USD (period around 2012–13) with market interbank average kept within 2 percent of the official rate (de facto peg).
  - Interbank market rate (weighted average, NBU) series shown around 7.8–8.3 for Jul-12 to Oct-13 (Figure 3).
  - Base money (end of period, Table 1): 4.4 (2009), 15.8 (2010), 6.3 (2011), 6.4 (2012), 14.7 (2013), 12.9 (2014 proj), 12.6 (2015 proj), 12.4 (2016 proj), 12.1 (2017 proj), 11.9 (2018 proj).
  - Broad money (end of period): -5.5 (2009), 22.7 (2010), 14.7 (2011), 12.8 (2012), 16.8 (2013), 14.1 (2014 proj), 13.4 (2015 proj), 13.1 (2016 proj), 12.7 (2017 proj), 12.3 (2018 proj).

### External sector, reserves, and financing (2008–18)
- External position (Figure 4 / Table 3 / Table 4):
  - Current account balance (percent of GDP, Table 1): -1.5 (2009), -2.2 (2010), -6.3 (2011), -8.1 (2012), -8.3 (2013), -8.2 (2014 proj), -7.7 (2015 proj), -7.4 (2016 proj), -7.1 (2017 proj), -7.1 (2018 proj).
  - Gross reserves (end of period, Table 1 / Table 3): 26.5 (2009), 34.6 (2010), 31.8 (2011), 24.5 (2012), 18.5 (2013), 11.2 (2014 proj), 9.2 (2015 proj), 8.3 (2016 proj), 7.4 (2017 proj), 7.1 (2018 proj) (billions of U.S. dollars).
  - Months of next year's imports of goods and services (Table 1 / Table 3): 4.3 (2009), 4.2 (2010), 3.7 (2011), 3.0 (2012), 2.2 (2013), 1.3 (2014 proj), 1.0 (2015 proj), 0.9 (2016 proj), 0.8 (2017 proj), 0.7 (2018 proj).
- Balance of payments dynamics (Figure 4 / Table 3):
  - Financial account: FDI and portfolio inflows have helped offset large FX cash outflows; NBU intervened as needed to stabilize reserves and the exchange rate.
  - External spreads and sovereign risk: EMBIG spreads for Ukraine rose again in 2012–13 (Figure 4), with sovereign risk premium increasing more than the regional trend.
- Gross external financing requirements (Table 4, Billions of U.S. dollars):
  - Total financing requirements: 48.8 (2010), 71.1 (2011), 84.8 (2012), 72.5 (2013), 67.7 (2014 proj), 61.2 (2015 proj), 78.0 (2016 proj), 85.1 (2017 proj), 88.9 (2018 proj).
  - Total financing sources: 52.2 (2010), 67.4 (2011), 79.0 (2012), 69.7 (2013), 63.5 (2014 proj), 70.3 (2015 proj), 76.7 (2016 proj), 83.8 (2017 proj), 88.1 (2018 proj).
  - Increase in gross reserves (negative indicates drawdown): 8.5 (2010), -3.1 (2011), -7.2 (2012), -6.0 (2013), -7.3 (2014 proj), -2.0 (2015 proj), -0.9 (2016 proj), -0.8 (2017 proj), -0.4 (2018 proj).

### Public finances, debt, and projections (2010–18)
- General government balance and public debt (Table 1 / Table 2):
  - General government balance (percent of GDP): -6.3 (2010), -5.8 (2011), -2.8 (2012), -4.5 (2013), -5.7 (2014 proj), -4.6 (2015 proj), -4.7 (2016 proj), -6.5 (2017 proj), -6.3 (2018 proj), -6.3 (2019 proj in series if applicable).
  - Overall balance (including Naftogaz operational deficit) (percent of GDP): -8.7 (2010), -7.4 (2011), -4.3 (2012), -5.5 (2013), -7.7 (2014 proj), -6.6 (2015 proj), -6.3 (2016 proj), -8.0 (2017 proj), -7.7 (2018 proj), -7.6 (2019 proj if shown).
  - Public debt (end of period, percent of GDP): 35.4 (2010), 40.5 (2011), 36.8 (2012), 37.4 (2013), 41.3 (2014 proj), 44.7 (2015 proj), 48.0 (2016 proj), 53.4 (2017 proj), 57.5 (2018 proj), 60.2 (2019 proj if shown).
- General government finances (billions of UAH, Table 2 / Table 8):
  - Revenue (billions of UAH): 468.3 (2013), 558.2 (2014 proj), 627.3 (2015 proj), 666.2 (2016 proj), 651.2 (2017 proj), 680.8 (2018 proj), 722.1 (2019 proj), 738.7 (2020 proj), 789.8 (2021 proj), 844.8 (2022 proj) — as presented in Table 2 header for 2013–18 projections.
  - Expenditure (billions of UAH): 530.6 (2013), 594.1 (2014 proj), 690.4 (2015 proj), 719.6 (2016 proj), 733.4 (2017 proj), 750.0 (2018 proj), 798.4 (2019 proj), 851.4 (2020 proj), 906.8 (2021 proj), 969.0 (2022 proj) — as in Table 2.
  - Overall balance (billions of UAH): -62.3 (2013), -35.9 (2014 proj), -63.0 (2015 proj), -53.4 (2016 proj), -82.1 (2017 proj), -69.2 (2018 proj), -76.5 (2019 proj), -112.8 (2020 proj), -117.0 (2021 proj), -124.0 (2022 proj).
- Financing composition (Table 2, billions of UAH and percent of GDP):
  - General government financing (billions of UAH): 62.3 (2013), 35.9 (2014 proj), 63.0 (2015 proj), ... (series continues in table).
  - IMF disbursements listed: 16.1 (2010 disbursement noted in Table 2) and subsequently "0.0" entries under IMF (includes SDR allocations) for later years in the disbursement rows shown.

### Debt structure and rollover (2008–13)
- External debt and public debt (Figure 5 / Table 3 / Table 4):
  - External debt (percent of GDP): high across 2008–13; Table 3 memorandum: Total external debt (percent of GDP) 86.0 (2010), 77.2 (2011), 76.6 (2012), 76.6 (2013), 75.3 (2014 proj), 74.7 (2015 proj), 75.1 (2016 proj), 75.2 (2017 proj), 75.2 (2018 proj).
  - Public debt hovers around 40 percent of GDP in the period shown (Figure 5).
- Rollover rates (Figure 5 / Table 4):
  - Banks' LT and ST rollover rates remained strong through 2013; corporate sector rollover rates were even higher (reflecting intercompany lending).
  - Loan rollover rates (Table 4, memorandum): Loan rollover rate (percent) – Banks: 78.7 (2010), 72.2 (2011), 82.9 (2012), 90.8 (2013), 99.9 (2014 proj), 123.6 (2015 proj), 119.7 (2016 proj), 118.7 (2017 proj), 114.6 (2018 proj). Corporates: 137.6 (2010), 140.3 (2011), 148.7 (2012), 116.6 (2013), 116.7 (2014 proj), 118.2 (2015 proj), 118.3 (2016 proj), 117.1 (2017 proj), 113.5 (2018 proj).
- Sovereign spreads (Figure 5): EMBI Global and Ukraine-specific spreads rose in 2012–13 relative to Emerging Europe.

### Financial sector and banking system indicators (2009–13)
- Banking sector size and structure (Table 6):
  - Number of banks: 182 (2009), 176 (2010), 176 (2011), 176 (2012), 176 (2013).
  - Foreign-owned banks' share in statutory capital: 35.8 (2009), 40.6 (2010), 41.9 (2011), 41.8 (2012), 41.2 (2013), 39.3 (2013 quarterly values continue in table).
- Asset quality and credit (Table 6 / Figure 6):
  - Credit growth (year-over-year percent change): -2.3 (2009), 1.1 (2010), 9.5 (2011), 6.3 (2012), 3.6 (2013), 1.4 (2014 proj), 2.2 (2015 proj), 3.8 (2016 proj), 5.1 (2017 proj), 7.0 (2018 proj).
  - NPLs to total loans (NBU definition): 13.1 (2009), 14.9 (2010), 14.3 (2011), 14.3 (2012), 13.7 (2013), 12.8 (2014 proj), 16.5 (2015 proj), 15.9 (2016 proj), 15.2 (2017 proj), 14.0 (2018 proj).
  - NPLs to total loans (broad definition): 37.6 (2009), 40.3 (2010), 37.7 (2011), 39.1 (2012), 38.4 (2013), 40.5 (2014 proj), 26.7 (2015 proj), 27.1 (2016 proj), 27.2 (2017 proj), 25.6 (2018 proj).
- Liquidity and deposits (Table 6 / Figure 6):
  - Deposits in foreign currency to total deposits: 47.2 (2009), 42.2 (2010), 42.1 (2011), 42.6 (2012), 42.3 (2013), 42.0 (2014 proj), 43.3 (2015 proj), 43.8 (2016 proj), 41.7 (2017 proj), 39.9 (2018 proj).
  - Loans in foreign currency to total loans: 51.2 (2009), 46.5 (2010), 40.6 (2011), 40.6 (2012), 40.3 (2013), 38.5 (2014 proj), 37.7 (2015 proj), 36.9 (2016 proj), 37.2 (2017 proj), 36.7 (2018 proj).
- Profitability and capitalization (Table 6):
  - Return on assets (after tax; end-of-period): -4.4 (2009), -1.5 (2010), -0.8 (2011), 0.7 (2012), 0.3 (2013), 0.3 (2014 proj), 0.5 (2015 proj), 1.1 (2016 proj), 0.2 (2017 proj), 0.2 (2018 proj).
  - Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets: 18.1 (2009), 20.8 (2010), 18.9 (2011), 17.9 (2012), 18.0 (2013), 18.2 (2014 proj), 18.1 (2015 proj), 18.2 (2016 proj), 18.0 (2017 proj), 17.9 (2018 proj).

### Structural governance and competitiveness indicators (Figure 7)
- Doing Business and competitiveness:
  - Ukraine ranks below many CESEE peers on Ease of Doing Business (Doing Business 2014) and Global Competitiveness Index 2013-2014 components, based on the plotted comparisons (Figure 7).
- Governance indicators:
  - Governance Indicators (average of six indices normalized between 0 and 1) plot shows Ukraine below the CESEE frontier and below best performers in the region (Figure 7).
- Corruption perception:
  - Perception of Corruption 2012 positions Ukraine with relatively high perceived corruption compared with many CESEE peers (Figure 7).

### Scenarios and projected adjustment (2011–18)
- Baseline vs Adjustment scenario key projected outcomes (Figure 8 / Table 7):
  - GDP growth (year-on-year percent change) plotted for Baseline and Adjustment scenarios across 2011–2018 (Figure 8).
  - Inflation (end of period, percent) and current account balance (percent of GDP) trajectories are shown for Baseline and Adjustment scenarios in Figure 8.
  - Adjustment Scenario (Table 7 selected indicators):
    - Real GDP (percent change): 0.2 (2012), -0.3 (2013), 0.5 (2014 proj), 3.5 (2015 proj), 4.0 (2016 proj), 4.5 (2017 proj), 4.5 (2018 proj).
    - Public debt (end of period, percent of GDP): 37.4 (2012), 41.3 (2013), 41.5 (2014 proj), 39.7 (2015 proj), 37.8 (2016 proj), 34.6 (2017 proj).
    - Current account balance (percent of GDP, Adjustment scenario): -3.0 (2013), -10.2 (2014 proj), -14.3 (2015 proj), -14.5 (2016 proj), -14.9 (2017 proj), -15.2 (2018 proj), -15.6 (2019 proj), -16.1 (2020 proj), -17.2 (2021 proj) as per Table 3 adjustment scenario rows.

### Key summarized risks and vulnerabilities (as evident in figures and tables)
- External vulnerabilities:
  - Persistently large current account deficits and declining gross reserves (gross reserves fell from 34.6 to 18.5 billions of U.S. dollars between 2010 and 2013).
  - High external debt stock (total external debt at 86.0 percent of GDP in 2010, 77.2 in 2011, and 76.6 in 2012–13 per Table 3 memorandum).
  - Rising sovereign spreads (EMBIG) in 2012–13.
- Fiscal pressures:
  - General government and overall balances show persistent deficits; overall (including Naftogaz) deficit and public debt projected to increase under baseline.
- Financial sector risks:
  - High levels of NPLs (NBU and broad definitions), reliance on NBU support and refinancing loans, FX mismatches in earlier years, and concentration in the banking sector.
- Macroeconomic performance:
  - Weak growth, negative output gaps, deflation in 2013 (headline CPI -0.3 percent period average), and constrained import coverage (months of imports dropping below 2 months in projections).

*International Monetary Fund staff report content as presented in the source document.*

### Annex I. Ukraine: Competitiveness, Exchange Rate Assessment,

### Annex I. Ukraine: Competitiveness, Exchange Rate Assessment, and Reserve Adequacy

### Competitiveness: recent evolution and drivers
- Ukraine’s competitiveness has eroded after a period of overvaluation in 2004–08 driven mainly by large inflation differentials with main trading partners.
- A forced nominal devaluation in 2009 boosted competitiveness, but since then:
  - Unabated wage pressures despite low inflation have led to high real wage growth.
  - Productivity grew much more slowly relative to other CESEE countries, partly due to poor quality capital stock and slower technological advances.
- Indicators:
  - ULC-based competitiveness indicator points to a large deviation from trading partners, already exceeding the 2008 levels.
  - CPI-based indicator is far more muted because of the large weight of administered prices in the CPI.
- Consequences: persistent erosion in competitiveness under a pegged exchange rate contributed to an unsustainable current account deficit and falling reserves.

