## _cr15221 — IMF AML/CFT Assessment Excerpts (Rwanda) ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [_cr15221 — IMF AML/CFT Assessment Excerpts (Rwanda)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/_cr15221.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/_cr15221.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/_cr15221.pdf.json) --- ### Overview and key findings - Rwanda enacted Law N°47/2008 of 09/09/2008 (the AML/CFT Law); FIU established by Presidential Order N°27/01 of 30/05/2011 and became operational shortly before assessment. - Financial sector small and bank-dominated (eight/nine commercial banks referenced across sections); financial inclusion limited—some 80 percent of the population, mostly rural, does not have formal access to financial products. - Growth and macro facts (selected): - Population: about 11,700,000 inhabitants, as of 2012. - Per capita GDP (PPP): $1,284 in 2011. - Agriculture growth: 3.0 percent (first three quarters of 2012). - Export sector increased by 24.8 percent in 2012. - Budget financed by grants: about 40 percent; grants add up to 11.0 percent of GDP in 2010–2011. - Assessment view: legal framework broadly aligns with FATF 40+9 but lacks sufficient detail and implementation; many obligations not yet operational; numerous Recommendations and Special Recommendations rated NC, PC, LC, or N/A (detailed ratings throughout). ### Legal framework, ML and TF criminalization (R.1, R.2, SR.II) - Laws and instruments cited: - Law N°47/2008 of 09/09/2008 (AML/CFT Law). - Law N°45/2008 of 09/09/2008 (Counter Terrorism). - Organic Law No 01/2012/OL of 02/05/2012 (Penal Code). - Money laundering (PC Article 652 / AML/CFT Law Article 2): - Elements include conversion, transfer, handling, concealment, acquisition, possession, use, and participation/attempts, including extraterritorial application: "ML is committed even if the original acts ... are carried out on the territory of a third State." - Definitions: "property" per AML/CFT Law Article 2.9; "proceed" per Article 2.8. - Sanctions under PC (absence of aggravated circumstances): imprisonment of more than five years to seven years; fine of two to five times the value of the laundered sums. - Aggravated circumstances (Article 657) may double sanctions. - Authorities indicated practical view that prior conviction for predicate offense is necessary to secure ML conviction; no ML convictions brought to courts at time of assessment (one ML case disclosed and under investigation). - Terrorist financing (PC Article 653 / CT law Article 15 definitions): - TF offense defined as providing, collecting, managing funds/assets or advice with aim/knowledge they are to be used to commit terrorism acts. - Shortcoming: failure to criminalize collection/provision of funds by terrorist organizations or individual terrorists absent link to specific terrorist act. - Sanctions: imprisonment of more than five (5) years to seven (7) years and a fine of two (2) to five (5) times amount of assistance (PC Article 652.2) and other provisions in Articles 521–522 with higher ranges (10–20 years) for certain conduct. - No TF convictions at time of mission; one TF-related prosecution pending before High Court. - Assessors’ concerns and major legal suggestions: - Clarify that prior conviction for predicate offence is not necessary to prove proceeds status. - Ensure intentional element can be inferred from objective factual circumstances. - Criminalize provision/collection of funds to individual terrorists and to terrorist organizations. - Ensure TF offense covers collection/provision to organizations/individuals and direct/indirect collection. ### Confiscation, freezing, provisional measures (R.3, SR.III) - Legal provisions referenced: - Freezing: Article 55 AML/CFT Law; Article 25 of AML/CFT Law allows FIU to freeze for 48 hours (Article 25). - Seizure: Article 56 AML/CFT Law; Articles 67–73 CPC. - Confiscation: Articles 51–53 PC; Article 61 AML/CFT Law addresses fate of confiscated property. - Findings: - Framework enables seizure and confiscation of all property subject to confiscation; but framework not used in practice. - FIU issued ex-parte freezing order once; no funds or assets confiscated under AML/CFT Law/PC at assessment time. - Rights of bona fide third parties not sufficiently protected during seizure/provisional measures. - No mechanisms to freeze without delay pursuant to UNSCR 1267/1373; FIU had not set national UNSCR freezing list and had not ordered freezing under UNSCRs. - Recommendations: - Put in place laws/procedures to freeze without delay funds/assets designated under UNSCR 1267 and UNSCR 1373; establish mechanisms for distribution of UNSCR lists, delisting/unfreezing requests, authorizing access for basic expenses, and third-party protections. - Ensure effective identification, tracing, provisional measures, and confiscation use in ML/TF/predicate crimes. ### Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) — mandate, governance, operations, resources (R.26, R.30) - Legal basis and organization: - Article 20 AML/CFT Law; Presidential Order N.27/01 of 30/05/2011; Order No.119/01 of 09/12/2011; Prime Minister’s Order No.180/03 of 09/12/2011 appointing Advisory Board. - FIU established as law enforcement unit within Rwanda National Police (RNP); Advisory Board chaired by Governor of BNR; Director appointed by Inspector General of RNP. - Core functions (Article 5 of Decree): collect, analyze, disseminate information and investigate ML/TF; propose legal changes; establish indicators; participate in training; coordinate prevention activities. - Operational data and weaknesses: - STRs / declarations: STRs from banks received: 6 (various sections); declarations from Kigali airport: 116 (also referenced 121 declaration forms and RF 714 million recorded Dec 2011–Jan 2012). - Reports disseminated to NPPA: 1. - FIU staff: 12 investigators (RNP) and 2 support staff (total 14) in one section; elsewhere FIU staff reported as 12 investigators and 2 support staff; another section references "13 staff". - Technical gaps: lacks hardware, analytical software, electronic filing, secure storage. - Independence concerns: Director appointed/dismissed within RNP; budget provided by RNP and not regular; Advisory Board membership comprises officials with own reporting lines; staff rotation compromises retention and autonomy. - Confidentiality and data security: STRs stored in hard/soft copies on personal computers; no secure server; STRs sent by normal post, unencrypted email, or phone. - International engagement: contacted Egmont Group to begin membership process but not yet member; had not exchanged information with foreign FIUs at assessment time. - Training and activity: - Some training in 2011: BNR workshops, RNP/BTC forensic accounting course, three–month advanced criminal investigation course; limited AML/CFT-specific analysis training. - FIU disseminated one case to NPPA; other reports unsubstantiated and filed. - Recommendations (R.26 / resources): - Provide comprehensive reporting guidance and forms to all reporting entities (banks already received forms; extend to nonbank FIs and DNFBPs). - Strengthen analytical capacity (analysts with financial background; analytical software/hardware; move from investigations to analysis and timely dissemination). - Secure information systems and establish sustainable, independent FIU budget and governance safeguards. - Publish periodic annual reports, typologies, statistics; consider Egmont Group membership; provide specialized training. ### Preventive measures — Financial institutions (R.4–11, SR.VII) - Scope and CDD framework shortcomings: - Article 10 AML/CFT Law sets CDD triggers but thresholds not set by FIU; Article 10 requires identification "prior to establishing a business relationship" and in specified cases, but law is general and lacks required detail on verification sources, beneficial ownership, legal arrangements. - Article 9(4) prohibits anonymous/fictive accounts for "financial institutions"—text ambiguity as "financial institutions" in law does not include banks, though authorities assert it applies to banks; legal gap remains. - Insurance companies and intermediaries not captured as "reporting entities" in practice—scope limitation repeated. - No obligation to apply CDD for wire transfers per Interpretative Note to SR.VII; FIU had not set threshold for cross-border transfers; Article 6 references originator information but threshold unset. - Beneficial ownership identification weak: Article 14 provides for "economic beneficiary" reporting only where uncertainty persists. - No explicit rules for non-face-to-face business, new technologies, or reliance on third parties (R.8, R.9). - Record-keeping and wire transfers: - Article 17 requires identification and transaction records to be kept for at least ten (10) years; account files not specifically required. - No requirement for ordering financial institutions to obtain/maintain full originator information for wire transfers of EUR/US$1,000 or more; no requirement for verification of originator identity in line with R.5. - In practice, SWIFT used; banks reported system flags for missing originator info, but no statutory monitoring or sanctions post-licensing. - Monitoring, internal controls, STRs: - Article 15 requires attention to complex/unusual transactions but reporting entities not required to keep findings available to authorities/auditors. - Article 19 requires AML/CFT programs but text is general and lacks detail (compliance officer independence, audit function, access to CDD information). - STR regime: Article 21 requires reporting when reasonable grounds to suspect ML/TF, but scope too narrow—does not require reporting of funds linked to individual terrorists/organizations; no explicit obligation to report attempted transactions; only six STRs from banks since FIU operational. - Key numeric findings and indicators: - STRs received from banks: 6. - Cases disseminated to NPPA: 1. - Compliance ratings (summarized from assessment): - R.5 — NC; R.6 — NC; R.7 — NC; R.8 — NC; R.10 — PC; SR.VII — NC; R.13 — NC; R.14 — C; R.15 — PC. - Recommendations: - Extend AML/CFT scope to include insurance companies/intermediaries. - Require reliable independent verification sources, beneficial owner identification, ongoing due diligence, enhanced measures for PEPs, and detailed internal controls/audit and training. - Set thresholds for occasional transactions and cross-border cash and wire transfer originator information (EUR/US$1,000 equivalent) and require transmission of originator data through payment chains. - Establish sanctions and supervisory monitoring post-licensing. ### Designated non‑financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) and other NFBPs (R.12, R.16, R.20, R.24–25) - DNFBPs in scope per Article 3 / Article 12: lawyers (limited carve-out when acting under legal professional privilege), auditors, real estate agents, dealers in high-value goods/precious metals and stones, owners/directors/managers of casinos (owners/directors/managers are reporting entities but casinos as legal persons not included), money transporters, travel agencies, NGOs. - Casino and dealers thresholds: - FIU had not set thresholds required by law (e.g., for casinos and dealers in precious metals/stones); consequently identification obligations not enforceable. - The country’s first (and only) casino had recently become operational; as of mission date there were four real estate companies. - Professional secrecy and legal privilege: - Lawyers/notaries subject to absolute professional secrecy under Criminal Code and Bar regulations; carve-out for reporting is narrow—lawyers acting under professional secrecy are not required to submit STRs for privileged information. - Article 27(3) of AML/CFT Law: protection from proceedings for breach of professional secrecy for good-faith reporters—assessors note uncertainty regarding scope and effectiveness against absolute privilege for lawyers. - Supervision and FIU remit for DNFBPs: - FIU designated to supervise DNFBPs not under any supervisory body (Presidential Order No. 27/2011 Article 13), but had not yet started monitoring/supervising DNFBPs by mission date. - No sectoral SRO guidance for many DNFBP categories; ICPAR oversees accountants but not AML/CFT aspects; Kigali Bar Association oversees advocates but does not monitor AML/CFT compliance. - Implementation and effectiveness: - DNFBPs visited unaware of obligations; no STRs filed by DNFBPs; casino player-tracking did not include customer identification. - R.12 — NC; R.16 — NC; R.24 — NC; R.25 — NC. - Recommendations: - Incorporate casinos as reporting entities; set thresholds for casinos and dealers; ensure DNFBPs subject to R.5–11 measures; provide guidance, outreach, supervisory capacity, and sanctions. ### Supervisory framework, licensing, sanctions, and AML/CFT oversight (R.17, R.23, R.29, R.30) - Competent authorities: - National Bank of Rwanda (BNR): prudential regulator for banks, microfinance, insurance, pension plans, bureaux de change, payment service providers; BNR houses the FIU but was not formally designated AML/CFT supervisor. - Capital Markets Authority (CMA): regulator for securities market; established in June 2011; no AML/CFT inspections conducted to date. - Gaps and findings: - AML/CFT Law does not designate authorities responsible for AML/CFT supervision; neither BNR nor CMA had established legal basis to conduct AML/CFT supervision or performed AML/CFT inspections at assessment time. - BNR onsite inspection manuals focused on prudential risks; limited AML/CFT references; no documentation of AML/CFT inspection work provided. - Staffing figures provided for BNR areas (examples): Banking: Number of Staff 13; Microfinance: Number of Staff 77; Insurance and Pension Funds (NBFIs): Number of Staff 11; but no annual budget allocations provided. - Supervisory resources and AML/CFT training insufficient; BNR and CMA had not provided AML/CFT training to staff. - Sanctions regime: sectoral laws provide powers for prudential/market conduct sanctions but do not extend clearly to AML/CFT; Article 54 AML/CFT Law enables disciplinary/supervisory authority to sanction but lacks detail; tipping-off and certain penalties under AML/CFT Law repealed by 2012 PC. - Money/value transfer services (SR.VI): - Money remitters licensed by BNR; 14 registered money transfer businesses referenced. - Western Union and MoneyGram operate through agency relationships with banks; not licensed or registered as legal entities in Rwanda—supervisory gap. - Supervisory resources for PSPs limited (head of supervision + one other responsible for 14 PSPs). - Recommendations: - Designate competent authority(ies) for AML/CFT supervision; develop formal AML/CFT supervisory framework (offsite/onsite); ensure sanctions that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive for AML/CFT non-compliance; ensure BNR/CMA powers to exchange AML/CFT information domestically/internationally and to compel production of records. - Compliance ratings summarized: - R.17 — NC; R.23 — NC; R.29 — NC; R.30 — NC (resources); R.25 — NC. ### Law enforcement, prosecution, investigative powers, judiciary issues (R.27, R.28, R.36–39) - LEA and NPPA structure: - NPPA: headquarters in Kigali; represented at 12 intermediate levels and 60 primary levels; Economic and Financial Department handles ML-related prosecutions; 16 public prosecutors with national competence; 72 public prosecutors at intermediary levels and 60 at primary levels referenced. - Rwanda National Police (RNP): total force between 8,000 and 10,000 police officers. - FIU and investigations: - FIU is the only authority explicitly designated to investigate ML; in practice FIU conducts investigations and takes witnesses’ statements (221 reference: FIU took witness statements following STRs). - LEAs typically investigate predicate offences without tracing proceeds; ML offense rarely applied in practice. - Powers and limitations: - No legislative power compelling production of documents/information from lawyers (attorney-client privilege absolute in many instances). - Special investigative techniques (Article 26 AML/CFT Law) exist (monitoring accounts, access to systems, wiretap, audio-visual recording, seizure) but not used in practice due to lack of technical/human resources and training. - No formal mechanism to postpone/waive arrest or seizure for evidence-gathering though practice allows deferment; seizure/arrest orders available under CPC Articles 30, 33. - Statistics on predicate offences (as provided): - Terrorism: Received case files 8; Cases handled by prosecutors 3; Submitted cases (to court) 1. - Corruption and related offences: Received 209; Cases handled by prosecutors 116; Submitted cases 19. - Embezzlement of public funds: Received 150; Cases handled by prosecutors 73; Submitted cases 11. - Illicit trafficking in narcotics: Received 3500; Cases handled by prosecutors 2285; Submitted cases 251. - Illicit trafficking in goods and merchandise: Received 111; Cases handled by prosecutors 48; Submitted cases 8. - Trafficking human being: Received 2; Cases handled by prosecutors 0; Submitted cases 0. - Financial fraud: Received 525; Cases handled by prosecutors 192; Submitted cases 30. - Court system: - 12 Intermediate Courts and 60 Primary Courts in the country. - Recommendations: - Appoint and resource dedicated financial investigators at NPPA and RNP (other than FIU). - Grant LEAs powers to compel production from lawyers in cases permitted by standard; ensure investigations trace proceeds and apply special investigative techniques more frequently. - Limit Minister of Justice power to intervene (negative injunction) to strengthen prosecutorial independence. - R.27 — PC; R.28 — PC. ### Cross-border cash movement and SR.IX - Article 7 AML/CFT Law provides for declaration at borders for cash/BNI above threshold to be set by FIU; threshold unset at assessment time. - FIU had drafted cross-border cash declaration directive proposing US$10,000 threshold; pilot at Kigali airport resulted in 121 declaration forms and around RF 714 million recorded in Dec 2011–Jan 2012 (one section references 116 declarations received at Kigali airport). - Legal loopholes and shortcomings: - Exemption for funds certified by withdrawal slip from accredited banks not in line with SR.IX. - No powers for customs to request further origin/use information or to stop/restrain cash/BNI for reasonable time. - No definition of "bearer negotiable instruments." - SR.IX rating: NC. - Recommendations: Implement SR.IX features (threshold, definitions, powers to stop/restrain, sanctions, cargo/mail coverage, record retention). ### International cooperation, MLA, extradition, and mutual assistance (R.36–40, SR.V) - AML/CFT Law Chapter IV provisions (Articles 28–46) provide framework for MLA, extradition, freezing/seizure/confiscation cooperation, transmission, contents and processing of requests. - Practical experience limited: - Two MLA requests received in ML context (from Switzerland and Belgium); authorities responded via rogatory commission; little practical experience otherwise. - Authorities may use domestic powers to respond to requests; no established practice coordinating seizure/confiscation with other countries. - Extradition: Article 35 AML/CFT Law provides extradition for ML/TF but extradition only available for persons convicted of ML/TF, not persons charged and pending trial; Constitution Article 26 prohibits extradition of Rwandan nationals. - Key issues and recommendations: - Lack of mechanism to determine best venue for prosecution in cross-border cases. - Broader legal privilege (lawyers) impedes obtaining information requested by foreign states in some cases; recommend ensure information held by lawyers may be obtained in circumstances envisaged by standard. - R.36 — PC; R.37 — LC; R.38 — PC; SR.V — PC. - Recommend establish framework to freeze/seize/confiscate and share proceeds of predicate offences in response to foreign requests; ensure extradition availability for persons charged and pending trial; ensure nationals convicted abroad subject to prosecution in Rwanda when extradition refused. ### Nonprofit organizations (SR.VIII) - Legal framework: Law N°04/2012 (national NGOs), Law N°05/2012 (international NGOs), Law N°06/2012 (religious NGOs); RGB registers/monitors national and religious NGOs; Directorate General of Immigration and Emigration registers international NGOs. - Findings: - No comprehensive domestic review of NPO sector to identify types at risk of TF; implementing regulations not yet issued. - Re-registration underway; 338 national NGOs registered; 468 religious NGOs; 156 international NGOs reported (Table entries). - Laws do not require collection/public availability of identity of persons who own, control or direct NPO activities nor require retention of transaction records for at least five (5) years in line with SR.VIII. - Supervision/monitoring inadequate; outreach on TF risks not targeted to NPOs. - SR.VIII rating: PC. - Recommendations: conduct sector review, outreach, monitor large/internationally active NPOs, require record retention for at least five (5) years, ensure access to ownership/control information. ### Financial sector structure and selected statistics - Banking and sector depth: - Banking sector assets as of Sept 2010: RF 644 billion (about 60 percent of total financial system assets). - Ratio of private sector credit to GDP increased six-fold to 12 percent of GDP. - Bank assets to GDP ratio: 19.7 percent (shallow banking sector). - Banking indicators (Solvency ratio total capital): 21.0 (Dec 2009), 24.4 (Dec 2010), 27.2 (Dec 2011). - NPLs/Gross loans: 11.9 / 10.8 / 8.0 (Dec 2009 / Dec 2010 / Dec 2011). - Return on average assets: 1.0 / 2.0 / 2.2 (Dec 2009 / Dec 2010 / Dec 2011). - Forex exposure/core capital: 0.9 / 5.0 / 6.6 (Dec 2009 / Dec 2010 / Dec 2011). - Microfinance sector (Table 2, RF billion): - Total assets: 43 (Dec 2010); 48.2 (Dec 2011). - Gross loans: 32.3 (Dec 2010); 37.8 (Dec 2011). - NPL rate: 11% (Dec 2010); 11.3% (Dec 2011). - Capital adequacy ratio (solvency): 34.5% (Dec 2010); 31.7% (Dec 2011). - Insurance indicators (Table 3, RF billions / per cent): - Total assets: 128.2 (Dec 2010); 143.7 (Dec 2011). - Total gross premiums: 50 (Dec 2010); 60.2 (Dec 2011). - Underwriting profit: 7.1 (Dec 2010); 11.9 (Dec 2011). - Return on equity (ROE) per cent: 17 (Dec 2010); 18.5 (Dec 2011). - Insurance penetration about 2.3 percent. - Financial sector institutions (selected counts): - Commercial banks: 9 (number of institutions). - Life insurance companies and occupational pension funds: 2. - Savings institutions: 416. - Foreign exchange bureaus: 97 (as of June 2012). - Securities intermediaries members of Stock Exchange: 7 (as of June 2012). - Money transfer service providers independently authorized: 14 (at assessment). ### Aggregate recommendations (selected, preserved phrasing and numeric precision where present) - Criminalization and legal clarity: - Ensure concealment/disguise of movement of property constitutes ML; clarify prior conviction not necessary; enable inference of intention from objective circumstances. - Criminalize provision and collection of funds to individual terrorists and terrorist organizations. - FIU capacity and governance: - Provide comprehensive reporting guidance and forms to all reporting entities; strengthen FIU analysis capacity; secure systems; ensure operational independence; publish annual reports and typologies; seek Egmont membership. - Preventive regime and supervision: - Extend AML/CFT scope to cover insurance companies/intermediaries, include trust/CSPs once law in force; require full CDD, beneficial ownership identification, ongoing due diligence, PEP measures and wire transfer originator information (EUR/US$1,000 threshold equivalent). - Designate competent AML/CFT supervisors (BNR/CMA or others), develop formal supervisory framework with offsite/onsite examination, ensure adequate staffing/resources and AML/CFT training. - Introduce effective, proportionate sanctions for AML/CFT non-compliance across sectors. - LEAs and prosecutions: - Appoint dedicated financial investigators at NPPA and RNP; increase use of special investigative techniques; grant powers to compel production of documents (including measures to address legal privilege consistent with international standards); ensure prosecution of nationals convicted abroad when extradition refused. - Cross-border and international cooperation: - Implement SR.III and SR.IX mechanisms; establish procedures for UNSCR freezing/delisting/unfreezing; ensure cross-border ML/TF cooperation, MLA, and extradition procedures operate effectively and timely. - DNFBPs and NPOs: - Bring casinos and applicable DNFBPs fully within reporting entity definitions; set thresholds; strengthen supervision, guidance, and sanctions; conduct NPO sector risk assessment and ensure record-keeping for five (5) years where required. *Source: Preface to the IMF AML/CFT assessment report for Rwanda.* ### Preface ................................................................................................................ ### Preface ### Scope and Standards Applied - Assessment based on the Forty Recommendations 2003 and the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing 2001 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). - Prepared using the AML/CFT Assessment Methodology 2004, as updated. - Report provides a summary of AML/CFT measures in place in Rwanda at the time of the mission or shortly thereafter, describes and analyzes those measures, sets out Rwanda’s levels of compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations (see Table 1), and provides recommendations to strengthen the system (see Table 2). ### Mission and Evidence Base - Assessment considered: - All materials supplied by the authorities. - Information obtained on site during the mission from June 4 to 14, 2012. - Other verifiable information subsequently provided by the authorities. - During the mission, the assessment team met with officials and representatives of all relevant government agencies and the private sector. ### Assessment Team - Conducted by a team of assessors composed of staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). - Evaluation team members: - Nadine Schwarz (LEG, team leader) - Francisco Figueroa (LEG) - Carolina Claver (LEG) - Chady El Khoury (LEG) ### Areas Reviewed - Institutional framework. - Relevant AML/CFT laws, regulations, guidelines, and other requirements. - Regulatory and other systems to deter and punish money laundering (ML) and financing of terrorism (FT) through financial institutions and Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs). - Capacity, implementation, and effectiveness of the systems. ### Publication, Presentation, and Endorsement - Report produced by the IMF as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) of Rwanda. - Presented to the ESAAMLG Task Force of Senior Officials Meeting in Luanda, Angola, September 1–5, 2014. - Endorsed by this organization on its plenary meeting of September 3, 2014. ### Acknowledgment - Assessors expressed gratitude to the Rwandan authorities for their cooperation throughout the assessment mission. *Source: Preface to the IMF AML/CFT assessment report for Rwanda.* ### 1. Rwanda has taken considerable steps over the last years to establish a national AML/CFT ### _cr15221 - 1. Rwanda has taken considerable steps over the last years to establish a national AML/CFT framework ### Overview and key findings - Rwanda enacted the law on prevention and penalizing the crime of money laundering and financing terrorism (Law No. 47/2008 of 09/09/2008, the AML/CFT Law) in 2008. - A financial intelligence unit (FIU) was established in 2011 and became operational shortly before this assessment. - The AML/CFT framework remains unfamiliar to most relevant authorities and reporting entities; more efforts are needed to raise awareness on prevention and detection of money laundering and terrorist financing. - Rwanda’s financial sector is small and mainly dominated by banks; authorities have modernized the sector and aim to attract foreign investors. - While risks of money laundering and terrorist financing do not appear to be particularly significant in Rwanda, further action is required to: - bolster the legal framework; - improve implementation; - strengthen overall supervision of reporting entities within the financial sector; and - mitigate potential domestic and cross-border risks. ### Legal systems and related institutional measures - Money laundering: - Money laundering is criminalized in a way that largely meets the standard, but wording is somewhat ambiguous. - Authorities indicate a prior conviction for the predicate offense is necessary to secure a conviction for money laundering, although this is not specifically required in the law. - Seizure and confiscation: - Framework enables seizure and confiscation of all property subject to confiscation under the standard, providing tools to remove property from criminals' hands. - The framework has not been used in practice. - Rights of bona fide third parties are not sufficiently protected in cases of seizure. - Terrorist financing: - Amendments to the Penal Code enhanced the legal framework to fight terrorism and its financing. - Terrorist financing is criminalized as an autonomous offense, but does not cover the provision and collection of funds from individual terrorists and terrorist organizations. - There are no measures to freeze without delay funds or other assets of terrorists, those who finance terrorism, and terrorist organizations in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), except for a few letters sent by the Central Bank to banks to immediately freeze the accounts of individuals listed by the United States. - Institutions and operational independence: - Authorities competent in analysis and investigation of money laundering, predicate crimes, and financing of terrorism have been established. - The FIU was established within the National Police; its core functions and independence need further strengthening. - Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) should be more proactive in tracing illicit funds while investigating predicate crimes. - Delineation of powers and roles between the FIU and other LEAs should be clearer, with the FIU focusing on analysis of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) and other LEAs conducting financing investigations. - Cross-border cash/bearer negotiable instruments: - A declaration system was introduced but is not fully in line with the standard and is not being implemented. ### Preventive measures — Financial institutions - AML/CFT Law obligations: - Imposes basic identification, monitoring, and record keeping requirements on a number of financial institutions, providing a sound basis for a preventive framework. - Obligations lack necessary level of detail to be effective, notably with respect to the beneficial owner (i.e., the person who ultimately owns or controls the assets held or the customer). - Do not address all elements of an adequate customer due diligence (CDD) process. - General obligation for financial institutions to develop and maintain internal controls is not sufficiently clear to be implemented. - Scope and gaps: - Preventive measures apply to all “reporting entities,” which in Rwanda do not include insurance companies and intermediaries. - No additional requirements exist for cross-border banking and similar relationships. - Measures for non-face-to-face transactions and new technologies, record keeping, and wire transfers are weak. - Reporting obligations: - All financial institutions other than insurance companies and intermediaries are required to report to the FIU transactions they suspect constitute or are linked to money laundering or terrorist financing. - Financial institutions are not required to report attempted transactions or transactions that appear to be linked or related to individual terrorists. - Because the money laundering offense does not apply to all designated predicate offenses, the scope of the reporting requirement is materially too narrow. - Supervision: - Financial institutions are not subject to adequate, timely, and effective AML/CFT supervision. - The National Bank of Rwanda and the Capital Markets Authority maintain that their functions include monitoring AML/CFT compliance and sanctioning non-compliance, but they have not conducted AML/CFT inspections and could not establish the legal basis for conducting AML/CFT supervision. ### Preventive measures — Designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) - Most DNFBPs active in Rwanda are subject to the same AML/CFT preventive measures obligations as financial institutions, but do not appear to be implementing them. - The Law applies to all DNFBPs with the exception of casinos—the owners, directors, and managers of which are subject to the AML/CFT Law—but not to casinos as separate legal entities. - Company formation services are provided by lawyers, accountants, and real estate agents, all subject to the AML/CFT Law. - No trust-related services appeared to be provided in Rwanda at the time, but a new law enabling establishment of Rwandan trusts was expected to come into force and require trust-related services in the future. ### Legal persons, arrangements, and nonprofit organizations (NPOs) - Company registration: - Authorities have established a modern central registration system capturing basic information on companies and businesses created in the country. - Information is easily accessible by authorities and the public, but is not necessarily up to date or verified and does not seek to establish beneficial ownership of legal entities incorporated in Rwanda. - Law enforcement authorities may obtain additional information from legal entities themselves, but legal entities have no obligation to maintain up-to-date information on their beneficial owners. - NPO framework: - Rwanda has sought to set a legal framework supporting allocation and facilitation of local and international NPOs. - Ratified norms include the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of December 16, 1966, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of June 27, 1981, and Law N. 20/2000 of July 26, 2000 related to nonprofit making organizations. - So far, 178 international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been registered and engage in domains such as health, education, social assistance, capacity building, microfinance, and sports. ### National and international cooperation - Coordination and cooperation: - No mechanism exists to ensure cooperation among relevant authorities or coordination of development and implementation of the AML/CFT framework. - In practice, bilateral communication occurs sporadically between some authorities. - Mutual legal assistance and extradition: - Legal framework for mutual legal assistance and extradition allows a broad range of measures on behalf of a foreign State, but apply only to fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, not to combating predicate offenses. - Extradition may only be granted for persons who have been convicted of money laundering or terrorist financing, and not for persons charged and pending trial. - No mechanism exists to ensure that Rwandan nationals (who may not be extradited) are prosecuted in Rwanda. - In practice, the framework for international cooperation has rarely been put to the test and practical implementation issues remain unclear. ### General information on Rwanda (selected socio-economic facts) - Geography and demography: - Rwanda is landlocked in central Africa, bordered by Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). - Total surface area is 26,338 square kilometers. - Altitude ranges from 1,000 to 4,500 meters above sea level. - Population: about 11,700,000 inhabitants, as of 2012. - Life expectancy: just above 58 years. - Economy: - Per capita GDP (PPP) estimated at $1,284 in 2011, compared with $416 in 1994. - Agriculture grew by a moderate 3.0 percent during the first three quarters of 2012 due to unfavorable weather conditions. - Export sector increased by 24.8 percent in 2012, boosted by diversification of markets for tea and minerals, particularly coltan. - Growth has averaged about 8 percent a year and is projected to be in the range of 7.5–8 percent for 2012 and 2013. - Poverty: 57 percent of the population living below the national poverty line in 2006. - Rwanda remains highly dependent on grants from Development Partners: about 40 percent of the budget is financed by grants, adding up to 11.0 percent of GDP in 2010–2011. - Governance and legal system: - Current Constitution adopted by referendum in June 2003; legislative power vested in Parliament with two chambers: Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. - President is head of State, elected every seven years; at time of assessment, incumbent President was Paul Kagame, who took office in 2000. - Judiciary restructured in 2004; hierarchy: Supreme Court, High Courts, Intermediate Courts, Primary Court, and mediation committees. - Gacaca courts were used for transitional justice and ended shortly after the assessors’ onsite visit. *Italic: IMF staff assessment excerpt from the provided source content.* ### 35. There are 12 Intermediate Courts, and 60 Primary Courts in the country. ### _cr15221 - 35. There are 12 Intermediate Courts, and 60 Primary Courts in the country. ### Judiciary and Specialized Courts - There are 12 Intermediate Courts, and 60 Primary Courts in the country. - Specialized Courts: - Gacaca Courts: - From 2001 to 2012, responsible for the trial and judgment of cases against persons accused of the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity, committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, except cases whose jurisdiction is vested in other courts. - Military courts: - Comprise the Military Tribunal and the Military High Court. - The Military Court tries in the first instance all offenses committed by military personnel, irrespective of their rank. - The Military High Court shall try in the first instance all offenses that constitute a threat to national security and murder committed by soldiers, irrespective of rank. - The Military High Court is an appellate court in respect of decisions rendered by the Military Tribunal. - Note: Shortly after the onsite mission, the commercial tribunal and commercial high court were established by the Organic Law No 06/2012/OL of September 14, 2012, determining the organization, functioning, and jurisdictions of commercial courts. ### Transparency, Good Governance, and Anti-Corruption Framework - World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators: - Control of corruption and rule of law have experienced a steady increase during the last 10 years. - Transparency indicator ranking: currently ranked forty-ninth out of 183 jurisdictions; six years earlier ranked eighty-third out of 158. - Legal framework: - Rwandan Law No. 23/2003 of August 7, 2003 on the Prevention, Suppression, and Punishment of Corruption and Related Offences imposes fines and imprisonment on those convicted of corruption. - Modified and complemented by Law No. 17/2005 of August 18, 2005, which established the Office of the Ombudsman; responsibilities include listing and publishing the names of persons convicted for corruption and related offenses. ### General Situation of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (ML/TF) - Structural factors and perceived risks: - Mainly rural economy, offering limited opportunities for crime that could generate substantial proceeds. - Authorities did not provide estimates of relative volumes of predicate crimes; amounts generated by crime described as relatively low across predicates. - Government implements effective anti-crime and anti-corruption policies; major proceeds-generating crimes appear to be controlled. - Proceeds of foreign crimes are not generally found in Rwanda, per authorities. - Ongoing threats from rebels in the DRC → relatively large standing army and domestic police on the border; authorities claim these forces make borders relatively secure against unlawful entry and smuggling. - Foreign exchange controls and a small financial sector reduce attractiveness for laundering proceeds of foreign crimes. - Assessment team findings and recommendations: - No evidence found that money laundering was a significant problem in Rwanda, but risk of laundering both domestic and neighboring countries’ criminal proceeds is relatively small but not negligible. - Domestic predicate crimes generating proceeds include trafficking in narcotics and corruption, embezzlement of public funds, and illicit trafficking in goods and merchandise. - Authorities’ action focuses on predicate crimes; laundering activities resulting from these crimes have not been investigated and sanctioned. - No evidence that terrorist financing is a major concern; one case of terrorist financing investigated (results not disclosed to the team). - Recommendation: authorities are strongly recommended to conduct a national risk assessment, taking into account all available information, including press reports, law enforcement information, and intelligence assessments. - Legal and institutional developments: - March 2009: Law on the “Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism” passed. - Establishes a legislative framework that meets the main obligations of the FATF standard, but lacks the necessary level of detail. - At the time of the assessment, implementation was ongoing; key elements such as the establishment of an FIU had only recently been undertaken. - Awareness of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT Law requirements was relatively low across competent authorities and reporting entities. - As a result, no cases of potential money laundering had been brought before the courts. - One case of potential terrorist financing had been investigated and was pending before the High Court at the time of the assessment. ### Overview of the Financial Sector - Sector structure and depth: - The Rwandan financial sector is small and dominated by eight commercial banks. - Financial sector transitioning toward a more modern, competitive, open, and inclusive system. - Financial Sector Development Plan and reforms noted in 2011 FSAP. - Ratio of private sector credit to GDP increased six-fold to 12 percent of GDP. - Among the EAC, Rwanda has the lowest financial market depth as measured by either the ratio of private sector credit to GDP or bank deposits to GDP. - Survey results: some 80 percent of the population, mostly in rural areas, does not have formal access to financial products. - Authorities granted licenses to some 400 Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) to operate as deposit-taking institutions, with a view to granting lending licenses as well. - As of September 2010, total assets of the banking sector accounted for about RF 644 billion or 60 percent of total assets in the financial system. - MFIs and Old SACCOs and Umurenge SACCOs numbered 109 and 416 institutions, respectively; no financial information available supporting total assets within the Umurenge SACCOs. - Total assets for MFIs and Old SACCOs accounted for another eight percent of total assets in the financial system. - Banking and nonbanking institutions: - At the time of the assessment, Rwanda had nine commercial banks, one development bank (that merged with the mortgage financing bank in 2011), three microfinance banks, and one cooperative bank. - The financial services sector is small; banking sector controls over 73 percent of total financial sector assets. - Rwanda has a shallow banking sector with a ratio of bank assets to GDP of only 19.7 percent. - Banking indicators (Table 1: Indicators December 2009 / December 2010 / December 2011): - Solvency ratio (total capital): 21.0 24.4 27.2 - NPLs/Gross loans: 11.9 10.8 8.0 - NPLs Net / Gross loans: 10.0 9.3 7.0 - Return on average assets: 1.0 2.0 2.2 - Return on average equity: 5.5 11.2 10.6 - Cost of deposits: 2.3 2.7 2.4 - Liquid assets/total deposits: 68.1 58.2 45.3 - Forex exposure/core capital: 0.9 5.0 6.6 ### Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) - December 2011 developments: - Total assets of the microfinance sector increased by 12 percent. - Gross loans increased by 17 percent; deposits increased by 4 percent. - In 2011, two MFIs were upgraded to microfinance banks. - MFIs serve 8 percent of depositors and 90 percent of borrowers. - Microfinance indicators (Table 2: in RF billion; December 2010 / December 2011): - Total assets: 43 48.2 - Gross loans: 32.3 37.8 - Non-performing loans: 3.6 4.2 - Deposits: 23 24 - Equity: 14.9 15.3 - NPL rate: 11% 11.3% - Liquidity ratio: 55.5% 56.9% - Capital adequacy ratio (solvency): 34.5% 31.7% ### Payment Services, Forex, Securities, and Insurance - Money transfer services: - Allowed through licensed banks (e.g., MoneyGram and Western Union) or independently. - At the time of the assessment, 14 money transfer service providers were authorized to operate independently. - Foreign Exchange (Forex) Dealers: - As of June 2012, there were 97 forex bureaus in the system. - Securities: - As of June 2012, there were seven securities intermediaries members of Rwanda’s Stock Exchange. - The CMA has licensed eight securities intermediaries who are operational in Rwanda. - Insurance sector: - Small sector; at the time of the assessment, two insurance companies were providing life insurance. - There were eight insurers (six private and two public), five insurance brokers, and 102 insurance agents. - Insurance penetration about 2.3 percent. - Total assets, gross premiums, and profits increased; sector performance improving progressively. - Insurance indicators (Table 3: in RF billions; Dec. 2010 / Dec. 2011): - Total assets: 128.2 143.7 - Total capital: 85 94.9 - Total gross premiums: 50 60.2 - Underwriting profit: 7.1 11.9 - Total net profit: 16 21.4 - Claims ratio in per cent: 44 41.9 - Combined ratio in per cent: 81 78 - Current ratio (per cent): 272 242.9 - Return on equity ratio (ROE) in per cent: 17 18.5 - Return on assets ratio (ROA) in per cent: 11 11.8 ### Financial Sector Structure (Selected Statistics) - Statistical Table 1 (Structure of Financial Sector) — selected entries: - Commercial banks: Number of Institutions 9; Total Assets ($ million) — RF 644 billion noted elsewhere; Authorized/Registered and Supervised by: RDB/BNR - Life insurance companies and occupational pension funds: 2; RDB/BNR - Company pension funds: 1; BNR - Insurance brokers: 5; BNR - Savings institutions: 416; RCA/BNR - Foreign exchange: 97; RDB/BNR - According to the authorities, commercial banks, mortgage banks, life insurance companies, and investment companies established in Rwanda did not have branches or subsidiaries abroad. ### Financial Activities and Supervisory Responsibilities (Statistical Table 2) - Examples of mappings (activity → type of institution → AML/CFT regulator and supervisor): - Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public → Banks → BNR - Lending (including consumer credit; mortgage credit; factoring) → Banks; Credit card companies; Factoring and finance/consumer credit → BNR - The transfer of money or value → Banks; Money remitters → BNR - Issuing and managing means of payment → Banks; Credit card companies; Electronic money institutions → BNR - Trading in foreign exchange → Banks → BNR - Participation in securities issues → Banks; Investment companies → BNR; CMA - Underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment related insurance → Life insurance companies; Lateral pension funds; Life insurance agents and brokers → BNR ### Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) - Under Article 3 of the AML/CFT Law, reporting entities include: - Members of the private legal practice when they represent or assist their clients outside of a judicial in specific circumstances; - Auditors; - Real estate agents; - Traders in items of significant value, such as works of art (paintings, masks, and precious stones and metals); - Owners, directors and managers of casinos and gambling halls, including national lotteries. - FIU supervision: - May 2011: FIU designated to check if reporting entities not under any supervisory body fulfill obligations set out in the AML/CFT Law (Article 13 of the Presidential Order No. 27/01 of May 30, 2011). - Since designation, all DNFBP categories under the AML/CFT Law fall under FIU supervision. - As of the mission date, the FIU had not started monitoring or supervising DNFBPs’ implementation of AML/CFT obligations. ### Dealers, Legal Professionals, and Accountants - Dealers in precious metals and precious stones: - Rwanda produces some precious stones, such as coltan, wolfram, and castrate; no estimates provided on the size of production. - The country produces no precious metals or gems; no significant retail jewelry sector apparent. - Lawyers and Notaries: - Legal profession consists of lawyers and notaries. - Advocates primarily advise on litigation and do not typically serve in an investment advisory capacity or act as financial intermediaries. - Notaries are state employees based at district and sector levels; activities generally restricted to legal documentation and do not include acting as financial intermediaries. - As of the mission date, there were 738 lawyers and 479 public notaries. - Accountants: - As of the mission date, there were 289 registered Certified Public Accountants (CPAs), 124 registered Certified Accounting Technicians (CATs), 36 Practitioners, and 32 Audit Firms. - The Rwandan accounting sector is very small and primarily limited to providing accounting services. *Source: _cr15221 - 35. There are 12 Intermediate Courts, and 60 Primary Courts in the country.