## _cr14252

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### Introduction — key messages
- The CEMAC region recorded robust growth for more than a decade but substantial development challenges remain.
- Oil producing countries (all CEMAC countries except CAR) launched ambitious public investment programs to fill infrastructure gaps.
- Despite large spending of oil wealth, poverty, income inequality and unemployment remain high due to poorly targeted and unproductive public spending.
- Business climate is one of the most challenging in Africa.
- Main regional challenge: implement structural reforms to promote sustainable and inclusive growth while adopting macro policies that preserve financial stability, ensure efficient use of oil revenues, and increase resilience to shocks.
- Regional institutions (BEAC, COBAC, the CEMAC Commission, BDEAC) face important capacity constraints and should be strengthened.
- Progress noted: BEAC launched a reform agenda and made progress in some areas; CEMAC Commission activities were affected by the conflict in CAR; unresolved partial non-repatriation of foreign assets by some member states; monetary policy framework unchanged despite Fund technical assistance.

### Recent economic developments, medium-term outlook, and risks — findings and projections
- 2013 macro performance and composition:
  - Real GDP growth (2013): 2½ percent.
  - Non-oil GDP growth (2013): 4½ percent.
  - Inflation (2013): 1.8 percent (below convergence ceiling of 3 percent).
  - Regional primary balance in 2013: turned into a deficit.
  - Non-oil primary deficit (2013): 24.6 percent of non-oil GDP (NOGDP).
  - Average public debt (region, weighted): around 23 percent of GDP (below 70 percent ceiling).
  - External current account deficit (2013): 3.1 percent of GDP.
  - Foreign reserves (excluding non-repatriated foreign assets) at end-2013: US$17.5 billion, equivalent to 5.1 months of imports.
  - Monetary conditions: large unsterilized surpluses from past oil revenues impair monetary transmission; bank deposit growth slowed in 2013 but remained strong; credit growth accelerated; banking system liquidity decreased following a decline in foreign assets but excess liquidity remains high partly due to BEAC injections.

- 2014 near-term projection:
  - Regional growth (2014): projected to pick up to 5 to 5½ percent.
  - Inflation: expected to remain moderate.
  - Fiscal stance: continued expansionary fiscal policies in some countries → fiscal deficit about 3 percent of GDP on average despite higher hydrocarbon revenues.
  - Current account (2014): expected around 3 percent of GDP (hydrocarbon exports nearly 90 percent of total exports offset by strong imports).

- Medium-term baseline (2014–19), conditional on significant reforms:
  - Non-oil growth (2014–19): could average around 5½ percent per annum.
  - Oil output: initially grow by 1 to 1½ percent before declining at end of period.
  - Non-oil primary deficit: improve from 28 percent of non-oil GDP in 2013 to 16 percent in 2019 (reflecting scaling back of public investment in Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo and Chad).
  - Regional fiscal balance: remain in deficit due to declining hydrocarbon revenue despite non-oil improvements.
  - Current account (medium term): expected to stay between 3 and 4 percent of GDP.
  - International reserves (2019 projection): around equivalent of six months of goods and services imports, assuming repatriation of future balance of payments surpluses.

- Downside scenario and quantified risks:
  - Main risk: significant, prolonged drop in oil and other commodity prices.
  - Under downside scenario estimates:
    - Non-oil and oil commodity prices decrease by about 3 and 5 percent, respectively, with a larger fall in 2014 (about 15 percent for oil and 8 percent for non-oil commodity prices).
    - Overall fiscal balance (excl. grants) reduced by about 2 percentage points of GDP in 2014–15.
    - Regional current account balance decreased by about 1.5 percentage points.
    - Cumulative reduction of CEMAC official reserves by about US$ 3.5 billion by 2019.
  - Other downside risks: lack of reforms leading to weak private investment; limited regional integration; increased political instability/security risks (e.g., conflict in CAR, Boko Haram).

### Policy discussions — major areas and staff advice (overview)
- Four major policy challenges:
  - a) Improve the fiscal surveillance framework to ensure Monetary Union stability.
  - b) Make monetary policy more effective.
  - c) Ensure financial sector stability and adequate financing of the economy.
  - d) Promote regional integration and enhance potential for regional growth.
- Strengthening regional institutions (BEAC, COBAC, CEMAC Commission, BDEAC) is essential and requires stronger support by member states.

### A. Improving the Regional Surveillance Framework — findings and policy recommendations
- Assessment of current framework:
  - Current fiscal surveillance framework does not provide an appropriate anchor for fiscal policies.
  - Natural resource (oil) revenues create unique opportunities and challenges; current convergence criteria do not effectively ensure sustainability.
  - Budget balance rule based on the basic fiscal balance can contribute to procyclicality.
  - Excluding investment expenditure financed from external resources can mask unsustainable debt dynamics.
  - Public debt criterion of 70 percent of GDP no longer binding and would not prevent the risk of another debt crisis.

- Staff advice and reform options:
  - Improve the CEMAC budget rule while keeping it simple, transparent, and uniform where possible.
  - Option: adopt a rule based on a structural primary fiscal balance with an oil price smoothing formula.
  - Calibrate fiscal objectives to build or preserve adequate fiscal buffers.
  - New rule could include country-specific objectives for fiscal savings accumulation (e.g., stabilization funds).
  - Stabilization funds recommended for hydrocarbon-dependent countries to protect against large commodity price fluctuations.
  - Annex 4 scenarios suggest targeting a zero or slightly positive structural balance to ensure sufficient savings against oil price downturns.

### Reform of the budget rule and public debt ceiling
- Staff analysis: risk of debt distress increases considerably if public debt exceeds 50 percent of GDP.
- Recommendation: lower the debt ceiling from 70 percent to around 50 percent of GDP to limit debt distress risk.
- Aim: establish consistency among fiscal surveillance criteria to avoid a high primary fiscal balance target leading to debt ceiling breaches.
- Complementary national fiscal rules could be considered, consistent with regional rules.
- Rules criteria should be simple, transparent, and easy to implement and monitor.

### Regional medium-term debt strategy
- Authorities should design a comprehensive regional medium-term debt strategy to:
  - define optimal debt composition to balance cost-risk objectives;
  - support a regional debt market via harmonized rules for government debt issuance and prevent crowding-out of countries in the regional market.
- Implementation must be accompanied by capacity building at country level.
- Clarification: "Regional debt strategy means the coordination at the regional level of different national debt strategies for CEMAC member states."

### Enforcement and reform of fiscal surveillance framework
- Finding: fiscal convergence criteria often not respected, with no consequence.
- Recommendations:
  - Enhance ownership via inclusive, participatory reform approach.
  - Strengthen regional institutions (especially CEMAC Commission) for wider dissemination of surveillance results and involvement in national budget preparation.
  - Expand role of national supervisory entities in monitoring and disseminating regional rules.
  - Supplement regional surveillance with structural national reforms, including strengthening public financial management in investment project selection.

### Fiscal coordination and PFM
- Progress in implementing CEMAC public financial management directives noted but with substantial delays.
- Regional authorities should ensure member states’ measures (e.g., tax exemptions) remain within regional legislation limits to avoid eroding tax base.

### Authorities’ views on fiscal rules and PFM
- Authorities concurred on need to revise fiscal convergence criteria.
- CEMAC Commission held a Regional Surveillance Committee meeting in late June to discuss reform; will prepare a study with recommendations for Franc Zone meeting in 2015.
- Authorities agreed to review the debt ceiling criterion to align with the budget rule while preserving room for public investment; they highlighted the trade-off between country-specific calibration and simplicity/transparency.
- Authorities suggested assessing quality and efficiency of borrowed funds when evaluating debt levels.
- CEMAC Commission noted action plan with IMF Fiscal Affairs Department enabled progress in Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, and Chad; monitoring and implementation to continue with AFRITAC technical assistance.

### External position and reserves
- 2013 current account deficit widened to about 3 percent of GDP due to higher public investment and deterioration of trade balance.
- Analyses indicate current account balance and REER remain broadly in line with fundamentals (Annex 3); REERs vary but none shows significant misalignment.
- Deterioration in current accounts mainly related to expansionary fiscal stances rather than exchange rate overvaluation.
- Regional official reserves declined slightly in 2013 but remain adequate by different metrics.
- Risk: partial compliance with foreign assets centralization; member states directly holding foreign assets abroad appear substantial but data limited.
- Staff encouraged BEAC to agree a framework for managing foreign reserves and fiscal savings including: maintaining adequate regional reserves; more effective transparent management of fiscal savings; ensuring adherence to regional rules vis-à-vis emerging donors.
- Authorities’ view: BEAC exploring options for noncompliance, including creating a more diversified portfolio of FX holdings in excess of balance of payment needs, managed by BEAC and offering higher returns to member states.

### Making monetary policy more effective
- Problem: Excess liquidity weakens monetary transmission; BEAC main rate disconnected from lending rates; shallow banking system and underdeveloped financial markets weaken channels; CFA peg to Euro limits exchange rate channel.
- Observation: BEAC actions inject liquidity into a banking system already in surplus; interbank market virtually nonexistent due to lack of trust.
- Fact: Excess reserves represented around 200 percent of reserve requirements in August 2013.
- Staff recommendations:
  - Accelerate transition to market-based monetary policy and enhance BEAC capacity to manage liquidity.
  - Implement 2011 Monetary Policy Committee decision to freeze and gradually eliminate over 10 years the stock of central bank advances to governments; encourage governments to issue T-Bills to repay central bank.
  - Undertake monetary operations to sterilize structural liquidity surpluses to develop interbank market.
- Implementation challenges and measures:
  - Calibrate BEAC interventions using standard liquidity forecasting; create daily databases and forecasting techniques for autonomous liquidity factors.
  - Streamline monetary instruments: eliminate refinancing facility for long-term loans; exclude troubled banks from counterparties; cautiously expand eligible collateral and introduce new instruments.
  - Revitalize money market and support development of government securities markets.
  - Rapidly provide human and IT resources for reform.
  - Strengthen coordination among COBAC, national governments, and primary dealers.
- Authorities’ view: BEAC plans ambitious reform to transform monetary policy organization and revitalize interbank and government securities markets.