### Exchange rate assessment and misalignment estimates
- Assessment approach: standard CGER-type methodologies, October 2013 WEO assumptions, and a projected current account deficit of more than 7 percent of GDP over the medium term.
- Quantitative misalignment estimates under unchanged policies:
  - Macroeconomic balance method: REER depreciation needed of about 14 percent (to close a gap of about 4 percentage points between the current account balance and the norm over the medium term).
  - External sustainability method: REER depreciation needed of about 16.3 percent to reach the current account balance that would stabilize Ukraine’s NFA position.
  - Reduced-form equilibrium real exchange rate method: estimates a small undervaluation of about -1.8 percent (attributed mainly to non-structural and highly volatile variables).
- Caveats: historical structural breaks in the data undermine robustness of reduced-form results; underlying fundamentals and market expectations are consistent with sizable overvaluation.

### Reserve adequacy and external vulnerabilities
- Gross reserves:
  - Fell to US$20.7 billion by end-October 2013 (36 percent of short-term debt) from a peak of $38 billion in May 2011.
- Drivers of reserve decline: large current account deficit, bank deleveraging, household foreign exchange withdrawals, and large repayments on outstanding foreign debts (including Fund repurchases).
- IMF composite reserve adequacy metric:
  - Ukraine scores poorly on the new composite IMF metric that weights short-term debt, other portfolio liabilities, broad money, and exports.
  - Official reserves are recommended to be in the range of 100–150 percent of the appropriate composite measure.
- Reserve adequacy metrics (Ukraine, 2010–15):
  - Gross official reserves (billions of US dollars): 2010 34.6; 2011 31.8; 2012 24.5; 2013 18.5; 2014 11.2; 2015 9.1.
  - Months of imports of goods and services: 2010 4.2; 2011 3.7; 2012 3.0; 2013 2.2; 2014 1.3; 2015 1.0.
  - Percent of short term debt at remaining maturity: 2010 73.3; 2011 55.4; 2012 40.0; 2013 32.3; 2014 18.8; 2015 14.5.
  - Percent of short term debt at remaining maturity plus current account deficit: 2010 68.9; 2011 47.0; 2012 32.4; 2013 25.8; 2014 15.0; 2015 11.7.
  - Percent of IMF composite measure: 2010 92.6; 2011 75.7; 2012 52.8; 2013 38.6; 2014 21.3; 2015 16.5.
- Implication: limited policy buffers and poor coverage of short-term debt increase vulnerability to external shocks.

### Policy scenarios, fiscal adjustments, and implications for external sustainability
- Baseline: unchanged policies imply projected medium-term current account deficit of more than 7 percent of GDP and substantial REER overvaluation (14–16 percent by CGER methods).
- Fiscal consolidation scenario (no devaluation):
  - Fiscal consolidation starting in 2014 targeting a combined fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficit of 1.9 percent of GDP over the medium term, with the exchange rate pegged at its current level, would:
    - Squeeze domestic demand and reduce the medium-term current account deficit to around 6 percent of GDP (versus more than 7 percent under the baseline).
    - Leave major vulnerabilities unaddressed: a double-digit real hryvnia devaluation would still be needed for competitiveness adjustment.
    - Not achieve external sustainability: international reserves would still fall sharply in 2014 and remain below two months of imports; short-term debt coverage would remain below 30 percent throughout the medium term.
- Conclusion: closing fiscal and quasi-fiscal policy gaps alone, without a devaluation and competitiveness gains, would only marginally improve external sustainability while leaving substantial risks.

*Source: IMF staff report Annexes I–III as supplied in the content unit.*

### 85.3 percent at 208 (10 percentage points above the baseline), while the ratio of external debt to

### _cr14145 - 85.3 percent at 208 (10 percentage points above the baseline), while the ratio of external debt to

### Baseline debt dynamics and projections
- Gross nominal public debt (percent of GDP) by year: 2011: 25.4; 2012: 36.8; 2013: 37.4; 2014: 41.3; 2015: 44.7; 2016: 48.0; 2017: 53.4; 2018: 57.5; 2019: 60.2 (as presented in tables).
- Change in gross public sector debt (cumulative) by year: 2011: 0.4; 2012: -3.7; 2013: 0.6; 2014: 3.9; 2015: 3.4; 2016: 3.3; 2017: 5.5; 2018: 4.0; 2019: 2.7; cumulative: 22.7.
- Identified debt-creating flows (cumulative) by year: 2011: -1.6; 2012: -5.8; 2013: 0.8; 2014: 5.8; 2015: 2.5; 2016: 2.5; 2017: 4.1; 2018: 3.2; 2019: 2.0; cumulative: 20.0.
- Primary deficit (percent of GDP) by year: 2011: 2.2; 2012: 0.8; 2013: 2.6; 2014: 3.4; 2015: 1.3; 2016: 1.1; 2017: 2.5; 2018: 1.9; 2019: 1.4; cumulative: 11.7.
- Primary (noninterest) revenue and grants (percent of GDP) by year: 2011: 40.9; 2012: 42.9; 2013: 44.5; 2014: 45.5; 2015: 45.3; 2016: 44.9; 2017: 42.8; 2018: 42.7; 2019: 42.5; cumulative: 263.7.
- Primary (noninterest) expenditure (percent of GDP) by year: 2011: 43.0; 2012: 43.7; 2013: 47.1; 2014: 48.9; 2015: 46.6; 2016: 46.0; 2017: 45.4; 2018: 44.6; 2019: 43.9; cumulative: 275.3.
- Automatic debt dynamics (percent of GDP) by year: 2011: -2.5; 2012: -4.8; 2013: -0.9; 2014: 2.8; 2015: 2.3; 2016: 1.7; 2017: 1.8; 2018: 1.5; 2019: 0.8; cumulative: 10.8.
- Effective interest rate (defined as interest payments divided by debt stock at end of previous year) by year: 2011: 4.5; 2012: 5.8; 2013: 5.6; 2014: 7.5; 2015: 10.8; 2016: 11.1; 2017: 11.1; 2018: 10.4; 2019: 9.1.

### External debt baseline and dynamics (2010–18)
- Baseline: external debt (percent of GDP) by year: 2010: 86.0; 2011: 77.2; 2012: 76.6; 2013: 76.6; 2014: 76.7; 2015: 75.3; 2016: 74.7; 2017: 75.1; 2018: 75.2.
- Change in external debt by year: 2010: -2.2; 2011: -8.8; 2012: -0.6; 2013: 0.1; 2014: -1.4; 2015: -0.6; 2016: 0.4; 2017: 0.1; 2018: 0.0.
- Identified external debt-creating flows (4+8+9) by year: 2010: -17.5; 2011: -13.2; 2012: 1.0; 2013: 3.5; 2014: 2.0; 2015: 2.6; 2016: 2.1; 2017: 1.9; 2018: 1.6.
- Current account deficit, excluding interest payments (percent of GDP) by year: 2010: -2.7; 2011: 0.6; 2012: 2.4; 2013: 2.9; 2014: 2.9; 2015: 2.7; 2016: 2.5; 2017: 2.2; 2018: 2.2.
- Deficit in balance of goods and services (percent of GDP) by year: 2010: 2.9; 2011: 6.2; 2012: 8.1; 2013: 7.7; 2014: 7.3; 2015: 5.9; 2016: 5.1; 2017: 4.6; 2018: 4.3.
- Exports (percent of GDP) by year: 2010: 50.8; 2011: 54.4; 2012: 51.1; 2013: 48.8; 2014: 48.4; 2015: 46.6; 2016: 45.2; 2017: 44.0; 2018: 42.8.
- Imports (percent of GDP) by year: 2010: 53.7; 2011: 60.6; 2012: 59.2; 2013: 56.5; 2014: 55.8; 2015: 52.5; 2016: 50.4; 2017: 48.6; 2018: 47.1.
- Net non-debt creating capital inflows (negative) by year: 2010: -7.4; 2011: -5.2; 2012: -7.0; 2013: -5.1; 2014: -5.4; 2015: -4.0; 2016: -4.2; 2017: -4.2; 2018: -4.5.
- Automatic debt dynamics (external) by year: 2010: -7.4; 2011: -8.5; 2012: 5.6; 2013: 5.7; 2014: 4.5; 2015: 3.9; 2016: 3.9; 2017: 3.9; 2018: 3.9.
- Contribution from nominal interest rate (external) by year: 2010: 4.9; 2011: 5.7; 2012: 5.7; 2013: 5.4; 2014: 5.2; 2015: 5.0; 2016: 4.9; 2017: 5.0; 2018: 5.0.
- Contribution from real GDP growth (external) by year: 2010: -3.1; 2011: -3.7; 2012: -0.1; 2013: 0.3; 2014: -0.7; 2015: -1.1; 2016: -1.0; 2017: -1.1; 2018: -1.1.
- Residual, including change in gross foreign assets (2-3) by year: 2010: 15.4; 2011: 4.4; 2012: -1.6; 2013: -3.4; 2014: -3.4; 2015: -3.2; 2016: -1.8; 2017: -1.8; 2018: -1.6.
- External debt-to-exports ratio (percent) by year: 2010: 169.4; 2011: 142.1; 2012: 150.0; 2013: 157.2; 2014: 155.6; 2015: 160.3; 2016: 166.1; 2017: 171.0; 2018: 175.8.
- Gross external financing need (billions of U.S. dollars) by year: 2010: 48.8; 2011: 70.8; 2012: 84.8; 2013: 72.4; 2014: 67.6; 2015: 71.2; 2016: 78.0; 2017: 85.1; 2018: 88.9.
- Gross external financing need (percent of GDP) by year: 2010: 35.8; 2011: 43.3; 2012: 48.1; 2013: 41.2; 2014: 36.9; 2015: 36.2; 2016: 37.1; 2017: 37.8; 2018: 36.9.

### Stress-test scenarios and results
- Real depreciation shock (one-time 30 percent depreciation in 2013) projections:
  - Baseline: external debt (percent of GDP) in shock box: 75 (baseline indicated in multiple charts).
  - Real depreciation shock scenario result highlighted: 108 (in box labelled "Combined Shock" and "Real Depreciation Shock 3/ 30% depreciation").
- Individual scenario averages shown in boxes (examples as displayed):
  - Historical: 52 (in one chart); Baseline: 75; Scenario (varies by test) examples: 77 (i-rate shock), 94 (growth shock), 85 (current account shock), 90 (combined shock).
- Stress-test descriptions:
  - Individual shocks are permanent one-half standard deviation shocks.
  - Combined shock uses Permanent 1/4 standard deviation shocks applied to real interest rate, growth rate, and current account balance.
  - Real depreciation shock follows standard IMF stress test: one-time real depreciation of 30 percent in 2013.
- Macro-fiscal stress tests include: Primary Balance Shock; Real GDP Growth Shock (customized to half the historical standard deviation); Real Interest Rate Shock; Real Exchange Rate Shock; Combined Macro-Fiscal Shock; Contingent Liability Shock.

### Alternative scenarios and composition of public debt
- Alternative scenarios provided: Baseline; Historical; Constant Primary Balance.
- Baseline scenario macro assumptions (selected):
  - Real GDP growth (percent): 2013: -0.3; 2014: 1.0; 2015: 1.5; 2016: 1.6; 2017: 1.8; 2018: 2.0.
  - Inflation (GDP deflator, percent): 2013: 2.0; 2014: 4.0; 2015–2018: 5.5 each year.
  - Primary Balance (percent of GDP): 2013: -3.4; 2014: -1.3; 2015: -1.1; 2016: -2.5; 2017: -1.9; 2018: -1.4.
  - Effective interest rate (percent): 2013: 7.5; 2014: 10.8; 2015: 11.1; 2016: 11.1; 2017: 10.4; 2018: 9.1.
- Constant Primary Balance scenario: Primary Balance set at -3.4 (percent of GDP) for 2013–2018; corresponding effective interest rates listed (examples: 2014: 10.9; 2015: 11.3; 2016: 11.1; 2017: 10.5; 2018: 8.7).
- Composition charts (by maturity and by currency) are provided for projections (no numerical breakdowns beyond axis labels in supplied extract).

### Key macroeconomic assumptions underlying external baseline
- Real GDP growth (percent): 2010: 4.1; 2011: 5.2; 2012: 0.2; 2013: -0.3; 2014: 1.0; 2015: 1.5; 2016: 1.5; 2017: 1.5; 2018: 1.5.
- GDP deflator in U.S. dollars (change in percent): 2010: 11.7; 2011: 13.9; 2012: 7.7; 2013: 0.0; 2014: 3.4; 2015–2018: 5.5 each year.
- Nominal external interest rate (percent): 2010: 6.5; 2011: 7.9; 2012: 8.0; 2013: 7.0; 2014–2018: 7.1 each year.
- Growth of exports (U.S. dollar terms, percent): 2010: 27.7; 2011: 28.3; 2012: 1.3; 2013: -4.8; 2014: 3.5; 2015: 3.2; 2016: 3.9; 2017: 4.1; 2018: 4.2.
- Growth of imports (U.S. dollar terms, percent): 2010: 30.3; 2011: 35.2; 2012: 5.4; 2013: -4.9; 2014: 3.0; 2015: 1.0; 2016: 2.6; 2017: 3.2; 2018: 3.9.
- Current account balance, excluding interest payments (percent of GDP): 2010: 2.7; 2011: -0.6; 2012: -2.4; 2013: -2.9; 2014: -2.9; 2015: -2.7; 2016: -2.5; 2017: -2.2; 2018: -2.2.
- Net non-debt creating capital inflows (percent of GDP): 2010: 7.4; 2011: 5.2; 2012: 7.0; 2013: 5.1; 2014: 5.4; 2015: 4.0; 2016: 4.2; 2017: 4.2; 2018: 4.5.