* ### 59. The country’s first (and only) casino has recently become operational. Real estate agents are ### _cr15221 - 59. The country’s first (and only) casino has recently become operational. Real estate agents are ### Gambling, real estate, and company formation - The country’s first (and only) casino has recently become operational. - Real estate agents are organized in associations and registered by the Rwanda Development Board (RDB). - As of the mission date, there were four real estate companies. - There are no trust and CSPs operating in Rwanda; company formation services are typically rendered by lawyers, real estate agents, or accountants. - Under Law No. 58/2011, lottery, casinos, gaming machines, sport books, and an internet gaming are regulated gambling activities. ### Central registration and beneficial ownership - Rwanda has a central registration system that provides basic information on companies at incorporation but does not include information on beneficial ownership. - Additional information on companies, cooperatives, and NGOs may be obtained by law enforcement from the legal entity itself, but there is no legal guarantee that such information will be up to date or will pertain to beneficial ownership. ### AML/CFT strategy and priorities - The BNR and the FIU are highly engaged in protecting the financial system from money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) risks. - There is no national AML/CFT strategy or priorities identifying specific objectives or government measures to combat ML and TF. - The intention is for the newly established FIU to take the lead in the country’s AML/CFT strategy. ### Institutional framework: coordination bodies - FIU Advisory Board: - The FIU is located at the central bank premises but is part of the Rwanda National Police. - The FIU is organized into two administrative areas: the Advisory Board and the Management. - The FIU Advisory Board comprises a Chairperson (the Governor of the BNR), a Vice Chairperson, five other members, and the Director of the FIU. - These individuals are appointed by a Prime Minister’s Order upon request from the Minister in charge of Internal Security. - FIU Advisory Board responsibilities include: - Proposing measures to enable the FIU to fulfill its mission; - Updating legislation relating to the fight against money laundering and financing of terrorism; - Establishing internal rules and regulations of the FIU; - Proposing agreements with other FIUs; - Monitoring and evaluating FIU achievements to assess adequacy of measures or modify them; - Giving a quarterly (or any time deemed necessary) report to the Minister in charge of Internal Security. - Ministry of the Internal Security: - Composed of the Rwanda National Police and the Rwanda Correctional Service. - Economic and financial crimes are investigated by the Crime Investigation Department (CID); ML and TF cases are investigated by the FIU; terrorist acts by the Anti Terrorist Unit. - Ministry of Justice: - Responsible for legislation and monitoring public notaries. - Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM): - Responsible for licensing and regulating lawful gambling under Law No. 58/2011. - Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Cooperation: - Responsible for negotiation and implementation of conventions and for transmission of UNSCR lists to the Ministry of Justice which forwards them to the National Police. ### Law enforcement, criminal justice, and operational agencies - National Public Prosecutor Authority (NPPA): - Responsible for prosecution of criminal offenses in Rwanda. - Headquarters in Kigali; represented at 12 intermediate levels and 60 primary levels. - A specialized unit at headquarters investigates and prosecutes economic and financial crimes, including ML and related offenses. - The Prosecutor General is assisted by his deputy, 16 public prosecutors with national competence, and 5 inspectors. - There are 72 public prosecutors at the intermediary levels and 60 prosecutors at primary levels. - NPPA has the Economic and Financial Department responsible for ML cases. - Rwanda National Police: - Responsible for maintenance of law and order and public security; monopoly over preliminary investigations. - Judicial Police conduct investigations under NPPA supervision. - Organized nationally and headed by an Inspector General. - The total force numbers between 8,000 and 10,000 police officers. - Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA): - Established pursuant to Law No. 08/2009 of 27/04/2009. - Participates in setting taxes and is responsible for collecting, controlling, and managing taxes. - The Investigation Department conducts investigations into tax evasion and tax fraud and has judicial powers to investigate in cooperation with customs agents. - Rwanda Governance Board (RGB): - Promotes good governance. - Holds the commercial register for legal persons and registers/monitors local NGOs and religious organizations. - FIU: - A law enforcement (police) unit established pursuant to Presidential Order No. 27/01 of May 30, 2011 and became operational shortly before this assessment. - The FIU is also the regulator and designated competent supervisory authority, pursuant to Presidential Order No. 27/2011, for compliance with AML/CFT obligations for all DNFBPs without an established supervisory authority (including lawyers, notaries, accountants, real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones, currency transporters, casino owners, directors and managers, travel agencies, and nongovernmental organizations). ### Financial sector and DNFBP bodies - Rwanda National Bank (BNR): - Prudential regulator of banks, microfinance, insurance companies and agents, pension plans, bureaux de change, and payment system/services providers. - The BNR was not designated to supervise these persons and entities for AML/CFT purposes. - The BNR houses the FIU. - Capital Markets Authority (CMA): - Established in June 2011; regulator of brokers, dealers, sponsors, investment advisers, investment banks, investment managers, custodians, securities exchange, clearing house, and credit rating agency. - Kigali Bar Association (KBA): - Self-regulatory organization overseeing practicing advocates (lawyers) and accountants; these professionals are subject to KBA oversight. - Institute of Chartered Public Accountants of Rwanda (ICPAR): - Oversees accounting professionals, but this oversight does not include AML/CFT-related issues. - Real Estate Agents: - There is no self-regulatory organization for real estate agents. - Company service providers: - Company services may be provided by lawyers, accountants, and real estate agents. ### Approach to risk and recent progress - Rwanda has not adopted an overall risk-based approach in its AML/CFT framework. - Authorities have not conducted an overall assessment of potential ML and TF risks in Rwanda. - The current AML/CFT legal and supervisory framework was developed without considering Rwanda’s money laundering and terrorist financing risks. - Both the BNR and the CMA were at a very early stage of implementation of AML/CFT matters at the time of the onsite visit; some AML/CFT Regulations were drafted but not shared with the mission. - Progress since the previous assessment: - Rwanda underwent a World Bank assessment of its AML/CFT framework in 2005 but did not agree to publication of the detailed assessment report. - Since 2005, Rwanda enacted the Prevention and Penalizing the Crime of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism Law No. 4/2008 (the AML/CFT Law) in 2008, and established an FIU through Presidential Order No. 27/01 of May 2011. ### Legal framework and criminalization of money laundering - Key laws: - Law No 47/ 2008 of 09/09/2008 on prevention and penalizing the crime of money laundering and the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT Law). - Organic Law No 01/2012/OL of 02/05/2012 instituting the Penal Code (PC). - Law No 45/2008 of 09/09/2008 on Counter Terrorism (CT law). - The legal framework criminalizes ML and TF, establishes provisional measures, allows for confiscation, and sets a basic framework for international cooperation. - The current PC came into force in June 2012 and repealed the prior Penal Code (Decree-Law No 21/77 of August 18, 1977) and any prior legal provision contradicting it (Article 765). - Money laundering is criminalized under Article 652 of the PC and Article 2 of the AML/CFT Law; sanctions are set out in Article 654 of the PC (and in the AML/CFT Law). - Article 652 (money laundering acts) includes: - conversion, transfer or handling of property known to be derived from a misdemeanor or a felony to conceal or disguise illicit origin; - assisting any person involved to escape justice; - concealment or disguise of true nature, origin, location, disposition, donation, rights with respect to or ownership of property known to be derived from felony or misdemeanor crimes; - acquisition, possession or use of property knowing at the time of receipt it is derived from felony or misdemeanor crimes; - participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit, aiding, inciting, abetting, facilitating or counseling the commission of any of the acts set forth. - Article 652 provides that ML is committed “even if the original acts leading to the acquisition, disposition or transfer of the property to be laundered or the protection of the offender are carried out in the territory of a third State.” - The definition of “property” is in Article 2.9 of the AML/CFT Law: “an asset of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, as well as legal documents or instruments evidencing the existence of a right to, or interest in an asset.” - The term “proceed” is defined in Article 2.8 of the AML/CFT Law as “property which directly or indirectly is derived from the offence.” - There is no judicial experience sanctioning money laundering to date; money laundering has not been sanctioned by the courts. - One case of terrorist financing has been investigated and prosecuted as an ancillary offense to terrorism under the CT law rather than as an autonomous offense under the AML/CFT Law. - Proving that property is proceeds of crime: - Neither the PC nor the AML/CFT Law addresses whether a prior conviction is needed to secure a conviction for ML. - No case law exists to clarify the type or level of proof required. - NPPA representatives indicated Article 119 of the Law on evidences provides prosecutors may provide evidence by any means, but prosecutors and judges would, in their opinion, find it very difficult to convict without a conviction for the predicate crime. - Scope of predicate offenses: - The PC adopts an all-crimes approach by referring to property “derived from a misdemeanor or a felony.” - The AML/CFT Law specifies listed offenses in its Article 5, but the PC (as an organic law) prevails where it conflicts with the AML/CFT Law. - A table in the source lists predicate offenses and relevant Penal Code articles for a broad set of crimes (organized criminal group, terrorism and terrorist financing, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, illicit trafficking in stolen goods, corruption and bribery, fraud, counterfeiting currency, counterfeiting and piracy of products, environmental crime, murder and grievous bodily injury, kidnapping and hostage-taking, robbery or theft, smuggling, extortion, forgery, piracy, insider trading and market manipulation). *Source: IMF staff country report excerpt provided in the content unit.* ### 96. The PC adopts an all crimes approach to money laundering by referring, in the offense, to ### _cr15221 - 96. The PC adopts an all crimes approach to money laundering by referring, in the offense, to ### Scope of the money laundering (ML) offense - The PC adopts an "all crimes" approach by referring to property “derived from a misdemeanor or a felony.” - Articles 22 and 23 of the PC define: - felony: an offense punishable under the law by a main penalty of an imprisonment of more than five years; - misdemeanor: an offense punishable under the law by a main penalty of an imprisonment of six months to five years. ### Extraterritorially committed predicate offenses (c. 1.5) - Last paragraph of Article 652 of the PC: “ML is committed even if the original acts leading to the acquisition, disposition or transfer of the property to be laundered or the protection of the offender, are carried out on the territory of a third State.” - Text is limitative (does not extend to all paragraphs) but authorities interpret it broadly (including “acts leading to (...) the protection of the offender”) and apply it to all activities that may constitute ML. ### Laundering one’s own illicit funds (c. 1.6) - AML/CFT Law and the PC make no distinction between self-laundering and third-party laundering. - Authorities state no fundamental legal principle prohibits prosecuting and convicting a person who committed both the predicate and the ML offenses. - In the absence of case law, it is unclear whether prosecutors and judges will apply the ML offense to the perpetrator of the predicate offense. - Footnote: According to the authorities, following the assessment, one person was convicted for self-laundering. ### Ancillary offenses (c. 1.7) - Article 652.d of the PC: participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit, aiding, inciting, abetting, facilitating or counseling the commission of any of the acts set forth in the definition of money laundering also constitute the money laundering offense. ### Additional element — acts overseas that are not offenses overseas (c. 1.8) - Article 652 of the PC and Article 2 paragraph 1 (last sentence) of the AML/CFT Law provide that the ML offense may be committed when the “original acts” are committed abroad. - Wording does not require criminalization in the third country as a condition for application; thus it meets this additional element. ### Liability of natural and legal persons (c. 2.1–2.4) - Article 652 of the PC: ML offense applies to those who intentionally engage in one or more ML activities, knowing such property is derived from a felony or misdemeanor or from an act of participation in such offenses. - Authorities explained prosecutors would have to establish that the perpetrator knew the property derives from a felony or misdemeanor (general knowledge of underlying criminal source). - In absence of case law, authorities view that judges would not be satisfied that the perpetrator knew the property was illicit unless a prior conviction for the predicate crime proves knowledge; objective factual circumstances would most probably not be enough to secure a conviction. - Article 656 of the PC recognizes criminal liability of legal persons for several offenses, including money laundering. - Articles 131, 132, and 138 of the criminal procedure code (CPC): liability of legal persons does not preclude possible parallel criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings. ### Sanctions for ML (c. 2.5) - Sanctions under the PC (absence of aggravated circumstances): - any natural person who commits money laundering or is an accomplice is liable to a term of imprisonment of more than five years to seven years; - a fine of two to five times the value of the amount of the laundered sums. - AML/CFT Law Article 48 (no longer in force since entry into force of the 2012 PC) had provided: - imprisonment from five to ten years; and - fine of up to ten times the amount of the laundered sums. - Aggravated circumstances (Article 657 of the PC) may double the sanction. Aggravated circumstances include: - ML committed repeatedly; - in the course of employment; - within the framework of an organized criminal conspiracy; - if the predicate offense is punishable by a term of imprisonment higher than the one for the ML offense. - Article 656 (legal persons): legal entities liable to a fine equal to twice the fine applicable to individuals, without prejudice to liability for complicity of its representatives. Depending on gravity, legal entity may be sentenced to: - prohibition from direct or indirect involvement in specific professional activities; - suspension for not less than five (5) years; - dissolution when established as a criminal organization. - Article 32 et seq. of the PC provide sanctions against legal persons, including (inter alia): dissolution; fine; temporary prohibition from professional or social activities; temporary prohibition from activities in a specific zone; permanent closure of enterprises used to commit acts; exclusion from public procurement for up to five (5) years; prohibition to issue a check, a credit card or a negotiable instrument; confiscation of objects used or produced by the offence; placement under judicial supervision; publication of the decision by media. Article 656 prevails for ML and FT. ### Statistics (R.32) - Authorities’ experience is scant: - One case of alleged money laundering disclosed by the FIU to the NPPA and under investigation at time of assessment. - No money laundering cases prosecuted and brought before the courts. - Authorities provided statistics related to investigations, prosecutions, and sanctions for predicate offenses (table entries preserved as provided): - Terrorism: Received case files (from the police) 8; Cases handled by prosecutors 3; Submitted cases (to court) 1. - Corruption and related offences: Received 209; Cases handled by prosecutors 116; Submitted cases 19. - Embezzlement of public funds: Received 150; Cases handled by prosecutors 73; Submitted cases 11. - Illicit trafficking in narcotics: Received 3500; Cases handled by prosecutors 2285; Submitted cases 251. - Illicit trafficking in goods and merchandise: Received 111; Cases handled by prosecutors 48; Submitted cases 8. - Trafficking human being: Received 2; Cases handled by prosecutors 0; Submitted cases 0. - Financial fraud: Received 525; Cases handled by prosecutors 192; Submitted cases 30. - Verdicts / penalties excerpted from the table (preserved as provided): - Corruption: Number of verdicts 153; Number of accused 229; Number of acquittals 64; Penalties distribution: ]0-1[ 7; [1-5] 134; ]5-10[ 5; [10-15] 7; (additional cell) 1; 11. - Embezzlement of public funds: Number of verdicts 169; Number of accused 254; Number of acquittals 85; Penalties distribution: ]0-1[ 7; [1-5] 101; ]5-10[ 15; [10-15] 22; (additional cell) 0; 24. - Illicit trafficking in narcotics: Number of verdicts 2001; Number of accused 2349; Number of acquittals 106; Penalties distribution: ]0-1[ 1012; [1-5] 997; ]5-10[ 14; [10-15] 0; (additional cell) 156; 64. - Illicit trafficking (goods/merchandise): Number of verdicts 59; Number of accused 67; Number of acquittals 0; Penalties distribution: ]0-1[ 45; [1-5] 10; ]5-10[ 0; [10-15] 0; (additional cell) 6; 4. - Financial fraud: Number of verdicts 188; Number of accused 252; Number of acquittals 45; Penalties distribution: ]0-1[ 46; [1-5] 150; ]5-10[ 0; [10-15] 0; (additional cell) 9; 2. - Authorities noted amounts involved in these crimes were, in most instances, small (no specific figures provided). - Footnote: According to the authorities, in one case of illicit enrichment, the seizure and confiscation were conducted on cars, house, and plots. ### Implementation and effectiveness - Most frequently investigated proceeds-generating crimes in Rwanda (authorities): illicit drug trafficking (by far), followed by corruption (most tender offering and embezzlement of public funds), traffic of coltan from area bordering Congo, and fraud. - LEAs conduct investigations and prosecutions into predicate crimes without tracing the funds. - ML offense has never been applied (no prosecutions brought to court). - Risks and issues identified: - Risk of money laundering is not negligible given number of asset-generating crimes. - Authorities’ view that a prior conviction for the predicate crime is necessary to prove proceeds status creates a practical obstacle to ML prosecutions. - Investigations into predicate crimes do not sufficiently focus on proceeds: occasionally cash or bank deposits identified, but other asset types (real estate, stocks, cars) are not regularly identified, traced, and confiscated; these assets often remain with criminals. - LEAs and judiciary lack experience and expertise in handling ML cases; legal framework broadly in line with standard but not implemented effectively. ### Recommendations and comments (to comply fully with Recommendations 1 and 2) - Recommendation 1: - Ensure that the concealment or disguise of the movement of property knowing that such property is derived from an offense also constitutes money laundering; - Clarify that prior conviction for the predicate offense is not a necessity to secure a money laundering conviction (i.e., when proving that property is the proceeds of crime). - Recommendation 2: - Ensure that, in practice, intention can effectively be inferred from objective factual circumstances; - Ensure that criminal sanctions do not preclude the possibility of parallel civil or administrative proceedings if such proceedings are available. ### Compliance ratings (summary) - R.1: LC (factors underlying rating) - Lack of clarity as to whether prior conviction for the predicate offense is required to prove that property is the proceeds of crime, and authorities are of the view that it is a necessary requirement. - ML offense does not cover the concealment or disguise of the movement of property. - Lack of effectiveness of the money laundering offense. - R.2: PC (factors underlying rating) - Lack of clarity as to whether the intentional element of the offense can be inferred from objective factual circumstances, and authorities are of the view that it cannot. - Lack of sanctions and effective implementation of the money laundering offense. *Source: _cr15221 - 96. The PC adopts an all crimes approach to money laundering by referring, in the offense, to* ### part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to ### _cr15221 - part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to ### Definition of funds and scope of TF offense - Article 653 of the PC refers to “funds,” “assets,” and “any goods,” but only “funds” is defined in Article 15 of the CT law on supporting terrorist acts as: - (i) funds or any other property used to support terrorism including the property of an organization operating or prohibited from operating; - (ii) outcomes of a terrorist act; and - (iii) outcomes of an act carried out with an intention to commit terrorism in accordance with provisions of international conventions Rwanda ratified relating to suppression of terrorism. - The term “property” is explained in the AML/CFT Law in a way which is in line with the standard. - Article 653 of the PC and the CT law definition of funds are sufficiently broad to cover legitimate and illegitimate sources. - The legal framework fails to criminalize the collection or provision of funds by a terrorist organization or individual terrorists; TF charges require a link to a specific terrorist act. ### Attempt, ancillary offenses, and liability - Complicity in an FT offense criminalized and sanctioned under Article 655 of the PC. - Attempt to commit the terrorist financing offense criminalized under Article 27 of the PC. - Direction of others to commit and contribution to the commission of the TF offense covered by Articles 97 to 99 of the PC. - Legal persons may be held criminally liable for the FT offense under Article 656 of the PC. - Articles 131, 132, and 138 of the CPC permit parallel criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings against legal persons. ### Predicate offense, jurisdiction, and mental element - Terrorism and FT are predicate offenses to money laundering. - Article 16 of the PC addresses extraterritorial jurisdiction for several offenses, including terrorism, but does not extend to financing of terrorism; TF offenses therefore do not apply when the alleged offender is in a different country from where the terrorist organization is located or the terrorist act occurred or will occur. - Article 653 of the PC defines the mental element: financing a terrorism enterprise by providing, collecting or managing funds, assets or any goods or by providing advice, with the aim of having those assets or goods utilized or knowing that they are intended to be used, entirely or partially in order to commit any of [the] terrorism acts. - Authorities did not clarify how “knowledge” would be established or whether intention can be inferred from objective factual circumstances. ### Sanctions for FT and related offenses - Article 652.2 of the PC: “any person, who commits terrorism financing, shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of more than five (5) years to seven (7) years and a fine, in Rwandan francs, of two (2) to five (5) times the amount of his/her financial assistance.” - In aggravated circumstances sanctions may be doubled (Article 657 of the PC) if FT committed repeatedly, in the course of employment, within an organized criminal conspiracy, or if the principal offense is punishable by a term of imprisonment higher than that for FT. - Article 521 of the PC: - “any person who donates or receives financial support or any other assets, he/she believes or has reason to believe that they can be used for terrorist purpose, shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of ten (10) years to fifteen (15) years.” - “Any person who incites another person to donate or receive financial support or any other assets, he/she believes or has reason to believe that they can be used for terrorist purpose shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years to twenty (20) years.” - Article 522 of the PC: “any person who knowingly makes an agreement or has an interest in it in order to acquire funds or any other assets, or enables a person to acquire money or support, having reason to believe that they can be used for terrorist purpose, shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years to twenty (20) years.” ### Statistics and case evidence - There were no FT convictions in Rwanda at the time of the on-site mission. - Rwanda had investigated one case of conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism, resulting in prosecution of one individual; the case was pending before the high court at the time of the assessment and related to activities in the border region with the Democratic Republic of Congo. - Authorities mentioned they suspected individuals of financing a terrorist group in the border area with DRC, but it was not clear what measures were taken to investigate and sanction these activities. - LEAs have a relatively low level of understanding of FT techniques and trends and are not using investigative techniques to trace funds and other assets that may finance terrorism. - One investigation undertaken in the terrorism case resulted in prosecution for conspiracy to commit a terrorist act rather than use of TF offenses. ### Implementation, effectiveness, and FATF compliance (SR.II) - The TF offense addresses several FATF elements and covers provision and collection of funds for committing a terrorist act; CT law defines “funds” in line with the standard. - Shortcomings: - Failure to criminalize collection/provision of funds by terrorist organizations or individual terrorists limits ability to bring TF charges absent a link to a specific terrorist act. - CT law and PC criminalize some but not all terrorist acts listed in the annex of the ICSFT. - Lack of clarity on whether intentional element can be inferred from objective circumstances. - Lack of effectiveness: no sanctions imposed under TF offenses. - SR.II rating: NC - Factors underlying rating include: - Provision and collection of funds to individual terrorists and to terrorist organizations are not criminalized. - Direct and indirect collection and provision of funds not covered under the FT offense. - Funding limited to acts defined in treaties to which Rwanda is party; not all financing of terrorist acts covered. - Lack of clarity regarding intentional element inference. - Lack of effectiveness of the FT offense. ### Confiscation, freezing, and seizing of proceeds (R.3) - Relevant legal provisions: - Freezing: Article 55 of the AML/CFT Law. - Seizing: Article 56 of the AML/CFT Law, and Articles 67 to 73 of the CPC. - Confiscation: Articles 51–53 of the PC. - Article 2.2 of the AML/CFT Law defines confiscation as “permanent deprivation of property by a definitive decision of a competent tribunal which transfers to the State the ownership of this property and any related title to property.” - Article 51 of the PC enables confiscation of proceeds, instrumentalities used or intended to be used, and allows confiscation of property of equivalent value; proceeds include property derived both directly and indirectly from the commission of an offense and extend to assets held by third parties according to authorities. - CT law (Article 35) calls for confiscation of property of an accused of an offense of aiding terrorist acts but does not extend to funds and property, proceeds of the terrorist financing offense, or funds and property derived from proceeds as required by the standard. - Article 51 of the PC complements AML/CFT Law and CT law by enabling confiscation of instrumentalities and property of corresponding value when assets cannot be produced. ### Provisional measures, tracing, and protections - “Freezing” defined in Article 2.5 of the AML/CFT Law as temporary delay of execution of a transaction, prohibition or restriction of transfer, conversion, transformation, movement of property on basis of a decision or directive by a competent authority. - Article 25 of the AML/CFT Law: FIU may freeze property or transactions for a period that cannot exceed 48 hours and must immediately communicate its decision to the reporting entity; FIU should refer the case to the NPPA if presumption of money laundering is conclusive or lift the freeze and inform the reporting entity. - Article 56: NPPA or competent court may seize funds and property related to offenses under the law; if proceeds cannot be raised from suspects’ properties, NPPA or court may seize other assets in the property of the suspects up to the amount of alleged proceeds. - Property can be seized by LEAs under Article 30 of the CPC. - Laws do not establish detailed procedures for provisional measures; practice is scarce. FIU issued an ex-parte freezing order in one instance and referred the case to the NPPA, which ordered seizure to continue investigation. - FIU and LEAs, in rare ML investigations, pursued only funds (cash or bank deposits) and not other asset types covered by “funds.” - Information and documents covered by legal privilege may not be accessed by investigative authorities, potentially obstructing tracing of proceeds. - Neither the PC nor AML/CFT Law enables bona fide third parties to ensure rights are not prejudiced during pre-confiscation/provisional measures; bona fide third parties can nevertheless seize the civil judge (“action recursoire”). - Article 60 of the AML/CFT Law voids acts intended to withdraw assets from confiscation measures under the Law; no equivalent provision for predicate offenses including terrorist financing. ### Statistics and effectiveness (R.3) - FIU ordered freeze of an account in a ML investigation in one instance only. - No other provisional measures taken and no funds confiscated on basis of the AML/CFT Law. - Authorities have not used provisional and confiscation measures for funds and assets suspected of being linked to terrorist financing. - No information provided on number of provisional measures and confiscation orders taken on basis of predicate offenses. - No provisions for: (a) confiscation of assets from organizations principally criminal in nature; (b) civil forfeiture; (c) confiscation reversing burden of proof—these additional elements are absent due to Rwanda’s legal system. - Implementation assessment: - Legal framework for confiscation is overall sound with minor deficiencies, but never used in absence of convictions for ML or FT. - LEAs and FIU do not effectively use powers to identify and trace property subject to confiscation. - Bona fide third parties may challenge confiscation orders but cannot ensure rights are protected by provisional measures. - LEAs not proactive in following money in predicate crimes, ML, and FT due to lack of capacity and training. - No funds or assets confiscated under the AML/CFT Law and the PC. ### Recommendations (from the assessment) - Criminalize the provision and collection of funds to individual terrorists and to terrorist organizations. - Ratify and implement: - the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on March 10, 1988; and - the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on March 10, 1988. - Ensure that, in practice, intention can be inferred from objective factual circumstances. - Review the approach in applying FT provisions to ensure legal framework is used more effectively. - Ensure bona fide third parties can defend their rights at all stages of the confiscation process. - Effectively identify and trace property that is, or may become, subject to confiscation or is suspected of being proceeds of crime. - Make effective use of provisional and confiscation measures to fight ML, FT, and predicate crimes. ### Compliance outcome summaries - SR.II: NC - Key factors: non-criminalization of provision/collection to terrorists/organizations; limited coverage of direct/indirect collection; funding limited to treaty-defined acts; unclear mental element inference; lack of effectiveness. - R.3: LC - Key factors: rights of bona fide third parties not ensured in criminal process; lack of effectiveness with no funds or assets confiscated under AML/CFT Law and the PC; limited use of provisional measures and tracing powers. *Source: _cr15221 - part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to — IMF assessment text.* ### 158. Article 23 of the AML/CFT Law gives the FIU the mandate to establish a list of “natural and ### Article 23 of the AML/CFT Law; FIU functions and SR.III assessment ### Freezing measures under UNSCRs (SR.III) - Article 23 of the AML/CFT Law mandates the FIU to establish a list of “natural and legal persons and organizations who shall be subject to restrictive measures as terrorists or linked to terrorist organizations or financing terrorism and terrorist organizations” in accordance with “the United Nations Resolutions for the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts.” - Authorities interpret this to refer to UNSCR 1373 (and its successor resolutions), and not to UNSCR 1267. - Article 23.2: FIU must “set the list of persons, entities or organizations whose funds are frozen by financial organisms and other persons subject to this law and submit it to the Prosecutor General.” - Article 23.3: FIU must ensure that the names on the list are sufficiently detailed to allow effective identification. - At the time of assessment: - The FIU had not developed such a list and had not ordered the freezing of funds in application of the UNSCRs. - There are no obligations on reporting entities to freeze the funds and assets of persons designated by the UNSC in the absence of an FIU order. - There is no mechanism to address freezing actions initiated by other countries, or by Rwanda itself. - No measures ensure communication of freezing orders to all reporting entities and competent authorities and no guidance on freezing existed. - There is no mechanism to consider de-listing and unfreezing requests, or for authorizing access to funds and other assets pursuant to UNSCR 1454 (2002). ### Implementation and effectiveness (findings) - The RNP receives UNSCR designations through Interpol and sends them to border control stations. - Financial institutions and designated non-financial persons reported not having knowledge of the UNSCR lists of persons whose funds should be frozen. - The Central Bank sent a few letters to banks in 2011, in response to a diplomatic note from the United States, with instructions to immediately freeze the accounts of the persons listed in the note. ### Conclusions and Recommendations (SR.III) - Conclusion: Rwanda did not implement the necessary measures to freeze without delay funds or other assets of terrorists, those who finance terrorism, and terrorist organizations in accordance with UNSCRs relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts. - Authorities are recommended to take the following actions: - Put in place effective laws and procedures to freeze terrorist funds or other assets or persons designated by the United Nations Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee in accordance with UNSCR 1267 of 1999 and successor resolutions. Such freezing should take place without delay and without prior notice to the designated persons involved; - Put in place effective laws and procedures to freeze terrorist funds or other assets of persons designated in the context on UNSCR 1373 of 2001. Such freezing should take place without delay and without prior notice to the designated persons involved; - Develop effective laws and procedures to examine and give effect to, if appropriate, the actions initiated under the freezing mechanisms of other jurisdictions; - Extend the freezing measures to all “funds and other property,” covering all financial assets and property of any kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, as well as legal documents or instruments of any kind evidencing title to or interest in such property; - Provide a clear and rapid mechanism for distributing the UNSCR lists nationally to the financial institutions and other persons or entities that may be holding targeted funds or other assets; - Provide clear guidance to financial institutions and other persons or entities that may be holding targeted funds or assets concerning their obligations in taking action under freezing mechanisms; - Introduce effective and publicly known procedures for timely review of requests to delist designated persons and to unfreeze the funds or other property of persons or entities removed from the lists; - Introduce effective and publicly known procedures for unfreezing as promptly as possible the funds or other property of persons or entities inadvertently affected by a freezing mechanism, upon verification that the person or entity is not a designated person; - Introduce appropriate procedures for authorizing access to funds or other property frozen pursuant to Resolution S/RES/1267(1999) and that have been determined to be necessary for basic expenses, the payment of certain types of fees, expenses, and service charges, as well as extraordinary expenses; - Introduce appropriate procedures allowing a person or entity whose funds or other property were frozen to challenge the measures, including with ultimate recourse to a court; - Introduce a provision that would ensure protection for the rights of third parties acting in good faith; and - Develop appropriate measures to effectively monitor compliance with relevant legislation, rules, or regulations governing the obligations under SRIII and to impose civil, administrative, and criminal sanctions to failure to comply with such legislation, rules, or regulations. ### SR.III Compliance and rating - SR.III rating: NC - Factors underlying rating: - Absence of measures to freeze without delay funds or other assets of terrorists, those who finance terrorism, and terrorist organizations in accordance with the UNSCRs relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts. - Absence of measures, including legislative ones, enabling competent authorities to seize and confiscate property that is the proceeds of, or used in, or intended or allocated for use, in the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts, or terrorist organizations. ### The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU): legal basis and mandate - Legal basis: - Article 20 of the AML/CFT Law establishes the FIU. - FIU Presidential Decree N.27/01 of 30/05/2011 determining the organization, functioning, and mission of the FIU. - FIU Presidential Order No.119/01 of 09/12/2011 amending Decree N.27/01 of 30/05/2011. - Prime Minister’s Order No.180/03 of 09/12/2011 appointing the members of the Advisory Board of the FIU. - Establishment and main responsibilities: - FIU established as a law enforcement agency part of the National Police; Presidential Order issued on May 30, 2011. - Article 5 of the Order: FIU responsibilities include collecting, analyzing, disseminating information to whom it may concern and investigating in view of combating money laundering and financing of terrorism in accordance with the AML/CFT Law. - At the time of the assessment, FIU had received some STRs from banks, two reports from open sources, and 112 declaration forms from the customs. - Additional powers and responsibilities (per Presidential Order): - Oppose execution of operations and conduct criminal investigations into money laundering and terrorist financing cases; - Propose modifications and amendments to laws and regulations related to AML/CFT; - Establish indicators to recognize suspicious transactions; - Participate in professional training of reporting entities’ personnel; - Propose measures to reinforce the fight against money laundering and financing of terrorism; - Coordinate prevention activities carried out by all institutions charged with AML/CFT Law implementation. ### FIU governance and organization - Supervision and bodies: - FIU operates under supervision of the ministry in charge of internal security. - Main bodies: Advisory Board and management. - Advisory Board: - Chaired by the Governor of the BNR. - Members appointed for a three-year mandate renewable by Prime Minister’s Order upon request by the minister in charge of internal security. - Director of the FIU is a member and Secretary of the Advisory Board. - Responsibilities: proposing measures to enable the FIU to fulfill its mission; updating legislation; establishing internal rules; proposing agreements with foreign FIUs; monitoring and evaluating FIU achievements; giving quarterly (or ad hoc) reports to the minister in charge of internal security. - Current members listed include: Governor of the BNR (Chairperson), the Prosecutor General (Deputy Chairperson), head of the investigation department in the Rwanda Defense Forces, Commissioner of Intelligence in RNP, Commissioner General of Rwanda Revenue Authority, Commissioner of Criminal Investigation in RNP, and Chief of External Security in National Intelligence and Security Service. - Management: - Director appointed by the Inspector General of the RNP. - Director responsibilities: daily management; ensure rules and discipline; fulfill Unit responsibilities; prepare and submit annual budget proposal to Inspector General of Police; ensure relationships with other competent authorities; submit annual management report; coordinate control activities and reporting. ### FIU operations and activity levels - Operational history: - FIU became operational in December 2011 after Prime Minister appointed Advisory Board members on December 9, 2011. - Between then and assessment, FIU had received six STRs from banks and disseminated one report to the NPPA; other cases deemed unsubstantiated and filed. - Guidelines to reporting entities: - Article 12 of the FIU Presidential Order: FIU must issue directives for reporting entities concerning STRs, customer identification, record-keeping, and other obligations. - At assessment time, some directives including reporting forms had been drafted but not approved by the Advisory Board or published in the official Gazette. - Access to information: - FIU, as part of RNP, can conduct investigations and collect administrative, financial, and law enforcement information. - Access to databases: Rwanda Revenue Authority, Company Registration, Motor Vehicle Registration. - Access to information held by reporting entities could be granted through an order from the prosecutor or via NNPA investigative powers. - Additional information requests: - Article 9 of the FIU Presidential Order: FIU can request reporting entities to transmit information, documents, and registries without charge. - At assessment time, FIU had not made such a request when relevant for received STRs. - Dissemination: - Article 5 and Article 9: FIU should immediately investigate and transmit reports to the NPPA when there is reasonable suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, accompanied by all useful information. - FIU had disseminated one case to NPPA; low dissemination possibly due to a high dissemination threshold. - Operational independence and constraints: - Article 25 of Presidential Order No.27/01: FIU personnel should not exercise functions in reporting entities or elected functions that could jeopardize independence. - Independence concerns: - Director appointed by Inspector General of Police, who manages operational resources. - No clear rules for designation and dismissal of director and staff. - RNP officers obliged under Police Law to follow instructions of Inspector General and can be moved to other RNP departments. - Budget not set regularly; provided by RNP since FIU creation. - BNR provides offices and equipment. - Advisory Board members are full-time officials of other agencies with their own investigative powers and reporting lines. - FIU staff are primarily RNP staff; positions seen as professional development rather than FIU-specific. - Protection and security of information: - Article 24 of AML/CFT Law: FIU officers must preserve confidentiality of information obtained in their duties and cannot reveal it unless a competent Court decides otherwise. - FIU located in two spaces: Central Bank office building and RNP; perimeter security controlled but internal FIU access could be improved to restrict Central Bank staff access. - Storage and handling: STRs and information filed in hard and soft copies on personal computers; no secure server; STRs sent by normal post, unencrypted email, or verbally by phone to FIU director. - Reporting and publication: - Advisory Board to give quarterly (or ad hoc) report to minister in charge of internal security; at assessment time no report had been prepared. - Director submits management reports to Inspector General of Police; no report published to date. A draft first-year report existed and was awaiting publication. - International engagement: - FIU had contacted the Egmont Group to begin membership process but had not exchanged information with foreign FIUs. - Authorities indicated Egmont membership considered only after joining ESAAMLG. ### FIU resources and staffing (R.30) - Human resources: - FIU staff: 12 investigators (all RNP staff) and 2 support staff. - Investigators conduct file investigations when reports are received. - No statutory provisions in AML/CFT Law relating directly to recruitment, retention, and integrity standards for FIU personnel; Police Law applies to FIU staff for honesty, integrity, loyalty, good faith, and confidentiality. - Financial resources: - Budget is not set regularly and is temporarily provided by the RNP. - FIU has two premises: one provided by the Police and the other by the Central Bank. - Staff is provided by the Police. *Content unit: _cr15221 - 158.* ### 189. Technical Resources: The FIU lacks a number of tools necessary for it to effectively meet its ### _cr15221 - 189. Technical Resources: The FIU lacks a number of tools necessary for it to effectively meet its ### Technical resources and information systems - The FIU lacks the following tools necessary to effectively meet its obligations: - hardware and analytical software appropriate to the functions of an FIU; - an electronic information and filing system; - a secure system of information storage to manage that system. ### Training and staff capacity - FIU staff received some training in 2011; few courses are relevant to AML/CFT. Courses completed include: - Two workshops organized by BNR on payment system—6 staff; - RNP and BTC conducted one–month FIU courses on forensic accounting, money laundering, and financing terrorism—6 staff; - Three–month advanced course in criminal investigation and crime scene management—6 staff; - Criminal investigation short courses on forensic awareness—12 staff; - Footwear recovery techniques course for one week—2 staff; - Egmont Group meeting—Director and staff member; - Three–day pre-assessment workshop conducted by the IMF—Director and a staff member. ### Statistics (R.32) — Number of reports received by the FIU (Statistical Table 4) - STR received from banks: 6 - Declarations received from Kigali airport: 116 - Reports received from open sources: 2 - Cases disseminated to the NPPA: 1 ### Implementation and effectiveness of the FIU - Establishment and operation: - The FIU became operational in 2011 and received a limited number of STRs. - It disseminated one report to the NPPA; other reports were filed. - It does not have appropriate power to access financial, administrative information. - Reporting guidance and forms: - The FIU sent some templates for STR forms to banks, but not to nonbank FIs and DNFBPs. - Additional guidance on the manner of reporting should be sent to reporting entities. - Role and functions: - FIU employees from the Police are conducting police investigations instead of intelligence analysis. - According to Recommendation 26, the FIU should limit its work to the analysis phase and disseminate financial information to LEAs for investigation or action when there are grounds to suspect ML or FT. - Conducting investigations by the FIU risks jeopardizing confidentiality and causing tipping off. - Analysis and dissemination: - The FIU should take a more proactive approach to analysis to generate more intelligence and increase the number of reports disseminated to the NPPA. - No objective criteria have been developed for dissemination; decisions are taken based on judgment. - Factors undermining core functions: - Other functions (investigation powers, issuing directives) divert limited staff resources from receipt, analysis, and dissemination of STRs. - Lack of analytical training for FIU staff and reliance on investigative techniques. - Paper-based system of information storage severely restricts cross-checking analysis between STRs and other information. - FIU staff may be posted in and out of the FIU depending on RNP staffing needs, affecting autonomy and retention of expertise. - Independence and governance concerns: - No clear rules for designation and dismissal of the director and staff of the FIU; Presidential Order No. 27/2011 states the director is appointed and may be dismissed by the appointing authority in the RNP, but does not establish required qualifications or conditions for dismissal. - The FIU’s budget had been provided by the RNP whose budget is set annually; there were no plans for a sustainable FIU budget. - Composition and responsibilities of the Advisory Board of the FIU could jeopardize confidentiality of information. - No retention policy for FIU staff. - At the time of assessment, the FIU had been operational for less than a year and had not published an annual report, typologies, trends or information regarding its activity. - Rwanda had not considered becoming an Egmont Group member by submitting an application and had not exchanged information with foreign FIUs. ### Recommendations and comments (authorities are recommended to do the following) - Provide reporting entities with guidance on the manner of reporting, including comprehensive reporting forms for all reporting entities other than banks (which have already received a reporting form). - Ensure that the FIU asks reporting entities for additional information when the information is correlated to received information. - Ensure that the FIU strengthens the quality of its analysis of STRs and other information, in particular by undertaking more in-depth analysis that could lead to improving the quality and quantity of disseminated reports. This could be achieved inter alia by: - conducting analysis of information instead of investigation; - strengthening the technical tools available to the analysts; - increasing the number of analysts with financial background and raising their awareness; - Ensure that the information held by the FIU is securely protected. - Ensure the independence of the FIU by, among other things: - putting in place proper safeguards for the sharing of information with the Advisory Board; - securing adequate financial, human, and technical resources to conduct its core functions; - securing the information held at its premises; - Publish periodic annual reports with comprehensive statistics, typologies, and trends of money laundering and terrorist financing as well as information regarding its activities. - Consider applying for Egmont Group membership. - Ensure that the FIU provides additional specialized and practical in-depth training to its employees. Training should cover, for example, predicate offenses to money laundering, analysis techniques, and familiarization with money laundering and terrorist financing typologies and risks and vulnerabilities. ### Compliance with Recommendation 26 — Summary of factors relevant to s.2.5 underlying overall rating (R.26 PC) - Lack of analysis of STRs and other information mostly due to performing investigations and lack of analytical tools and weak quality/quantity of reporting. - Lack of guidance on manner of reporting, including reporting forms for nonbank reporting entities. - No additional requests of information addressed to reporting entities. - Very low level of dissemination due to low level of STRs received. - No publication of annual reports containing information about its activities, statistics, and typologies. - Lack of sufficient operational independence and autonomy mainly due to the powers and responsibilities of the Advisory Board. - Information not securely protected. - Effectiveness was not established. ### Law enforcement, prosecution, and related authorities — framework for investigation and prosecution (selected elements) - Legal framework: Articles 160 and 161 of the Constitutions, the Criminal Procedure Code, the AML/CFT Law, the Anti-Corruption Law, and the Police Act of 2011. - NPPA — Economic and Financial Department: - The NPPA prosecutes criminal offenses in Rwanda. The prosecution service has presence in Kigali and at intermediary and primary levels. - The prosecutor general is assisted by his deputy, 16 public prosecutors with national competence, and 5 inspectors. - There are 72 public prosecutors at the intermediate levels and 60 prosecutors at primary levels. - A team of eight prosecutors and six inspectors is set up at the NPPA office in Kigali to investigate and prosecute economic crimes. The team is assisted by one prosecutor at each intermediate level of the prosecutions. - Only a single case of money laundering had been disseminated to the NPPA at the time of the assessment and was under review by the NPPA’s Economic and Financial Department. - Rwanda National Police (RNP): - The RNP is responsible for maintenance of law and order and public security. It has the monopoly of preliminary investigations, conducted under the supervision of the NPPA. - The RNP is organized at a national level and is headed by an inspector general. - The total force numbers between 8,000 and 10,000 police officers. - The Economic and Financial Crime Unit of the RNP has four sections investigating: (i) corruption and embezzlement, (ii) bank/financial fraud and bankruptcy, (iii) forged or false documents, and (iv) cyber crimes. None of the sections are designated to conduct ML investigations. - FIU designation and practice: - The FIU is a unit of the RNP. Pursuant to Article 5 of the Presidential Order No. 27/01, the FIU is responsible for the collection, analysis, dissemination, and investigation of information related to potential money laundering or terrorist financing activities. - Money laundering: the FIU is the only authority explicitly designated to investigate money laundering. Predicate offenses are investigated by: - Economic and Financial Section of the RNP; - Investigation Service of the Revenue Service; - Ombudsman. - In practice, the FIU conducts evidence-gathering through investigations. - The FIU is also designated to investigate terrorist financing; however, the Intelligence Department at the RNP also investigates terrorist financing under the CT law. All cases are investigated under the supervision of and eventually prosecuted by the Economic and Financial Department of the NPPA. - RNP — Anti-Terrorist Unit: - Created in 2004 and comprises 20 officers. - Mission: detect, investigate, and prevent terrorism activities, including financing of these activities; focus on border areas and the airport; cooperate with Economic and Financial Unit and customs; cooperate with Ministry of Local Government and Rwanda Governance Board in monitoring non-profit organizations. - They have conducted few investigations of terrorism cases. - Ombudsman: - Established to promote good governance and prevent and fight corruption and injustice. Article 182 mandates the Office to prevent and fight injustice, corruption and other related crimes and receive true declaration of assets of persons determined by law. - The Ombudsman may initiate criminal investigations by referring indications of corruption including embezzlement to the police. - The Ombudsman does not target criminal proceeds as such, but has powers to file legal action for recovery of such proceeds. - Revenue Service - Investigation Department: - Competent for investigations into tax evasion and tax fraud; has judicial powers to investigate in cooperation with customs at border points. - The department has not investigated ML cases in relation to these predicate crimes. - Postpone/waive arrest or seizure (c. 27.2): - No