## Medium Term Outlook, 2010–2018 (_cr1484)

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### Recent developments
- Political and security
  - The political and security situation "has stabilized, but remains fragile."
  - Peaceful elections in Mali and Togo and progress toward normalization in Côte d’Ivoire noted.
  - Upcoming elections and high demand for better governance and living standards could test political stability; region vulnerable to internal security breakdowns and spillovers.
- Growth and inflation (2011–2013)
  - Regional growth: rebounded from 1.2 percent in 2011 to 6.6 percent in 2012, and reached 5.5 percent in 2013.
  - Country highlights: Côte d’Ivoire growth about 9 percent; growth exceeded 5 percent in Benin, Burkina Faso, and Togo; weak economy in Guinea-Bissau; drought in the Sahel negatively affected Mali.
  - Regional inflation decreased to 1.6 percent in 2013, driven by lower food prices.
- Fiscal developments (2013)
  - Area-wide fiscal deficit (including grants) stabilized at about 3 percent of GDP despite substantial increase in public investment.
  - Composition of spending shifted toward investment; grants and tax revenue increased in most countries.
  - Fiscal deficits decreased in all countries except Benin, Mali, and Niger.
  - Public debt ratios declined in all countries except Burkina Faso, Niger, and Senegal.
  - Average public debt ratio for the region recorded a small decline to about 39 percent of GDP.
- Monetary policy and money markets (2013)
  - BCEAO lowered policy rates by 50 basis points in 2013.
  - Liquidity injections increased as bank liquidity contracted and inflationary pressures remained moderate.
  - Money growth remained moderate, at about 10 percent.
  - Decline of net foreign assets was offset by strong growth in credit to the economy.
  - Bank lending rates recorded a small decrease.
- External sector (2013)
  - Area-wide current account deficit (including official transfers) widened from 5.6 percent of GDP in 2012 to 6.7 percent in 2013.
  - Drivers: higher public investment boosting imports of intermediate goods, equipment, and services; sharp decline in gold prices.
  - Gold exports represent about 20 percent of total regional exports.
  - Overall balance of payments recorded a slight deficit, leading to a small decline of official reserves to 4.7 months of next year’s extra-regional imports.
- External position assessment
  - Effective nominal appreciation about 4.5 percent; real effective appreciation 2.5 percent in 2013.
  - Real effective exchange rate remains broadly in line with regional fundamentals and official reserves adequate, provided the current account deficit narrows in the medium term.
  - Recent current account and reserves developments warrant close monitoring.

### Outlook and risks
- Baseline outlook
  - Growth would exceed 6 percent in 2014, reflecting substantial scaling up of investment in Côte d’Ivoire and Niger, and rebounding agricultural production in Mali.
  - Medium-term: growth exceeding 5 percent in most WAEMU countries.
  - Inflation would remain moderate at about 2 percent.
  - Current account deficit projected to gradually decline after 2014 as gross investment stabilizes at a high level and begins generating higher exports, boosting income and savings.
  - Current account financing expected to remain mostly through non-debt creating inflows (FDI and grants).
  - Projections assume stabilization of political and security situations, and sustained implementation of growth-enhancing reforms and investment.
- Key risks (selected entries from Risk Assessment Matrix)
  - Persistence of political and security risks
    - Likelihood: Medium
    - Expected Impact: High
    - Consequences: negative impact on economic activity, growth, and inequality; delays in reforms and investment; additional fiscal costs; destruction of capital (incl. human).
  - Adverse weather conditions
    - Likelihood: Low
    - Expected Impact: Medium to High
    - Consequences: food insecurity; additional fiscal costs; negative impact on activity and inflation.
  - Sharp slowdown in China / Protracted slower growth in advanced and emerging economies
    - Likelihood: Medium (China; elsewhere), High (Europe)
    - Expected Impact: Low to Medium
    - Consequences: negative impact on exports, foreign investment, remittances and aid.
  - Sustained decline in commodity prices
    - Likelihood: Medium
    - Expected Impact: Medium
    - Consequences: average positive effects on external position and inflation, but negative if decline concentrated in gold prices.
  - Delays in key reforms (infrastructure, energy, public finance, financial sector, regional integration)
    - Likelihood: Medium
    - Expected Impact: Medium to High
    - Consequences: fiscal sustainability issues; lower growth and slower poverty reduction; increased financial instability.
  - Market access risks
    - WAEMU countries planning to tap international markets in 2014 could face higher financing costs if global financial volatility increases.

### Macroeconomic policy mix and staff recommendations (2014)
- Fiscal stance and country differences
  - Area-wide fiscal deficit (excluding Niger) would slightly decrease in 2014 despite further scaling-up of investment.
  - Niger’s deficit would temporarily increase substantially with government financing of a large hydrocarbon-sector project.
  - Fiscal consolidation would continue in higher-deficit countries (Senegal and Togo).
  - Public investment expected to increase in all countries; current expenditure-to-GDP ratio would decline in most.
  - Regional public debt ratio expected to remain stable at about 39 percent of GDP.
- Staff advice on policy mix
  - Current mix looks appropriate; more stimulative policies not required at this juncture.
  - Pause in monetary easing seems appropriate given entrenched growth, worsening current account deficit, and declining official reserves.
  - Countries encouraged to strengthen fiscal sustainability while maintaining public investment and expanding social safety nets.
  - Additional efforts needed to improve quality of spending and revenue mobilization.
  - If temporary downside risks materialize in 2014, allow automatic stabilizers where financing is available; a more permanent shock would require adjustment.
- Authorities’ views
  - Authorities broadly agreed but were more optimistic on balance of risks.
  - Emphasized need to preserve fiscal sustainability while addressing development needs requiring higher investment and social spending.

### Monetary policy effectiveness and reforms
- Observed transmission and constraints
  - Monetary policy transmission is limited and asymmetric across countries.
  - With limited capital mobility, scope exists for active monetary policy under the exchange rate regime.
  - Empirical work: changes in policy rates have a statistically significant but small impact on inflation.
  - Constraints: shallow financial system, absence of an exchange rate channel, differences in financial depth and concentration, limited financial integration.
- Empirical quantitative points (regional averages)
  - Standard deviation of policy rates and deposit rates over last 5 years: about 0.2.
  - Policy rate → money market rate: +1.4 percentage point per one percentage point policy increase.
  - Policy rate → interbank rate: +1.9 percent per one percentage point policy increase.
  - Policy rate → lending rate: +0.7 percent per one percentage point policy increase.
  - Policy rate → inflation: −0.05 percent per one percentage point policy increase.
  - Money market rate → interbank rate: +1.4 percentage point per one percentage point money market increase.
  - Money market rate → lending rate: +0.3 percentage point per one percentage point money market increase.
  - Money market rate → inflation: −0.03 percent per one percentage point money market increase.
  - Financial-development interaction: monetary tightening can lower inflation by about 1 percentage point at the upper 80th percentile of credit-to-GDP; no effect at the 20th percentile.
- Staff recommendations to strengthen monetary policy effectiveness
  - Accelerate reforms to develop the interbank and public debt markets to reduce liquidity injections, improve liquidity transactions among banks, and establish a reference interest rate.
  - Better understand transmission channels by country.
  - Improve policy coordination on projecting net government position vis-à-vis the banking system and establish a single treasury account in each country.
  - Improve quality, timeliness, and coverage of economic and financial data; develop intra-annual indicators.
- Authorities’ plans and status
  - Launch electronic platform to auction and trade liquidity and government paper expected by mid-2014; introduce collateralized interbank operations and primary dealers.
  - BCEAO noted banks’ increased demand for liquidity should increase monetary policy effectiveness in the future.
  - Efforts ongoing to develop quarterly national accounts.

### Fiscal policy coordination and reform of convergence criteria
- Rationale and observed shortcomings
  - Regional surveillance framework under review to improve fiscal coordination.
  - Existing criteria enforcement weak: basic fiscal deficit frequently violated; debt ceiling of 70 percent of GDP may no longer be constraining.
- Staff’s design principles for new criteria
  - Specify ultimate objective: fiscal sustainability.
  - Keep only criteria directly related to fiscal sustainability; consider retaining two or three criteria (e.g., a debt criterion and a deficit criterion).
  - Ensure mutual consistency of criteria and rely on debt sustainability analysis; consider “debt brakes” to adjust deficit ceilings.
  - Keep rules simple, transparent, and allow national tailoring consistent with regional rules.
- Improving ownership and compliance
  - Use inclusive reform approach to improve country ownership.
  - Transpose regional rules into national laws and fiscal frameworks.
  - Increase transparency and communication; use national fiscal councils where feasible.
  - Strengthen national budget processes and systematic use of medium-term fiscal frameworks.
- Authorities’ views
  - Concurred with many principles but raised issues: financial sanctions unlikely to work; independent fiscal councils may not be feasible; cyclically-adjusted deficit "probably too complex"; disagreed with lowering debt ceiling arguing it would constrain public investment.

### Financial sector deepening, supervision, and crisis management
- Diagnosis and key facts
  - Banking sector expanded: average credit-to-GDP ratio increased from 15 to 23 percent over the last decade.
  - Microfinance reached about 15 percent of the WAEMU population.
  - Regional government debt market expanded; private debt market underdeveloped; foreign investor participation very limited.
  - Mobile banking rising but penetration much lower than East Africa.
  - Banks are liquid and relatively well capitalized on average, but substantial heterogeneity exists.
  - A quarter of banks do not meet solvency ratios; half of banks do not respect the single risk exposure ratio; high share of nonperforming loans.
  - Pan-African banking groups hold about 50 percent of the assets of the WAEMU’s banking system.
- Staff advice on market deepening and supervision
  - Accelerate reforms to develop interbank and sovereign debt markets; support creation of credit bureaus.
  - Address weak transparency, underdeveloped judicial and business environments, limited financial skills, and suboptimal taxation regimes.
  - Strengthen Banking Commission staffing and training for more frequent on-site supervision and earlier risk identification.
  - Consider stronger and more systematic sanctions to increase credibility of supervision.
  - Move to Basel II/III regulation (with IMF technical support); in the interim, tighten rules on risk concentration and provisioning, and set an early deadline to raise banks’ minimum capital requirement to CFAF 10 billion.
  - Move to consolidated reporting and supervision; strengthen cross-border supervision and cooperation.
  - Reconsider resolution architecture to give more powers to the supervisor; reduce time banks can spend in receivership.
- Authorities’ response and implementation status highlights
  - Banking Commission staffing doubled last year; minimum capital raised earlier to CFAF 5 billion; principle agreed to raise to CFAF 10 billion (deadline pending).
  - Planned reforms: deposit insurance scheme and payment guarantee scheme expected to be launched in 2014; financial stability fund work ongoing; credit bureaus expected to be operational in 2014; agreement on free basic banking services list.
  - Implementation status snapshot (selected):
    - Introduction of Collateralized operations (repo): Ongoing
    - Rollout of electronic platform (Application Trésor): Ongoing
    - Introduction of Primary Dealers: Ongoing
    - Improve issuance coordination with Agence UMOA Titres: Done
    - Improve data quality, coverage and timeliness: No major improvement
    - Increase compliance with prudential norms: No major improvement
    - Launch deposit insurance system: Ongoing

### Regional integration, competitiveness, and resilience
- Diagnosis
  - WAEMU underperformed faster-growing SSA economies due to sociopolitical instability, weak structural competitiveness, infrastructure gaps, undeveloped financial sectors, and weak institutions.
  - Regional integration remains low despite a common currency and, in principle, free flow of goods and factors.
  - Recovery in Côte d’Ivoire starting in 2012 boosted regional prospects.
- Staff advice
  - Deepen the single market and address nontariff obstacles (e.g., illicit road blocks and payments).
  - Coordinate regional investment in transportation and energy infrastructure and improve business and legal environments.
  - Accelerate implementation of the second phase of the Regional Economic Program (PER).
  - Strengthen financial system development, improve access, and facilitate remittances flows.
  - Consider more fiscal federalism in the medium term; a small centralized fiscal risk-sharing mechanism (temporary transfers) could provide significant income smoothing.
- Authorities’ views and constraints
  - Concurred with need to pursue regional integration; full implementation of the PER hampered by financing availability; intend to step up fund-raising efforts.
  - Considering ways to channel remittances towards investment.
- Remittances (role and policy)
  - Remittances reached an estimated $3.6 billion in 2011.
  - In 2011 remittances were about 50 percent higher than net FDI and amounted to about 60 percent the amount of official aid inflows.
  - Remittances finance mainly consumption (55 percent) and investment (21 percent).
  - Empirical result: a one percent decrease in real WAEMU GDP is associated with a four percent increase in net remittances inflows to the WAEMU (about 0.1 percent of GDP), confirming remittances are countercyclical.
  - Policy suggestions: facilitate remittances through competition and transparency in transfer market, innovative transfer technologies, improved access to financial institutions, and mobile banking development.
  - Financial inclusion context: ratio of adults with a bank account in the WAEMU is about 13 percent (SSA average 31 percent).