### Market perception and risk indicators (selected)
- Sovereign spreads and market indicators as of specified periods:
  - EMBI (bp) cited value: 876 (average over 14-Aug-13 through 12-Nov-13 referenced).
  - CDS (bp) cited value: 946.
- Ratings (examples listed): Moody's: Caa1 / B3 (foreign/local); S&Ps: B- / B-; Fitch: B- / B-.
- Real GDP growth (percent) historical and projected table: 2011: 4.1; 2012: 5.2; 2013: 0.2; 2014: -0.3; 2015: 1.0; 2016: 1.5; 2017: 1.6; 2018: 1.8; 2019: 2.0 (as presented in related tables).
- Inflation (GDP deflator, percent) historical and projected: 2011: 16.2; 2012: 14.3; 2013: 8.0; 2014: 2.0; 2015–2019: 4.0–5.5 range per table entries.

### Notable scenario-specific quantified outcomes highlighted in text
- "85.3 percent at 208 (10 percentage points above the baseline), while the ratio of external debt to exports would reach around 207 percent at 2018 (31.5 percentage points above the baseline)." (text excerpt preserved verbatim).
- "Finally, a 30 percent depreciation of the domestic currency with no change in current policies would raise the debt-to-GDP ratio to 108.2 percent at 2018 (33 percentage points above the baseline)." (text excerpt preserved verbatim).

*Source: IMF staff (document extract).*

### Annex IV. The Role of Devaluation Expectations in Determining

### Annex IV. The Role of Devaluation Expectations in Determining the Spread Between Local and Foreign Currency Interest Rates in Ukraine

### Background
- Ukraine experienced three episodes of sharp devaluation since the hryvnia introduction: in 1994–95, 1998–99, and in 2008.
- Between episodes, the exchange rate was relatively stable at around:
  - 2 UAH/USD in 1996–98,
  - 5 UAH/USD in 2000–08,
  - about 8 UAH/USD since 2009.
- Over the last seven years (for which the data is available), economic agents nearly always expected some devaluation in the months ahead and almost never projected hryvnia appreciation.
- Implied devaluation expectations derived from forward/NDF contracts reached unusually high levels: sometimes 20–30 percent for more than two years (mid-2011 onward).
- In late 2012, when the pegged exchange rate came under pressure:
  - average rates on term deposits and medium-term credits in the national currency reached 20 percent,
  - consumer price deflation lasting more than a year produced real interest rates of around 20 percent.
- Rationale for using deposit-rate spreads:
  - FX deposit rates reflect bank-failure risk and alternative FX funding costs.
  - UAH deposit rates reflect the same risks plus currency devaluation risk.
  - Therefore, the spread between comparable household UAH and FX deposit rates can be used as a proxy for devaluation expectations of banks and depositors.

### Model estimates
- Empirical observations:
  - Except for 2008–09 crisis years, deposit spreads closely followed devaluation expectations.
  - The evolution of NDF-implied devaluation preceded deposit spread changes by about three months.
  - During 2008–09, large currency movements disrupted the correlation; NDF-implied devaluation was capped at 15 percent for that crisis period in the preferred specification.
  - After adjustment and with a three-month lag, the adjusted NDF-implied devaluation and the deposit spread curves nearly overlapped (correlation as high as 0.95).
- Alternative measures:
  - NBU quarterly-survey-based devaluation expectations had correlation 0.74 with deposit-rate spread (with a two-month lag) but survey data quality and representativeness were judged inferior to NDF series.
- Regression results (Table 1 summary):
  - Dependent variable: spread between average interest rates on household term deposits in UAH and FX with maturity up to 1 year.
  - Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
  - Coefficient on implied devaluation (NDF, 1 year, with 3 months lag) is highly significant and typically ranged from 0.26 to 0.30 across specifications (regressions 1–3 and 6–8).
  - Interpretation: every additional 1 percent of expected devaluation added up to 0.30 percent to the interest-rate spread in preferred specifications.
  - When the regression constant was constrained to zero (attributing all spread variation to implied devaluation), the coefficient reached 0.55 (regression 4).
  - In the presence of the NDF-implied devaluation variable, other macro/financial variables were often insignificant, had very low coefficients, or unexpected signs (regressions 5–8).
- Robustness and causality:
  - Granger causality tests strongly confirmed that the adjusted NDF-implied devaluation series Granger-caused the deposit interest-rate spread but not vice versa.
  - Tests rejected that GDP growth, expected economic conditions (NBU quarterly survey), or actual and projected inflation Granger-caused the deposit spread.
  - The inflation series showed an unexpected strong negative correlation of -0.50 with the deposit spread series.
- VAR and pass-through analysis:
  - Both adjusted NDF-implied devaluation and deposit spread are non-stationary in levels but stationary in first differences; standard tests rejected cointegration.
  - A VAR on first differences with three lags produced standardized accumulated impulse responses.
  - Pass-through coefficients (Table 2): accumulated widening of the deposit spread in response to a 1 percent increase in implied devaluation:
    - Month 1: 0.03
    - Month 2: 0.08
    - Month 3: 0.19
    - Month 4: 0.27
    - Month 5: 0.32
    - Month 6: 0.34
    - Month 7: 0.35
    - Month 8: 0.33
    - Month 9: 0.31
    - Month 10: 0.30
    - Month 11: 0.29
    - Month 12: 0.29
  - Interpretation: when devaluation expectations increase by 1 percentage point due to a shock, deposit spreads increase eventually by about 0.29 percentage points (settling at about 0.29 in 12 months; peak pass-through about 0.35 in seven months).

### Conclusions and policy implications
- Core finding:
  - Devaluation expectations are the most important factor shaping the deposit interest-rate spread and thus sustaining high hryvnia deposit and credit rates.
  - Quantitative effect: an additional 1 percentage point of devaluation expectation contributes about 0.26–0.30 percentage points to the deposit spread (consistent with regression and VAR results).
- Transmission to lending rates:
  - High deposit rates translate into high credit rates.
  - Historically, loan rates exceeded deposit rates by margins covering transaction costs, credit risk provisions, and bank profits; that margin largely disappeared after the 2008 crisis.
  - Because loan rates cannot sustainably remain below deposit rates, reducing UAH deposit rates is critical for cutting credit rates—this requires reducing devaluation expectations first.
- Exception during 2008–09 crisis:
  - The 2008–09 episode showed a wide deviation: skyrocketing devaluation expectations did not produce proportionally high deposit-rate spreads.
  - The reason was the different policy response in 2008:
    - Authorities allowed steep devaluation, but provided substantial liquidity support and restrictions: NBU provided ample stabilization loans, bailed out several insolvent banks, and introduced a temporary ban on early withdrawal of term deposits (October 2008 to May 2009, with modification in December 2008).
    - Under those measures, banks refrained from raising deposit rates even as they lost about 25 percent of hryvnia deposits and 20 percent of foreign currency deposits in six months from September 2008.
  - By contrast, in late 2012 the NBU defended the exchange rate peg and squeezed bank liquidity, forcing banks to compete for deposits and raise deposit rates despite high devaluation expectations; as a result, devaluation was avoided and hryvnia deposits in banks increased by 20 percent in the six months from November 2008, while foreign deposits stagnated.
- Policy implication summary:
  - Harnessing devaluation expectations is a critical precondition for reducing hryvnia deposit rates.
  - Significant changes in the exchange rate regime and monetary policy priorities are required to lower hryvnia interest rates in the economy.
  - Providing concrete recommendations on how to reduce devaluation expectations is beyond the scope of this paper; the analysis only established the strong link between policy mix (2012–13) that produced unusually high devaluation expectations and the resulting high deposit interest rates.

*Prepared by Michael Gorbanyov. Source: Staff estimates as presented in Annex IV.*

### 10.5 percent. NBU strictly rationed financing

### _cr14145 - 10.5 percent. NBU strictly rationed financing

### Context and market outcomes
- NBU strictly rationed financing provided to banks at the official rates, reducing their relevance as indicators of short-term credit rates.
- In case of liquidity stress banks cannot rely on NBU refinancing, while the cost of interbank credit can be prohibitively expensive.
- Banks maintained high liquidity “buffers,” which diminished their potential for providing credit to economy.
- The episode undermined the transmission mechanism from the NBU policy rates to the bank credit rates and, ultimately, to economic growth and inflation.
- Liquidity provision and absorption by NBU in 2013:
  - Absorption to Provision ratio: Nearly 7:1 on average
  - Upto 63:1 in September

### Monetary policy framework reforms (three main reforms)
- First: increase the role of the NBU policy rate in steering market interest rates by promoting an operational instrument with the interest rate closely linked to the policy rate.
- Second: create automatic standing facilities that banks can freely use for borrowing from and lending to the NBU without fear of formal or informal sanctions or stigma; these would set the limits of the “corridor” for short-term market interest rates.
- Third: introduce a reserve averaging period and give more flexibility to banks in managing their liquidity over it.
- If successfully implemented, the system would ensure short-term market interest rates fluctuate around the key policy rate within the corridor defined by the standing facilities.

### Operational instruments and interest-rate corridor
- Link the NBU policy rate directly to rates on its main money market operational instruments.
- Initially set up two main instruments supporting the key policy rate:
  - One that provides liquidity (e.g., 7-day or 14-day repurchasing agreements (repos)).
  - One that absorbs liquidity (e.g., 7-day or 14-day certificates of deposits (CDs)).
- Interest rate on both instruments should be pre-set and firmly linked to the policy rate (for example, by using a constant differential); the difference between them should be relatively small, around 50 basis points.
- Both instruments should be auctioned regularly and initially rather frequently (but not on the same day).
- Over time one instrument may become redundant except during stress; system would evolve toward having only one key instrument, most likely the one absorbing liquidity.
- All other operations at the short end of the yield curve should be discontinued as soon as possible to prop the importance of these two instruments.
- Longer-term instruments should be phased out at the central bank level; long-term benchmark securities should be issued by the government.
- Longer-term NBU instruments, if offered, should be provided in a price-taking fashion to avoid compromising the price-setting role of the main short-term instruments.
- Use existing overnight facilities to form the corridor:
  - The existing overnight (O/N) collateralized refinancing facility can form the upper limit of the interest-rate corridor.
  - Recently introduced unlimited placement of overnight CDs could create the lower limit of the corridor.
- Standing facilities on both sides of the corridor should operate in a fully automatic regime, with easy access for all solvent banks at their discretion.
- The interest-rate corridor could be set rather wide at first, but shortened gradually; eventually it can be narrowed to 200–300 bps, which is most effective for controlling the interbank rates.
- Recommended auction modalities: main instruments should be provided in price-setting (as opposed to price-taking) manner.

### Reserve requirements and liquidity management
- Current system: complex, differentiated reserve requirements for various types of deposits, readjusted regularly (about twice per year); banks required to meet obligatory reserve requirements daily (subject to some ad hoc exceptions).
- Banks must deposit 40 percent of the required reserves in a special account with the NBU and cannot use it even during the day.
- Reform proposals:
  - Allow banks to meet reserve requirements on average over a period of two weeks or one month, allowing flexibility to manage liquidity within this period.
  - Make reserve requirements on foreign exchange and hryvnia deposits more uniform.
  - As a first step, consider introducing a small positive reserve requirement on hryvnia deposits, which are now exempt.
  - Make changes to reserve requirements less frequent and provide advance guidance to banks to prepare.

### Implementation timeline and market engagement
- Implementation of the main elements of the new policy framework can be completed within a year.
- These reforms can be made operational simultaneously with the shift to a more flexible exchange rate regime, which the new monetary policy framework would support.
- Good reception by the banking community requires intensive communication.
- Practical experience and feedback from market participants would help refine the new instruments and make the framework most effective in achieving NBU’s policy objectives.

*Prepared by Michael Gorbanyov with the inputs from David Vávra.*

### Annex VI. Determinants of Sovereign Borrowing Costs from

### Annex VI. Determinants of Sovereign Borrowing Costs from International Markets

### Background and context
- Large part of Ukraine’s debt is financed externally: the share of FX-denominated debt in the general government total debt was fluctuating around 70 percent.
- Quasi-sovereign entities (SOEs), including Naftogaz and Ukrainian Railways, also finance parts of their debt externally.
- The ratio of government’s external debt to GDP rose from 9.7 percent in 2007 to 22.2 percent in 2012.
- Large placements of Eurobonds took place in 2012–13; secondary market rates on Eurobonds have risen recently.
- External financing costs depend on two main determinants:
  - Global market sentiment (beyond control of Ukrainian authorities).
  - Domestic macroeconomic, external, and fiscal fundamentals (affected by economic policies).

### How external borrowing costs are measured
- The EMBI spread index by JP Morgan is used as the measure of credit risk for Ukraine:
  - Calculated as the weighted average difference in yields between Ukraine’s sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds and U.S. Treasuries.
  - Controls for exchange rate risk by including only U.S. dollar denominated Ukrainian bonds.
  - Controls for interest rate risk by matching duration to U.S. Treasuries and adjusting for unusual bond characteristics.
  - Minimizes liquidity risk by including only bonds with sufficient secondary market liquidity, minimum face value of USD 500 million, and at least 2.5 years of maturity at inclusion.
  - Liquidity risk is not fully eliminated; EMBI spread could slightly overstate credit risk during global financial stress.

