## _cr15130

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### 1. Household Debt — Overview, structural drivers, vulnerabilities, and policy responses
- Key findings
  - Overall household debt as a share of income has been rising steadily over the last decade.
  - Korean households have accumulated more liquid financial assets than debt since 2002; household net debt (gross debt minus currency, deposits, and financial security holdings) as a share of income has decreased.
  - About one third of low-income, older, and self-employed households have high debt servicing burdens.
  - Pockets of vulnerability exist among older, lower-income, and self-employed households; higher debt service could negatively impact consumption given higher marginal propensities to consume or liquidity constraints.

- Structural factors shaping household balance sheets
  - Demographics: share of household debt held by households in their fifties and older has increased by more than 10 percent in the last decade and may continue to rise as population ages.
  - Chonsei rental system: chonsei accounts for almost half of Korea’s rental housing market; chonsei-related loans have almost doubled since 2009.
  - Mortgage product composition: about 75 percent of houses are financed by short-term interest-only loans.

- Housing finance transition and policy measures
  - Government loan conversion program aims to increase the share of fixed-rate and amortizing loans from currently less than 25 percent to 40 percent by 2017.
  - Note on transition: conversion may transitorily increase household debt repayment even if household net worth is unchanged.
  - Staff recommendation: deepen market and regulatory infrastructure so market-based incentives encourage households and banks to move toward fixed-rate, amortizing mortgages; execution should focus on deepening long-term mortgage market and increasing housing finance resilience.
  - KHFC role and metrics:
    - KHFC securitizes all loans brought to its balance sheet before the close of the same day.
    - KHFC share in total mortgage lending rose from around 4½ percent at end-2011 to around 8 percent as of end-August 2014.

- Macro-financial implications
  - Aggregate household balance sheets relatively stable; rising debt does not pose near-term systemic risks absent large shocks.
  - Vulnerable segments (older, lower-income, self-employed) could propagate weaker consumption if debt service rises.
  - Prevalence of short-term, interest-only mortgages and chonsei-related borrowing increases sensitivity to interest rate and rollover risks.

### Exchange rate, external sector, and near-term outlook
- Exchange rate dynamics and reserves
  - Won has been on a gradual, appreciating trend since 2012 on a measured, trade-weighted basis; climbed against the yen and weakened against the U.S. dollar in the last several months.
  - Staff assessment: the exchange rate is being assessed as undervalued.
  - Official foreign exchange reserves increased in the first half of 2014 and have declined modestly in U.S. dollar terms thereafter; reserves broadly stable at around 130 percent as a share of the IMF’s composite reserve adequacy metric during most of this period.

- Current account and oil price effects
  - Current account surplus increased sharply since 2011, reaching 6¼ percent of GDP in 2014.
  - Oil imports fell from 8½ percent of GDP in 2011 to 6¾ percent of GDP in 2014.
  - Korea’s oil balance (accounting for exports of petroleum products) is about 3 percent of GDP.
  - A 40 percent decline in oil prices assumed in the baseline for 2015 leads to a first round oil windfall of 1¼ percent of GDP; historical trends suggest spillovers to non-oil exports would reduce this windfall by about ¼ - ½ percentage points of GDP.

- Outlook and projections (selected)
  - Output growth projection for 2015: centered at around 3 percent.
  - Inflation forecast: projected to be in the 1–1½ percent range.
  - Baseline assumptions consistent with BOK revision to 3.1 percent and Q1 outturn.

- Near-term risks and external exposure
  - Domestic risks: households’ concerns about future house price and wage growth could weigh on consumption; business sentiment tied to external prospects.
  - External risks: partner country growth concerns (China, EU, Japan); persistent weak yen risks exporters’ profits and market share.
  - Policy buffer: allowing the won to respond flexibly provides a key buffer; FX intervention should be limited to smoothing excess volatility.

- Box 3 — Impact of the Weaker Yen on Korea’s Exports — key findings
  - Since August 2011 the yen depreciated by over 35 percent against the U.S. dollar and by about 40 percent against the won.
  - Effects concentrated more on profit margins than on prices or volumes to date.
  - Example: since Q1 2012 Hyundai Motors’ operating margin decreased by around 20 percent while Toyota’s increased by over 60 percent.
  - Short-run exchange rate elasticities are low; longer-run elasticities larger, implying lagged shifts in competitiveness.

### Policy guidance to boost growth momentum (staff recommendations)
- General approach
  - Staff argued for more pro-active use of available policy tools; the risks of doing too little too late outweigh the risks of doing too much.
  - A broad-based, bold set of policy actions is preferred to shift confidence.

- Monetary policy
  - There is scope for monetary policy to take pre-emptive action against downside risks.
  - Policy rate cuts can help shift incentives away from cash hoarding; the zero lower bound limits space.
  - Short-run effects on household debt ratios should be addressed via macro-prudential mortgage lending tools.

- Fiscal policy
  - The 2015 expansionary budget is a step in the right direction for near-term aggregate demand support.
  - Revised medium-term deficit path is consistent with using fiscal space when needed while preserving longer-term fiscal sustainability.
  - Budget support should be broadened where temporary measures can boost employment and household incomes without undermining structural reforms or fiscal sustainability.
  - Expansion of policy-based lending with budget support should prioritize the most commercially viable enterprises, including refocusing public support for SMEs, in a way that preserves financial sector profitability and capital buffers.

### Structural reforms: priorities, authorities’ views, and implementation
- Reform priorities (paras. 23, 35 and related)
  - Increase service sector productivity: promote competition in health, education, and protected professions; remove regulatory impediments to investment.
  - Make firms more dynamic: phase out government support sustaining unviable SMEs; advance restructuring of ailing enterprises.
  - Reduce labor market rigidities: address gaps in legal protection for regular and non-regular workers; move to performance- rather than seniority-based wages; reduce incentives for early retirement; improve unemployment insurance.
  - Increase female labor force participation: improve public support for childcare; facilitate part-time work; enhance job search and training support.
  - Strengthen social safety net to reduce precautionary savings and support political viability of reforms.

- Tax and fiscal space
  - Total revenue (including social contributions and local governments) reached 24.3 percent of GDP in 2013.
  - VAT collections: 4.3 percent of GDP and 24 percent of tax revenues (excluding social contributions).
  - PIT: 3.7 percent of GDP.
  - CIT: 3.4 percent of GDP.
  - Staff indicates potential substantial revenue yield from base-broadening even without changing rates.

- Authorities’ views and implementation stance
  - Authorities view household debt as not posing imminent risks and prefer gradual stabilization while avoiding forced deleveraging.
  - Authorities emphasize macro-prudential policy framework’s role and regulatory limits on foreign exchange exposure as key to resilience.
  - Authorities reluctant on measures requiring fundamental institutional changes such as establishing two distinct committees for macroprudential policy and crisis management recommended by FSAP.

### Financial stability, macroprudential measures, and FSAP recommendations (paras. 25–28, Appendix III)
- Macroprudential tools and measures
  - Limits on mortgage lending: LTV and DTI ratios introduced and currently significantly tighter than at introduction; mid-2014 saw modest unwinding of earlier tightening.
  - Measures introduced after Lehman collapse: ceiling on banks’ loan-to-deposit ratio; leverage cap on banks’ foreign exchange derivatives positions; levy on foreign exchange funding (levy expanded to cover non-bank financial institutions and structure streamlined starting from July 2015).
  - Staff assessment: these measures increased financial sector resilience by reducing exposure to liquidity shocks and lengthening maturity of foreign exchange borrowing.

- FSAP high-priority recommendations implementation status (selected)
  - Establish a dedicated macroprudential council: Status: Not initiated.
  - Strengthen independence of FSC and FSS: Status: Not initiated.
  - Enhance enforcement and increase fines: Status: Initiated.
  - Enhance coordination on stress testing (BOK and FSS): Status: In progress.
  - Empower supervisors to set capital ratios above Basel II minimum: Status: Initiated; financial holding companies subject to Basel II capital requirement since February 11, 2014.
  - Apply regulatory framework consistent with banks to NBDIs: Status: In progress.
  - Improve AML/CFT supervision via RBA: Status: In progress.
  - Enhance risk-sensitivity of supervision and examinations: Status: Implemented for banks; timing Medium-term.
  - Crisis preparedness apex committee: Status: Not initiated.
  - KDIC deposit insurance replenishment/back-up funding: Status: Initiated; implemented back-up funding per KDIC Act.
  - BOK contingency plan for ELA and liquidity: Status: Implemented (contingency plan).

### Appendix I — Risk Assessment Matrix (selected risks and likelihoods)
- Global risks
  - Surge in financial volatility from asynchronous policy normalization: Likelihood: High; Impact: Medium.
  - Financial imbalances from prolonged low interest rates: Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Medium.
  - Persistent dollar strength: Likelihood: High; Impact: Low.
  - Protracted slower growth in key economies: Likelihood: Medium/High; Impact: High.
  - Sharp growth slowdown in China: Likelihood: Low/Medium; Impact: High.

- Domestic risks
  - Self-reinforcing downside dynamic (deflationary/stagnation risk): Likelihood: Low; Impact: High.
  - High household and corporate indebtedness under extreme shocks: Likelihood: Low; Impact: High.
  - Geopolitical risk from North Korea: Likelihood: Low; Impact: High.