### External sector, reserves, and vulnerability
- Key 2013 figures
  - Exports of goods and services (WAEMU): 27.8 percent of GDP in 2013.
  - Imports of goods and services (WAEMU): 39.0 percent of GDP in 2013.
  - Current account, excl. grants (WAEMU): -10.5 percent of GDP in 2013.
  - Current account, incl. grants (WAEMU): -6.7 percent of GDP in 2013.
  - Reserves in months of imports (excl. intra-WAEMU imports): 4.7 months in 2013.
  - Foreign exchange cover ratio (WAEMU): 91.2 percent in 2013 (gross official reserves divided by short-term domestic liabilities).
  - Regional official reserves projected to decrease from CFAF 7051 billion (US$13. 8 billion) at end-2012 to CFAF 6886 billion (US$13.9 billion) at end-2013.
  - External financing composition: private transfers ~3 percent of GDP; public current transfers (grants) rose from 1.4 percent of GDP in 2012 to 3.7 percent of GDP in 2013; capital grants increased to 1.8 percent of GDP in 2013 and expected to reach 2 percent in 2014; FDI averaged around 2.2 percent of GDP; loans increased from 1.3 percent of GDP in 2012 to about 3 percent in 2013.
  - Gold exports represent about 20 percent of total regional exports; decline in gold prices contributed to wider current account deficit.
- Staff assessment
  - Reserves coverage at end-2013: 4.7 months of next year imports, 50 percent of broad money, and about 91 percent of short-term liabilities.
  - Alternative optimal reserves range between 5 to 10 months of imports, placing current reserves at the low end of the optimal range.

### Public debt and fiscal projections (WAEMU aggregate, selected)
- WAEMU total public debt (Percent of GDP): 44.4 (2010), 44.4 (2011), 39.7 (2012), 38.8 (2013Est.), 38.7 (2014Proj.), 38.5 (2015Proj.), 38.2 (2016Proj.), 37.5 (2017Proj.), 37.1 (2018Proj.).
- Government total revenue, excl. grants (Percent of GDP): 17.9 (2010), 16.6 (2011), 19.0 (2012), 19.4 (2013Est.), 19.4 (2014Proj.), 19.4 (2015Proj.), 19.8 (2016Proj.), 20.2 (2017Proj.), 20.4 (2018Proj.).
- Government expenditure (Percent of GDP): 23.3 (2010), 23.2 (2011), 24.8 (2012), 25.3 (2013Est.), 26.9 (2014Proj.), 25.5 (2015Proj.), 25.7 (2016Proj.), 25.8 (2017Proj.), 25.8 (2018Proj.).
- Overall fiscal balance, excl. grants (Percent of GDP): -5.4 (2010), -6.5 (2011), -5.8 (2012), -5.9 (2013Est.), -7.5 (2014Proj.), -6.1 (2015Proj.), -5.9 (2016Proj.), -5.7 (2017Proj.), -5.4 (2018Proj.).
- Overall fiscal balance, incl. grants (Percent of GDP): -3.1 (2010), -4.0 (2011), -3.6 (2012), -3.0 (2013Est.), -4.3 (2014Proj.), -3.2 (2015Proj.), -3.1 (2016Proj.), -3.0 (2017Proj.), -2.9 (2018Proj.).
- Basic fiscal balance, incl. grants & HIPC (Percent of GDP): -0.7 (2010), -2.1 (2011), -2.1 (2012), -0.9 (2013Est.), -1.1 (2014Proj.), -0.9 (2015Proj.), -0.8 (2016Proj.), -0.7 (2017Proj.), -0.6 (2018Proj.).
- Nominal GDP (billions of CFA francs) for 2013: 43,220.
- Nominal GDP per capita (US dollars) for 2013: 816.

### Growth diagnostics and structural constraints
- Key findings on WAEMU underperformance
  - Per-capita GDP increased by 20 percent since 1995 in WAEMU vs. more than doubled in faster-growing SSA economies.
  - Lower TFP growth explains a large part of underperformance; average TFP growth negative in Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Togo; low in Niger, Benin and Mali; Burkina Faso an exception with significant TFP increase.
  - Slower capital accumulation and limited structural transformation (industry share falling except in Côte d’Ivoire; services share increased less than peers).
  - Business climate and institutional weaknesses: problems in enforcing contracts, starting a business, protecting investors’ rights, trading across borders, infrastructure and electricity supply, tax and property registration procedures.
- Quantitative assessment highlights (1995–2012 panel regressions)
  - Social conflicts: occurrence increases growth differential by about 0.6–0.8 percentage point (coefficients: -0.823**, -0.580*, -0.612***).
  - Public investment: a one percentage point increase in public investment-to-GDP reduces the growth gap by about 0.5–0.7 percentage point (coefficients: -0.033**, -0.016***).
  - Governance/institutions: significant impact on growth and reduction in probability of social conflict.
  - Model statistics: observations N reported across specifications: 131, 136, 136, 136, 111, 135; R-squared values: 0.36, 0.35, 0.28, 0.26, 0.24, 0.44.
- Policy implications
  - Strengthen institutional quality and governance to reduce political instability and social conflicts.
  - Increase public investment and improve its efficiency.
  - Address structural competitiveness constraints to promote structural transformation and higher returns to private investment.
  - Close infrastructure gaps (roads, logistics, electricity) and promote human capital accumulation.
  - Maintain prudent macroeconomic policies to sustain low and stable inflation while managing external indebtedness.

### Monetary transmission evidence and policy implications (Appendix III)
- Framework and empirical approach
  - DL models and Panel VAR used on monthly data (February 2007–September 2013, 80 observations).
  - Policy rates have had low variability—BCEAO changed policy rate only six times during estimation period.
- Aggregate and country-heterogeneous results
  - Policy rates affect money market, interbank, and lending rates, but pass-through to lending rates and inflation is small and heterogeneous.
  - Stronger transmission in Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Togo; almost nonexistent in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Niger.
  - Greater financial development (higher credit-to-GDP) and lower banking-sector concentration strengthen monetary policy effectiveness.
- Policy implications from transmission analysis
  - Develop financial markets and intermediation to improve pass-through.
  - Foster competition in the banking sector to increase monetary policy effectiveness.
  - Improve data and monitoring to better tailor monetary policy to country conditions.

### Executive Board and staff appraisal (summary)
- Directors welcomed strong growth and moderate inflation; near-term outlook: continued strong growth.
- Priorities to sustain momentum while preserving macro stability:
  - Consolidate improvements in regional security.
  - Ensure high-quality public investment and ambitious growth-enhancing reforms.
  - Pause further monetary easing given widening current account deficit and declining reserves.
  - Strengthen fiscal and debt sustainability while maintaining public investment and expanding social safety nets.
  - Accelerate financial sector reforms, develop interbank and sovereign debt markets, and strengthen bank supervision (move toward Basel II/III while tightening prudential rules in interim).
  - Improve crisis prevention and resolution frameworks and data transparency/access.
  - Enhance regional trade integration, remove nontariff barriers, and fill infrastructure gaps.

*International Monetary Fund — WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, "Medium Term Outlook, 2010–2018" (excerpted from _cr1484).*

### 1. Medium Term Outlook, 2010–2018 ____________________________________________________________  19

### 1. Medium Term Outlook, 2010–2018

### Recent Developments
- Political and security
  - The political and security situation "has stabilized, but remains fragile."
  - Peaceful elections in Mali and Togo and progress toward normalization in Côte d’Ivoire noted.
  - Upcoming elections and high demand for better governance and living standards could test political stability; region vulnerable to internal security breakdowns and spillovers.
- Growth and inflation (2011–2013)
  - Regional growth: rebounded from 1.2 percent in 2011 to 6.6 percent in 2012, and reached 5.5 percent in 2013.
  - Country highlights: Côte d’Ivoire growth about 9 percent; growth exceeded 5 percent in Benin, Burkina Faso, and Togo; weak economy in Guinea-Bissau; drought in the Sahel negatively affected Mali.
  - Regional inflation decreased to 1.6 percent in 2013, driven by lower food prices.
- Fiscal developments (2013)
  - Area-wide fiscal deficit (including grants) stabilized at about 3 percent of GDP despite substantial increase in public investment.
  - Composition of spending shifted toward investment; grants and tax revenue increased in most countries.
  - Fiscal deficits decreased in all countries except Benin, Mali, and Niger.
  - Public debt ratios declined in all countries except Burkina Faso, Niger, and Senegal.
  - Average public debt ratio for the region recorded a small decline to about 39 percent of GDP.
- Monetary policy and money markets (2013)
  - BCEAO lowered policy rates by 50 basis points in 2013.
  - Liquidity injections increased as bank liquidity contracted and inflationary pressures remained moderate.
  - Money growth remained moderate, at about 10 percent.
  - Decline of net foreign assets was offset by strong growth in credit to the economy.
  - Bank lending rates recorded a small decrease.
- External sector (2013)
  - Area-wide current account deficit (including official transfers) widened from 5.6 percent of GDP in 2012 to 6.7 percent in 2013.
  - Drivers: higher public investment boosting imports of intermediate goods, equipment, and services; sharp decline in gold prices.
  - Gold exports represent about 20 percent of total regional exports.
  - Overall balance of payments recorded a slight deficit, leading to a small decline of official reserves to 4.7 months of next year’s extra-regional imports.
- External position assessment
  - CFA franc: effective nominal appreciation about 4.5 percent; real effective appreciation only 2.5 percent in 2013 owing to low inflation.
  - Analyses suggest the real effective exchange rate remains broadly in line with regional fundamentals and official reserves adequate, provided the current account deficit narrows in the medium term.
  - Recent current account and reserves developments warrant close monitoring.

### Outlook and Risks
- Baseline outlook
  - With sustained reform implementation, growth would remain strong in 2014 and the medium term.
  - Growth would exceed 6 percent in 2014, reflecting substantial scaling up of investment in Côte d’Ivoire and Niger, and rebounding agricultural production in Mali.
  - Medium-term: growth exceeding 5 percent in most WAEMU countries.
  - Inflation would remain moderate at about 2 percent.
  - Current account deficit projected to gradually decline after 2014 as gross investment stabilizes at a high level and begins generating higher exports, boosting income and savings.
  - Current account financing expected to remain mostly through non-debt creating inflows (FDI and grants).
  - Projections assume stabilization of political and security situations, and sustained implementation of growth-enhancing reforms and investment.
- Risk assessment (selected entries from Risk Assessment Matrix)
  - Persistence of political and security risks
    - Likelihood: Medium
    - Expected Impact: High
    - Expected events: possible deterioration of security conditions; high demand for governance could test stability during elections.
    - Consequences: negative impact on economic activity, growth, and inequality; delays in reforms and investment; additional fiscal costs (security spending, refugee inflows) or lower fiscal revenue; destruction of capital (incl. human).
  - Adverse weather conditions
    - Likelihood: Low
    - Expected Impact: Medium to High
    - Consequences: food insecurity for vulnerable populations; additional fiscal costs; negative impact on economic activity and inflation.
  - Sharp slowdown in China / Protracted slower growth in advanced and emerging economies
    - Likelihood: Medium (China; elsewhere), High (Europe)
    - Expected Impact: Low to Medium
    - Consequences: negative impact on exports and foreign investment; impact on remittances and aid flows; larger impact if Europe is affected.
  - Sustained decline in commodity prices
    - Likelihood: Medium
    - Expected Impact: Medium
    - Consequences: on average could be positive for external position, inflation, and economic activity, but effects vary significantly across countries; could be negative if decline is concentrated in gold prices.
  - Delays in key reforms at country and regional levels (infrastructure, energy, public finance, financial sector, regional integration)
    - Likelihood: Medium
    - Expected Impact: Medium to High
    - Consequences: potential fiscal sustainability issues; lower growth and slower poverty reduction; increased financial instability if supervision lags the evolving financial system.
  - Market access risks
    - WAEMU countries planning to tap international markets in 2014 could face higher financing costs should unconventional monetary policy exit lead to increased global financial market volatility.

### Coordinating Policies to Ensure Stability and Support Growth

A. Macroeconomic Policy Mix in 2014
- Fiscal outlook and country differences
  - Area-wide fiscal deficit (excluding Niger) would slightly decrease in 2014 despite further scaling-up of investment.
  - Niger’s deficit would temporarily increase substantially with government financing of a large hydrocarbon-sector project.
  - Fiscal consolidation would continue in higher-deficit countries (Senegal and Togo).
  - Public investment expected to increase in all countries; in most, the ratio of current expenditure to GDP would decline.
  - Regional public debt ratio expected to remain stable at about 39 percent of GDP.
- Staff’s advice on policy mix
  - Current mix looks appropriate; more stimulative policies not required at this juncture.
  - Monetary policy easing over the past two years was justified by favorable inflation developments and growth uncertainty; with growth now better entrenched and a worsening current account deficit and declining official reserves, a pause in easing seems appropriate.
  - Countries are encouraged to strengthen fiscal sustainability while maintaining public investment and expanding social safety nets.
  - Additional efforts needed to improve quality of spending and revenue mobilization.
  - If temporary downside risks materialize in 2014, allow automatic stabilizers to operate where financing is available.
  - A more permanent shock to growth would require adjustment.
- Authorities’ views
  - Authorities broadly agreed with staff assessment but were more optimistic on balance of risks.
  - They were confident that political stability, security, and ongoing reforms would boost potential growth.
  - Authorities emphasized the need to preserve fiscal sustainability while addressing development needs that require higher investment and social spending.