legislative measures formally allow LEAs to postpone or waive arrest of suspects and/or seizure of money for the purpose of identifying persons or evidence gathering. Practice is used frequently according to LEAs. - Seizure and arrest orders can be obtained from courts on the basis of Articles 30 and 33 of the CPC; execution can be deferred based on appreciation of judicial police or prosecutor’s office. - Special investigative techniques (Articles and practice): - Article 26 of the AML/CFT Law allows, for evidence related to ML/FT, temporary measures to: monitor bank accounts and other related matters; gain access to systems, networks, and computer servers; monitor or listen to telephone/telefax/telecommunications or electronic transmissions; audio-visual recording; and communication of notarized private banking, financial, or commercial information documents. These acts require strong grounds to suspect use or likely use in ML/FT. - These techniques are not yet used in practice due to lack of technical and human resources and training. - Specialized investigation groups and multinational cooperation: - Authorities have not considered putting in place specialized investigation groups for conducting multi-national cooperative financial investigations. - National cooperation between sections and departments of the RNP and other competent authorities takes place at the inspector general’s level. - The Rwanda Cooperative Agency (RCA) provides power to act as judicial police agent in financial investigations. - Review of ML and FT trends by LEAs: - Money laundering and terrorist financing methods, techniques, and trends are not reviewed by LEAs on a regular, interagency basis. No analysis or studies have been conducted or disseminated. - Powers to compel production/searches (c. 28.1): - No specific provision grants LEAs power to compel production of necessary documents and information. CPC provides powers to search and seize documentation and other things under possession of suspect or any other person (Article 29 and Article 30 of the CPC, and Articles 28 to 32 of the Police Act of 28/20/2011). - These powers are used to obtain financial records mostly from banks. Powers were never used to obtain financial information detained by lawyers and other professions. - Lawyers are bound by strict confidentiality requirements; professional secrecy obligation is absolute: LEAs cannot obtain information detained by lawyers, not even on basis of court order. - All documents and information other than those held by lawyers can be obtained using search or seizure powers after obtaining a warrant from a public prosecutor. - Power to take witnesses’ statements (c. 28.2): - Pursuant to Article 26 of the CPC, a judicial police officer interrogates suspects and records their statements; may interrogate any person presumed to have any detail to clarify and compel testimony after oath; may deny any person from moving away from a specified area until a statement has been taken and, if necessary, compel him or her to remain there. *Source: _cr15221 - 189. Technical Resources: The FIU lacks a number of tools necessary for it to effectively meet its* ### 221. The FIU took witnesses’ statements on this legal basis in several instances following the receipt ### _cr15221 - 221. The FIU took witnesses’ statements on this legal basis in several instances following the receipt ### Investigations, LEA functions, and resource adequacy - The FIU took witnesses’ statements on this legal basis in several instances following the receipt of STRs from banks. - The Intelligence Department of the NRP also heard several witnesses in alleged financing of terrorism cases (although these cases were prosecuted as conspiracy in committing terrorist acts). - Statistics (R.32): - Several agencies informed the assessment team that they did not conduct money laundering and/or financing of terrorism investigations. - Some statistics were provided regarding the number of predicate crimes cases investigated by different LEAs. (Refer to statistics under Section 1 for more details about the predicate crimes.) - Adequacy of resources—LEAs (R. 30): - Financial and Human Resources: - LEAs receive sufficient funding from the state budget, which has made it possible for them to improve their material and human resources considerably in recent years. - According to the authorities, the NPPA has sufficient financial and human resources to perform its duties. - There were few cases of corruption of LEAs during the recent years. However, these cases are limited due to the efficient zero tolerance policy adopted by the government. - Independence, Technical Resources and Training: - The RNP benefits from sufficient independence and resources to undertake its functions in an adequate manner. - All RNP staff must undergo training in his/her field of work before starting his or her functions with a specific department. Continuous training programs are also conducted, including refreshers and newly introduced courses. These include basic training as well as specialized courses (e.g., anti-terrorism, road and safety, criminal investigations, etc.). - The number of prosecutors at the NPPA is also considered to be sufficient to ensure a normal functioning of the investigation and prosecution and an appropriate enforcement of the law. - A typical feature of the Rwanda’s prosecution framework is the fact that the minister of justice has the power of negative injunction (instructing the Public Prosecutor’s Office not to investigate or prosecute). Although this power seems to be very rarely used, it raises an issue in terms of possible political interference in judicial matters. - Overall, the level of technical knowledge on AML/CFT issues is low: the training provided to LEAs’ agents, including prosecutors, is not sufficient. There is a need for in-depth training on the scope of predicate offenses, money laundering, and terrorist financing trends and typologies; techniques to investigate and prosecute these offenses; as well as on techniques for tracing property that is the proceeds of crime or is linked to the financing of terrorism. - The assessment team was not given the opportunity to meet representatives from the judiciary and was not provided with information on the judiciary’s resources. - Implementation and effectiveness: - In addition to the core functions of an FIU, the Rwandan FIU was given the mandate to investigate money laundering and terrorist financing cases. - At the time of the assessment, the FIU had investigated five cases of potential money laundering and disseminated one to the NPPA. - One case of potential terrorist financing had been investigated by the RNP Anti-Terrorist Unit, prosecuted, and was pending before the courts. - None of the other LEAs had investigated money laundering cases, although they mentioned that they often investigate predicate crimes that generate considerable amounts of proceeds. - While the AML/CFT Law allows for money laundering convictions based on the laundering of property generated by any criminal activity and does not require a conviction for the predicate crime, there seems to be little appreciation for the fact, in many instances, that money laundering is conducted by the perpetrator of the predicate crime. - It appears that the LEAs concentrate their investigations solely on the predicate crime and do not follow its proceeds to examine potential money laundering activity. - LEAs expressed a belief that money laundering cases could only be generated by STRs and investigated by the FIU and could not be the object of separate law enforcement actions. - The report notes that most money laundering cases are developed through rigorous investigation of predicate crimes and by following the proceeds generated from those crimes, and that money laundering crimes must be proactively investigated, using techniques such as undercover operations and electronic surveillance. - The independence of the prosecution could be jeopardized by the Minister of Justice’s power of negative injunction (although required to be motivated by writing). - Conclusion: the investigatory framework of Rwanda is not effective in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. ### Recommendations and comments (to comply with Recommendations 27 and 28) - Recommended actions: - Appoint and adequately resource dedicated financial investigators at the NPPA and RNP (other than the FIU) to deal with money laundering cases; - Provide LEAs with adequate powers to compel the production of documents and information from lawyers; - Investigate money laundering and/or terrorist financing offenses irrespective of whether the source of information emanates from the FIU or any other source; - Provide the judiciary with more independence by limiting the power of the Minister of Justice to intervene in the decisions of the Prosecutor General; - Provide AML/CFT training to all LEAs and in particular to all dedicated financial crime investigators and prosecutors. - Additional consideration: - Making a more frequent use of special investigative techniques, such as the monitoring of accounts and special investigative techniques to detect and investigate money laundering and its predicate crimes. ### Compliance ratings for R.27 and R.28 - R.27 — PC - The various police units responsible for the investigation of the predicate crimes do not investigate ML-related activities; the FIU conducts some investigations into ML on the basis of STRs received, although it should focus on its analysis functions. - Effectiveness of the current investigation and prosecution framework was not established. - R.28 — PC - Lack of powers to compel production of documents and information from FIs and DNFBPs (documents can only be seized based on powers in CPC). - No legal power obtaining documents and information held by lawyers. - Effectiveness of powers for document production, search, and seizure was not established. ### Cross-Border Declaration or Disclosure (SR.IX) — legal framework and implementation - Legal Framework: - The AML/CFT Law provides for a declaration system. - Article 7 of the AML/CFT Law provides that any person who leaves or enters the Republic of Rwanda transporting cash or negotiable bills or exchange of an amount above the threshold set by the FIU without prior declaration (except for funds certified by a withdrawal slip issued by an accredited bank in Rwanda) commits an offense of money laundering. - At the time of the assessment, the threshold for declaration had not been set and the powers of customs to implement Article 7 had not been established, thus rendering the declaration system inoperable. - The AML/CFT Law and customs law do not provide clear powers for customs to request and obtain further information from the carrier with regard to the origin of the currency or the bearer negotiable instruments and their intended use. - No provision enables the authorities to stop or restrain currency and bearer negotiable instruments for a reasonable time in order to ascertain whether evidence of ML or TF may be found. - There are no proportionate sanctions for false disclosure, failure to disclose, or cross-border transportation for ML and TF purposes. - The requirement for the retention of records does not extend to all kinds of bearer negotiable instruments declared or otherwise detected, or the identification data of the bearer. - There is no definition of bearer negotiable instruments. - Implementation and Effectiveness: - The FIU staff prepared a draft cross-border cash declaration directive, which is currently pending approval by its Advisory Board. The unit proposed a US$10,000 threshold. - Although the threshold has not been adopted and, as a result, the requirement in the law is not enforceable, the authorities informed the assessment team that two of its staff are present at Kigali airport and are asking passengers to declare the currency they carry based on the US$10,000 threshold. This resulted in 121 declaration forms being sent to the FIU. They were later analyzed and filed. - In less than a month (December 2011 to January 2012), the FIU staff recorded around RF 714 million at Kigali International Airport. - The legal assumption in Article 7 that those who omit to declare or to get a certificate from an accredited bank commit an ML offense is too stringent and not in line with SR.IX. - The exemption related to the funds certified by a withdrawal slip issued by an accredited bank in Rwanda is not in line with SR.IX requirements. - The obligation of declaration does not extend to transportation through cargo containers and the mail, and the term BNI is not defined; it was not possible to establish that it covers all the elements required by the standard. - Competent authorities do not have the appropriate powers to implement the declaration system as required by the standard. ### Cross-Border Declaration — recommendations - Ensure that the proposed declaration system has the characteristics described under SR.IX; - Remove the exemption related to the funds certified by a withdrawal slip issued by an accredited bank in Rwanda; - Amend the requirements to extend to the shipment of currency and bearer negotiable instruments through cargo containers and the mail; - Define the term “bearer negotiable instruments” to include monetary instruments in bearer form such as travelers cheques; negotiable instruments (including cheques, promissory notes, and money orders) that are either in bearer form, endorsed without restriction, made out to a fictitious payee, or otherwise in such a form that title can pass upon delivery; and incomplete instruments (including cheques, promissory notes, and money orders) signed, but with the payee’s name omitted; - Ensure that competent authorities have the powers to request and obtain further information from the carrier with regard to the origin of the currency or bearer negotiable instruments and their intended use in cases of suspicion of ML or TF, the temporary restraint measures, and the adequate and uniform level of sanctions; - Provide competent authorities with the authority to stop or restrain cash or bearer negotiable instruments for a reasonable time in order to ascertain whether evidence of ML or TF may be found, where there is a suspicion of ML or TF, or where there is a false declaration; and - Once this system is established, competent authorities should be provided with training on the best practices paper for SR.IX. ### SR.IX compliance rating and summary factors - SR.IX — NC - Declaration system is not yet in force and is not in line with the standard. - Exemption regarding the withdrawal of cash from banks could limit the effectiveness of the declaration system. - Lack of clear powers to request and obtain further information from the carrier with regard to the origin of the currency or the bearer negotiable instruments and their intended use. - Lack of powers to be able to stop or restrain currency and bearer negotiable instruments for a reasonable time in order to ascertain whether evidence of ML or TF may be found. - Lack of proportionate sanctions for false disclosure, failure to disclose, or cross-border transportation for ML and TF purposes. - The requirement for the retention of records does not extend to all kinds of bearer negotiable instruments declared or otherwise detected, or the identification data of the bearer. - Absence of clear definition of bearer negotiable instruments. - Lack of implementation of the system transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments across all border points. - Lack of training on the best practice of implementing the requirement of SR.IX. - Effectiveness of the declaration system has not been established. ### Preventive measures — financial institutions (risk, CDD, supervision) - Risk of money laundering or terrorist financing: - Rwanda has not conducted a systemic review of potential ML and TF risks affecting the Rwandan financial system and/or the reporting entities within the system that could serve as a basis for applying enhanced and/or reduced measures in its financial system. - The AML/CFT Law imposes obligations on reporting entities and institutions to comply with the requirements with respect to prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. - There is an obligation to apply enhanced due diligence measures, but it is only applicable to politically exposed persons. - The existing AML/CFT legal and supervisory frameworks have been developed without considering ML/TF risk level. - Customer due diligence, including enhanced or reduced measures (R.5 to 8) — legal framework: - The main relevant texts are the AML/CFT Law and the law 007/2007 (the Banking Law). These two texts constitute primary legislation for the purposes of this assessment as they have been issued by a legislative body and impose mandatory requirements with sanctions for noncompliance. - The AML/CFT Law sets out basic customer identification, monitoring, and record keeping requirements applicable to “reporting entities.” However, the notion of reporting entities in the context of the Rwandan AML/CFT Law does not cover insurance companies and brokers/agents. As a result, these persons and entities are not subject to the AML/CFT preventive measures obligations. - For purposes of this assessment, when the assessors make reference to the term “reporting entities,” they are referring to “all reporting entities” as defined by the FATF and not as defined by the Rwandan law. - Article 3 of the AML/CFT Law states that the provisions of the law shall apply to “any person or legal entity that, in the framework of its profession, conducts, controls or advises transactions involving deposits, exchanges, investments, conversions or any other capital movement or any other property,” in particular the following: - The National Bank of Rwanda; - Banks and other financial institutions; - A list of DNFBPs; and - Travel agencies and non-government organizations. - As mentioned above, insurance companies and intermediaries do not conduct any of the activities listed under Article 3 of the AML/CFT Law. As a result, they are therefore not subject to the preventive measures. - The authorities indicated that the BNR was included as a reporting entity because it is allowed to open and keep accounts for the public. Pursuant to Article 50 of the Central Bank law, it “may, in accordance with laws in force and its general rules, open and keep current accounts for any public institution, State organ, other central banks, international organizations and diplomat missions.” They indicated further that diplomatic missions can benefit from the following services: (i) money deposit through cash or bank transfer, (ii) money withdrawal through cash or bank transfer, (iii) BNR checks and payment order books, (iv) online access to their account through BNR extranet, and (v) bank account statement. The same applies to public agencies. The authorities also mentioned that the general public may withdraw cash against checks issued by public agencies for services rendered or deposit fund to pay for tender documents relating to tenders from public institutions or to pay courts fees. - The financial system consists mainly of the following financial institutions: banks, non-banking financial institutions, insurance brokers/companies, SACCOs, and micro-credit institutions, securities brokers, pension funds, forex bureaux, and payment systems/service providers. - Money or value transfer systems are licensed by the BNR; however, in the case of Western Union and MoneyGram, these operate through an agency relationship with banks licensed also by the BNR. - As of the mission date, there were 14 money transfer services providers. - The AML/CFT preventive measures for financial sector entities are set out in Articles 9, 10, 13–17, and 19 of the AML/CFT Law, and address customer identification, reporting of suspicious transactions, recordkeeping, paying attention to complex, unusual transactions, and internal controls. - There are no sector-based regulations or other similar enforceable requirements issued by the competent supervisory authorities to complement the legal provisions applicable to all reporting entities with more specific measures and which impose additional mandatory requirements with sanctions for non-compliance. - Supervision of the financial sector is carried out by the BNR and the CMA. The BNR supervises the following institutions: banks, microfinance companies, savings and credit institutions, insurance companies and brokers, bureaux de change, pension funds, and payment systems/services providers (which includes money remitters). The CMA is the designated competent authority for the entities operating in the securities market (securities brokers, dealers, sponsors, investment advisers, investment managers, custodians, securities exchange, clearing houses, and credit rating agency). - The AML/CFT Law does not designate or make any reference to the authorities responsible for AML/CFT supervision, and does not refer to any other specific laws. The sector-specific laws provide the legal framework for the BNR and the CMA with respect to prudential supervision, but do not address AML/CFT issues. - Although the authorities claim that they are responsible for conducting AML/CFT supervision, neither the BNR nor the CMA have conducted such supervision in practice. *Source: _cr15221 (selected extracts).* ### 253. Pursuant to Article 9(4) of the AML/CFT Law, financial institutions are prohibited from opening ### _cr15221 - 253. ### Prohibition on anonymous or fictitious accounts - Article 9(4) of the AML/CFT Law: financial institutions are prohibited from opening or maintaining anonymous or digitized accounts, as well as accounts with fictitious or incorrect names. - In Rwanda’s legal text, “financial institutions” do not include banks; authorities state the obligation in Article 9(4) applies equally to banks and to the rest of the financial institutions. - Legal gap: Article 9(4) only refers to “financial institutions,” and there are no other provisions in the law that prohibit banks from opening or maintaining anonymous, numbered, or fictitious-name accounts. - Despite the legal gap, private sector representatives (including banks), BNR, and CMA reported that they do not open or maintain anonymous or numbered accounts or accounts in fictitious names; no known anonymous or fictitious-name accounts were reported. Nevertheless, the legal framework is assessed as falling short of the standard. ### When is CDD required (c. 5.2) - Article 10 of the AML/CFT Law requires reporting entities to identify customers in the following cases: - Prior to establishing a business relationship; - When they execute occasional transactions exceeding the threshold set by the FIU; - When they receive a wire transfer that does not contain full information about the originator; - When there is suspicion of money laundering; and - When they have doubts about the veracity or accuracy of the customers’ previously obtained identification data. - “Identification” in Article 10 includes verification, meaning presentation by the customer of a formal document to establish identity. - Article 2(4) defines “customer” narrowly as natural or legal person that (i) opens a bank account or in the name of whom a bank account is opened, (ii) has the power to sign on that account, (iii) deposits, transfers, or receives money by using that account, and (iv) is authorized to conduct the transaction on that account — a definition limited to “bank accounts” and not to “withdrawals” or other services. - The FIU has not set the threshold for occasional transactions requiring CDD; as a result, the identification obligation tied to that threshold remains inapplicable. - Article 10 only requires CDD when receiving a wire transfer lacking full originator information; this does not fully comply with criterion 5.2.c) regarding wire transfers per the Interpretative Note to SR.VII. - No requirement in Article 10 for reporting entities to apply CDD measures when there is a suspicion of terrorist financing as required under criterion 5.2.d). - Conclusion: Article 10 only partially meets the requirements of criterion 5.2. ### Identification measures and verification sources (c. 5.3) - Article 10 obliges reporting entities to identify natural and corporate customers; no identification requirements for legal arrangements. - Identity verification for natural persons requires presentation of a valid official identification document including a photograph; an Order of the Minister of Justice was to list acceptable documents but none had been issued as of the mission date. - No implementing regulation provides specific guidance on documents, data, or information for identification and verification of customers (natural and legal). - In practice, reporting entities request: - Rwandan National Identification card (ID) for national citizens; all citizens are issued a national ID at the age of sixteen. - Passport for foreign customers. - National ID contains: a unique ID number, name, sex, date of birth, place of birth (sector), place of issuance, and signature of the holder; it has a unique bar code including the date of birth as part of the personal identification number. The national ID does not include the address of the holder. - Practical limitation: reporting entities cannot reliably verify physical addresses because streets are not numbered or identified by names but by commonly known points of reference. - No legal requirement for physical presence during account opening; accounts may be opened electronically. Industry practice: generally open accounts in customer’s presence, but non-face-to-face account opening occurs (see Recommendation 8 reference in source). - For legal persons, Article 10 requires identification with any valid document, in particular the registration certificate; no definition of “valid” is provided. - Registration certificate (Office of Registrar General) includes: (i) registered corporate name, (ii) legal form, (iii) date and place of incorporation, (iv) type of business, (v) address, and (vi) shareholders, directors, including the managing director, and provisions relating to the powers to bind the legal person. - Article 10 is assessed as falling short of the standard because it allows “reasonable measures” rather than requiring reliable, independent source documents, data, or information for verification. - No specific guidance on what constitutes reasonable measures to verify identity of members of legal persons; reporting entities primarily rely on Articles of Incorporation and the certificate of domestic company registration. ### Legal arrangements and trusts - At the time of the assessment there were no legal provisions specifically relating to trusts or similar legal arrangements in Rwanda. - Note in source: Since then, authorities issued law No. 20/2013 of March 25, 2013, regulating creation of trusts and trustees; this law came into force more than two months after the onsite mission and was not taken into account for the current assessment. - Assessors found no indication that financial institutions in Rwanda provided services to (foreign) legal arrangements; authorities could not establish due diligence measures that would be applied if such services were rendered. ### Identification of persons acting on behalf of customers (c. 5.4) - Article 10, paragraph 5: any person known to act on behalf of a customer must present evidence to act on his/her behalf and his/her identity card or an official identification document in conformity with paragraph 2. - No further indication of which documents suffice to demonstrate authority; authorities indicated FIs always require a power of attorney or other legal authorization when a person acts on behalf of a customer. - For verification of legal status of a legal person, reporting entities must obtain the certificate of registration as proof of incorporation; the certificate does not necessarily provide information on provisions regulating the power to bind the legal person. - Law No. 7/2009 (law relating to companies) Article 187 requires members of the Board of Directors to disclose to or cause it to be registered by the Registrar General within 30 days “any change of name, address or any other details about its members, to updated the information on new Board of Directors.” - Reporting entities request national ID of shareholders and directors and Board resolutions authorizing persons to open the business relationship; authorities could not explain how changes regarding shareholders are informed and the frequency. ### Identification of beneficial owners (c. 5.5, 5.5.1, 5.5.2) - Article 10 requires persons acting on behalf to present evidence and identification documents. - Article 14: when uncertainty exists about whether the customer acts on personal behalf, bank or financial institution shall obtain information to establish exact identity of the principal or stakeholder. After verification, if uncertainty persists on the identity of the “economic beneficiary,” financial institutions shall file an STR with the Financial Investigation Unit. - No guidance on who is considered “the principal or the stakeholder” or “the economic beneficiary”; not established that this includes natural person(s) on whose behalf a transaction is conducted or those who ultimately own or control a customer (natural persons with controlling interest or those who comprise the mind and management). - Proof of ownership structure provided by registration certificate; certificate may not enable understanding of control structure or identification of natural persons with controlling interest. - Conclusion: AML/CFT framework fails to provide a clear definition of beneficial owner and procedures for identifying beneficial owners in multi-layered or complex ownership structures. ### Information on purpose and nature of business relationship (c. 5.6) - Reporting entities are not required to obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship. ### Ongoing due diligence and record updating (c. 5.7, 5.7.1, 5.7.2) - Reporting entities are not required to conduct ongoing due diligence on the business relationship. - No requirement to ensure documents, data, or information collected under CDD are kept up to date and relevant, including reviews for higher risk categories. ### Risk—Enhanced due diligence for higher-risk customers (c. 5.8) - AML/CFT Law sets a standard due diligence process for most cases. - No obligation to apply enhanced procedures for high-risk customers except for politically exposed persons (PEPs; described under Recommendation 6 in source). ### Risk—Simplified/Reduced CDD measures and overseas residents (c. 5.9, 5.10, 5.12) - Rwandan legislation does not address application of simplified or reduced CDD measures by reporting entities. ### Timing of verification and consequences of failure (c. 5.13–5.16) - Article 10 requires identification and verification to take place “prior to establishing a business relationship”; no provision for delayed verification. - AML/CFT Law does not address consequences of failure to complete CDD before or after commencing the business relationship. - Authorities and private sector indicate industry practice is to refuse a transaction or establishment of a business relationship if customer fails to provide required CDD information in a timely manner; no STR is filed in such cases. ### Existing customers and anonymous accounts (c. 5.17–5.18) - AML/CFT Law does not address customers who opened accounts prior to its entry into force; no requirement to apply CDD to customers with relationships entered into prior to 2009 based on materiality and risk, or to conduct due diligence on such existing relationships at appropriate times. ### Implementation and effectiveness - Overall implementation of CDD measures by reporting entities is low. - Only banks were broadly aware of CDD requirements and implemented some basic CDD measures; compliance is higher in banks with foreign ownership due to home country and group AML/CFT policies that exceed Rwanda’s obligations. - Other reporting entities show lower compliance and familiarity: securities and insurance brokers (insurance sector not subject to AML law), microfinance companies, exchange bureaus, and money remitters are less familiar with detailed AML/CFT requirements. - CDD is typically conducted at account opening or when a business relationship is established; reliance on national ID or passport for natural persons is universal in practice. - Lack of legal basis for certain CDD obligations can hinder reporting entities’ ability to obtain sufficient information and supporting documentation. - Some banks are enabling remote account opening, with internal policies requiring authentication at embassies/consulates or bank branches in home country before acceptance. - Low awareness and compliance on beneficial ownership: only one bank reported a standardized beneficial-owner declaration form; most other financial institutions were not aware of requirements. - Reporting entities lack specific provisions on reasonable measures to verify legal persons; for domestic legal persons they rely exclusively on certificate of registration. - For foreign companies, financial institutions rely on original documents from country of origin without further verification, which may be insufficient if originating country has weak systems. - Reporting entities do not request information on purpose and intended nature of the business relationship or on source of wealth and source of funds. - No substantive ongoing due diligence: foreign banks have monitoring systems, but other reporting entities have no monitoring or manual monitoring, creating challenges for timely identification of unusual or suspicious transactions. *Source: _cr15221 - 253.* ### 295. Only a few reporting entities (mainly banks) seem to be conducting ongoing due diligence on the ### _cr15221 - 295. Only a few reporting entities (mainly banks) seem to be conducting ongoing due diligence on the ### Customer Due Diligence (CDD) implementation and effectiveness - Only a few reporting entities (mainly banks) conduct ongoing due diligence on the business relationship; frequency of updating customer data is left to each institution due to lack of specific legal requirements. - Only a few banks perform enhanced due diligence for certain categories of customers; generally none of the reporting entities classifies customers based on risk and they treat all customers the same. - Reporting entities indicated that not all existing customers have undergone the CDD process. - Failure to complete the CDD process would prevent opening an account, establishing a business relationship, or performing the transaction, but none of the reporting entities would consider filing an STR in such cases. - Implementation and effectiveness: "effectiveness has not been established." ### CDD and recordkeeping responsibilities for agents and money remitters - Lack of clarity between banks and their agents (Western Union and MoneyGram as money remitters) on CDD and recordkeeping responsibilities; assessors were unable to review AML/CFT responsibilities for principal and agent. - The two referenced entities (Western Union and MoneyGram) are not licensed by the BNR or registered as legal entities in Rwanda; authorities could not explain arrangements for customer identification and verification. - The assessment team was not provided the opportunity to meet with money remitters (14 registered as of the mission date) and could not assess their AML/CFT compliance; BNR officials could not describe CDD measures established by money remitters. - Inconsistent understandings exist as to which reporting entity (bank or money remitter) is responsible for implementing CDD measures and maintaining customer records. - SR.VI referenced for detailed description regarding alternative remittances. ### Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) — legal framework, requirements, and implementation - Article 16 of the AML/CFT Law imposes requirements on reporting entities dealing with a "political leader" (defined in Article 2(7)); definition aligns with FATF Glossary and applies to domestic and foreign PEPs. - Article 16 requires reporting authorities, in addition to normal due diligence measures, to have appropriate risk management systems to determine whether the customer is a political leader (cited in para. 302). - Article 2(4) defines "customer" but does not include potential customer or beneficial owner; Article 16 therefore falls short of requiring systems to determine whether the potential customer or beneficial owner is a PEP (para. 303). - Article 16(2) requires senior management approval before establishing a business relationship with a political leader but is silent on existing customers or beneficial owners who become political leaders after account opening (para. 304). - Article 16(3) requires taking all reasonable measures to establish source of wealth and source of funds for the customer but does not extend these requirements to beneficial owner(s) identified as political leaders (para. 305). - Article 16(4) requires monitoring of the business relationship with political leaders but does not require enhanced ongoing monitoring as required by the standard (para. 306). - Enhanced measures in the law apply to both domestic and foreign PEPs (para. 307). - Rwanda signed the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption in November 2004 and ratified in October 2006; promulgated by Presidential Order No. 56/01 of 27/12/2005 (para. 308). - Implementation and effectiveness: only a few banks have enhanced due diligence in line with the Law; most institutions undertake the same CDD for all customers and lack common practice/guidance on what constitutes a "prominent public function." Insufficient awareness and low implementation; "Effectiveness has therefore not been established." ### Cross-border correspondent accounts and similar relationships - Rwandan legislation is silent with respect to establishing cross-border correspondent accounts and similar relationships (para. 311). - Legal framework does not require reporting entities to: - gather sufficient information about a respondent institution; - assess respondent institution’s AML/CFT controls; - obtain senior management approval before establishing correspondent relationships; - document AML/CFT responsibilities of each institution (para. 312). - Authorities and private sector reported that cross-border correspondent relationships in Rwanda do not involve payable-through accounts (para. 313). - Implementation: cross-border correspondent relationships apply to banks and securities brokers; some relationships governed by signed contracts but assessors could not ascertain whether contracts include AML/CFT measures in line with Recommendation 7. Reporting entities could not establish whether they assessed reputation, quality of supervision, or AML/CFT controls of respondents (para. 314). - Effectiveness: "Effectiveness was therefore not established." (para. 315) ### Misuse of new technology, non-face-to-face business relationships, and mobile banking - No legal requirements to address ML threats from new or developing technologies; no physical presence requirement for account opening (para. 316). - Most banks require physical presence to open accounts; securities brokers do not require physical presence and may use power of attorney or nominee procedures (paras. 317–318). - Stock Exchange trading is manual; brokers may accept cash at their discretion (para. 319). - Mobile banking features: - Allows customers to check balances and send/receive electronic money (e-money) via SIM-based service supported by agent network (para. 320). - Telephone company indicated more than 490,000 users across the country (para. 320). - Agent role: (i) register new customers, (ii) receive money from registered customers, (iii) pay out money; service includes "receiving international remittances" (para. 321). - The telephone company reported approximately 760 agents in its network and that it had reached US$100 million in transactions since launch (para. 321). No national figures were provided. - The authorities had not assessed or addressed ML threats arising from mobile banking nor established an appropriate regulatory/supervisory framework for mobile banking, network operators, or the system; no AML/CFT supervision of mobile banking services as of the mission date (para. 322). - Overall, effective implementation regarding new technologies and non-face-to-face business relationships was not established. ### Key recommendations (summary) - Strengthen legal and regulatory framework and provide sector-specific regulations and guidelines to support AML/CFT Law (para. 323). - Recommendation 5 (CDD enhancements) — require in law or regulation all financial institutions to: - Refrain from establishing or keeping anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious names; - Undertake CDD measures in specified cases, including occasional wire transfers per the Interpretative Note to SR.VII and where there is suspicion of terrorist financing; - Establish applicable threshold for CDD for occasional transactions; - Identify customers and verify identity using reliable, independent source documents, data, or information; - Establish mechanisms for verifying power to bind legal persons or arrangements; - Identify beneficial owners and verify identity in line with the standard (including persons who exercise ultimate effective control); - Conduct ongoing due diligence on the business relationship, including transaction scrutiny and keeping CDD information up to date (paras. 324–325). - Additional measures to require in law, regulation, or other enforceable means (para. 325): - Obtain information on purpose and intended nature of business relationship; - Perform enhanced due diligence for higher risk categories; - Refuse to open/establish/execute and consider filing an STR when unable to comply with CDD; - Terminate business relationships and consider filing an STR when doubts arise about identity data; - Apply CDD to existing customers predating the AML/CFT Law on materiality and risk basis; - Perform CDD on existing customers holding anonymous or fictitious-name accounts predating the Law. - Recommendation 6 (PEPs) — provide examples of "prominent public functions" (e.g., heads of state or government; senior politicians; senior government, judicial, or military officials; senior executives of state owned corporations; important political party officials) and require reporting entities to: - Put in place appropriate risk management systems to determine whether a potential customer, customer, or beneficial owner is a PEP; - Obtain senior management approval to continue the business relationship when a customer or beneficial owner is subsequently found to be or becomes a PEP; - Establish source of wealth and source of funds of beneficial owners identified as PEPs; - Conduct enhanced monitoring on that relationship (paras. 326–327). - Recommendation 7 (correspondent relationships) — require reporting entities to: - Gather sufficient information about respondent institutions to understand their business, reputation, and quality of supervision; - Assess respondent institution’s AML/CFT controls; - Obtain senior management approval before establishing correspondent relationships; - Document respective obligations of each institution (para. 328). - Recommendation 8 (new technology and non-face-to-face) — establish measures, policies, and procedures to prevent misuse of new technologies and protect financial institutions from ML/TF threats arising from new or developing technologies; implement specific CDD measures for non-face-to-face business relationships; consult Basel Committee "Risk Management Principles for Electronic Banking" (July 2003) (para. 329). ### Compliance ratings and underlying factors (Recommendations 5–8) - R.5 — NC. Key factors: - Scope limitation: Insurance companies and intermediaries not subject to AML/CFT Law. - Banks not prohibited from keeping anonymous or fictitious-name accounts. - No requirement to undertake CDD for certain occasional wire transfers or for suspicion of terrorist financing. - No threshold set by FIU for CDD for occasional transactions; identification obligation inapplicable. - No mechanisms to verify power to bind legal person or arrangement. - No requirement to identify and verify customers using reliable independent sources. - No requirement to identify beneficial owners in line with the standard or to understand control structures. - No requirement for ongoing due diligence or to keep CDD information up to date. - No obligation to establish purpose and intended nature of business relationships. - No requirement for enhanced CDD for high-risk customers/transactions. - No requirement to reject/terminate relationships or consider STRs when CDD cannot be completed. - No requirement to apply CDD to existing customers predating the Law. - Low level of implementation and lack of demonstrated effectiveness. - R.6 — NC. Key factors: - Scope limitation: Insurance companies and intermediaries not subject to AML/CFT Law. - No requirement for risk management systems to identify PEPs (potential customer, customer, or beneficial owner). - No requirement for senior management approval to continue relationships when a customer or beneficial owner becomes a PEP. - No requirement to establish source of wealth/source of funds for beneficial owners identified as PEPs. - No requirement for enhanced monitoring of PEP relationships. - Low level of implementation and lack of demonstrated effectiveness. - R.7 — NC. Key factor: - No measures in relation to cross-border correspondent banking or other similar relationships. - R.8 — NC. Key factors: - Scope limitation: Insurance companies and intermediaries not subject to AML/CFT Law. - No requirement for policies to prevent misuse of technological developments for ML/TF. - No policies/procedures to address risks associated with non-face-to-face business relationships or transactions. - No specific and effective CDD procedures for non-face-to-face customers. *Content derived from the referenced IMF assessment chapter/section.* ### 330. The AML/CFT Law and other relevant laws are silent with respect to the acceptance by financial ### _cr15221 - 330. The AML/CFT Law and other relevant laws are silent with respect to the acceptance by financial ### Reliance on Intermediaries / Third Parties for CDD (Recommendation 9) - Legal status: - The AML/CFT Law and other relevant laws are silent with respect to the acceptance by financial institutions of intermediaries or third parties to perform some of the elements of the CDD process or to introduce business. - There are no legal or regulatory requirements addressing the reliance by financial institutions on intermediaries or third parties to perform the CDD elements and to comply with the different requirements set out under this Recommendation. - Implementation and effectiveness: - BNR, CMA, and reporting entities understand that under the AML/CFT Law, reporting entities are required to undertake their own due diligence process and may not rely on introducers, even from within the same group. - Absence of prohibition could lead to different interpretations by reporting entities. - BNR and some bank representatives view reliance as not prevalent in the financial sector; securities sector representatives indicated some reliance on intermediaries or third parties to perform some elements of the CDD process without following the requirements envisaged under the standard. - In the absence of legal provisions, implementation is not uniform across sectors and institutions and raises concerns about effectiveness. - Recommendations to comply with Recommendation 9: - Regulate reliance on intermediaries or third parties to perform elements of the CDD process, and ensure the following: - CDD measures performed by the intermediary or third parties are those listed under Criteria 5.3 to 5.6 of the Methodology; - The information collected by the third party may be immediately available to reporting entities upon request without delay; - The reporting entities are required to satisfy themselves that the third party is regulated and supervised and to have measures in place to comply with CDD requirements in line with Recommendation 5. - The ultimate responsibility for customer identification and verification remains with the reporting entities relying on the third party. - Compliance assessment: - R.9 — NC - Scope limitation: Insurance companies and intermediaries are not subject to the AML/CFT Law. - No legal or regulatory provisions addressing reliance on third parties to perform elements of the CDD process or introduce business. ### Financial Institution Secrecy or Confidentiality (Recommendation 4) - Legal framework and access: - With the exception of a specific requirement in the securities sector, there are no banking secrecy or other confidentiality requirements in the financial sector. - Sector-specific laws cited: Law 55/2007 (Central Bank Law), Law 007/2008 (Banking Law), Law 01/2011 (Law regulating the Capital Market in Rwanda), Law 11/2011 (Establishment of Capital Market Authority), Law 52/2008 (insurance), Law 40/2008 (Microfinance), Law 3/2010 (Payment Systems). - Article 8 of the AML/CFT Law: “every reporting entity, control organ, or auditor must respect the conditions set forth by the law, notwithstanding any obligation of professional secrecy or restriction of divulgation of information imposed by any other law.” - Article 59 of the Banking Law: no person may invoke professional secrecy as grounds for non-disclosure of information required by the Central Bank; banks required to submit documents, declarations and financial statements and provide information, clarification, or explanation requested by the BNR. - Article 54 of the Insurance Law grants the BNR power to “seek information and explanation from the officers, employees, agents and representatives of insurers and insurance intermediaries, whether in preparation for, during or after a compliance inspection.” - Articles 40 and 41 of the Microfinance Law and Article 9 of the Payment Systems Law grant broad access powers to the BNR. - Securities sector: Article 49 of the Capital Markets Law restricts disclosure without consent but Article 50 lists exceptions including aiding the Central Bank of Rwanda and the CMA. - Practical issues and information sharing: - LEAs can obtain documents and information other than those held by lawyers via warrant from the public prosecutor; in practice LEAs can access information required to combat ML or FT. - Financial secrecy does not constitute an impediment for effective implementation of the FATF Recommendations. - Domestic legal framework does not provide the BNR with the power to share information with other competent authorities in Rwanda; authorities state BNR shares information in practice but not for AML/CFT purposes since it has not conducted AML/CFT supervision. - Central Bank Law provides capacity to share information with foreign counterparts, but this does not apply to AML/CFT. - CMA has powers to cooperate and share information domestically and internationally under the Capital Markets Law (articles 51, 52, 57, and 58 and Article 3 paragraph 14 of Law 11/2011) subject to conditions (e.g., confidentiality assurances by foreign authority). - BNR and CMA have signed MOUs domestically and internationally, but these do not cover AML/CFT issues and neither has been designated as an AML/CFT supervisor. - Nothing prevents sharing of information between financial institutions where required by R.7, R.9, or SR.VII; however, no legal provision related to cross-border correspondent relationships or intermediaries/introduced business. - Authorities indicated financial institutions share information as required under R.4 through associations, but no evidence on practical implementation was provided. - Implementation and effectiveness: - Authorities could not demonstrate that BNR and CMA have asked for and shared information on AML/CFT issues at domestic and international levels; MOUs do not address AML/CFT. - Financial institutions were not fully aware of the ability to share information with other financial institutions in matters related to cross-border relationships, intermediaries, or wire transfers. - Recommendations: - Ensure that the BNR is granted the power to exchange AML/CFT information with other domestic competent authorities. - Ensure that competent authorities share information on AML/CFT-related issues at both domestic and international levels. - Ensure that reporting entities are allowed to share information required under R.7, R.9, or SR.VII. - Compliance assessment: - R.4 — PC - Scope limitation: Insurance companies and intermediaries are not subject to the AML/CFT Law. - Mechanisms for exchanging and sharing information among competent authorities do not address AML/CFT matters. - Effectiveness was not established with respect to the sharing of information between competent authorities, at both domestic and international levels. ### Record-Keeping and Wire Transfer Rules (Recommendation 10 and SR.VII) - Legal framework: - Applicable laws and regulation: AML/CFT Law, Law 7/2008 (organization of banking), Regulation 2/2010 governing Payment Services Providers. - Record-keeping requirements: - Article 17(2) of the AML/CFT Law: reporting entities are required to maintain for at least ten years all necessary records on transactions at the national or international level. - Article 17(3): “persons required to exercise due diligence shall maintain account books and business correspondence for a period of at least ten years after the end of the business relationship.” - Authorities interpret “account books” as “accounting records,” including nature and date of transaction, type and amount of currency, type and identification number of any account involved, etc. - Article 17(1): reporting entities must keep records on the identification data obtained through or presented during the CDD process for a period of at least 10 years after the end of the business relationship; for an occasional customer the ten-year period starts from the conclusion of the transaction. - There is no requirement to maintain account files in line with criterion 10.2 (i.e., account applications, related business activity, and any other supporting information related to the identification data). - Effectiveness and shortcomings: - The 10-year period seems sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions for prosecution purposes. - Some necessary components of transaction records (customers' and beneficiary's name, address, or other identifying information normally recorded by the financial institution) are not properly maintained. - Shortcomings identified under Rec.5 (obtaining adequate customers’ and beneficial owner’s identification documents) and challenges in verifying the physical address affect effective implementation of record-keeping requirements. - Article 17(4): “identification data and transactions records are immediately given to the requesting competent domestic authorities upon authorization by the Financial Investigation Unit.” This requirement is too restrictive because access is only possible upon authorization by the FIU. - Wire transfers and originator information: - Only banks and money remitters are licensed to provide payment services; only banks can conduct wire transfer activities. - Money remitters conduct services through banks; large money remitters such as Western Union and MoneyGram operate through agency relationships with local banks and are not licensed by the BNR or incorporated as legal entities in Rwanda. - Article 6 paragraph 1 of the AML/CFT Law: “any transfer of money or negotiable instruments destined for or coming from a foreign country, of an amount at least equal to a threshold (still to be set) by the FIU, must be performed by a bank, a financial institution or an authorized money remitter.” - Paragraph 2: banks, other reporting entities, and money remitters must include “accurate originator information” on all money transfers, electronic or other, along with any other related message; this information must go along with the transfer through the payment chain. - The law does not define “accurate originator information.” Authorities understand this to cover the originator’s name, account number, and address (“full originator information”), but could not corroborate that this information is indeed required in practice. *IMF mission report content as provided in the source.