### Financial sector stability and development
- Risks: banking system vulnerable to credit, liquidity, operational, reputational, and legal risks; lending to connected parties contributed to capital erosion in some banks.
- Microfinance institutions gaining importance (Cameroon and the Congo) and linkages to banks via deposits increasing.
- Financial soundness indicators vary across countries and banks:
  - Aggregate solvency ratio in Cameroon: improved from 6.3 percent at end-December 2012 to 7.9 percent at end-December 2013 (regulatory minimum: 8 percent).
  - Nonperforming loans ratio deteriorated substantially in Equatorial Guinea.
- COBAC capacity: staffing substantially increased recently; additional analytical and regulatory staff still needed; expansion of nonbank sector, microfinance, and mobile banking requires targeted monitoring.
- Staff advice:
  - Accelerate bank resolution plans and strengthen banks’ internal controls.
  - Enhance COBAC capacity for rating financial institutions and encourage external ratings.
  - Support FSAP update planned for second half of 2014.
- Financial sector development recommendations:
  - Create a genuine regional debt market.
  - Create credit bureaus and rating systems for businesses.
  - Merge the two regional stock exchanges.
  - Improve guarantee and collateral systems.
  - Improve financial infrastructure, including payment system.
  - Improve regional business climate.
  - Develop strategies for vulnerable population segments and SMEs through regulatory reforms and financial infrastructure.
  - Promote financing for rural areas and adopt regulations on virtual and mobile banking services.
- Authorities’ view and actions:
  - Progress reported on creation of credit information bureau and rating system (operational by end 2015 target).
  - Enhanced payment system to support mobile banking and regional networks.
  - Judicial reforms and development of new financial products (e.g., leasing) remain national competencies.
  - Authorities proposed better use of governments’ savings to finance infrastructure, with BEAC supporting mechanisms to channel surpluses to deficit countries and seeking greater private sector participation.
  - Noted TCI (taxe communautaire d’intégration) as Commission’s main financing source and problems in collecting it.

### Financing infrastructure — staff findings and recommendations
- Staff advised against BEAC using government deposits to create new financing instruments for infrastructure (equivalent to direct lending to government and interfering with monetary policy).
- Recommended boosting coordination and transparency for government securities markets: improved cash and debt management, resolution of syndication constraints, and enhancing role of primary dealers to improve secondary market liquidity.
- A more developed medium- and long-term securities market should provide adequate financing for budget deficits related to infrastructure.
- Staff encouraged strengthening BDEAC capacities to finance large regional infrastructure projects.
- Private sector participation and innovative financing:
  - Promote public-private partnerships and strengthen role of financial markets and commercial banks through innovative financing.
  - Unbundle infrastructure projects into successive sub-projects to facilitate bank lending.
  - Implement guarantee systems to reduce investors' exposure to risk.

### Promoting regional integration and enhancing growth potential
- CEMAC intra-regional trade levels: around 3 percent of total trade.
- Greater integration could boost regional growth by two percentage points via trade promotion and efficient regional policy implementation.
- Weak regional competitiveness and productivity constrain private investment; constraints include limited investment absorption, financing access difficulties, and challenging business climate.
- Staff advice:
  - Improve cooperation among member states and regional authorities (e.g., common stance on EPA negotiations).
  - Define a regional action plan to improve business environment using international best practices.
  - Improve management of public investment projects via monitoring committees.
  - Strengthen BDEAC role in supporting regional development policies.

### Strengthening institutional capacity: BEAC, COBAC, CEMAC Commission
- BEAC: progress on reform and modernization; institutional autonomy should be strengthened; constraints in human resource management and budget allocations.
- COBAC and BEAC staffing: significant increases welcomed; notable staffing needs remain in research departments.
- Safeguards and governance: BEAC quadrennial assessment in 2013; risks remain elevated; safeguards rolling measures and annual IMF visits continue.
- CEMAC Commission: tight personnel and financial constraints; relocation to Libreville following CAR events; ongoing initiatives include monitoring PFM directives, preparing regional development plan review by 2015, feasibility study for business climate regional observatory (with World Bank), reducing regional trade barriers, and studying tariff/double taxation issues.

### Staff appraisal: risks, policy adjustments, and specific recommendations
- Short-term growth: prospects solid but downside risks significant; non-oil growth reliant on public investment.
- Fiscal and monetary guidance:
  - Fiscal stance too expansionary in several countries despite high oil prices and debt relief.
  - Monetary policy effectiveness limited due to weak transmission channels and excess liquidity.
  - Stronger BEAC reform efforts and coordination among BEAC, governments, and primary dealers are needed.
- Surveillance and fiscal rules:
  - Current fiscal deficit rule can encourage procyclical policies; does not control external borrowing for capital spending.
  - Option: adopt structural primary fiscal balance rule with oil price smoothing formula.
  - Debt ceiling could be lowered from 70 percent to around 50 percent of GDP to limit debt distress risk.
  - Enforcement of surveillance needs strengthening with greater ownership by member countries.
- Financial sector and statistics:
  - Strengthen regulatory and supervisory frameworks; advance bank resolution plans.
  - Create credit registries and pursue judicial reforms to foster credit growth.
  - Improve quality of economic and financial information; national accounts and balance of payments hampered by poor statistics.
- Financing infrastructure: caution advised on use of government savings deposited at BEAC; promote greater private sector participation and appropriate safeguards.
- IMF engagement: Fund to continue technical assistance to support modernization and reform of regional institutions, conditional on demonstrated effectiveness.

### Key quantitative tables and selected medium-term projections (2011–2019 where indicated)
- Real GDP (CEMAC, 2011–2019 Est./Proj.): 3.9; 5.2; 2.6; 5.3; 4.7; 6.4; 5.4; 3.8; 3.5
- Oil GDP (CEMAC, 2011–2019): -2.2; -2.7; -7.1; 3.2; 1.8; 6.1; 5.9; -3.3; -6.5
- Non-oil GDP (CEMAC, 2011–2019): 5.9; 6.6; 4.6; 5.4; 5.1; 6.4; 5.7; 5.3; 5.3
- Consumer prices (period average, CEMAC, 2011–2019): 2.5; 2.7; 1.8; 2.7; 2.1; 2.1; 2.0; 2.0; 2.0
- Nominal GDP (Billions of CFA francs, 2011–2019): 42,407; 45,445; 45,727; 48,273; 49,827; 52,728; 55,904; 57,872; 60,027
- CFA francs per U.S. dollar, average (2011–2019): 471.95; 510.54; 494; 479; 471; 465; 458; 424; 445
- Oil prices (US dollars per barrel, 2011–2019): 104.0; 105.0; 104; 104; 98; 93; 90; 88; 87
- Non-oil primary balance (percent of non-oil GDP, 2011–2019): -23.7; -28.0; -24.6; -23.6; -21.5; -19.7; -17.6; -15.7; -14.1
- Total Public Debt (percent of GDP, 2011–2019): 19.2; 20.0; 22.9; 23.7; 25.2; 26.7; 28.2; 30.4; 32.2
- Gross official reserves (end of period, Millions of U.S. dollars, 2011–2019): 15,717; 17,531; 17,490; 17,698; 17,528; 18,325; 19,750; 20,945; 21,489
- Months of imports of goods and services (less intra regional imports, 2011–2019): 5.0; 5.4; 5.1; 5.0; 4.8; 4.8; 5.1; 5.3; 5.8
- Current account, including grants (percent of GDP, 2011–2019): 1.8; -0.6; -3.1; -3.2; -3.8; -3.4; -2.7; -3.2; -3.7
- Country-level real GDP growth (2013, selected): Cameroon 5.5; Central African Republic -3.6; Chad 3.9; Congo, Republic of 3.3; Equatorial Guinea -4.9; Gabon 5.9
- Selected 2013 indicators:
  - Non-oil primary deficit (2013): 24.6 percent of non-oil GDP.
  - Foreign reserves (end-2013): US$17.5 billion (5.1 months of imports).
  - Regional average public debt (around 2013): around 23 percent of GDP.

### Annex 4 — Revising the Debt Limit Criterion (summary of analysis)
- Methodology: uses Fund-Bank debt sustainability framework and a Probit model; domestic debt crises identified via IMF Historical Public Debt Database.
- Key quantitative results:
  - With average real GDP growth of 4.6 percent, estimated debt burden threshold varies between about 35 and 65 percent depending on institutional capacity.
  - On average, risk of debt distress increases substantially if public debt exceeds about 45 percent of GDP.
  - A 50-percent debt ceiling would still leave room for scaling up public investment, conditional on improved investment effectiveness and absorption capacity.
  - Debt-to-GDP ratio projections under specified assumptions: about 32 percent in 2019; about 46 percent in 2030.
- Costs of a debt crisis:
  - Exclusion from international capital markets can last up to 5.5 years.
  - Debt crises can reduce trade flows by approximately 8 percent per year.
  - Empirical estimates: debt crises reduce output by about 6–10 percent short term and about 10 percent medium term; CEMAC-specific: about 9 percent short term and about 1 percent medium term (after 5 years).
  - Literature: growth reduced by about 1.8 percentage point when total debt exceeded 70 percent of GDP; about 2 percentage point when debt exceeded 90 percent of GDP.
- Suggested policy implication: lower debt ceiling to be consistent with estimated thresholds (average risk increase above ~45 percent) and strengthen surveillance, compliance, and transparency.