- Policy response guidance
  - Utilize Korea’s fiscal space and monetary loosening to mitigate external shocks.
  - Maintain flexible exchange rate; use intervention to smooth excessive volatility.
  - Korea’s international reserves judged sufficient to buffer a range of external shocks.

### Appendix IV — Public Sector Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) — baseline, scenarios, and selected projections
- Baseline Scenario key assumptions (2014–2019, in percent)
  - Real GDP growth: 3.3, 3.1, 3.5, 3.7, 3.7, 3.7
  - Inflation: 0.6, 2.5, 1.2, 1.8, 2.0, 2.3
  - Primary Balance: -1.7, -1.3, -0.8, -0.2, 0.0, 0.3
  - Effective interest rate: 2.7, 3.5, 3.9, 4.6, 4.5, 4.4

- Historical and constant primary balance scenario assumptions (2014–2019, in percent)
  - Historical scenario Real GDP growth: 3.3, 3.8, 3.8, 3.8, 3.8, 3.8
  - Constant Primary Balance Primary Balance: -1.7 each year 2014–2019

- Selected DSA projections and fiscal metrics (selected years)
  - Real GDP (percent change): 2014 = 3.3; 2015 (proj) = 3.1; 2016 (proj) = 3.5.
  - Nominal GDP (trillions of won): 2014 = 1,485; 2015 (proj) = 1,568; 2016 (proj) = 1,643.
  - Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2014 = 6.3; 2015 (proj) = 7.3; 2016 (proj) = 5.9.
  - CPI inflation (average): 2014 = 1.3; 2015 (proj) = 1.2; 2016 (proj) = 2.3.
  - Consolidated central government overall balance (percent of GDP): 2014 = 0.6; 2015 (proj) = 0.4; 2016 (proj) = 0.7.
  - External debt (end period, US$ billions): 2014 = 425.4; 2015 (proj) = 426.6; 2016 (proj) = 428.8.
  - Gross international reserves (end period, US$ billions): 2014 = 358.8; 2015 (proj) = 364.4; 2016 (proj) = 359.8.
  - Debt service ratio (percent of exports of goods and services): 2014 = 7.9; 2015 (proj) = 8.4; 2016 (proj) = 9.0.

- Fiscal and debt structure highlights (selected figures)
  - Central government debt (trillion won): 2012: 425.1; 2013: 473.4; 2014: 518.2; 2015: 567.9; 2016: 615.2.
  - Central government debt (percent of GDP): 2012: 30.9; 2013: 33.1; 2014: 34.9; 2015: 36.2; 2016: 37.4.
  - Total revenue (including social contributions and local governments) 2013: 24.3 percent of GDP.

### Key macro-financial indicators and projections (selected series and exact figures)
- Real GDP (percent change) historic and projected:
  - 2012: 2.3
  - 2013: 2.9
  - 2014: 3.3
  - 2015: 3.1
  - 2016: 3.5
- Nominal GDP (trillions of won):
  - 2012: 1,377.5
  - 2013: 1,429.4
  - 2014: 1,485.1
  - 2015: 1,568.4
  - 2016: 1,642.9
- Current account balance (percent of GDP):
  - 2012: 4.2
  - 2013: 6.2
  - 2014: 6.3
  - 2015: 7.3
  - 2016: 5.9
- CPI inflation (end of period):
  - 2012: 1.4
  - 2013: 1.1
  - 2014: 0.8
  - 2015: 1.6
  - 2016: 2.5
- Exports, f.o.b. (US$ billions):
  - 2012: 603.5
  - 2013: 618.2
  - 2014: 621.3
  - 2015: 593.5
  - 2016: 617.3
- Imports, f.o.b. (US$ billions):
  - 2012: 554.1
  - 2013: 535.4
  - 2014: 528.6
  - 2015: 474.5
  - 2016: 503.8
- Gross international reserves (end period, US$ billions, excludes gold):
  - 2012: 323.2
  - 2013: 341.7
  - 2014: 358.8
  - 2015: 364.4
  - 2016: 359.8
- Total external debt (US$ billions / percent of GDP):
  - 2012: 408.9 / 33.4
  - 2013: 423.5 / 32.4
  - 2014: 425.4 / 30.2
  - 2015: 426.6 / 29.9
  - 2016: 428.8 / 28.6
- Household credit (percent of disposable income):
  - 2009: 124.8
  - 2010: 127.7
  - 2011: 131.3
  - 2012: 133.1
  - 2013: 134.2
  - 2014: 138.0

- Medium-term projections (selected)
  - Real GDP (percent change): 2017–2020 each year: 3.7 (2017), 3.7 (2018), 3.7 (2019), 3.7 (2020).
  - Consumer price (period average, percent change): 2017–2020 each year: 3.0 (2017), 3.0 (2018), 3.0 (2019), 3.0 (2020).
  - Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2017: 5.6; 2018: 5.3; 2019: 4.8; 2020: 4.3.
  - Nominal GDP (trillions of won) projected: 2015: 1,568; 2016: 1,643; 2017: 1,733; 2018: 1,833; 2019: 1,944; 2020: 2,062.
  - Per capita GDP (US$) projected: 2015: 28,166; 2016: 29,521; 2017: 31,403; 2018: 33,557; 2019: 35,954; 2020: 38,644.

*Source: IMF staff report (Republic of Korea) — content as provided in the supplied PDF excerpt.*

### 1. Household Debt _________________________________________________________________________________7

### 1. Household Debt

### Overview and key findings
- Overall household debt as a share of income has been rising steadily over the last decade.
- Unlike many other countries leading up to the global financial crisis, the rise in Korea’s household debt has recently occurred with relatively stable house prices and cautious consumer spending, keeping household leverage low and stable and the sector’s aggregate net worth comparable to that in many other advanced economies.
- Korean households have accumulated more liquid financial assets than debt since 2002; household net debt (gross debt minus currency, deposits, and financial security holdings) as a share of income has decreased.
- About one third of low-income, older, and self-employed households have high debt servicing burdens.
- Pockets of vulnerability exist, particularly among older, lower-income, and self-employed households; these households have relatively higher marginal propensities to consume or are more likely to be liquidity constrained, so higher debt service could negatively impact consumption.

### Structural factors shaping household balance sheets
- Demographics: Korea’s baby boom generation has begun to retire; the share of household debt held by households in their fifties and older has increased by more than 10 percent in the last decade and may continue to rise as population ages.
- Chonsei rental system: Chonsei currently accounts for almost half of Korea’s rental housing market. In the chonsei system the tenant loans a large deposit (a large share of the property’s value, often borrowed from a bank) interest-free to the landlord and lives rent-free; this can lead to higher measured gross household debt than otherwise. Chonsei-related loans have almost doubled since 2009.
- Mortgage product composition: Reflecting Korea’s relatively young mortgage market, about 75 percent of houses are financed by short-term interest-only loans, allowing households to accumulate equity in other types of assets instead of paying down mortgage principals.

### Housing finance, policy measures, and transition challenges
- The structure of household debt could be strengthened by facilitating a transition toward more stable, long-term finance for housing.
- Government policy: A loan conversion program has been launched with the aim of increasing the share of fixed-rate and amortizing loans from currently less than 25 percent to 40 percent by 2017.
- Note on transition effects: The process of conversion may have the transitory impact of increasing household debt repayment even if it does not affect household net worth.

### Vulnerabilities and macro-financial implications
- While aggregate household balance sheets are relatively stable and rising debt does not pose near-term systemic risks in the absence of large macroeconomic shocks, certain segments are vulnerable:
  - Older, lower-income, and self-employed households exhibit higher shares of debt at risk.
  - An increase in household debt service due to higher debt levels and/or higher interest rates may have a negative impact on consumption through these vulnerable groups.
- The prevalence of short-term, interest-only mortgage structures and chonsei-related borrowing increases sensitivity to interest rate and rollover risks; a key challenge is facilitating the transition by households and financial institutions toward a more stable, long-term structure.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt titled "1. Household Debt" from the Republic of Korea chapter.*

### 12.      Exchange rate. The won has been on a gradual, appreciating trending since 2012 on a

### 12.      Exchange rate. The won has been on a gradual, appreciating trending since 2012 on a

### Exchange rate dynamics
- The won has been on a gradual, appreciating trend since 2012 on a measured, trade-weighted basis, masking important movements in cross rates.
- The won continues its climb against the yen, while it has weakened against the U.S. dollar in the last several months.
- Staff assessment: the exchange rate is being assessed as undervalued.
- Official foreign exchange reserves (including the BOK’s forward position) increased in the first half of 2014 and have declined modestly in U.S. dollar terms thereafter, reflecting valuation losses related to shifts in the relative exchange rates of the major reserve currencies (paragraph 33).

### Balance of payments and current account
- The current account surplus increased sharply since 2011, reaching 6¼ percent of GDP in 2014.
- Key drivers:
  - Lower global oil prices.
  - Weak domestic demand.
  - Substantially lower domestic investment with a high import component.
- Oil imports fell from 8½ percent of GDP in 2011 to 6¾ percent of GDP in 2014.
- Korea’s oil balance (accounting for exports of petroleum products) is about 3 percent of GDP.
- A 40 percent decline in oil prices assumed in the baseline for 2015 leads to a first round oil windfall of 1¼ percent of GDP; historical trends suggest spillovers to non-oil exports would reduce this windfall by about ¼ - ½ percentage points of GDP.
- The counterpart to the higher current account surplus has mainly been an increase in corporate retained earnings held abroad.
- Other capital account developments including portfolio flows have been broadly stable.