* ### 358. There is no specific requirement for ordering financial institutions to obtain and maintain in all ### _cr15221 - 358. There is no specific requirement for ordering financial institutions to obtain and maintain in all ### Wire transfers and SR.VII — Findings - There is no specific requirement for ordering financial institutions to obtain and maintain in all wire transfers of EUR/US$1,000 or more, the information related to the originator of the wire transfer as requested under criteria VII.1 (i.e., the name of the originator, the originator’s account number (or unique reference number if no account number exists), and the originator’s address). - There are no requirements for ordering financial institutions to verify the identity of the originator in accordance with Recommendation 5. - Exceptions exist for: i) wire transfers performed with credit or debit card so long as the number appears in the included information (applies when the credit or cash cards are used as a means of payment); and ii) “wire transfers and payments when the originator subject to the obligation of providing information and the beneficiary are financial institutions which are acting on their own account” (paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same Article). These exceptions are in line with the type of payments listed in the Interpretative Note to SR.VII. - Article 10 of the AML/CFT Law requires reporting entities to identify their customers when they receive a wire transfer that does not contain full information about the originator; authorities could not explain the rationale for this requirement. - Article 6 does not apply in practice, considering that the FIU has not yet set the threshold applicable to cross-border wire transfers. - Ambiguity: Article 6 paragraph 2’s obligation to include “accurate originator information” is, according to authorities, intended to apply to both cross-border and domestic transfers; however, the law’s text of paragraph 1 seems to limit Article 6 (including paragraph 2) to cross-border transfers equal to or above the threshold. - There is no requirement for each intermediary and beneficiary financial institution in the payment chain to ensure that all originator information that accompanies a wire transfer is transmitted with the transfer. - There are no rules governing measures (other than identification of the bank’s own customer) to be taken when wire transfers are not accompanied by complete originator information. - No measures are in place to effectively monitor compliance of financial institutions with rules and regulations implementing SR.VII. Regulation 002/2010 of the BNR requires submission of “proof of ability” to comply with all AML/CFT measures as a licensing condition (Article 4, paragraph 9), but the BNR could not establish whether this had been implemented and had not examined compliance after licensing. - Once a license has been granted, there are no sanctions for non-compliance with the wire transfer obligations. - At the time of the assessment, the FIU has not yet set the threshold applicable to cross-border wire transfers. - Operational practice: Wire transfers are carried out using the SWIFT system, which requires that all fields in the message order are adequately completed. Bank representatives indicated the system detects lack of originator information and places transfers “on hold” until information is provided. Absence of complete information is not considered a factor in assessing whether a transaction should be reported to the FIU, and no reports have been filed for failure to provide full originator information. Financial institutions report no major implementation issues but show a low level of awareness of how AML/CFT controls should apply in this regard. ### Record-keeping and Recommendation 10 — Findings - Reporting entities retain all business records for at least ten years and such records are available to competent authorities, as reported by BNR, the CMA, and private sector representatives. - In practice, banks, insurance companies, and securities firms comply with sector-specific laws; with respect to AML/CFT, only banks were aware of the record-keeping requirement, reflecting low effectiveness and implementation of AML/CFT Law obligations. - Documentation maintained includes copies obtained during customer identification (account applications for natural and legal persons, copies of national ID, passports (for natural persons), certificates of incorporation, articles of association, powers of attorney, and transaction history). - Some necessary components of transaction records — identification of the customer and the beneficial owner, and the ability to verify the address using independent and reliable data — are not properly maintained. Shortcomings in CDD implementation affect record-keeping effectiveness. ### Monitoring of implementation, supervision, and sanctions — Findings - No measures in place to effectively monitor compliance with SR.VII after licensing. - No sanctions available post-licensing for non-compliance with wire transfer obligations. - Financial institutions demonstrate low awareness and inconsistent implementation of AML/CFT controls related to wire transfers. ### Recommendations (R.10 and SR.VII) — as provided Recommendation 10: - Require financial institutions to maintain records on account files; - Ensure that all customer information required under Recommendation 5 is properly maintained; - Ensure that there is no restriction to timely access to customer and transaction records by competent authorities. Recommendation SR.VII: - Require financial institutions conducting wire transfers (both domestic and international) of EUR/US$1,000 or more to obtain and maintain full originator information (i.e., the originator’s name, account number, and the address) and to verify the identity of the originator in accordance with Recommendation 5; - Require each intermediary and beneficiary financial institution in the payment chain to ensure that all originator information that accompanies the wire transfer is transmitted with the transfer; - Require beneficiary financial institution to adopt effective risk-based procedures for identifying and handling wire transfers that are not accompanied by complete originator information and to consider the lack of complete originator information as a factor in assessing whether they are required to be reported to the FIU and consider restricting or terminating its business relationship with financial institutions that fail to meet SR.VII; - Monitor the compliance of financial institutions with the requirements set forth under SR.VII; and - Ensure that there are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for failure to comply with the wire transfer requirements. ### Compliance ratings and factors - R.10 — PC - Scope limitation: Insurance companies and intermediaries are not subject to the AML/CFT Law. - No requirement to maintain accounts files. - Limitation/restriction of competent authorities’ access on a timely basis to customer and transaction records. - Shortcomings under Recommendation 5 affect effectiveness and implementation of record-keeping measures (necessary components of transaction records: address, beneficiary’s name). - SR.VII — NC - No requirement for reporting entities conducting wire transfers both domestic and international of amounts equivalent to EUR/US$1000 or more to obtain and maintain full originator information. - No requirement for ordering financial institutions to verify the identity of the originator in accordance with Recommendation 5. - Lack of clarity as to whether originator information should be included in domestic wire transfers. - No requirement on intermediaries and beneficiary financial institutions in the payment chain to ensure that all originator information that accompanies a wire transfer is transmitted with the transfer. - No requirement on beneficiary financial institution to adopt effective risk-based procedures for identifying and handling wire transfers that are not accompanied by complete originator information and to consider the lack of complete originator information a factor in assessing whether they are required to be reported to the FIU and consider restricting or terminating its business relationship with financial institutions that fail to meet SR.VII. - No supervisory framework to ensure compliance with the wire transfer requirements after the granting of the necessary license. - No sanctioning regime for failure to comply with wire transfer requirements. - Lack of effective implementation. ### Monitoring of transactions and relationships (R.11 and R.21) — Findings - The AML/CFT Law establishes the framework for monitoring unusual transactions (R.11) and paying special attention to countries not sufficiently applying the FATF Recommendations (R.21). No AML/CFT regulations were in place at the time of the assessment; draft regulations had been prepared but not shared with assessors. - Reporting entities are required to pay special attention to complex, unusual patterns of transactions or exceptionally large transactions with no apparent economic or lawful purpose, examine background and purpose, document findings in writing, and transmit a report to the FIU (Article 15, paragraph 1). Article 17, paragraph 2 requires reporting entities to maintain records for at least 10 years. Reporting entities are not required to make their findings available to competent authorities and auditors. - Article 15, paragraph 2 requires paying special attention to business relationships and transactions with persons residing in countries that do not apply regulations for combating money laundering or apply insufficient regulations equivalent to the Rwandan AML/CFT Law; the requirement does not extend to countries that do not apply the standard on combating terrorist financing. No measures are in place to advise reporting entities of weaknesses in other countries’ AML/CFT systems. - Implementation: Private sector meetings revealed limited knowledge and inconsistent implementation; few banks (generally those with a parent company abroad) showed better understanding. Some entities (except banks) lacked automated real-time monitoring systems; monitoring was manual and end-of-day. Several reporting entities were not aware of the AML/CFT Law; therefore, no monitoring of unusual transactions was taking place. Implementation is not considered effective. ### Recommendations (R.11 and R.21) — as provided Recommendation 11: - Require reporting entities to keep the findings of their analysis and examination of unusual transactions available for competent authorities and auditors. Recommendation 21: - Ensure that the reporting requirement extends to combating terrorist financing; - Ensure that reporting entities are advised of concerns about weaknesses in the AML/CFT systems of other countries; - Extend the obligation on reporting entities to examine, as far as possible, the background and purpose of transactions that have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, and to keep their written findings of those transactions available to assist competent authorities and auditors for business relations and transactions with persons residing in countries that do not apply regulations for combating money laundering or apply insufficiently regulations equivalent to those provided for the Rwandan AML/CFT Law; - Establish mechanisms for applying counter-measures where a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations. ### Suspicious Transaction Reporting (R.13-14, 19, 25 and SR.IV) — Findings - The AML/CFT Law provides the legal framework for reporting transactions to the FIU, including reporting for any suspicion of money laundering and terrorist financing, and for any unusual transaction that is not justified. The scope of the suspicious transaction reporting requirement is too narrow for both money laundering and terrorist financing. - The level of reporting is extremely low: only six STRs submitted by banks since the establishment of the FIU in May 2011, due to lack of awareness of AML/CFT Law obligations. - The obligation to report suspicious transactions to the FIU is set out in Article 21 of the AML/CFT Law and applies to all reporting entities listed under Article 3 (BNR, banks, and other nonbank financial institutions including microfinance institutions, payment systems/service providers, money remitters, and bureaux de change). The obligation does not extend to insurance companies and insurance brokers/agents because they are not covered by the definition of reporting entity. - No regulations or guidelines had been issued to provide further guidance on reporting suspicious transactions. - Reporting entities must, when they have reasonable motives to suspect funds are linked to money laundering or financing of terrorism, report immediately to the FIU and immediately convey additional information that may confirm or deny their suspicion (Article 21). Banking sector representatives reported practice to report when they suspect links to potential money laundering or terrorist financing. *Source: _cr15221 - 358. There is no specific requirement for ordering financial institutions to obtain and maintain in all (excerpt).* ### 383. As mentioned under Recommendation 1 above, the money laundering offense covers most, but ### _cr15221 - 383. As mentioned under Recommendation 1 above, the money laundering offense covers most, but ### Scope of the reporting obligation and predicate offenses - The money laundering offense covers most, but not all, of the designated categories of predicate offenses (paragraph 383). - The scope of the reporting obligation and its reference to “money laundering activities” is therefore too limited (paragraph 383). - With respect to terrorism and its financing, the reporting obligation does not address suspicions that funds may be linked or related to individual terrorists, terrorist organizations, and those who finance terrorism (paragraph 383). ### No Reporting Threshold for STRs (c. 13.3) - There is no explicit obligation to report attempted transactions; authorities could not explain whether attempted transactions are implicitly included under Article 21 of the AML/CFT Law (paragraph 384). - Meetings with banking sector representatives indicated banks would report attempted transactions as good practice or due to parent company requirements abroad, but none have been reported so far (paragraph 384). - In line with the standard, there are no thresholds in the law that would limit the range of suspicious transactions to be reported (paragraph 385). ### Making of ML and TF STRs Regardless of Possible Involvement of Tax Matters (c. 13.4, c. IV.2) - There is no explicit restriction in the law limiting reporting requirements when transactions are thought to involve tax matters (paragraph 386). - As of the mission date, no tax-related STRs had been reported to the FIU (paragraph 386). ### Protection for Making STRs (c. 14.1) and Prohibition Against Tipping-Off (c. 14.2) - No proceedings for breach of professional secrecy can be brought against executive officers and employees of reporting entities who, in good faith, have transmitted information or submitted STRs to the FIU, even if investigations or court orders did not result in any conviction (Article 27(3) of the AML/CFT Law) (paragraph 387). - Authorities could not establish whether the protection extended to independent or external board members, managers, and agents/representatives; however, Article 27(3) seems sufficiently broad to provide general protection (paragraph 388). - Reporting entities are prohibited from revealing to customers or third parties that information has been communicated to the FIU or that a report related to ML or FT has been submitted to the FIU (Article 22 of the AML/CFT Law). Authorities described “third parties” as any other person (natural or legal) not related to the customer or reporting entities; BNR is not considered a third party by BNR officials (paragraph 389). ### Confidentiality of reporting staff (c. 14.3) - The law does not address confidentiality of reporting staff names and personal details, but authorities indicated that in practice the FIU keeps such details confidential (paragraph 390). ### Consideration of Reporting of Currency Transactions Above a Threshold (c. 19.1–19.3) - Article 18 of the AML/CFT Law requires reporting authorities to report to the FIU all cash transactions above the threshold set out by the FIU, using forms and time determined by FIU regulations; this requirement is not applicable when both sender and recipient are “banks or financial institutions” (paragraph 391). - Reporting authorities must report aggregated linked transactions that would exceed the established threshold (paragraph 392). - At the time of the assessment, no threshold had been set (paragraph 393). - No systems were in place for reporting cash transactions to the FIU (paragraph 394). ### Feedback, Guidelines, and Statistics (c. 25.2; R.32) - At the time of the assessment, no feedback or guidelines had been provided to reporting entities regarding their reporting obligations (paragraph 395). - Statistics: since the FIU became operational in 2011, six STRs have been filed; all six were sent by banks. No other statistics were provided by the BNR (paragraph 396). ### Implementation and Effectiveness - Implementation of the reporting obligation is low, partly because although the AML/CFT Law has been in force since 2009, the FIU was not established until 2011 (paragraph 397). - The system for reporting suspicious transactions does not seem to be effective, supported by the low number of reports and very low awareness among reporting entities (except for a limited better awareness among foreign-owned banks). Assessors conclude guidance and outreach activities are needed (paragraph 398). ### Recommendations and Comments (3.7.2) - Amend the reporting obligation to apply to all the predicate offenses designated by the FATF (paragraph 399). - Include insurance companies and insurance brokers/agents in the definition of reporting entity (paragraph 399). - Require all reporting entities (as defined in the FATF standard) to report all transactions, including attempted transactions, when they suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect proceeds of criminal activity, or funds related/linked to, or to be used for, terrorism, terrorist acts, terrorist organizations, or those who finance terrorism (paragraph 399). - Ensure competent authorities, particularly the FIU, provide guidance to assist reporting entities on AML/CFT issues covered under the FATF recommendations, including at minimum a description of ML and FT techniques and methods and additional measures to ensure effective AML/CFT procedures (paragraph 399). - Establish communication mechanisms between the BNR, the FIU, and the CMA, and mechanisms for providing feedback to reporting entities including general and specific or case-by-case feedback (paragraph 399). - Consider providing guidance to reporting entities using the FATF Best Practice Guidelines on Providing Feedback to Reporting Financial Institutions and Other Persons as a reference (paragraph 399). - Clarify that protection for good faith reporting extends to board members or managers, board committees, the compliance officer, other officers, and any agents or representatives of reporting entities (paragraph 399). ### Compliance with Recommendations 13, 14, 19, 25, and SR.IV (3.7.3) - R.13: NC - Reasons: - Scope of reporting obligation is too narrow because ML offense does not apply to all FATF-designated predicate offenses. - Reporting obligation does not extend to insurance companies and insurance brokers/agents. - No obligation to report attempted transactions. - No obligation to report funds suspected of being linked or related to or to be used by individual terrorists. - Implementation of reporting obligation is low. - R.14: C (This recommendation is met.) - R.19: C (This recommendation is met.) - R.25: NC - Reasons: - Lack of guidelines and guidance on reporting obligation. - Lack of adequate and appropriate feedback from competent authorities, in particular the FIU. - SR.IV: NC - Reason: - No obligation to report funds suspected of being linked or related to or to be used by individual terrorists, terrorist organizations, or those who finance terrorism. ### Internal Controls, Compliance, Audit, and Foreign Branches (R.15 and 22) — Description and Analysis - Legal framework: AML/CFT Law requires reporting entities to develop and maintain AML/CFT programs, designate a compliance officer at management level, and establish recruitment mechanisms; except for banks, non-bank reporting entities have not adopted or implemented policies and procedures in line with these requirements. Obligation does not extend to insurance companies and insurance brokers/agents as they are not included in the definition of reporting entities (paragraph 400). - Article 19(1) and (2) requires programs to include “the improvement of policies, procedures and controls including recruitment supervision mechanisms to check whether recruitment requirements are satisfactorily complied with” and “the designation of inspections at the management level”; intention to include requirement to designate a compliance officer at management level, but text should be clarified (paragraph 401). - Obligations under Article 19 are very general and lack necessary detail; do not establish required procedures/policies/controls (such as CDD measures), nor address record retention, detection of unusual and suspicious transactions, and the reporting obligation (paragraph 402). - No obligations to (i) communicate internal procedures/policies/controls to employees, and (ii) grant AML/CFT compliance officer and staff timely access to customer identification, CDD information, transaction records, and other relevant information (paragraph 403). - “Recruitment supervision mechanisms” refer to measures for hiring including face-to-face interviews, verifying employment and personal references, and obtaining a “Certificate of Good Conduct” from law enforcement agencies (paragraph 404). - Article 19(4) requires programs to include “a permanent audit function to ensure the conformity and the efficiency” of AML/CFT measures, but there is no obligation for an independent and well resourced audit function (paragraph 405). - Article 19(3) requires ongoing employee training on AML/CFT matters, but the obligation is general and does not specify content/scope; does not require inclusion of current ML and TF techniques, methods and trends, all aspects of the AML/CFT Law and obligations, or requirements concerning CDD and suspicious transaction reporting (paragraph 406). - Additional Element—Independence of Compliance Officer is not addressed (paragraph 407). - Application to foreign branches/subsidiaries: Not applicable—there are no Rwandan banks with foreign branches and subsidiaries abroad (paragraph 408). ### Implementation and Effectiveness (Internal controls) - Meetings revealed marked inconsistencies in scope and coverage of compliance programs across reporting entities (paragraph 409). - Level of compliance with Article 19 varied: banks with foreign ownership had basic AML/CFT measures; securities brokers, bureaux de change, microfinance institutions, pension funds, and payment services/system providers had no AML/CFT controls in place (paragraph 409). - Obligations do not extend to insurance companies and insurance brokers/agents (paragraph 409). - Main reasons for lack of compliance: lack of awareness of AML/CFT Law and obligations, lack of guidance and supervision by competent authorities (paragraph 409). - Preventive measures for internal AML/CFT programs are not effective (paragraph 409). ### Recommendations and Comments (3.8.2) - Require all reporting entities to establish, adopt, and maintain internal procedures, policies, and controls addressing CDD, record retention, detection of unusual and suspicious transactions, and the reporting obligation (paragraph 410). - Require reporting entities to designate the AML/CFT compliance officer at managerial level (paragraph 410). - Require reporting entities to ensure AML/CFT compliance officer and other appropriate staff have timely access to customer information, data and other CDD information, transaction records, and other relevant information (paragraph 410). - Require reporting entities to maintain an adequately resourced and independent audit function to test compliance with procedures, policies, and controls; provide sufficient detail to ensure scope includes AML/CFT audits and assessment of adequacy of internal control systems and policies (paragraph 410). - Require reporting entities to develop and maintain ongoing employee training on AML/CFT matters, including current ML and FT techniques, methods, and trends; all aspects of AML/CFT Law and obligations; and requirements concerning CDD and suspicious transaction reporting (paragraph 410). - Although R.22 is not currently applicable, authorities are encouraged to set out provisions for reporting entities in the event foreign branches and subsidiaries are established to observe AML/CFT measures consistent with home country requirements and FATF Recommendations, apply the higher standard where home and host differ to the extent local laws permit, and pay attention to branches/subsidiaries in countries that do not or insufficiently apply FATF Recommendations (paragraph 411). ### Compliance with Recommendations 15 and 22 (3.8.3) - R.15: PC - Factors underlying rating: - AML/CFT Law requires some measures but lacks necessary clarity and detail for full compliance with the standard. - Requirements for reporting entities to establish/adopt/maintain internal procedures, policies, and controls addressing CDD, record retention, detection of unusual and suspicious transactions, and reporting obligation are incomplete. - Incomplete requirements to communicate procedures/policies/controls to employees and to designate compliance officer and grant timely access to CDD information. - Requirements for internal audit function to assess adequacy of internal control systems and to maintain adequately resourced and independent audit function are incomplete. - Lack of implementation of requirements and effectiveness not established. - R.22: N/A *Source: IMF assessment text provided in content unit _cr15221 - 383.* ### 415. There is no requirement on banks to satisfy themselves that respondent financial institutions in a ### _cr15221 - 415. There is no requirement on banks to satisfy themselves that respondent financial institutions in a ### Shell banks; Implementation and Effectiveness; Recommendation 18 - "There is no requirement on banks to satisfy themselves that respondent financial institutions in a foreign country do not permit their accounts to be used by shell banks." - In practice, "none of the banks visited during the mission provide correspondent accounts to financial institutions abroad." - "Representatives from the banking sector indicated that there are no shell banks established in or operating from Rwanda and no Rwandan banks maintain any correspondent relationships with shell banks." - The legal framework for licensing a bank in Rwanda "effectively prohibits the establishment or continued operation of shell banks." - Recommendation to achieve full compliance with Recommendation 18: - "Explicitly require reporting entities to satisfy themselves that when establishing correspondent relationships in the future, their respondent institutions in foreign countries do not permit their accounts to be used by shell banks." ### Compliance rating for Recommendation 18 - R.18: LC - Underlying factor: "No requirement for reporting entities to satisfy themselves that their foreign respondents do not permit their accounts to be used by shell banks." ### The Supervisory and Oversight System — competent authorities, remit, and legal gaps (R. 23, 29, 17, and 25) - Two supervisory authorities: National Bank of Rwanda (BNR) and Capital Markets Authority (CMA). - "They are not responsible for AML/CFT supervision." - Authorities claim BNR and CMA remits "extend to the monitoring of the financial entities’ compliance with any obligations, i.e., including those set out in the AML/CFT Law. However, they were not able to provide the legal basis for this." - The AML/CFT Law "does not designate or make any reference to the authorities responsible for AML/CFT supervision, and does not cross-refer to any of the sector-specific laws (neither in its preamble, nor in its specific provisions)." - Sector-specific laws provide legal framework for BNR and CMA supervision but "do not address AML/CFT issues." - "There is therefore no authority that has been designated to monitor the reporting entities’ compliance with AML/CFT obligations." - "AML/CFT supervision does not take place, neither de jure nor de facto." ### BNR and CMA scopes, powers, and supervisory documentation - BNR responsibilities (prudential supervision): "banks, microfinance companies, insurance companies and brokers, pension funds, savings and credit institutions, bureaux de change, and payment systems/services providers (which includes money remitters)." - CMA responsibilities (market conduct): "securities firms, brokers, dealers, sponsors, investment advisers, investment banks, investment managers, custodians, securities exchange, clearing house, and credit rating agency." - Sector-specific laws grant powers to monitor/supervise for prudential/market conduct but "do not provide that the respective supervisory powers extend to AML/CFT issues or designate the BNR and the CMA as the competent authorities with responsibility to regulate and supervise their reporting entities for AML/CFT purposes." - BNR Offsite Surveillance Manual "exclusively focused on financial/prudential risks. There was no coverage of surveillance and monitoring activities for AML/CFT purposes." - BNR Onsite Inspection Procedures Manual (dated January 2010) includes limited AML/CFT references restricted to: - "(i) determining whether the bank has an effective AML/CFT function," - "(ii) determining the adequacy of internal audit review of anti-money laundering issues," - "(iii) communicating with examiners reviewing other areas to assess the level of compliance with other applicable laws such as AML." - Assessors "could not establish the scope or the extent of the onsite inspection work performed" as BNR officials "did not provide working papers supporting the AML/CFT activities conducted." - BNR documented AML/CFT matters "only when noncompliance issues and/or violations of law were identified." ### Onsite inspection statistics provided by BNR (2009–2011) - Table 6. Financial/Prudential onsite inspections conducted by the BNR (2009–2011): - Bank: Total Number of Reporting Entities Licensed and Operating as of the mission date: 15; 2009 Inspections Conducted: 4; 2010 Inspections Conducted: 4; 2011 Inspections Conducted: 7 - Microfinance: Total Number: 134; 2009 Inspections: 38; 2010 Inspections: 44; 2011 Inspections: 52 - Insurance Companies: Total Number: 13; 2009 Inspections: 6; 2010 Inspections: 2; 2011 Inspections: 5 - Pension Funds: Total Number: 1; 2009 Inspections: *; 2010 Inspections: *; 2011 Inspections: * - Bureaux de Change: Total Number: 133; 2009 Inspections: *; 2010 Inspections: 1; 2011 Inspections: 27 - Payment System/Services Providers: Total Number: *; 2009 Inspections: 3; 2010 Inspections: 8; 2011 Inspections: 14 - "*Information not provided by the authorities." - Despite indications that AML/CFT matters are "covered as part of the financial/prudential inspection," BNR "did not provide the assessors with documentation, including work papers and reports of inspections covering the AML/CFT work performed." ### Adequacy of resources — BNR and CMA (R. 30) - BNR staffing and budgetary resources (Table 7): - Banking: Number of Staff: 13; Annual Budget Allocation: No information provided. - Microfinance: Number of Staff: 77; Annual Budget Allocation: No information provided. - Insurance and Pension Funds (NBFIs): Number of Staff: 11; Annual Budget Allocation: No information provided. - Bureaux de Change: Number of Staff: 3; Annual Budget Allocation: No information provided. - Payment System/Services Providers: Number of Staff: 2; Annual Budget Allocation: No information provided. - Authorities "were not able to clearly determine or provide a reasonable estimate of the number of supervisors assigned to conduct AML/CFT inspections," making assessment of adequacy of resources impossible. - BNR stated "each staff of the BNR has signed a pledge of confidentiality" but no sample pledge was provided. - "As of the mission date, no specific training related to AML/CFT has been provided to BNR staff." - CMA staffing and budgetary resources (Table 8): - CEO Office: Number of Staff: 3; Annual Budget Allocation: "The budget is allocated to the institution and departments get their budget through actions that they perform." - Legal and Corporate Affairs: Number of Staff: 3; Annual Budget Allocation: "The budget is allocated to the institution and departments get their budget through actions that they perform." - Finance and Administration: Number of Staff: 4; Annual Budget Allocation: "The budget is allocated to the institution and departments get their budget through actions that they perform." - IT: Number of Staff: 3; Annual Budget Allocation: "The budget is allocated to the institution and departments get their budget through actions that they perform." - Market Development and Research: Number of Staff: 3; Annual Budget Allocation: "The budget is allocated to the institution and departments get their budget through actions that they perform." - Supervision and Inspection: Number of Staff: 3; Annual Budget Allocation: "The budget is allocated to the institution and departments get their budget through actions that they perform." - CMA has carried out market conduct inspections since June 2011 but "to date no AML/CFT inspection has yet been conducted." - CMA "has not provided training to its staff on AML/CFT matters, but is considering developing the training material." - As with BNR, it was "not possible to assess the adequacy of supervisory resources" at CMA due to lack of estimates of supervisors assigned to AML/CFT. ### Supervisory powers regarding AML/CFT; sanctions - Monitoring, supervision, and inspections by BNR and CMA "are mainly focused towards prudential (financial) matters and market conduct, respectively." - Powers under sector-specific laws "are only applicable to prudential and market conduct matters and do not extend to or address AML/CFT matters." - CMA entitlements: Articles 36 and 37 of Law 01/2011 permit CMA "to request, in the exercise of its functions, information from persons licensed or approved, and to enter any premises occupied by a licenses or approved person." - Ministerial Order No. 002/12/10/TC of May 18, 2012 "provides the CMA with adequate powers to decide the scope of and to conduct its supervisory functions." - Sanctions and legal provisions: - "Tipping off and failure to comply with the reporting requirements were punishable by 5 to 10 years imprisonment and/or a fine in Article 53, paragraphs 1 and 7 of the AML/CFT Law but these provisions have been repealed by the new Penal Code." - Article 54 of the AML/CFT Law enables the "disciplinary and supervisory authority" to sanction other failures to comply with the obligations of the law "according to the conditions provided for by the professional and administrative regulations." - Sector-specific laws provide sanctioning powers to BNR and CMA for violations of the requirements they impose, but "they do not specifically extend to violations of AML/CFT requirements." - Consequently, "it is therefore not entirely clear what sanctions would be imposed in this context." - The law limits availability of sanctions to cases where the failure was "a result of either a serious lack of vigilance or a shortcoming in the organization of the internal procedures of money laundering prevention." *Source: _cr15221 - IMF assessment text excerpt.* ### 441. The BNR has used its powers in very few occasions (see table below), mostly by imposing ### _cr15221 - 441. The BNR has used its powers in very few occasions (see table below), mostly by imposing ### Licensing and fit-and-proper framework - The BNR is responsible for granting and revoking licenses for banks, microfinance, insurance companies and brokers, pension funds, savings and credit cooperatives, bureaux de change, and payment system/services providers, as well as changes in control over ownership of these reporting entities. - The CMA is responsible for granting and revoking licenses for brokers, dealers, sponsors, investment advisers, investment banks, investment managers, custodians, securities exchange, clearing house, and credit rating agency. - All regulated entities require authorization and a license from the BNR or the CMA to operate in Rwanda. Licensing requirements are covered under the relevant sector law, except for pension schemes. - Excerpts from sectoral licensing and fit-and-proper provisions as presented: - Banking: Banking Law: Articles, 5 and 6; and Articles 18 to 21. Regulation No. 03/2008: Articles 2 and 3. Banking Law (Art. 5(c)) provides a general statement on qualifications, experience, trustworthiness, and professional reputation. Regulation (Art. 2 and 3) covers fit and proper criteria for substantial shareholders (Appendix 2), proposed directors, and officers (Appendix 4). Competent Authority: BNR. - Microfinance: Microfinance Law No. 40/2008 of 26/08/2008 - Articles 9, 10, 11, 12, 14; Law No. 40/2008 of 26/08/2008 - Article 22, 23. Competent Authority: BNR. - Insurance: Regulation No. 05/2009 of 29/07/2009 - Articles 6, 7, 38, 43, 44. Regulation No. 05/2009 of 29/07/2009 on licensing requirements and other requirements for carrying out insurance business, Article 8. BNR to have regard to: (a) personal quality relating to general probity, competence and soundness of judgment, diligence; (b) previous conduct and activities including bankruptcies and involvement in insolvent enterprises; (c) convictions or complicity in offences involving corruption, fraud, tax evasion, money laundering, other economic and financial crimes, crime against humanity, crime of genocide or terrorism. Competent Authority: BNR. - Pension: Not covered in law or regulation. Competent Authority: BNR. (Authorities noted a draft law pending before Parliament.) - Payment System Provider: Regulation No. 006/2012 of 21/06/2012 of the BNR governing payment services providers; Regulation No. 05/2010 of 27/12/2010 of the BNR relating to licensing criteria of operating payment and securities settlement systems - Articles 3, 4, 5, 6. Fit and proper: Not covered in law or regulation. Competent Authority: BNR. - Foreign Exchange (Regulation): Regulation No. 13/2001 - Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. Fit and proper: Not covered in law or regulation. Competent Authority: BNR. - Securities: Regulation No. 01 of 6/06/2012 – Articles 4, 5, 6, 7. Regulation No. 01 of 06/06/2012 of the CMA on capital markets sets out elements CMA should take into account: person’s honesty, integrity, and reputation (including past criminal convictions and disciplinary actions); person’s competence and capability (including past training); person’s financial soundness (including past bankruptcies). Competent Authority: CMA. - Authorities report that, in addition to licensing requirements, all owners, directors, and officers are subject to a vetting process for technical competence, solvency, and integrity. - For PSP licensing, forex bureaux are covered and a clearance form from the Prosecution Authority is submitted to address background checks. - Authorities indicated the only pension scheme is public (owned by the government) and in that instance the requirements are not applicable. ### Statistical information on licensing activities - Authorities provided the following Statistical Table 5. Licensing Activities (as presented): - Apps. Rec’d - 2009 0 0 0 0 0 10 12 1 - 2010 0 13 133 1 6 20 15 7 - 2011 1 372 120 7 7 50 26 0 - Applications withdrawn - 2009 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 - 2010 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 - 2011 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 - Applications rejected - 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - Applications approved - 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 - 2010 0 5 120 0 2 0 10 7 - 2011 1 157 105 5 5 0 0 15 4 - Applications pending - 2009 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 - 2010 0 8 13 1 2 0 0 0 0 - 2011 0 215 15 2 2 0 0 ### Licensing of Value Transfer/Exchange Services and other financial institutions - Legal persons providing money or value transfer service or a money or currency changing service are subject to the AML/CFT requirements, and subject to the licensing requirements of the BNR. - Authorities indicated there are no natural persons providing money or value transfer or currency changing services in Rwanda; these activities are conducted through legal persons licensed by the BNR. - At the time of the mission, there were no financial institutions in addition to those subject to the Core Principles. ### Supervision, AML/CFT oversight, and implementation issues - Persons and entities that conduct financial sector activities, as defined in the FATF Recommendations, are not subject to AML/CFT supervision in Rwanda because neither the AML/CFT Law nor sector-specific laws designate or delegate supervisory responsibility for AML/CFT purposes to a competent authority or authorities. - With respect to reporting entities subject to the Core Principles, the authorities did not provide documentation explaining whether and how prudential measures relevant to money laundering are applied for AML/CFT purposes. - MVTS and bureaux de change are subject to supervision under the BNR. However, current supervisory practices/activities do not cover AML/CFT matters. - At the time of the assessment, no feedback or guidelines had been provided to reporting entities with respect to their AML/CFT obligations. (Authorities noted the BNR issued, in June 2014, comprehensive guidelines to banks on AML/CFT to provide guidance on the implementation of the AML/CFT Law.) - No authority has been designated to conduct AML/CFT supervision. Although authorities claim the BNR and CMA are responsible for AML/CFT supervision, they could not establish the legal basis, and in practice neither has conducted AML/CFT supervision. - Existing supervisory framework appears inadequate to enable the BNR and the CMA to effectively monitor compliance by reporting entities with respect to obligations established by the AML/CFT Law. - Although the range of administrative sanctions and powers available to the BNR and the CMA with respect to prudential matters is broad, none of these sanctions and powers target AML/CFT-related matters; hence the sanctions and powers are considered inadequate. - No measures or mechanisms are in place to ensure that CMA supervisory staff maintains high professional standards or legal provisions and sanctions applicable to confidentiality standards. No training on AML/CFT matters has been provided to CMA staff since its inception. ### Money or value transfer services (SR.VI) — key findings - Money remitters are licensed, regulated, and supervised by the BNR as a category of payment service providers (PSPs). - Two categories of reporting entities can provide money transfer services: banks and registered money transfer businesses. There are currently 14 registered money transfer businesses. - Western Union and MoneyGram operate under agency agreements with the majority of banks; these two entities are not licensed by the BNR and are not registered as legal entities in Rwanda. Unlike their agents (the banks), they are not subject to the requirements imposed by the AML/CFT Law. - Banks are authorized to transfer money as part of permitted banking activities (Article 9 of the Banking Law). - Registered money transfer businesses are licensed by the BNR under the law on payment system (Article 7). PSPs are defined broadly in Article 2 of the law on payment system but the definition includes some but not all elements of the FATF definition and the Interpretative Note to SR VI. - The law designates the BNR as competent supervisory authority for money remitters and vests the BNR with powers to sanction noncompliance with the law on payment system. However, these powers fall short of including responsibility over AML/CFT matters, including sanctions for noncompliance with AML/CFT obligations. - PSPs are covered by and subject to obligations imposed by the AML/CFT Law (customer identification, monitoring, record-keeping, declaration of cash transactions, compliance programs, and suspicious transaction reporting), but shortcomings noted under other Recommendations also affect PSPs. - Authorities indicated BNR supervisory visits to PSPs focus on transactions and controls, not on assessing AML/CFT compliance. - PSPs must provide the BNR with regulatory reports on a weekly and monthly basis to support oversight/surveillance. - Supervisory resources for PSPs comprised the head of the supervision department and one other supervisor responsible for 14 PSPs. Resources appear very low relative to number of licensed/registered reporting entities, impeding ability to identify ML/FT risks. - Authorities did not explain the scope of surveillance or how they supervise implementation of customer identification and due diligence for remittance services provided by Western Union and MoneyGram. - No obligations require PSPs to maintain a list of agents; authorities could not provide a current list of agents operating with licensed PSPs. ### Recommendations to address deficiencies (to comply with Recommendations 23, 17, 25 and 29) - Recommendation 23: - Designate a competent authority or authorities responsible for AML/CFT supervision of the reporting entities; - Develop, adopt, and implement a formal AML/CFT supervisory framework, including setting out the necessary activities for offsite surveillance and examination procedures for onsite visits; and - Ensure that, in the course of prudential supervision of financial institutions subject to the Core Principles, supervisors apply for AML/CFT purposes the prudential regulatory and supervisory measures that are also relevant to money laundering. - Recommendation 17: - Ensure that there is an adequate range of sanctions (administrative, civil, and financial) for noncompliance with the AML/CFT requirements to ensure that these are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive, and that they may be applied without undue limitation; and - Ensure that the range of sanctions not only applies to legal persons that are financial institutions or businesses but also to their directors and senior management. - Recommendation 25: - Consider providing guidance to reporting entities on their AML/CFT obligations, using as a reference the FATF Best Practice Guidelines on Providing Feedback to Reporting Financial Institutions and Other Persons, in particular with respect to the reporting of suspicious transactions. - Recommendation 29: - Ensure that competent authorities such as the BNR and the CMA have adequate powers to monitor and ensure compliance by financial institutions with the requirement to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, including powers to do the following: - Conduct inspections to ensure compliance; - Compel production of or to obtain access to all records, documents, or information relevant to monitoring compliance; and - Enforce and sanction financial institutions and their directors or senior management for failure to comply with or properly implement requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. ### Ratings and underlying factors (Compliance with Recommendations 17, 23, 25, and 29) - R.17 — NC - No sanctioning regime for failure to comply with AML/CFT obligations (i.e., no competent authority), lack of clarity as to the range of available sanctions, and scope limitation of available sanctions. - R.23 — NC - No authority or authorities designated for AML/CFT supervision. - Institutions not subject to adequate AML/CFT regulation and supervision. - Lack of fit-and-proper measures for pension, payment service providers, and forex sectors, and application of relevant Core Principles to AML/CFT matters. - Lack of measures to ensure that relevant prudential regulatory and supervisory measures are also applicable for AML/CFT purposes. - Effectiveness was not established. - R.25 — NC - Lack of guidelines and guidance on AML/CFT issues provided by the BNR and the CMA to reporting entities. - R.29 — NC - Lack of adequate supervisory authority/powers addressing AML/CFT matters across all sectors. *Source: _cr15221 - 441. The BNR has used its powers in very few occasions (see table below), mostly by imposing* ### 465. The BNR is vested with powers to sanction noncompliance with the requirements under the law ### _cr15221 - 465. The BNR is vested with powers to sanction noncompliance with the requirements under the law ### BNR powers, Best Practices, and payment service providers (PSPs) - The BNR is vested with powers to sanction noncompliance with the requirements under the law on payment system. However, these powers do not extend to compliance with AML/CFT requirements. (para. 465) - The authorities have not yet implemented the measures set out in the Best Practices Paper for SR VI (c. VI.6). (para. 466) - Implementation and effectiveness observations: - The authorities were not able to coordinate a meeting/visit with a licensed PSP as part of the assessment. (para. 467) - PSPs are considered reporting entities under the AML/CFT Law and subject to all obligations imposed by this law, but supervisory staff reported low awareness of AML/CFT issues within this sector. (para. 467) - Considering limited supervisory resources, lack of AML/CFT supervision, and absence of sanctions for noncompliance, the level of implementation is considered low. (para. 467) - Anecdotal evidence indicates an informal money/value transfer system appears to be operating within Rwanda, used by a large group of individuals residing outside Rwanda in neighboring countries; the BNR did not confirm this. (para. 468) - Less than 15 percent of the population has access to financial services and the economy is significantly cash-based, suggesting frequent transfers through channels outside banking and money remittance sectors. (para. 468) ### Recommendations and compliance—Special Recommendation VI - Authorities are recommended to: - Address the shortcomings identified in recommendations 4–11, 13–15, and 21–23, and Special Recommendation VII, as applicable to this recommendation. (para. 469) - Ensure that informal PSP systems currently operating in Rwanda are registered or licensed, subject to the applicable FATF Recommendations and to adequate monitoring. (para. 469) - SR.VI compliance rating: NC. Summary of factors underlying rating: - Shortcomings in other recommendations related to CDD, sanctions, supervision, and regulation affect implementation and effectiveness of SR.VI. (section 3.11.3) - No list of agents maintained by the MVT service operator or provided to the authorities. (section 3.11.3) - No sanctions available for failure to comply with AML/CFT requirements. (section 3.11.3) - Informal money/value transfer system operating in Rwanda without effective monitoring. (section 3.11.3) ### DNFBPs—Scope, legal framework, and supervisory capacity - DNFBPs designated under Article 3 of the AML/CFT Law: (para. 470) - Members of private legal profession when they represent or assist their clients outside of a judicial process; - Auditors; - Real estate agents; - Traders in items of significant value, such as works of art (paintings, masks), as well as precious metals and stones; - Owners, directors, and managers of casinos and gaming halls, including the national lottery. - Casinos are not “reporting entities” under Article 3 of the AML/CFT Law; Article 11 designates owners/directors/managers of casinos as reporting entities, but casinos themselves are not included as reporting entities. (para. 471) - Some DNFBPs have professional licensing laws, but these do not contain additional AML/CFT obligations; no SRO has issued AML/CFT requirements beyond a code of ethics. (para. 472) - Trust service providers were not present at mission date; a new law regulating trusts and trustees was passed in March 2013. Authorities are recommended to include trust and CSPs as reporting entities subject to AML/CFT framework. (para. 473) - FIU designation and powers: - FIU designated as competent supervisory authority for compliance with AML/CFT obligations for reporting entities “that are not under any supervisory body” (Article 13 of Presidential Order No. 27/2011 of 05/30/2011). (para. 474) - FIU has not been provided with powers to impose sanctions and, given its recent designation, has not yet monitored or supervised compliance. (para. 474) ### CDD measures and thresholds for DNFBPs (Articles referenced) - CDD requirement set forth in Article 10 of the AML/CFT Law applies equally to all reporting entities. (para. 476) - Article 12 specifies circumstances where CDD and record-keeping apply to DNFBPs: (para. 477) - Real estate agents: when involved in transactions concerning buying and selling of real estate; - Dealers in precious metals and precious stones: when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer equal to or above the threshold, which is (still to be) specified by FIU; - Lawyers, notaries, other legal professionals, and accountants: when preparing for or carrying out transactions concerning buying and selling of real estate; management of client’s money, securities, or any other assets; management of bank, savings, or securities accounts; organization of contributions for creation, operation, or management of business companies; creation, operation, or management of legal persons or arrangements, and buying and selling of business entities. - Casinos (Article 11) obligations include: (para. 478) - Demonstrate lawful origin of funds necessary for creation of enterprise from day of application for opening; - Confirm identity, upon presentation of a valid identity card or any valid original official document, of players who buy, bring, change chips or game tags for an amount of money superior or equal to the threshold set by the FIU; - Record all such transactions; and - Record any transfer of funds transacted between casinos and gaming halls. - FIU has not established the applicable threshold for casinos and dealers in precious metals and stones; in absence of threshold, these entities are not required to identify clients. This legal loophole and non-designation of casinos as reporting entities expose the sector to ML/FT risks. (paras. 