B. Monetary Policy Effectiveness
- Observed transmission and constraints
  - Monetary policy transmission is limited and asymmetric across countries.
  - With limited capital mobility, there is some scope for active monetary policy under the exchange rate regime.
  - Empirical work suggests changes in policy rates have a statistically significant but small impact on inflation.
  - Constraints: shallow financial system (underdeveloped interbank market, no secondary market for government debt), absence of an exchange rate channel, differences in financial depth and concentration, limited financial integration.
- Staff’s advice
  - Accelerate reforms to develop the interbank and public debt markets to:
    - Reduce need for liquidity injections.
    - Improve liquidity transactions among banks.
    - Establish a reference interest rate for monetary policy.
  - More work needed to better understand monetary policy transmission channels in the region and individual countries.
  - Improve policy coordination with country authorities, particularly on projecting the net government position vis-à-vis the banking system and establishing a single treasury account in each country to strengthen liquidity management and monetary policy implementation.
  - Improve quality, timeliness, and coverage of economic and financial data; develop intra-annual indicators on economic and financial activity.
- Authorities’ views
  - Authorities intend to complete these reforms as soon as possible.
  - Acknowledged delays in launching the electronic platform to auction and trade liquidity and government paper; expected launch by mid-2014, together with introduction of collateralized operations on the interbank market and primary dealers.
  - BCEAO noted that banks’ increased demand for liquidity over the past two years would likely increase monetary policy effectiveness in the future.
  - Efforts are ongoing to develop quarterly national accounts.

C. Fiscal Policy Coordination
- Rationale for review
  - Regional surveillance framework under review to improve fiscal policy coordination.
  - Existing criteria and enforcement mechanism have shortcomings: the basic fiscal deficit criterion has often been violated; after debt relief the debt criterion (ceiling of 70 percent of GDP) may no longer be constraining and could be high from a debt vulnerability perspective.
  - WAEMU Commission launched a review covering design of convergence criteria and incentives for compliance; experts’ report received but no reform proposal yet.
- Staff’s advice on design principles for new criteria
  - Specify the ultimate objective: staff views fiscal sustainability as the objective.
  - Keep only criteria directly related to fiscal sustainability; consider retaining only two or three criteria (e.g., a debt criterion and a deficit criterion).
  - Ensure mutual consistency of criteria (e.g., deficit ceiling should not lead systematically to breaching debt ceiling).
  - Rely on comprehensive debt sustainability analysis to ensure consistency; consider introducing “debt brakes” that adjust deficit ceilings based on past deviations or distance to debt ceiling.
  - Keep criteria simple, transparent, and easy to implement and monitor.
  - Allow some tailoring of fiscal rules at national level, consistent with regional rules (e.g., rules for saving or investing natural resource revenues).
  - Treat any ceiling on debt/deficit as not optimal per se; staying below ceilings preserves space to respond to shocks.
- Improving ownership and compliance
  - Improve country ownership via an inclusive reform approach, even if it delays implementation.
  - Transpose regional rules into national laws and fiscal frameworks to increase the cost of deviation.
  - Increase transparency and communication on objectives and outcomes.
  - Use national fiscal councils where adequately staffed and independent to complement the WAEMU Commission.
  - Strengthen national budget processes, for instance through systematic use of medium-term fiscal frameworks.

*International Monetary Fund — WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, "Medium Term Outlook, 2010–2018"*

### 18.      The authorities concurred with many of the broad principles, but raised issues with a

### 18. The authorities concurred with many of the broad principles, but raised issues with a few staff proposals.

### Authorities’ initial views (regional governance and rules)
- WAEMU Commission:
  - Stressed that financial sanctions were unlikely to work.
  - Agreed with the need to have full ownership of the rules by country authorities and intended an inclusive approach to reform of regional surveillance.
  - Expressed doubts about the feasibility of establishing independent fiscal councils in member states.
  - Concurred with the need for simple rules; viewed the use of a cyclically-adjusted fiscal deficit as "probably too complex at this juncture."
  - Disagreed with staff’s earlier recommendation to lower the debt ceiling, arguing it would constrain public investment and ultimately growth.

### Other areas for policy coordination — findings
- Transposition and implementation of regional PFM directives into national laws (which should have been completed by end-2011) is way behind schedule.
- Regional and international markets have become important sources of government financing, creating new debt management challenges; national capacity-building efforts are ongoing.
- A regional debt agency was created and is now operational; it will focus on improving debt issuance coordination, providing advice to national authorities on debt management, and broadening the investor base.
- Trade and tax policies are in principle highly coordinated, although actual application may not always be consistent.
- An agreement was found on a common external tariff (CET) for ECOWAS, influenced by ongoing negotiations with the European Union on an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).

### Staff’s advice on coordination and fiscal/tax issues
- Transposition and implementation of the PFM directives should accelerate; the WAEMU Commission should identify reasons for delays and communicate findings and recommendations to the Council of Ministers.
- Extension of the customs union to ECOWAS carries risks for tax coordination that need careful consideration.
- Ongoing WAEMU efforts to further harmonize tax policies (with IMF technical support) are welcome.
- A regional approach on issues such as taxation of investment and petroleum products is warranted to reduce distortions affecting the single market.
- Staff regrets that the new CET for ECOWAS raised external protection for WAEMU countries.
- The possibility for each ECOWAS country to apply additional protection for a few years to 3 percent of tariff lines of its choice carries serious risks for tariff regime integrity and the single market, and could jeopardize WAEMU tax harmonization efforts.

### Authorities’ response on coordination and debt/PFM
- Acknowledged delays and risks but noted positive developments:
  - Technical work on PFM directive transposition is well advanced and should allow for substantial progress in 2014.
  - Stressed the CET remains a significant achievement to foster regional integration despite risks.
  - Noted the regional debt agency would build capacity in debt management.

### Accelerating financial sector reforms — diagnosis
- Financial depth, breadth, and access remain low despite significant development.
  - Banking sector expanded: average credit-to-GDP ratio increased from 15 to 23 percent over the last decade.
  - Microfinance sector has developed quickly since early 2000s, reaching about 15 percent of the WAEMU population.
  - Regional government debt market has expanded rapidly since its creation in 2003.
- Regional debt markets remain underdeveloped, particularly for private debt; foreign investor participation is very limited compared with Ghana and Nigeria.
- Mobile banking is rising but penetration remains much lower than in East Africa.
- Financial sector soundness:
  - Banks are liquid and relatively well capitalized on average, but substantial heterogeneity exists.
  - A quarter of banks do not meet solvency ratios.
  - Some banks face serious difficulties in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Togo (country-specific, not systemic).
  - Half of banks do not respect the single risk exposure ratio, despite it being much higher than international standards.
  - High share of nonperforming loans; asset quality is an issue.
  - Fast-developing regional banking groups (some facing governance or financial challenges) raise new opportunities and risks.
  - Pan-African banking groups hold about 50 percent of the assets of the WAEMU’s banking system.

### Staff’s advice on financial sector development and market deepening
- Accelerate reforms to develop and strengthen the financial system.
- Address main obstacles: weak transparency, underdeveloped judicial and business environments, limited financial skills, and suboptimal taxation regimes.
- Support creation of credit bureaus to reduce information asymmetry.
- Complete reforms to develop interbank and sovereign debt markets as a priority; combine with more active communication (including by the new regional debt agency) and further harmonization of financial product taxation to attract foreign investors.

### Staff’s advice on supervision, crisis prevention, and resources
- Bank supervision and regulation:
  - Compliance with key prudential ratios remains insufficient and urgently needs to improve.
  - Strengthen staffing and training at the Banking Commission to allow more frequent on-site supervision and earlier risk identification.
  - Consider stronger and more systematic sanctions to increase credibility of the supervision framework.
  - Strengthen collaboration with other supervisors to improve oversight of regional banking groups.
  - Move to Basel II/III regulation (with IMF technical support) to align prudential rules with international standards.
  - Meanwhile, consider tightening rules on risk concentration and claims and provisioning classification, and set an early deadline to raise banks’ minimum capital requirement to CFAF 10 billion.
  - Move to consolidated reporting and supervision is a priority.
- Crisis prevention and resolution:
  - Compile and publish financial soundness indicators on a regular and timely basis to improve transparency and market discipline.
  - Continue developing macro-prudential analyses, with regular stress tests and early-warning indicators.
  - Reconsider the resolution architecture to give more powers to the supervisor (there is a single supervisor but no single resolution framework), in line with international best practice.
  - Reduce the time a bank can spend in receivership to force earlier decisions on restructuring or closing.
- Resources:
  - Adequate resources need to be dedicated to implement the ambitious reform agenda on time.
  - Recommend close cooperation between regulators and supervisors.

### BCEAO governance and audit
- Substantial progress in improving governance framework; last safeguards assessment concluded in December 2013.
- Implementation of the 2010 Institutional Reform enhanced governance:
  - Audit committee established to oversee audit and financial reporting.
  - Increased transparency with more timely publication of audited financial statements.
  - BCEAO committed to IFRS implementation by end-2014.
- Assessment identified limitations in external audit process and recommended steps to ensure adequacy.

### Authorities’ views on financial-sector timing and reforms
- Advocated taking a longer perspective on bank assessments and ongoing reforms.
- Banking Commission staffing doubled last year.
- Minimum capital had already been raised earlier to CFAF 5 billion; principle agreed to raise it further to CFAF 10 billion (only deadline remains to be determined).
- Banks facing problems are known, circumscribed, and being addressed; authorities expected substantial improvement in 2014.
- Noted consolidated and cross-border supervision progress, including regular information sharing and joint onsite inspections with Moroccan and Nigerian authorities.
- Planned reforms in pipeline:
  - Deposit insurance scheme (pre-funded by banks’ contributions) and a payment guarantee scheme expected to be launched in 2014.
  - Deposit insurance scheme, once sufficiently funded, will likely contribute to faster bank resolution.
  - Work ongoing on a financial stability fund to avoid possible sovereign debt payment incidents due to liquidity problems.
  - Credit bureaus expected to be operational in 2014 with regional coverage.
  - Agreement with banks on a list of free basic banking services.
  - Ongoing work to promote and regulate Islamic finance, legal framework for leasing contracts, investment funds, and mortgage credits, and on better supervising the microfinance sector.

### Regional Authorities’ Response to Staff Recommendations on Financial Sector Reforms (implementation status highlights)
- Deepening Capital Markets:
  - Introduction of Collateralized operations (repo): Ongoing
  - Rollout of electronic platform to auction and trade liquidity and government paper (Application Trésor): Ongoing
  - Introduction of Primary Dealers: Ongoing
  - Improve issuance coordination with help of Agence UMOA Titres: Done
  - Address distortion (e.g., tax advantage) for sovereign paper: Ongoing
  - Promote mobile banking: Ongoing
  - Accelerate establishment of credit and guarantee bureau: Ongoing
  - Improve at all levels data quality, coverage and timeliness: No major improvement
  - Strengthen liquidity and inflation forecasting to improve liquidity management: Ongoing
- Strengthening Regulation and Supervision:
  - Increase compliance with prudential norms: No major improvement
  - Provide Banking Commission with power to impose elevated pecuniary penalties: Under consideration
  - Bring down gradually 75 percent single risk exposure towards international norms: Not started yet
  - Tighten NPL classification and bring them down to international standards (90 days), and tighten provisioning rules when initial credits provided with guarantees: Not started yet
  - Reflect on whether to change zero risk weighting of government bonds: Not started yet
  - Broadening application of capital requirement to include operational risk: To be considered in the context of moving to Basel II/III
  - Move towards consolidated supervision, including supervising financial holding companies: Working group started, and combined with Basel II/III
  - Improve cross-border supervision (cooperation protocols, regular meetings, information sharing): Ongoing
- Improve Crisis Management Framework:
  - More active use of stress testing: Ongoing
  - Produce and publish more disaggregated data on lending, sectoral balance sheets: Not started yet
  - Develop early warning system indicators, and improve timeliness and distribution of Financial Soundness Indicators: Ongoing
  - Expand set of macro-prudential instruments: Ongoing
  - BCEAO receives explicit mandate for Early Warning System: Yes
  - Strengthen resolution regime, including by adopting key attributes of Financial Stability Board of closing down banks: Not started yet
  - Devise ex ante burden sharing arrangement to overcome bank resolution delays: Not started yet
  - Systematic investigation of responsibilities of directors, shareholders and auditors in case of bankruptcy, and prosecution if fault found: Ongoing
  - Launch deposit insurance system: Ongoing

### Toward a more dynamic and resilient economic union — diagnosis
- WAEMU underperformed sub-Saharan Africa’s high-growth economies over past two decades due to:
  - Sociopolitical instability and security issues.
  - Weak structural competitiveness from challenging business and legal environments, infrastructure gaps, undeveloped financial sectors, and weak institutional capacities.
  - Frequent asymmetric shocks and limited smoothing mechanisms, contributing to substantial economic volatility.
- Despite a common currency and, in principle, free flow of goods and factors, regional integration remains low.
- Recovery in Côte d’Ivoire starting in 2012 boosted regional economic prospects.
- Key challenge: sustain the momentum and translate it into sustained and inclusive growth.