### Recent policy initiatives (measures to spur economic recovery)
- Direct budget stimulus:
  - About ½ percent of GDP in additional spending in 2014 focused on financial support for home buyers and renters.
  - The 2015 budget allowed for a more broad-based increase including for social spending.
- Increased support for policy-based lending:
  - Capital injection to the Korean Development Bank to support new growth source projects (including those centered on intellectual property) through lending and diverse forms of hybrid capital.
- Ad hoc tax measures to incentivize firms to allocate idle cash to wages, dividends, or investments.
- Housing market measures:
  - Legislation to unwind major regulatory roadblocks for housing reconstruction projects.
  - Some unwinding of earlier tightening of mortgage lending restrictions (paragraph 26).
  - Preliminary signs of a pickup in house prices and transactions volumes.
- Fiscal reorientation:
  - Stronger expenditure growth over the medium term with timing of planned deficit reduction pushed back relative to last year’s budget.
  - Projected public debt now expected to peak at 37 percent of GDP.
- Authorities have put in place or aim to launch initiatives to address structural challenges (paragraphs 37 and 39).

### Outlook (projections and conditions)
- Output growth projection for 2015: centered at around 3 percent; exceeding this midpoint will require a rebound in aggregate demand.
- Baseline assumptions (consistent with BOK revision to 3.1 percent and Q1 outturn):
  - Some gain in growth momentum beginning in the second quarter from a modest increase in construction investment and consumption related to easing of monetary and fiscal policy and lower fuel prices.
  - Inflation forecast: projected to be in the 1–1½ percent range, depending on one-off impacts of lower oil prices and increase in administered tobacco prices.
  - Underlying inflation currently hovering around 1 percent; an increase would likely require higher wage growth or a nominal depreciation of the won.

### Near-term risks and external exposure
- Domestic risks:
  - Households’ concerns about future house price and wage growth could continue to weigh on consumption.
  - Business sentiment linked to firms’ views of the external environment and prospects for private consumption and future growth potential.
- External risks:
  - Partner country growth concerns for China, the EU, and Japan (text figure).
  - Persistently weak yen:
    - Korean export volumes have held up so far but show signs of weakening prospects with Korean market share beginning to decline in some industries.
    - Profit and stock price pressures for key exporters, downward price pressure on input-providing domestic SMEs.
    - A sustained weak yen could lead to off-shoring, lower investment in domestic capacity and R&D, and reduced export proceeds.
    - Strong dollar could provide some buffer.
- Other external factors:
  - Lower oil prices: Korea benefits but transmission to domestic growth may be slow; first-round windfall and potential reduction in inflation expectations.
  - Exposure to global financial risks: potential for capital inflows as a “bounded safe haven,” but risk of sudden reversals and disruptive volatility; allowing the won to respond flexibly would provide a key buffer.

### Box 3 — Impact of the Weaker Yen on Korea’s Exports (key findings)
- Since the Bank of Japan’s QQE in August 2011 the yen depreciated by over 35 percent against the U.S. dollar and by about 40 percent against the won.
- Effects concentrated more on profit margins than on prices or volumes to date.
- Price pass-through:
  - Both Korea and Japan decreased export prices modestly; Japan’s export price cuts were somewhat higher in sectors with high product similarity (metal, electronics, transportation equipment).
- Volume response:
  - Export volumes have been slow to respond; Japan’s real exports declined until late 2012 then rebounded since late 2014; Korea’s real exports largely traced pre-crisis trends.
- Profit margins:
  - Limited volume and price response led to higher profits for Japanese exporters and lower profits for Korean firms.
  - Example: since Q1 2012 Hyundai Motors’ operating margin decreased by around 20 percent while Toyota’s increased by over 60 percent.
- Market share:
  - Korean exporters’ market share stalled since 2011 with gains in China, ASEAN, and the United States offset by slippages elsewhere; Japan endured broad losses.
  - Korea expanded market share in electronics while experiencing flat or declining shares in other leading export items.
- Short- and long-run responsiveness:
  - Historical and econometric evidence indicates low short-run exchange rate elasticities for both countries, with elasticities increasing over the longer run.
  - The muted short-run response may mask a more fundamental, lagged shift in relative competitiveness affecting pricing, investment location, R&D, and capacity decisions.

### Risks of a downside growth and inflation scenario
- A self-reinforcing downside dynamic could arise where falling inflation expectations suppress consumption, weak external prospects lead firms to withhold investment and hiring, and expectations become self-fulfilling.
- Entrenched low or negative inflation expectations can be difficult to reverse and can have long-lasting negative effects on household, corporate, and public sector balance sheets.
- The likelihood may not be high but potential costs could be significant.

### Authorities’ views
- Authorities agreed that the near-term outlook is subject to uncertainties and risks.
- They expected growth to pick up from the second quarter as a result of stimulus policies, policy rate cuts, and lower oil prices, viewing the likelihood of a stagnation/fall in nominal and real growth as low at the time of the mission.
- External risks from an orderly U.S. Fed tightening were seen as manageable, though bouts of disruptive volatility were acknowledged.
- Authorities emphasized Korea’s strong fundamentals—positive growth, current account surpluses, low debt, and solid reserve buffers—and viewed a flexible exchange rate as a key shock absorber.

### Policy guidance to boost growth momentum (staff recommendations and assessment)
- General approach:
  - Given high costs if the downside scenario materializes, staff argued for a more pro-active use of available policy tools than in a normal cyclical environment.
  - The risks of doing too little too late outweigh the risks of doing too much.
  - A broad-based, bold set of policy actions is preferred to shift confidence rather than incremental steps.
- Assessment of measures already taken:
  - Measures to date have not had a material impact on confidence, suggesting they may fall short of what is needed.
  - Effectiveness of policy rate cuts depends on whether they spur households and firms to take on more leverage and whether housing market easing leads to a recovery sufficient to change savings behavior.
  - Budget measures are relatively modest; impact of steps to unlock idle corporate cash is difficult to predict.
- Monetary policy recommendation:
  - There is scope for monetary policy to take pre-emptive action against downside risks.
  - Policy rate cuts can help shift incentives away from cash hoarding toward consumption and investment in an environment of excess cash holdings.
  - The longer weak expectations persist, the more policy rates would need to be cut; the zero lower bound limits space and waiting risks reducing effectiveness.
  - Concerns about short-run effects on household debt ratios should be addressed via macro-prudential mortgage lending tools (paragraph 26).
- Fiscal policy recommendation:
  - The 2015 expansionary budget is a step in the right direction for near-term aggregate demand support.
  - The revised medium-term deficit path is consistent with using fiscal space when needed while preserving longer-term fiscal sustainability.
  - Relatively modest public debt provides flexibility to take additional measures if nominal GDP growth underperforms.
  - Budget support should be broadened where temporary measures can boost employment and household incomes without undermining structural reforms or fiscal sustainability.
  - Expansion of policy-based lending with budget support should prioritize the most commercially viable enterprises, including refocusing public support for SMEs, in a way that preserves financial sector profitability and capital buffers.

*Source: IMF staff report (Republic of Korea) — content as provided.*

### 23.      Structural reforms. The reforms discussed in paragraphs 36–38 should be undertaken as

### _cr15130 - 23.      Structural reforms. The reforms discussed in paragraphs 36–38 should be undertaken as

### Structural reforms (paras. 23)
- Reforms discussed in paragraphs 36–38 should be undertaken as quickly as feasible independent of the near-term macroeconomic outlook.
- Most reforms will take time to yield direct growth benefits, but maintaining momentum could shore up confidence in the economy’s long run potential.

### Authorities’ views on near-term priorities (para. 24)
- Authorities viewed revitalizing the economy as a key near term priority and stood ready to take additional policy actions if growth momentum does not pick up soon.
- Korea’s strong dependence on global developments and underlying structural factors make this task more challenging.
- Specific institutional perspectives:
  - Bank of Korea (BOK):
    - Recognized space for further monetary easing if needed.
    - Headline inflation has been pushed down in part by supply side factors including low oil prices.
    - Survey data show inflation expectations anchored in the mid-2 percent range; officials cautioned against over-reacting to inflation falling below target.
    - Many factors driving weak demand—low wage growth, consumer and investor caution—reflect structural rigidities limiting the effectiveness of monetary easing alone.
    - Monetary policy must balance growth and stability and remain mindful of possible impact of monetary easing on household debt.
  - Ministry of Strategy and Finance:
    - Emphasized fiscal policy’s role in supporting demand within boundaries of maintaining fiscal soundness, including through direct budget spending and expanded/refocused policy lending.
    - Korea lacks clear broad-based short-run infrastructure spending needs.
    - Slower than initially-projected nominal output growth cited as key reason for budget revenue shortfalls in recent years; achieving the nominal growth target important for meeting revenue target and addressing increased social spending needs.
  - Authorities on household debt:
    - Agreed household debt does not pose imminent risks and prefer gradual stabilization while avoiding forced deleveraging.
    - Prefer addressing concerns via existing government tools for setting mortgage lending standards.
    - A coordinated approach to monetary and macro-prudential policy would be needed.