479–480) - Article 10(2) requires identification of natural and legal persons be verified by a valid official identification document. (para. 481) ### Record-keeping and transaction monitoring - Article 17 requires maintenance of records on transactions and identification data for a period of 10 years, following the end of the business relationship; however, the requirement falls short regarding 10 years following completion of the transaction. Other deficiencies in Section 3 apply equally to DNFBPs. (para. 486) - Casinos must record transactions in “an appropriate register in a chronological order...and preserve this register for five (5) years when the last transaction was recorded.” Transfers between casinos/gaming halls must also be recorded and preserved for five years. (para. 487) - Record-keeping obligation applies to “players” and does not extend to customers who purchase, redeem, or transfer chips without “playing.” (para. 488) - Article 15 requires all reporting entities to pay attention to complex, unusual transaction patterns and to examine background and purpose, establish findings in writing and transmit report to the FIU; there is no requirement for DNFBPs to make findings available to competent authorities and auditors. (para. 489) - No detailed guidelines were available to DNFBPs for detection of unusual transactions as of mission date. (para. 490) ### Implementation, effectiveness, and sectoral weaknesses - DNFBPs met during the mission were unaware of obligations under the AML/CFT Law and did not conduct CDD. (para. 491) - The casino operating in Rwanda has a player tracking system that tracks buying/selling of chips but does not include customer identification. (para. 491) - Real estate sector shows no evidence of CDD implementation, despite activities such as opening bank accounts, assistance in company incorporation at Rwanda Development Board, and acceptance of cash. (para. 492) - DNFBPs did not understand or apply the concept of PEP and treat all transactions uniformly. (para. 493) - DNFBPs do not comply with record-keeping requirements and lack systems to monitor complex, unusual large transactions. (para. 494) ### Recommendations for DNFBPs and preventive measures - Address deficiencies identified under Recommendations 5, 6, and 8 to 11. (para. 495) - Specific additional recommendations: (para. 496) - Incorporate casinos as reporting entities under the AML/CFT Law; - Designate the threshold called for by the AML/CFT Law for customer identification by casinos and dealers in precious metals and stones; - Ensure DNFBPs are subject to preventive measures and record-keeping requirements in line with Recommendations 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11; - Ensure effective implementation of AML/CFT provisions by DNFBPs; - Develop outreach campaigns to raise awareness of CDD obligations and ML/TF risks in all DNFBP sectors; - Include trust service providers among reporting entities once trust law enters into force. (para. 496) ### Compliance with Recommendation 12—R.12 rating factors - R.12 rating: NC. Summary of factors relevant to s.4.1 underlying overall rating: (para. 4.1.3) - Casinos are not reporting entities under the AML/CFT Law. - No threshold for CDD measures applicable to casinos and dealers in precious metals and stones. - Shortcomings in Recommendations 5, 6, and 10–11 apply to DNFBPs. - No provisions in line with Recommendations 8–9. - Lack of implementation of preventive measures by DNFBPs. - Effectiveness of preventive measures to AML/CFT has not been established. ### Suspicious Transaction Reporting for DNFBPs (R.16) - Reporting requirements under Article 21 apply to DNFBPs designated under Article 3, except casinos; Article 21 requires immediate reporting to FIU when there are reasonable motives to suspect funds linked to ML/TF and conveying additional information that may confirm or deny suspicion. (paras. 497, 498) - The legal framework provides no reporting threshold for dealers in precious metals or stones; they are subject to same reporting requirements as other reporting entities. (para. 498) - Casinos are not required to report suspicious transactions. (para. 499) - Article 8 requires reporting entities, control organs, or auditors to respect AML/CFT obligations notwithstanding secrecy restrictions, with an exception: lawyers, notaries and other independent legal professions acting as independent jurists are not required to submit an STR to the FIU if information was acquired under professional secrecy or legal professional privilege. Lawyers are considered reporting entities when they represent or assist clients outside a judicial process in specified activities (buying/selling properties or businesses; handling client money/securities; opening/management of accounts; formation/management/directing of companies, trusts, or similar ventures). (para. 500) *Source: _cr15221 - 465. The BNR is vested with powers to sanction noncompliance with the requirements under the law on payment system (excerpts).* ### 501. Information gained while exercising their traditional roles of providing legal advice or ### _cr15221 - 501. Information gained while exercising their traditional roles of providing legal advice or ### Legal professional privilege and professional secrecy - Information gained while exercising traditional roles of providing legal advice or representation in litigations is covered by legal professional privilege and, consequently, exempt from the reporting requirements (para. 501). - Lawyers are subject to strict professional secrecy provisions under the Criminal Code, the law organizing the lawyers’ profession, and internal regulations issued by the Bar Association; authorities state secrecy provisions in practice do not allow compliance with the reporting requirement (para. 502). - Article 283 of the Criminal Code: “Any person serving as a keeper who reveals a professional secrecy entrusted to him/her by virtue of function, occupation or religious authority shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of six (6) months to two (2) years and a fine of one million (1,000,000) to seven million (7,000,000) Rwandan francs or one of these penalties.” (para. 502) - Article 658 (section 6): natural person or legal entity who in certain duties “disregards the rules related to the secrecy of information collected, related to the prohibition to reveal them or communicate them, shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of five hundred thousand (500,000) to five million (5,000,000) Rwandan francs.” (para. 503) - Bar/lawyers’ professional secrecy provisions cited: - Article 64 (Law regulating the lawyers’ profession): “The Confidentiality covers everything that has an intimate nature, that the client has a moral or material interest in not revealing when the lawyer learns in the course of his business or his client or the opposing party or counsel, or third parties.” (para. 504) - Article 65: privilege covers communications in a lawyer's office, correspondence, talks and negotiations between counsels, both in terms of content and the fact of their existence, unless the fact of their existence must be found for good cause that the Bar will enjoy. (para. 504) - Article 101 (Internal regulation): “The Advocate and the entire staff of his office, are strictly bound to respect professional secrecy, which is absolute, and which no one, including the client, cannot be met.” (para. 504) - The legal professional privilege appears to extend beyond communications received from clients in ascertaining legal position or in defending/representing clients in proceedings, which adversely impacts the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system (para. 505). - Notaries: public officers subject to legal professional secrecy per the General Statute for Rwanda Public Service; authorities could not explain the extent or reporting practice for notaries (para. 506). ### Protections for reporting and confidentiality rules for DNFBPs - Article 27(3) of the AML/CFT Law: no proceedings for breach of professional secrecy can be brought against those who, in good faith, have transmitted information or submitted STRs to the FIU, even if the investigation or the court orders did not result in any conviction (para. 507). - DNFBPs are prohibited from revealing that an STR has been filed to the same extent as reporting entities (para. 508). ### Internal controls, compliance officers, training, and related DNFBP obligations - Article 19 of the AML/CFT Law requires all reporting entities to develop AML/CFT policies, procedures, and controls; designate a compliance officer at the management level; establish mechanisms for recruiting staff; maintain an independent audit function; and an ongoing employee training program (para. 509). - Identified shortcomings (para. 509–510): - Current requirements do not establish the type of procedures, policies, and controls required (such as CDD). - Do not address record retention, detection of unusual and suspicious transactions, and the reporting obligation. - No obligations to communicate internal procedures, policies, and controls to employees. - No obligation to grant AML/CFT compliance officer and staff timely access to customer identification, CDD information, transaction records, and other relevant information. - Lack of requirement for internal audit function to assess adequacy of internal control systems and policies with respect to AML/CFT and to maintain an independent and well resourced audit function. ### Special attention to high-risk countries (Recommendation 21) as applied to DNFBPs - Article 15(2) of the AML/CFT Law obliges reporting entities to pay special attention to countries not sufficiently applying the FATF Recommendations (para. 511). - Gaps summarized (para. 511): - Lack of measures to advise reporting entities of concerns about weaknesses in other countries’ AML/CFT systems. - Lack of requirements for reporting entities to examine background and purpose of transactions with no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose. - Lack of counter-measures where a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies FATF Recommendations. ### Implementation and effectiveness (DNFBPs) - Majority of DNFBPs visited were not aware of the AML/CFT Law or their reporting obligations; no STR has been filed by any DNFBP category (para. 512). - At the time of the onsite visit, none of the DNFBPs met had internal AML/CFT control procedures and measures in place (para. 512). - Professional secrecy provisions imposed on lawyers and advocates are absolute and not in line with the standard (para. 512). - Overall implementation of AML/CFT measures is very weak, raising serious concerns about regime effectiveness (para. 513). ### Recommendations specific to DNFBPs (section 4.2.2) - Authorities are recommended to: - Require casinos to report suspicious transactions to the FIU (para. 514). - Ensure that the carve-out for legal and professional secrecy is limited to information (i) obtained in the course of ascertaining the legal position of a client, or (ii) in performing their tasks of defending or representing that client in, or concerning judicial, administrative, arbitration, or mediation proceedings (para. 514). - Ensure that all DNFBPs are subject to and effectively implement the requirements under Rec. 13, 14, 15, and 21 (para. 514). ### Compliance with Recommendation 16 — summary points and factors (section 4.2.3) - Overall rating: R.16 NC (para. 4.2.3 header) - Relevant factors underlying the rating: - Casinos are not subject to the requirements of Rec. 13, 14, 15, and 21. - Shortcomings identified for Rec. 13, 14, 15, and 21 apply to DNFBPs. - Professional secrecy provisions for lawyers and legal professionals impede suspicious transaction reporting. - No reporting by DNFBPs. - Effectiveness was not established (para. 4.2.3 table). ### Regulation, supervision, and monitoring of DNFBPs (R.24–25) - Sector-specific laws do not address regulation, supervision, and monitoring of DNFBPs for AML/CFT purposes (para. 515). - May 30, 2011 Presidential Order No. 27/01 designated the FIU to “check if the reporting entities which are not under any supervising body, fulfill the obligations set out in the AML/CFT Law” (Article 13); since designation, all DNFBPs fall within FIU remit, but FIU had not yet been monitoring or supervising compliance at the time of assessment (para. 515). - Other relevant authorities (para. 516): - Rwanda Development Board (RDB): registers/incorporates DNFBP legal persons and issues operational licenses renewed annually. - Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MINICOM): through a still-to-be-designated competent authority, responsible for supervision of casinos pursuant to the Gaming Activities Law (no competent authority designated at time of assessment). - Rwanda Bar Association: oversight for advocates as members. - Certified Public Accountants of Rwanda (ICPAR): SRO for accountants; registers and grants practicing certificates to CPAs. ### Sanctions, licensing, and casinos (paras. 517–521) - No sanctioning regime exists for noncompliance with AML/CFT obligations for DNFBPs (para. 517). - Casinos are not reporting entities; only owners, directors and managers of casinos and gaming halls, including national lotteries, are reporting entities under Article 3(4)e of the AML/CFT Law (para. 518). - Law No. 58/2011 (Gaming Activities) assigns overall control to MINICOM and allows a Prime Minister’s Order to determine another gaming regulatory authority; responsibilities outlined in Article 5 are comprehensive but do not clearly and directly allocate AML/CFT regulatory/supervisory responsibility or sanctioning powers for AML/CFT noncompliance (para. 519). - Article 23 (Gaming Activities Law): applicant for casino license must submit application to regulatory authority which must conduct probity and other investigations and hearings; Article 11(1) of the AML/CFT Law requires managers, directors, and owners of casinos and gaming halls to demonstrate lawful origin of funds at application for opening (para. 520). - Gaming Activities Law came into effect on March 26, 2012; at time of assessment no competent regulatory authority had been designated to oversee casinos (para. 521). ### Monitoring systems for other DNFBPs (paras. 522–526) - Real estate agents: not subject to monitoring/oversight by a designated competent authority or SRO (para. 522). - Legal professionals: only advocates who are Rwanda Bar Association members are under some oversight for admission, standards, training, ethics and sanctions, but the Bar Association does not monitor members’ AML/CFT compliance (para. 523). - Accountants: ICPAR established May 2008 by Law 11/2008; responsible for registration, regulation, disciplinary measures, and license revocation for CPAs, but does not oversee AML/CFT compliance (para. 524). - Traders in items of significant value, precious stones and metal, travel agencies, business of transporting money: not subject to any form of supervision or monitoring (para. 525). - All DNFBPs fall under the FIU’s supervision per Article 13 of Presidential Order No. 27/01; given recent designation, FIU had not started monitoring or supervising DNFBPs’ compliance (para. 526). ### Guidelines, resources, and FIU capacity (paras. 527–530) - No guidelines issued to assist DNFBPs in implementing AML/CFT requirements; no feedback provided by the FIU to DNFBPs (para. 527). - FIU staffing: 13 staff in total to perform STR receipt, analysis, dissemination, and supervision functions; considered neither enough nor adequate (para. 528). - Implementation and effectiveness: - FIU had not started supervisory function; DNFBPs remain unsupervised for AML/CFT purposes (para. 529). - Current supervision framework inadequate due to FIU lacking resources and expertise; authorities may consider creating one or several separate supervisors for DNFBPs other than the legal profession (para. 530). - Recommendation that Ministry of Justice implement a mechanism to enable more effective supervision of advocates’ compliance with AML/CFT requirements (para. 530). ### Recommendations and comments on regulation and supervision (section 4.3.2) - Authorities are recommended to: - Ensure the FIU has adequate capacity (resources and expertise) to conduct supervisory functions, or reconsider the current DNFBP supervision framework (para. 531). - Introduce a sanctioning regime for noncompliance with AML/CFT obligations applicable to DNFBPs (para. 531). - Ensure designated competent authorities or SROs responsible for monitoring have adequate powers and resources (para. 531). - Increase awareness among all DNFBP categories (para. 531). - Provide guidance to assist DNFBPs implement and comply with AML/CFT requirements (para. 531). - Provide feedback to DNFBPs on current techniques, methods, and trends or sanitized examples of actual ML and FT cases (para. 531). ### Compliance ratings for R.24 and R.25 (section 4.3.3) - R.24 NC — factors: - FIU lacks capacity to conduct AML/CFT supervision adequately. - No AML/CFT supervision of DNFBPs. - No sanctions for non-compliance with AML/CFT obligations. - Lack of implementation and awareness of AML/CFT obligations. (para. 4.3.3 table) - R.25 NC — factors: - No guidance issued to assist DNFBPs in implementing AML/CFT obligations. - No general feedback provided by the FIU. (para. 4.3.3 table) *Source: _cr15221 - 501. Information gained while exercising their traditional roles of providing legal advice or representation in litigations (excerpts).* ### 532. The methodology provides the following examples of businesses or professions to which ### 532. The methodology provides the following examples of businesses or professions to which ### DNFBPs and other vulnerable non‑financial businesses — description and analysis - The methodology lists dealers in high value and luxury goods, pawnshops, gambling, auction houses, and investment advisers as examples of businesses or professions countries “should consider” applying the FATF Recommendations to. (para. 532) - Authorities did not provide information about measures to encourage development and use of modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to money laundering. (para. 533, 536) - Authorities have not considered imposing CDD and/or reporting obligations on businesses, professions, or activities that could generate a significant risk of ML or FT in Rwanda. (para. 533) - No assessment has been conducted of non‑financial businesses and professions (other than DNFBPs currently subject to the AML/CFT Law) that could be used or exposed to potential ML and FT risks. (para. 535) - Implementation and effectiveness: No evidence of measures or steps taken to apply preventive measures to other non‑financial businesses and professions vulnerable to ML/FT, or to encourage modern and secure transaction techniques. Rwanda’s economy is mainly cash‑based. One measure suggested by the authorities could be minimizing reliance on cash and increasing reliance on more secure means of conducting financial transactions. (para. 537) ### Recommendations (4.4.2) - Conduct a risk assessment of non‑financial businesses and professions (other than DNFBPs) that could be used for or exposed to potential ML and FT activities in Rwanda; (para. 538) - On the basis of the results of the risk assessment, introduce measures to reduce reliance on cash; (para. 538) - Apply Recommendations 5, 6, 8-11, 13-15, 17, and 21 to non‑financial businesses and professions (other than DNFBPs) that are at risk of being misused for ML and FT, in line with the results of the risk assessment; (para. 538) - Encourage the development and use of modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to ML. (para. 538) ### Compliance with Recommendation 20 (4.4.3) - R.20: NC (para. 4.4.3 heading) - Summary of factors underlying rating: - No risk assessment has been conducted in the domestic sector. (para. 4.4.3) - No consideration has been given to applying the FATF recommendations to other higher‑risk businesses and professions. (para. 4.4.3) - No evidence of measures or steps taken to encourage the development of modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to ML. (para. 4.4.3) --- ### Legal persons — types, registration, and access to beneficial ownership (5.1 and 5.1.1) - Types of legal persons under Rwandan law: (para. 539) - Companies, regulated by law No. 07/2009 of 27/04/2009 relating to companies (the Companies Law), with types: private company limited by shares, private company limited by guarantees, private company limited by shares and guarantees, private unlimited company, public company limited by shares, and public company limited by shares and guarantees. (para. 539) - Cooperative organizations, regulated by law No. 50/2007, with types: production cooperative organizations, commercial and consumer cooperative organizations, services cooperative organizations, and multipurpose cooperative organizations. (para. 539) - Non‑governmental organizations (NGO), governed by Law No. 4/2012 and categorized as public interest organizations, common interest organizations, and foundations. The Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) registers, grants legal personality, and monitors national and religious NGOs; the Directorate General of Immigration and Emigration registers and monitors international NGOs. (para. 539) - Associations cannot be established as a separate type of legal person under Rwandan law. (para. 540) ### Statistics (companies and NGOs) (para. 540) - Companies (statistics provided with respect to companies only): - 1) Limited by shares private 15,546 - 2) Limited by guarantee private 10 - 3) Limited by shares and guarantee private 1 - 4) Unlimited private 4 - 5) Limited by shares public 60 - 6) Limited by guarantee public 0 - 7) Limited by shares and guarantee public 0 - 8) Unlimited public 0 - Table 10. Registered NGOs in Rwanda: - National NGOs: REGISTERED 338, IN PROCESS OF REGISTRATION 440 - Religious NGOs: REGISTERED 468, IN PROCESS OF REGISTRATION 58 - International NGOs: REGISTERED 156, IN PROCESS OF REGISTRATION 16 - Total: REGISTERED 962, IN PROCESS OF REGISTRATION 514 - Grand Total 1476 - No information was provided as to the number of existing cooperatives. (para. 541) ### Measures to prevent unlawful use of legal persons — Companies (c. 33.1) - Central registration system: compulsory registration with the Office of the Registrar General of the Rwanda Development Board; registration certificate constitutes proof of incorporation. Applications must be sent or delivered to the Registrar General and accompanied by a memorandum of association and articles of association, if any. The memorandum must state the name of the company, the head office, and particulars of any business occupation. (para. 542) - Memorandum of association of company with share capital must state: (para. 543) - The amount of share capital; - The number of shares making the share capital unless where the company is an unlimited company; and - The full name and the number of shares of every shareholder. - Application form for incorporation requires (selected fields reproduced exactly as in source): (para. 544) - Company’s identification data (company code; name reservation ID; company name); - Applicant’s position (power of attorney, power of representative, managing director, chairman of the board), name, gender, ID document (national ID card or passport) and its number, date of birth, address, and contact information (telephone and email); - Head office address and working hours (although it is not clear whether the head office must be in Rwanda); - Optional: chairman of the board’s ID, date of birth, address; - Managing director, company employee/secretary, members of the board: name, gender, ID document (national ID card or passport) and its number, date of birth, address, contact information (telephone and email); - Auditor and Accountant: type (person or organization), name, gender, ID document (national ID card or passport) and its number, date of birth, address, company or enterprise’s code and registered name and registered office address; - Business activities (code and name); - Capital information (type, number, par value, and total value of shares); - Guarantee type and amount; - Subscribers: ID information and address; - Guarantor: ID information, guarantee type and amount; - Employees: date of hiring first employee and number of employees at the time of registration; - Amalgamated company code; and - Signature of all shareholders, as well as copies of their passports or ID cards (Article 2 of the law No. 14/2010 of May 7, 2010 modifying and complementing Law No. 7/2009 of April 27, 2009 relating to companies). (para. 544) - The registration form requires designation of the managing director. (para. 545) - When a shareholder is a foreign company, representatives must provide: (para. 546) - a duly authenticated copy of the articles of association and the certificate of registration, or any other instrument constituting or defining their incorporation; and - a notarized declaration made by the authorized representatives of the company to take shares in the Rwandan company. - Certificate of registration is issued once legal requirements are complied with and is “conclusive evidence” of incorporation and its date. (Article 17 of the company law). (para. 547) - Identity and other information required at establishment are not really verified by the Office of the Registrar General; the Rwanda Development Board mechanism aims to facilitate establishment rather than establishing beneficial owners. (para. 548) - Some elements must be kept up to date, but changes in control structure or shareholdings are not required to be reflected in the registrar general; transfers of shares should be reflected in the company register of shares but there is no timeframe for updates and no measure to ensure register is current. No clear requirements for a directors’ register to ensure up‑to‑date management and control information. (para. 549) - All information collected by the Office of the Registrar General is automated and accessible across headquarters and four branches. (para. 550) ### Measures for cooperative organizations (paras. 551–552) - Application for legal personality requires an application letter to the Rwanda Cooperative Agency (RCA) passing through the Mayor and accompanied by: (para. 551) - four copies of the by‑laws bearing date and signatures or fingerprints of founding members (copies of by‑laws for district or national level must be certified by an authorized notary, who must verify identity of all members for district or national level cooperatives but not for sector level cooperatives); - four copies of the minutes of the Constituent General Assembly meeting bearing signatures or fingerprints of all founding members; - four copies of the list of the members of the Board of Directors and of the Supervisory Committee indicating names, addresses, functions, and signatures; - a specimen of the signature or fingerprints of persons authorized to represent the Cooperative; and - a certificate issued by the district authorities where the cooperative has its headquarters. - A cooperative that has complied with registration provisions becomes a body corporate and within thirty days from obtaining legal personality submits required documents to the Official Gazette Office for publication of the registration certificate. (Article 25) (para. 552) ### NGOs and INGOs — registration and information requirements (paras. 553–555) - Registration certificate required before NGOs start activities, except common interest organizations and foundations which may start activities and comply with registration within two years (and remain under monitoring). (para. 553) - RGB ensures national and religious NGOs submit activity and financial reports for the previous year during registration and must be notified of changes to states, legal representative, head office, and harmonization with legislation. (Article 29 of NGO Law and Articles 29 and 32 of RBO Law). (para. 554) - Requirements: (para. 554) - NGOs: statutes must provide name, mission and activities, organ and conflict resolution mechanisms, criteria and procedures for adhesion or loss of membership, organ in charge of administration and financial audit, hierarchy of organs and competence in decision making, and property disposal upon dissolution (Article 6 of Law for national NGOs). - Religious NGOs: must provide name, mission, area of activities, beneficiaries, organizational structure, competence and duties of organs, criteria for leadership, administrative and financial audit organs, conflict resolution organ and mechanisms, and property disposal upon dissolution (Article 16 of law governing religious NGOs). - INGOs: must provide an authenticated copy of statutes, an official document allowing operation in country of origin and indicating geographical establishment, nature of intended activities and action plan, and the budget and its source (Article 7 of the international NGO law). - All NGOs must present the information above when applying for registration; distribution of information is done in accordance with national laws relating to access to information. (para. 555) ### Access to and maintenance of beneficial ownership information (c. 33.2–33.4; implementation) - While basic information at incorporation is collected and accessible, beneficial ownership information is not obtained, verified, and maintained either at the Office of the Registrar General or the RGB, and there is no indication it would be otherwise available (for example through tax authorities or trust and company service providers). (para. 556) - Competent authorities have online access to all information in the Central Registrar and may request additional information from the company itself. Neither the Office of the General Registrar nor RGB nor the legal person is required to gather and maintain current and up‑to‑date information on beneficial ownership. (para. 557) - Prevention of misuse of bearer shares: Shares may not be issued in bearer form; Article 15 of the Company Law requires them to be nominative. (para. 558) - Financial institutions can access the Central Register database online, but it does not include information on a company’s beneficial owners—only the original shareholdings. (para. 559) ### Implementation and effectiveness (paras. 560–561) - Authorities have streamlined the process for creation of legal persons and established a modern central registration system easily accessible to competent authorities and the public. (para. 560) - Information in the Central Register is relatively limited and not kept up to date; it does not aim at establishing control structure or beneficial ownership. Competent authorities may request additional information from companies, but that information is not necessarily current and does not identify the natural person who ultimately owns or controls the legal person. (para. 560) - No precise information on activities usually conducted by Rwandan legal entities was provided; most companies limited by private shares appear to mainly operate businesses (size unclear) and there are generally no or few asset management vehicles. (para. 561) *Source: _cr15221 - 532. The methodology provides the following examples of businesses or professions to which* ### 562. In order to fully comply with Recommendation 33, it is recommended that the authorities do the ### _cr15221 - 562. In order to fully comply with Recommendation 33, it is recommended that the authorities do the ### Compliance with Recommendation 33 - Rating: R.33 — PC - Summary of factors underlying rating: - Information collected at the time of incorporation is easily accessible, but it is not kept up to date and does not specifically address the beneficial ownership. - Recommendation: - Take additional steps to prevent the misuse of legal persons established in Rwanda by ensuring that there is adequate transparency concerning their beneficial ownership and control. ### Legal Arrangements — Access to Beneficial Ownership and Control Information (R.34) - Legal framework: - The current legal framework does not allow for the establishment of legal arrangements such as the common law “trust,” and there is no indication that the private sector is holding or otherwise dealing with assets of foreign “trusts.” - The Rwandan authorities indicated they are working on draft legislation that will allow for the creation of Rwandan trusts. - Footnote: Law No. 20/2013 of March 25, 2013 regulating the creation of trusts and trustees came into force more than two months after the assessment team’s onsite visit and therefore has no bearing on this assessment. The law defines a trust as “a fund created in writing as a result of mutual undertaking by any person or a person obliged to fulfill any obligation where the property owner transfers his/her property to a trustee for the benefit of the beneficiary or beneficiaries for a specified period or a specific purpose.” It also provides that the “trustee must properly manage such property in accordance with the trust instrument concluded with the property owner.” - Measures and implementation: - No measures have currently been taken to prevent the potential misuse of legal arrangements, collect information on their beneficial owners, and ensure the competent authorities’ access to that information. - The lack of evidence of trust use in Rwanda and unfamiliarity with trusts among private sector and authorities led to the assessment that Recommendation 34 does not appear to be applicable at the time of this assessment. - Recommendations and comments: - Although Recommendation 34 was considered nonapplicable at the time of assessment, in light of the upcoming entry into force of a new law allowing for the creation of Rwanda trusts, it is recommended that the authorities: - Take all necessary steps to prevent the misuse of the Rwandan trust for money laundering or terrorist financing purposes. - Ensure that adequate, accurate, and timely information on these trusts (including information on the settler, trustee, and beneficiaries) can be obtained by competent authorities in a timely fashion. - Facilitate access to that information by reporting entities. - Consider the examples provided in the FATF methodology. - Compliance rating: R.34 — N/A ### Nonprofit Organizations (SR.VIII) — Description and Analysis - Legal framework: - Three laws regulating NPOs in Rwanda: - Law N°04/2012 of 17/02/2012 governing the organization and the functioning of the national nongovernmental organizations (Law on National NGOs). - Law Nº05/2012 of 17/02/2012 governing the organization and functioning of international nongovernmental organizations (Law on International NGOs). - Law Nº06/2012 of 17/02/2012 determining organization and functioning of religious-based organizations (Law on religious NGOs). - The AML/CFT Law requires NPOs to report suspicious transactions. - NPO classification: - National nongovernmental organizations are classified into: - Public interest organizations - Common interest organizations - Foundation - Review of adequacy and implementation: - The RGB is the competent authority for registering, granting legal personality, and monitoring national and religious NGOs; the Directorate General of Immigration at the Ministry of Internal Security (MIS) registers and supervises international NGOs. - Implementing regulations related to NPOs have not been issued yet. - The RGB and the MIS did not use all sources of available information to undertake a domestic review on the activities, size, and other relevant features of the NPO sector to identify types at risk of TF misuse. - Re-registration in process: 50 out of 100 national NGOs were registered under the new law; remaining NGOs were asked to present proper documentation or face termination notices. - Outreach: Information provided during registration and additional awareness campaigns occur, but RGB and MIS did not conduct an outreach campaign specifically raising awareness of the risks of terrorist abuse and measures to protect the sector. - Supervision and monitoring: - National and religious NGOs: RGB may determine administrative entities to assist supervision (Article 30). RGB must ensure NGOs submit a copy of activity and financial report for the previous year (conditions not yet determined) and notify changes concerning state, legal representative, head office, and harmonization with legislation (Article 29). - International NGOs: MIS may request an internal audit within the 90 days from the date of the request (Article 22). - At the time of the onsite mission, RGB was not supervising NGO activities comprehensively; monitoring powers exist but are not being fully exercised. - Information and record-keeping: - Statutory information required by laws includes name, mission, organs, membership criteria, administration and financial audit organs, hierarchy, and property disposal on dissolution. - International NGO registration requires authenticated statutes, official document allowing operation in country of origin, nature of intended activities and action plan, and budget and source. - Laws do not contain specific obligations to publicly maintain information on identity of persons who own, control, or direct NPO activities, nor to make this available through appropriate authorities. - Certification and registration timelines: - Temporary certificate of registration valid for a period of 12 months. - NGOs should apply for legal personality nine months after issue of the temporary certificate. - Pre-registration period for common interest organizations and foundations shall not exceed two years. - International NGOs: certification is issued immediately upon approval of the DGIE; no one-year pre-certification requirement. - Record retention gaps: - Laws do not clearly require NPOs to maintain records for a period of at least five years or require transaction records to be sufficiently detailed to verify funds were spent consistent with purpose and objectives. - Cooperation, information sharing, and investigations: - RGB and DGIE are entitled to share information relevant to all NPOs, but it is unclear whether sharing can be both spontaneous and upon request. - Coordination between RGB, DGIE, and LEAs is not effective enough to allow timely information sharing, coordination, and cooperation. - LEAs have powers to obtain administration and management information during investigations, but registration data are incomplete (financial information not routinely collected and updated only upon request). - Authorities did not develop effective mechanisms for prompt sharing of information among competent authorities to take preventative or investigative action on suspected TF exploitation of NPOs. - LEAs lack sufficient investigative expertise and capacity to promptly examine NPOs suspected of FT or exploitation for this purpose. - International requests: - DGIE (international NGOs) and RGB (national and religious NGOs) designated as points of contact for international requests regarding NPOs suspected of TF. - Implementation and effectiveness—key statistics: - Currently, there are 338 national NGOs, 468 religious NGOs, and 156 INGOs registered in Rwanda. - New legislation entered into force shortly before the assessment and had not been fully implemented; implementing regulations not yet issued. - Laws have contributed to increased transparency but contain loopholes; not all required information is collected at registration; monitoring is not effectively conducted; information is not required to be kept for five years; no effective mechanisms to share relevant information and conduct prompt investigations. - Recommendations and comments (authorities are recommended to do the following): - Use all sources of available information to undertake a domestic review on the NPOs’ activities, size, and other relevant features of the NPO sector to identify features and types of NPOs at risk of being misused for terrorist financing by virtue of their activities or characteristics. - Conduct outreach programs focused on raising awareness on the risks of terrorist abuse and the measures available to protect against such abuses, directed to the entire NPO sector. - Effectively monitor those NPOs which account for a significant portion of the financial resources under control of the sector, and a substantial share of the sector’s international activities. - Require NPOs to maintain information related to the identity of person(s) who own, control, or direct their activities, including senior officers and board members, or to make it available through appropriate authorities; and make such information as well as information on the NPOs’ purpose and stated activities and objectives publicly available. - Review the NPO legislation to require NPOs to maintain, for a period of at least five years, and make available to appropriate authorities, records of domestic and international transactions that are sufficiently detailed to verify that funds have been spent in a manner consistent with the purpose and objectives of the organization. - Put in place effective mechanisms to share relevant information, target, and promptly investigate terrorist abuse of NPOs among all levels of appropriate authorities that hold relevant information on NPOs. ### Compliance with Special Recommendation VIII - Rating: SR.VIII — PC - Summary of factors underlying rating: - No review on the NPO sector has been conducted and lack of outreach to the NPO sector on the risks of TF. - Insufficient supervision/monitoring of the NPO sector (mostly domestic NGOs) that account for a significant portion of the financial resources under control of the sector, and a substantial share of the sector’s international activities. - Lack of requirement to maintain relevant information and make it available publicly and to appropriate authorities. - No requirement to maintain certain records required under SRVIII for a period of five years. - Lack of effective mechanisms to share relevant information and promptly investigate terrorist abuse of NPOs among all levels of appropriate authorities that hold relevant information on NPOs. *Source: _cr15221 - assessment text provided.* ### 6. NATIONAL ### 6. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ### 6.1 National Cooperation and Coordination (R.31 and R.32) — Description and Analysis - Legal Framework: - Domestic coordination is not addressed in the laws and regulations of Rwanda. - Mechanisms for Domestic Cooperation and Coordination in AML/CFT (c. 31.1): - There is no effective mechanism to enable policy makers, law enforcement and supervisors, and other competent authorities to cooperate, and where appropriate, coordinate domestically the development and implementation of AML/CFT policies and activities. - The Advisory Board of the FIU brings together several competent authorities and could be used to ensure some level of domestic cooperation, but its main task is to support the FIU rather than Rwanda’s broader AML/CFT efforts. Its original composition was recently limited without any clear explanation or justification. It is now chaired by the Governor of the BNR, and comprises the Prosecutor General (Deputy Chairperson), the head of the Investigation Department in the Rwanda Defense Forces, two representatives of the RNP (the Commissioners of Intelligence and of Criminal Investigation, respectively), the Commissioner General of Rwanda Revenue Authority, and the Chief of External Security of the National Intelligence and Security Service. Representatives from the Office of Ombudsman, MFA, and the MOCI are no longer part of the Advisory Board. - Bilateral Cooperation amongst competent authorities: - FIU–LEAs cooperation: - FIU has access to a number of databases and uses its investigation powers to gather necessary information to promptly undertake its functions. - FIU does not receive feedback from LEAs on trends, methodologies, and typologies developed by relevant LEAs. - Authorities state regular meetings are organized between the FIU and LEAs to exchange information; other regular quarterly meetings are organized to discuss policy issues. - Cooperation amongst LEAs: - Some forms of cooperation and coordination attempts exist within law enforcement, and a degree of interaction between the FIU and the RNP. - FIU and customs cooperate in interception of suspicious cross-border cash movements. - No effective mechanisms for coordination amongst LEAs to ensure sharing of information between them on predicate crimes and ML offenses. - FIU–supervisory authorities cooperation: - Supervisory bodies and the FIU do not exchange information related to their AML and CFT activities. - Supervisory authorities do not inform the FIU about reporting entities’ compliance with the AML/CFT Law (i.e., inspection results). - FIU does not provide supervisory authorities with information resulting from analysis of STRs and other information. - Cooperation amongst supervisory authorities: - No mechanism allowing cooperation between supervisory agencies of FIs and DNFBPs, notably, BNR, MOJ, and MOCI. - Additional Element—Mechanisms for Consultation Between Competent Authorities and Regulated Institutions (c. 31.2): - There is no mechanism in place for consultation between competent authorities, the financial sector, and other sectors (i.e., DNFBPs, NPOs) that are subject to AML/CFT legislation. - Effectiveness of the AML/CT system (c.32.1): - Rwanda did not review the effectiveness of its AML/CFT system. - Implementation and Effectiveness: - In the absence of a clear coordination mechanism, authorities communicate bilaterally, but communication is sporadic and not as effective as it could be. - Competent authorities do not maintain comprehensive statistics on matters relevant to the effectiveness and efficiency of the AML/CFT system. ### 6.1 Recommendations and Compliance - Recommendations and Comments: - Put in place effective mechanisms between policy makers, the FIU, LEAs, and supervisors to enable cooperation and, where appropriate, coordination domestically concerning the development and implementation of policies and activities to combat ML and TF. - Ensure that the FIU, LEAs, and supervisory authorities effectively exchange information on AML/CFT issues. - Develop comprehensive statistics in relevant areas of the fight against ML and TF (including statistics on domestic investigations; prosecutions; property frozen, seized and confiscated; convictions; and international cooperation, etc.). - Review the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system on a regular basis. - Compliance with Recommendation 31: - R.31: NC - Lack of a mechanism to ensure cooperation amongst all relevant authorities and coordination of the development and implementation of AML/CFT policies and activities. - No bilateral exchange of information between the FIU, LEAs, and supervisory authorities. - R.32: NC - Lack of collection of detailed statistics on matters relevant to the effectiveness and efficiency of the AML/CFT regime. - No review of the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system on a regular basis. ### 6.2 The Conventions and UN Special Resolutions (R.35 and SR.I) — Description and Analysis - Legal Framework: - Rwanda is party to relevant conventions under the standard: - Acceded to the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the Vienna Convention) on May 12, 2012. - Signed and ratified the 2000 Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention) on December 14, 2000 and September 26, 2003, respectively. - Signed the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (the ICSFT) on December 4, 2001 and ratified it on May 13, 2002. - Upon publication in the official Gazette, international treaties and agreements conclusively adopted in accordance with law are “more binding than organic laws and ordinary laws except in the case of non compliance by one of parties” (Article 126 of the Constitution). - Most provisions of the relevant international conventions require implementing measures; Rwanda has taken measures with the adoption of the AML/CFT Law, albeit not entirely comprehensively. - Rwanda has not fully implemented the UNSCRs dealing with the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorism. - Additional Element—Ratification or Implementation of Other relevant international conventions (c. 35.2): - Rwanda is party to the 1999 Convention of the Organization of African Unity on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. - Implementation and Effectiveness: - Rwanda has not yet fully implemented relevant provisions of the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, or the relevant UNSCRs and the ICSFT. ### 6.2 Recommendations and Compliance - Recommendations and Comments: - Recommendation 35: - Fully implement the provisions of the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, the ICSFT, and the relevant UNSCRs. - SR.I: - Implement fully the relevant UNSCRs. - Compliance with Recommendation 35 and Special Recommendation I: - R.35: LC - Effective implementation was not established. - SR.I: PC - Effective implementation was not established. ### 6.3 Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) (R.36–38, SR.V) — Description and Analysis - Legal Framework: - Main framework for cooperation in the fight against ML and TF is set out in chapter IV of the AML/CFT Law. - International conventions and bilateral agreements define scope and conditions of MLA that Rwanda may render. - Rwanda concluded bilateral cooperation agreements with Kenya, Luxembourg, Malawi, and Uganda, but their content was not shared with the assessment team. - According to the Constitution, multilateral and bilateral agreements take precedence over domestic law. - Description below is based on the AML/CFT Law due to absence of provided agreements. - Widest Possible Range of Mutual Assistance (c. 36.1): - Article 28: government of Rwanda shall cooperate with other States in exchange of information; investigations and procedures dealing with protective measures; and seizures and confiscation of instruments, funds and property related to money laundering and financing of terrorism. Does not deal with cooperation with respect to predicate offenses. - Article 29: cooperation may include: - collecting evidence or statements from persons; - assisting requesting state’s legal authorities in providing access to detained persons or other persons to witness or help in enquiries; - providing judicial documents; - executing searches and seizures; - examining objects and visiting sites; - providing information and items with evidential value; - providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents, including bank statements, accounting documents, and registers, showing functioning of an enterprise or its commercial activities. Authorities state bank statements may be obtained upon request from the NPPA or the police. - Article 31: investigative and trial measures may be executed pursuant to requested state’s law, as long as not incompatible with Rwanda’s legislation; judges or civil servants of requesting state may participate in measures taken by their Rwandan counterparts, if necessary. - Provision of Assistance in Timely, Constructive and Effective Manner (c. 36.1.1): - Authorities mentioned they endeavor to respond to MLA requests to the largest extent possible, and in a timely fashion; no supporting statistics provided. - No Unreasonable or Unduly Restrictive Conditions on Mutual Assistance (c. 36.2): - AML/CFT Law (Article 30) lists grounds for refusal; listed grounds include: - Likely to prejudice public order, sovereignty, security, or fundamental principles of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda; - Requesting authority not competent under requesting state law, or request not duly transmitted; - Facts have already been criminally processed, sentenced, or definitively judged in Rwanda; - Offense does not exist under Rwandan law or does not have common characteristics with an offense under Rwandan law; - Requested measures or similar measures not authorized in Rwanda or cannot be applied to the offenses on which the request is based; - Requested measures cannot be decreed or executed because of prescription of the crime of money laundering or financing terrorism under requesting state’s or Rwanda’s laws; - Foreign ruling requested to be implemented is not binding under the legislation of Rwanda; - Conditions under which the decision from the requesting state has been ordered do not offer sufficient guarantees of defense rights; - Substantial grounds for believing the request has been made to prosecute or punish a person on basis of sex, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinions or status; - Request is based on a political offense or motivated by political considerations; - Case is not important enough to justify requested measures or enforcement of foreign court decision. - In case of refusal, Rwandan government must immediately communicate grounds for decision to requesting state (Article 30). - Authorities were not aware of any requests turned down for discretionary grounds listed. - Efficiency of Processes (c. 36.3): - Requests transmitted through diplomatic channels; MFA transmits to Ministry of Justice which forwards to NPPA upon verification. - In urgent cases, requests may be communicated through INTERPOL or directly to judicial authorities by mail or other faster means; unless confirmed via diplomatic channels, requests are not followed up (Article 41). - Authorities strive to maximize both INTERPOL and diplomatic channels to avoid delays. - All requests and annexes must be in or accompanied by translation in Kinyarwanda, English, or French (Article 41). - Requests must specify necessary elements (Article 42), including: - authority requesting the measure; - requested authority; - subject of the request and relevant context; - facts justifying the request; - elements to facilitate identification of persons (civil status, nationality, address, profession); - information to identify and locate persons, instruments, resources, or property concerned; - text of legal provision instituting the offense or report of law applicable and indication of sentence incurred; - description of required assistance and detail of any particular procedure requesting state wishes applied. - Additional information necessary for provisional measures or confiscation, and for enforcement of decisions (certified copies, enforceability certificate, limits, amounts, third-party rights). - Provision of Assistance Regardless of Possible Involvement of Fiscal Matters (c. 36.4): - Authorities indicate that fiscal character of offense is not by itself sufficient grounds to refuse cooperation. - Provision of Assistance Regardless of Existence of Secrecy and Confidentiality Laws (c. 36.5): - Article 8: every reporting entity, control organ, or auditor must implement the law notwithstanding any obligation of professional secrecy or restriction of divulgation of information imposed by any other law; authorities state this allows requesting, on behalf of a foreign State, information held by reporting entities. - Assessment found this did not include information held by lawyers because scope of legal privilege in Rwanda is too broad and applies to all information obtained by lawyers. - Availability of Powers of Competent Authorities (applying R.28, c. 36.6): - (Text ends at paragraph 623 in supplied content; details on 36.6 not provided in supplied excerpt.) *Source: _cr15221 - 6. NATIONAL* ### 624. According to the authorities, the powers available to them to search and seize information may be ### _cr15221 - 624. According to the authorities, the powers available to them to search and seize information may be ### International Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) — Powers and Scope - 624. According to the authorities, the powers available to them to search and seize information may be used in response to a request for MLA. - 626. Authorities may use the powers granted in the domestic context to respond to a direct request for assistance from foreign judicial or enforcement authorities. - 627. Measures and procedures described for MLA are equally applicable to requests in the fight against terrorist financing. ### Avoiding Conflicts of Jurisdiction - 625. No mechanisms were established to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction. - Authorities did not recall having encountered a conflict of jurisdiction in practice. ### Dual Criminality and Mutual Assistance - 628. The AML/CFT Law addresses dual criminality only in the context of extradition. - MLA may be rendered for less intrusive and compulsory measures even where there is no dual criminality. - This principle has not been tested by courts in the absence of requests made in the context of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. ### Timeliness and Provisional Measures (Freezing, Seizure, Confiscation) - 629. Requests for provisional measures are dealt with by the competent court; if a request is written in general terms, the court will pronounce the most appropriate protective measure provided by Rwandan legislation; where requested provisional measures are not provided in Rwanda, the court may substitute other appropriate measures (Article 32). - No example of “appropriate measures” was provided. - Authorities state powers under the PC (Article 51) to freeze, seize, and ultimately confiscate can be exercised in response to a foreign request to the same extent as in domestic investigations. - Authorities may seize, freeze, and confiscate all items subject to confiscation under the standard. - Due to absence of requests for provisional measures and confiscation, authorities have no practical experience implementing these provisions on behalf of a foreign State. ### Property of Corresponding Value - 630. If assets to be frozen, seized, and confiscated are no longer available or not identifiable, authorities may seize and confiscate assets of corresponding value (Article 51 of the PC). - Authorities indicate this provision applies domestically and may be used in response to a request from a foreign State. ### Coordination of Seizure and Confiscation Actions - 631. No mechanism exists for coordinating seizure or confiscation actions with other countries. - Authorities were not aware of any need for such coordination in practice so far. - 632. The provisions and authorities’ views above apply equally to MLA in the context of combating the financing of terrorism. ### Asset Forfeiture Fund and Sharing of Confiscated Assets - 633. Article 61 of the AML/CFT Law: confiscated resources or assets are vested in the state which may allocate them to a fund designated for combating money laundering, terrorism, transnational organized crime, and illicit traffic of drugs and psychotropic substances. They remain burdened on to the amount of their value of the charge legally made up to the profit of third parties. In the event of confiscation by default, confiscated assets are vested to the state and liquidated according to relevant procedures. If the competent court acquits the prosecuted person following case review, it orders restitution of confiscated assets in monetary terms by the state. - 634. In practice, no such fund was established because no assets were confiscated, but the law sets the framework to do so if needed. - 635. Article 34 of the AML/CFT Law provides the Rwandan state powers to dispose of confiscated property on its territory upon request of foreign authorities, “unless an agreement concluded with the requesting State provides otherwise.” Authorities indicate this would enable them to share assets, if deemed appropriate. ### Recognition of Foreign Forfeiture/Confiscation Orders - 636. Article 31 of the AML/CFT Law: investigative and trial measures are to be executed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Rwanda “unless the competent authorities of another State require that it be proceeded according to a specific form compatible with the legislation of the Republic of Rwanda.” - Authorities state this would enable recognition of a foreign order for confiscation of assets from organizations principally criminal in nature, civil forfeiture, and/or confiscation that reverses the burden of proof if approved by the High Court through exequatur. - No request to recognize such an order was made; it is unclear whether the High Court would deem a foreign measure “compatible with the legislation of Rwanda” and approve implementation. ### Statistics on MLA Requests and Practical Experience - 637. At the time of the assessment, authorities had received two requests for MLA in the fight against money laundering (one from Switzerland and the other from Belgium). - Authorities responded to the requests through rogatory commission, but did not provide information on the object of the requests or timing of the response. - Authorities reported having requested a neighboring country’s assistance in a terrorist financing case, without additional details. - Authorities were not aware of any requests for MLA having been turned down. ### Implementation and Effectiveness Findings - 638. Conditions and range of measures Rwanda can take in response to MLA requests appear reasonable. - Rwanda has little experience requesting or providing MLA in combating ML, TF, and predicate crimes other than genocide. - Authorities appeared eager to cooperate with other states to the greatest extent possible. - Due to lack of practical experience, authorities could not establish that the MLA framework allows for timely responses, that dual criminality requirements do not constitute unreasonable obstacles in practice, nor how coordination of seizing and confiscation measures would work practically or how they would cooperate with respect to predicate offenses. ### Recommendations (6.3.2) - Recommendation 36: - Consider devising a mechanism for determining the best venue of jurisdiction of defendants in the interest of justice in cases that are subject to prosecution in more than one country; and - Ensure that information obtained by lawyers may be obtained upon request from another state in the circumstances envisaged in the standard. - Recommendation 38: - Establish a framework to freezing, seizing, and confiscating and sharing the proceeds of predicate offenses in response to a request from a foreign country. ### Compliance Ratings and Key Factors (6.3.3) - R.36 — PC - Deficiencies under Recommendations 1 and 2 may limit scope of assistance authorities can provide. - Broad scope of legal privilege prevents obtaining upon request from a foreign state information held by lawyers. - Timeliness of responses was not established. - No mechanism to determine best venue for prosecution in cross-border cases. - R.37 — LC - Effective implementation was not established. - R.38 — PC - AML/CFT Law addresses cooperation in freezing, seizing, and confiscation in ML/TF context only; similar cooperation with respect to predicate offenses is unclear. - Effective implementation was not established. - SR.V — PC - Deficiencies under Recommendations 1 and 2 may limit scope of assistance. - Timeliness of responses was not established. - No consideration given to determining best venue for prosecution in cross-border cases. - Effective implementation was not established. --- ### Extradition — Legal Framework and Practice (6.4) - 640. The AML/CFT Law sets the general framework for extradition in ML/TF cases. - 641. Rwanda has concluded bilateral extradition agreements with Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda, but their content was not shared with the assessment team; applicability to ML/TF is unclear. - 642. Article 26 of the Constitution: no Rwandan national may be extradited. ### Dual Criminality and Extradition - 643. Dual criminality is a condition for extradition (Article 36 of the AML/CFT); extradition may be carried out when the offense or a similar offense is envisaged both in the requesting State and the Republic of Rwanda. - Authorities state technical differences between laws would not constitute an impediment to extradition. ### Money Laundering as Extraditable Offense; Grounds for Refusal - 644. Article 35 of the AML/CFT Law: money laundering and terrorist financing are extraditable offenses. - Requests for extradition follow applicable treaty terms or, absent a treaty, the UN standard treaty of extradition (Resolution 45/116). - AML/CFT Law sets grounds for compulsory and optional refusal of extradition (Articles 37 and 38). - Extradition is only available for persons who have been convicted on money laundering charges, and not for persons charged for money laundering and pending trial. ### Extradition of Nationals and Cooperation for Prosecution - 645. Rwanda cannot extradite its nationals (Articles 25 of the Constitution and 37 of the AML/CFT Law). - AML/CFT Law requires referral to competent Rwanda court when certain grounds of refusal are met, but does not list nationality among grounds triggering aut dedere aut judicare. - No action is required following refusal to extradite a Rwandan national; therefore no framework exists for cooperation in prosecution of a Rwandan national. ### Efficiency and Simplified Procedures - 646. Laws and procedures aim to ensure requests are founded, but do not address timeframes for response. - At assessment time, no extradition requests had been submitted and processed under the AML/CFT Law; timeliness could not be established. - 647. No simplified extradition procedures are in place (c. 39.5, and V.8). - 648. Rwanda has not been requested to extradite anyone on the basis of a conviction for money laundering or terrorist financing. ### Extradition Recommendations (6.4.2) - Ensure that Rwandan nationals found guilty of money laundering or terrorist financing by a foreign state and whose extradition is refused by Rwanda on grounds of nationality only are subject to prosecution in Rwanda. - If necessary, establish a framework for cooperation with the foreign state that originally requested extradition to ensure efficiency. - Ensure extradition is available for persons charged with money laundering or terrorist financing and pending trial. - Ensure extradition requests may be handled without undue delay. ### Extradition Compliance Ratings (6.4.3) - R.39 — PC - No framework to prosecute a Rwandan national found guilty abroad where extradition is refused on nationality. - No cooperation framework for domestic prosecution following extradition refusal. - Extradition not available for persons charged and pending trial. - Unclear whether extradition requests could be executed without undue delay. - Effectiveness not established. - R.37 — LC - Effective implementation not established. - SR.V — PC - Same deficiencies as R.39 noted (nationality, lack of cooperation framework, extradition not available for charged persons pending trial, unclear timeliness, effectiveness not established). ### Other Forms of International Cooperation (beginning of 6.5) - 650. FIU: Articles 14 to 16 of the FIU Presidential Decree establish FIU legal framework for cooperation. - 651. Financial sector laws (Central Bank Law No. 55/2007; Banking Law No. 007/2008; Law Regulating the Capital Market in Rwanda No. 1/2011; Law Establishing the Capital Market Authority No. 52/2008) provide framework for exchanging and sharing information with foreign counterparts. *Source: _cr15221 (excerpts 624–651) — IMF assessment text* ### 652. The law enforcement authorities in Rwanda are able to provide international cooperation to their ### _cr15221 - 652. The law enforcement authorities in Rwanda are able to provide international cooperation to their ### Overview of international cooperation by law enforcement authorities (LEAs) - LEAs provide international cooperation through Interpol and direct police-to-police contact. - The Directorate of International Cooperation (DIC) at the RNP receives and replies to requests for information. The directorate is composed of four divisions: multilateral cooperation, cooperation with organizations, bilateral cooperation, and research and liaison. - Eight officers are working for the Directorate. - LEAs have signed MOUs with counterparts in a large number of countries; direct assistance is generally not subject to conditions or restrictions. - Information-sharing extends to information subject to confidentiality. - Rwanda is a member of regional organizations facilitating LEA information exchange: - The Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO), created in 1998 in Kampala, Uganda. - The EAC (East African Community) of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi, headquartered in Arusha, Tanzania; Customs Union established in 2005 and a Common Market in 2010, with planned Monetary Union and Political Federation phases. - LEAs in Rwanda are not authorized to conduct investigations on behalf of foreign counterparts (standard not met). - Cooperation may not be refused merely because of involvement of fiscal matters, but no written process specifying scope or nature of international AML/CFT information sharing (or explicit permission to share information related to fiscal matters) was provided to assessors. - LEAs cannot obtain financial information and documents from lawyers; lawyers are subject to stringent confidentiality requirements when preparing for or carrying out transactions for clients concerning activities under Recommendation 12. ### Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) legal framework and practice - Article 14 of the AML/CFT Law: the FIU can transmit information resulting from its examination to national or relevant foreign control organs or authorities responsible for enforcement of the AML/CFT Law when it has good reasons to believe information is suspicious or can contribute to an investigation on non-respect of the AML/CFT Law or to the crime of money laundering and financing of terrorism, in compliance with the Instructions of the Inspector General of the RNP. - Authorities stated: “the Director of the FIU works under the supervision of the IGP, and follows the RNP crime prevention strategies and standard operating procedures as provided by the RNP leadership.” - Article 15: the FIU can, on its own initiative or upon request, provide, receive, or exchange information with foreign FIUs or foreign counterparts with similar functions about an STR, provided counterparts are under the same obligations of professional secrecy. FIU can conclude cooperation agreements in compliance with its procedural manual approved by the Advisory Board. When receiving a request, it shall follow up within the limits of the power conferred by law. - Article 16: confidentiality requirements—before transmitting personal data to a foreign authority, the FIU must ensure the information is protected by the same provisions of professional secrecy and used for purposes envisaged by the decree or the AML/CFT Law. - Implementation gaps: - The Inspector General of the RNP did not release instructions determining conditions for information sharing. - The FIU did not develop the procedural manual for cooperation agreements as required by Article 15 of the Presidential Decree. - In practice, the FIU did not sign MOUs with foreign counterparts and has never shared information with them. - The FIU is not a member of the Egmont Group and is not implementing its principles. - Note in assessment: the authorities indicated that, since the assessment, the FIU has been sharing information with other law enforcement agencies on a regular and at times on a daily basis. ### Supervisory authorities and cross-border information exchange (BNR and CMA) - BNR (Bank of Rwanda) and the CMA (Capital Market Authority) have powers to share information internationally: - Law 55/07, Article 72 allows the BNR to cooperate with foreign central banks, foreign supervisory authorities, foreign regulators, and international institutions. Article 58, section 3 of the Banking Law provides for consolidated supervision and grants the BNR power to “set out modalities of cooperation with the supervisory authority of the host country by means of a cooperative agreement.” However, BNR is not the AML/CFT supervisor and therefore may not use these powers for AML/CFT purposes. - The CMA has powers under Articles 51, 52, 57, and 58 of Law 1/2011, and Article 3 paragraph 14 of Law 11/2011 to share information with international competent authorities, provide assistance, carry out investigations of alleged breaches, and provide information or opinion to foreign regulatory authorities. - Some MOUs were concluded by authorities (unspecified with whom) but do not provide for exchange of information in relation to ML and underlying predicate offenses. - No information provided on practical mechanisms or frequency whereby BNR and CMA provide assistance to foreign counterparts. - CMA may provide assistance subject to conditions: - (i) the foreign regulatory authority is legally recognized; - (ii) assistance would be used in fulfilling responsibilities; - (iii) the foreign authority will provide comparable assistance to CMA; - (iv) the foreign authority will comply with conditions CMA may impose on transmission; and - (v) the foreign authority is able to keep information confidential. - Based on these provisions, CMA’s exchange of information does not appear subject to disproportionate or unduly restrictive conditions. ### Implementation, effectiveness, and identified gaps - No information was provided on the number and type of requests received from foreign counterparts by competent authorities. - No information on whether and under what conditions competent authorities may make inquiries on behalf of foreign counterparts. - No information on controls or safeguards to ensure information received by competent authorities (other than CMA) is used only in an authorized manner. - Practical effectiveness: - Very little information on legal framework for cooperation; competent authorities have little or no practical experience cooperating internationally on AML/CFT matters. - The FIU never shared information with counterparts (at time of assessment). - LEAs are not proactive in requesting information on ML/TF and underlying predicate offenses; most requests made by Rwanda concern fugitive tracking and Genocide cases. - LEAs are not authorized to conduct investigations on behalf of foreign counterparts. - LEAs never shared TF information with counterparts; lack of TF criminalization limits scope of sharing TF information. - MOUs in place do not cover AML/CFT matters sufficiently to allow BNR and CMA to share or exchange information in relation to: - both ML and the underlying predicate offenses, and - allowing AML/CFT supervisory authorities to conduct inquiries on behalf of foreign counterparts. - Professional secrecy provisions applicable to lawyers (advocates) impede sharing or exchanging information. ### Statistics (R.32) and resource observations - No statistics provided regarding number and type of requests received from foreign counterparts by any competent authorities. - At time of assessment, implementation of AML/CFT framework had only just begun; authorities not fully seized of AML/CFT functions. - It was not possible to establish whether current resources are sufficient; all competent authorities likely to require additional resources. - Overall level of awareness of combating ML/TF and AML/CFT provisions was relatively low across competent authorities. - Statistical information scarce due to limited application of the law; authorities appeared to have capacity to produce valid statistics once implementation increases. - No review of the effectiveness of the AML/CFT framework had been conducted due to recent implementation. ### Recommendations and comments (section 6.5.2 and related) - Ensure that the FIU shares information with its foreign counterparts. - Provide LEAs with the power to conduct investigations on behalf of foreign counterparts. - Allow sharing of information and documents detained by lawyers when conducting transactions for their client concerning activities set under Recommendation 12. - Maintain statistics on the number of requests for assistance made or received by law enforcement authorities, the FIU, and supervisors, including whether the request was granted or refused and the response time. - Ensure that all AML/CFT supervisors have arrangements in place to share and exchange information with respect to both ML and the underlying predicate offenses. - Grant powers to all AML/CFT supervisors to allow for the conduct of inquiries on behalf of foreign counterparts. - Establish controls and safeguards for the AML/CFT supervisor for banks and other entities licensed by the BNR, FIU, and LEAs to ensure information received by competent authorities is used only in an authorized manner. - Ensure that requests for cooperation are not refused on the grounds of professional privilege or legal professional secrecy. ### Compliance ratings summary for Recommendation 40 and SR.V (section 6.5.3) - R.40: NC - With respect to the FIU and LEAs: - No sharing of information by the FIU with foreign counterparts. - Lack of powers of LEAs to conduct investigations on behalf of foreign counterparts. - Impossibility of sharing information detained by lawyers when conducting transactions for their clients concerning activities under Recommendation 12. - Lack of statistics and overall effectiveness. - With respect to supervisory authorities: - No AML/CFT supervisor in place for the banking sector that may cooperate with foreign counterparts. - Lack of arrangements to share/exchange information with respect to both ML and predicate offenses. - Lack of powers to allow all AML/CFT supervisors to conduct inquiries on behalf of foreign counterparts. - Lack of controls and safeguards to ensure information received by competent authorities is used only in an authorized manner. - Requests for cooperation could be refused on grounds of professional privilege or legal professional secrecy. - Lack of overall effectiveness. - SR.V: NC - With respect to the FIU and LEAs: - Lack of TF criminalization limits ability to provide cooperation. - Lack of overall effectiveness of exchange of TF-related information. - Lack of statistics. - With respect to supervisory authorities: - Lack of arrangements to facilitate sharing/exchange of information with respect to both TF and underlying predicate offenses. - Lack of powers to allow all AML/CFT supervisors to conduct inquiries on behalf of foreign counterparts in TF matters. - Lack of controls and safeguards in the banking sector to ensure information is used only in an authorized manner. - Lack of requirements to ensure information is not refused on grounds that it involves fiscal matters. - Requests for cooperation could be refused on grounds of professional privilege or legal professional secrecy. - Lack of overall effectiveness. ### Related ratings and resource recommendations (sections 7.1–7.2) - R.30: NC - Unable to determine whether resources are sufficient (in numerical terms) due to lack of implementation. - Resources did not appear adequate in terms of technical knowledge of AML/CFT. - Insufficient training provided on AML/CFT. - R.32: NC - Lack of collection of detailed statistics relevant to effectiveness and efficiency of the AML/CFT regime. - No review of the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system on a regular basis. - Recommendations related to resources and statistics: - Ensure all competent authorities are adequately structured, funded, staffed, and provided with sufficient technical and other resources, including operational independence and autonomy. - Provide adequate AML/CFT training to staff of competent authorities. - Review the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system on a regular basis. - Ensure all competent authorities maintain comprehensive statistics relevant to AML/CFT effectiveness and efficiency in line with the FATF standard. *Source: IMF assessment text _cr15221 (excerpts as provided).* ### 6. Politically exposed persons ### 6. Politically exposed persons ### Politically exposed persons (PEPs) — NC - Scope limitation: Insurance companies and intermediaries are not subject to the AML/CFT Law. - No requirement to put in place appropriate risk management systems to determine whether a potential customer, a customer, or the beneficial owner is a PEP. - No requirement to obtain senior management approval to continue the business relationship when the customer or the beneficial owner is subsequently found to be or subsequently becomes a PEP. - No requirement to take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds for the beneficial owners identified as PEPs. - No requirement to conduct enhanced monitoring on the relationship with PEPs. - Low level of implementation. - The effectiveness of the measures related to PEPs has not been demonstrated. ### Correspondent banking — NC - No measures in relation to cross-border correspondent banking or other similar relationships. ### New technologies and non-face-to-face business — NC - Scope limitation: Insurance companies and intermediaries are not subject to the AML/CFT Law. - No requirement on reporting entities to do the following: - Have policies in place or take such measures as may be needed to prevent the misuse of technological developments in money laundering or terrorist financing schemes; - Have policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks associated with non-face-to-face business relationships or transactions; and - Implement measures for managing the risks including specific and effective CDD procedures that apply to non-face-to-face customers. ### Third parties and introducers — NC - Scope limitation: Insurance companies and intermediaries are not subject to the AML/CFT Law. - No legal or regulatory provisions addressing reliance on third parties to perform elements of the CDD process or introduce business. ### Record-keeping — PC - Scope limitation: Insurance companies and intermediaries are not subject to the AML/CFT Law. - No requirement to maintain accounts files. - Limitation/restriction of competent authorities’ access on a timely basis to customer and transaction records. - The shortcomings identified under Rec.5 affect the effectiveness and implementation of the record-keeping measures with regard to the necessary components of transaction records (i.e., address, beneficiary’s name). ### Unusual transactions — NC - No obligation to make findings of examinations of complex and unusual transactions available to competent authorities and auditors. - Limited knowledge of the requirement coupled with ineffective implementation due to non-automated systems for monitoring transactions. - Lack of effective implementation. ### DNFBP—Recommendations 5, 6, 8–11 — NC - Casinos are not reporting entities under the AML/CFT Law. - No threshold for CDD measures applicable to casinos and dealers in precious metals and stones. - The shortcomings identified in the framework of Recommendations 5, 6, and 10–11 are applicable to designated non-financial business and professions. - No provisions in line with Recommendations 8–9. - Lack of implementation of the preventive measures by DNFBPs. - The effectiveness of the preventive measures to AML/CFT has not been established. ### Suspicious transaction reporting — NC - The scope of the reporting obligation is too narrow because the money laundering offense does not apply to all the predicate offenses designated by the FATF. - The reporting obligation does not extend to insurance companies and insurance brokers/agents. - There is no obligation to report attempted transactions. - There is no obligation to report funds suspected of being linked or related to or to be used by individual terrorists. - Implementation of reporting obligation is low. ### Protection and no tipping-off — C - This recommendation is met. ### Internal controls, compliance and audit — PC - Although the AML/CFT Law does require the implementation of some measures to prevent ML and TF, it lacks the necessary level of clarity and detail to be in compliance with the standard. In particular: - The requirements for reporting entities to establish, adopt, and maintain internal procedures, policies, and controls addressing CDD, record retention, detection of unusual and suspicious transactions, and the reporting obligation are incomplete. - There are incomplete requirements for reporting entities to do the following: - Communicate the internal procedures, policies, and controls to prevent ML and TF to their employees; and - Designate the AML/CFT compliance officer and other appropriate staff with timely access to customer identification and other CDD information, transaction records, and other relevant information. - The requirements for internal audit function to assess the adequacy of internal control systems and policies with respect to AML/CFT and to maintain an adequately resourced and independent audit function are incomplete. - There is a lack of implementation of the requirements under this recommendation. - Effectiveness was not established. ### DNFBP—Recommendations 13–15 and 21 — NC - Casinos are not subject to the requirements of Rec. 13, 14, 15, and 21. - The shortcomings identified in the framework of Recommendations 13, 14, 15, and 21 are applicable to non-financial business and professions. - Professional secrecy provisions for lawyers and legal professionals pose an impediment to suspicious transactions reporting. - No reporting by DNFBPs. - Effectiveness was not established. ### Sanctions — NC - No sanctioning regime for failure to comply with AML/CFT obligations (i.e., no competent authority, lack of clarity as to the range of available sanctions, and scope limitation of available sanctions.) ### Shell banks — LC - No requirement for reporting entities to satisfy themselves that their foreign respondents do not permit their accounts to be used by shell banks. ### Other forms of reporting — C - This recommendation is met. ### Other NFBP and secure transaction techniques — NC - No risk assessment has been conducted in the domestic sector. - No consideration has been given to applying the FATF recommendations to other higher-risk businesses and professions. - No evidence of measures or steps taken to encourage the development of modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to ML. ### Special attention for higher risk countries — NC - Lack of measures to advise reporting entities of concerns about weaknesses in the AML/CFT systems of other countries. - Lack of requirements imposed on reporting entities to examine, as far as possible, the background and purpose of transactions that have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, and that the written findings of those business transactions are available to assist competent authorities and auditors. - Lack of countermeasures in place to address instances where a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations. - Lack of effective implementation. ### Foreign branches and subsidiaries — N/A - (No content provided.) ### Regulation, supervision and monitoring — NC - No authority or authorities designated for AML/CFT supervision. - Institutions not subject to adequate AML/CFT regulation and supervision. - Lack of fit-and-proper measures for pension, payment service providers, and Forex sectors, and application of relevant Core Principles to AML/CFT matters. - Lack of measures to ensure that relevant prudential regulatory and supervisory measures are also applicable for AML/CFT purposes. - Effectiveness was not established. ### DNFBP—regulation, supervision and monitoring — NC - The FIU does not have the capacity (both in terms of resources and expertise) to conduct AML/CFT supervision in an adequate manner. - No AML/CFT supervision of DNFBPs. - No sanctions for non-compliance with the AML/CFT obligations. - Lack of implementation and awareness of AML/CFT obligations. ### Guidelines and Feedback — NC - Lack of guidelines and guidance on reporting obligation. - Lack of adequate and appropriate feedback from competent authorities, in particular the FIU. - No guidance has been issued to assist DNFBPs in the implementation of their AML/CFT obligations. - No (general) feedback has been provided by the FIU. - Lack of guidelines and guidance on AML/CFT issues provided by the BNR and the CMA to reporting entities. ### The FIU — PC - Lack of analysis of STRs and other information mostly due to performing investigations and lack of analytical tools and weak quality/quantity of reporting. - Lack of guidance on manner of reporting including reporting forms for nonbank reporting entities. - No additional requests of information addressed to reporting entities. - Very low level of dissemination due to low level of STRs received. - No publication of annual reports containing information about its activities, statistics, and typologies. - Lack of sufficient operational independence and autonomy mainly due to the powers and responsibilities of the Advisory Board. - Information not securely protected. - Effectiveness was not established. ### Law enforcement authorities — PC - The various police units responsible for the investigation of the predicate crimes do not investigate ML related activities; the FIU conducts some investigations into ML on the basis of STRs received, although it should focus on its analysis functions. - Effectiveness of the current investigation and prosecution framework was not established. ### Powers of competent authorities — PC - Lack of powers to compel production of documents and information from FIs and DNFBPs (documents can only be seized based on powers in CPC). - No legal power obtaining documents and information held by lawyers. - Effectiveness of powers for document production, search, and seizure was not established. ### Supervisors — NC - Lack of adequate supervisory authority/powers addressing AML/CFT matters across all sectors. ### Resources, integrity, and training — NC - Unable to determine whether resources are sufficient (in numerical terms) due to lack of implementation. - Overall, resources did not appear adequate in terms of technical knowledge of AML/CFT. - Insufficient training provided on AML/CFT. ### National cooperation — NC - Lack of a mechanism to ensure cooperation amongst all relevant authorities and coordination of the development and implementation of AML/CFT policies and activities. - No bilateral exchange of information between the FIU, LEAs, and supervisory authorities. ### Statistics — NC - Lack of collection of detailed statistics on matter relevant to the effectiveness and efficiency of the AML/CFT regime. - No review of the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system on a regular basis. ### Legal persons – beneficial owners — PC - Information collected at the time of incorporation is easily accessible but it is not kept up to date and does not specifically address the beneficial ownership. ### Legal arrangements – beneficial owners — N/A - (No content provided.) ### International cooperation — Conventions — LC - Effective implementation was not established. ### Mutual legal assistance (MLA) — PC - The deficiencies identified under Recommendations 1 and 2 may limit the scope of assistance that the authorities can provide. - Broad scope of the legal privilege prevents the authorities from obtaining upon request of a foreign state any information held by lawyers. - Timeliness of responses was not established. - No consideration given to determining the best venue for prosecution of defendants in the interest of justice in cases that are subject to prosecution in more than one country. ### Dual criminality — LC - Effective implementation was not established. ### MLA on confiscation and freezing — PC - The AML/CFT Law addresses cooperation in freezing, seizing, and confiscation in the context of ML/TF only and similar cooperation with respect to the predicate offenses is unclear. - Effective implementation was not established. ### Extradition — PC - There is no framework to allow for the prosecution of a Rwandan national found guilty of ML or TF by a foreign State and whose extradition is refused on the basis of nationality only. - There is no framework for cooperation in domestic prosecution of a Rwandan national whose extradition was refused on the grounds of nationality. - Extradition is not available for persons charged for money laundering and pending trial. - It is unclear whether a request for extradition could be executed without undue delay. - The effectiveness of the framework for extradition was not established. ### Other forms of cooperation — NC - With respect to the FIU and LEAs: - No sharing of information by the FIU with foreign counterparts. - Lack of powers of LEAs to conduct investigations on behalf of foreign counterparts. - Impossibility of sharing information detained by lawyers when conducting transactions for their client concerning the activities set under Recommendation 12. - Lack of statistics and overall effectiveness. - With respect to supervisory authorities: - No AML/CFT supervisor in place for the banking sector that may cooperate with foreign counterparts. - Lack of arrangements in place to the sharing and exchange of information with respect to both ML and the underlying predicate offenses. - Lack of powers to allow all AML/CFT supervisors to conduct inquiries on behalf of foreign counterparts. - Lack of controls and safeguards in place for the BNR to ensure that the information received by competent authorities is used only in an authorized manner. - Lack of requirements in place to ensure that the information is not refused on the grounds that it involves fiscal matters. - Requests for cooperation could be refused on the grounds of professional privilege or legal professional secrecy. - Lack of overall effectiveness. ### Summary of Nine Special Recommendations (SRs) - SR.I Implement UN instruments — PC - Effective implementation was not established. - SR.II Criminalize terrorist financing — NC - The provision and collection of funds to individual terrorists and to terrorist organizations are not criminalized. - The direct and indirect collection and provision of funds is not covered under the TF offense. - Funding of terrorist acts is limited to acts defined in the treaties to which Rwanda is party, and therefore not all financing of terrorist acts are covered in the TF offense. - Lack of clarity as to whether the intentional element of the offense of TF can be inferred from objective factual circumstances. - Lack of effectiveness of the TF offense. - SR.III Freeze and confiscate terrorist assets — NC - Absence of measures to freeze without delay funds or other assets of terrorists, those who finance terrorism, and terrorist organizations in accordance with the UNSCRs relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts. - Absence of measures, including legislative ones, which would enable the competent authorities to seize and confiscate property that is the proceeds of, or used in, or intended or allocated for use in the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts, or terrorist organizations. - SR.IV Suspicious transaction reporting — NC - There is no obligation to report funds suspected of being linked or related to, or to be used by individual terrorists, terrorist organizations, or those who finance terrorism. - SR.V International cooperation — PC - The deficiencies identified under Recommendations 1 and 2 may limit the scope of assistance that the authorities can provide. - Timeliness of responses was not established. - No consideration given to determining the best venue for prosecution of defendants in the interest of justice in cases that are subject to prosecution in more than one country. - Effective implementation was not established. - There is no framework to allow for the prosecution of a Rwandan national found guilty of ML or TF by a foreign State and whose extradition is refused on the basis of nationality only. - There is no framework for cooperation in domestic prosecution of a Rwandan national whose extradition was refused on the grounds of nationality. - Extradition is not available for persons charged for money laundering and pending trial. - It is unclear whether a request for extradition could be executed without undue delay. - The effectiveness of the framework for extradition was not established. - With respect to the FIU and LEAs: - Lack of TF criminalization limits the ability to provide cooperation by all concerned authorities. - Lack of overall effectiveness of the exchange of information relating to TF. - Lack of statistics. - With respect to supervisory authorities: - Lack of arrangements in place to facilitate the sharing and exchange of information with respect to both TF and the underlying predicate offenses. - Lack of powers to allow all AML/CFT supervisors to conduct inquiries on behalf of foreign counterparts in TF matters. - Lack of controls and safeguards in place in the banking sector to ensure that the information received by competent authorities is used only in an authorized manner. - Lack of requirements in place to ensure that the information is not refused on the grounds that it involves fiscal matters. - Requests for cooperation could be refused on the grounds of professional privilege or legal professional secrecy. - Lack of overall effectiveness. - SR.VI AML/CFT requirements for money/value transfer services — NC - The shortcomings identified in other recommendations related to CDD, sanctions, supervision, and regulation affect the implementation and effectiveness of this recommendation. - No list of agents maintained by the MVT service operator or provided to the authorities. - No sanctions available for failure to comply with AML/CFT requirements. - Informal money/value transfer system operating in Rwanda without effective monitoring. - SR.VII Wire transfer rules — NC - No requirement for reporting entities conducting wire transfers, both domestic and international, of amounts equivalent to EUR/US$1,000 or more to obtain and maintain full originator information. - No requirement for ordering financial institutions to verify the identity of the originator in accordance with Recommendation 5. - Lack of clarity as to whether originator information should be included in domestic wire transfers. - No requirement on intermediaries and beneficiary financial institutions in the payment chain to ensure that all originator information that accompanies a wire transfer is transmitted with the transfer. - No requirement on beneficiary financial institution to adopt effective risk-based procedures for identifying and handling wire transfers that are not accompanied by complete originator information and to consider the lack of complete originator information a factor in assessing whether they are required to be reported to the FIU and consider restricting or terminating its business relationship with financial institutions that fail to meet SR. VII. - No supervisory framework to ensure compliance with the wire transfer requirements after the granting of the necessary license. - No sanctioning regime for failure to comply with wire transfer requirements. - Lack of effective implementation. - SR.VIII Nonprofit organizations — PC - No review on the NPO sector has been conducted and lack of outreach to the NPO sector on the risks of FT. - Insufficient supervision/monitoring of the NPO sector, mostly domestic NGOs, which account for a significant portion of the financial resources under control of the sector, and a substantial share of the sector’s international activities. - Lack of requirement to maintain relevant information and make it available publicly and to appropriate authorities. - No requirement to maintain certain records required under SR.VIII for a period of five years. - Lack of effective mechanisms to share relevant information and promptly investigate terrorist abuse of NPOs among all levels of appropriate authorities that hold relevant information on NPOs. - SR.IX Cross-Border Declaration and Disclosure — NC - Declaration system is not in force yet and is not in line with the standard. - Exemption regarding the withdrawal of cash from banks could limit the effectiveness of the declaration system. - Lack of clear powers to request and obtain further information from the carrier with regard to the origin of the currency or the bearer negotiable instruments and their intended use. - Lack of powers to be able to stop or restrain currency and bearer negotiable instruments for a reasonable time in order to ascertain whether evidence of ML or TF may be found. - Lack of proportionate sanctions for false disclosure, failure to disclose, or cross-border transportation for ML and TF purposes. - The requirement for the retention of records does not extend to all kinds of bearer negotiable instruments declared or otherwise detected, or the identification data of the bearer. - Absence of clear definition of bearer negotiable instruments. - Lack of implementation of the system transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments across all border points. - Lack of training on the best practice of implementing the requirement of SR.IX. - Effectiveness of the declaration system has not been established. *Source: _cr15221 - 6. Politically exposed persons* ### 1. General ### 1. General ### 2. Legal System and Related Institutional Measures #### 2.1 Criminalization of Money Laundering (R.1 and 2) - Ensure that the concealment or disguise of the movement of property, knowing that such property is derived from an offense, also constitutes money laundering. - Clarify that prior conviction for the predicate offense is not a necessity to secure a money laundering conviction (i.e., when proving that property is the proceeds of crime). - Ensure that, in practice, intention can effectively be inferred from objective factual circumstances. - Ensure that criminal sanctions do not preclude the possibility of parallel civil or administrative proceedings if such proceedings are available. #### 2.2 Criminalization of Terrorist Financing (SR.II) - Criminalize the provision and collection of funds to individual terrorists and to terrorist organizations. - Ratify and implement the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on March 10, 1988, and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on March 10, 1988. - Ensure that, in practice, intention can be inferred from objective factual circumstances. - Review the approach taken in applying the TF provisions to ensure that the legal framework in place is used more effectively. #### 2.3 Confiscation, freezing, and seizing of proceeds of crime (R.3) - Ensure that bona fide third parties can defend their rights at all stages of the confiscation process. - Effectively identify and trace property that is, or may become, subject to confiscation or is suspected of being the proceeds of crime. - Make effective use of the provisional and confiscation measures to fight ML, TF, and predicate crimes. #### 2.4 Freezing of funds used for terrorist financing (SR.III) - Rwanda did not implement the necessary measures to freeze without delay funds or other assets of terrorists, those who finance terrorism, and terrorist organizations in accordance with the UNSCRs relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts. - Put in place effective laws and procedures to freeze terrorist funds or other assets or persons designated by the United Nations Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee in accordance with UNSCR 1267 of 1999 and successor resolutions. Such freezing should take place without delay and without prior notice to the designated persons involved. - Put in place effective laws and procedures to freeze terrorist funds or other assets of persons designated in the context on UNSCR 1373 of 