### Staff’s advice on regional integration, competitiveness, and resilience
- Accelerating regional integration:
  - Deepening the single market can provide additional growth impetus.
  - Address nontariff obstacles to goods mobility (e.g., illicit road blocks and payments) through coordinated action.
- Improving structural competitiveness:
  - Coordinated regional action warranted for transportation and energy infrastructure investment and to improve business and legal environments.
  - A regional project on improving the business climate is welcome to disseminate best practices and address issues needing regional policy changes.
  - Accelerate implementation of the second phase of the Regional Economic Program (PER) on infrastructure.
- Strengthening economic resilience:
  - Further integration and more efficient stabilization mechanisms needed to reduce occurrence and impact of shocks, particularly asymmetric ones.
  - Priorities include developing the financial system, improving access, and facilitating remittances flows (which are countercyclical and contribute significantly to external financing).
  - Consider more fiscal federalism in the medium term; staff estimates suggest a system of temporary transfers through a relatively small centralized fiscal risk-sharing mechanism could provide significant income smoothing.

### Authorities’ views on regional development priorities
- Concurred with the need to pursue regional integration forcefully.
- Noted full implementation of the PER is hampered by financing availability; intend to step up fund-raising efforts.
- Considering ways to channel remittances towards investment.

### Staff appraisal — outlook and risks
- Strong growth and low inflation are expected to continue in 2014, with moderate downside risks.
- Sustaining performance over the medium term requires:
  - Ambitious growth-enhancing reforms.
  - High quality public investment.
  - Consolidation of recent improvements in regional political and security situation.
- Short-term risks:
  - Political stability could be tested with upcoming elections in a number of member states amid high demand for better governance and higher living standards.
  - Security issues in the Sahel.
- Principal medium-term risk: delays in implementing growth-enhancing reforms at national and regional levels.

*WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.*

### 34.      Against these risks, the current macroeconomic policy mix looks appropriate and more

### _cr1484 - 34.      Against these risks, the current macroeconomic policy mix looks appropriate and more

### Monetary policy and macro stance
- "Against these risks, the current macroeconomic policy mix looks appropriate and more stimulus is not required at this juncture."
- "Monetary policy easing was justified in the past two years in light of favorable inflationary developments and prospects and uncertainty on the growth outlook."
- "With growth now better entrenched, a worsening current account deficit and declining official reserves, a pause in the easing seems appropriate."
- "As projections are for continued strong growth, countries are encouraged to seek opportunities to strengthen fiscal sustainability while maintaining public investment efforts and expanding social safety nets."
- "Additional efforts to improve the quality of spending and revenue mobilization are required for this purpose."

### Fiscal policy coordination
- "Fiscal policy coordination needs to be improved."
- "The ongoing review of the regional surveillance framework is welcome."
- "Its ultimate goal should be to preserve fiscal and external sustainability."
- "Convergence criteria should be reconsidered in light of this objective, which does not preclude leaving room for fiscal responses to shocks."
- "Improving country ownership of the new rules will be critical for compliance."
- "A highly participatory approach to the reform is therefore highly desirable."

### Financial sector reforms
- "Financial sector reforms go in the right direction but the pace of implementation needs to increase."
- "Despite significant financial sector development in recent year years, financial depth, breadth and access remain low and hamper sustainable economic development and the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies."
- "Reforms to develop the interbank and sovereign debt markets have incurred delays and should be completed as soon as possible."
- "Banks’ compliance with key prudential ratios remains insufficient and urgently needs to improve."
- "Recent efforts to strengthen staffing and training at the Banking Commission are welcome and need to continue."
- "Stronger sanctions, and more broadly a strengthening of the role of the supervisor, should also be considered."
- "As the welcome move to Basel II/III regulation is likely to take time, a tightening of certain prudential rules and fixing an early deadline for raising banks’ minimum capital requirement is recommended in the meantime."
- "Ongoing reforms to improve the financial crisis prevention and resolution framework are welcome and will require adequate resources to be pursued in parallel."

### Data transparency and information quality
- "Transparency, availability and quality of information need to improve."
- "The BCEAO’s recent efforts to publish more information and analysis are welcome."
- "Coordinated efforts involving national and regional authorities will be required to improve data quality, coverage, and timeliness."

### Regional integration
- "Regional integration offers opportunities to increase resilience and growth, but recent developments in this area are a source of concern."
- "More concerted efforts are required to develop regional infrastructure and improve the functioning of the common market."
- "The enlargement of the customs union to ECOWAS, although potentially beneficial, has regrettably led to higher protection and raises risks for tax policy coordination and the integrity of the single market."

*International Monetary Fund — WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (excerpt).*

### 39.      It is proposed that the discussions with the WAEMU authorities remain on the standard

### _cr1484 - 39.      It is proposed that the discussions with the WAEMU authorities remain on the standard 12-month cycle.

### Engagement timing
- It is proposed that the discussions with the WAEMU authorities remain on the standard 12-month cycle.

### Medium-term macro outlook (WAEMU aggregate)
- Real GDP Growth (WAEMU): 4.2 (2010), 1.2 (2011), 6.6 (2012), 5.5 (2013Est.), 6.5 (2014Proj.), 6.3 (2015Proj.), 7.1 (2016Proj.), 6.7 (2017Proj.), 6.3 (2018Proj.).
- GDP per capita at constant prices (WAEMU): 1.2 (2010), -1.7 (2011), 3.7 (2012), 2.6 (2013Est.), 3.6 (2014Proj.), 3.4 (2015Proj.), 4.1 (2016Proj.), 3.8 (2017Proj.), 3.4 (2018Proj.).
- Broad money to GDP (WAEMU): 8.3 (2010), 6.3 (2011), -1.6 (2012), 5.3 (2013Est.).
- Consumer prices (average, WAEMU): 1.4 (2010), 3.9 (2011), 2.4 (2012), 1.6 (2013Est.), 2.3 (2014Proj.), 2.2 (2015Proj.), 2.2 (2016Proj.), 2.2 (2017Proj.), 2.2 (2018Proj.).
- Terms of trade (WAEMU): -0.4 (2010), 6.4 (2011), -1.0 (2012), -0.8 (2013Est.), 1.2 (2014Proj.), 0.9 (2015Proj.), -0.6 (2016Proj.), -0.7 (2017Proj.), -0.4 (2018Proj.).

### Growth drivers and projections (selected messages)
- "Growth momentum is expected to continue ... reflecting reforms and investment efforts in most countries."
- Investment, savings, and current account balance dynamics shown with gross national savings and gross domestic investment series (see figures).

### Fiscal positions and public finances
- Government total revenue, excl. grants (WAEMU): 17.9 (2010), 16.6 (2011), 19.0 (2012), 19.4 (2013Est.), 19.4 (2014Proj.), 19.4 (2015Proj.), 19.8 (2016Proj.), 20.2 (2017Proj.), 20.4 (2018Proj.) (Percent of GDP).
- Government expenditure (WAEMU): 23.3 (2010), 23.2 (2011), 24.8 (2012), 25.3 (2013Est.), 26.9 (2014Proj.), 25.5 (2015Proj.), 25.7 (2016Proj.), 25.8 (2017Proj.), 25.8 (2018Proj.) (Percent of GDP).
- Overall fiscal balance, excl. grants (WAEMU): -5.4 (2010), -6.5 (2011), -5.8 (2012), -5.9 (2013Est.), -7.5 (2014Proj.), -6.1 (2015Proj.), -5.9 (2016Proj.), -5.7 (2017Proj.), -5.4 (2018Proj.) (Percent of GDP).
- Official grants (WAEMU): 2.3 (2010), 2.5 (2011), 2.2 (2012), 2.9 (2013Est.), 3.2 (2014Proj.), 2.9 (2015Proj.), 2.8 (2016Proj.), 2.7 (2017Proj.), 2.5 (2018Proj.) (Percent of GDP).
- Overall fiscal balance, incl. grants (WAEMU): -3.1 (2010), -4.0 (2011), -3.6 (2012), -3.0 (2013Est.), -4.3 (2014Proj.), -3.2 (2015Proj.), -3.1 (2016Proj.), -3.0 (2017Proj.), -2.9 (2018Proj.) (Percent of GDP).
- Basic fiscal balance, incl. grants & HIPC (WAEMU): -0.7 (2010), -2.1 (2011), -2.1 (2012), -0.9 (2013Est.), -1.1 (2014Proj.), -0.9 (2015Proj.), -0.8 (2016Proj.), -0.7 (2017Proj.), -0.6 (2018Proj.) (Percent of GDP).
- Table 3 country-level fiscal indicators include Primary fiscal balance and overall fiscal balance (including grants) for Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and WAEMU aggregates with exact yearly values (2010–2018).

### External sector and reserves
- Exports of goods and services (WAEMU): 29.1 (2010), 29.0 (2011), 29.1 (2012), 27.8 (2013Est.), 26.2 (2014Proj.), 26.4 (2015Proj.), 26.5 (2016Proj.), 26.4 (2017Proj.), 26.7 (2018Proj.) (Percent of GDP).
- Imports of goods and services (WAEMU): 36.4 (2010), 33.4 (2011), 37.0 (2012), 39.0 (2013Est.), 37.6 (2014Proj.), 36.6 (2015Proj.), 36.2 (2016Proj.), 35.8 (2017Proj.), 36.1 (2018Proj.) (Percent of GDP).
- Current account, excl. grants (WAEMU): -6.8 (2010), -3.3 (2011), -7.1 (2012), -10.5 (2013Est.), -10.4 (2014Proj.), -9.1 (2015Proj.), -9.0 (2016Proj.), -8.6 (2017Proj.), -8.4 (2018Proj.) (Percent of GDP).
- Current account, incl. grants (WAEMU): -5.0 (2010), -2.0 (2011), -5.6 (2012), -6.7 (2013Est.), -7.6 (2014Proj.), -7.1 (2015Proj.), -7.0 (2016Proj.), -7.0 (2017Proj.), -7.0 (2018Proj.) (Percent of GDP).
- Foreign exchange cover ratio (WAEMU): 99.9 (2010), 97.2 (2011), 98.4 (2012), 91.2 (2013Est.) (percent; Gross official reserves divided by short-term domestic liabilities).
- Reserves in months of imports (excl. intra-WAEMU imports, WAEMU): 6.6 (2010), 5.7 (2011), 5.0 (2012), 4.7 (2013Est.).

### Monetary policy and inflation
- Monetary policy easing continued in 2013.
- Consumer Price Inflation (WAEMU headline): 1.4 (2010), 3.9 (2011), 2.4 (2012), 1.6 (2013Est.), projections at 2.3 (2014) and 2.2 thereafter through 2018.
- Figures show policy interest rates and selected interest rates: BCEAO standing lending facility rate and WAEMU average interbank rate, with the interbank rate remaining in the corridor but substantially above Euro area rates.
- Liquidity conditions: Broad money growth and excess reserves series indicate "Excess liquidity lowered compared to the previous year" and "Inflation continued to moderate... thanks to lower imported food and fuel prices."

### Financial sector and banking system
- Banking sector described as "well capitalized, but substantial heterogeneity exists across countries and institutions."
- Non-performing loans have increased recently for most countries; progress in compliance with prudential regulation remains limited.
- Non-Performing Loans, 2005–2013 (Percent of Total Loans): country series shown; WAEMU aggregate displayed in Figure.
- Capital Adequacy Ratio, June 2013: country values plotted (see figure).
- Credit to Private Sector (Percent of GDP, 2004–2013): WAEMU below peers; series shown with WAEMU and SSA averages.
- Banking accounts per 1000 persons (2004–11): series shown comparing WAEMU with GHA, KEN, SSA Avg.
- Prudential regulations compliance (Percent of banks complying) for items including Minimum capital, Fixed assets and NE participations, Related party lending, Exposure to large borrower, Liquidity ratio, Transformation ratio: time series for 2009, 2012 (June), 2013 (June) indicate limited progress.

### Public debt levels and sensitivity
- WAEMU total public debt (Percent of GDP): 44.4 (2010), 44.4 (2011), 39.7 (2012), 38.8 (2013Est.), 38.7 (2014Proj.), 38.5 (2015Proj.), 38.2 (2016Proj.), 37.5 (2017Proj.), 37.1 (2018Proj.).
- External public debt (WAEMU): 32.5 (2010), 31.5 (2011), 26.5 (2012), 26.8 (2013Est.), 27.8 (2014Proj.), 27.8 (2015Proj.), 27.6 (2016Proj.), 27.3 (2017Proj.), 27.1 (2018Proj.) (Percent of GDP).
- Figure 2: Sensitivity of Public Debt to Lower Growth — projections for Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire contrast Baseline vs. Permanently Lower Growth scenario. Note on scenario: "The permanently lower growth scenario assumes that GDP growth is one standard deviation below the baseline divided by the square root of the length of the projections (i.e., around 0.4 percent below the baseline GDP growth on average)." (Projections are taken from 2013 DSAs of WAEMU countries (2012 DSA for Benin).)