### Main drivers of external borrowing costs
- Four main sources of risk driving external borrowing costs for EMs, including Ukraine:
  - Credit risk (default risk).
  - Interest rate risk (sensitivity of bond market value to interest changes).
  - Exchange rate risk (sensitivity of bond market value to currency movements).
  - Liquidity risk (ability to sell the bond on the secondary market without large discount).

- Macroeconomic fundamentals
  - High economic growth reduces spreads through improved debt sustainability.
  - Impact of inflation is ambiguous in theory; empirically, moderately high inflation can improve debt servicing by inflating debt away and increasing the tax base.
  - In Ukraine prior to the crisis: monthly industrial production growth averaged 12 percent and inflation averaged 10 percent.
  - During the crisis: growth dipped and inflation soared, contributing to a sharp hike in spreads.

- External fundamentals
  - Real exchange rate depreciation should generally enhance debt sustainability and reduce borrowing costs through improved competitiveness, but rapid nominal depreciation can undermine fiscal sustainability if foreign currency debt share is high.
  - High FX reserves enhance ability to service external debt and should reduce borrowing costs.
  - In Ukraine: real exchange rate appreciated steadily, reaching 20 percent in the run-up to the crisis; record 30 percent real depreciation in 2009; FX reserves-to-GDP rose from 10 percent in 2003 to 20 percent at the onset of the crisis, later declining back to 10 percent of GDP.

- Fiscal fundamentals
  - High fiscal deficits and high public debt lead to higher borrowing costs through increased financing needs and vulnerability to shocks.
  - In Ukraine: debt-to-GDP declined from 30 percent in 2003 to 10 percent in mid-2008, then rose back to 30 percent within two years post-crisis, and continued increasing in 2012–13, rapidly approaching the 40 percent threshold identified as vulnerable for EMs by the IMF’s debt sustainability framework.

- Limitations of domestic fundamentals as predictors
  - Domestic fundamentals are slow-moving and available at low frequency and cannot explain high-frequency EMBI movements.
  - EMBI spreads also reflect liquidity risk driven by global liquidity conditions.
  - Fundamentals can lag market perceptions and markets can overreact, especially early in crises.

- Global factors
  - Global liquidity and risk appetite conditions play an important role; VIX is a widely used proxy for global risk aversion.
  - Studies find global factors can explain between 50 to 80 percent of variability in EM sovereign spreads.
  - VIX closely tracks Ukraine’s EMBI spread, indicating strong association.

### Empirical estimation results (EMBI spread regressions)
- Dependent variable: EMBI spread in percentage points. Estimation method: OLS. Sample period: Jan, 2003–May, 2013. Robust standard errors reported.
- Intercept-only regression:
  - EMBI spread in Ukraine averaged at 5.7 percent level (intercept).
- Crisis dummy (value = 1 for Oct 2008–December 2009):
  - Coefficient: 12.98*** (column (I)); textual summary cites a coefficient estimate of 12.9 percent.
  - Interpretation: macroeconomic instability during the crisis and pre-crisis vulnerabilities led to a dramatic widening of the spread exceeding twice its historical average and loss of market access.

Key estimated sensitivities (textual summaries and table coefficients):
- Global factors
  - VIX coefficient estimates: 0.41*** (column (III)), 0.37*** (column (II)), 0.41*** (column (IV)), 0.42*** (column (V)).
  - Textual interpretation: One unit increase in VIX leads to about 40 basis points increase in EMBI spread.

- Macroeconomic fundamentals
  - Industrial production (IP) growth (y-o-y, percent): coefficient ~ -0.12*** (column (I)), -0.10*** (column (II)), -0.09*** (column (III)).
    - Textual interpretation: A 1 percentage point increase in industrial production annual growth rate leads to about 9 basis point reduction in spreads.
  - Inflation (y-o-y, percent): coefficient ~ -0.13*** (column (III)), -0.16*** (column (II)), -0.13*** (column (IV)).
    - Textual interpretation: A 1 percentage point increase in CPI leads to 13 basis points reduction in spreads.

- External fundamentals
  - REER appreciation (y-o-y, percent): coefficients 0.09*** (column (IV)), 0.11*** (column (V)).
    - Textual interpretation: A 1 percentage point increase in REER pushes spreads up by 11 basis points (reported).
  - FX reserves/GDP (percent): coefficient -0.13 (column (IV)), -0.19** (column (V)).
    - Textual interpretation: A 1 percentage point decline in FX reserves-to-GDP ratio increases spreads by 19 basis points (reported).

- Fiscal fundamentals
  - Debt/GDP (lagged, percent): coefficient 0.05* (column (V)).
    - Textual interpretation: A 1 percentage point increase in debt-to-GDP ratio pushes spreads up by 5.5 basis points (reported).
  - Deficit/GDP (percent): coefficient 1.14** (column (V)).
    - Textual interpretation: A 1 percentage point increase in deficit-to-GDP ratio pushes spreads up by 114 basis points (reported); higher sensitivity to deficit ratio is related to scaling issues because one percentage point increase in deficit per month is equivalent to 12 percentage points increase per annum.

- Goodness of fit and sample sizes (from Table 1)
  - Number of observations by specification: 126, 111, 110, 110, 110 (columns (I)–(V)).
  - Adjusted R^2 by specification: 0.59, 0.75, 0.81, 0.82, 0.83.
  - Note (text): The adjusted R^2 in column (III) is 0.75, suggesting that increase in global risk aversion and deterioration of domestic fundamentals during the crisis period explain three quarters of the EMBI spread variation. A separate exercise found that additional contribution of global factors to R^2 is only 0.1 if VIX enters after controlling for all domestic fundamentals.

### Conclusions and policy implications
- Ukraine’s borrowing costs heavily depend on:
  - Global factors (especially global risk aversion proxied by VIX).
  - Domestic fundamentals: macroeconomic, external, and fiscal.
- Policy recommendations drawn from empirical results:
  - Strengthen domestic macroeconomic fundamentals to reduce sovereign borrowing costs.
  - Maintain or restore access to international capital markets at sustainable borrowing rates.
  - Expand FX reserves and other buffers to cushion against changes in global market sentiment.
  - Fiscal consolidation is essential to restore fiscal space eroded after the crisis and to reduce external borrowing costs.
- Illustrative evidence:
  - Following recent Fed tapering remarks, Ukraine’s EMBI spread rose by a larger amount than that of regional peers with better fundamentals, highlighting the importance of buffers.

*Prepared by Tigran Poghosyan (Fiscal Affairs Department).*

### Annex VII. Ukraine: Government Expenditures—Options for

### Annex VII. Ukraine: Government Expenditures—Options for Fiscal Consolidation

### Background
- Ukraine suffers from external imbalances and low growth. A de facto exchange rate peg policy pursued by NBU worsened external competitiveness and hampered credit growth.  
- Headline inflation has fallen rapidly on account of tight monetary policy, flat utility prices, and decelerating economic activity.  
- Expansionary fiscal policies introduced additional rigidity to current expenditures and contributed to the further worsening of external imbalances.  
- Public debt-to-GDP ratio tripled from its pre-crisis levels and is on path to exceed 40 percent, often considered a danger zone for emerging economies, putting pressure on near term refinancing needs and the sovereign risk premium.  
- Some structural fiscal reforms already undertaken:  
  - New tax code approved in 2010 treating all taxes under one legal framework.  
  - New customs code reduced customs clearance time from 24 to four hours and set up a “single window” shop.  
  - Comprehensive pension reform approved in late 2011 aligned the retirement age for women (from 55 to 60) to men (60) and increased the years of service for pension eligibility, with expected medium-term annual savings of 1.8 percent of GDP.  
  - Centralization of the Large Taxpayers Office and progress in automating tax refunds (50 percent of all VAT receipts being refunded via automated system).  
  - Amended double taxation treaty with Cyprus ratified; transfer pricing regulation adopted by Parliament.  
- Rationale for expenditure-driven consolidation: government expenditures are very high (close to 50 percent of GDP) while capital expenditures are historically low; limited room for revenue-based consolidation given government revenues close to 45 percent of GDP.

### Diagnostics: Government Expenditures versus Comparator Countries
- Total government expenditure: close to 50 percent of GDP (third largest among comparator countries).  
- Total revenue: close to 45 percent of GDP (fifth largest among comparator countries).  
- Current expenditures: 45 percent of GDP (second highest after Hungary among comparator countries).  
- Capital expenditures: 3 percent of GDP (falling further in 2013), historically low and averaging just 2 percent of GDP over the last decade.  
- Execution rates: current expenditures execution 97 percent versus capital expenditures execution 70 percent.  
- Consequence: years of underinvestment and inefficient use of resources left public infrastructure in disrepair and generated a significant backlog of needed public infrastructure investments.

### Structure of Current Spending: Social Benefits, Pensions, and Wages
- Social benefits (including pension and non-pension benefits): 22 percent of GDP, highest among comparators.  
- Pension expenditures: three quarters of total social expenditures; increased from 12 percent of GDP in 2004 to about 17 percent of GDP in 2012.  
- Total pension expenditure in the 2013 budget: 17.8 percent of GDP. Composition in 2013 (mln UAH / percent of GDP):  
  - PF own expenditure 192,779   13.5  
  - PF own revenue 171,018   12.0  
  - CG-financed expenditure 61,470     4.3  
  - Opening balance from 2012 2,200       0.2  
  - Contributions 164,285   11.5  
  - Other revenue 4,534       0.3  
  - Deficit covered by CG 21,761     1.5  
  - Total expenditure 254,249   17.8  
  - Total revenue and financing 254,249   17.8  
- Pensioner statistics and average pensions (2013):  
  - Number of pensioners in total: 13,639,739 (100 percent); average pension UAH 1,471 per month.  
  - Distribution:  
    - up to 900 UAH: 329,799 (2.4 percent) — average UAH 762  
    - 901 UAH - 1000 UAH: 2,099,010 (15.4 percent) — average UAH 981  
    - 1001 UAH - 1100 UAH: 2,702,765 (19.8 percent) — average UAH 1,052  
    - 1101 UAH - 1200 UAH: 2,610,823 (19.1 percent) — average UAH 1,144  
    - 1201 UAH - 1300 UAH: 1,078,498 (7.9 percent) — average UAH 1,245  
    - 1301 UAH - 1400 UAH: 706,134 (5.2 percent) — average UAH 1,347  
    - 1401 UAH - 1500 UAH: 551,756 (4.0 percent) — average UAH 1,448  
    - above 1500 UAH: 3,560,954 (26.1 percent) — average UAH 2,479  
  - 3.5 million pensioners earn more than UAH 1,500 per month.  
  - 44 percent of total pension spending is directed to the 26 percent of pensioners in the above UAH 1,500 per month bracket.  
  - Average replacement rate: 50 percent (among the highest in the region).  
- Pension fund financing: central government transfers finance privileged pensions and top-ups covering the differential between basic pensions and the subsistence minimum—4.3 percent of GDP—and the pension fund deficit (1.5 percent of GDP).  
- Wages and public employment:  
  - Compensation of employees exceeds 11 percent of GDP.  
  - Average monthly economy-wide wage: UAH 2,722.  
  - Average monthly pension for those above 1500 UAH bracket: UAH 2,479.  
  - Public sector employment ~ one third of total employment.  
  - Wage bill climbed from 10.4 percent of GDP in 2011 to a projected 11.7 percent in 2013.  
  - Public sector wages heterogeneous: public administration wages exceed economy-wide wages; wages in education also relatively high.  
  - Public employment high in health and education (over 65 percent of total public employment); employment norms not linked to output performance and do not reflect demographic decline.  
  - Despite high employment and large spending in social sectors, outcome measures are weak: life expectancy (20th highest among comparators), DPT immunization (27th highest), primary enrollment (12th highest), secondary enrollment (13th highest).

### Pension System Accounting Identity and Policy Levers
- Pension system described by identity (notation preserved in source):  
  - Deficit financing ratio expression implies PF deficit financing can be reduced by:  
    - increasing the contribution rate ( );  
    - increasing the number of contributors (C);  
    - reducing the pension replacement ratio ( );  
    - reducing the number of eligible pensioners (P).

### Recommended Measures to Improve Pension Finances (as presented)
- Reduce the accrual rate back to 1% (from current 1.35 %).  
- Repeal indexation of pensions by 20 percent of average wage growth (if higher than the CPI growth) and keep only CPI indexation.  
- Delink minimum pension benefits from minimum subsistence and introduce means testing for minimum subsistence supplement.  
- Reduce unfunded privileged/special pensions through:  
  - widening the contribution period to qualify for such benefits;  
  - raising the retirement age and service period; and  
  - converging the accrual rate and indexation for civil servants to the general system.  
- Consider further increases in the retirement age in line with the increase in life expectancy.

### Recommended Measures to Reduce the Public Wage Bill and Improve Efficiency
- Contain public sector wage growth below CPI growth for a couple of years to offset large real growth rates in 2012–13, with the aim of reducing the wage bill to 10 percent of GDP in the medium term.  
- Perform functional analysis of critical sectors to identify areas for efficiency enhancements.  
- Reassess appropriateness of public sector norms and speed up the shift to per capita allocation of resources and performance-based budgeting.  
- Conduct public employment census to identify problem areas and eliminate vacant positions by gradually introducing elements of attrition in public employment.