### Core principles for reform of regional surveillance framework (summary)
- Simplify convergence criteria: reduce from 8 to two-three main criteria while monitoring others.
- Refocus on monetary union stability; fiscal balance criteria should reduce procyclicality.
- Use a non-resource primary balance to allow temporary scaling up of investment.
- Ensure mutual consistency between main criteria to avoid fiscal targets causing debt breaches.
- Lower the debt criterion informed by debt sustainability analysis; view ceiling as a constraint rather than optimal level.
- Make criteria simple, transparent, easy to implement and monitor; transpose rules into national laws and involve stakeholders to increase ownership and enforcement.

*Italic line: Source: IMF staff report excerpt and staff compilations from _cr14252_ (INTRODUCTION, RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, MEDIUM-TERM OUTLOOK AND RISKS, POLICY DISCUSSIONS, Annexes 1 and 4).*

### INTRODUCTION _________________________________________________________________________________ 4

### _cr14252 - INTRODUCTION

### Introduction — key messages
- The CEMAC region has recorded robust growth for more than a decade but substantial development challenges remain.
- Oil producing countries (all CEMAC countries except CAR) launched ambitious public investment programs to fill infrastructure gaps.
- Despite large spending of oil wealth, poverty, income inequality and unemployment (especially among the young) remain high as public spending was often poorly targeted and used unproductively.
- The business climate is one of the most challenging in Africa.
- The region’s most pressing challenge: implement structural reforms to promote sustainable and inclusive growth while adopting macro policies to preserve financial stability, ensure an efficient use of oil revenues and increase resilience against shocks.
- Regional institutions face important capacity constraints (BEAC, COBAC, the CEMAC Commission, BDEAC) and should be strengthened to support reform efforts.
- Progress to date: BEAC launched an ambitious reform agenda and has made progress in some areas; CEMAC Commission activities were substantially affected by the conflict in Central African Republic (CAR); unresolved issue of non-full repatriation of foreign assets by some member states; the monetary policy framework remains unchanged despite extensive Fund technical assistance.

*Countries in CEMAC: Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo.*

### Recent economic developments, medium-term outlook, and risks — findings and projections
- 2013 macro performance and composition:
  - Real GDP growth decelerated in 2013 to 2½ percent, driven by falls in oil production in most member countries (Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon).
  - Non-oil GDP growth in 2013: 4½ percent.
  - Inflation declined to 1.8 percent, below the regional convergence ceiling of 3 percent.
  - Regional primary balance turned into a deficit for the first time since 2009.
  - Non-oil primary deficit in 2013: 24.6 percent of non-oil GDP (NOGDP).
  - Average public debt for the region: around 23 percent of GDP (weighted average), below the regional surveillance framework ceiling of 70 percent of GDP for individual countries.
  - External current account deficit (2013): 3.1 percent of GDP.
  - Foreign reserves (excluding non-repatriated foreign assets) at end-2013: US$17.5 billion, equivalent to 5.1 months of imports.
  - Monetary conditions: large unsterilized surpluses from past oil revenues continue to impair monetary policy transmission; growth of bank deposits slowed in 2013 but remained strong; credit growth accelerated; banking system liquidity decreased following a decline in foreign assets but excess liquidity remains high due in part to BEAC liquidity injections.

- 2014 near-term projection:
  - Regional growth projected to pick up to 5 to 5½ percent in 2014 (supported by increased oil production, mostly in Cameroon and Chad, and continued public investment).
  - Inflation expected to remain moderate.
  - Fiscal stance: continuation of expansionary fiscal policies in some countries will maintain the fiscal deficit at around 3 percent of GDP on average despite higher hydrocarbon revenues.
  - Current account deficit in 2014 expected to remain around 3 percent of GDP (hydrocarbon exports nearly 90 percent of total exports offset by strong imports).

- Medium-term (2014–19) baseline (conditional on significant reforms):
  - Non-oil growth could average around 5½ percent per annum over 2014–19, assuming reforms to promote private investment and deepen the financial sector.
  - Oil output would initially grow by 1 to 1½ percent before declining at the end of the period.
  - Non-oil primary deficit improvement: from 28 percent of non-oil GDP in 2013 to 16 percent in 2019, reflecting substantial scaling back of public investment in Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo and Chad.
  - Regional fiscal balance: would remain in deficit due to declining hydrocarbon revenue despite non-oil improvements.
  - Current account: expected to stay between 3 and 4 percent of GDP.
  - International reserves: projected to be around the equivalent of six months of goods and services imports in 2019, supported by capital account surpluses (projection assumes repatriation of future balance of payments surpluses).

- Downside scenario and quantified risks:
  - Main risk: significant, prolonged drop in oil and other commodity prices.
  - Under the downside scenario staff estimate:
    - Non-oil and oil commodity prices would decrease by about 3 and 5 percent, respectively, with a larger fall in 2014 (about 15 percent for oil and 8 percent for non-oil commodity prices).
    - The overall fiscal balance (excl. grants) would be reduced by about 2 percentage points of GDP in 2014–15.
    - The regional current account balance would decrease by about 1.5 percentage points.
    - Cumulative reduction of CEMAC official reserves by about US$ 3.5 billion by 2019.
  - Other downside risks: lack of reforms leading to weak private investment, limited regional integration due to weak institutional capacity and political support, and increased political instability/security risks (e.g., conflict in CAR, Boko Haram) that could weigh on FDI and growth.

### Policy discussions — major areas and staff advice (overview)
- Four major challenges discussed:
  - a) Improving the fiscal surveillance framework to ensure the stability and sustainability of the Monetary Union.
  - b) Making the conduct of monetary policy more effective.
  - c) Ensuring the stability of the financial sector and adequate financing of the economy.
  - d) Promoting regional integration and enhancing the potential for regional growth.
- Strengthening of regional institutions (BEAC, COBAC, CEMAC Commission, BDEAC) is essential and will require stronger support by member states.

### A. Improving the Regional Surveillance Framework to Ensure the Stability of the Union — findings and policy recommendations
- Assessment of current framework:
  - The current fiscal surveillance framework does not provide an appropriate anchor for fiscal policies of CEMAC member states.
  - Natural resource (oil) revenues create unique opportunities and challenges; current fiscal convergence criteria do not effectively ensure sustainability.
  - The budget balance rule based on the basic fiscal balance could contribute to procyclicality.
  - Failure to include investment expenditure financed from external resources could mask an unsustainable debt dynamic.
  - In a monetary union, individual country fiscal management has implications for the stability of the whole zone.
  - Following debt relief and higher hydrocarbon resources, the public debt criterion of 70 percent of GDP no longer presents a binding constraint and would not prevent the risk of another debt crisis.

- Staff advice and reform options:
  - Improve the CEMAC budget rule to address current challenges while keeping it simple, transparent, and as uniform as possible.
  - One option: adopt a rule based on a structural primary fiscal balance with an oil price smoothing formula.
  - Fiscal objectives should be calibrated to ensure building-up or preserving adequate fiscal buffers.
  - The new rule could include country-specific objectives on the level of fiscal savings accumulated (e.g., in stabilization funds).
  - Stabilization funds could be important for countries most dependent on hydrocarbon resources to protect against large and prolonged commodity price fluctuations and avoid sudden, drastic adjustments in public spending.
  - Annex 4 (2013 Staff Report on Common Policies for CEMAC Member Countries) presents scenarios suggesting that a zero or slightly positive structural balance should be targeted to ensure sufficient savings to protect against downturns in oil prices.

*Italic line: Source: IMF staff report excerpt (INTRODUCTION, RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, MEDIUM-TERM OUTLOOK AND RISKS, POLICY DISCUSSIONS — A. Improving the Regional Surveillance Framework).*

### 12.      The reform of the budget rule could be supplemented with a downward revision of

### _cr14252 - 12.      The reform of the budget rule could be supplemented with a downward revision of

### Reform of the budget rule and public debt ceiling
- Staff analysis concluded the risk of debt distress would increase considerably if public debt exceeded 50 percent of GDP (see Annex 4).
- Recommendation: lower the debt ceiling from 70 percent to around 50 percent of GDP to limit the risk of debt distress.
- Aim: establish consistency among fiscal surveillance criteria so that, for instance, an excessively high limit on the primary fiscal balance does not lead countries to exceed the debt ceiling.
- Complementary national fiscal rules could be considered, consistent with regional rules, to anchor policies while accounting for specific structural characteristics.
- Criteria for rules should be simple, transparent, and easy to implement and monitor.

### Regional medium-term debt strategy
- Authorities should design a comprehensive regional medium-term debt strategy.
- Purpose: define an optimal composition of debt in CEMAC to balance cost-risk debt management objectives.
- Role: support strengthening the regional debt market by setting harmonized rules for government debt issuance and preventing crowding-out of one country by another in the regional market.
- Implementation must be accompanied by capacity building at the individual country level.
- Note: "Regional debt strategy means the coordination at the regional level of different national debt strategies for CEMAC member states."