### Financial stability and macro-financial risks (paras. 25–26)
- 2013 FSAP found near-term vulnerabilities of Korean financial sector limited; banks’ vulnerabilities to corporate and household exposures appear contained in near term, but further economic weakness could impair soundness.
- Staff urged progress on high priority FSAP recommendations:
  - Strengthen financial stability analysis and supervision.
  - Develop financial market infrastructure.
  - Reform institutional framework to separate macroprudential policy making from crisis management to increase transparency, accountability, and political independence (Appendix III).
- Authorities have initiated measures in line with recommendations but reluctant on measures requiring fundamental institutional changes.
- Macroprudential and capital flow management tools in use include:
  - Limits on mortgage lending: loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios introduced in last decade; adjusted several times and currently significantly tighter than when introduced. In mid-2014 authorities took a modest step toward unwinding earlier tightening given banks’ strong balance sheet position.
  - Measures introduced after Lehman collapse to contain liquidity and foreign exchange vulnerabilities: a ceiling on banks’ loan-to-deposit ratio, a leverage cap on banks’ foreign exchange derivatives positions, and a levy on foreign exchange funding.
    - Footnote: The levy will be expanded to cover non-bank financial institutions and its structure streamlined starting from July 2015.
    - Staff assessment: these measures succeeded in increasing financial sector resilience by reducing exposure to liquidity shocks, reducing maturity mismatches, and lengthening maturity of foreign exchange borrowing; regarded as appropriately aimed at systemic stability.

### Mortgage financing (paras. 27–28)
- Government launched a loan conversion program to increase share of fixed-rate and amortizing loans from currently less than 25 percent to 40 percent by 2017.
- Program funded by Korea Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC) issuing mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
  - KHFC securitizes all loans brought to its balance sheet before the close of the same day to limit exposure to credit risks of long-term amortizing products.
  - Securities generally purchased by pension funds looking to match long-term liabilities.
- Staff recommendation: deepen market and regulatory infrastructure so market-based incentives encourage households and banks to move toward fixed-rate, amortizing mortgages; execution should be tightly focused on deepening long-term mortgage market and increasing housing finance resilience.
- KHFC share in total mortgage lending rose from around 4½ percent at end-2011 to around 8 percent as of end-August 2014.
- Authorities’ view:
  - Financial sector currently sound with improved asset quality and satisfactory capital adequacy.
  - Confident mortgage loan conversion program will meet government’s target given high demand.
  - Low corporate profitability in some ailing sectors could affect financial institutions’ balance sheets, but progress in debt restructuring and lower oil prices have improved leverage ratios and operating balances.
  - Implemented various measures to strengthen financial stability analysis, supervision, and financial market infrastructure.
  - Emphasized macro-prudential policy framework’s role and regulatory limits on foreign exchange exposure as key to resilience.
  - Do not see need to establish two distinct committees for macroprudential policy and crisis management recommended by FSAP; view current institutional framework as adequate.

### Assessing external stability (paras. 29–33 and Box 4)
- Overview:
  - Korea has large external buffers and does not currently face external sustainability issues.
  - Heavy reliance on gaining export market share is increasingly limited and exposes economy to external shocks.
  - Achieving balanced, sustainable long-run growth depends on closing large productivity gaps in the non-traded sector, reducing net exports’ role in demand growth.
- Current account:
  - Underlying current account surplus is larger than consistent with economic and policy fundamentals, even after allowing for transitory windfall from lower oil prices which is expected to continue to put upward pressure on the surplus in the near term.
  - Gap partly reflects precautionary savings related to a relatively weak social safety net (Box 4).
- Policies to address imbalances (para. 31):
  - Structural policies:
    - Staff scenario analysis: a 0.3 percentage point increase in non-traded sector productivity would increase long-run potential output growth by 0.2 percentage points, and for a given real exchange rate would result in a reduction in the current account surplus of around 1 percent of GDP.
  - Fiscal policy:
    - Government’s more expansionary fiscal stance, both this year and over medium term, could help narrow imbalances, especially if coupled with an expanded social safety net reducing precautionary savings.
  - Exchange rate flexibility:
    - Won appreciation over time likely needed to reduce external imbalances to levels consistent with fundamentals even with some productivity gap closing.
- Medium-term current account prospects (para. 32):
  - Multiple uncertain trends affect current account and response to price changes: demographics (rapid aging and increased life expectancy) could raise aggregate household savings now that unwind over time; durability of the oil dividend; uncertain exchange rate elasticities—staff analysis suggests Korean export volumes have become highly inelastic to exchange rate movements in the short run, pushing adjustment into the longer term.
  - Longer-run export prospects affected by product innovation and competition from newer competitors in China and elsewhere.
- Exchange rate and reserves (para. 33):
  - Maintaining a flexible exchange rate is essential as a buffer and to facilitate adjustment toward domestic growth sources; won should remain market determined with intervention limited to smoothing excess volatility.
  - Quantity of reserves increased steadily since 2008 but broadly stable at around 130 percent as a share of the IMF’s composite reserve adequacy metric during most of this period.
  - Foreign exchange intervention proxies point to periods of net purchases at levels below first half of 2014; proxies are suggestive with high uncertainty.
    - Footnote: Recent large shifts in cross rates add uncertainty to constructed proxies; models suggest cumulative intervention since mid-2014 of anywhere from zero to modest net purchases.

- Box 4: External Stability Assessment — key figures and assessments
  - NIIP increased from -2.9 percent of GDP in 2013 to 5.8 percent in 2014; expected to strengthen further as current account is in strong surplus.
  - Net external debt position was -16.7 percent of GDP in 2014.
  - Banks’ short term external debt remains below pre-crisis levels; currency mismatch risks limited due to forward hedging by exporters.
  - Cyclically-adjusted current account surplus in 2014 assessed to be in the range of 2½ to 5 percent above level consistent with fundamentals and desirable policies.
  - Applying plausible elasticities produces a range for the exchange rate gap of 5–13 percent.
  - EBA regression estimation (2014):
    - gap 6.2
    - REER index 0.1
    - REER level -13.8
    - of which policy gaps 0.7-2-2.1
    - of which residual 5.42-11.8
    - cyclically adjusted current account norm 0.9
  - External sustainability (ES) approach estimation gap 3.7-14.2
  - 2014 REER gap (%): -13 to -5
  - Staff assessment: Korea’s external position in 2014 was substantially stronger than that implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies; developments as of March, 2015 point to a somewhat stronger external position in 2015.

### Authorities’ views on external position (para. 34)
- Authorities agreed narrowing the current account surplus would be desirable and expected as economy recovers and temporary factors recede.
- Emphasized surplus appears unrelated to a weak exchange rate; increase driven mostly by sharp fall in oil prices, weak domestic demand, and demographic changes despite real appreciation of won since 2012.
- Criticized IMF econometric approaches for not fully capturing country-specific factors (past foreign exchange liquidity crises, speed of population aging, trade elasticities).
- Do not view exchange rate as undervalued; support flexible, market-determined exchange rate with intervention limited to smoothing operations.
- Put more emphasis on boosting near-term growth and productivity-enhancing structural reforms to bring about transition.

*IMF staff summary extracted from the source content provided.*

### 35.      Key structural challenges. The Korean economy faces many well-diagnosed impediments to

### _cr15130 - 35.      Key structural challenges. The Korean economy faces many well-diagnosed impediments to

### Key structural challenges
- Low service sector productivity
  - The ratio of service-to-manufacturing sector productivity in Korea is very low compared to its peers and investment in services has been consistently lagging.
  - Causes include regulatory barriers in the sector that impede competition.
- An un-dynamic SME sector
  - SMEs provide the bulk of services and employ around 90 percent of the workforce.
  - The sector includes many unprofitable firms kept afloat through government guarantees, subsidies, and protections, tying up labor, capital, and budgetary resources in low productivity activities and stifling innovation.
- Labor market rigidities and distortions
  - Female labor force participation is low and dips sharply for women aged 30–40 years.
  - An age-linked compensation system encourages firms to push older and more skilled workers into early retirement.
  - Labor market duality: high protection for regular workers (particularly in large manufacturing firms) versus over half of the labor force who are self-employed and non-regular workers — leading to higher turnover, lower firm-based training, and hampered employment prospects for market entrants (largely young people).

### Structural policy priorities (staff recommendations)
- Increasing service sector productivity
  - Promote competition in health, education, and other protected professions.
  - Remove regulatory impediments to investment.
- Making firms more dynamic
  - Phase out government support that sustains unviable SMEs.
  - Advance restructuring of ailing enterprises to free up resources for more productive activities.
- Reducing labor market rigidities
  - Address gaps in legal protection for regular and non-regular workers.
  - Move to performance- rather than seniority-based wages.
  - Reduce incentives for forcing early retirement.
  - Improve unemployment insurance.
- Increasing female labor force participation
  - Improve public support for childcare.
  - Facilitate part-time work.
  - Enhance job search and training support.
- Strengthen the government’s role in providing a social safety net to increase the political and social viability of reforms and to reduce income inequality.

### Government initiatives and consensus-building
- Government priorities align with staff: labor market, finance, public sector, and education reforms under the Three-Year Plan for Economic Innovation for 2015.
- The May, 2013 tripartite agreement between unions, employers, and the government supports momentum for labor market reform.
- Progress requires sustained consensus-building among stakeholders; changes in laws, regulations, guidelines, and practices will take time and involve significant political and economic hurdles.
- Other reforms include promoting finance-IT convergence, invigorating venture capital, refocusing SME financing, and building public-private partnerships for infrastructure.