2001. Such freezing should take place without delay and without prior notice to the designated persons involved. - Develop effective laws and procedures to examine and give effect to, if appropriate, the actions initiated under the freezing mechanisms of other jurisdictions. - Extend the freezing measures to all “funds and other property,” which would make it possible, pursuant to the aforementioned resolutions, to cover all financial assets and property of any kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, as well as legal documents or instruments of any kind evidencing title to or interest in such property. - Provide a clear and rapid mechanism for distributing the UNSCR lists nationally to the financial institutions and other persons or entities that may be holding targeted funds or other assets. - Provide clear guidance to FIs and other persons or entities that may be holding targeted funds or assets concerning their obligations in taking action under freezing mechanisms. - Introduce effective and publicly known procedures for timely review of requests to de-list designated persons and to unfreeze the funds or other property of persons or entities removed from the lists. - Introduce effective and publicly known procedures for unfreezing as promptly as possible the funds or other property of persons or entities inadvertently affected by a freezing mechanism, upon verification that the person or entity is not a designated person. - Introduce appropriate procedures for authorizing access to funds or other property frozen pursuant to Resolution S/RES/1267 (1999) and that have been determined to be necessary for basic expenses, the payment of certain types of fees, expenses, and service charges, as well as extraordinary expenses. - Introduce appropriate procedures allowing a person or entity whose funds or other property were frozen to challenge the measures, including with ultimate recourse to a court. - Introduce a provision that would ensure protection for the rights of third parties acting in good faith. - Develop appropriate measures to monitor effectively the compliance with relevant legislation, rules, or regulations governing the obligations under SR.III and to impose civil, administrative, and criminal sanctions to failure to comply with such legislation, rules, or regulations. #### 2.5 The Financial Intelligence Unit and its functions (R.26) - Provide reporting entities with guidance on the manner of reporting, including comprehensive reporting forms for all reporting entities other than banks (which have already received a reporting form). - Ensure that the FIU asks reporting entities for additional information when the information is correlated to received information. - Ensure that the FIU strengthens the quality of its analysis of STRs and other information, in particular by undertaking more in-depth analysis that could lead to improving the quality and quantity of disseminated reports. This could be achieved inter alia by: - (i) conducting analysis of information instead of investigation, - (ii) strengthening the technical tools available to the analysts, and - (iii) increasing the number of analysts with financial background and raising their awareness. - Ensure that the information held by the FIU is securely protected. - Ensure the independence of the FIU by, among other things, (i) putting in place proper safeguards for the sharing of information with the Advisory Board, (ii) securing adequate financial, human, and technical resources to conduct its core functions, and (iii) securing the information held at its premises. - Publish periodic annual reports with comprehensive statistics, typologies, and trends of money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as information regarding its activities. - Consider applying to Egmont Group membership. - Ensure that the FIU provides additional specialized and practical in-depth training to its employees. This training should cover, for example, predicate offenses to money laundering, analysis techniques, and familiarization with money laundering and terrorist financing typologies and risks and vulnerabilities. #### 2.6 Law enforcement, prosecution and other competent authorities (R.27 and 28) - Appoint and adequately resource dedicated financial investigators at the NPPA and RNP (other than the FIU) to deal with money laundering cases. - Provide LEAs with adequate powers to compel the production of documents and information from lawyers. - Investigate money laundering and/or terrorist financing offenses irrespective of whether the source of information emanates from the FIU or any other source. - Provide the judiciary with more independence by limiting the power of the Minister of Justice to intervene in the decisions of the Prosecutor General. - Provide AML/CFT training to all LEAs and in particular to all dedicated financial crime investigators and prosecutors. - Consider making a more frequent use of special investigative techniques such as the monitoring of accounts and special investigative techniques to detect and investigate money laundering and its predicate crimes. #### 2.7 Cross-Border Declaration and Disclosure (SR.IX) - Ensure that the proposed declaration system has the characteristics described under SR.IX. - Remove the exemption related to the funds certified by a withdrawal slip issued by an accredited bank in Rwanda. - Amend the requirements to extend to the shipment of currency and bearer negotiable instruments through cargo containers and the mail. - Define the term “bearer negotiable instruments” to include monetary instruments in bearer form, such as traveler's cheques and negotiable instruments (including cheques, promissory notes, and money orders) that are either in bearer form, endorsed without restriction made out to a fictitious payee, or otherwise in such a form that title can pass upon delivery; and incomplete instruments (including cheques, promissory notes, and money orders) signed, but with the payee’s name omitted. - Ensure that competent authorities have the powers to request and obtain further information from the carrier with regard to the origin of the currency or bearer negotiable instruments and their intended use in cases of suspicion of ML or TF, and the temporary restraint measures, and the adequate and uniform level of sanctions. - Provide competent authorities with the authority to stop or restrain cash or bearer negotiable instruments for a reasonable time in order to ascertain whether evidence of ML or TF may be found where there is a suspicion of ML or TF or where there is a false declaration. - Once this system is established, competent authorities should be provided with training on the best practices paper for SR.IX. ### 3. Preventive Measures–Financial Institutions #### 3.1 Risk of money laundering or terrorist financing (No specific bullets provided in source content beyond the heading.) #### 3.2 Customer due diligence, including enhanced or reduced measures (R.5–8) - The AML/CFT Law includes a number of basic CDD obligations, in particular the obligation to identify the customer. However, it fails to address all the elements required in the standard and, in a number of instances, is too general and lacks the necessary level of detail to be effective. - Going forward, the requirements set forth under the AML/CFT Law should be better supported and complemented with sector-specific regulations and guidelines. Recommendation 5: - Require in law or regulation all financial institutions (as defined in the FATF standard) to do the following: - Refrain from establishing or keeping anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious names. - Undertake CDD measures in the following cases: - When carrying out occasional transactions that are wire transfers in the circumstances covered by the Interpretative Note to SR.VII; and - When there is a suspicion of terrorist financing (in addition to the suspicion of money laundering already included in the law), without exceptions and regardless of the amounts involved. - Establish the applicable threshold for undertaking CDD for occasional transactions. - Identify their customers and verify that customer’s identity using reliable, independent source documents, data, or information (identification data). - Establish mechanisms for adequately verifying the power to bind the legal person or arrangement. - Identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial owner in line with the definition set forth under the standard, which should refer not only to the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the persons on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted but also the persons who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement, including those who comprise the mind and management of a company. - Conduct ongoing due diligence on the business relationship, which should include the scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of the business relationship and monitoring of the business relationship to ensure that documents, data, or information collected under the CDD process are kept up to date. Further recommended requirements: - Obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship. - Perform enhanced due diligence for higher risk categories of customers, business relationships, or transactions. - Refuse to open an account, establish a business relationship, or conduct the transaction, and consider making an STR when they are unable to comply with the CDD requirements. - Terminate the business relationship and consider filing an STR when they have doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data. - Apply CDD measures to existing customers that predate the AML/CFT Law on the basis of materiality and risk and conduct due diligence on such existing relationships at appropriate times. - Perform CDD measures on existing customers who hold anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious names that predate the AML/CFT Law. Recommendation 6: - Provide examples of the prominent public functions that would fall under the definition of “political leader” (e.g., heads of state or of government; senior politicians; senior government, judicial, or military officials; senior executives of state-owned corporations; and important political party officials). - Require reporting entities to do the following: - Put in place appropriate risk management systems to determine whether a potential customer, a customer, or the beneficial owner is a PEP. - Obtain senior management approval to continue the business relationship when the customer or the beneficial owner is subsequently found to be or subsequently becomes a PEP. - Establish the source of wealth and the source of funds of beneficial owners identified as PEPs. - Conduct enhanced monitoring on that relationship. Recommendation 7 (correspondent relationships): - Gather sufficient information about the respondent institution to understand fully the nature of the respondent’s business and to determine its reputation and quality of supervision. - Assess the respondent institution’s AML/CFT controls. - Obtain approval from senior management before establishing correspondent relationship. - Documenting the respective obligations of each institution. Recommendation 8 (new technologies and non-face-to-face): - Establish measures including policies and procedures designed to prevent and protect financial institutions (as defined by the FATF standard) from money laundering and terrorist financing threats that may arise from new or developing technologies or specific CDD measures that apply to non-face-to-face business relationships and transactions. - Authorities are encouraged to consult the Risk Management Principles for Electronic Banking issued by the Basel Committee in July 2003. #### 3.3 Third parties and introduced business (R.9) - Regulate reliance on intermediaries or third parties to perform elements of the CDD process, and ensure the following: - CDD measures performed by the intermediary or third parties are those listed under Criteria 5.3 to 5.6 of the Methodology; - The information collected by the third party may be immediately made available to reporting entities upon request without delay; and - The reporting entities are required to satisfy themselves that the third party is regulated and supervised for and have measures in place to comply with CDD requirements in line with Recommendation 5. - The ultimate responsibility for customer identification and verification remains with the reporting entities relying on the third party. #### 3.4 Financial institution secrecy or confidentiality (R.4) - Ensure that the BNR is granted the power to exchange AML/CFT information with other domestic competent authorities. - Ensure that competent authorities share information on AML/CFT-related issues both at domestic and international levels. - Ensure that reporting entities are allowed to share information required under R.7, R.9, or SR.VII. #### 3.5 Record keeping and wire transfer rules (R.10 and SR.VII) Recommendation 10: - Require financial institutions to maintain records on account files. - Ensure that all customer information required under R.5 is properly maintained. - Ensure that there is no restriction to timely access to customer and transaction records by competent authorities. Recommendation SR.VII: - Require financial institutions conducting wire transfers (both domestic and international) of EUR/US$1,000 or more to obtain and maintain full originator information (i.e., the originator’s name, account number, and the address) and to verify the identity of the originator in accordance with Recommendation 5. - Require each intermediary and beneficiary financial institution in the payment chain to ensure that all originator information that accompanies the wire transfer is transmitted with the transfer. - Require beneficiary financial institution to adopt effective risk-based procedures for identifying and handling wire transfers that are not accompanied by complete originator information and to consider the lack of complete originator information as a factor in assessing whether they are required to be reported to the FIU and consider restricting or terminating its business relationship with financial institutions that fail to meet SR.VII. - Monitor the compliance of financial institutions with the requirements set forth under SR.VII. - Ensure that there are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for failure to comply with the wire transfer requirements. #### 3.6 Monitoring of transactions and relationships (R.11 and 21) Recommendation 11: - Require reporting entities to keep the findings of their analysis and examination of unusual transactions available for competent authorities and auditors. Recommendation 21: - Ensure that the reporting requirement extends to combating terrorist financing. - Ensure that reporting entities are advised of concerns about weaknesses in the AML/CFT systems of other countries. - Extend the obligation on reporting entities to examine, as far as possible, the background and purpose of transactions that have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, and to keep their written findings of those transactions available to assist competent authorities and auditors for business relations and transactions with persons residing in countries that do not apply regulations for combating money laundering or apply insufficiently regulations equivalent to those provided for the Rwandan AML/CFT Law. - Establish mechanisms for applying counter-measures where a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations. #### 3.7 Suspicious transaction reports and other reporting (R.13, 14, 19, 25, and SR.IV) - Amend the reporting obligation to apply to all the predicate offenses designated by the FATF. - Include insurance companies and insurance brokers/agents in the definition of reporting entity to ensure that the reporting obligation covers them as well. - Require all reporting entities (as defined in the FATF standard) to report all transactions, including attempted transactions, when they suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that the funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related or linked to, or to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts, or terrorist organizations or those who finance terrorism. - Ensure that competent authorities, and particularly the FIU, provide guidance to assist reporting entities on AML/CFT issues covered under the FATF recommendations, including, at a minimum, a description of ML and TF techniques and methods; and any additional measures that these institutions could take to ensure that their AML/CFT procedures are effective. - Establish communication mechanisms between the BNR, the FIU, and the CMA, as well as a mechanism for providing feedback to reporting entities, including general and specific or case-by-case feedback. - Consider providing guidance to reporting entities using as a reference the FATF Best Practice Guidelines on Providing Feedback to Reporting Financial Institutions and Other Persons. - Clarify that the protection for good faith reporting extends to the members of the board of directors or managers, the board committees, the compliance officer, other officers of the reporting entities, and any agents or representatives of the reporting entities. *Source: _cr15221 - 1. General* ### 3.8 Internal controls, compliance, ### _cr15221 - 3.8 Internal controls, compliance, ### Internal controls, compliance, audit and foreign branches (R.15 and 22) - Require all reporting entities to establish, adopt, and maintain internal procedures, policies, and controls addressing CDD, record retention, detection of unusual and suspicious transactions, and the reporting obligation. - Require reporting entities to designate the AML/CFT compliance officer at managerial level. - Require reporting entities to ensure that the AML/CFT compliance officer and other appropriate staff have timely access to customer information, data and other CDD information, transaction records, and other relevant information. - Require reporting entities to maintain an adequately resourced and independent audit function to test compliance with the procedures, policies and controls; and provide them with sufficient details to ensure that the scope of the internal audit function clearly includes AML/CFT audits and an overall assessment of the adequacy of the internal control systems and policies with respect to AML/CFT. - Require reporting entities to develop and maintain ongoing employee training on AML/CFT matters, in particular to include information on current ML and TF techniques, methods, and trends; all aspects of the AML/CFT Law and obligations; and the requirements concerning CDD and suspicious transaction reporting. - Although Recommendation 22 is not currently applicable to Rwanda, the authorities are also encouraged to set out provisions for reporting entities in the event that foreign branches and subsidiaries are established to ensure that these institutions observe AML/CFT measures consistent with home country requirements and the FATF Recommendations, to the extent that local (i.e., host country) laws and regulations permit; to pay particular attention that this principle is observed with respect to their branches and subsidiaries in countries that do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations; and where the minimum AML/CFT requirements of the home and host countries differ, to apply the higher standard, to the extent that local (i.e., host country) laws and regulations permit. ### Shell banks (R.18) - Explicitly require reporting entities to satisfy themselves that when establishing correspondent relationships in the future, their respondent institutions in foreign countries do not permit their accounts to be used by shell banks. ### The supervisory and oversight system – competent authorities and SROs (R.23, 29, 17, and 25) Recommendation 23: - Designate a competent authority or authorities responsible for AML/CFT supervision of the reporting entities. - Develop, adopt and implement a formal AML/CFT supervisory framework, including setting out the necessary activities for offsite surveillance and examination procedures for onsite visits. - Ensure that, in the course of prudential supervision of financial institutions subject to the Core Principles, supervisors apply for AML/CFT purposes the prudential regulatory and supervisory measures that are also relevant to money laundering. Recommendation 17: - Ensure that there is an adequate range of sanctions (administrative, civil, and financial) for noncompliance with the AML/CFT requirements to ensure that these are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive, and that they may be applied without undue limitation. - Ensure that the range of sanctions not only applies to legal persons that are financial institutions or businesses but also to their directors and senior management. Recommendation 25: - Consider providing guidance to reporting entities on their AML/CFT obligations using as a reference the FATF Best Practice Guidelines on Providing Feedback to Reporting Financial Institutions and Other Persons, in particular with respect to suspicious transactions. Recommendation 29: - Ensure that competent authorities like the BNR and the CMA have adequate powers to monitor and ensure compliance by financial institutions with the requirement to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, including powers to do the following: - Conduct inspections to ensure compliance; - Compel production of or to obtain access to all records, documents or information relevant to monitoring compliance; and - Enforce and sanction financial institutions and their directors or senior management for failure to comply with or properly implement requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. ### Money value transfer services (SR.VI) - Address the shortcomings identified in recommendations 4–11, 13–15, and 21–23, and Special Recommendation VII, as applicable to this recommendation. - Ensure that informal PSP systems currently operating in Rwanda are registered or licensed, and subject to the applicable FATF Recommendations and to adequate monitoring. ### Preventive Measures – Nonfinancial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) Customer due diligence and record-keeping (R.12) - The shortcomings identified under Recommendations 5, 6, and 8 to 11 in Section 3 are equally valid for DNFBPs. The preventive measures applicable to DNFBPs need to be expanded and tailored to the specificities of each business and profession. - Address the deficiencies identified under Recommendations 5, 6, and 8 to 11 above. - Incorporate casinos as reporting entities under the AML/CFT Law. - Designate the threshold called for by the AML/CFT Law for customer identification by casinos and dealers in precious metals and stones. - Ensure that DNFBPs are subject to the preventive measures and record-keeping requirements in line with Recommendations 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11. - Ensure the effective implementation of the AML/CFT provisions by DNFBPs. - Develop outreach campaigns specifically to raise awareness of CDD obligations and, more generally, to raise awareness of ML and TF risks in all of the DNBFP sectors. - Although trusts services are not provided at the time of the assessment, in view of the upcoming entry in force of a new law allowing for the creation of Rwandan trusts and of the related services that will be provided, it is recommended that the authorities include trust service providers amongst the reporting entities subject to the AML/CFT Law. Suspicious transaction reporting (R.16) - Require casinos to report suspicious transactions to the FIU. - Ensure that the carve-out for legal and professional secrecy is limited to information (a) obtained in the course of ascertaining the legal position of a client, or (b) in performing their tasks of defending or representing that client in or concerning judicial, administrative, arbitration, or mediation proceedings. - Ensure that all DNFBPs are subject to and effectively implement the requirements under Recommendations 13, 14, 15, and 21. Regulation, supervision, monitoring, and sanctions (R.17, 24, and 25) - Ensure that the FIU has adequate capacity (in terms of resources and expertise) to conduct its supervisory functions, or reconsider the current framework for supervision of DNFBPs. - Introduce a sanctioning regime for noncompliance with the AML/CFT obligations applicable to DNFBPs. - Ensure that the designated competent authorities or SROs responsible for monitoring have adequate powers and resources to perform their functions. - Increase awareness among all DNFBP categories. - Provide guidance to assist DNFBPs implement and comply with their respective AML/CFT requirements. - Provide feedback to DNFBPs on current techniques, methods, and trends or sanitized examples of actual ML and TF cases. Other designated non-financial businesses and professions (R.20) - Conduct a risk assessment of non-financial businesses and professions (other than DNFBPs) that could be used for or exposed to potential ML and TF activities in Rwanda. - On the basis of the results of the risk assessment, introduce measures to reduce reliance on cash. - Apply Recommendations 5, 6, 8–11, 13–15, 17, and 21 to non-financial businesses and professions (other than DNFBPs) that are at risk of being misused for ML and FT, in line with the results of the risk assessment. - Encourage the development and use of modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to ML. ### Legal Persons and Arrangements and Non-Profit Organizations Legal Persons – Access to beneficial ownership and control information (R.33) - Take additional steps to prevent the misuse of legal persons established in Rwanda by ensuring that there is adequate transparency concerning their beneficial ownership and control. Legal Arrangements – Access to beneficial ownership and control information (R.34) - Despite the fact that this Recommendation is considered to be non-applicable to Rwanda at the time of this assessment, in light of the upcoming entry into force of a new law allowing for the creation of Rwanda trusts, it is recommended that the authorities take all necessary steps to prevent the misuse of the Rwandan trust for money laundering or terrorist financing purposes, and ensure that adequate, accurate, and timely information on these trusts (including information on the settler, trustee, and beneficiaries) can be obtained by competent authorities in a timely fashion, and to facilitate access to that information by reporting entities. The authorities are in particular recommended to consider the examples provided in the FATF methodology. Non-profit organizations (SR.VIII) - Use all sources of available information to undertake a domestic review on the NPOs’ activities, size, and other relevant features of the NPO sector for the purpose of identifying the features and types of NPOs that are at risk of being misused for terrorist financing by virtue of their activities or characteristics. - Conduct outreach programs focused on raising awareness on the risks of terrorist abuse and the measures available to protect against such abuses directed to the entire NPO sector. - Effectively monitor those NPOs that account for a significant portion of the financial resources under control of the sector, and a substantial share of the sector’s international activities. - Require NPOs to maintain information on related to the identity of person(s) who own, control, or direct their activities, including senior officers and board members, or to make it available through appropriate authorities and make such information as well as information on the NPOs’ purpose and stated activities and objectives publicly available. - Review the NPOs’ legislation to require NPOs to maintain, for a period of at least five years, and make available to appropriate authorities, records of domestic and international transactions that are sufficiently detailed to verify that funds have been spent in a manner consistent with the purpose and objectives of the organization. - Put in place effective mechanisms to share relevant information, target, and promptly investigate terrorist abuse of NPOs among all levels of appropriate authorities that hold relevant information on NPOs. ### National and International Cooperation National cooperation and coordination (R.31) - Put in place effective mechanisms between policy makers, the FIU, LEAs, and supervisors, which will enable them to cooperate and, where appropriate, coordinate domestically with each other concerning the development and implementation of policies and activities to combat ML and TF. - Ensure that the FIU, LEAs, and supervisory authorities effectively exchange information on AML/CFT issues. - Develop comprehensive statistics in the relevant areas of the fight against ML and TF (including statistics on domestic investigations; prosecutions; property frozen, seized, and confiscated; convictions; and international cooperation, etc.). - Review the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system on a regular basis. The Conventions and UN Special Resolutions (R.35 and SR.I) - Recommendation 35: Fully implement the provisions of the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, the ICSFT, and the relevant UNSCRs. - SR.I: Implement fully the relevant UNSCRs. Mutual Legal Assistance (R.36, 37, 38, and SR.V) - Recommendation 36: - Consider devising a mechanism for determining the best venue of jurisdiction of defendants in the interest of justice in cases that are subject to prosecution in more than one country. - Ensure that information obtained by lawyers may be obtained upon request from another State in the circumstances envisaged in the standard. - Recommendation 38: - Establish a framework to freezing, seizing, and confiscating and sharing the proceeds of predicate offenses in response to a request from a foreign country. Extradition (R.39, 37, and SR.V) - Ensure that Rwandan nationals who are found guilty of money laundering or terrorist financing by a foreign State and whose extradition to that State is refused by Rwanda on the grounds of nationality only are subject to prosecution in Rwanda. - If necessary to ensure the efficiency of this process, establish a framework for cooperation with the foreign State that had originally requested the extradition of the Rwandan national. - Ensure that extradition is available for persons charged for money laundering or terrorist financing and pending trial. - Ensure that extradition requests may be handled without undue delay. Other Forms of Cooperation (R.40 and SR.V) - Ensure that the FIU shares information with its foreign counterparts. - Provide LEAs with the power to conduct investigations on behalf of foreign counterparts. - Allow for the sharing of information and documents detained by lawyers when conducting transactions for their client concerning the activities set under Recommendation 12. - Maintain statistics on the number of requests for assistance made or received by law enforcement authorities, the FIU, and supervisors, including whether the request was granted or refused and the response time. - Ensure that all AML/CFT supervisors have arrangements in place to share and exchange information with respect to both ML and the underlying predicate offenses. - Grant powers to all AML/CFT supervisors to allow for the conduct of inquiries on behalf of foreign counterparts. - Establish controls and safeguards for the AML/CFT supervisor for banks and other entities licensed by the BNR, FIU, and LEAs to ensure that the information received by competent authorities is used only in an authorized manner. - Ensure that requests for cooperation are not refused on the grounds of professional privilege or legal professional secrecy. ### Other Issues Resources and statistics (R.30 and 32) Recommendation 30: - Ensure that all competent authorities are adequately structured, funded, staffed, and provided with sufficient technical and other resources to fully and effectively perform their functions, keeping in mind that adequate structuring includes the need for sufficient operational independence and autonomy to ensure freedom from undue influence or interference. - Ensure that staff of competent authorities are provided with adequate training on AML/CFT. Recommendation 32: - Review the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system on a regular basis. - Ensure that all competent authorities maintain comprehensive statistics on matters relevant to the effectiveness and efficiency of the AML/CFT framework in line with the FATF standard. Other relevant AML/CFT measures or issues - None. General framework–structural issues - None. *Source: _cr15221 - 3.8 Internal controls, compliance,* ### Annex 4. Copies of Key Laws, Regulations, and Other Measures ### _cr15221 - Annex 4. Copies of Key Laws, Regulations, and Other Measures ### Inventory of laws, regulations, and measures included - Law N°47/2008 of 09/09/2008 on prevention and penalising the crime of money laundering and financing terrorism (AML/CFT law). - Law N°45/2008 of 09/09/2008 on counter terrorism (the CT law). - Extracts of the Organic Law No. 1/2012.OL of 2/5/2012 instituting the penal code (the PC): Preamble; Articles 5, 22, 23, 16, 27, 97, 98, 99, 169 to 175, 652, 653 and 656. - Extracts from the Law N°13/2004 of 17/05/2004 relating to the code of criminal procedure, O.G special N° of 30/07/2004: Articles 26, 131, 132 and 138. - Extracts from the Law N°55/2007 of 30/11/2007 governing the Central Bank of Rwanda (the Central Bank law): Articles 6 and 53. - Extracts of the Law N°07/2008 of 08/04/2008 concerning organisation of banking (Banking law): Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 58 and 61. - Presidential Order N°27/2011 of 30/05/2011 determining the organisation, functioning and mission of the financial investigation unit (see additional attachment). ### AML/CFT Law N°47/2008 (09/09/2008) — structure and key articles (bilingual headings appear in the source) - Official identification: - ITEGEKO N°47/2008 RYO KUWA 09/09/2008 - LAW N°47/2008 OF 09/09/2008 ON PREVENTION AND PENALISING THE CRIME OF MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCING TERRORISM - LOI N°47/2008 DU 09/09/2008 RELATIVE A LA PREVENTION ET A LA REPRESSION DU BLANCHIMENT DE CAPITAUX ET DU FINANCEMENT DU TERRORISME - Table of contents headings and specific article references (as listed in the source): - CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL PROVISIONS - Article One : Purpose of this Law - Article 2: Definitions of terms - Article 3: Reporting entity - Article 4: Act of terrorism and financing terrorism - Article 5: Illicit money or assets - CHAPTER II: TRANSPARENCY IN FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS - Article 6: Money transfer - Article 7: Cash declaration at the border - Article 8: Professional secrecy - Article 9: Prohibition of fictive banks and anonymous accounts and other preventive measures - Article 10: Identification of customers - Article 11: Identification of casinos, gaming halls and their customers - Article 12: Identification of other non-financial businesses and professions - Article 13: Identification of occasional customers - Article 14: Identification of the owner - Article 15: Special monitoring of certain transactions. - Article 16: Due diligence related to a political Leader - Article 17: Record-keeping - Article 18: Declaration of cash transactions - Article 19: Programs of reporting authorities - CHAPTER III : PREVENTION AND DETECTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCING OF TERRORISM - Article 20: Establishment, organization, functioning and mission of the Financial Investigation Unit - Article 21: Declaration of suspicious transaction and funds - Article 22: Obligation of discretion - Article 23: List of terrorists and their financiers - Article 24: Confidentiality - Article 25: Temporary freezing of assets and transactions - Article 26: Special investigative techniques - Article 27: Exemption of liability - CHAPTER IV: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION - Article 28: Cooperation with other States - Article 29: Purpose of the request for mutual assistance - Article 30: Refusal of cooperation - Article 31: Request for investigative and trial measures - Article 32: Request for protective measures - Article 33: Request for dispossession - Article 34: Fate of dispossessed property - Article 35: Requests for extradition - Article 36: Dual incrimination - Article 37: Compulsory grounds for refusing extradition - Article 38: Optional grounds for refusing extradition - Article 39: Aut dedere aut judicare - Article 40: Return of assets - CHAPTER V: GENERAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE REQUESTS FOR MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND EXTRADITION - Article 41: Transmission of request - Article 42: Contents of the requests - Article 43: Requests processing - Article 44: Additional information - Article 45: Request for confidentiality - Article 46: Prohibition of using pieces of evidence for other purposes - Article 47: Payment of charges - CHAPTER VI: PENALTIES AND OTHER MEASURES - Article 48: Money laundering and financing of terrorism - Article 49: Complicity in money laundering or terrorism financing - Article 50: Penalties for legal person - Article 51: Aggravating circumstances - Article 52: Mitigating circumstances - Article 53: Penalties for other offences - Article 54: Failure to perform the law - Article 55: Protective measure - Article 56: Seizure - Article 57: Confiscation - Article 58: Order of confiscation - Article 59: Confiscation of property of a criminal organization - Article 60: Nullity of certain acts - Article 61: Fate of confiscated property - CHAPTER VII: FINAL PROVISIONS - Article 62: Repeal of inconsistent provisions - Article 63: Entry into force ### Other structural or publication details included in the annex - Reference to Official Gazette publication: - OG N° 12bis of 23 03 2009 - Year indicators shown: "Umwaka wa 48 n°12bis Year 48 n° 12bis", and dates "23 Werurwe 2009 23 March 2009". - The annex presents bilingual (Kinyarwanda / English / French) headings and table-of-contents entries for Law N°47/2008 as printed in the Official Gazette excerpt. *Annex 4. Copies of Key Laws, Regulations, and Other Measures* ### CHAPTER VII: FINAL PROVISIONS ### CHAPTER VII: FINAL PROVISIONS ### Legal framework and listed final articles - Article 62: Repealing provisions / Disposition abrogatoire - Article 63: Commencement / Entrée en vigueur - Article 56: Saisie - Article 57: Confiscation / Confiscation - Article 58: Ordonnance de confiscation - Article 59: Confiscation des biens d’une association criminelle - Article 60: Nullité de certains actes - Article 61: Sort des biens confisqués ### CHAPTER ONE: General provisions — Purpose (Article One) - Purpose: prevent, detect, fight and eradicate: - 1° the use of the financial system or other economic sectors for the purpose of money laundering; - 2° the financing of acts of terrorism whether related to money laundering or not. ### Article 2: Definitions — enumerated terms and exact formulations - 1° “offence of money laundering” / “infraction de blanchiment de capitaux”: - a. the conversion, transfer or handling of property whose author knows that they are derived from felony or misdemeanor crimes, or from an act of participation in such offence, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or assisting any person involved in the commission of such an offence to escape justice; - b. the concealment or disguise of the true nature, origin, location, disposition, donation, rights with respect to or ownership of property, knowing that such a property is derived from felony or misdemeanor crimes or from an act of participation in such offences; - c. acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such a property is derived from felony or misdemeanor crimes or from an act of participation in such offences; - d. participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit, aiding, inciting, abetting, facilitating or counseling the commission of any of the acts set forth in accordance with this Article. - Additional cross-jurisdictional note: - “Money laundering is committed even if the original acts leading to the acquisition, possession or transfer of the property to be laundered and the protection of the offender are carried out in the territory of another State.” - 2° “confiscation” / “confiscation”: - permanent deprivation of property by a definitive decision of a competent tribunal which transfers to the State the ownership of this property and any related title to property; - 3° “criminal organization” / “organisation criminelle”: - structured group acting in concert with the aim of committing an offence qualified as a crime, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a material or financial benefit; - 4° “customer” / “client” (listed functions): - a. opens a bank account or in the name of whom a bank account is opened; - b. has the power to sign on that account; - c. deposits, transfers or receives money by using that account; - d. is authorized to conduct the transaction on that account; - 5° “freezing” / “ihagarika ryagateganyo” / “gel”: - measure which consists of the temporary delay of the execution of a transaction, the prohibition or restriction of the transfer, the conversion, the transformation, the movement of property on the basis of a decision or a directive issued by a competent authority; - 6° “instrument” / “igikoresho”: - object used or meant to be used, in full or in part, and in any manner, in order to commit a criminal offence; - 7° “political Leader” / “umuntu ugaragara mu rwego rwa politiki” / “haute personnalité politique”: - any person who is or has been entrusted with prominent public functions in the Republic of Rwanda or in other countries including his/her family members or other persons who are his/her close associates or have business or financial relationships with him or her; - 8° “proceed” / “indonke” / “produit”: - property which, directly or indirectly, is derived from the commission of an offence; - 9° “property” / “umutungo” / “bien”: - an asset of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, as well as legal documents or instruments evidencing the existence of a right to, or interest in, an asset; - 10° “reporting entity” / “ushinzwe gutanga amakuru” / “entité déclarante”: - natural or legal person with legal personality set forth in Article 3 of this Law. ### Article 3: Reporting entity — scope and specific categories - The provisions of this Law apply to any natural or legal person that, in the framework of its profession, conducts, controls or advises transactions involving deposits, exchanges, investments, conversions or any other capital movement or any other property, in particular: - 1° the National Bank of Rwanda; - 2° banks and other financial institutions; - 3° members of private legal practice, when they represent or assist their clients outside of a judicial process, in particular within the framework of the following activities: - a. buying and selling of properties, trading companies or businesses; - b. handling of money, securities and other assets belonging to clients; - c. opening and management of current, savings or securities accounts; - d. formation, management or directing of companies, trusts or other similar ventures or the execution of any other financial transactions. - 4° other specified categories (examples listed in the source): - a. financial auditors / abagenzuzi b‟imari; - b. brokers linking buyers and sellers in transactions relating to immovable property; - c. dealers in high-value goods including works of art, precious stones and metals; - d. money remittance service providers; - e. owners, operators and managers of betting, gaming and entertainment establishments including national level gambling operators; - f. transport and freight organizations; - g. non-governmental organizations. *Source: _cr15221 - CHAPTER VII: FINAL PROVISIONS* ### 4. other persons, in particular: ### _cr15221 - 4. other persons, in particular: ### Other persons / designated obliged entities - a. auditors; - b. real estate agents; - c. traders in items of significant value, such as works of art such as paintings, masks as well as precious stones and metals; - d. natural/legal persons involved in the business of transporting money; - e. owners, directors and managers of casinos and gaming halls, including national lotteries; - f. travel agencies; - g. Non-governmental organizations. - c. ouverture ou gestion de comptes bancaires, courants ou de titres ; - d. constitution, gestion ou direction de sociétés commerciales, de fiducies ou de structures similaires ou exécution d‟autres opérations financières. - 4. les autres assujettis, notamment: - a. les auditeurs; - b. les agents immobiliers ; - c. les marchands d‟articles de grande valeur, tels que les objets d‟art notamment les tableaux, les masques, les pierres et les métaux précieux ; - d. les intermédiares financiers ; - e. les propriétaires, les directeurs et les gérants de casinos et d‟établissements de jeux, y compris de lotteries nationales ; - f. les agences de voyage ; - g. les organisations non gouvernementales. ### Article 4 — Act of terrorism and financing terrorism - Notwithstanding the application of international conventions ratified by the Republic of Rwanda, acts of terrorism shall be those specified by the provisions of the law on counter terrorism. - Any act shall constitute an act of financing of a terrorism enterprise by any person by: - providing, collecting or managing funds, assets or any goods; or - providing advice with the aim of having those assets or goods utilized or knowing that they are intended to be used, entirely or partially in order to commit any of terrorism acts provided for by the law on counter terrorism. - Article 4 : Acte de terrorisme et du financement du terrorisme (French mirror text conveying the same provisions). ### Article 5 — Illicit money or assets: definition and predicate offences - For the implementation of this Law, the origin of money or property is illicit when derived from the commission of: - 1° an offence related to: - a. terrorism; - b. corruption and related offences as defined by the law; - c. organized crime; - d. illicit trafficking in narcotics; - e. illicit trafficking in weapons, goods and merchandise; - f. trafficking in illegal labour; - g. trafficking in human beings; - h. exploitation of prostitution; - i. illicit use of hormonal, anti-hormonal, beta-adrenergic or production stimulating substances on animals or the illegal trade in such substances; - j. illicit trafficking in human organs and tissues; - 2° an offence related to the stock market or irregular public issue of shares; - 3° financial fraud, hostage-taking, theft or extortion with the use of violence or threats or fraudulent bankruptcy; - 4° one of the offences defined under the Law on prevention and suppression of corruption and related offences. - Article 5 : Capitaux ou biens illicites (French mirror text begins with "Pour l‟application de la présente loi, l‟origine de capitaux ou de biens est illicite lorsque ceux-ci proviennent de la commission:"). *OG N° 12bis of 23 03 2009* ### CHAPTER II: TRANSPARENCY IN ### _cr15221 - CHAPTER II: TRANSPARENCY IN FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS ### Article 6 — Money transfer - Any transfer of money or negotiable instruments destined for or coming from a foreign country, of an amount at least equal to a threshold set by the Financial Investigation Unit, shall be performed by the intermediary of a bank or a financial institution or by an authorized money remitter. - Banks and other financial institutions and money remitters shall include accurate originator information in money transfers, electronic or others, along with any other related message. This information shall go along with the transfer throughout the payment chain. - Paragraph 2 exemptions: - Paragraph 2 does not apply to wire transfers performed with credit or cash card the number of which appears in the included information; it shall apply, however, when the credit or cash cards are used as a means of payment. - Paragraph 2 does not apply to wire transfers and payments when the originator subjected to the obligation of providing information and the beneficiary are financial institutions which are acting on their own account. ### Article 7 — Cash declaration at the border - Any person who leaves or enters the Republic of Rwanda transporting cash or negotiable bills or exchange or an amount above that of the threshold set by the financial investigation unit without prior declaration, except for funds certified by a withdrawal slip issued by an accredited bank in Rwanda shall commit an offence of money laundering. ### Article 8 — Professional secrecy - Every reporting entity, control organ or auditor, shall respect the conditions set forth by this Law, notwithstanding any obligation of professional secrecy or restriction of divulgation of information imposed by any other law. - Exception: - Lawyers, notaries and other independent legal professions acting as independent jurists are not required to submit a suspicious transaction report to the Financial Investigation Unit if the information that they acquired was obtained in circumstances resulting from professional secrecy or a legal professional privilege. ### Article 9 — Prohibition of fictive banks and anonymous accounts and other preventive measures - To operate on the territory of the Republic of Rwanda, banks or financial institutions shall have to be physically present on the said territory. - Banks and other financial institutions shall not implement business relationships with banks registered in places where they are not physically present. - Any legal persons or entities established in the Republic of Rwanda shall provide accurate, relevant and updated information, directly or indirectly, to the judicial authorities and the Financial Investigation Unit regarding the natural or legal persons who are effectively controlling or managing them or who constitute their legal representation, as well as information about their managers and beneficial owners. - Financial institutions shall not open or maintain anonymous or digitized accounts, nor accounts with fictive or incorrect names. ### Article 10 — Identification of customers (Customer due diligence triggers) Reporting entities shall identify their customers in the following cases: - 1° prior to establishing a business relationship; - 2° when they execute occasional transactions exceeding the threshold set by the Financial Investigation Unit; - 3° when they receive a wire transfer that does not contain full information about the originator; - 4° when there is suspicion of money laundering; - 5° when they have doubts about the veracity or accuracy of the customers‟ previously obtained identification data. - Identity verification: - The identity of a natural person shall be verified by the presentation of a valid official identification documents, including a photograph. An Order of the Minister in charge of justice shall establish a list of the acceptable official identification documents. - Legal persons shall be identified with any valid document, in particular their registration certificate. - Any person known to act on behalf of a customer must present evidence to act on his/her behalf, as well as his/her identity card or an official identification document in conformity with paragraph 2 of this Article. ### Article 11 — Identification of casinos, gaming halls and their customers - Obligations for managers, directors and owners: - 1° demonstrate to the relevant public authorities, from the day of the application for the opening, the lawful origin of the funds necessary for the creation of the enterprise; - 2° confirm the identity, upon presentation of a valid identity card or any valid original official document bearing a photo (copy to be kept), of players who buy, bring, change chips or game tags for an amount of money superior or equal to a threshold set by the Financial Investigative authority; - 3° record all transactions referred to in subparagraph 2 in an appropriate register in chronological order, including their nature and amount, indicating all names of each player and the number of the presented identification document, and preserve this register for five (5) years from when the last transaction was recorded; - 4° record any transfer of funds transacted between casinos and gaming halls in an appropriate register in chronological order and preserve this register for five (5) years from the time when the last transaction was recorded. - Game chips must identify the issuing branch; chips issued by one branch shall not be refunded by another branch. ### Article 12 — Identification of other non-financial businesses and professions Customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements apply to non-financial businesses and professions in particular circumstances: - 1° real estate agents: when involved in transactions concerning the buying and selling of real estate; - 2° dealers in precious metals and precious stones: when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer equal to or above the threshold specified by the Financial Investigation Unit; - 3° lawyers, notaries, other legal professionals and accountants: when they prepare for or carry out transactions for their client concerning: - a. buying and selling of real estate; - b. management of client‟s money, securities or any other assets; - c. management of bank, current or securities accounts; - d. organization of contributions for the creation, operation or management of business companies; - e. creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements, and buying and selling of business entities. ### Article 13 — Identification of occasional customers - Occasional customers shall be identified as described in Article 10 for transactions involving an amount equivalent to at least the threshold set by the Financial Investigation Unit. - Identification shall also be required for transactions below the threshold if they are part of linked or seemingly linked transactions whose total exceeds that threshold. ### Article 14 — Identification of the owner (beneficial owner) - When there is uncertainty whether a customer acts on his/her personal behalf, the bank or financial institution shall by all means obtain information to establish the exact identity of the principal or stakeholder. - If uncertainty persists after verification, the financial institution shall make a report on a suspicious transaction and forward it to the Financial Investigation Unit. ### Article 15 — Special monitoring of certain transactions - Reporting authorities must pay special attention to complex, unusual, or exceptionally large transactions that have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose. - They must examine background and purpose, document findings in writing, and transmit the report to the Financial Investigation Unit. - Reporting authorities must also monitor business relationships and transactions with persons residing in countries that do not apply or apply insufficiently regulations for combating money laundering equivalent to those in this Law. ### Article 16 — Due diligence related to a political Leader In addition to normal due diligence, reporting authorities must: - 1° have appropriate risk management systems to determine whether the customer is a political Leader; - 2° obtain employer approval for establishing business relationships with such a customer; - 3° take all reasonable measures to establish his/her source of wealth and source of funds; - 4° conduct monitoring of the business relationship with such a client. ### Article 17 — Record-keeping - Reporting authorities shall keep identification data obtained during customer due diligence for a period of at least ten (10) years after the end of the business relationship. For an occasional customer, the ten (10) year period starts from the conclusion of the transaction. - Reporting authorities shall maintain all necessary records on transactions at the national or international level for at least ten (10) years. - Persons required to exercise due diligence shall maintain account books and business correspondence for at least ten (10) years after the end of the business relationship. - Identification data and transaction records shall be immediately given to requesting competent domestic authorities upon authorization by the Financial Investigation Unit. ### Article 18 — Declaration of cash transactions - Reporting authorities shall indicate to the Financial Investigation Unit, in the form and time determined by that Unit, all cash transactions within the threshold set out by the Unit, unless the sender and the recipient are banks or financial institutions. - Reporting authorities must also indicate transactions below the threshold if they form part of linked transactions whose total would exceed the threshold. ### Article 19 — Programs of reporting authorities (AML/CFT programs) Reporting authorities shall develop and maintain programs against money laundering and financing of terrorism, including: - 1° the improvement of policies, procedures and controls, including recruitment supervision mechanisms to check compliance with recruitment requirements; - 2° the designation of inspections at the management level; - 3° an ongoing employee training programme; - 4° a permanent audit function to ensure the conformity and the efficiency of the adopted measures in order to apply this Law. - Supervising authorities may disclose the contents and modalities of implementation of preventive programmes and perform in situ investigations to verify implementation. *Source: CHAPTER II: TRANSPARENCY IN FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS (excerpts).