### Enforcement and reform of fiscal surveillance framework
- Finding: Fiscal convergence criteria are often not respected, with no consequence (Table 7).
- Recommendation: enhance ownership of the surveillance framework by member states via an inclusive, participatory reform approach.
- Strengthen regional institutions (especially the CEMAC commission) to ensure wider dissemination of regional surveillance results and greater involvement in national budget preparation.
- Improve compliance by expanding the role of national supervisory entities in monitoring and disseminating regional rules.
- Supplement regional surveillance with structural changes at the national level, including strengthening public financial management in the selection of investment projects.

### Fiscal coordination and harmonization
- Staff welcomed progress in implementing the CEMAC public financial management (PFM) directives but noted substantial delays.
- Regional authorities should ensure measures by member states (e.g., tax exemptions) remain within limits proposed by regional legislation to avoid eroding the tax base.

### Authorities’ views on fiscal rules and PFM
- Regional authorities concurred on the need to revise fiscal convergence criteria.
- The CEMAC commission held a Regional Surveillance Committee meeting in late June to discuss possible reform and will prepare a study with specific recommendations for the Franc Zone meeting in 2015.
- Authorities agreed on reviewing the debt ceiling criterion to align with the budget rule while preserving room for financing public investment, but highlighted difficulty in balancing country-specific calibration with simplicity and transparency.
- Authorities suggested assessing the quality and efficiency of use of borrowed funds when evaluating debt levels.
- The CEMAC Commission noted the action plan developed with the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department enabled substantial progress in four countries: Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, and Chad.
- Monitoring and implementation will continue based on clear roadmaps and additional technical assistance from AFRITAC.

### External position and reserves
- Finding: regional current account deficit widened to about 3 percent of GDP in 2013 due to higher public investment and deterioration of the balance of trade in most CEMAC countries.
- Analyses indicate the current account balance and real effective exchange rate (REER) remain broadly in line with regional fundamentals (Annex 3); REERs vary across members but none shows significant misalignment.
- Deterioration of member states’ current accounts in recent years is more related to an excessively expansionary fiscal stance in certain countries than to exchange rate overvaluation.
- Regional official reserves declined slightly in 2013 but remain adequate, not excessive, according to different metrics.
- Risk: only-partial compliance of several member states with the foreign assets centralization requirement is a potential risk; foreign assets directly held abroad by member states appear to be substantial, but data are limited.
- Staff encouraged the BEAC to continue discussions to agree a framework for managing foreign reserves and fiscal savings that could include: a requirement to maintain an adequate level of regional reserves; more effective and transparent management of member states' fiscal savings; and ensuring adherence to regional rules vis-à-vis emerging donors.
- Staff initiated discussions with the BEAC on possible options and encouraged a proactive process to find solutions.
- Authorities’ view: the BEAC is exploring options to solve noncompliance; one alternative could be creating a more diversified portfolio of financial assets for FX holdings in excess of balance of payment needs, managed by the BEAC and offering higher returns to member states.

### Making monetary policy more effective
- Problem: Excess liquidity weakens monetary policy transmission; the BEAC’s main monetary policy rate is disconnected from lending rates, reflecting an ineffective interest rate channel. Shallow banking system and underdeveloped financial markets weaken credit and asset price channels. The Franc CFA peg to the Euro limits the exchange rate channel.
- Observation: BEAC’s monetary actions inject liquidity into a banking system already in surplus; absence of a well functioning interbank market forces BEAC to provide liquidity to some banks unable to mobilize funding due to lack of trust among banks.
- Fact: Excess reserves represented around 200 percent of reserves requirements in August 2013.
- Action: In 2012 the BEAC suspended liquidity-absorbing operations to encourage interbank trading, but interbank activity remained virtually nonexistent.
- Staff recommendations:
  - Accelerate transition to a market-based monetary policy and enhance BEAC capacity to manage liquidity.
  - Accelerate implementation of the 2011 Monetary Policy Committee decision to freeze and gradually eliminate over 10 years the stock of central bank advances to governments, including by encouraging governments to issue T-Bills to repay the central bank.
  - Start undertaking monetary operations aimed at sterilizing structural liquidity surpluses to develop the interbank market.
- Challenges for monetary policy modernization:
  - Calibrate BEAC interventions using standard liquidity forecasting processes; create daily databases and develop forecasting techniques for autonomous liquidity factors.
  - Streamline monetary policy instruments: eliminate the refinancing facility for long-term loans; exclude troubled banks from monetary policy counterparties; cautiously expand eligible collateral and introduce new monetary instruments to avoid excessive liquidity injection.
  - Take concrete actions to revitalize the money market; BEAC should support development of government securities markets during the transition.
  - Provide rapidly the human and IT resources needed to implement the reform plan.
  - Strengthen policy coordination among COBAC, national governments, and primary dealers; coordination is key for reform success.
- Authorities’ view: BEAC plans an ambitious reform to transform monetary policy organization and better link strategic and operational frameworks, aiming to reinstate transmission channels by revitalizing interbank and government securities markets.

### Financial sector stability
- Risks: banking system vulnerable to credit, liquidity, operational, reputational, and legal risks. Lending to connected parties has contributed to capital erosion in some banks that have been restructured or placed under provisional administration. Banks may be exposed to liquidity shocks from oil revenue fluctuations or troubled banks. Microfinance institutions are gaining importance in some countries (Cameroon and the Congo) and have stronger linkages with banks via deposits.
- Financial soundness indicators vary considerably across countries and banks.
  - Aggregate solvency ratio in Cameroon remained below the regulatory minimum of 8 percent but improved from 6.3 percent at end-December 2012 to 7.9 percent at end-December 2013.
  - Nonperforming loans ratio deteriorated substantially in Equatorial Guinea.
- COBAC capacity: COBAC substantially increased staffing very recently; additional human resources, after training, should enable better enforcement of prudential regulations, but additional staff needed in analytical and regulation areas. Expansion of nonbank financial sector, microfinance, and mobile banking requires targeted monitoring by COBAC.
- Staff advice:
  - Accelerate bank resolution plans and strengthen banks’ internal controls.
  - Enhance internal capacity at COBAC for rating financial institutions and encourage external credit ratings.
  - Support preparations for the FSAP update planned for the second half of 2014 to review reforms and identify remaining challenges.
- Authorities’ view:
  - COBAC considered significant progress was made to improve banking supervision and strengthen financial sector stability; new recruitments will double frequency and speed of banking inspections.
  - Full implementation of ECERBER, a remote financial reporting system, improved quality of financial information disclosure and off-site supervision.
  - Situation of troubled banks improved—especially in Cameroon—but constraints remain to liquidate insolvent institutions due to weaknesses in the regional judicial system and delays in adopting new crisis management regulation.
  - COBAC’s relocation to Libreville in early July 2014 will slow down activities for a few months but should not cause major disruptions.

### Financial sector development and financing of the economy
- Constraint: total financial sector assets represent 25 percent of regional GDP; sector dominated by banks with a business model focused on large companies and high service fees, limiting access for individuals and SMEs.
- Obstacles: difficulties in assessing credit risk; issues securing collateral and title instruments; presence of large foreign banks and local banks and lack of trust between them pose challenges for monetary policy and supervision.
- Financial inclusion remains extremely limited; the proportion of the population with access to financial services is well below expected levels given economies’ structures and development (see SIP on Financial Inclusion in the CEMAC).
- Staff recommendations to foster financial deepening:
  - Create a genuine regional debt market.
  - Create credit bureaus and rating systems for businesses.
  - Merge the two regional stock exchanges.
  - Improve the guarantee and collateral system.
  - Improve financial infrastructure, including the payment system.
  - Improve the regional business climate.
  - Develop strategies to provide access to financial services for vulnerable population segments and small businesses through regulatory reforms and financial infrastructure development.
  - Regulatory reforms could promote financing for rural areas and adopt regulations on virtual and mobile banking services.

*Source: IMF staff report section contained in the supplied PDF excerpt.*

### 36.      Staff advised against the BEAC using government deposits to create new financing

### _cr14252 - 36.      Staff advised against the BEAC using government deposits to create new financing

### Financing infrastructure: staff findings and recommendations
- Staff advised against the BEAC using government deposits to create new financing instruments for infrastructure projects, because such measures would be equivalent to direct lending to government and interfere with the conduct of monetary policy.
- Staff recommended boosting coordination and transparency for the development of the government securities markets, including:
  - improved governments cash and debt management;
  - the resolution of potential constraints relating to syndication;
  - enhancing the role of primary dealers in improving the liquidity of CEMAC governments’ securities secondary market.
- A more developed medium ––and long––term securities market should provide adequate financing for budget deficits related to infrastructure development projects.
- Staff encouraged the authorities to strengthen the capacities of BDEAC to finance large regional infrastructure projects.

### Private sector participation and innovative financing
- Larger financing for infrastructure projects could be based on an institutional framework promoting private sector participation, including more public-private partnerships and a strengthened role for financial markets and commercial banks through the targeted use of innovative financing methods.
- These mechanisms should help limit the build-up of public debt related to infrastructure investment scaling-up, provided that proper safeguards are put in place to limit fiscal contingent liabilities and other fiscal risks.
- To facilitate bank lending, infrastructure projects could be unbundled into successive sub-projects corresponding to different stages of maturity.
- Regional authorities could implement guarantee systems to reduce investors' exposure to risk.