### Financial soundness indicators (selected)
- Regulatory capital to risk weighted assets: 6.7 (2007), 9.7 (2008), 10.1 (2009), 11.0 (2010), 10.7 (2011), 10.7 (2012), 10.7 (2013Jun).
- Gross NPLs to total loans: 18.9 (2007), 19.2 (2008), 17.2 (2009), 17.5 (2010), 15.9 (2011), 15.9 (2012), 16.9 (2013Jun).
- Provisioning rate: 65.7 (2007), 68.0 (2008), 61.4 (2009), 63.6 (2010), 64.2 (2011), 63.4 (2012), 60.7 (2013Jun).
- Liquid assets to total assets: 38.1 (2007), 36.6 (2008), 33.9 (2009), 33.2 (2010), 33.5 (2011), 32.5 (2012), 31.8 (2013Jun).
- Total loans to total deposits: 78.8 (2007), 81.7 (2008), 78.4 (2009), 83.9 (2010), 84.3 (2011), 86.2 (2012), 86.0 (2013Jun).

*International Monetary Fund: WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION — excerpted figures and tables from the source content.*

### Annex 1. Regional Authorities’ Responses to 2013 Policy

### Annex 1. Regional Authorities’ Responses to 2013 Policy Recommendations

### Policy Mix
- 2013 Article IV recommendations:
  - Pursue current monetary policy stance taking into account inflationary outlook and financial system constraints.
  - Reduce fiscal deficit in high-deficit countries.
  - Continue reducing fiscal deficit and rebuild fiscal space over the medium term.
- Authorities’ response: Broadly consistent
  - Monetary policy stance has been appropriate.
  - Macroeconomic policies at the country level have been broadly consistent with Fund advice in the context of Fund-supported programs.

### Fiscal policy coordination
- 2013 Article IV recommendations:
  - Review fiscal convergence criteria.
  - Strengthen regional surveillance framework.
  - Improve tax policy coordination.
  - Strengthen country debt management and improve liquidity and debt policy coordination.
- Authorities’ response: Partially consistent
  - The reform of the regional surveillance framework is ongoing.
  - Regional debt agency has been launched to advise treasuries and improve issuance coordination.
  - TA has been received to revise certain aspects of tax directives.

### Monetary policy / Financial sector development
- 2013 Article IV recommendations:
  - Accelerate interbank and government debt markets reforms.
  - Improve inflation and liquidity forecasting.
  - Improve the quality, availability and timeliness of macroeconomic and financial information.
- Authorities’ response: Partially/Broadly consistent
  - Regional debt agency (above) has been launched.
  - Delays in the reform of interbank and debt market, with launch now expected in early 2014.
  - Regional rules on credit and guarantee bureaus have been approved, with launch expected in 2014.
  - Availability of macroeconomic and financial information is improving through more regular BCEAO publications.

### Financial regulation and supervision
- 2013 Article IV recommendations:
  - Strengthen regulation.
  - Improve supervision and crisis prevention.
  - Enhance the crisis management framework.
- Authorities’ response: Partially/Broadly consistent
  - MCM TA has been requested to move to the Basel II, but the process will take time.
  - MCM Training has been received to improve supervision, and staffing of the Banking commission has increased.
  - Availability of financial soundness indicators has marginally improved.
  - Progress has been made in developing the supervision of banking groups and international cooperation with other supervisors.
  - Work is ongoing on setting up a deposit insurance scheme and a financial stability fund.

### Growth / Regional Integration
- 2013 Article IV recommendations:
  - Strengthen regional integration agenda.
  - Coordinate action to remove trade barriers, increase labor mobility, financial integration, and regional structural policy.
  - Coordinate actions to preserve common market.
- Authorities’ response: Partially consistent
  - Limited progress has been reached here.

### Selected Policy Recommendations for Member States (high-level summary)
- BEN:
  - Use fiscal space and rely on concessional financing to scale up public investment.
  - Introduce strong PFM and tax administration reforms to preserve fiscal stability.
  - Improve the business climate with strong reforms.
- BFA:
  - Improve quality and pace of investment spending.
  - Envisage fiscal rules to manage natural resources revenue.
  - Maintain prudent fiscal management if a deficit emerges.
  - Reduce infrastructure gaps particularly in the energy sector by targeted and timely investments.
  - Boost investment to support structural transformation and employment.
- CIV:
  - Adopt a medium-term debt strategy.
  - Prompt regularization of domestic arrears.
  - Accelerate tax reforms (VAT).
  - Accelerate public banks restructuring.
  - Continue to implement reforms to improve the business climate.
- GNB:
  - Adopt prudent fiscal management by improving transparency on non-regular spending.
  - Develop a contingency plan in case financial support remains limited.
  - Continue PFM and tax administration reforms.
  - Accelerate action to strengthen and develop the microfinance sector.
  - Improve transparency and introduce reforms in the energy sector.
- MLI:
  - Reinforce PFM to effectively use increasing donor assistance.
  - Improve revenue collection.
  - Implement a single treasury account.
  - Improve transparency and strengthen banks’ balance sheets.
  - Accelerate restructuring of a state-owned bank and the microfinance sector.
  - Improve competitiveness and the business climate.
- NGR:
  - Accommodate fiscal policy to face additional fiscal costs (security, refugees) and maintain prudent fiscal policy over the medium term.
  - Introduce prudent and transparent debt management.
  - Continue advancing in the PFM reforms and strengthening the oversight of oil and mining sectors to improve revenue collection.
  - Strengthen oversight on natural resources sector, but limit public participation in projects.
  - Encourage private sector development.
  - Assess progress in implanting financial sector reform and action plan.
- SEN:
  - Reduce the fiscal deficit to a more sustainable level by streamlining expenditures and accelerating reform implementation.
  - Accelerate reform in the electricity sector.
- TOG:
  - Reduce fuel subsidies.
  - Accelerate PFM and tax administration reforms.
  - Improve public debt management by controlling new loans and stopping prefinancing fund public investment.
  - Accelerate restructuring of a systemic state-owned bank.
  - Initiate steps for setting up a single treasury account.

### Appendix I. External Stability Assessment — Balance of Payments
- Recent developments and outlook:
  - The regional current account deficit increased from 2 percent of GDP in 2011 to 5.6 percent of GDP in 2012 and 6.7 percent of GDP in 2013.
  - Regional investment increased from about 20 percent of GDP in 2012 to about 22 percent of GDP in 2013.
  - Trade balance deficit deteriorated from 7.9 percent in 2012 to 11.2 percent in 2013.
  - The current account deficit in individual members in 2013 ranged from 17.2 percent of GDP in Niger to 1.8 percent of GDP in Côte d’Ivoire.
  - In the medium term, the WAEMU current account deficit is expected to stabilize at about 7 percent of GDP.
- External financing composition:
  - Private transfers have remained at about 3 percent of GDP in recent years.
  - Public current transfers (grants) increased from 1.4 percent of GDP in 2012 to 3.7 percent of GDP in 2013 and are expected to remain at about 2.8 percent in 2014.
  - Capital grants increased from 1.5 percent of GDP in 2012 to 1.8 percent of GDP in 2013 and are expected to reach 2 percent of GDP in 2014.
  - FDI have averaged around 2.2 percent of GDP.
  - Loans increased from 1.3 percent of GDP in 2012 to about 3 percent in 2013 and are expected to stabilize at this level in the medium term.
  - Overall non-debt creating flows are expected to remain the main source of external financing.

### Appendix I. External Stability Assessment — Reserves Adequacy
- Regional official reserves:
  - Projected to decrease from CFAF 7051 billion (US$13. 8 billion) at end-2012 to CFAF 6886 billion (US$13.9 billion) at end-2013.
  - Reserves coverage at end-2013: 4.7 months of next year imports, 50 percent of broad money, and about 91 percent of short-term liabilities.
  - Alternative optimal reserves range: between 5 to 10 months of imports (Dabla-Norris et al., 2011), placing current reserves at the low end of the optimal range.

### Appendix I. External Stability Assessment — Price Competitiveness (REER)
- Exchange rate and inflation developments:
  - Effective nominal exchange rate appreciated by about 4.6 percent since the beginning of 2013.
  - Real exchange rates appreciated by 2.5 percent owing to moderate inflation developments.
  - REER remained below or close to its 2000–12 average for most WAEMU countries.
  - Country REER changes in 2013: Niger ~5 percent appreciation; Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal ~4 percent appreciation; Benin ~2 percent depreciation.
- Model-based REER assessments (CGER):
  - Macroeconomic balance approach: exchange rate depreciation necessary to close gap around 7 percent.
  - Equilibrium real exchange rate estimated as a function of medium-term fundamentals points to a 2.1 percent undervaluation.
  - External sustainability method indicates a misalignment of about 5 percent.
  - Results reflect projected high growth rates and decrease in the current account deficit under the baseline scenario.

### Appendix I. External Stability Assessment — Structural Competitiveness
- Survey-based indicators and business environment:
  - World Bank “Doing Business” 2014: overall worsening of WAEMU countries’ situation despite significant improvements in post-crisis Côte d’Ivoire.
  - WAEMU business climate has improved marginally over the last five years and remains well behind that of peer countries.
  - Key challenges: enforcing contracts, starting a business, protecting investors’ rights, trading across borders, inadequate supply of infrastructure and electricity, cumbersome procedures for paying taxes and registering properties.
  - World Bank Governance Indicators show relatively better position on governance and political stability but still indicate institutional and governance problems and a relative deterioration over the last 5 years.

### Appendix II. Growth in the WAEMU — Key findings
- Growth divergence:
  - Per-capita GDP has more than doubled in faster-growing SSA economies over the last two decades, while WAEMU per-capita GDP increased by 20 percent since 1995.
  - Growth underperformance in the WAEMU appears “more than a commodity story.”
- Constraints identified:
  - Political instability, challenging business and legal environments, substantial infrastructure gap, weak institutional and public investment management capacity.
  - These factors affected both the level of investment and its efficiency, limiting sustainable high growth and structural transformation.
- Cross-country variation:
  - Burkina Faso recorded performance similar to Uganda or Tanzania.
  - Some WAEMU countries registered a decrease in per-capita GDP (Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Guinea-Bissau).

*Source: Annex 1. Regional Authorities’ Responses to 2013 Policy Recommendations — _cr1484 (IMF staff report content provided).*

### 2.      This note attempts to explain this divergence, relying on a number of approaches. First,

### 2.      This note attempts to explain this divergence, relying on a number of approaches. First, 

### A. External Environment
- External volatility does not seem to have been higher in the WAEMU (Figure 2).
- Average shocks synchronization with the rest of the world‒a broad measure of country or region-specific shocks‒has been broadly similar between WAEMU and benchmark countries.
- The fluctuations of external demand seemed to have had a lower impact on growth in the WAEMU than in the benchmark countries.
- On average a one percentage point change in real GDP growth in 95 percent of trading partners leads to 0.1 percentage point change in the WAEMU growth and 0.2 percentage point change in the benchmark growth one year later.
- Terms of trade have had more favorable trend in the WAEMU, but their volatility seems to have been slightly higher than in the benchmark sample.
- WAEMU countries have received less FDI and foreign aid than benchmark countries: the difference amounts to an (un-weighted) average of about 2 percent of GDP over the entire period (average 1995-2012, % of GDP).
- Cross-country notes:
  - Niger, Mali, and Togo have received relatively large FDI inflows.
  - Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso, and to the lesser extent Benin and Niger received relatively large aid inflows.

### B. Macroeconomic Environment and Policies
- Inflation:
  - Inflation has been on average lower and much less volatile in the WAEMU, likely reflecting its exchange rate and monetary regime.
- Current account:
  - Current account deficits have been broadly comparable across the two groups of countries (1995-2012, % of GDP).
- External debt:
  - External debt was on average higher in WAEMU countries until recently (External debt (% of GDP) series shown).
- Public investment:
  - Public investment has been higher in benchmark countries on average (particularly in Cabo Verde, Mozambique and Ethiopia).
  - Differences in public investment ratios have been limited between Burkina Faso, Mali, Benin, Togo, and Senegal and the other benchmark countries, suggesting that public investment efficiency may be lower in the WAEMU.
- Country example:
  - Burkina Faso: fiscal balance (% of GDP, 1995-2012) and public investment dynamics contributed to recent growth spurts (Box 1).

### C. Structural Environment
- Total Factor Productivity (TFP):
  - Lower TFP growth explains a large part of the WAEMU’s underperformance.
  - Average TFP growth has been negative in Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Togo and low in Niger, Benin and Mali.
  - Burkina Faso is the only WAEMU country with a significant increase in TFP over the last 20 years.
- Capital accumulation:
  - Slower capital accumulation contributed to lower growth performance in the WAEMU.
- Trade and structural transformation:
  - Degrees of openness are similar between the two groups (openness measured as sum of exports and imports over GDP).
  - The share of industry in GDP has decreased in the WAEMU (except in Côte d’Ivoire), a marked difference with benchmark countries.
  - The share of services in GDP has increased less on average in the WAEMU than in the benchmark countries.
  - Most WAEMU countries continue to export mainly non-transformed commodities; exceptions with changed export composition include Mali, Togo, Burkina-Faso.
- Structural competitiveness:
  - Measured by business climate indicators, structural competitiveness has remained low in the WAEMU and may have hampered structural transformation.