### Tax reform and fiscal space
- Korea’s relatively low public debt provides flexibility to undertake structural reforms with potential short-run fiscal costs and long-run fiscal payoffs.
- Revenue is low relative to peers, partly due to weak compliance and high levels of exemptions.
- Total revenue
  - Total revenue (including social contributions and local governments) reached 24.3 percent of GDP in 2013.
- Composition of revenue
  - VAT collections reached 4.3 percent of GDP and accounted for 24 percent of tax revenues (excluding social contributions).
  - Personal Income Tax (PIT) generated 3.7 percent of GDP.
  - Corporate Income Tax (CIT) generated 3.4 percent of GDP.
  - Customs duties represent around 0.8 percent of GDP.
- Tax system issues and reform options
  - PIT features a high level of deductions and credits which diminish progressivity; attempts have been made to replace exemptions with tax credits.
  - Large differences between PIT, CIT, and capital gains rates may facilitate avoidance and income shifting.
  - CIT complexity (three rate levels: 10, 20 and 22 percent) complicates monitoring and control.
  - Property taxation remains tilted towards taxing transactions; shifting to recurrent taxes on immovable property would enhance tax efficiency.
  - Staff estimates indicate potential substantial revenue yield from base-broadening even without changing rates.

### Income inequality and social mobility (Box 5 findings)
- Standard composite metrics (Gini coefficients) are near the average for OECD countries, but trends point to increasing polarization.
  - Average market income Gini: 0.43
  - Average disposable income Gini:  0.29
- Social mobility has been relatively high but is falling; intergenerational correlations for educational attainment and socioeconomic status have increased.
- Perceptions of the middle class have changed: increasing polarization between highly lucrative jobs requiring exceptional qualifications and mediocre jobs with limited upward mobility.
- Elderly poverty
  - Korea’s elderly poverty problem is worst among the OECD and stems from an immature social insurance system, rapid changes in social norms, shortfalls in retirement savings, and increased life expectancy.
- Gender occupational inequality
  - Weak corporate support for maternity, shortage of childcare availability, and intense competition in early childhood education lead to a sizeable drop in labor force participation for women in childbearing ages.
- Policy remedy suggestion: coordinated actions across labor market, educational system, SME sector, services sector, and conglomerates, and consideration of fiscal policy given low fiscal redistribution.

### Staff appraisal and macro outlook (paragraphs 40–46)
- Near-term and structural challenges
  - Growth momentum has stalled due to sluggish domestic demand; inflation is low; external uncertainties have increased.
  - Weak non-manufacturing productivity and heavy reliance on manufacturing exports expose Korea to external shocks; demographic headwinds from a rapidly aging population are building.
- Downside risk scenario
  - Risk of a self-reinforcing downside where expectations of falling price and wage growth suppress consumption and investment, potentially becoming self-fulfilling and difficult to reverse.
- Policy stance recommendations
  - Policies should focus on shoring up momentum; recent monetary easing and fiscal initiatives are steps in the right direction but it is too early to gauge full impact.
  - There is room for further monetary policy easing if needed.
  - Relatively modest public debt allows flexibility to broaden public support for recovery while preserving longer-run fiscal sustainability.
- External position and exchange rate
  - Korea has built external buffers and exchange rate flexibility to enhance resilience.
  - Korea’s external position is substantially stronger than implied by medium-term fundamentals; durable reduction of the imbalance requires shifting away from heavy reliance on manufacturing exports via structural reforms to boost non-traded sector productivity.
  - The won should remain market determined with intervention limited to smoothing excess volatility.
- Financial sector and household debt
  - Financial fundamentals are relatively sound; the financial system is broadly stable with solid capital buffers.
  - Overall household debt has been rising but matched by increases in household financial assets; current debt levels are not viewed as a near-term threat to financial stability, though mortgage market structure should transition toward more fixed rate, longer-maturity amortizing mortgages.
- Conclusion
  - The government’s focus on boosting future growth potential and initial reforms to labor market and other rigidities are welcome; reforms should begin now given their long lead time and Korea’s fiscal space to absorb short-run costs.

*Source: REPUBLIC OF KOREA, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (excerpt).*

### 47.      Staff recommends that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard 12-month

### _cr15130 - 47.      Staff recommends that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard 12-month

### Recommendation
- Staff recommends that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

### Real Economy (Figure 1 and accompanying description)
- Growth has been sluggish in 2014 due to weak domestic demand.
- Both exports and imports declined in the second half of the year.
- Facility investment growth has weakened and retail sales remain flat.
- Business and consumer sentiment indices are stagnant.
- Headline inflation has remained below the Bank of Korea’s target band since late 2012.
- Annual wage growth has been weak.
- Labor market indicators shown:
  - Wage (In percent, yoy) series plotted for 2010Q1–2014Q3.
  - Employment rate (In percent, RHS) series plotted for 2010Q1–2014Q3.
  - Sources: CEIC Data Company; and Korea Statistics.

### Inflation and Monetary Policy (Figure 1 / Figure 2)
- CPI (2010=100) and CPI (y/y percent change) plotted covering 2010M1–2015M1.
- BOK's inflation targeting range shown; headline inflation below it since late 2012.
- Real Policy Rate using expected inflation (RHS) plotted.
- Source: CEIC Data Company Ltd.

### Housing and Banking (Figures 1–2)
- Housing and Rent Price Index (March 2013=100) series for National and Seoul, 2010M1–2015M1.
- Housing prices appear to be recovering; housing market transactions recovering.
- Banking indicators (In percent):
  - Total Loan to Deposit Ratio (LHS)
  - Nonperforming Loans/Total Assets (in percent, LHS)
  - Capital Adequacy Ratio (RHS)
  - Source: Financial Supervisory Service (FSS).
  - Note: Total loan consists of Bank Account, Trust Account, and Merchant Banking Account.
- Credit (y/y percent change) series for:
  - To private sector (other depository corporations)
  - To households (all financial institutions)
  - To SMEs (CSBs)
  - Source: CEIC Data Company Ltd.
- Interest Rate series (In percent) shown:
  - 3-yr KTB
  - Bank Lending Rate (CSBs newly extended)
  - Policy Rate
  - Source: CEIC Data Company Ltd.

### Monetary and Financial Sector Summary (Figure 2)
- Interest rates have declined as the Bank of Korea loosened its monetary policy stance since August 2014.
- Private sector credit growth is picking up slowly.
- Banking sector soundness remains robust.
- Banks’ short-term external debt remains below the level during the GFC despite some recent increases.
- House prices and housing market transactions show recovery.

### External Sector (Figure 3 and narrative)
- Overall capital outflows have continued, while inflows into bonds rebounded recently.
- Current account surplus has continued to rise, in part due to the decline in oil imports.
- The won has appreciated sharply against the Japanese yen and somewhat in real effective terms.
- Reserve accumulation continued in 2014.
- Current Account & Oil Imports (In percent of GDP) series, 2009–2014:
  - Current Account Balance and Value of Oil Imports plotted.
  - Sources: CEIC Data Company Ltd.; IMF staff estimates.
- Net Capital Flows (In billions of U.S. dollars) series plotted 2010Q1–2014Q3 showing Assets, Liabilities, Net.
  - Sources: CEIC Data Company Ltd.; Bank of Korea; and IMF staff calculations.

### Key Projections and Selected Indicators (Tables 1–4 summaries)
- Real GDP (percent change) projections:
  - 2012: 2.3
  - 2013: 2.9
  - 2014: 3.3
  - 2015: 3.1
  - 2016: 3.5
- Total domestic demand projections:
  - 2012: 1.2
  - 2013: 0.7
  - 2014: 2.4
  - 2015: 2.9
  - 2016: 3.4
- Nominal GDP (in trillions of won):
  - 2012: 1,377.5
  - 2013: 1,429.4
  - 2014: 1,485.1
  - 2015: 1,568.4
  - 2016: 1,642.9
- Current account balance (in percent of GDP):
  - 2012: 4.2
  - 2013: 6.2
  - 2014: 6.3
  - 2015: 7.3
  - 2016: 5.9
- CPI inflation (end of period):
  - 2012: 1.4
  - 2013: 1.1
  - 2014: 0.8
  - 2015: 1.6
  - 2016: 2.5
- CPI inflation (average):
  - 2012: 2.2
  - 2013: 1.3
  - 2014: 1.3
  - 2015: 1.2
  - 2016: 2.3
- Exports, f.o.b. (in billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2012: 603.5
  - 2013: 618.2
  - 2014: 621.3
  - 2015: 593.5
  - 2016: 617.3
- Imports, f.o.b. (in billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2012: 554.1
  - 2013: 535.4
  - 2014: 528.6
  - 2015: 474.5
  - 2016: 503.8
- Gross international reserves (end of period, US$ billions, excludes gold):
  - 2012: 323.2
  - 2013: 341.7
  - 2014: 358.8
  - 2015: 364.4
  - 2016: 359.8
- Total external debt (in billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2012: 408.9
  - 2013: 423.5
  - 2014: 425.4
  - 2015: 426.6
  - 2016: 428.8
- Total external debt (in percent of GDP):
  - 2012: 33.4
  - 2013: 32.4
  - 2014: 30.2
  - 2015: 29.9
  - 2016: 28.6