### Authorities’ views on financing and financial sector development
- Authorities reported steps to support financial sector development, including progress to create a credit information bureau and rating system which should become operational by end 2015.
- Steps taken to enhance financial infrastructure include an enhanced payment system to support mobile banking and regional banking networks.
- Important measures such as judicial reforms to address lengthy and inefficient court proceedings or developing new financial products (e.g. leasing) are the competence of member states.
- Authorities stressed the need to find alternative and innovative sources of financing to support growth and proposed better use of governments’ savings to finance the region’s infrastructure needs, with BEAC supporting mechanisms to channel resources from countries with financial surpluses to finance infrastructure projects in deficit countries, while seeking greater private sector participation to limit public debt.
- The document notes TCI (i.e. taxe communautaire d’intégration, in French, a regional tax) as the Commission’s main source of financing and problems in collecting it from member states.

### Promoting regional integration and enhancing growth potential
- CEMAC intra-regional trade levels are around 3 percent of total trade.
- Greater integration could boost regional growth by two percentage points by promoting regional trade and a more efficient implementation of regional policies.
- Weak regional competitiveness and productivity hamper private investment growth; constraints include limited investment absorption capacities, difficulties accessing financing, and a challenging business climate.
- Staff advice to promote integration and development:
  - Improve cooperation among member states and regional authorities (e.g., common standing on EPA negotiations).
  - Define a regional action plan to improve the business environment, drawing on international best practices.
  - Improve management of public investment projects via monitoring committees for major national and regional projects.
  - Strengthen the role of the BDEAC in supporting regional development policies.

### Strengthening institutional capacity: BEAC, COBAC, and the CEMAC Commission
- BEAC progress and remaining needs:
  - BEAC has made progress on its reform and modernization plan but institutional autonomy should be strengthened.
  - Constraints exist in human resource management and budget allocations; BEAC should review budget allocations to ensure success of the monetary policy reform.
- COBAC and BEAC staffing:
  - Staff welcomed the significant increase in BEAC’s and––especially––COBAC’s personel, which should strengthen regional supervision.
  - Noted significant staffing needs in BEAC’s and COBAC’s research departments, which could adversely impact production and monitoring of key economic, monetary and financial indicators.
- Safeguards and governance:
  - The BEAC was subject to a quadrennial assessment in 2013; risks remain elevated and annual IMF staff visits to monitor priority recommendations and progress have continued as part of safeguards “rolling measures.”
  - A safeguards staff visit in early April 2014 concluded BEAC has made good progress in implementing recommendations but continues to face challenges on institutional autonomy and governance.
- CEMAC Commission constraints and actions:
  - The Commission faces tight personnel and financial constraints and needs new staff to fulfill its regional role.
  - Despite operational constraints, regional initiatives pursued include monitoring adoption of PFM directives, organizational and budgetary reform of the Commission, preparing a review of the regional development plan by 2015, preparing—with World Bank support—a feasibility study for a business climate regional observatory, reducing regional trade barriers, and preparing a study to reduce the common external tariff and eliminate double taxation to third-country products.
  - The Commission’s planned relocation to Libreville (Gabon) follows events in the Central African Republic that constrained effectiveness.

### Staff appraisal: risks, policy adjustments, and specific policy recommendations
- Short-term growth and risks:
  - Short-term regional growth prospects should remain solid but downside risks are significant.
  - Non-oil growth will continue to rely on public investment programs; a prolonged decline in hydrocarbon prices triggered by a global slowdown would have a substantial impact on the fiscal and external current account balances and would likely force a large scaling down of public investment.
  - Increased security risks could weigh on FDI and growth.
- Fiscal and monetary policy guidance:
  - The policy mix should be adjusted to support stability and growth; fiscal stance has become too expansionary in several countries despite high oil prices and debt relief.
  - The effectiveness of monetary policy is very limited due to weak transmission channels; excess liquidity, inefficient liquidity management, and underdeveloped regional interbank and debt markets make monetary policy largely ineffective.
  - Stronger reform efforts by the regional central bank are needed; coordination among BEAC, national governments, and primary dealers is key to reform success.
- Surveillance and fiscal rules:
  - The current fiscal deficit rule can encourage procyclical policies in the face of volatile oil revenues and does not control for external borrowing for capital spending.
  - One option is to adopt a rule based on a structural primary fiscal balance with an oil price smoothing formula.
  - The debt ceiling could be lowered from 70 percent to around 50 percent of GDP to limit the risk of debt distress and reinforce consistency among fiscal surveillance criteria.
  - Enforcement of fiscal surveillance needs to be strengthened, based on enhanced ownership by member countries.
- Financial sector and statistics:
  - Stronger regulatory and supervisory frameworks are needed; further progress is required in implementing bank resolution plans.
  - Creation of credit registries and judicial system reforms are essential for fostering credit growth.
  - Regional and national authorities should promote strategies to enhance access to finance.
  - Regional institutions need to focus on enhancing the quality of economic and financial information; national accounts and balance of payments analysis are hampered by poor statistical quality.
- Financing infrastructure: cautionary guidance
  - Staff advised caution in considering the use of governments’ savings deposited at BEAC to finance infrastructure projects, warning these measures may have destabilizing effects on macroeconomic policy implementation.
  - Authorities should focus on promoting greater private sector participation through appropriate investment incentives.
- IMF engagement:
  - The Fund will continue to provide technical assistance to support modernization and reform efforts of regional institutions, provided that its effectiveness can be demonstrated.

*Source: _cr14252 - 36.      Staff advised against the BEAC using government deposits to create new financing*

### 60.      It is proposed that the discussions with the CEMAC authorities remain on the standard

### _cr14252 - 60.      It is proposed that the discussions with the CEMAC authorities remain on the standard

### Macroeconomic growth and prices
- Real GDP (CEMAC): 3.9; 5.2; 2.6; 5.3; 4.7; 6.4; 5.4; 3.8; 3.5 (2011–2019 Est./Proj.)
- Oil GDP (CEMAC): -2.2; -2.7; -7.1; 3.2; 1.8; 6.1; 5.9; -3.3; -6.5 (2011–2019)
- Non-oil GDP (CEMAC): 5.9; 6.6; 4.6; 5.4; 5.1; 6.4; 5.7; 5.3; 5.3 (2011–2019)
- Consumer prices (period average, CEMAC): 2.5; 2.7; 1.8; 2.7; 2.1; 2.1; 2.0; 2.0; 2.0 (2011–2019)
- Consumer prices (end of period, CEMAC): 4.3; 3.1; 2.3; 2.7; 2.6; 2.6; 2.7; 2.4; 2.5 (2011–2019)

### National income composition and nominal GDP
- Nominal GDP (CEMAC): 15.0; 7.2; 0.6; 5.6; 3.2; 5.8; 6.0; 3.5; 3.7 (annual percent change, 2011–2019)
- Nominal GDP (Billions of CFA francs, memorandum): 42,407; 45,445; 45,727; 48,273; 49,827; 52,728; 55,904; 57,872; 60,027 (2011–2019)
- CFA francs per U.S. dollar, average: 471.95; 510.54; 494; 479; 471; 465; 458; 424; 445 (2011–2019)
- Oil prices (US dollars per barrel): 104.0; 105.0; 104; 104; 98; 93; 90; 88; 87 (2011–2019)

### Fiscal positions and public debt
- Total revenue, excluding grants (percent of GDP, CEMAC): 27.9; 27.9; 26.8; 26.1; 25.9; 25.3; 24.8; 24.1; 23.1 (2011–2019)
- Government expenditure (percent of GDP, CEMAC): 25.6; 29.4; 29.5; 29.5; 29.2; 28.0; 26.9; 26.5; 26.1 (2011–2019)
- Primary basic fiscal balance (CEMAC, note definition): 5.6; 2.0; 2.3; 1.4; 1.6; 1.3; 1.7; 1.5; 0.9 (2011–2019)
- Basic fiscal balance (CEMAC): 4.9; 0.7; 0.5; -0.1; 0.2; 0.4; 0.8; 0.5; -0.2 (2011–2019)
- Overall fiscal balance, excluding grants (CEMAC): 2.0; -1.6; -2.7; -3.5; -3.4; -2.7; -2.2; -2.4; -3.0 (2011–2019)
- Primary balance (CEMAC): 3.6; 0.3; -0.4; -1.3; -1.3; -1.2; -0.7; -0.8; -1.4 (2011–2019)
- Non-oil overall fiscal balance, excluding grants (percent of non-oil GDP, CEMAC): -26.2; -31.1; -27.9; -26.8; -24.4; -21.7; -19.6; -17.7; -16.1 (2011–2019)
- Non-oil primary balance (percent of non-oil GDP, CEMAC): -23.7; -28.0; -24.6; -23.6; -21.5; -19.7; -17.6; -15.7; -14.1 (2011–2019)
- Total Public Debt (CEMAC): 19.2; 20.0; 22.9; 23.7; 25.2; 26.7; 28.2; 30.4; 32.2 (percent of GDP, 2011–2019)
- External public debt (percent of GDP, CEMAC): 12.4; 14.2; 16.8; 17.2; 18.4; 19.0; 19.7; 20.6; 21.1 (2011–2019)