### D. Institutional Environment
- Governance and institutions:
  - WAEMU countries score significantly lower in terms of quality of governance and property rights, transparency, accountability and corruption (World Governance Indicators average, 1996-2012).
  - Weaker institutions and governance frameworks affect the business climate and private investment (both domestic and foreign).
- Political instability:
  - Although the average number of social conflicts has been similar across groups, their severity and frequency has been more important in the WAEMU.
  - The economic impact of social unrest has been larger in the WAEMU, as illustrated by slower post-conflict recovery.
- Doing Business indicators (2012) and measures such as Starting a business, Getting credit, Trading across borders show poorer WAEMU performance on several metrics.

### Growth Diagnostics: the Role of Private Investment and Entrepreneurship
- Private investment:
  - Differences in private investment explain to some extent lower growth in the WAEMU.
  - Average domestic private investment and its growth have been lower in the WAEMU (Private Investment (% of GDP), 1995-2012; cross-country differences noted: higher in Mali and Senegal; increased significantly in Niger in the recent period).
- Constraints to private investment (Growth Diagnostics decision tree):
  - Two sets of factors: high cost of finance and low return on economic activity.
  - Cost of finance:
    - WAEMU costs and access to capital seem broadly similar to benchmark countries.
    - Development and efficiency of the banking sector appear broadly comparable.
    - Average real and nominal lending rates (2005-2012) shown; nominal and real rates plotted by country.
  - Low return on investment:
    - Identified as the biggest obstacle in this framework.
    - While social returns to investment seem broadly similar, high microeconomic risks prevent translation to the individual level.
    - Main constraints: weaker institutional and legal environment, higher political instability, complicated tax procedures, and sometimes more important infrastructure gaps (Education, health and infrastructure indicators; Road density; Telephone lines; Logistics performance index).
    - An inadequate business environment prevents development of “new ideas” (non-traditional products, higher-productivity activities), undermining competitiveness and slowing structural transformation.

### Quantitative Assessment
- Main quantitative findings (Regression results for 8 WAEMU countries over the period 1995-2012; variables in relative terms compared to the benchmark; country and time fixed effects included):
  - Social conflicts:
    - Occurrence of a new conflict in the WAEMU increases the growth differential by about 0.6–0.8 percentage point.
    - In Table 1, Social conflicts coefficient(s) reported as -0.823**, -0.580*, -0.612*** in different specifications (t-statistics in parentheses: (-3.94),(-1.84),(-2.94)).
  - Public investment:
    - A one percentage point increase in the public investment-to-GDP ratio in WAEMU countries reduces the growth gap by about 0.5–0.7 percentage point.
    - Public investment coefficients reported as -0.033**, -0.016*** (t-statistics (-3.37)(-4.00)) in some specifications.
  - External indebtedness:
    - External indebtedness appears statistically significant but less important.
  - Institutions and governance:
    - Quality of institutions and governance, efficiency of the legal environment, and transparency impact growth by affecting political stability.
    - Governance coefficients in regressions reported as 0.814*, 0.425** (t-statistics (-2.25)(-2.59)) in some specifications.
- Model performance:
  - Observations N reported across specifications: 131, 136, 136, 136, 111, 135.
  - R-squared values reported: 0.36, 0.35, 0.28, 0.26, 0.24, 0.44.
- Robustness and interpretation:
  - The effect of political instability is significantly reduced when governance variables are controlled for.
  - Probit regressions (results available upon request) suggest that an improvement in institutional quality significantly decreases the probability of occurrence of a social conflict.

### Country Case: Burkina Faso (Box 1)
- Growth episodes:
  - Burkina Faso recorded a few growth spurts since the CFA franc devaluation in 1994.
  - Growth takeoff driven by sound economic management, medium-term macroeconomic planning, reforms in the cotton sector, and a boom in gold exports.
- Reforms and outcomes:
  - Significant progress in implementing structural reforms and public investment programs.
  - Authorities contained fiscal deficits, generated space for public investment, and implemented structural reforms.
  - Substantial aid inflows helped improve institutional and business environment leading to a significant increase in TFP.
- Remaining vulnerabilities:
  - Economy remains fragile and vulnerable to external and climatic shocks due to heavy reliance on agriculture production, cotton and gold exports.
  - Economic volatility remains important with implications on poverty reduction and sustainable development.
- Policy implication:
  - Pursuing structural reforms and closing infrastructure gaps to support private sector development is essential.

### Policy Implications and Recommendations (implied by analysis)
- Strengthen institutional quality and governance to reduce political instability and the probability of social conflicts.
- Increase public investment and improve its efficiency; a one percentage point increase in public investment-to-GDP can reduce the WAEMU–benchmark growth gap by about 0.5–0.7 percentage point.
- Address structural competitiveness constraints: improve business climate, regulatory frameworks, and facilitate structural transformation away from non-transformed commodity exports.
- Continue efforts to improve TFP through reforms that promote innovation, structural transformation, and human capital accumulation.
- Address infrastructure gaps (roads, logistics, electricity) to raise returns to private investment and entrepreneurship.
- Maintain prudent macroeconomic policies that sustain low and stable inflation while managing external indebtedness.

*Prepared by Douglas Shapiro and Aleksandra Zdzienicka with inputs from Rodrigo Garcia-Verdu*

### Appendix III. Monetary Policy Transmission in WAEMU

### Appendix III. Monetary Policy Transmission in WAEMU Countries

### Monetary policy framework and transmission channels
- The BCEAO sets two policy rates: the minimum bid rate for liquidity injections and the rate for liquidity provision outside auctions. These policy rates aim to influence monetary market conditions (intermediate target), such as the money market rate or the one-week interbank interest rate, which in turn should influence banks’ deposit and lending rates, and ultimately inflation.
- Because of the peg and limited asset markets, the exchange rate channel is inactive and the asset price channel is largely absent; the interest rate channel is one of the few available channels in the WAEMU.
- Deposit and lending rates differ substantially among WAEMU countries; Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal have lower lending rates than other countries.
- Variability of rates:
  - The policy rates and deposit rates have had very low variability over the last 5 years, with the standard deviation from the mean of both rates about 0.2.
  - The interbank market and lending rates show larger dispersion around the mean, with more important lending-rate fluctuations in Benin, Guinea-Bissau and Niger.

### Aggregate empirical findings (distributed-lag estimates and role of money market)
- Policy rate effects (regional averages):
  - A one percentage point increase in the policy rates translates into:
    - a 1.4 percentage point increase in the money market rate,
    - a 1.9 percent increase in the interbank rate,
    - a 0.7 percent increase in the lending rate,
    - a 0.05 percent decline in inflation.
  - No significant impact on average deposit rates was detected.
- Money market rate effects:
  - A one percentage point increase in the money market rates leads to:
    - an increase in the interbank rate by about 1.4 percentage point,
    - an increase in the average lending rate by 0.3 percentage point,
    - a decline in inflation by 0.03 percent.
  - The interbank rate does not appear to play a significant role in monetary transmission.
  - The impact of lending-rate changes on inflation is less significant and more delayed (up to three months).
  - Average deposit rates do not seem to play any role in the transmission process.

### Country heterogeneity (country-specific distributed-lag estimates)
- General pattern: the link from money market and interbank rates to lending rates is the main channel at the country level, but strength and timing vary considerably.
- Stronger transmission to lending rates observed in: Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Togo.
- Almost nonexistent transmission to lending rates observed in: Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Niger.
- Timing differences:
  - Lending rates react quickly to money market and interbank changes in Burkina Faso and Senegal.
  - Impact is more delayed in Togo.
- Deposit rates:
  - Policy rates appear to affect deposit rates in Mali, but deposit rates are generally not affected by money market rates across most countries.
- Inflation transmission:
  - Significant policy/money-market effects on inflation in Benin, Senegal, and Togo.
  - No significant impact on inflation in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Niger.

### Panel VAR results and role of country characteristics
- Panel VAR baseline results:
  - Policy rates have a significant, if small, impact on average inflation dynamics in WAEMU.
  - The central bank reacts with a very significant, but small tightening to a cost-push shock.
  - The lending rate increases at about half the rate of the policy rate, but the lending-rate response is insignificant.
  - A monetary policy shock reduces significantly the price level, although the lending-rate channel does not appear to contribute materially to this tightening.
  - A shock to the lending rate has no significant impact on the price level and does not trigger a central-bank reaction.
- Financial development (credit-to-GDP) effects:
  - In response to a one standard deviation increase in the monetary policy rate:
    - If the economy has higher financial development (equivalent to the upper 80th percentile of credit-to-GDP within WAEMU), the lending rate increases significantly and inflation falls by about 1 percentage point.
    - At low levels of financial development (equivalent to the 20th percentile), no impact on either the lending rate or inflation is found.
  - These results are consistent with stronger monetary policy effectiveness in Benin, Senegal and Togo, which have the largest financial depth by traditional metrics.
- Banking sector concentration effects:
  - Monetary tightening is associated with a lower inflation if the banking sector is not very concentrated; under a highly concentrated banking sector there appears to be no effect on inflation.
  - The lending rate does not appear to be the transmission channel for the concentration effect, as there is no significant difference in lending-rate responses under different degrees of banking-sector concentration.

### Key quantitative points and timings
- Standard deviation of policy rates and deposit rates over last 5 years: about 0.2.
- Policy rate → money market rate: +1.4 percentage point per one percentage point policy increase.
- Policy rate → interbank rate: +1.9 percent per one percentage point policy increase.
- Policy rate → lending rate: +0.7 percent per one percentage point policy increase.
- Policy rate → inflation: −0.05 percent per one percentage point policy increase.
- Money market rate → interbank rate: +1.4 percentage point per one percentage point money market increase.
- Money market rate → lending rate: +0.3 percentage point per one percentage point money market increase.
- Money market rate → inflation: −0.03 percent per one percentage point money market increase.
- Financial-development interaction: monetary tightening can lower inflation by about 1 percentage point at the upper 80th percentile of credit-to-GDP; no effect at the 20th percentile.

### Conclusions and policy implications
- Policy rates affect other interest rates, but the size and statistical significance vary across countries.
- Policy rates have a significant, if small, impact on inflation at the regional level.
- Heterogeneity in transmission is related to country-specific financial-sector characteristics:
  - Greater financial development (higher credit-to-GDP) strengthens the pass-through from policy to lending rates and to inflation.
  - Higher banking-sector concentration weakens the impact of monetary tightening on inflation, though not via observable lending-rate responses.
- Policy implication highlighted in the note: further developing financial markets, increasing financial intermediation, and fostering competition in the banking sector would be crucial to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy in the WAEMU.

*Source: Appendix III. Monetary Policy Transmission in WAEMU Countries (IMF staff report).*

### 12.      The characteristics of the financial sector seem to explain the heterogeneity in monetary

### _cr1484 - 12.      The characteristics of the financial sector seem to explain the heterogeneity in monetary

### Financial-sector characteristics and monetary transmission — key findings
- The characteristics of the financial sector seem to explain the heterogeneity in monetary transmission across countries, with the effectiveness of monetary policy increasing with the level of financial development and the degree of competition in the financial sector.
- This could explain why, for instance, monetary policy seems to be more effective in Benin, Senegal, and Togo, whose financial depth is higher.
- Deficit biases in the WAEMU are on average of about 1 percent of GDP.
- Evidence cited indicates that primary fiscal deficits in fiscal strategy plans reviewed in Mauro (2011) turned out to be higher by ½ percent of GDP on average than initially planned.

### Methodological annex — Distributed Lag (DL) model
- Model specification:
  - The DL model links key variables in the monetary transmission chain via
    - Y_t = α_0 + α_1 X_t + Σ (β_i X_{t-i}) + ε_t  (model form indicated in text).
  - The independent variable X_t is sequentially represented by:
    - the BCEAO policy rate,
    - the marginal rate of liquidity injections,
    - the interbank rate,
    - the deposit and lending rates of each individual WAEMU country.
  - The dependent variable Y_t is sequentially represented by:
    - the marginal rate of liquidity injections,
    - the deposit and lending rates,
    - inflation of each individual country.
- Estimation strategy (three steps):
  1. Run an OLS regression to get the contemporaneous (zero period) dynamic multiplier or impact effect for a unit change in X_t on Y_t.
  2. If the impact coefficient is significant and has the right sign, augment the model by adding 12 lags of the independent variable.
  3. Choose the appropriate lag structure by an autometric model reduction; given collinearity concerns, select a lag structure that does not change with specification.
- Data and sample:
  - Data received directly from the BCEAO.
  - Estimation period: February 2007-September 2013 on monthly data (80 observations).
  - Contextual notes: BCEAO started managing liquidity more actively by introducing liquidity injections in February 2007, discontinued the discount rate (taux d’escompte), established the marginal lending window replacing the repo rate (taux de pension), and introduced a minimum bid rate at liquidity auctions.
  - During the estimation period, the BCEAO changed its policy rate only six times, of which four times in 2012–2013. This gives very little variability in the key independent variable.