### Key Statistics and Fiscal Magnitudes (preserved from source)
- Public debt-to-GDP ratio: on path to exceed 40 percent.  
- Government expenditures: close to 50 percent of GDP.  
- Government revenues: close to 45 percent of GDP.  
- Current expenditures: 45 percent of GDP.  
- Capital expenditures: 3 percent of GDP (falling further in 2013); averaged 2 percent of GDP over the last decade.  
- Social benefits: 22 percent of GDP.  
- Pension expenditures: increased from 12 percent of GDP in 2004 to about 17 percent of GDP in 2012.  
- Total pension expenditure in 2013 budget: 17.8 percent of GDP.  
- Pension Fund own expenditure 192,779 (mln UAH) — 13.5 percent of GDP.  
- Pension Fund own revenue 171,018 (mln UAH) — 12.0 percent of GDP.  
- Central government-financed expenditure 61,470 (mln UAH) — 4.3 percent of GDP.  
- Opening balance from 2012: 2,200 (mln UAH) — 0.2 percent of GDP.  
- Contributions: 164,285 (mln UAH) — 11.5 percent of GDP.  
- Other revenue: 4,534 (mln UAH) — 0.3 percent of GDP.  
- Deficit covered by central government: 21,761 (mln UAH) — 1.5 percent of GDP.  
- Total pension fund expenditure and total revenue and financing: 254,249 (mln UAH) — 17.8 percent of GDP.  
- Number of pensioners: 13,639,739; average pension UAH 1,471 per month.  
- Economy-wide average wage: UAH 2,722.  
- Average pension for above-1500 UAH bracket: UAH 2,479.  
- Share of pensioners above UAH 1,500 per month: 26.1 percent (3,560,954 persons).  
- Share of pension spending to that above-UAH-1,500 group: 44 percent.  
- Average replacement rate: 50 percent.  
- Public sector wage bill: 10.4 percent of GDP in 2011; projected 11.7 percent in 2013.  
- Target medium-term public wage bill: 10 percent of GDP.  
- Expected medium-term annual savings from 2011 pension reform: 1.8 percent of GDP; fiscal gains in the first three years projected to be 0.5 percent of GDP annually.  
- VAT refund automation: 50 percent of all VAT receipts being refunded via automated system.

*Prepared by Linda Kaltani (European Department) and Tigran Poghosyan (Fiscal Affairs Department).*

### Annex VIII. Reforming Energy Subsidies in Ukraine

### Annex VIII. Reforming Energy Subsidies in Ukraine

### Background
- Ukraine is very energy inefficient: energy intensity is "twice as large as that of Russia and ten times higher than that of the OECD."
- Energy sector losses have macroeconomic proportions and risk undermining macroeconomic stability.
- Large energy subsidies bridge gaps between retail and cost-recovery prices for gas and heating:
  - Utility companies serving households currently receive gas at 28 percent of full import pass-through price.
  - The average household pays about 19 percent of the full import pass-through price.
  - Utilities’ prices to households are, on average, only about 70 percent of their cost-recovery level net of a return on investment.
- Market segmentation creates arbitrage opportunities: industrial consumers face full import-price passthrough while households and district heating companies are heavily subsidized, reducing incentives for efficiency and creating incentives to siphon cheap gas to higher-paying consumers.
- Post-tax energy subsidies rose again after Russia started to raise gas prices for Ukraine; by 2012 post-tax energy subsidies amounted to 7.6 percent of GDP.
  - Of this amount only 1.3 percent of GDP was recorded on budget (as cash injections and subventions to local government to pay heating utilities); the remainder is off-budget operations such as recapitalization bonds or non-central government sources.

### Empirical evidence and distributional impacts
- Cross-country evidence: energy subsidies are generally ill targeted and have wide-ranging adverse economic consequences (fiscal deficits, misallocation of resources, deterring energy investment, undermining institutions, reinforcing inequality).
- Econometric findings (staff estimates):
  - Natural gas subsidies have a negative, substantial, and statistically significant impact on real per capita GDP growth.
  - Capital investment has a positive and significant impact on economic growth; energy subsidies may undermine growth by draining resources from human and capital investment.
  - Regression results: total energy subsidies (kerosene, gasoline, diesel, and natural gas) show inconclusive effects, while natural gas subsidies show a highly significant negative effect.
- Distributional evidence:
  - Bottom quintile receives 13.6 percent of total subsidies; top quintile receives 26.5 percent.
  - The unequal distribution is more pronounced for heating compared to natural gas; urban, affluent households (district heating users) capture a large share.
  - Poorer households spend a larger share of income on utilities:
    - For households connected to grid, share of expenditures on heat and gas in total net income is 9.7 percent for the first quintile and 4.6 percent for the fifth quintile.
  - GMI and social assistance context:
    - GMI receives only 4 percent of the social assistance budget.
    - GMI coverage is extremely low at less than 5 percent of the households in the bottom quintile.
- Fiscal trade-offs:
  - Energy subsidies (7.6 percent of GDP by 2012) represent a significant fiscal drain with high opportunity cost in foregone public investment.
  - About 60 percent of heat is currently wasted, indicating major potential savings from efficiency investments.

### Restarting energy sector reforms (policy framework)
- A comprehensive reform plan should rest on four pillars:
  1. Adjust energy tariffs to cost-recovery levels and eliminate chronic losses in Naftogaz while protecting the most vulnerable.
  2. Accelerate heat/gas metering installation and energy saving efforts to complement tariff hikes.
  3. Diversify gas imports away from Russia.
  4. Increase domestic gas exploration and production, including overcoming obstacles to shale gas exploration.
- Tariff adjustment recommendations:
  - Tariffs for households and utilities should increase immediately by at least 40 percent.
  - Adopt a schedule to raise tariffs to the cost recovery level over the next three years through semiannual increases of 20 percent until mid-2016.
  - Tariffs to industry would increase broadly in line with exchange rate movements.
  - Higher tariffs combined with somewhat higher gas sales to industry and efficiency gains would lead to operational cost recovery for Naftogaz in the medium term.
- Social protection to offset tariff impacts on the poor:
  - Scale up the existing system of targeted social assistance to protect the bottom two quintiles.
  - Refocus social assistance on income-based targeting rather than privilege-based benefits.
  - Move toward consolidation of social assistance into a single cash-transfer system such as GMI by shifting out of benefits focused on the cost of housing utilities into targeted cash benefits.
  - The World Bank believes GMI and housing utility subsidy programs can be scaled up within a six-month period.

### Short-term reform options (one-year horizon)
- Scale up GMI:
  - Increase income threshold and benefit amount to cover more poor people while preserving targeting performance.
  - Improve management information systems, approval and auditing procedures, and the information network among local offices and the Ministry of Social Protection.
- Restructure housing utilities benefits:
  - Replace the existing cap system with a cost-sharing system to limit benefits to a predefined group of poor households with minimal infrastructure adjustments.
- One-off cash transfers:
  - Link transfers to the tariff increase for a predefined share of the population and for households expected to have difficulty paying higher tariffs; could supplement GMI during heating season months.
- Lifeline tariff for gas and heating:
  - Provide a minimal amount of gas and/or heating at heavily subsidized prices contingent on meter installation and payment performance.
  - Gas meter installation is underway and at a good point; district heat meters lag behind, allowing differentiated treatment.

### Designing a public communication campaign
- Key messages/themes to be communicated:
  - Energy subsidies are a legacy of the past: expensive, inequitable, and unaffordable; the system is degraded after a protracted lack of investment over 25 years.
  - Energy subsidies are not a “free lunch”: if subsidies are not reduced, higher taxes or larger deficits would fall disproportionally on households in upper quintiles and taxpayers given the size of the grey economy.
  - High opportunity cost: subsidies crowd out public investment in health, education, and infrastructure; capital expenditure in Ukraine is low relative to other transition countries.
  - Protection for vulnerable groups: almost half of the population will receive social assistance to protect against reform effects; identifying the most vulnerable is feasible and the system can be scaled up quickly; heating assistance will be provided in winter if GMI cannot be scaled up in time.
  - Transparency and institutional reform: institute an automatic price adjustment mechanism implemented by NERC and NURC with public review at predefined frequencies; enhance regulators’ financial and political independence; shift regulatory focus to rate-of-return regulation; fully integrate quasi-fiscal subsidies into the budget for transparency and reduced fiscal risks.
  - Leverage neighboring countries’ experiences and past domestic lessons: regulators already exist; Ukraine’s candidacy for EITI will enhance transparency; better knowledge of subsidy beneficiaries and social assistance matrix supports reform design.

*Prepared by Linda Kaltani. Source: IMF staff estimates and analysis in Annex VIII. Reforming Energy Subsidies in Ukraine.*

### Box 1. Examples of Transition Countries Tackling Energy Subsidy Reforms

### Box 1. Examples of Transition Countries Tackling Energy Subsidy Reforms

### Armenia
- Context and problem:
  - After gaining independence, Armenia significantly underpriced electricity (providing subsidies to the tune of 11 percent of GDP).
  - Early price adjustments did not completely eliminate quasi-fiscal subsidies, and increasing gas prices led to an exacerbation of the problem.
- Policy responses:
  - In 1999, Armenia introduced a cash transfer program that replaced child and family allowances.
    - The new program was used as a mechanism to help beneficiaries maintain their real consumption in the face of higher electricity bills.
    - Continued efforts were made to increase the coverage of the cash transfer program.
  - One-off cash transfers were made to low-income households and households considered at risk of struggling to cope with higher electricity prices.
  - The Global Partnership on Output-based Aid (GPOBA) and the World Bank funded a scheme providing grants to poor households for individual heating solutions based on gas heaters and in some cases boilers.
- Drawbacks / unintended consequences:
  - Tariff increases for electricity caused some customers to switch to cheaper, often dirtier, fuel sources such as wood fuel or natural gas.
  - Many poor households were pushed to not heat at all.
- Takeaways for Ukraine:
  - GMI is critically important and could to be scaled up in coverage and benefit; one-off cash transfers may be necessary.

### Moldova
- Context and drivers:
  - Increases in Russian gas import prices prompted tariff increases and overall reforms in the energy sector in Moldova.
  - IMF and World Bank-supported programs were instrumental in pushing reforms forward.
- Key reforms implemented:
  - (i) Parliament transferred the responsibility for tariff setting from the municipal authorities to the energy regulator.
  - (ii) The energy regulator raised energy tariffs to financial cost-recovery levels.
  - (iii) The power to appoint the energy regulator’s council of administration and approve its budget was transferred to Parliament.
- Social mitigation and institutional measures:
  - To mitigate the impact of higher energy tariffs on the most vulnerable, the central government provided support alongside the municipal assistance scheme as a bridge until the new targeted social assistance system was fully deployed.
  - Steps on the social assistance front included improved capacity of social services and continuous awareness campaigns to increase applications and expand enrollment in the new means-tested social assistance program so as to more quickly phase out the old category-based compensation system.
  - The guaranteed minimum income and the cold-month assistance were increased.
  - The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection allocated additional resources to strengthen its capacity to promptly process applications for the cash transfer program to ensure adequate access to social assistance.
- Drawbacks / challenges:
  - Uneven implementation, with heating arrears remaining a challenge.
  - Pressure from the municipality of Chisinau to limit heating tariff increases.
- Takeaways for Ukraine:
  - NERC and NURC should be de facto independent with appointments of its members done by Parliament rather than the President.
  - Awareness campaigns can be put in place in order to increase applications for GMI and/or housing utilities subsidies.
  - The resources of the Ministry of Social Protection may need to be re-assessed to ensure that it has the capacity to handle a potentially much larger number of beneficiaries.

*IMF staff compilation from Box 1: Examples of Transition Countries Tackling Energy Subsidy Reforms.*

### 1.   Return to economic activity 2. Cost of finance

### 1.   Return to economic activity 2. Cost of finance

### Social returns (low investment in complementary to capital factors of production)
- Geography – strategic location, large market size, but discrepancies between east and west (industrial development concentrated in the eastern part);
- Human capital – solid education, but existing skill mismatches between labor demand and supply;
- Infrastructure – underprovision and weaknesses in infrastructure, specyfically in transport, logistic and energy;

### Appropriability / Local finance
- Government failures:
  - domestic saving - below CEESE average (since 2009); a downward trend in domestic savings to GDP ratio;
  - intermediation – vulnerabilities in the financial sector; underdeveloped equity market;
  - market failures (information and coordination externalities leading to sub-optimal investment): underperformance in export diversification and sophistication, weaknesses in technology absorption and innovation;
- Micro risks:
  - weaknessess in governance and the rule of law; poor property rights and contract enforcement; corruption; room to improve competition;
- Macro risks:
  - high vulnerabilities, external imbalances, inconsistent policy mix;

### International finance
- International finance - volatile; access to foreign capital largely depends on macroeconomic stability, authorities' willingness to conduct reforms and on global risk perception;
- Sometimes ease of access to foreign capital (investors' profit seeking) may mask the urgency for reforms;

### Constraints to growth (summary points from Table 1 and Table 3)
- Weak protection of property rights;
- Corruption, undocumented extrapayments, favoritism;
- Weak judicial independence; judiciary subject to various pressures to influence court decisions;
- Weak efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes and challenging government actions and regulations;
- Weak transparency of government policymaking;
- Weak auditing and reporting standards;
- Weak legal protection of minority shareholders’ interests;
- Weak reliability of police services in enforcing law and order;
- Market dominated by a few business groups and weak effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy in promoting competition;
- Taxes reduce incentives to invest;
- Administrative complexity creates uncertainty in commercial transactions;
- Completing licensing requirements is still time-consuming and costly;
- Weak efficiency of custom procedures;
- Non-tariff barriers constrain trade freedom;
- Underdeveloped investment framework with several sectoral restrictions, bureaucracy;
- Soundness of banks;
- Weak affordability of financial services for businesses;
- Undeveloped financing through local equity market;
- Underdeveloped regulation and supervision of securities exchanges;
- Limited technology transfer by FDI;
- Weak cluster development;

### Heatmap and indicators
- Heatmap of Structural Indicators in CESEE: legend indicates green—better than CESEE average; orange—between average and one standard deviation below average; red—more than one standard deviation below average.
- Data sources referenced: World Economic Forum 2013-2014 Global Competitiveness Index; Heritage Foundation 2013 Index of Economic Freedom; World Bank 2011 Worldwide Governance Indicators.