### External sector and reserves
- Exports of goods and nonfactor services (percent of GDP, CEMAC): 55.5; 55.1; 51.3; 49.3; 46.3; 45.1; 43.9; 41.2; 38.3 (2011–2019)
- Imports of goods and nonfactor services (percent of GDP, CEMAC): 43.8; 43.5; 43.5; 43.4; 42.2; 41.6; 40.2; 38.5; 37.1 (2011–2019)
- Balance on goods and nonfactor services (percent of GDP, CEMAC): 11.7; 11.6; 7.9; 7.2; 4.7; 4.9; 5.4; 4.2; 2.3 (2011–2019)
- Current account, including grants (percent of GDP, CEMAC): 1.8; -0.6; -3.1; -3.2; -3.8; -3.4; -2.7; -3.2; -3.7 (2011–2019)
- Total exports (CFAF billions): 23,518; 25,040; 23,465; 23,813; 23,081; 23,777; 24,554; 23,869; 22,974 (2011–2019)
  - Oil exports (CFAF billions): 19,197; 20,382; 18,112; 18,117; 17,000; 17,222; 17,436; 16,221; 14,734 (2011–2019)
  - Non-oil exports (CFAF billions): 2,726; 3,039; 3,526; 3,749; 4,011; 4,353; 4,772; 5,147; 5,562 (2011–2019)
- Total imports (CFAF billions): 18,557; 19,777; 19,866; 20,352; 20,740; 21,173; 21,547; 21,457; 21,613 (2011–2019)
- Income, net (CFAF billions): -4,243; -5,609; -5,143; -5,124; -4,358; -4,499; -4,651; -4,379; -3,732 (2011–2019)
- Gross official reserves (end of period): Millions of U.S. dollars: 15,717; 17,531; 17,490; 17,698; 17,528; 18,325; 19,750; 20,945; 21,489 (2011–2019)
- Months of imports of goods and services (less intra regional imports): 5.0; 5.4; 5.1; 5.0; 4.8; 4.8; 5.1; 5.3; 5.8 (2011–2019)
- Balance on current account (CFAF billions): 775; -295; -1,421; -1,525; -1,893; -1,781; -1,529; -1,832; -2,229 (2011–2019)

### Monetary and financial indicators
- Net foreign assets (annual percent change of beginning-of-period broad money, CEMAC): 16.9; 9.5; -0.4 (2009–2013 annual changes shown)
- Net domestic assets (same basis): 0.4; 6.7; 9.0 (2009–2013)
- Broad money (annual change): 18.0; 16.6; 6.4 (2011–2013)
- Broad money/GDP (CEMAC): 16.0; 19.5; 19.9; 20.4; 22.2; 23.5 (2008–2013 dec. series)
- Credit to the private sector/GDP (CEMAC): 6.7; 8.3; 8.1; 9.2; 9.7; 11.5 (2008–2013 dec. series)

### Country-level highlights (selected, percent of GDP or shares where indicated)
- Real GDP growth (2013, selected countries): Cameroon 5.5; Central African Republic -3.6; Chad 3.9; Congo, Republic of 3.3; Equatorial Guinea -4.9; Gabon 5.9
- Gross national savings (percent of GDP, 2013): Cameroon 17.2; Central African Republic -1.7; Chad 17.3; Congo, Republic of 27.4; Equatorial Guinea 46.4; Gabon 41.2; CEMAC 28.3
- Gross domestic investment (percent of GDP, 2013): Cameroon 21.1; Central African Republic 8.7; Chad 26.7; Congo, Republic of 30.9; Equatorial Guinea 54.4; Gabon 30.1; CEMAC 31.4
- Balance on current account (percent of GDP, 2013): Cameroon -3.9; Central African Republic -10.4; Chad -9.5; Congo, Republic of -3.6; Equatorial Guinea -12.0; Gabon 10.6; CEMAC -3.1

### Banking sector and prudential indicators
- Banking sector: summary medium-term projections and indicators included; Table 13 reports violations of main prudential ratios by country and year (2011–2013) and Table 14 provides bank ratings as of December 2013 (number of banks by rating).
- Quality of loan portfolio (2012–2013, gross loans, non-performing loans, provisions, share of non-performing loans, rate of provisioning): aggregated CEMAC figures for 2012 and 2013 shown in Table 15.

### Convergence criteria and compliance (2011–19 projections)
- Basic fiscal balance (overall budget balance excluding grants and foreign-financed investment): CEMAC aggregate: 4.9; 0.7; 0.5; -0.1; 0.2; 0.4; 0.8; 0.5; -0.2 (2011–2019)
- Consumer price inflation (≤ 3% threshold): number of countries violating by year shown in Table 7; CEMAC country series provided (2011–2019)
- Level of public external debt (≤ 70% GDP criterion): country series and number of countries violating (none) shown in Table 7
- Non-accumulation of government arrears (≤ 0): country series and number of countries violating shown in Table 7

### Summary medium-term projections (selected)
- Real GDP (CEMAC): 3.9; 5.2; 2.6; 5.3; 4.7; 6.4; 5.4; 3.8; 3.5 (2011–2019)
- Exports, f.o.b. (annual percent change, CEMAC): 30.9; -1.6; -3.2; 4.6; -1.3; 4.3; 4.9; -1.4; -2.4 (2011–2019)
- Import volume (annual percent change, CEMAC): 1.0; 3.2; -7.9; 4.5; 3.4; 0.7; 0.6; 0.0; 0.0 (2011–2019)
- Terms of trade (annual percent change, CEMAC): 15.6; -1.1; 0.5; -0.1; -3.7; -3.3; -3.6; -3.6; -0.9 (2011–2019)
- Central government overall balance, including grants (percent of GDP, CEMAC): 2.7; -1.2; -2.1; -2.8; -2.7; -2.1; -1.7; -1.9; -2.5 (2011–2019)
- Current account balance, including grants (percent of GDP, CEMAC): 1.8; -0.6; -3.1; -3.2; -3.8; -3.4; -2.7; -3.2; -3.7 (2011–2019)
- Non-oil overall balance, including grants (percent of non-oil GDP, CEMAC): -24.9; -29.9; -27.1; -25.8; -23.4; -20.9; -18.9; -17.0; -15.4 (2011–2019)

*Source: IMF staff compilations and tables in the provided document.*

### Annex 1. Regional Authorities’ Responses to 2013 Policy

### Annex 1. Regional Authorities’ Responses to 2013 Policy Recommendations

### Policy mix — Authorities’ response
- CEMAC commission agreed to review the fiscal convergence framework but no report or study has been prepared yet.
- Implementation of CEMAC PFM directives has continued but has not been finalized; the degree of implementation varies among countries.
- Not much has been done in strengthening compliance with regional surveillance.

### Growth and regional integration — Recommendations and responses
- Recommendations:
  - Take measures to support the improvement of regional business environment.
  - Strengthen key regional institutions (COBAC, CEMAC commission) to implement regional growth enhancing policies.
  - Enhance the quality of economic and financial information.
  - Review key fiscal convergence criterion on fiscal balance.
  - 70 percent of GDP debt limit could be revised downward.
  - Strengthen compliance with regional surveillance.
- Authorities’ responses and developments:
  - CEMAC commission has created a unit to support improving the business environment in the region. Certain countries — but not all — have been launching reforms to improve business climate.
  - COBAC has increased its headcount by 50 percent and its operational capacity should improve. Its relocation to Libreville could cause some short-term operational problems.
  - CEMAC commission has been temporarily relocated to Libreville and should improve its operational activities. Underbudgeting and understaffing remains a problem.
  - BEAC authorities are working on the creation of a regional CPI index and on improved monetary statistics. STA TA assistance has been requested.
  - Not much has been done at national level to improve statistics (e.g., national accounts).

### 2013 Article IV recommendations — Macroeconomic policy alignment
- Recommendations:
  - Some countries should have a more cautious fiscal stance due to limited policy buffers.
  - Resolve the issue of only partial repatriation of reserves by certain member states.
  - Reassess current framework for monetary policy.
  - Continue with the reforms to strengthen the safeguard framework.
  - Strengthen the regulatory and supervisory framework to reinforce financial stability.
  - Accelerate creation of regional interbank and debt markets.
- Authorities’ responses and developments:
  - Macroeconomic policies at country level have not been fully consistent with Fund advice. Most countries have continued their fiscal expansionary stance reducing policy buffers. That said, most countries have plans to initiate some degree of fiscal consolidation in 2015.
  - Regional authorities are working — with IMF support — on a new reserve management system to resolve the issue of only partial repatriation of reserves.
  - Monetary policy remains largely ineffective due to weak transmission mechanisms that are hampered by excessive systemic liquidity. The reform of monetary policy instruments has been slow. The new MCM long-term resident expert has been working on the monetary framework reform.
  - Progress in the implementation of the safeguard framework has continued.
  - Progress was made in the reform of the regulatory framework but authorities should accelerate the implementation of key pending reforms.
  - The regional authorities have not made much progress in the creation of regional interbank and debt markets.

### Fiscal policy coordination
- Implementation issues:
  - CEMAC commission review of fiscal convergence framework pending (no report yet).
  - Degree of implementation of PFM directives varies across countries.
  - Compliance with regional surveillance remains weak.

### Monetary policy framework and financial development
- Key observations:
  - BEAC is working on a regional CPI index and improved monetary statistics (STA TA assistance requested).
  - Monetary policy transmission remains weak due to excessive systemic liquidity; reforms of monetary policy instruments have been slow.
  - Regulatory and supervisory reform progress has been incomplete; acceleration required.
  - Little progress on regional interbank and debt market creation.

### Risk Assessment — Selected risks and expected impacts (summary)
- Protracted slower growth in advanced (AE) and emerging (EM) economies
  - Expected impact: Medium
  - Likelihood: Medium to High for some channels; staff subjective assessments vary by scenario.
- Growth slowdown in China
  - Expected impact: Medium to High (negative impact on hydrocarbon exports and fiscal revenues).
- Sustained decline in commodity prices
  - Expected impact: Medium to High
  - Consequences: Lower oil prices will have a negative impact on hydrocarbon exports and hydrocarbon fiscal revenues in most countries of the region. Lower hydrocarbon revenue will erode fiscal sustainability in many countries of the region.
- Delays in implementing CEMAC regional and national reforms
  - Expected impact: Medium-term; could delay financial sector reform and problem bank resolution, increase budget deficits in some countries (Cameroon and Gabon).
- Sociopolitical instability and security issues (including regional spillovers)
  - Expected impact: Medium/Low to Medium
  - Consequences: Continued instability in the region (CAR) and neighboring countries (northern Nigeria, Mali, Libya) could lead to displacement, greater instability affecting CEMAC member countries (especially Cameroon) and additional fiscal costs (security spending, refugee inflows) or lower fiscal revenue.