### Methodological annex — Panel VAR approach
- Benchmark framework:
  - Based on a panel interaction VAR as described in Towbin and Weber (2013).
  - Models dynamic interaction between policy rate (i_p), retail lending rate (i_r), and inflation rate (π_p).
  - Each right-hand-side variable can vary deterministically with structural country characteristics Xi,t.
- Full model characteristics:
  - Inflation is modeled as a function of its own lags, contemporaneous and lagged policy and lending rates, and interaction terms between these regressors and structural characteristics Xi,t.
  - Shocks identified using a simple Choleski ordering; the model assumes prices are slow moving and adjust with a lag to interest rates.
  - Policy rate can be adjusted to contemporaneous inflation; retail lending rate adjusts to current policy rate and current inflation.
  - Policy rate reaction assumed uniform across countries (β-coefficients), while responses of inflation and retail lending rates vary with country structural characteristics (α-coefficients).
- Heterogeneity analysis:
  - Impulse response functions can vary over time and across countries with structural characteristics.
  - Importance of structural characteristics illustrated by contrasting cumulative impulse response functions evaluated at the 20th and 80th percentiles of the sample distributions (holding other variables at the median).

### Fiscal rules and institutions — WAEMU context and recommendations
- Context and rationale:
  - Fiscal policy is the main stabilization tool in WAEMU because the union has a common monetary policy and a fixed exchange rate regime; labor mobility is low and intra-regional fiscal transfers are not significant.
  - WAEMU convergence criteria include fiscal rules; two main ones have limited effectiveness: the target of a positive basic fiscal balance (frequently missed) and the public debt ratio below 70 percent of GDP (now easily met and not binding).
  - The enforcement mechanism for existing rules has not proved fully effective.
- Observed problems:
  - Deficit biases have led some WAEMU countries to accumulate significant public debt since MDRI debt relief.
  - Predicted deficits 1 and 2 years ahead at the time the budget for year T is formulated underestimate outturns by significant margins, producing higher than expected debt levels over time.
- Principles for redesigning effective fiscal rules:
  - Specify the ultimate objective: staff view fiscal sustainability as the ultimate objective.
  - Keep a short list of criteria directly related to that objective (e.g., a stock-based public debt criterion and a flow-related deficit rule), while other metrics become monitored indicators.
  - Ensure internal coherence between criteria (e.g., link deficit ceiling to likelihood of breaching debt ceiling; use comprehensive debt sustainability analysis).
  - Consider introducing “debt brakes” that adjust the deficit ceiling based on past deviations from targets or the distance to the debt ceiling.
  - Keep rules simple and easy to implement and monitor; structural deficit rules can be useful but may be difficult given data quality and cyclical ambiguity.
  - Allow national-level tailoring consistent with regional principles (e.g., rules for natural-resource revenue management, scope for countercyclical policy for countries with strong budget processes).
  - Emphasize that ceilings are not optimal targets; deficits should be significantly lower than ceilings when circumstances are favorable.
  - Strengthen budget processes to avoid deficit biases: accelerate transposition of public financial management directives into national laws and frame credible, binding medium-term fiscal frameworks.
  - Address fiscal risks and plan for contingencies (e.g., energy-sector contingent liabilities); contingency planning helps prevent inefficient adjustments that cut investment spending.

*Italic: Source — _cr1484 - 12.      The characteristics of the financial sector seem to explain the heterogeneity in monetary (PDF chapter/section).*

### 13.      Fiscal rules do not preclude growth-friendly fiscal policies. A concern often expressed is

### 13. Fiscal rules do not preclude growth-friendly fiscal policies

### Fiscal rules and growth
- Larger fiscal deficits in the WAEMU have not been associated with higher growth rates post MDRI.
- The empirical literature suggests that fiscal multipliers tend to be small in developing countries (see Spilimbergo, Symansky, and Schindler, 2009).
- Implication: Growth should not be sought through sustained fiscal stimulus; fiscal policy can foster growth by:
  - contributing to macroeconomic stability;
  - improving the composition and quality of spending (e.g., favoring investment over inefficient transfers, such as generalized price subsidies);
  - creating more efficient tax systems that reduce distortions.

### Design choices and trade-offs of fiscal rules
- Simple rules imply trade-offs between focusing on debt sustainability (e.g., debt or deficit rules) and avoiding procyclical policies (e.g., expenditure rules).
- Procyclicality of ceilings on the debt ratio or the overall deficit can be reduced by staying away from ceilings in favorable circumstances to build buffers for negative shocks.
- Well-defined escape clauses allow temporary suspension of rules in exceptional circumstances but must be designed to avoid abuse; a common safeguard is requiring super-majorities (e.g., from parliament) to approve suspensions.

### Performances of common numerical rules (as summarized in the source)
- Trade-offs across rule types (excerpted assessments in source):
  - Debt ratio: Preserve a sustainable debt ratio ++++++- ; Sound deficit level - ; Avoids large adjustments in a single year - ; Limit procyclicality --- ; Target relatively controllable - ; Comprehensive coverage ++++++++
  - Overall deficit: Preserve a sustainable debt ratio - ; Sound deficit level +++++- ; Avoids large adjustments in a single year +++++ ; Limit procyclicality ++ ; Target relatively controllable +++++ ; Comprehensive coverage +++++++++-
  - Primary deficit: (properties summarized in table; see source for full mapping)
  - Expenditure: (properties summarized in table; see source for full mapping)
- Note: Source uses notation +++ = very good, ++ = good, + = fair, - = poor.

### Improving adherence to fiscal rules
- Main causes of weak effectiveness of WAEMU fiscal rules:
  - Insufficient incentives for compliance.
  - WAEMU Commission’s surveillance is hampered by lack of availability and timeliness of data and by capacity issues.
  - Sanctions exist but are not applied.
- International experience: incentive mechanisms are more effective at the national level.
  - Regional rules are desirable in a monetary union because of externalities and the need to ensure the regional fiscal stance is consistent with the exchange rate regime.
  - Regional rules may lack country-level ownership; transposing rules into domestic laws (or constitutions) could increase binding character for national policy-makers.
  - Fiscal councils could strengthen compliance by increasing public awareness of deviations and their economic implications.
- Role of fiscal councils:
  - When independent and credible, fiscal councils can contribute to fiscal stability and growth by providing independent assessment of public finances and public information.
  - Design options range from reporting/alerting the public on compliance to providing in-house fiscal projections.
  - In resource-constrained WAEMU members, councils could focus solely on reporting and alerting the public about compliance/noncompliance.
  - Councils tend to work better at the national level and would complement regional surveillance by the WAEMU Commission.

### Fiscal federalism and risk-sharing in the WAEMU
- Context and need:
  - Idiosyncratic shocks are frequent and there is limited wage and price flexibility, limited labor mobility and constraints on counter-cyclical fiscal policies.
  - Existing shock-smoothing mechanisms are less effective when most needed (during crises).
- Potential for a centralized fiscal risk-sharing mechanism:
  - Could help smooth macroeconomic volatility and increase consumption smoothing, particularly during severe shocks.
  - Staff estimations (stylized) indicate:
    - A contribution of about ¾ percent of each WAEMU country’s GDP would allow achieving an amount of income smoothing comparable with that observed in existing federal states.
    - A contribution of about 1–1¼ percent of GDP could insure WAEMU countries against even more severe downturns.
  - Design principles for a regional stabilization mechanism should include being:
    - relatively simple;
    - automatic;
    - non-regressive (size of transfers and contribution do not vary with per capita income);
    - based on temporary transfers that are a function of serially uncorrelated shocks and able to offset a large part of these shocks.
  - Financing: contributions would be used to pay transfers to countries negatively hit by shocks; disbursed transfers would be proportional to the size of shocks, relative size of each economy, and resources accumulated in the fund each year. If no country is affected, contributions are saved.

### Foreign investor participation in the WAEMU regional government debt market
- Key empirical observations:
  - Participation of nonresident investors in the WAEMU regional government debt market has been very limited.
  - Senegal: less than 2.5 percent of its debt issued on the WAEMU market is held by nonresidents.
  - WAEMU market amounts to about 8 percent of regional GDP.
  - By contrast, foreign ownership of government debt in Ghana and Nigeria hovers around 20 and 25 percent, respectively.
- Factors deterring foreign participation (investor views from interviews):
  - Risk-adjusted nominal interest rates on the WAEMU market are viewed as unattractive; yields are perceived as low relative to other African countries even accounting for exchange rate stability.
  - Perception that the regional market does not price risks adequately; yields across sovereign issuers do not seem to reflect the range of fiscal situations.
  - Small market size limits liquidity and pricing; WAEMU debt is not included in LCB global indices used by bond funds.
  - Lack of an active secondary market (due in part to domestic investors’ “buy-and-hold” strategy) constrains foreign investors, who may only be interested in short-term paper.
  - Exchange control regulations and practices are viewed as cumbersome in practice, particularly on repatriation of proceeds; investors perceive investing in Ghana or Nigeria as easier and more transparent.

*Source: IMF staff analysis as presented in the provided content unit.*

### 9. In the wake of the euro area crisis, investors also mention issues related to currency

### 9. In the wake of the euro area crisis, investors also mention issues related to currency

### Investor concerns on currency union architecture
- A country in a monetary union does not issue its currency; in the event of a loss of confidence from investors, there may therefore not be a “buyer of last resort” to restore confidence, with a liquidity problem that may turn into a solvency problem (de Grauwe, 2011).
- In the WAEMU:
  - Direct financing of governments by the BCEAO has been phased out.
  - There are strict rules on the amount of government paper the BCEAO can accept for bank refinancing purposes.
  - The Financial Stability Fund (FSF) is expected to play the role of a liquidity backstop for governments in the future, but it is not yet operational.

### Other possible factors limiting foreign participation in the WAEMU market
- Market fragmentation:
  - Regional market for government securities is fragmented: government paper is issued through two different channels—auctions by the BCEAO on the money market; and the regional stock exchange (only longer-term paper).
  - Fragmentation reduces liquidity and raises the costs of investing.
- Communication and information gaps:
  - Communication targeting foreign investors was very limited until the creation of Agence UMOA-titres.
  - Dissemination of economic and financial information by national and regional authorities has been limited until recently, and has generally been exclusively in French.
  - Investors had limited knowledge or understanding of key developments or institutional arrangements in the WAEMU, including the rules and institutions supporting the exchange rate regime.
- Language barriers:
  - Limited English is spoken in francophone Africa; information and documents are mainly in French.
  - Major international capital markets and dominant news flows are Anglophone, creating an information gap for francophone countries.
- Perceptions of political stability and investment climate:
  - The region tends to have lower scores in political stability and investment climate in available international surveys.
- Taxation and access constraints:
  - Within the Union, interests are subject to taxation for investors who do not reside in the issuing country, with tax rates varying from country to country.
  - A foreign investor can only buy on the WAEMU market by opening a bank account in a WAEMU country; to optimize taxation across sovereigns an investor may need to open an account in each issuing country.
  - Double taxation (in the investor’s home country) may also be an issue.
- Financial infrastructure and practices:
  - Regulations, custody, settlements, etc., may lag behind Anglophone competitors.
  - Custodians and brokers are typically the same entity in WAEMU markets (whereas U.S. law requires separation for U.S. investors).
  - The technological platform with real time pricing only came into effect in 2013.

### Policy recommendations on nonresident investment in the WAEMU market
- Strategic objective:
  - Nonresident investment in the WAEMU market should be sought and increased gradually, while addressing the related risks.
  - Governments can finance deficits through domestic or external funds; tapping external savings increases resources and reduces crowding out risk.
  - Issuing on the regional market (local currency) contributes to market development, increases liquidity, reduces costs, diversifies investor base, and eliminates exchange rate risk.
  - Risks: foreign investors may be more footloose and large relative to market size, potentially generating volatility and complicating monetary policy, reserve management, and financial stability.
  - Conclusion: On balance, a gradual move to higher nonresident participation is desirable and should be accompanied by adequate safeguards.
- Specific measures to increase attractiveness:
  - Improve communication with nonresidents:
    - Agence UMOA Titres will have a key role in the short term.
    - BCEAO has improved external communication in the past two years and should continue, e.g., by publishing English versions of key documents (such as the quarterly reports prepared for the monetary policy council).
    - Governments should improve dissemination of key economic and financial information, including in English.
  - Accelerate ongoing reforms to develop the WAEMU market:
    - Significant foreign investment is unlikely until the market reaches a larger size and there is a secondary market.
    - Ongoing reforms to develop the market and the interbank market are critical.
    - Establishment of the Financial Stability Fund could address liquidity concerns raised by investors.
  - Reduce segmentation of the sovereign bond market to increase market size and liquidity.
  - Harmonize taxation to ensure foreign investors see the WAEMU market as one integrated market and avoid double taxation.

*Selected reference cited in this section: De Grauwe, Paul, 2011, “Managing a Fragile Eurozone”, CESifo Forum, Vol. 12, pp. 40–45.*

### Appendix VI. The Role of Worker Remittances in Stabilizing Output in the WAEMU — Overview
- Remittances have become an increasingly important source of financing for WAEMU members, with important differences across countries.
- Remittances play an important role as a shock-absorbing device when economies slow down.
- Encouraging and facilitating remittances inflows should be pursued through more competition and transparency in the transfer market, innovative transfer technologies, and improved access to financial institutions.