### Balance of Payments and Financial Account (Table 2 highlights)
- Current account balance (in billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2012: 50.8
  - 2013: 81.1
  - 2014: 89.2
  - 2015: 104.8
  - 2016: 88.6
- Trade balance (in billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2012: 49.4
  - 2013: 82.8
  - 2014: 92.7
  - 2015: 119.0
  - 2016: 113.5
- Financial and capital account balance (in billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2012: -41.1
  - 2013: -68.2
  - 2014: -76.2
  - 2015: -101.3
  - 2016: -95.6
- Portfolio investment, net (Table 2):
  - 2012: 6.7
  - 2013: -9.3
  - 2014: -33.6
  - 2015: -36.5
  - 2016: -33.5
- Direct investment, net (Table 2):
  - 2012: -21.1
  - 2013: -15.6
  - 2014: -20.7
  - 2015: -22.5
  - 2016: -24.4

### Fiscal and Government Finance (Tables 3.a–3.b)
- Central government revenue (in trillions of won):
  - 2012: 304.7
  - 2013: 308.0
  - 2014: 320.0
  - 2015: 334.8
  - 2016: 351.8
- Tax revenue (in trillions of won):
  - 2012: 203.0
  - 2013: 201.9
  - 2014: 209.8
  - 2015: 218.4
  - 2016: 229.9
- Expenditure (in trillions of won):
  - 2012: 283.2
  - 2013: 298.7
  - 2014: 312.4
  - 2015: 329.6
  - 2016: 341.9
- Net lending (+) / borrowing (-) (in trillions of won):
  - 2012: 21.5
  - 2013: 9.3
  - 2014: 7.6
  - 2015: 5.3
  - 2016: 9.9
- Overall balance (in percent of GDP):
  - 2012: 1.3
  - 2013: 1.0
  - 2014: 0.6
  - 2015: 0.4
  - 2016: 0.7
- Overall balance excluding Social Security Funds (in percent of GDP):
  - 2012: -1.3
  - 2013: -1.5
  - 2014: -2.0
  - 2015: -2.1
  - 2016: -1.9
- Central government debt (trillion won) and as percent of GDP:
  - Debt (trillion won): 2012: 425.1; 2013: 473.4; 2014: 518.2; 2015: 567.9; 2016: 615.2
  - In percent of GDP: 2012: 30.9; 2013: 33.1; 2014: 34.9; 2015: 36.2; 2016: 37.4

### Medium-Term Projections (Table 4 highlights)
- Real GDP (percent change) 2013–20:
  - 2013: 2.9
  - 2014: 3.3
  - 2015: 3.1
  - 2016: 3.5
  - 2017: 3.7
  - 2018: 3.7
  - 2019: 3.7
  - 2020: 3.7
- Consumer price (period average, percent change) projections:
  - 2013: 1.3
  - 2014: 1.3
  - 2015: 1.2
  - 2016: 2.3
  - 2017: 3.0
  - 2018: 3.0
  - 2019: 3.0
  - 2020: 3.0
- Current account balance (in percent of GDP) projections:
  - 2013: 6.2
  - 2014: 6.3
  - 2015: 7.3
  - 2016: 5.9
  - 2017: 5.6
  - 2018: 5.3
  - 2019: 4.8
  - 2020: 4.3
- Nominal GDP (in trillions of won) projected:
  - 2015: 1,568
  - 2016: 1,643
  - 2017: 1,733
  - 2018: 1,833
  - 2019: 1,944
  - 2020: 2,062
- Per capita GDP (in U.S. dollars) projected:
  - 2013: 25,996
  - 2014: 27,978
  - 2015: 28,166
  - 2016: 29,521
  - 2017: 31,403
  - 2018: 33,557
  - 2019: 35,954
  - 2020: 38,644

### Financial Soundness and Vulnerability Indicators (Tables 5–6)
- Total loans (in percent of GDP):
  - 2009: 120.7
  - 2010: 114.4
  - 2011: 117.2
  - 2012: 117.6
  - 2013: 118.8
  - 2014: 123.4
- Household credit (in percent of disposable income):
  - 2009: 124.8
  - 2010: 127.7
  - 2011: 131.3
  - 2012: 133.1
  - 2013: 134.2
  - 2014: 138.0
- Broad money (M3, percent change, end of period):
  - 2011: 6.6
  - 2012: 7.8
  - 2013: 6.5
  - 2014: 8.7
  - 2015 (Feb-15): 8.9
- Private sector credit (Dep. Corp. survey, percent change, end of period):
  - 2011: 6.8
  - 2012: 3.7
  - 2013: 3.2
  - 2014: 7.4
  - 2015 (Feb-15): 7.5
- One-month call borrowing rate (in percent):
  - 2011: 3.3
  - 2012: 2.8
  - 2013: 2.5
  - 2014: 2.0
  - 2015 (Mar-15): 1.7
- Exports and imports (12-month basis in US$, Feb-15):
  - Exports: -15.4 (2015 Feb-15)
  - Imports: -21.9 (2015 Feb-15)
- Gross official reserves (US$ billion):
  - 2011: 304.2
  - 2012: 323.2
  - 2013: 341.7
  - 2014: 358.8
  - 2015 (Proj.): 364.4
- Reserves to total short-term external debt (percent) (projection):
  - 2011: 163.0
  - 2012: 181.0
  - 2013: 203.5
  - 2014: 209.7
  - 2015 (Proj.): 218.2

### International Investment Position (Table 7)
- Total assets (in billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2010: 697.1
  - 2011: 759.5
  - 2012: 861.0
  - 2013: 967.5
- Reserve assets:
  - 2010: 291.6
  - 2011: 306.4
  - 2012: 327.0
  - 2013: 346.4
- Total liabilities (in billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2010: 828.2
  - 2011: 840.6
  - 2012: 955.4
  - 2013: 1,004.8

*Source: IMF staff report content as provided in the supplied PDF excerpt.*

### Appendix I. Korea—Risk Assessment Matrix

### Appendix I. Korea—Risk Assessment Matrix

### Global Risks
- Side-effects from global financial conditions: A surge in financial volatility
  - Likelihood: High
  - Transmission potential: A surge in financial volatility, possibly triggered by asynchronous policy normalization or reassessments of economic fundamentals, could result in a general tightening of global financial conditions.
  - Impact: Medium
  - Key effects: Overall tightening of financial conditions including rising bond yields and falling equity prices would lead to weaker domestic growth. While Korean banks’ reliance on foreign wholesale funding has decreased after the GFC, banks would likely face some funding pressures if global financial condition tightens.

- Side-effects from global financial conditions: Financial imbalances from protracted period of low interest rates
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Transmission potential: The risks may stem from excessive build-up of corporate leverage, asset-price misalignment and delays in fiscal and structural reforms, which could lead to large negative consequences for economic growth and potential spillovers.
  - Impact: Medium
  - Key effects: Side effects could lead to a sudden reversal of capital flows and fall in asset prices which would hurt business sentiment and investment. Sharply tighter financial conditions could be a drag on growth as financing costs of banks and corporate rise.

- Side-effects from global financial conditions: Persistent dollar strength
  - Likelihood: High
  - Transmission potential: The relative exchange rates movements could adversely affect the balance sheets of firms with debt service dominated in dollars.
  - Impact: Low
  - Key effects: Korean banks have reduced their short-term external debt after the GFC, limiting the impact of currency mismatches. Korea’s exports may benefit from the depreciation against the dollar. On the other hand, there are possible downside growth risks from a persistently weak Japanese yen.

- Protracted period of slower growth in key advanced and emerging economies
  - Likelihood: Medium/High
  - Transmission potential: Trade (both volume and price) would be the dominant channel, with adverse second round effects on domestic demand.
  - Impact: High
  - Key effects: Deterioration in external conditions could lead to weakening exports and have adverse impact on domestic demand, resulting in higher unemployment and weaker corporate profits transferring into higher credit risks in the corporate and household sectors.

- Sharp growth slowdown and financial risks in China
  - Likelihood: Low/Medium
  - Transmission potential: A sharper-than-expected growth slowdown in China will have large negative impact on Korea’s exports.
  - Impact: High
  - Key effects: China accounts for about 25 percent of Korea’s exports. A China slowdown would substantially affect Korean exports and, via second round effects, affect the global economy.

### Domestic Risks
- Risks of self-reinforcing downside dynamic taking hold
  - Likelihood: Low
  - Transmission potential: The stalled growth momentum and weak inflation, against a difficult and more deflationary global environment, could become entrenched, with household and investor pessimism leading to stagnating or falling nominal and real growth.
  - Impact: High
  - Key effects: Entrenched low or negative inflation can be very difficult to break and can have long-lasting negative effects on household, corporate, and public sector balance sheets. Reforms needed to shore up potential output could be more costly and difficult to implement in an environment of weak economic growth.