### Reform strategy and priorities (overall)
- Reform priorities need to be defined based on their impact on growth and guarantee broad-based improvements to address obstacles to investment on different levels and in different dimensions;
- Strategy should avoid targeting structural indicators that offer only narrow-based advances in competitiveness ratings without effectively addressing major economic distortion adversely influencing investment activity;
- Strategy could build on the President’s Reform Program for 2010–14, but should re-focus on broad-based benefits to growth in the medium term;
- Reforms should simultaneously address impediments to investment on the demand and supply side;
- Emphasis equally on creation of a solid legal framework, efficient implementation of regulations, and the execution of law;
- Essential to strengthen the judicial system, simplify or repeal burdensome government regulations, step-up anti-corruption measures, including by enhancing the anti-money laundering (AML) framework, and strengthen the financial system;
- Sector-specific policy measures, particularly in the gas and energy sector, would be beneficial but are beyond the scope of this note;

### Specific reform recommendations (based on staff analysis and EBRD, EU, WB, OECD recommendations)

Institutions
- continue to reform the justice system to improve its efficiency and governance and ensure fair resolution of commercial disputes;
- establish an independent business ombudsman, as recommended by a number of business organizations and IFIs, to respond to concerns about unfair business practices and advocate swift action to resolve such concerns;
- strengthen administrative, judicial and operational enforcement capacity to protect property rights;
- avoid frequent changes in regulations, reduce delays in issuing regulations and ensure their effective implementation (avoid administrative discretion);
- enhance implementation and law enforcement;

Business and services regulation
- reduce frequency and fragmented changes to public procurement law; establish a monitoring system to ensure proper implementation of public procurement;
- streamline administrative procedures in licensing and business permits;
- continue to address delays in VAT refunds through conventional measures;
- impose clear and consistent rules in tax administration;
- make the recently reformed corporate insolvency framework operational;

Openness to trade and FDI; Innovation
- remove the remaining foreign investment and trade restrictions in line with WTO commitments;
- ensure thorough implementation of the Custom Code;

Financial market rigidities
- fully implement the 2008 FSAP recommendations and recommendations of the 2013 Article IV report, including strengthen the overall legal, regulatory, and supervisory framework, and remove obstacles to capital market development;
- ensure consistent implementation and enforcement of supervision on consolidated basis, bank resolution framework, and of the law on disclosure of ultimate beneficiary owners.

*Sources: IMF staff analysis; World Bank Ukraine-Country Economic Memorandum; World Bank 2014 Doing Business; World Economic Forum 2013–2014 Global Competitiveness Index. See Hausmann et al. (2005) for details on a decision tree.*

### References

### References

### Bibliographic sources cited
- EBRD, 2011 “Strategy for Ukraine 2011-2014” http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/country/strategy/ukraine_country_strategy_2011_2014.pdf.  
- EBRD, 2012, “Transition Report 2012” http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/flagships/transition.shtml  
- EU, 2013 “EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the Association Agreement” http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/docs/index_en.htm  
- GRECO, 2013 “Third Addendum to the Compliance Report on Ukraine” http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/GrecoRC1&2(2009)1_ThirdAdd_Ukraine_EN.pdf.  
- Hausmann, Ricardo, Dani Rodric, and Andres Velasco, 2005, “Growth Diagnostics”, Working Paper, http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~rhausma/new/growthdiag.pdf  
- Heritage Foundation, 2013 “Index of Economic Freedom” http://www.heritage.org/index /ranking  
- IMF, 2010 “Cross-Cutting Themes in Employment Experiences During the Crisis,” IMF Report SM/10/274, http://www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=4499  
- OEDC, 2011 “Investment Policy Reviews: Ukraine 2011” http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-ukraine-2011_9789264113503-en  
- OECD, 2012A “Competitiveness and Private Sector Development: Ukraine 2011. Sector Competitiveness Strategy”. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/competitiveness-and-private-sector-development-ukraine-2011_9789264128798-en  
- OECD, et al., 2012B “SBA country profile: Ukraine”, in SME Policy Index: Eastern Partner Countries 2012: Progress in the Implementration of the Small Business Act for Europe, OECD Publishing http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264178847-23-en  
- European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2011 “The EU's neighbouring economies: coping with new challenges”. European Economy, Occasional Papers 86, Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/op86_en.htm  
- Sala-i-Martin X., Artadi E., “The Global Competitiveness Index" (with Elsa V. Artadi), Global Competitiveness Report, Global Economic Forum 2004  
- World Economic Forum 2013, 2013 “The Global Competitiveness Report 2013 – 2014”, http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2013-2014  
- World Bank, 2010 “Ukraine - Country Economic Memorandum. Strategic Choices to Accelerate and Sustain Growth”, Report No. 55895-UA http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/08/12806057/ukraine-country-economic-memorandum-strategic-choices-accelerate-sustain-growth  
- World Bank, 2012 “Worldwide Governance Indicators” http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home  
- World Bank, 2013 “Doing Business 2013. Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises” http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2013

---

### Fund relations

### SDR Department and outstanding arrangements (As of October 31, 2013)
- Net cumulative allocation: 1,309.44 SDR Million, 100.00 percent Allocation.  
- Holdings: 25.04 SDR Million, 1.91 percent Allocation.  
- Outstanding Purchases and Loans: Stand-by Arrangements 3,968.75 SDR Million, 289.27 percent Quota.

### Latest financial arrangements (amounts and dates preserved)
- Stand-By: Date of Arrangement 07/28/10; Expiration Date 12/27/12; Amount Approved 10,000.00 SDR million; Amount Drawn 2,250.00 SDR million.  
- Stand-By: Date of Arrangement 11/05/08; Expiration Date 07/27/10; Amount Approved 11,000.00 SDR million; Amount Drawn 7,000.00 SDR million.  
- Stand-By: Date of Arrangement 03/29/04; Expiration Date 03/28/05; Amount Approved 411.60 SDR million; Amount Drawn 0.00 SDR million.

### Projected payments to Fund (SDR Million; based on existing use of resources and present holdings of SDRs)
- Forthcoming Principal by year: 2013 609.38; 2014 2,390.63; 2015 968.75.  
- Charges/Interest by year: 2013 14.68; 2014 26.47; 2015 7.90; 2016 1.37; 2017 1.16.  
- Total by year: 2013 624.06; 2014 2,417.09; 2015 976.65; 2016 1.37; 2017 1.16.

### Exchange arrangements
- Hryvnia (UAH) introduced in September 1996 at KrB 100,000 to UAH 1.  
- NBU influences the exchange rate via interventions, foreign exchange regulations and controls, and moral suasion; no specific path or target announced.  
- Since 2009 the official exchange rate remained close to UAH 8.0 per U.S. dollar; from July 2012 fixed at 7.993 UAH/USD.  
- Average-weighted interbank market rate for U.S. dollar (as calculated by the NBU) did not deviate by more than 2 percent from the official NBU rate since September 2009 (though market-quoted interbank or cash rates often exceeded this threshold).  
- Classification history: effective February 2, 2009, de facto exchange rate arrangement changed from managed floating with no predetermined path to other managed arrangement retroactive to April 30, 2008; since March 1, 2010 classified as stabilized arrangement.  
- NBU developing a monetary policy framework focused on domestic price stability with greater exchange rate flexibility; transition to a free floating exchange rate planned when financial system recovers and transmission mechanisms mature.  
- On September 24, 1996, Ukraine accepted obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement.  
- Two multiple currency practices maintained: (i) use of the official exchange rate for certain government transactions; and (ii) requirement that a Ukrainian resident who sells previously purchased foreign exchange not used within 10 days shall transfer 100 percent of the positive difference from the sale price, on a quarterly basis, to the State budget.

### FSAP, ROSCs and safeguards
- FSAP participation: Joint World Bank–IMF FSAP assessment in 2003; Financial Sector Stability Assessment (FSSA) considered by Executive Board on May 14, 2003. Assessed: Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision; Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies; CPSS Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems; OECD Principles for Corporate Governance; Accounting and Auditing Practices; World Bank’s Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights System; and AML/CFT Methodology.  
- FSAP update undertaken in 2007; assessed: Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision; IOSCO Core Principles of Securities Regulation. FSSA considered by Executive Board as part of 2008 Article IV consultation.  
- Next FSAP scheduled for the second half of 2014 prior to the 2014 Article IV consultation.  
- ROSCs: Data ROSC Module conducted April 3–17, 2002 and considered by Executive Board on August 5, 2003 (IMF Country Report No. 03/256). Fiscal Transparency Module (experimental) issued September 1999; update April 2004 (IMF Country Report No. 04/98).  
- Safeguards assessments: Most recent assessment of the NBU completed on February 1, 2011. Findings: NBU strengthened safeguards framework since 2008 assessment by implementing majority of recommendations; deferred implementation of some provisions under new NBU law enacted in 2010 weakens effectiveness; new financial risks emerged because of special legislation and resolutions impairing NBU autonomy. Steps taken include approval of a law repealing requirement that bank recapitalization bonds are subject to mandatory repurchase at face value by the NBU.

### UFR/Article IV Consultation
- Ukraine is on a 12-month consultation cycle.  
- Last Article IV consultation concluded on June 29, 2012 and a report was published on IMF external website.

---

### Relations with the World Bank

### Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) and objectives
- CPS (2012-16) discussed by Board of Directors on February 16, 2012. CPS aims to assist Ukraine in overcoming implementation bottlenecks in the Presidential Program and to support reform and EU integration agenda.  
- CPS organized around two pillars emphasizing improved governance:  
  - Pillar I: supports relations between government and citizens; focuses on improving public services, sustainability and efficiency of public finances, and more transparent and accountable use of public resources.  
  - Pillar II: supports cooperation between government and business; focuses on growth, competitiveness and job creation, improvements in business climate, promotion of domestic and foreign direct investments, and channeling public investment into critical public infrastructure.  
- World Bank Group assistance calibrated to match authorities' commitment, capacity and track-record. Investment loans offered where governance risks manageable and implementation track record established; analytical and advisory services offered to strengthen reform consensus and build capacity. Development policy lending contingent on sustainable macroeconomic framework and progress on governance weaknesses.

### World Bank investment lending portfolio and pipeline
- Current investment lending portfolio: nine operations totaling US$ 1.9 billion, of which almost 50 percent has been disbursed.  
- Public sector projects: Public Finance Modernization Project (US$50 million); Statistical System Modernization Project (US$42 million).  
- Energy and infrastructure projects: Hydropower Rehabilitation Project and additional financing (US$166.0 million) approved June 2005 and November 2009; Power Transmission Project (US$200 million) approved August 2007; Energy Efficiency Project (US$200 million) approved in 2011. Roads projects: Roads and Safety Improvement project (US$400 million) approved 2009; Second Roads and Safety Improvement Project (US$450 million) approved 2012. Urban Infrastructure Project (US$140 million).  
- Financial sector: Second Export Development Project (EDP2; US$154 million plus additional financing of US$150 million).  
- Investment lending program for first two years of CPS envisages base level support in range of US$500 million per annum.  
- Current investment lending pipeline for FY14 includes operations totaling US$850 million: scaling up targeted social assistance; second Urban Infrastructure project; District Heating Energy Efficiency Project (subject to government demand and Bank lending capacity).  
- FY15–16 potential areas: (i) transport and trade facilitation; (ii) energy efficiency and energy security; (iii) municipal services and governance; (iv) health services and financing; (v) private sector development and access to financing.  
- Possibility for upward revision through Development Policy Lending (DPL) if reforms accelerate and governance progress made; Programmatic Financial Sector DPL series and cross-sector DPL series could be launched subject to conditions.

### Analytical and advisory assistance (AAA) priorities
- Main AAA areas: (i) investment climate including agriculture, land, business regulations; (ii) fiscal, tax and PFM; (iii) energy efficiency and governance (including gas sector modernization); (iv) financial sector stability and development; (v) municipal governance and service delivery; (vi) social reforms (targeted social assistance and pension reform); (vii) health sector reforms.  
- Partnerships in policy dialogue and AAA with EC, IMF, USAID, EBRD and other bilateral donors to continue and expand.

---

### Indicative IBRD Knowledge Services, FY13–14

### Pillar 1: Improving public services and public finances
- Structural and Governance Reforms TA (Programmatic)  
- Gas and Heating Tariff Reform TA  
- Municipal Energy Efficiency Finance  
- Solid Waste Management Sector Review  
- Effective Response to HIV/AIDS  
- Support to Family and Community Services  
- IDF Pilot Health reform

### Pillar 2: Improving policy effectiveness and economic competitiveness
- Structural and Governance Reforms TA (Programmatic)  
- Financial Sector TA (Programmatic)  
- Private Sector Development TA (Programmatic)  
- Agriculture and Landing Monitoring TA  
- Ukraine Smart Grid Project PPG  
- Partnership for Market Readiness in Ukraine TA

---

### Bank-Fund Collaboration: agreed objectives and division of labor
- Joint Management Action Plan: Fund and Bank to support Ukraine’s efforts to:  
  - Pursue fiscal consolidation whilst finding fiscal space to increase public investments to support private sector growth and tackle pressing social issues.  
  - Move forward with energy sector and utility tariff reforms whilst protecting the poor.  
  - Complete rehabilitation and strengthen oversight of the banking system.  
  - Strengthen the monetary policy framework.  
  - Improve the investment climate.