### Remittances: key historical and cross-country figures
- Remittances reached an estimated $3.6 billion in 2011.
- In 2011 remittances were:
  - about 50 percent higher than net foreign direct investment,
  - and amounted to about 60 percent the amount of official aid inflows.
- In the WAEMU remittances finance mainly:
  - consumption: 55 percent,
  - investment: 21 percent.
- Migration stocks and destinations (2010, World Bank):
  - About 5.5 million citizens of WAEMU countries lived abroad, about 6 percent of the region’s population.
  - 63 percent of these lived in other WAEMU countries.
  - Nigeria and France hosted about 600,000 and 300,000 WAEMU migrants, respectively.
  - Within the WAEMU, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso are the source of about 65 percent of intra-WAEMU migration and serve as destination for about 85 percent of it.
  - Burkina Faso has about 10 percent of its population living abroad.
- Geographic sources of remittances (2011):
  - France is the largest source of remittances to the WAEMU by volume with about US$0.5 billion.
  - France, Italy, and Spain together account for about a third of gross remittances inflows into WAEMU countries, and 43 percent of remittances originating from outside the WAEMU.
  - Remittances coming from WAEMU countries make up about a quarter of the total, with Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso accounting for the bulk.
- Remittances per migrant (2010, selected figures, USD per migrant):
  - Average migrant from the WAEMU sends home about $560 a year.
  - Migrants residing in France send an average $1,741 a year.
  - Migrants residing in Côte d’Ivoire send home an average $188 a year.
  - Table 5 (selected entries) shows country and sending-region variation in remittances per migrant.

### Remittances as countercyclical inflows and shock absorbers
- Empirical result (panel OLS, 1995–2012):
  - Table 6 (WAEMU: Real GDP and Net Remittances Inflows):
    - Log net remittances inflows on Log real GDP coefficient: -4.02037*** [0.001]
    - Country fixed effects: yes
    - Year fixed effects: yes
    - Constant: 35.54756*** [0.000]
    - Observations: 113
- Interpretation:
  - Controlling for country and year fixed effects, a one percent decrease in real WAEMU GDP is associated with a four percent increase in net remittances inflows to the WAEMU (about 0.1 percent of GDP).
  - This confirms the countercyclical character of remittances: migrants tend to send more money home when economic activity in a recipient country slows down.

### Remittances’ role in reducing output volatility
- Empirical framework:
  - Analytical framework similar to Chami et al. (2009) over 1995–2011.
  - Output volatility defined as the standard deviation of real GDP growth from that country’s average growth over the observation period.
  - Variables tested: net remittances inflows, aid, government expenditure, FDI, terms of trade, trade openness index.
  - Estimation: panel OLS with country and year fixed effects.
- Key regression results (Table 7. WAEMU: Factors Affectting Output Volatility):
  - Net remittances inflows (log): -1.125**  -1.080**  [0.028] [0.038]
  - Government expenditure (log): 7.559*  9.151**  [0.090] [0.046]
  - Aid (log): -1.911  -1.895  [0.239] [0.250]
  - FDI (log): -0.008  0.300  [0.987] [0.572]
  - Private credit (log): 0.598  1.225  [0.670] [0.424]
  - Terms of trade: -0.043  [0.117]
  - Trade openness index: -0.041  [0.643]
  - Country fixed effects: yes
  - Year fixed effects: yes
  - Constant: -42.507  -60.471  [0.357] [0.204]
  - Observations9494
  - R-squared0.8090.817
  - p-values in brackets; significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
- Interpretation:
  - The natural log of remittances has a negative and significant effect on output volatility, indicating remittances act as countercyclical shock-absorbers.
  - Government expenditure has a positive and significant effect on output volatility (public spending in WAEMU is pro-cyclical).
  - Aid, FDI, and private credit have no significant effect on output volatility in these specifications.
  - Results are robust to inclusion of terms of trade and trade openness.

### Conclusions and policy suggestions on remittances
- Remittances inflows:
  - Act as countercyclical output stabilizers.
  - Are a significant factor in reducing output volatility.
  - Help smooth asymmetric shocks and increase member countries’ resilience.
  - Constitute a source of financing for the region (particularly those from outside the WAEMU).
- Policy implications and recommendations:
  - Facilitating remittances circulation could improve WAEMU resilience to shocks.
  - Encourage higher labor mobility, which contributes to adjusting to asymmetric shocks and indirectly increases remittances.
  - Improve access to financial institutions and money transfer companies; increase competition and transparency in remittance transfer markets to reduce costs and channel more transfers into the formal sector.
  - Develop mobile banking in the WAEMU to facilitate intra-WAEMU remittances (no exchange rate cost associated with transfers within the union).
- Financial inclusion context:
  - Ratio of adults with a bank account in the WAEMU is about 13 percent, significantly below the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) average of 31 percent.

*IMF — Excerpt from Chapter: West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) staff report and Appendix VI on remittances.*

### 6.6 percent in 2012, regional growth reached 5.5 percent last year. This performance was driven

### _cr1484 - 6.6 percent in 2012, regional growth reached 5.5 percent last year. This performance was driven

### Recent developments and growth
- Regional GDP growth: "6.6 percent in 2012, regional growth reached 5.5 percent last year."
- Drivers of 2013 performance:
  - post-crisis recovery in Côte d’Ivoire
  - public investment efforts
  - good harvests in several countries
  - beginning of oil production in Niger
- Country-specific outcomes:
  - Côte d’Ivoire: growth "about 9 percent"
  - Growth exceeded "5 percent" in Benin, Burkina Faso, and Togo
  - Economy remained weak in Guinea-Bissau
  - Drought in the Sahel heavily reduced GDP growth in post-crisis Mali
- Regional inflation: decreased to "1.6 percent" due to lower food prices

### Fiscal policy and public debt
- Area-wide fiscal deficit (including grants): stabilized at "about 3 percent of GDP" despite a substantial increase in public investment in 2013
- Composition of spending shifted toward investment
- Grants and tax revenue increased in most countries
- Average public debt ratio for the region: small decline to "about 39 percent of GDP"
- Government financial operations (selected indicators, percent of GDP):
  - Government total revenue, excl. grants: "19.4" in 2013 (table shows 2013 = "19.4")
  - Government expenditure: "25.3" in 2013
  - Overall fiscal balance, excl. grants: "-5.9" in 2013
  - Official grants: "2.9" in 2013
  - Overall fiscal balance, incl. grants: "-3.0" in 2013
  - Basic fiscal balance, incl. grants & HIPC: "-0.9" in 2013
- Memorandum: Nominal GDP (billions of CFA francs) for 2013: "43,220"

### Monetary policy, banking, and reserves
- BCEAO actions in 2013:
  - lowered policy rates by "50 basis points"
  - increased liquidity injections as bank liquidity contracted
- Money growth: remained moderate; decline of net foreign assets offset by strong credit growth
- Bank lending rates: recorded a small decrease
- Official reserves: small decline to "4.7 months of next year’s extra-regional imports"
- Broad money (annual percentage change): "10.6" in 2013 (table shows broad money = "10.6" for 2013)
- Money and credit (annual changes in percent of beginning-of-period broad money):
  - Net foreign assets: "-4.3" in 2013
  - Net domestic assets: "14.8" in 2013

### External sector and current account
- Area-wide current account deficit (including official transfers): widened to "6.7 percent" in 2013
- Drivers of wider current account deficit:
  - higher public investment boosting imports of intermediate goods, equipment, and services
  - sharp decline in gold prices; gold exports represent "about 20 percent of total regional exports"
- Exports of goods and services: "27.8" percent of GDP in 2013
- Imports of goods and services: "39.0" percent of GDP in 2013
- Current account, excl. grants: "-10.5" percent of GDP in 2013
- External public debt: "26.8" percent of GDP in 2013
- Total public debt: "38.8" percent of GDP in 2013
- Foreign exchange cover ratio (estimates for end-September 2013): "91.2"

### Regional surveillance framework and fiscal coordination
- Existing criteria and enforcement mechanism suffer shortcomings:
  - key criterion on the basic fiscal deficit frequently violated
  - after debt relief the debt criterion is "no longer constraining"
- WAEMU Commission has launched a review of the whole framework to improve fiscal policy coordination
- Objectives of the review:
  - preserve fiscal and external sustainability
  - make convergence criteria simple and transparent
  - leave policy room for countries to respond to shocks
  - adopt participatory approach to increase ownership and compliance
- Areas recommended for coordination progress:
  - public finance management
  - debt management
  - tax policy

### Executive Board assessment (summarized views)
- Directors welcomed strong growth and moderate inflation; near-term outlook: continued strong growth
- Key priorities to sustain momentum while preserving macro stability:
  - consolidating improvements in regional security
  - high-quality public investment
  - ambitious growth-enhancing reforms
- Policy recommendations:
  - pause in monetary easing given widening current account deficit and declining official reserves
  - strengthen fiscal and debt sustainability and build buffers while maintaining public investment and expanding social safety nets
  - improve quality of spending and increase revenue mobilization
  - accelerate financial sector reforms, develop interbank and sovereign debt markets, strengthen bank supervision
  - move toward Basel II and III regulation while tightening certain prudential rules in the meantime
  - improve crisis prevention and resolution framework
  - enhance regional trade integration, remove nontariff barriers, fill regional infrastructure gaps, improve business and legal environments
  - continue improving the quality and timeliness of data

### WAEMU authorities’ statement and policy stance
- Authorities concur with staff on positive developments and favorable outlook: "Growth recorded a strong 5.5 percent in 2013"
- Authorities’ view on public finances:
  - shift towards investment-dominated spending profile
  - imports dominated by capital goods
  - area-wide fiscal deficit "about 3 percent of GDP"
  - increased tax mobilization and grants to support investment agenda
- Surveillance framework reform priorities:
  - set new fiscal rules that support development agenda and ensure long-term fiscal sustainability
  - emphasis on reviewing the debt criterion; staff recommended lowering ceiling from current "70 percent of GDP"
  - authorities argue the external debt criterion should account for development imperatives and not only debt vulnerability
  - area-wide average debt-to-GDP ratio fell from "125 percent in 2000 to less than 40 percent currently"
  - some countries have ratios "less than 20 percent"
  - preparatory work on other convergence criteria proceeding, with attention to transposition of regional rules into national laws and fiscal frameworks and to institutional feasibility
  - final reform proposal to be submitted to the Council of Ministers for decision

### Financial sector development and planned reforms
- Regional financial sector: described as "sound"; authorities addressing difficulties with limited public finance impact
- Strengthening actions:
  - banking commission reinforced and better staffed
  - set of financial sector reforms initiated by BCEAO to address vulnerabilities, including high concentration of lending
- Market infrastructure and instruments:
  - electronic infrastructure for interbank and public debt markets: final stage, should be functional "before mid-2014"
  - creation of credit bureaus: companies to be selected in 2014
  - regional agency to coordinate sovereign debt issuance: senior management recruited and further staffing underway
  - move to implement Basel II/III regulation in the coming years; interim tightening of certain prudential rules recommended
  - creation of a financial stability fund to address sovereign risks: governance architecture completed and resources to be made available in the period ahead

### Structural reforms for economic transformation
- Focus areas:
  - development of the private sector as main driver of inclusive growth
  - harmonization of reforms to improve business environment, including World Bank "Doing Business" related reforms
  - emphasis on SMEs: designing single set of characteristics for classifying SMEs; establishing a single market for SME participation in public procurement across countries
  - delivery of regional infrastructure projects and regional energy solutions
  - implementation of the second phase of the Regional Economic Program (PER)
  - facilitation of regional trade: lifting nontariff barriers, addressing illicit road blocks and bribe payments
  - agreement for a common external tariff (CET) for ECOWAS seen as a good step (discussions include ECOWAS proposal for "75 percent free access" for European goods against initial proposals of "70 percent (ECOWAS)" and "80 percent (EU)")
  - institutional reforms to improve functioning of WAEMU institutions, guided by the Commission’s Strategic Plan 2011-20 and the "WAEMU in 2020" report

### Key statistics and projections (selected table highlights, values preserved)
- GDP at constant prices (annual percentage change): 2010 = "4.2", 2011 = "1.2", 2012 = "6.6", 2013 = "5.5", 2014 = "6.5", 2015 = "6.3", 2016 = "7.1", 2017 = "6.7", 2018 = "6.3"
- Consumer prices (average): 2010 = "1.4", 2011 = "3.9", 2012 = "2.4", 2013 = "1.6", 2014 = "2.3", 2015 = "2.2", 2016 = "2.2", 2017 = "2.2", 2018 = "2.2"
- Gross domestic investment (percent of GDP): 2013 = "21.9"; public investment (of which): 2013 = "7.8"
- Current account, incl. grants (percent of GDP): 2013 = "-6.7"
- Reserves in months of imports (excl. intra-WAEMU imports): 2013 = "4.7"
- Nominal GDP per capita (US dollars): 2013 = "816"

*Source: IMF staff report and WAEMU authorities' statement (Executive Board Meeting, March 14, 2014).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/_cr1484.pdf_