- Risks of high household and corporate indebtedness to financial stability
  - Likelihood: Low
  - Transmission potential: Despite the relatively benign aggregate picture, there are pockets of vulnerabilities in household and corporate balance sheets (Box 1 and 2), which could pose risks to financial stability under extreme shocks to macroeconomic growth.
  - Impact: High
  - Key effects: The FSAP suggests that a shock comparable to that faced by an average firm during the 2008 crisis would induce aggregate expected losses comparable to late 2008 levels. A sharp deterioration in the housing market possibly triggered by extreme shocks to the macroeconomy could lead to an upsurge in household credit risks.

- Risks from North Korea
  - Likelihood: Low
  - Transmission potential: On the downside, a sharp rise in geopolitical tensions in the peninsula could potentially escalate and lead to destabilization of the Korean peninsula. On the upside, a peaceful reunification scenario could also materialize.
  - Impact: High
  - Key effects: The fallout of a serious escalation would have a vast impact on South Korea and will be multifaceted, entailing considerable fiscal costs and financial market instability. A peaceful reunification scenario would, while having immediate and possibly large fiscal costs, could confer long term benefits related to access to additional labor input and investment opportunities.

### Policy Response and Notes
- Policy Response for external shock scenarios:
  - Utilize Korea’s ample fiscal space and monetary loosening to mitigate effects.
  - Korea’s international reserves should be sufficient to buffer against a range of possible external shocks.
  - The ability of the won to respond flexibly is a key buffer; intervention can be used to smooth excessive exchange rate volatility.
- Note on the Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM):
  - The RAM shows events that could materially alter the baseline path (the scenario most likely to materialize in the view of IMF staff).
  - Relative likelihood categories: “low” = probability below 10 percent; “medium” = probability between 10 and 30 percent; “high” = probability between 30 and 50 percent.
  - The RAM reflects staff views as of the time of discussions with the authorities. Non-mutually exclusive risks may interact and materialize jointly.

*IMF staff summary from Appendix I. Korea—Risk Assessment Matrix*

### Appendix III. Implementation of

### Appendix III. Implementation of 2013 FSAP High Priority Recommendations

### Overall Financial Sector Oversight and Coordination
- Establish a dedicated and formal macroprudential council, with a stronger role for the BOK, the power to recommend regulatory action on the part of other bodies and transparency over policy deliberations.
  - Status: Not initiated.
  - Authorities' note: Korea already has the framework to monitor macroprudence at the regular Macroeconomic Financial Meeting with participants including deputies from the MOSF, FSC, BOK and FSS.
  - Timing: Medium-term
- Strengthen the independence of the FSC and FSS and increase transparency of the allocation of decision-making responsibilities among the two authorities.
  - Status: Not initiated.
  - Authorities' note: Reviewing and setting measures for strengthening independence is a medium-term project; decision-making responsibilities among FSC and FSS are stipulated in the laws and regulations.
  - Timing: Short to Medium-Term
- Enhance enforcement effectiveness by broadening the range of administrative and civil penalties and increasing the amount of administrative fines and civil penalties.
  - Status: Initiated.
  - Measures: Clarified standards for making accusation and enhanced working-level-review-procedure before filling accusations; increased use of monetary fines.
  - Timing: Medium-term

### Financial Stability Analysis, Stress Tests, and Financial Supervision
- Enhance coordination among agencies involved in stress testing (FSS and BOK).
  - Status: In progress.
  - Measures: BOK and FSS are in the process of establishing a communication channel for sharing their stress test results and discussing related issues.
  - Timing: Short-term
- FSS should carry out a comprehensive validation of banks’ stress testing exercise.
  - Status: In progress.
  - Measures: Authorities revised regulations to provide for banks’ stress testing in March 2014 and reviewed banks’ implementation of revised regulation in August 2014; authorities plan to steadily strengthen FSS’ validation standards.
  - Timing: Short-term
- Disclose to the public the results of the stress tests conducted by the authorities.
  - Status: In progress.
  - Measures: FSS is reviewing whether to disclose the result of FSS-BOK joint stress testing. BOK currently conducts macro stress tests and discloses results, if needed, mainly through its Financial Stability Report; BOK is reviewing regular disclosure of further detailed results.
  - Timing: Short-Term
- Empower supervisors to set capital ratios above the Basel II minimum, implement all principles of Pillar-2 of Basel II, and extend calculation of Basel II capital to group holding companies.
  - Status: Initiated.
  - Measures: Authorities undertaking procedure to revise relevant regulation and detailed regulation.
  - Implementation note: Financial holding companies are now subject to Basel II capital requirement since the revision of Regulation on Supervision of Financial Holding Companies on February 11, 2014.
  - Timing: Short-term
- Apply regulatory framework consistent with that for banks to all NBDIs, with larger entities also subjected to stricter supervision.
  - Status: In progress.
  - Measures: For cooperatives, asset classification and loan loss provisioning standards gradually being enhanced until July 2015; for mutual savings banks, standards for taking Prompt Corrective Action are gradually being strengthened for large savings banks to be in line with banks in a gradual manner.
  - Timing: Short-term
- Implement a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision, and expand supervisory activities to all deposit-taking institutions, and the designated non-financial businesses and professions.
  - Status: In progress.
  - Measures: (1) implementing RBA to KoFIU’s AML/CFT supervision activities; (2) conducting risk assessment on all institutions that made reports in 2013; (3) examining the banking sector based on RBA principles; (4) reviewing measures to implement RBA examinations in non-banks.
  - Coverage note: All deposit-taking institutions are now subject to AML/CFT implementation. AML/CFT supervision of DNFBPs currently encompasses only casino businesses.
  - Timing: Short-term
- Ensure sufficiently comprehensive audit oversight and introduce minimum standards for appointing external auditors of banks over and above existing requirements, reflecting expectations of experience and expertise.
  - Status: In Progress.
  - Measures: On April 30, 2013, FSC submitted a bill to the National Assembly on amendment of Act on External Audit of Stock Companies to give supervisory authorities discretionary power to determine the standards for appointing external auditors of stock companies and financial companies (the bill is currently pending).
  - Timing: Medium-term
- Enhance risk-sensitivity of supervision via more flexible and frequent examinations that also provide sufficient coverage of the smaller supervised entities and enhancement to the judgmental component of the assessments.
  - Status: Implemented.
  - Measures: For banks, Examination Improvement Measures introduced in May 2014 and changes reflected in examination plans and detailed operating plans. For savings banks, active consulting on business vulnerabilities; a team set up to monitor internal control system operation on a continuous basis.
  - Timing: Medium-term

### Crisis Preparedness and Crisis Management Framework
- Establish a dedicated apex committee for leading and coordinating crisis preparedness and management work; undertake periodical crisis simulation exercises.
  - Status: Not initiated.
  - Current practice: Crisis preparedness and management work is carried out by a cooperative arrangement involving relevant organizations such as Economic Ministers Meeting.
  - Timing: Short-term
- Replenish the deficit in deposit insurance fund; assure KDIC back-up funding.
  - Status: Initiated.
  - Measures: Authorities will provide measures on replenishing the deficit in deposit insurance fund, taking into account the results of savings banks restructuring program.
  - Implementation note: Implemented. In accordance with the current KDIC Act, KDIC will have a back-up funding in times of emergency from the government, BOK, insured financial firms and etc.
  - Timing: Short-term
- Address potential moral hazard risks by enhancing banks’ risk management; and ensuring that government support is not assured or open-ended.
  - Status: Not initiated.
  - Timing: Medium-term

### Systemic Liquidity Management and Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs)
- BOK to ensure that its crisis management contingency plan adequately covers ELA-related decisions. Put in place a Memorandum of Understanding to ensure effective coordination between BOK and FSC in FMIs matters, and provide BOK with more enforcement tools.
  - Status: Implemented (contingency plan).
  - Measures: BOK has a contingency plan identifying risk factors in financial and foreign exchange markets in stages of development and specifying corresponding measures including the overall scheme of emergency provision of liquidity; BOK will continue to further develop more detailed elements of its current contingency plan.
  - Timing: Short-term
- Put in place a Memorandum of Understanding to ensure effective coordination between BOK and FSC in FMIs matters, and provide BOK with more enforcement tools.
  - Status: Not initiated.
  - Authorities' note: Plan to discuss and review measures to enhance efficient cooperation among relevant organizations relating to FMI including the FSC and BOK.
  - Timing: Short-term
- Reform the credit risk and management framework for the securities market, and increase the number of KRX staff managing companywide and CCP-related matters.
  - Status: In progress.
  - Measures and developments:
    - Revision of the default waterfall for the listed products: public pre-announcement of legislation of the FSCMA made by the FSC on October 8, 2014, to revise the default waterfall in line with PFMIs (CCP’s skin-in-the-game prior to JCF and assessment power after the depletion of pre-funded resources); proposal is on the parliamentary process for approval of the National Assembly.
    - Shortening the substitute price of listed bonds: KRX reduced the calculation period of the substitute prices of listed bonds from weekly to daily basis in June 2014.
    - Establishment of the stress testing and back testing guideline: KRX articulated the basis for stress test for calculating the JCFs for the listed markets through revision of the Enforcement Rules of the Membership Regulation in November 2014.
    - KRX funding and staffing: KRX has enough re-funded assets to cover possible damages from the extreme but plausible stress condition in the securities market; KRX is planning to expand the total size of JCF in the long term and to establish a dedicated business unit for monitoring, controlling and managing settlement risks.
  - Timing: Short-term