### External Sustainability Assessment — Balance of Payments
- Recent developments:
  - Regional current account balance deteriorated from a surplus of 1.8 percent of GDP in 2011 to a deficit of 0.6 percent of GDP in 2012 and 3.1 percent in 2013.
  - The current account deficit is expected to increase slightly to 3.2 percent in 2014.
  - Drivers: substantial public investment (higher imports) and a gradual fall in oil-related exports.
  - 2014 projections: individual member current account balances projected to range from—14 percent of GDP in Central African Republic to 6.5 percent of GDP in Gabon.
  - Medium-term projection: regional current account projected to oscillate at around 3–4 percent of GDP as public investment gradual scaling down will be largely offset by declining oil-related exports.
- External financing composition:
  - FDI has averaged around 6 percent of GDP over the last decade.
  - Portfolio investment and aid have averaged about 0.5 percent of GDP over the same period.
  - Debt-creating flows averaged around 1 percent of GDP over the last decade and are expected to remain limited over the medium term.

### Reserves Adequacy
- Official reserves:
  - Regional official reserves are projected to remain stable from US$17.5 billion at the end-2013 to US$17.7 billion at the end-2014.
  - Reserves coverage metrics:
    - about 5 months of next year imports,
    - 80 percent of broad money,
    - about 1000 percent of short-term liabilities,
    - around 260 percent of the RA ratio.
  - Cost-benefit analysis indicates the level of reserve is at the low end of the optimal reserves range which varies between 5.6 to 13 months of imports depending on the interest rate differential with the rest of the world.
  - Note: approaches do not take into account access to reserves guaranteed by the French Treasury under franc zone arrangements.

### Price competitiveness and REER assessments
- Regional REER developments:
  - The effective real exchange rate (REER) appreciated slightly by about 5 percent during the last 12 months, reflecting the evolution of the nominal effective exchange rate and euro appreciation.
  - Country divergences in REER appreciation over last 12 months:
    - about 1 percent in Cameroon and Chad,
    - 7–8 percent in Republic of Congo,
    - more than 10 percent in Gabon and the CAR.
- Model-based assessments (Box 1) — REER/current account misalignment results:
  - CGER-based external sustainability method: positive deviation of about 10.5 percent.
  - Bems and Carvalho constant real annuity method: about 11.5-percent positive deviation.
  - Araujo et al. model: indicates about 7.5-percent REER overvaluation.
  - Conclusion: Taking into account CEMAC-specific factors, results do not indicate significant misalignments of the regional current account and REER provided that the current account deficit narrows as expected over the medium term.

### Structural competitiveness
- Survey-based indicators point to important structural competitiveness issues:
  - World Bank “Doing Business” indicators show an overall worsening of CEMAC countries’ situation over the last 5 years; challenges include starting a business, enforcing contracts, and trading across borders. Supply of infrastructure and electricity remains inadequate; procedures for paying taxes and registering properties remain cumbersome.
  - World Bank Governance Indicators show CEMAC countries lag peers and a relative deterioration in governance over the last 5 years, notably in government effectiveness, accountability, and quality of regulation.
- Survey caveats:
  - Indicators should be interpreted with caution due to limited number of respondents, limited geographical coverage, and standardized assumptions on business constraints and information availability.

*Source: Annex 1. Regional Authorities’ Responses to 2013 Policy Recommendations (IMF staff compilation).*

### Annex 4. Revising the Debt Limit Criterion

### Annex 4. Revising the Debt Limit Criterion

### Background and motivation
- The regional debt criterion (70 percent ceiling) is no longer a binding constraint across CEMAC members.
- Average CEMAC public debt decreased to about 18 percent of GDP in 2010 (its lowest historical level) following HIPC completion for Republic of Congo and Central African Republic and a substantial increase in oil-related revenue.
- Over the last 3 years, the public debt ratio has been increasing moderately but remains well below the 70 percent ceiling.
- The debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to increase moderately over the medium term as public investment stabilizes and oil revenues decrease.
- Recent debt accumulation has slightly exceeded expectations owing to:
  - higher-than-expected public investment, and
  - unanticipated shocks in some CEMAC countries (e.g., lower oil-related revenues, unfavorable weather conditions, and social conflicts).
- Regional fiscal rules exhibit multiple weaknesses:
  - fiscal balance ignores important sources of external indebtedness;
  - overall compliance with the rules has been weak and many countries have run deficits;
  - the debt criterion is no longer constraining to provide effective policy guidance;
  - the regional enforcement mechanism has not been effective due to a lack of credibility, transparency, and member states’ ownership.

### A. Estimating total debt thresholds
- Methodological approach:
  - Uses elements of the Fund-Bank debt sustainability framework and a Probit model to determine risk of debt distress, accounting for regional indebtedness, repayment capacities, policy and institutional capacity, macroeconomic shocks, and heterogeneity of CEMAC economies.
  - Domestic debt crises are defined as a failure to meet principals or interest payments to domestic creditors, identified using the IMF Historical Public Debt Database on domestic arrears.
  - Debt burden thresholds are computed as the average unconditional probability of debt distress for low and lower-middle income countries a year before the debt crisis occurrence; the probability ranges from 17 to 23 percent and depends on policy and institutional capacities.
- Key quantitative results:
  - Assuming an average real GDP growth of 4.6 percent, the estimated debt burden threshold varies between about 35 and 65 percent depending on institutional capacity of each member state.
  - On average, the risk of debt distress increases substantially if the public debt to GDP ratio exceeds the threshold of about 45 percent.
  - A 50-percent debt ceiling would still leave room for scaling up public investment, conditional on improvements in effectiveness and absorption capacity of public investment.
  - Debt-to-GDP ratio projections (under assumptions of public investment stabilizing at about 10 percent of GDP and continued decrease in oil-related revenue):
    - about 32 percent in 2019;
    - about 46 percent in 2030.

### B. Assessing the costs of a debt crisis
- Broad empirical findings on costs of debt crises:
  - Exclusion from international capital and credit markets can last up to 5.5 years after the crisis episode.
  - Debt crises can reduce trade flows by approximately 8 percent per year.
  - Debt default can lead to banking and/or currency crisis amplifying output losses.
  - Previous empirical analyses suggest debt crises can reduce output by about 6–10 percent in the short term and by about 10 percent over the medium term.
- CEMAC-specific estimates:
  - Debt crises have lowered output by about 9 percent in the short term and about 1 percent over the medium term (i.e., after 5 years of the crisis episode).
- Evidence on high-debt growth effects (literature):
  - Growth is reduced by about 1.8 percentage point when total debt exceeded 70 percent of GDP.
  - Growth is reduced by about 2 percentage point when debt exceed 90 percent of GDP.

### C. Suggestions for revising the regional surveillance framework
- Rationale:
  - Lowering the regional debt criterion is needed to better control debt accumulation and ensure long-term sustainability given frequent shocks and important development needs.
- Design considerations (implied by analysis):
  - Set a debt ceiling more consistent with estimated thresholds (estimated thresholds range about 35–65 percent; on average risk increases above about 45 percent).
  - Ensure the debt ceiling balances space for scaling up public investment with protection against elevated risk of debt distress (a 50-percent ceiling is identified as potentially compatible with scaling up investment, conditional on better investment returns and efficiency).
  - Strengthen the surveillance framework by addressing the identified weaknesses: incorporate external indebtedness in fiscal balance assessment, improve compliance and enforcement, enhance credibility, transparency, and member states’ ownership.

*Prepared by Aleksandra Zdzienicka. Source: Annex 4. Revising the Debt Limit Criterion (IMF staff analysis).*

### 11.      The reform of the regional surveillance framework should follow few simple

### 11.      The reform of the regional surveillance framework should follow few simple principles while taking into account CEMAC specific features

### Core principles for reform
- Simplify regional convergence criteria and refocus on the ultimate objective: the stability of the monetary union.
  - Reduce the number of regional criteria from 8 to two-three main criteria while continuing to monitor others as important economic and financial indicators.
  - Fiscal balance criteria should aim at reducing pro-cyclicality with the objective of long-term stability.
  - A non-resource primary balance should be set in a way to allow a temporary scaling up of investment.
- Ensure mutual consistency between main criteria.
  - The fiscal balance criterion should not be set too high and lead to a medium-term breach of the debt criterion.
  - More tailored fiscal rules could be implemented at the national level to improve policy guidance as long as they are consistent with the regional surveillance framework.
- Lower the debt criterion to ensure long-term sustainability and avoid significant output losses.
  - Use the debt sustainability framework to determine the level of the debt criterion.
  - The debt criterion should be seen as a ceiling to not breach rather than the optimal debt level.
- Make criteria simple, transparent, and easy to implement and monitor, while improving the effectiveness of the regional surveillance mechanism.
- Transpose regional rules into national laws and involve all stakeholders in reform.
  - Once consensus is reached, rules should be transposed into national budget laws and fiscal frameworks.
  - Compliance with rules should be monitored and communicated to the public to increase political costs of deviations from the rule.