### Specific areas of coordinated work and instruments
- Restoring confidence and fiscal sustainability:  
  - Strengthen public finances and advance structural reforms to underpin medium-term fiscal sustainability and growth.  
  - Reduce the footprint of the public sector and reallocate resources from transfers and other current spending toward growth-enhancing capital investments and better targeted social support.  
  - Bank recommends a series of structural measures to reform the pension system; Fund and Bank to work closely on sequencing reforms to put pension system on sound financial footing.  
  - Bank to provide project financing for public sector reforms (Public Finance Modernization Project, Statistical System Modernization Project, investments to modernize social assistance services).  
  - Bank and Fund to coordinate on debt management strengthening.

- Reforming and modernizing the energy sector whilst improving targeting of safety nets:  
  - Aim to improve energy efficiency, eliminate need for budgetary support to Naftogaz, and encourage investment in gas exploration, extraction, and transportation.  
  - Bank support focuses on infrastructure modernization through investment loans (hydropower rehabilitation, power and gas transmission, energy efficiency).  
  - Fund focuses on phasing out Naftogaz’s deficit via steady gas prices and utility tariff increases to advance cost recovery and reduce fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits.  
  - Bank to support Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative reporting in gas sector and advise on targeting social assistance to protect poor households.

- Preserving banking sector stability while deepening financial intermediation:  
  - Coordinate on advising NBU to improve regulatory and institutional supervisory framework to make banking system more resilient.  
  - Provide policy advice and technical assistance on crisis preparedness, contingency planning, and enhancing resolution tools.  
  - Support development of framework for recognition and resolution of impaired loans, including necessary changes to legislation, regulations, and tax treatment.  
  - Bank to provide technical assistance to non-bank financial institution regulators.

- Developing a more robust monetary policy framework:  
  - Fund leads on policy advice and technical assistance to strengthen monetary policy and operations frameworks and establish preconditions for moving toward inflation targeting over the medium term.  
  - Fund to provide technical assistance for liberalization of foreign currency market and addressing remaining NBU governance shortcomings identified in Safeguards Assessment.

- Improving investment climate:  
  - Bank Group leads support for measures to reduce entry and exit barriers, improve fair competition, and overcome governance and regulatory barriers to trade and FDI.  
  - Fund to provide support as appropriate.

World Bank Contact: Lalita Moorty, Lead Economist; Anastasia Golovach, Economist; (Tel.: 380-44-490-6671).

*References and staff report excerpts from the IMF country documentation contained in the supplied PDF content unit.*

### 1. Bank UA-Municipal energy efficiency

### 1. Bank UA-Municipal energy efficiency financing

### EBRD engagement and portfolio in Ukraine
- As of end-October 2013 the EBRD’s portfolio in Ukraine reached €4.8 billion (with 2013 signings of €630 million), with most of it being in the private sector.
- The Bank’s country exposure in Ukraine is its second largest after Russia, accounting for approximately 1/8th of the Bank’s overall portfolio.
- Portfolio exposure is roughly equally distributed across the Bank’s three main industry sectors: Industry & Commerce, Financial Institutions and Energy & Infrastructure.
- Country strategy for 2011–14 (approved April 2011) focuses on:
  - sustainable energy through energy efficiency and renewable energy, and energy security;
  - unlocking agricultural and industrial potential;
  - providing good quality and reliable infrastructure;
  - addressing legacy issues in the financial sector.
- The Bank is working on the country strategy for 2014–18.

### Crisis response and lending patterns
- During the 2008–09 financial crisis the EBRD pursued a country specific crisis response program coordinated with authorities and other IFIs.
- In 2009 the EBRD invested €1.1 billion in Ukraine (a record level), with almost two-thirds of the total amount invested in the banking sector.
- In 2009 the Bank invested over €250 million in the corporate sector and a further €220 million in the infrastructure and energy sectors.
- During 2010 and 2011 total investments remained at roughly €1.1 billion, but were more equally balanced across sectors.
- Starting from 2012 a marked decline in demand for development loans was observed, particularly in the non-agribusiness corporate sector, largely due to a deteriorating investment climate; the Bank has increased coordination with key players (including the IMF) to address corruption and unfair business practices.

### Support for private sector, SMEs, and agribusiness
- The Bank has supported medium and large local clients including Nibulon, MHP, Ukrplastic and Lugzentrokuz; participated in financing international investors and cross-border transactions.
- Small and medium-size enterprises have been reached via credit lines through partner banks.
- Small Business Support (SBS) and Business Advisory Services (BAS) programs:
  - BAS roll-out in May 2010 supported nearly 200 SMEs to improve production quality, market performance, business processes and organizational structures.
  - Enterprise Growth Programme (EGP) provided international operational and technical know-how for manufacturing companies with high value added to improve corporate governance, business transparency and corporate social responsibility.
  - The Bank may consider further expansion of advisory services in Ukraine’s regions.
- Agribusiness policy dialogue: active in the grain sector promoting transparency and predictability; organized two round tables leading to a working group advising government that grain export quotas deter investment. The Bank is exploring policy dialogue possibilities in the dairy sector.

### Energy, natural resources, and municipal sector investments
- The Bank supports modernization of gas transit system and implementation of the March 2009 EU-Ukraine memorandum of understanding on energy.
- Recent private renewable energy investments: the Bank signed five private deals (solar, wind, biomass) for the total amount of €54 million over the last year alone.
- Natural resources: the Bank extended USD 70 million loan to Coal Energy (private independent coal producer) including investment in coal mining and strong health and safety and energy efficiency components.
- Nuclear safety: in 2013 the Bank signed a €300 million Nuclear Safety sovereign loan with Energoatom as part of a major €1 billion project to be co-financed by Euroatom, addressing safe decommissioning of Chernobyl NPP and creation of a safe confinement for Unit 4.
- Municipal sector:
  - The Bank signed four loans totalling €50 million during 2012–2013 with Ukrainian municipal utilities for upgrade and modernization of district heating and water systems (first municipal loans without sovereign guarantees following budget framework amendments).
  - These projects will benefit from grant co-financing of €25 million from E5P Fund and Swedish SIDA.
  - The Bank provided a €152 million sovereign loan to finance the Dnipropetrovsk Metro completion project, to be co-financed by the European Investment Bank.
  - Strong pipeline of municipal projects, first of all in the district heating sector; scope of further investments will largely depend on progress with tariff reform.

### Transport and other infrastructure
- Transport sector financing includes two nonsovereign loans totalling €99 million to national railways (renewal of freight rolling stock) and to the air navigation service provider (system modernization).
- Continued financing of rehabilitation of main pan-European road corridors and support for independent private transport companies.

### Local currency lending and derivatives legislation
- On July 30 2013, President Yanukovych signed a law allowing the EBRD, IFC and other IFIs to issue bonds in Hryvna to fund local currency lending, particularly for SME and municipal borrowers; Parliament adopted relevant amendments on July 4, 2013.
- Operating regulations by financial sector regulators are still required to allow the EBRD to actually issue locally.
- EBRD worked with authorities on new derivatives legislation introducing netting and close-out netting and allowing hedging of foreign exchange risk and swap transactions; final draft is with the Cabinet of Ministers and the EBRD is largely satisfied with its content; next step is submission to the Rada for adoption.

---

### Statistical issues (November 2013)

### Assessment of data adequacy for surveillance
- General: Data provision has some shortcomings, but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
- Shortcomings identified particularly in national accounts, government finance statistics (GFS), and external sector statistics.

### National accounts
- NA are broadly in line with the 1993 SNA.
- STA multitopic TA mission (April 2010) flagged: financial account, sector balance sheets, and estimates of financial intermediation services indirectly measured as areas needing development.
- Volume measures of GDP have been rebased using 2007 as the reference period; recommended methodological improvements remain to be implemented.
- There is scope to increase the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine’s independence to improve data accuracy through flexible revisions.
- Since 2011 Ukraine is a beneficiary of the STA TA project on Capacity Building for Sustainable Compilation of Real Sector Statistics in Eastern Europe; SSS participated in three workshops on national accounts/price statistics.
- SSS requested assistance for implementation of the System of National Accounts 2008; a TA mission was expected in 2014:Q1.

### Price statistics
- CPI weights are updated annually.
- Geometric means are used at the very first level of price aggregation (beginning with January 2010 observations).
- Scientific sampling of outlets was introduced beginning with January 2011 observations, with results published within six days of the end of the reference month.
- Geographical coverage is limited to urban areas.
- CPI excludes price changes for owner occupied housing.

### Government finance statistics
- Compilers are cognizant of GFSM 2001 methodology and reference materials.
- Significant shortcomings: lack of a strong legal framework for compiling GFS and incomplete statistical coverage.
- Full adoption of GFSM 2001 depends on strengthening primary data sources, government accounting reform (undertaken under International Public Sector Accounting Standards), and completion of the GFS component of the World Bank project on development of statistics.
- Lack of clarity on the stock of VAT refund claims prevents full assessment of underlying fiscal performance.

### Monetary statistics
- Since September 2006 the NBU uses the Standardized Report Forms (SRF) for reporting monetary data to STA and EUR.
- Data for December 2001–August 2006 have been converted into the SRFs and used as the basis for publication of monetary statistics in the IFS.

### External sector
- Compilation relies heavily on the International Transactions Reporting System, customs declaration database, and enterprise surveys, providing broad and timely coverage.
- Improvements needed via increased enterprise surveys and more intensive use of available data sources in financial services, travel, compensation of employees, workers’ remittances, and reinvested earnings.
- Goods statistics could benefit from improved methodology for estimating the c.i.f./f.o.b. conversion coefficient and bringing reporting forms/instructions in line with international guidelines.
- Reconciliation efforts needed between direct investment data from enterprise surveys and ITRS; need to identify sources of large FX cash held outside the banking system classified under currency and deposits.
- Following 2012 STA TA, improvements are needed for direct investment: better coverage of debt instruments data and valuation of equity.

### Data standards and reporting
- Participant in the SDDS since January 10, 2003.
- Data ROSC published on August 19, 2003.
- IFS page published since July 1996.
- Monetary statistics published since September 2006 using the SRF framework in the IFS and available online.
- Quarterly Financial Soundness Indicators disseminated on the IMF’s website with observations beginning in 2005.
- International investment position compiled and reported since 2002.

### Selected data-timing entries (Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance, November 12, 2013)
- Exchange Rates: Date of latest observation 11/11/2013; Date received 11/12/2013; Frequency of data D; Frequency of reporting D; Frequency of publication D.
- International Reserve Assets and Reserve Liabilities of the Monetary Authorities: Date of latest observation 9/2013; Date received 10/18/2013; Frequency M.
- Reserve/Base Money: Date of latest observation 11/08/2013; Date received 11/12/2013; Frequency D; Frequency of reporting D; Frequency of publication M.
- Broad Money: Date of latest observation 11/08/2013; Date received 11/12/2013; Frequency D; Frequency of reporting D; Frequency of publication M.
- Central Bank Balance Sheet: Date of latest observation 9/2013; Date received 10/18/2013; Frequency M.
- Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Banking System: Date of latest observation 9/2013; Date received 10/18/2013; Frequency M.
- Interest Rates: Date of latest observation 11/08/2013; Date received 11/12/2013; Frequency D; Frequency of reporting D; Frequency of publication M.
- Consumer Price Index: Date of latest observation 10/2013; Date received 11/11/2013; Frequency M.
- Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing – General Government: Date of latest observation 9/30/2013; Date received 10/25/2013; Frequency M.
- Stocks of Central Government and Central Government-Guaranteed Debt: Date of latest observation 9/30/2013; Date received 10/25/2013; Frequency M.
- External Current Account Balance: Date of latest observation 9/30/2013; Date received 11/1/2013; Frequency M.
- Exports and Imports of Goods and Services: Date of latest observation 9/30/2013; Date received 11/1/2013; Frequency M.
- GDP/GNP Q2 2013: Date of latest observation 9/2013; Date received 9/2013; Frequency Q.
- Gross External Debt: Date of latest observation 7/2013; Date received 9/2013; Frequency Q.

---

### IMF staff statement (December 16, 2013)

### Recent macroeconomic developments (staff observations)
- Recent macroeconomic data came broadly in line with staff projections.
- Gross output in agriculture expanded by 43 percent y-o-y in October, supporting expectations that the economy may be gradually emerging out of the recession.
- The pace of decline in industrial production slowed to -4.9 percent y-o-y from -5.6 percent in September.
- The state-owned energy company Naftogaz continued to accumulate liabilities to Gazprom for unpaid gas imports (about US$2 billion as of end-November); authorities are seeking to defer settlement to 2014.

### Political developments and budget outlook
- The decision not to sign the Association Agreement with the EU led to mass protests and a political crisis which persists, despite the government’s survival of a no-confidence vote on December 3.
- Authorities reaffirmed their aspiration for EU integration; a Ukrainian delegation is going to Brussels to discuss aspects of implementation of the association and free trade agreement with the EU.
- Authorities have reportedly been seeking external financing from Russia and China.
- Under current circumstances, the content of the 2014 budget and the timing of its adoption remain uncertain.