### Debt, Economic and Market Indicators (Selected figures and projections; As of March 31, 2015)
- Sovereign and market indicators (year columns show 2012 through 2019 where applicable):
  - Nominal gross public debt: 27.8, 32.3, 34.5, 36.4, 37.7, 39.0, 39.7, 39.9, 39.6
  - EMBIG (bp) 3/: (displayed heading only)
  - Public gross financing needs: 5.5, 5.5, 6.6, 7.1, 6.4, 5.5, 4.3, 4.0, 2.9
  - 5Y CDS (bp): 52
  - Real GDP growth (in percent): 4.0, 2.3, 2.9, 3.3, 3.1, 3.5, 3.7, 3.7, 3.7
  - Ratings (Foreign / Local): Moody's Aa3 / Aa3; S&Ps A+ / AA-; Fitch AA- / AA
  - Inflation (GDP deflator, in percent): 2.3, 1.0, 0.9, 0.6, 2.5, 1.2, 1.8, 2.0, 2.3
  - Nominal GDP growth (in percent): 6.4, 3.4, 3.8, 3.9, 5.6, 4.8, 5.5, 5.7, 6.1
  - Effective interest rate (in percent) 4/: 4.5, 3.4, 3.0, 2.7, 3.5, 3.9, 4.6, 4.5, 4.4
- Contribution to changes in public debt (2012–2019, cumulative and annual items shown):
  - Change in gross public sector debt (cumulative): 1.6, 0.6, 2.2, 1.9, 1.3, 1.3, 0.6, 0.2, -0.3, 5.1
  - Identified debt-creating flows: -0.3, 1.0, 3.2, 2.3, 1.6, 1.5, 0.8, 0.4, -0.1, 6.4
  - Primary deficit: -0.1, 0.6, 1.5, 1.7, 1.3, 0.8, 0.2, 0.0, -0.3, 3.6
  - Primary (noninterest) revenue and grants: 17.5, 17.1, 16.5, 16.5, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, 16.5, 16.5, 98.8
  - Primary (noninterest) expenditure: 17.3, 17.7, 18.1, 18.2, 17.6, 17.2, 16.7, 16.5, 16.2, 102.4
  - Automatic debt dynamics: -0.5, -0.1, -0.3, -0.4, -0.7, -0.3, -0.3, -0.5, -0.6, -2.8
  - Interest rate/growth differential: -0.5, 0.0, -0.2, -0.4, -0.7, -0.3, -0.3, -0.5, -0.6, -2.8
    - Of which: real interest rate: 0.5, 0.7, 0.7, 0.7, 0.3, 0.9, 1.0, 0.9, 0.8, 4.7
    - Of which: real GDP growth: -1.0, -0.7, -0.9, -1.1, -1.1, -1.3, -1.4, -1.4, -1.4, -7.5
  - Exchange rate depreciation: 0.0, -0.1, 0.0, ... (ellipsis entries in table)
  - Other identified debt-creating flows: 0.3, 0.4, 1.9, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.9, 0.9, 0.8, 5.6
  - Net privatization proceeds (negative): 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.0
  - Contingent liabilities: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.0
  - General government debt - change (funding for reserve build up): 0.3, 0.4, 1.9, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.9, 0.9, 0.8, 5.6
  - Residual, including asset changes: 1.9, -0.4, -1.0, -0.4, -0.2, -0.2, -0.2, -0.2, -0.2, -1.3
- Baseline scenario note: Figures presented are in percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated; charts illustrate debt-creating flows (Primary deficit, Real GDP growth, Real interest rate, Exchange rate depreciation, Other debt-creating flows, Residual) and the change in gross public sector debt (projection and historical series).

*Source: IMF staff. As of March 31, 2015.*

### Appendix IV. Korea Public Sector Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

### Appendix IV. Korea Public Sector Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)

### DSA baseline and scenarios — key assumptions (in percent)
- Baseline Scenario (2014–2019)
  - Real GDP growth: 3.3, 3.1, 3.5, 3.7, 3.7, 3.7
  - Inflation: 0.6, 2.5, 1.2, 1.8, 2.0, 2.3
  - Primary Balance: -1.7, -1.3, -0.8, -0.2, 0.0, 0.3
  - Effective interest rate: 2.7, 3.5, 3.9, 4.6, 4.5, 4.4

- Historical Scenario (2014–2019)
  - Real GDP growth: 3.3, 3.8, 3.8, 3.8, 3.8, 3.8
  - Inflation: 0.6, 2.5, 1.2, 1.8, 2.0, 2.3
  - Primary Balance: -1.7, -0.2, -0.2, -0.2, -0.2, -0.2
  - Effective interest rate: 2.7, 3.5, 3.8, 4.6, 4.5, 4.4

- Constant Primary Balance Scenario (2014–2019)
  - Real GDP growth: 3.3, 3.1, 3.5, 3.7, 3.7, 3.7
  - Inflation: 0.6, 2.5, 1.2, 1.8, 2.0, 2.3
  - Primary Balance: -1.7, -1.7, -1.7, -1.7, -1.7, -1.7
  - Effective interest rate: 2.7, 3.5, 3.9, 4.7, 4.6, 4.6

Source: IMF staff.

### Composition of public debt and projected financing needs
- Charts in the DSA show projected:
  - Gross Nominal Public Debt (in percent of GDP) for 2012–2019 (baseline, historical, constant primary balance).
  - Public Gross Financing Needs (in percent of GDP) for 2012–2019.
  - Debt by maturity (short-term vs. medium and long-term) for 2003–2019 (projection).
  - Debt by currency (local vs. foreign currency–denominated) for 2003–2019 (projection).
- (No numeric series for these charts are provided in the text excerpt.)

### Macro outlook, risks, and recent policy measures (press release and Board assessment highlights)
- Growth momentum stalled: average quarterly growth declined to about 0.5 percent in the last three quarters of 2014 from about 1 percent in the previous four quarters; Sewol ferry accident (April 2014) had a large and persistent impact on sentiment.
- Inflation: headline inflation has fallen to below 1 percent, below the Bank of Korea’s target band of 2½–3½ percent.
- External: current account surplus remains at around 6¼ percent of GDP (driven by lower oil prices and weak domestic demand).
- 2015 outlook: growth projected to be in a range centered around 3 percent for 2015; exceeding the midpoint would require a rebound in aggregate demand.
- Policy responses:
  - Bank of Korea policy rate reduced by 75 basis points since August (to 1.75 percent).
  - Government implemented about ½ percent of GDP in additional spending in 2014 and increased spending in the 2015 budget.
  - Other measures: increased support for policy-based lending and measures to revive the housing market.
- Executive Board view:
  - Merit seen in pro-active near-term support plus structural reforms for longer-term growth.
  - Room for further monetary easing if needed.
  - Korea’s low public indebtedness provides ample room for additional fiscal stimulus and reinforced social safety nets without prejudice to debt sustainability.
  - Maintain flexible exchange rate; FX interventions should be limited to smoothing volatility.

### Selected economic indicators and fiscal/financial metrics (selected entries)
- Real GDP (percent change): 2014 = 3.3; 2015 (projection) = 3.1; 2016 (projection) = 3.5.
- Nominal GDP (in trillions of won): 2014 = 1,485; 2015 (proj) = 1,568; 2016 (proj) = 1,643.
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2014 = 6.3; 2015 (proj) = 7.3; 2016 (proj) = 5.9.
- CPI inflation (average): 2014 = 1.3; 2015 (proj) = 1.2; 2016 (proj) = 2.3.
- Consolidated central government overall balance (percent of GDP): 2014 = 0.6; 2015 (proj) = 0.4; 2016 (proj) = 0.7.
- External debt (end of period, in billions of U.S. dollars): 2014 = 425.4; 2015 (proj) = 426.6; 2016 (proj) = 428.8.
- Gross international reserves (end of period, in billions of U.S. dollars): 2014 = 358.8; 2015 (proj) = 364.4; 2016 (proj) = 359.8.
- Debt service ratio (percent of exports of goods and services): 2014 = 7.9; 2015 (proj) = 8.4; 2016 (proj) = 9.0.

### Identified vulnerabilities and reform priorities
- Financial sector resilience increased since 2008; near-term vulnerabilities limited.
- Household debt rising but matched by increases in household financial assets; structure of household mortgage debt contains risks (floating-rate interest-only loans, short maturities, bullet repayments).
- Corporate sector: some financial soundness indicators have weakened; income and profits concentrated in top firms; pockets of vulnerability exist.
- Structural constraints to potential output: low productivity in services, aging population, labor market rigidities, weak SME dynamism.
- Recommended reform priorities (staff and authorities concur on many points):
  - Structural reforms to boost service-sector productivity and competition (medical, tourism, education, financial services).
  - Labor market reforms to reduce rigidities, increase female labor force participation, and address non-regular worker treatment.
  - Measures to deepen mortgage market and improve mortgage loan structure; maintain macroprudential tools (LTV and DTI).
  - Corporate restructuring measures, including amendment to the Corporate Restructuring Act and review of SME credit guarantee programs.
  - Fiscal reforms to safeguard long-term fiscal sustainability (government employee pension reform, National Pension system review, SOE function/organization review).

*Source: IMF staff; Republic of Korea — Staff Report for the 2015 Article IV Consultation — Informational Annex (Appendix IV: Korea Public Sector Debt Sustainability Analysis).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/_cr15130.pdf_