### Rationale and supporting points (as presented)
- Simplification: moving from 8 criteria to two-three main criteria preserves focus on monetary union stability while allowing continued monitoring of other indicators.
- Pro-cyclicality risk: fiscal balance rules oriented toward reducing pro-cyclicality support long-term stability; a non-resource primary balance can accommodate temporary investment scaling-up.
- Consistency across criteria: preventing a fiscal balance target from causing a breach of the debt ceiling is necessary for coherence of the framework.
- Debt management: lowering the debt criterion and using debt sustainability analysis helps avoid significant output losses; the debt ceiling functions as a constraint rather than a target for optimal debt.
- Transparency and enforceability: simple and transparent criteria facilitate implementation and monitoring; legal transposition and public monitoring raise political costs of non-compliance.

### References cited in the section (selected works appearing in the source text)
- Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012) — methodological approach for estimating contemporaneous output growth against a crisis dummy.
- IMF (2013).
- Basdevant et al. (2014).

*Source: _cr14252 - 11.      The reform of the regional surveillance framework should follow few simple*

### 24.6 percent of Non-Oil GDP. Following debt relief and restructuring operations over the last

### 24.6 percent of Non-Oil GDP. Following debt relief and restructuring operations over the last

### Macroeconomic overview
- Regional real GDP growth declined to 2.5 percent in 2013 from 5.2 percent in 2012, owing mainly to a decrease in oil production and contraction of economic activity in CAR.
- Non-oil sector growth remained solid, supported by high public investment and buoyant domestic consumption; non-oil growth projected at 5-6 percent (medium term).
- Inflation in the region stood at 1.8 percent in 2013, below the convergence criterion of 3 percent.
- Current account: the current account deficit widened to around 3 percent of GDP as oil exports declined and investment-related imports remained large.
- Foreign reserves: decreased slightly but remained around US$17.5 billion, equivalent to 5.1 months of imports at end-2013.
- Public debt: average public debt for the region around 23 percent of GDP, well below the 70 percent of GDP ceiling set by the regional surveillance framework for individual countries.
- Debt analyses for member countries indicate low risk of debt distress.

### Monetary policy, liquidity, and financial sector
- Excessive liquidity makes monetary policy largely ineffective; the main monetary policy rate of the BEAC is disconnected from lending rates.
- Weak transmission channels: shallow banking system and underdeveloped financial markets weaken credit and asset price channels.
- Banking: growth of bank deposits slowed in 2013 but remained strong; growth of credit accelerated; liquidity in the banking system decreased following a decline in foreign assets.
- Reserves repatriation: noncompliance with foreign assets centralization continues to be a source of concern; BEAC has initiated discussions with stakeholders to agree on an appropriate framework.
- Financial sector strengthening underway: progress in strengthening COBAC’s capacities, adoption of new regulations, implementation of a remote financial reporting system, and recruitments to speed up banking supervision.
- Financial development measures: credit information bureau and rating system to be operational by end 2015; authorities reflecting on alternative financing sources including greater private sector participation in financing infrastructure projects.

### Risks and vulnerabilities
- Downside risks: significant vulnerability to a decline in oil and other commodity prices and to a protracted slowdown in partner countries.
- A prolonged drop in oil and commodity prices would have a significant impact on fiscal balances and the current account balance, and would require a larger and more abrupt reduction in public investment.
- Structural constraints: an extremely difficult business climate limits private investment growth and could weigh on medium-term potential growth.
- Security risks: deepening crisis in the Central African Republic and security challenges in Northern Cameroon could weigh on FDI and growth.
- External reserve adequacy: level of external reserves remains adequate but widening current account deficits could become a source of concern.

### Executive Board assessment and recommendations
- Board welcomed solid short-term macroeconomic prospects supported by public investment and a recovery in oil production, but noted significant downside risks from a potential oil price shock.
- Directors considered the fiscal stance too expansionary in some countries and noted limited effectiveness of monetary policy due to weak transmission channels.
- Recommendations and requests to authorities:
  - Improve compliance with regional reserves repatriation rules in coordination with BEAC.
  - Adapt the regional fiscal surveillance framework to better ensure stability and sustainability of policies.
  - Revise convergence criteria on fiscal deficit and public debt to limit pro-cyclicality and ensure low risks of debt distress while supporting prudent borrowing.
  - Expedite reform of the monetary policy framework to address excess liquidity, inefficient liquidity management, and underdeveloped interbank and debt markets.
  - Strengthen the regulatory and supervisory framework to ensure financial stability and support regional financial sector development.
  - Create credit registries and pursue judicial system reforms to foster efficient credit growth.
  - Be cautious about using governments’ savings deposited at BEAC to finance infrastructure projects; seek greater private sector participation.
  - Coordinate national and regional efforts to promote financial inclusion.
  - Foster regional integration and boost competitiveness; strengthen BEAC institutional autonomy and enhance capacities of the regional banking supervisor and the CEMAC Commission.

### Authorities’ policy commitments and planned reforms
- Fiscal surveillance: speed up implementation of regional directives on public financial management; Regional Surveillance Committee and national authorities discussed required reform; CEMAC Commission to prepare specific recommendations for the Zone Franc meeting in 2015; review debt ceiling criterion to be more consistent with budget rule and need for financing public investment.
- Monetary policy framework: implement with the Fund’s technical assistance an ambitious reform of BEAC’s monetary policy framework; revitalize interbank and government securities markets; enhance BEAC capacity to manage liquidity and develop interbank market.
- Financial sector: pursue enhancements of COBAC’s capacity; accelerate adoption of new regulation on crisis management; operationalize credit information bureau and rating system by end 2015.
- Regional integration and competitiveness: prepare, with World Bank support, a feasibility study to create a business climate regional observatory; implement measures to reduce regional trade barriers; prepare a study to reduce the common external tariff; eliminate double taxation to third-country products; create CEMAC-wide rules of origin.
- Institutional capacity: pursue BEAC reform and modernization, reinforce COBAC staffing, enhance CEMAC Commission, and improve quality of economic and financial information for monitoring and assessment.

### Selected economic and financial indicators (2010–15, as presented)
- GDP at constant prices (annual percent change): 2010: 5.6; 2011: 3.9; 2012: 5.2; 2013: 2.6; 2014: 5.3; 2015: 4.7.
- Oil GDP (annual percent change): 2010: 3.8; 2011: -2.2; 2012: -2.7; 2013: -7.1; 2014: 3.2; 2015: 1.8.
- Non-oil GDP (annual percent change): 2010: 11; 2011: 6.4; 2012: 5.9; 2013: 6.6; 2014: 4.6; 2015: 5.4; 2015 (proj): 5.1.
- Consumer prices (period average): 2010: 1.5; 2011: 2.5; 2012: 2.7; 2013: 1.8; 2014: 2.7; 2015: 2.1.
- Gross national savings (percent of GDP): 2010: 30.5; 2011: 33.0; 2012: 30.4; 2013: 28.3; 2014: 28.7; 2015: 27.3.
- Gross domestic investment (percent of GDP): 2010: 32.1; 2011: 31.2; 2012: 31.0; 2013: 31.4; 2014: 31.9; 2015: 31.1.
- Public investment (percent of GDP): 2010: 12.1; 2011: 13.9; 2012: 14.1; 2013: 14.8; 2014: 14.5; 2015: 13.4.
- Total revenue, excluding grants (percent of GDP): 2010: 24.9; 2011: 27.9; 2012: 27.9; 2013: 26.8; 2014: 26.1; 2015: 25.9.
- Government expenditure (percent of GDP): 2010: 24.3; 2011: 25.6; 2012: 29.4; 2013: 29.5; 2014: 29.5; 2015: 29.2.
- Overall fiscal balance, excluding grants (percent of GDP): 2010: 0.1; 2011: 2.0; 2012: -1.6; 2013: -2.7; 2014: -3.5; 2015: -3.4.
- Non-oil overall fiscal balance, excluding grants (percent of non-oil GDP): 2011: -23.6; 2012: -26.2; 2013: -31.1; 2014: -27.9; 2015: -26.8; (projection) -24.4.
- Non-oil primary fiscal balance (percent of non-oil GDP): 2010: -20.9; 2011: -23.7; 2012: -28.0; 2013: -24.6; 2014: -23.6; 2015: -21.5.
- Current account, including grants (percent of GDP): 2010: -1.6; 2011: 1.8; 2012: -0.6; 2013: -3.1; 2014: -3.2; 2015: -3.8.
- External public debt (percent of GDP): 2010: 12.3; 2011: 12.4; 2012: 14.2; 2013: 16.8; 2014: 17.2; 2015: 18.4.
- Gross official reserves (millions of U.S. dollars): 2010: 13,658; 2011: 15,717; 2012: 17,531; 2013: 17,490; 2014: 17,698; 2015: 17,528.
- Gross official reserves (months of imports): 2010: 4.3; 2011: 5.0; 2012: 5.4; 2013: 5.1; 2014: 5.0; 2015: 4.8.
- Nominal GDP (Billions of CFA francs): 2010: 36,863; 2011: 42,407; 2012: 45,445; 2013: 45,727; 2014: 48,273; 2015: 49,827.
- CFA francs per U.S. dollar, average: 2010: 495.3; 2011: 471.9; 2012: 510.5; 2013: 494; 2014: 479; 2015: 471.
- Oil prices (US dollars per barrel): 2010: 79.0; 2011: 104.0; 2012: 105.0; 2013: 104; 2014: 104; 2015: 98.

*Source: IMF staff and Executive Board discussion materials on Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/_cr14252.pdf_