*Source: _cr14145 - 1. Bank UA-Municipal energy efficiency*

### 4.      Markets have reacted negatively to the recent events with Ukraine’s Eurobond

### _cr14145 - 4.      Markets have reacted negatively to the recent events with Ukraine’s Eurobond

### Market reaction and external reserves
- Eurobond yields and CDS spreads widened sharply to multi-year highs.
- National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) gross reserves declined to US$18.8 billion at end-November (about 2.2 months of import coverage).
- Exchange rate has remained broadly stable so far, supported by NBU interventions.
- Commercial banks report only a small uptick in household deposit withdrawals.
- Persistent demand-supply imbalance in the foreign exchange market raises the risk of market-forced exchange rate adjustment in case of intensified pressures.

### Macroeconomic outlook and performance
- Ukrainian economy in recession since mid-2012; January–September 2013 GDP contracted by 1¼ percent y-o-y.
- Consumer prices stayed flat; tight monetary policy and decreasing food prices held inflation down.
- Trailing 12-month current account deficit elevated at about 8 percent of GDP by end-September despite a significant reduction in natural gas imports.
- International reserves fell below the equivalent of 2½ months of imports by end-October 2013.
- Under currently planned policies, modest growth should return in 2014, driven by improvements in external demand, strong grain exports, and continuing consumption expansion.
- Outlook subject to significant risks from inconsistent policy mix and heightened political and economic uncertainty.

### Fiscal position and vulnerabilities
- Fiscal stance loosened in 2012–13, contributing to vulnerabilities.
- Large pension and wage increases, generous energy subsidies, and soccer cup spending widened the combined deficit of general government and Naftogaz to 5½ percent of GDP in 2012.
- In 2013, combined government-Naftogaz deficit projected to expand to 7¾ percent of GDP.
- Overall energy subsidies reached about 7½ percent of GDP in 2012.
- Naftogaz’s losses in 2013:H1 more than doubled and the company is late on payments for imported gas.
- General government deficit in 2013 includes recognized arrears (1.3 percent of GDP).

### Monetary policy, exchange rate, and banking sector
- Tight monetary policy in 2012–13 focused on defending exchange rate stability while accommodating expanding fiscal deficit.
- Base money increased by nearly 15 percent in the year to September 2013.
- Authorities tightened foreign exchange regulations and controls to ensure supply, increasing transactions costs.
- Banking system appears stable but vulnerabilities persist:
  - Average capital adequacy ratio of 18 percent.
  - Non-performing loan ratio of 14 percent.
  - High interest rates induced more than 30 percent increase in hryvnia deposits in the year to November, while credit expanded only modestly.
- Ukraine remains current on all payments to the Fund; on the obligation basis, outstanding Fund credit would decline below 200 percent of quota by February 2014 and below 100 percent of quota by September 2014.

### Executive Board assessment and policy recommendations
- Current macroeconomic policy mix generated large external and fiscal imbalances and contributed to deepening the recession.
- Directors recommended a package of comprehensive policy adjustments including:
  - Curtailing fiscal and external current account deficits.
  - Phasing out energy subsidies.
  - Strengthening the banking sector.
  - Improving external competitiveness.
- Exchange rate and monetary policy:
  - Overvalued exchange rate contributed to widening external deficit, loss of competitiveness, and reserve depletion.
  - Directors advised allowing greater exchange rate flexibility and accelerating transition to an inflation targeting framework.
- Banking sector recommendations:
  - Enforce consolidated supervision and high reporting standards.
  - Proceed with independent audits of vulnerable banks.
  - Develop contingency plans to support banks if needed.
- Fiscal consolidation recommendations:
  - Reduce high budget expenditure by rationalizing public procurement, restraining growth in public sector wages and employment, and limiting pension indexation to inflation.
  - Refrain from unaffordable tax cuts.
- Energy sector reform recommendations:
  - Upfront, meaningful, and broad-based tariff increases essential to reduce quasi-fiscal losses, attract investment, and improve governance.
  - Accompany tariff increases with measures to protect the most vulnerable households.
  - Energy-saving reforms, increased domestic gas production, and diversification of energy imports welcomed but cannot substitute for tariff adjustments.
- Governance and business climate:
  - Continue strengthening institutional capacity, judicial system, law enforcement, and tax administration, and eradicate corruption.

### Findings from the Ex Post Evaluation (2010 Stand-By Arrangement)
- SBA was appropriately designed to address important vulnerabilities and delivered notable achievements, including passage of pension reform in 2011.
- Program quickly went off-track as authorities stopped implementing agreed policies, reflecting insufficient ownership.
- Lessons:
  - Exceptional access and long-duration arrangements may be too ambitious where program policy ownership is low.
  - A mechanism to terminate off-track arrangements could be useful.
  - Prior actions are a powerful tool for implementing program policies.

### Authorities’ views and measures taken
- Ukrainian authorities appreciate IMF cooperation and have implemented many prior recommendations, acknowledging some require longer time.
- External risks recognized: recession in Europe, slowdown in Russia and China, high import prices for energy; these factors pressure current account and growth.
- Reported outcomes and measures:
  - External position deterioration: current account deficit widened to over 8 percent of GDP; gross international reserves dropped to 2.1 months of future imports coverage.
  - Signs of gradual recovery driven by agriculture and private consumption: agriculture output growth amounted to 9.9 percent and retail trade amounted to 9.5 percent in January–October.
  - Near zero inflation (0.2 percent y-o-y in November).
- Monetary and financial sector actions:
  - Preparation for inflation targeting framework; improved overnight interest rate corridor and placement of overnight deposit certificates (mid-June 2013).
  - Model-based macroeconomic analysis and forecasting system developed by NBU.
  - Financial stability unit established in NBU; modeling toolkit for banking stress testing developed.
  - Dedollarization: share of FX deposits decreased to 38.6 percent in October from 43.6 percent at beginning of year; share of FX loans fell to 35.4 percent from 37 percent at beginning of year.
- Fiscal and regulatory measures:
  - New transfer pricing law (introduced September 1) expected to yield additional budget revenues near 0.5 billion Hryvnia in 2013.
  - Improvements in Doing Business indicators: Ukraine jumped 28 positions in one year with major advances in "building permits" (145 + positions), "registering property" (61 + position) and "loans" (11 + positions).
- Energy sector measures:
  - Reform of Naftogaz envisaged to remove cross-subsidization and increase transparency.
  - Gas savings incentive system for heating communal companies introduced; economic effect estimated to be 4.1 billion of Hryvnia in 2013.
  - Domestic gas production increased by 0.5 billion of cubic meters in 2013.
  - Gas consumption decreased by 7.2 per cent (y-o-y) in January-October 2013.

### Authorities’ preference on exchange rate adjustment and financial stability
- Authorities consider a one-time adjustment of the exchange rate may incur high risks for financial stability and prefer a gradual transition to a monetary regime based on interest rate management and a more flexible exchange rate.
- Proposed measures to staff:
  - Unification of market and official exchange rate.
  - Widening of the exchange rate band to +/-10 per cent from the current level.
  - Further steps to increase exchange rate fluctuations to deal with external mismatches, if needed.
- Authorities note IMF staff estimates the reduction of bank capital at 2.25-4 percent of GDP as result of the proposed devaluation and concomitant rise in NPLs; they express concern staff may underestimate second-round effects of a large devaluation.
- Authorities aim to keep inflation (at least its core component) in the target range of 4-6 per cent.

### Key statistics (selected from "Ukraine: Selected Economic Indicators, 2010–14")
- Nominal GDP (billions of Ukrainian hryvnias): 1,083; 1,302; 1,409; 1,432; 1,503 (2010–2014).
- Real GDP (percent change): 4.1; 5.2; 0.2; -0.3; 1.0 (2010–2014).
- GDP deflator (percent): 13.8; 14.3; 8.0; 2.0; 4.0 (2010–2014).
- Unemployment rate (ILO; percent): 8.1; 7.9; 7.5; 8.0; 8.0 (2010–2014).
- Consumer prices (period average): 9.4; 8.0; 0.6; -0.3; 1.6 (2010–2014).
- Core inflation (period average) 1/: 8.6; 7.7; 3.3; 0.2; 1.4 (2010–2014).
- Nominal monthly wages (average): 17.7; 17.5; 14.9; 9.0; 5.6 (2010–2014).
- Real monthly wages (average): 7.6; 8.8; 14.2; 9.3; 3.9 (2010–2014).
- General government balance 2/ (percent of GDP): -5.8; -2.8; -4.5; -5.7; -4.6 (2010–2014).
- Overall balance (including Naftogaz operational deficit) (percent of GDP): -7.4; -4.3; -5.5; -7.7; -6.6 (2010–2014).
- Structural general government balance (percent of GDP): -3.7; -3.0; -4.5; -4.1; -4.1 (2010–2014).
- Public debt (end of period) 3/ (percent of GDP): 40.5; 36.8; 37.4; 41.3; 44.7 (2010–2014).
- Base money (end of period, percent change): 15.8; 6.3; 6.4; 14.7; 12.9 (2010–2014).
- Broad money (end of period, percent change): 22.7; 14.7; 12.8; 16.8; 14.1 (2010–2014).
- Credit to nongovernment (end of period, percent change): 1.1; 9.5; 2.2; 7.8; 8.2 (2010–2014).
- Interbank overnight rate (annual average, percent) 4/: 2.0; 5.8; 10.8; 3.3; ...
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): -2.2; -6.3; -8.1; -8.3; -8.2 (2010–2014).
- Foreign direct investment (percent of GDP): 4.2; 4.3; 3.8; 2.4; 2.4 (2010–2014).
- Gross reserves (end of period, billions of U.S. dollars): 34.6; 31.8; 24.5; 18.5; 11.2 (2010–2014).
- Months of next year's imports of goods and services: 4.2; 3.7; 3.0; 2.2; 1.3 (2010–2014).
- Percent of short-term debt (remaining maturity): 73.3; 55.4; 40.0; 32.3; 18.8 (2010–2014).
- External debt (percent of GDP): 86.0; 77.2; 76.6; 76.7; 75.3 (2010–2014).
- Goods exports (annual volume change in percent): 9.3; 7.1; 2.0; -7.4; 3.9 (2010–2014).
- Goods imports (annual volume change in percent): 15.0; 22.6; 2.2; -5.5; 2.6 (2010–2014).
- Goods terms of trade (percent change): 0.3; 7.6; -3.2; 2.2; 0.2 (2010–2014).
- Hryvnia per U.S. dollar (end of period): 8.0; 8.0; 8.0; ...; ...

*IMF staff report and Executive Board assessment (Press Release No. 13/531), December 19, 2013.*

### introduction of inflation targeting in Ukraine. The NBU has done much on a technical level

### introduction of inflation targeting in Ukraine. The NBU has done much on a technical level

### Monetary policy and inflation targeting
- The NBU has done much on a technical level to achieve introduction of inflation targeting.
- A surge in inflation that inevitably accompanies a deep devaluation could, for a long time, undermine the NBU’s credibility, which is indispensable for inflation targeting.
- The NBU will continue its preparations to adopt a full-blown inflation targeting framework, including:
  - strengthening its forecasting capacity, and
  - upgrading the operational framework of monetary policy.
- Further IMF technical assistance on the design of the inflation targeting framework will be helpful.

### Fiscal policy
- Authorities understand that fiscal policy should aim to support external adjustments and strengthen the medium-term fiscal sustainability.
- Fiscal consolidation will help contain domestic demand pressures and put public debt on a declining path.
- The Ukrainian authorities are ready to adjust both the general government and Naftogaz deficits as well as government guarantees since these are the main drivers of public debt.
- Fiscal consolidation at the general government level will be achieved through a balanced combination of revenue and expenditure measures.
- Choice of projects for government guarantees will be based on strict selection criteria to find projects with a maximum cost recovery effect, and with emphasis on energy saving technologies and improvement of the balance of payments.
- Authorities are concerned that a too rapid depletion of fiscal stimulus could have strong negative effects on economic activity, with adverse consequences for fiscal sustainability.
- Authorities concur with staff that fiscal consolidation is needed, but favor a more gradual pace in restricting the budget deficit and state guarantees in 2014.

### Energy sector
- Authorities agree with IMF staff on the need for a significant reduction of inefficient subsidies in the energy sector.
- In some areas authorities need more time to carry out planned reforms in the most efficient way.
- Authorities consider raising gas and heating tariffs gradually in 2014-2015, starting with an increase in gas tariffs for households who consume more than a specific predetermined level.
  - This gradual approach will strengthen preparatory steps necessary to determine target groups for energy subsidies.
  - Rapid hikes in heating tariffs for all categories of the population could trigger a wave of non-payments, potentially undermining the positive effects for the balance sheet of Naftogaz.

### IMF engagement, market access, and risks
- Ukrainian authorities are ready to resume policy level discussions on a new Stand-by Arrangement with the Fund, which will help to stabilize the macroeconomic situation and to restore sustainable economic growth.
- Proposed activities, supported by the IMF, will restore access for Ukraine (both Government and private sector) to international capital markets.
- Increased flexibility of the exchange rate, fiscal consolidation and reduced energy subsidies are considered by a majority of experts (investors) to be prerequisites for the resumption of access to external financial resources.
- Market participants agree as well that a deep devaluation could be stressful for Ukraine’s financial system and may subsequently restrict market funding sources.

### Authorities’ perspective and reform approach
- Authorities thank the Fund for the continued constructive dialogue and agree with most of the assessments and recommendations.
- They recognize the necessity to accelerate reforms in the key policy sectors.
- They emphasize that consistency and balance in promoting reforms are key for preserving financial stability and political consensus in the Ukrainian society, and thus to realize the potential of the economy.

*Source: introduction of inflation targeting in Ukraine. The NBU has done much on a technical level*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/_cr14145.pdf_