* ### CHAPTER III : PREVENTION AND ### CHAPTER III : PREVENTION AND DETECTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING FINANCING TERRORISM ### Article 20 — Establishment, organization, functioning and mission of the Financial Investigation Unit - There shall be established a Financial Investigation Unit referred to as (Cellule de Renseignments Financiers) CRF in French abbreviation. - A Presidential Order shall determine the organization, functioning, mission and parent institution of the Unit. ### Article 21 — Declaration of suspicious transaction and funds - Banks, financial institutions and other legal persons subject to provisions of Article 3 of this Law shall, whenever they have reasonable motives to suspect that the funds or movement of funds are/is linked, associated or destined to be used in money laundering activities or for financing terrorism, terrorism or acts of terrorism, report immediately their suspicion to the Financial Investigation Unity. - These reports are confidential and cannot be communicated to the owner or the author of the transaction. - Once a report is presented in conformity with the provisions of paragraph One of this Article, the reporting entities shall also convey without delay any additional information confirming or denying suspicion. ### Article 22 — Obligation of discretion - Reporting entities can in no way reveal to their customers or third parties that information has been communicated to the Financial Investigation Unity or that a report related to money laundering or financing of terrorism has been submitted. ### Article 23 — List of terrorists and their financiers - In accordance with the United Nations Resolutions for the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts, the Financial Investigation Unit shall establish a list of natural or legal persons and organizations who shall be subject to restrictive measures as terrorists or linked to terrorist organizations or financing terrorism and terrorist organizations. - The Financial Investigation Unit shall set the list of persons, entities or organizations whose funds are frozen by the financial organisms and other persons subject to this Law and submit it to the Prosecutor General. - The Financial Investigation Unit shall ensure that the names of natural or legal persons figuring in the set list are sufficiently detailed in order to allow an effective identification. ### Article 24 — Confidentiality - The executive officers, employers or agents of the Financial Investigation Unit or any other person appointed to one of these posts must preserve the confidential character of the informations obtained in the exercise of their official duties, as well as when they have ceased to exercise these duties. - These information cannot be used for purposes other than the ones provided for by this Law and cannot be revealed unless there is a decision of the competent Court. ### Article 25 — Temporary freezing of assets and transactions - Due to the gravity of a transaction or the urgency to confront it, the Financial Investigation Unit may pronounce the freezing of the property or the transactions for a period that cannot exceed fourty eight hours (48) hours and shall immediately communicate its decision to the reporting entity. - During this time, the Financial Investigation Unit shall refer the case to the National Public Prosecutor Authority if the reasons on the basis of a presumption of money laundering are conclusive and, or, in the case to the contrary, lift the freezing order and inform immediately the reporting entity. - The National Public Prosecutor Authority may, as long as it is handling the case, extend the order on the freezing of property or transactions for an additional period of seven (7) days and notifies in writing the reporting entity. - The National Public Prosecutor Authority shall immediately refer the case to the competent Court so that it pronounces the property or transactions freezing. Examining the request, the competent Court may extend the period provided for in the prior paragraph. ### Article 26 — Special investigative techniques - To obtain evidence related to the offences under this Law, the competent Court may require, for a given period: - 1° monitoring of bank accounts and other related matters; - 2° access to systems, networks and computer servers; - 3° monitoring or listening through sound control unit of telephone, telefax, equipment of telecommunications or electronic transmissions; - 4° audio-visual recording of actions, behaviors or conversations; - 5° communication of notarized private banking, financial or commercial information documents. - The competent Court may also order the seizure of the documents provided for in subparagraph 5°. - These acts shall be only valid if there are strong grounds to suspect that the accounts, telephone lines, systems or data-processing networks or documents are used or likely to be used in a money laundering or terrorist financing process. ### Article 27 — Exemption of liability - No proceedings or action of civil, administrative or penal liability can be brought, nor any professional sanction decreed against the Director of the Financial Investigation Unit, deputies director, its employees, agents or experts when having acted in good faith in the exercise of their official duties in accordance with provisions under this Law. - However, when it is established that one of the above persons has acted in bad faith, he/she shall be punished in conformity with laws. - No proceedings for breach of professional secrecy can be brought against the executive officers and employees of reporting entities which, in good faith, have transmitted information or submitted the reports provided for in this Law, even if the investigations or the Court Orders did not result in any conviction. - No proceedings of civil, penal or professional liability can be brought against the executive officers and employees of the reporting entities due to material or non material damages resulting from the blocking of a transaction. - In case of prejudice resulting directly from a bona fide statement of suspicion, the State shall be liable for the damage suffered under the conditions and scope of the Republic of Rwanda legislation. ### Chapter IV — International cooperation (Articles 28–29) - Article 28: The State of Rwanda cooperates with other States for information exchange, investigations and prosecutions aiming at provisional measures, seizure and confiscation of equipment, funds and assets related to money laundering and financing of terrorism, for purposes of extradition and technical cooperation. - Article 29: Requests for cooperation by a foreign State in relation to offences under Article 2, paragraph 1° and 4° of this Law shall be handled in accordance with principles set out in this Law and may include: - 1° requests for evidence or testimony from persons; - 2° assistance for officials of the requesting State to reach detained persons or others to obtain testimony or assist investigation; - 3° provision of any judicially related documents. *Source: _cr15221 - CHAPTER III : PREVENTION AND (PDF chapter content).* ### CHAPTER IV: INTERNATIONAL ### CHAPTER IV: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ### Article 28 — Cooperation with other States - The Government of Rwanda shall cooperate with other States in the exchange of information, in investigation and in procedure, with regard to protective measures, seizures and confiscations of the instruments, funds and property related to money laundering and financing of terrorism, for purposes of extradition, and for purposes of mutual technical assistance. ### Article 29 — Purpose of the request for mutual assistance - The request for mutual legal assistance from a foreign State relating to the offences under Articles 2, 1º and 4 of this Law shall be carried out in accordance with the principles defined by this Law. - The cooperation may include: - 1° collection of evidence or statements from persons; - 2° assistance of foreign state legal authorities in providing access to detained persons or other persons in order to witness or to help in the enquiries; - 3° providing of any judicial document; - 4° executing searches and seizures; - 5° examining objects and visiting sites; - 6° providing information and items with evidential value; - 7° providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents, including bank statements, accounting documents and registers showing the functioning of an enterprise or its commercial activities. ### Article 30 — Refusal of cooperation (grounds) - Request for cooperation may only be refused if: - 1° it is likely to prejudice the public order, sovereignty, security or fundamental principles of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda; - 2° the requesting authority is not competent under the requesting state Law or the request is not duly transmitted; - 3° the facts on which the request is based have already been criminally processed, sentenced or definitively judged on the territory of the Republic of Rwanda; - 4° the offence on which the request is based does not exist under the law of the Republic of Rwanda or does not have common characteristics with an offence existing under the law of the Republic of Rwanda; - 5° the requested measures or other measures with similar effects are not authorized under the law of the Republic of Rwanda or can not be applied to the offences on which the request is based under the Law of the Republic of Rwanda; - 6° the requested measures can not be decreed or executed because of the prescription of the crime of money laundering or financing terrorism under the Law of the Republic of Rwanda or under the Law of the requesting state; - 7° the decision whose the implementation is requested is not binding under the legislation of the Republic of Rwanda; - 8° the decision from another country has been ordered in conditions that do not offer sufficient guarantees regarding the rights to defend oneself; - 9° there are substantial grounds for believing that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on the basis of sex, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinions or status; - 10° the request is based on a political offence or is motivated by political consideration; - 11° the case is not important enough to justify the requested measures or the enforcement of the foreign court decision. - The Government of the Republic of Rwanda shall communicate immediately the grounds for refusal of the request. ### Article 31 — Request for investigative and trial measures - Investigative and trial measures shall be executed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Rwanda unless the competent authorities of a another State requires that it be proceeded according to a specific form compatible with the legislation of the Republic of Rwanda. - A Judge or a civil servant sent by the requesting State may attend to the enforcement of the measures depending on whether they are executed by a judge or a civil servant. ### Article 32 — Request for protective measures - In case Rwanda is requested by another State for purposes of pronouncing protective measures, a competenr Court shall order the aforementioned solicited protective measures according to the proper Rwandan legislation. - If the request is written in general terms, the Court pronounces the most appropriate protective measures provided for by the Rwandan legislation. - In case the requested measures are not provided for by the Rwandan law, the competent Court may substitute them with appropriate measures provided for by the Rwandan law. ### Article 33 — Request for confiscation - In the case of a request for cooperation for the purpose of pronouncing a decision for seizure, a competent Court shall take a decision upon request of the National Public Prosecutor Authority. - The decision of seizure shall concern an asset constituting the product or the instrument of an offence taking place on the territory of the Republic of Rwanda, or creating an obligation to pay an amount of money corresponding to the value of this asset. - The competent Court dealing with a request relating to the enforcement of a decision of dispossession pronounced abroad examines the facts on which the decision was based and can refuse execution of the request only for one of the reasons enumerated in Article 30 of this Law. ### Article 34 — Fate of confiscated property - The Rwandan State shall have the powers to dispose of seized property on its territory upon request of foreign authorities, unless an agreement concluded with the requesting State provides otherwise. ### Article 35 — Requests for extradition - The requests for extradition of persons sought for purposes of procedure in a foreign State shall be carried out for the offences envisaged under Articles 2, 1º and 4 of this Law or for purposes to enforce a sentence related to such an offence. - The procedures and the principles provided for in the treaty of extradition in force between the requesting State and the Republic of Rwanda shall be applied. - In the absence of a treaty of extradition or legislative provisions, the extradition shall be carried out according to the procedure and respecting the principles defined by the standard treaty of extradition adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution 45/116. - However, the provisions of this Law shall form a legal basis for the procedure of extradition. ### Article 36 — Dual incrimination - Under the terms of this Law, the extradition shall be carried out only when the offence giving rise to extradition or a similar offence is envisaged both in the legislation of the requesting State and Republic of Rwanda. ### Article 37 — Compulsory grounds for refusing extradition - Requested extradition of the accused shall not be granted if: - 1° there are serious reasons to believe that the request for extradition was presented with a view to suing or punishing a person due to his/her race, religion, nationality, ethnic origins, political opinions, sex ou status, or that this situation may endanger him/her for any of the above reasons; - 2° a final judgement was pronounced in the Republic of Rwanda for the offence in respect of which the extradition is being sought; - 3° the person whose extradition is being sought can no longer, due to the legislation of one or the other of these countries, be sued or punished due to the elapsed time or an amnesty or any other reason; - 4° the person whose extradition is being sought has been or would be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments; - 5° the person whose extradition is being sought has not received or would not receive the minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings as contained in Article 14 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights; - The extradition may not be refused for the simple reason that the offence is considered as relating to fiscal issues. - In any case, extradition of a Rwandan citizen shall not be granted. ### Article 38 — Optional grounds for refusing extradition - Extradition may be refused if: - 1° the competent authorities of the Republic of Rwanda have decided not to proceed with charges against the person concerned for the particular offence for which the extradition is requested or to put an end to the proceedings instituted against the aforementioned person; - 2° proceedings for the offence related to the requested extradition are pending in the Republic of Rwanda; - 3° the offence for which the extradition is requested has been committed outside the territory of either country and that, according to the legislation of the Republic of Rwanda, the Rwandan juridictions are not competent with regard to the offences committed outside its territory in comparable circumstances; - 4° the person whose extradition is requested has been judged or risked to be judged or convicted in the requesting State by a special Court; - 5° the Republic of Rwanda, while taking into account the nature of the offence and the interests of the requesting State, considers that, given the circumstances of the matter, the extradition of the concerned person would be incompatible with humanitarian considerations, taking into account the age, the state of health or other personal circumstances of the aforesaid person; - 6° the offence for which the extradition is requested is considered by the legislation of the Republic of Rwanda as committed in all or partly on its territory; - 7° the extradition is requested in execution of a final judgment issued in the absence of the person concerned, who has not been able to ensure his/her defense for reasons beyond his/her will. ### Article 39 — Aut dedere aut judicare - When the Republic of Rwanda refuses the extradition for a reason mentioned in Article 37, paragraphs 3° and 4° of Paragraph One and in Article 38 of this Law, it shall refer the matter to the competent Court so that the person concerned can be prosecuted. ### Article 40 — Return of assets - Without prejudice to the legislation of the Republic of Rwanda and the rights of third parties, all assets found on the territory of the Republic of Rwanda acquired as a result of the offence committed or that may be required as elements of evidence shall be returned to the requesting State, upon request of the requesting State and if the extradition is granted. - Upon request of the requesting State, the assets set forth in paragraph One eo this Article may be returned to this State even if the granted extradition cannot be carried out. - Where the aforementioned assets are susceptible of seizure or dispossession on the territory of the Republic of Rwanda, the State shall be able to maintain temporarily or return them. - Upon request by the Republic of Rwanda and at any time the legislation of the Republic of Rwanda so provides, and in respect of the rights of third parties, the returned assets shall be brought back to the Republic of Rwanda free of charge, if prosecution is finalised. *Source: _cr15221 - CHAPTER IV: INTERNATIONAL* ### CHAPTER V: GENERAL PROVISIONS ### CHAPTER V: GENERAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE REQUESTS FOR MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND EXTRADITION ### Article 41 — Transmission of request - Requests addressed by foreign competent authorities for purposes of: - establishing the perpetration of money laundering or financing of terrorism, - to carry out or pronounce protective orders or a seizure, - for purposes of extradition shall be transmitted through diplomatic channels. - In urgent cases: - they may be communicated through INTERPOL or directly by the foreign authorities to the judicial authorities of the Republic of Rwanda, either by mail, or by any other faster means of transmission, leaving a hard copy or equivalent material. - In such cases, unless confirmation is given through diplomatic channels, requests shall not be followed up. - The requests and their annexes shall be accompanied by a translation in one of the official languages of the Republic of Rwanda. ### Article 42 — Contents of requests - The requests shall specify: - 1° the authority requesting for the measure; - 2° the requested authority; - 3° the subject of the request and any relevant remark on its context; - 4° the facts justifying the request; - 5° all known elements likely to facilitate the identification of the persons concerned and in particular the civil status, the nationality, the address and the profession; - 6° all necessary information to identify and locate the person, instruments, resources or property concerned; - 7° the text of the legal provision instituting the offence or, if needed, a report of the law applicable to the offence, and the indication of the sentence incurred for the offence; - 8° a description of the required assistance and the detail of any particular procedure that the requesting State wishes to see applied. - Additional elements required in particular cases: - 1° in the case of a request for a protective measure, a description of the protective order requested; - 2° in case of a request for a decision for confiscation, a report of the relevant facts and arguments allowing the judicial authorities to pronounce the confiscation, according to the provisions of national law. - In case of a request for enforcement of a decision of a protective measure or of confiscation, the requests shall be further accompanied by: - 1° a certified true copy of the decision setting out such grounds and, if it does not state them, an explanatory note of such a decision; - 2° a certificate according to which the decision is enforceable and not subject to ordinary means of redress; - 3° the indication of the limits within which the decision shall be carried out and, where appropriate, the amount of money to reclaim for the asset(s); - 4° if applicable and if possible, all indications related to the rights that third parties can demand on the instruments, resources, property or other. - In the case of a request for extradition and if the person concerned was declared guilty of an offence, the request shall be accompanied with: - the judgment or a certified copy conform to the judgment or any other document proving that the concerned person has been recognized guilt and indicative of the sentence pronounced, the fact that the judgment is enforceable and the extent to which the sentence has not been carried out. ### Article 43 — Requests processing - The Ministry in charge of justice, after having verified the legitimacy of the request, shall submit it to: - the National Public Prosecution Authority of the location where the investigations shall be carried out or where the person whose extradition is requested is located. - The National Public Prosecution Authority shall: - refer to the competent civil servants for the requests for investigation; - refer to the competent Court with regard to the requests related to protective orders, confiscations and extradition. - A judge or a civil servant delegated by the competent requesting State can attend the enforcement of the protective measures depending on whether they are executed by a judge, a prosecutor or an authorized civil servant. ### Article 44 — Additional information - The Ministry in charge of justice or the National Public Prosecution Authority dealing with the case, either on own initiative or upon request of the competent Court, may solicit, through diplomatic channels or directly, the foreign competent authority to provide all additional information necessary to: - carry out the request; or - facilitate its enforcement. ### Article 45 — Request for confidentiality - When the requesting State asks that the existence and the contents of its request be kept confidential, this must be done. - If it is impossible, the requesting authority shall be informed without delay. ### Article 46 — Prohibition of using pieces of evidence for other purposes - For investigations or procedures other than those provided for by the foreign State request, the use of the elements of evidence is prohibited. - Use of such evidence for other purposes may lead to nullity of the said investigations and procedures, unless there is a prior consent of the foreign Government. ### Article 47 — Payment of charges - Costs computed for the execution of the requests under this chapter are borne by the requesting State unless it is agreed otherwise. ### Beginning of CHAPTER VI — Penalties and other measures (Article 48 excerpt) - Article 48: Iyezandonke and financing of terrorism penalties: - Bitabangamiye ibihano biteganywa n‟andi mategeko, ahanishwa igifungo kuva ku myaka itanu (5) kugeza ku myaka icumi (10) n‟ihazabu kugeza ku nshuro icumi (10) z‟umubare w‟amafaranga y‟iyezandonke, umuntu wahamwe n‟icyaha cy‟iyezandonke n‟uwo bafatanyije. - Ahanishwa igifungo kuva ku myaka itanu (5) kugeza ku myaka icumi (10) n‟ihazabu ishobora kugeza ku nshuro icumi (10) z‟umubare w‟amafaranga y‟inkunga ye, umuntu wakoze icyaha cyo gutera inkunga iterabwoba. *Source: _cr15221 - CHAPTER V: GENERAL PROVISIONS* ### CHAPTER VI: PENALTIES AND OTHER ### _cr15221 - CHAPTER VI: PENALTIES AND OTHER ### Article 48 — Money laundering and financing of terrorism: primary penalties - Any person who commits the offence of money laundering and his/her accomplice shall be sentenced to an imprisonment from five (5) to ten (10) years and fine up to ten (10) times the amount of the laundered sums. - Any person who commits a crime of terrorist financing shall be sentenced to an imprisonment from five (5) years to ten (10) years and a fine of up to ten (10) times the amount of his/her financial assistance. - In case of legal-person liability (Article 50 reference), fines and other sanctions may apply in addition to penalties for natural persons. ### Articles 49–50 — Complicity and penalties for legal persons - Article 49 (Complicity): - Any person involved in an association with intent to commit practices in articles 2, 1° and 4 shall be sentenced to an imprisonment of five (5) years to ten (10) years and a fine which may be up to ten (10) times the amount of his/her financial assistance to terrorism. - Article 50 (Penalties for legal person): - A legal person benefiting from an offence committed by its representatives shall be fined an amount equal to five (5) times the fines specified in paragraph One of Article 48 of this Law. - Without prejudice to liability of representatives as accomplices, depending on gravity the legal person may be sentenced to: - 1° definitive prohibition from direct or indirect involvement in specific professional activities; - 2° closing for a minimum of five (5) years; - 3° dissolution when established to commit the incriminated facts. ### Articles 51–52 — Aggravating and mitigating circumstances - Article 51 (Aggravating circumstances — penalties in Articles 48, 49, 50 can be doubled): - 1° when the primary offence is punished with a sentence of imprisonment higher than the one in articles 48, 49 and 50 of this Law; - 2° when the offence is perpetrated in the exercise of a professional activity; - 3° when the offence is perpetrated within the framework of an organized criminal conspiracy; - 4° in case of a second offence. - Article 52 (Mitigating circumstances): - Penalties in Articles 48, 49 and 50 may be reduced when the author of the offence provides judicial authorities information they would not have obtained otherwise, which helps to prevent or limit effects of the offence, identify or prosecute other offenders, find evidence or prevent further offences set out in Articles 2, 1º and 4. ### Article 53 — Penalties for other offences (reporting, secrecy, record-keeping, thresholds) - Offences punishable by five (5) to ten (10) years imprisonment and a fine from five hundred thousand (500,000) to five million (5,000,000) Rwandan francs or any of these penalties: - 1° any executive official or clerk of reporting entities (Article 3) who, in exercise of duties, revealed to third parties the suspicious transaction report made to the Financial Investigation Unit or its follow up; - 2° any person who knowingly destroyed or withdrew records or documents whose conservation is envisaged by this Law; - 3° any person who performed or attempted to perform under a false identity the transactions for which declaration of identity is prescribed by this Law; - 4° any person who, having been informed because of their profession of an investigation for money laundering, informed the subject(s) of the investigation; - 5° any person who communicated to judicial authorities or competent civil servants documents he/she knew were truncated or erroneous; - 6° any person who disregarded rules related to secrecy of information collected under this Law (prohibition to reveal or communicate) except as provided; - 7° any person who failed to submit the suspicious transaction report required by this Law when circumstances indicated funds could derive from offences related to money laundering or terrorism financing; - 8° any person who carried out or accepted payments in cash for sums superior to the threshold set by the Financial Investigation Unit; - 9° any person who violated legal provisions related to international transfer of funds. ### Article 54 — Supervisory sanctions for non-compliance - When (due to serious lack of vigilance or internal organizational shortcomings) a bank, financial institution or other person referred to in Article 3 fails to meet obligations under this Law, the disciplinary or supervisory authority may impose sanctions according to professional and administrative regulations. ### Article 55 — Protective measures (freezing) - A President of a competent Court may, automatically or upon request of the National Public Prosecution Authority, order, at the expenses of the State, protective measures including the freezing of funds and financial transactions on property, whatever their nature, that can be seized or confiscated under this Law. - Lifting of these measures may be ordered at any time at the request of the National Public Prosecution Authority, or of the Financial Investigation Unit. ### Article 56 — Seizure - The National Public Prosecution Authority or competent Court may seize funds and property related to offences under this Law. - If proceeds cannot be raised from the properties of the suspects, other assets of the suspects may be seized up to the amount of the alleged proceeds of the offences. ### Articles 57–58 — Confiscation and orders - Article 57 (Confiscation — ordered upon conviction for offences under this Law): - 1° property objects of the offence, including revenues and other advantages drawn from it, whoever the owner may be, unless owner establishes acquisition in good faith; - 2° property belonging, directly or indirectly, to a person convicted of money laundering, to his/her spouse and his/her children, unless they establish licit origins and property right. - The decision ordering dispossession shall indicate the concerned assets and details necessary for identification and location. - Article 58 (Order of confiscation): - The competent Court may issue an order of confiscation if: - 1° it is proven that the aforementioned assets are the proceeds of an offence; - 2° the perpetrator of the offence which generated the proceeds cannot be charged either because he/she is not known or because it is legally impossible to prosecute him/her. ### Article 59 — Confiscation of criminal-organization property - All properties on which a criminal grouping, association or organization exercises authority must be confiscated when these properties are linked with one of the offences under Articles 2, 1º and 4 of this Law. ### Article 60 — Nullity of acts intended to frustrate confiscation - Any act carried out in return of payment or at no charge inter vivos or causa mortes whose purpose is to withdraw assets from confiscation measures under this Law shall be null and void. - In case of annulment of a contract in return of payment, the price is delivered to the purchaser only if it was actually paid. ### Article 61 — Fate of confiscated property - Confiscated resources or assets shall be vested in the State which may allocate them to a Fund designated for combating: - money laundering; - terrorism; - transnational organized crime; - illicit traffic of drugs and psychotropic substances. - They remain burdened to the amount of their value for the benefit of third parties legally entitled. - In event of confiscation by default, assets are vested to the State and liquidated according to relevant procedures. - If the competent court later acquits the prosecuted person following case review, it orders restitution of confiscated assets in monetary terms by the State. _ _cr15221 - CHAPTER VI: PENALTIES AND OTHER_ ### CHAPTER VII: FINAL PROVISIONS ### CHAPTER VII: FINAL PROVISIONS ### Article 62: Repealing provisions / Disposition abrogatoire - "All prior legal provisions contrary to this Law are hereby repealed, in particular Articles 25, 26 and 27 of the Law n° 23/2003 of 07/8/2003 aims at prevention, suppression and punishment of corruption and related offences." - "Toutes les dispositions antérieures contraires à la présente loi sont abrogées, notamment les articles 25, 26 et 27 de la Loi n° 23/2003 du 07/08/2003 relative à la prévention et à la répression de la corruption et des infractions connexes." ### Article 61: Destiny / Sort des biens confisqués - "Les ressources ou les biens confisqués sont dévolus à l'Etat qui peut les affecter à un fonds de lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le terrorisme, la criminalité transnationale organisée ou le trafic illicite des stupéfiants et substances psychotropes." - "Ils demeurent grevés, à concurrence de leur valeur, des droits réels licitement constitués au profit des tiers." - "En cas de confiscation prononcée par défaut, les biens confisqués sont dévolus à l‟Etat et liquidés suivant les procédures prévues en la matière." - "Toutefois, si la juridiction compétente acquitte la personne poursuivie après révision, elle ordonne la restitution en valeur par l‟Etat des biens confisqués." ### Article 63: Commencement / Entrée en vigueur - "This Law shall come into force on the date of its publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda." - "La présente loi entre en vigueur le jour de sa publication au Journal Officiel de la République du Rwanda." - Signed and dated: "Kigali, on 09/09/2008" / "Kigali, le 09/09/2008" - Signatories (as printed): - "The President of the Republic KAGAME Paul (sé)" - "The Prime Minister MAKUZA Bernard (sé)" - "Seen and sealed with the Seal of the Republic: The Minister of Justice/Attorney General KARUGARAMA Tharcisse (sé)" - French equivalents mirrored in the text. ### Context: Law N°45/2008 on Counter Terrorism — structure and key headings - The document contains the TABLE OF CONTENTS for LAW N°45/2008 OF 09/09/2008 ON COUNTER TERRORISM (also presented in Kinyarwanda and French). - Major chapters and sections listed include (verbatim headings and selected article numbers as given): - CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL PROVISIONS — Articles 1–8 (Purpose; Definitions including "Terrorism", "An act considered as terrorism", "Counter terrorism", etc.) - CHAPTER II: ACTS OF TERRORISM — Articles 9–28 (Organization, Prohibited organization, Incitement, Hijacking, Taking Hostage, Use of nuclear/chemical weapons, Financing, Confiscation) - CHAPTER III: COMPETENCE TO COUNTER TERRORISM — Articles 41–49 (Appeal; Cordoning; Arrest and search without warrant; Arrest warrants; Searches) - CHAPTER IV: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION — Articles 50–62 (Cooperation with other States; Requests for investigations, provisional measures, confiscation; Destiny of dispossessed property; Extradition) - CHAPTER V: GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO REQUEST FOR COOPERATION AND EXTRADITION — Articles 63–74 (Dual incrimination; Grounds for refusing extradition; Transmission and content of requests; Confidentiality; Payment) - CHAPTER VI: PENALTIES — Articles 75–103 (Participating, Complicity, Terrorist acts targeting protected persons, Hijacking, Use of explosives, Money laundering, Terrorism for political or religious purposes, etc.) - CHAPTER VII: FINAL PROVISIONS — Articles 104–105 (Repeals; Commencement) - Specific article headings and numbering are provided in Kinyarwanda, English, and French across the table of contents as reproduced in the source. ### Official references and publication identifiers (as printed) - "OG N° 12bis of 23 03 2009" - "OG N°14 OF 06 04 2009" - "ITEGEKO N°45/2008 RYO KUWA 09/09/2008 RYEREKEYE KURWANYA ITERABWOBA" (title in Kinyarwanda) - "LAW N o 45/2008 OF 09/09/2008 ON COUNTER TERRORISM" - "LOI N o 45/2008 DU 09/09/2008 RELATIVE A LA LUTTE CONTRE LE TERRORISME" *Source: _cr15221 - CHAPTER VII: FINAL PROVISIONS* ### CHAPTER VII: FINAL PROVISIONS ### CHAPTER VII: FINAL PROVISIONS ### Chapter header and listed articles - CHAPTER VII: FINAL PROVISIONS - Article 104: Abrogating provisions - Article 105: Commencement - activités du terrorisme - Article 101: Terrorisme pour des raisons politiques - Article 102: Terrorisme pour des raisons religieuses ou idéologiques - Article 103: Entrave à la production des informations relatives au terrorisme - CHAPITRE VII: DISPOSITIONS FINALES - Article 104: Disposition abrogatoire - Article 105: Entrée en vigueur ### Legal enactment and normative references - ITEGEKO N°45/2008 RYO KUWA 09/09/2008 RYEREKEYE KURWANYA ITERABWOBA - OG N°14 OF 06 04 2009 - LAW N o 45/2008 OF 09/09/2008 ON COUNTER TERRORISM - LOI N o 45/2008 DU 09/09/2008 RELATIVE A LA LUTTE CONTRE LE TERRORISME - We, KAGAME Paul, President of the Republic; - THE PARLIAMENT HAS ADOPTED, AND WE SANCTION, PROMULGATE THE FOLLOWING LAW AND ORDER IT BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA - THE PARLIAMENT: - The Chamber of Deputies, in its session of 20 May 2008; - The Senate in its session of 25 March 2008; - Pursuant to the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 04 June 2003 as amended to date, especially in Articles 10, 12, 15, 25, 47, 60, 62, 66, 67, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 108, 118, 169, 170, 173, 190 and 201; - References to international instruments and ratifications: - Suppression of Terrorists using high explosives adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on 15/12/1997, as ratified by Presidential Order n° 40/01 of 14/04/2002; - International Convention against the Taking of Hostages adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 17/12/1979, as ratified by Presidential Order n° 41/01 of 14/04/2002; - International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of terrorism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 09/12/1999 as ratified by the Presidential Order n° 43/01 of 14/04/2002; - Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials signed at Vienna on 26/12/1979 as ratified by the Presidential Order n° 45/01 of 14/04/2002; - African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of terrorism signed at Algiers on 13/07/1999 as ratified by the Presidential Order n° 39/01 of 14/04/2002; - Decree Law n° 21/77 of 18/8/1977 establishing the Penal Code; - Law n° 09/2000 of 16/06/2000 on the establishment, general organization and jurisdiction of the National Police; - Law n° 13/2004 of 17/05/2004 relating to the Code of criminal procedure as modified and complemented to date. ### Scope and purpose (Chapter One / Section One) - Article One: Purpose of this Law - This Law relates to counter terrorism - CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL PROVISIONS - Section One : Scope of this Law ### Definitions (Section 2, Article 2: Terrorism) - Article 2 : Iterabwoba - For the purpose of this Law, the term terrorism shall have the following meaning: - 1° to commit or threaten to commit acts aimed at leading State organs into changing their functioning through taking hostages of one or more persons, killing, injuring or threatening the population by use of any means that may kill or injure a person; ### Adoption and promulgation language entries - YEMEJE : - UMUTWE WA MBERE : INGINGO RUSANGE - Icyiciro cya mbere: Ibirebwa n’iri tegeko - Icyiciro cya 2 : Ibisobanuro by’amagambo - ADOPTS: - CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL PROVISIONS - Section 2: Definitions of terms - Article 2: Terrorism *Source: _cr15221 - CHAPTER VII: FINAL PROVISIONS* ### Section 2 : Définitions des termes ### Section 2 : Définitions des termes ### Article 2 : Terrorisme - Définitions (texte trilingue: Kinyarwanda, English, Français) — le terme terrorisme signifie : - 1° commettre ou menacer de commettre des actes dans l‟objectif de pousser les organes de l‟Etat à changer leur fonctionnement par la prise en otage d‟une ou de plusieurs personnes, tuer, blesser ou terroriser la population par l‟emploi d‟un objet quelconque qui peut tuer ou blesser une personne ; - 2° commettre ou menacer de commettre un acte visé au paragraphe 1° de cet article pour des raisons politique, religieuse ou toute cause idéologique. - English: Article 2: Terrorism — (text) to commit or threaten to commit an act referred to under paragraph 1° of this article on political, religious or any ideological grounds. ### Article 3 : Igikorwa gifatwa nk’iterabwoba / Act considered as terrorism - Kinyarwanda: Igikorwa gifatwa nk’iterabwoba bivuga igikorwa gikozwe cyangwa gukangisha kugikora mu nyungu z‟umuntu, agatsiko cyangwa ishyirahamwe ry‟iterabwoba. - English: Article 3: An act considered as terrorism — An act considered as terrorism shall mean an act committed or a threat to commit an act in the interest of an individual, a group or a terrorist organization. - Français: Article 3: Acte qualifié de terroriste — L‟acte qualifié de terroriste signifie un acte commis ou que l‟on menace de commettre dans l‟intérêt d‟un individu, d‟un groupe ou d‟une organisation terroriste. ### Article 4 : Act, person, property, population and State organs / Acte, personne, biens, population et organes administratifs de l’Etat - Définitions (trilingue): - 1° “igikorwa” / “act” / «un acte» : igikorwa gikorewe mu Rwanda cyangwa hanze y‟u Rwanda gikozwe n‟umunyarwanda cyangwa umunyamahanga; / act committed within or outside Rwanda by a Rwandan or a foreigner; / acte commis sur le territoire rwandais ou à l‟extérieur du Rwanda par un Rwandais ou un étranger; - 2° “umuntu cyangwa umutungo ukoreshwa mu iterabwoba” / “person or property used in terrorism” / «personne ou biens qui servent à commettre un acte de terrorisme» : umuntu uwo ari we wese cyangwa umutungo uwo ari wo wose aho biri hose; / any person or any property wherever they are situated; / toute personne ou tout bien quel que soit le lieu de situation; - 3° “abaturage” / “population” / «population» : abaturage n‟imitungo yabo mu bihugu bindi bitari u Rwanda gusa ; / population of other countries other than that of Rwanda and their property; / population d‟un pays autre que le Rwanda, y compris leur patrimoine ; - 4° “inzego z’ubutegetsi za Leta” / “State organs” / «organes de l’Etat» : inzego z‟ubutegetsi z‟u Rwanda cyangwa z‟ikindi gihugu. / administrative organs of Rwanda or of any other country. / organes administratifs du Rwanda ou d‟un autre pays. ### Article 5 : Kurwanya iterabwoba / Counter terrorism / Lutte contre le terrorisme - Kinyarwanda: “Kurwanya iterabwoba”: ibikorwa byose bifitanye isano no gukumira, kwirinda cyangwa guhagarika ibikorwa by‟iterabwoba, kimwe n‟ibikorwa bifitanye isano no gutuma hatangirika ibintu byinshi biturutse kuri ibyo bikorwa by‟iterabwoba. - English: Article 5: Counter terrorism — “Counter terrorism”: any act related to the curbing, prevention or stopping terrorist acts, as well as acts related to reducing the scale of destruction of property emanating from such acts of terrorism. - Français: Article 5 : Lutte contre le terrorisme — «Lutte contre le terrorisme» : tous les actes destinés à prévenir, éviter ou arrêter les actes de terrorisme, ainsi que les actions visant à limiter les dégâts causés par ces actes de terrorisme. ### Article 6 : Umuntu ugomba kurindwa mu rwego mpuzamahanga / Person to be protected at the international level / Personne devant jouir d’une protection internationale - Kinyarwanda: “Umuntu ugomba kurindwa mu rwego mpuzamahanga”: umuntu wese ufite ubudahangarwa n‟ibindi biteganywa n‟amategeko y‟Igihugu, amasezerano y‟akarere n‟amasezerano mpuzamahanga. - English: Article 6: Person to be protected at the international level — “Person to be protected at the international level”: any person enjoying immunity and other privileges provided for by the law of the concerned state, regional and international conventions. - Français: Article 6 : Personne devant jouir d’une protection internationale — «Personne devant jouir d’une protection internationale»: toute personne jouissant d‟une immunité et de toute autre protection prévue par la législation du pays, les conventions régionales et internationales. ### Article 7 : Ukora iterabwoba / Terrorist / Terroriste - Kinyarwanda: “Ukora iterabwoba”: umuntu, agatsiko k‟abantu cyangwa ishyirahamwe: 1° bakora cyangwa bakangisha gukora ibivugwa mu ngingo ya 2 y‟iri tegeko; 2° bafite cyangwa bagize uruhare mu gukora, gutegura cyangwa gutuma habaho ibikorwa by‟iterabwoba haba mbere cyangwa nyuma y‟igikorwa, babizi kandi babigambiriye cyangwa batambamiye ishakishwa ry‟ibimenyetso. - English: Article 7: Terrorist — “Terrorist”: person, a group of persons or an organization that: 1° commits or attempts to commit acts mentioned in article 2 of this Law; 2° participates or has participated in the commission, planning or aiding the commission of an act of terrorism whether before or after the act, knowingly and deliberately or interfered with investigations. - Français: Article 7: Terroriste — «Terroriste» : individu, groupe d‟individus ou organisation qui : 1° commet ou menace de commettre les actes visés à l‟article 2 de la présente loi ; 2° participe ou a été impliqué dans l‟exécution, la préparation ou qui a aidé d‟une manière quelconque à la commission des actes de terrorisme soit avant ou après l‟acte, sciemment et intentionnellement, ou qui a constitué un obstacle aux enquêtes. ### Article 8 : Amafaranga akoreshwa / Currency used / Capitaux utilisés - Kinyarwanda: “amafaranga” ni ibiceri, inote, sheki, urupapuro rw‟iposita rwohererejweho amafaranga, sheki zikoreshwa mu ngendo, impapuro zo kubikurizaho n‟ibindi bikoresho bikoreshwa nk‟amafaranga mu gihugu icyo ari cyo cyose. - English: Article 8: Currency used — In this Law, “currency”: are coins, notes, cheques postal money order, traveler‟s cheques, withdrawal cheques and other financial instruments in any country. - Français: Article 8: Capitaux utilisés — «capitaux» signifient les pièces, les billets, le mandat d‟arrivée, les chèques de voyage, les chèques de retrait ou tout autre titre ayant fonction de monnaie dans n‟importe quel pays. ### Article 9 : Ishyirahamwe cyangwa agatsiko k’iterabwoba / Organization or a group of terrorists / Association ou groupe terroriste - Kinyarwanda: “Kuba mu ishyirahamwe”: bivugwa ku muntu uri mu ishyirahamwe cyangwa mu gatsiko bikora iterabwoba cyangwa ku muntu watangiye gukora ibisabwa ngo yinjiremo azi ko ari cyo bigamije. - English: Article 9: Organization or a group of terrorists — “Membership of an organization”: fact for a person who is in an organization or a group of terrorists or starting to fulfill the requirements for adhering to that organization or group knowing its intentions. - Français: Article 9: Association ou groupe terroriste — «Etre membre d’une organisation»: le fait pour une personne de faire partie d‟une organisation ou d‟un groupe terroriste ou d‟entreprendre les démarches pour y adhérer en connaissance de cause. ### Article 10 : Ishyirahamwe ryabujijwe gukora / Prohibited organization / Organisation interdite - Kinyarwanda: “Ishyirahamwe ryabujijwe gukora”: ni ishyirahamwe ryatangajwe na Minisitiri bireba cyangwa undi wese ubifitiye ububasha ko ribujijwe gukora. - Iteka rya Minisitiri ufite umutekano mu nshingano ze rigena uburyo ishyirahamwe rihagarikwa n‟uburyo icyemezo cy‟iryo hagarikwa kijuririrwa. - English: Article 10: Prohibited organization — “Prohibited organization”: organization publicly prohibited from operating by the concerned Minister or any other competent authority. An Order of the Minister in charge of security shall determine the procedures of suspension of an organization and modalities for the appeal of such a decision. - Français: Article 10: Organisation interdite — «Organisation interdite»: une organisation déclarée par le Ministre concerné ou toute autre autorité compétente comme étant interdite d‟exercer ses activités. Un arrêté du Ministre ayant la sécurité dans ses attributions détermine les modalités de suspension d‟une association, ainsi que les modalités de recours contre cette décision. ### Article 11 : Ukuyobora inama y’ishyirahamwe ry’iterabwoba / Chairing meetings of terrorist organization / Direction d’une réunion d’une organisation terroriste - Kinyarwanda: Umuntu aba akoze icyaha cy‟iterabwoba iyo ateguye, ayoboye cyangwa se afashije gutegura cyangwa kuyobora inama azi ko : - 1° ari iyo gutera inkunga ishyirahamwe ryabujijwe gukora; - 2° ari iyo kugena ibikorwa by‟ ishyirahamwe ryabujijwe gukora; - 3° igomba gufatirwamo ijambo n‟umuntu uri cyangwa uvugwa ko ari mu ishyirahamwe ryabujijwe gukora. - English: Article 11: Chairing meetings of terrorist organization — Any person commits an offence when he/she plans, organizes or facilitates in organising or leading a meeting with the knowledge that: - 1° the meeting aims at financing a prohibited organization; - 2° the meeting aims at determining the activities of a prohibited organization to operate; - 3° in the meeting, a person who is member or recognized to be a member of the prohibited organization shall take a speech. - Français: Article 11: Direction d’une réunion d’une organisation terroriste — Commet une infraction celui qui prépare, dirige ou participe à la préparation ou la direction d‟une réunion sachant que : 1° elle vise à financer une organisation interdite ; 2° elle vise à préparer les activités d‟une organisation interdite; 3° une personne membre d‟une organisation interdite ou prise pour tel y prendra la parole. ### Article 12 : Gushishikariza abantu gukora iterabwoba / Inciting people to commit terrorism / Inciter la population à commettre le terrorisme - Kinyarwanda: Aba akoze icyaha cy`iterabwoba umuntu ufashe ijambo mu nama y‟ishyirahamwe ryabujijwe gukora cyangwa ritegura ibikorwa by‟iterabwoba, aba kandi akoze iterabwoba iyo akoresheje uburyo ubwo aribwo bose bushishikariza ishyirahamwe ryabujijwe gukora iterabwoba cyangwa kugena ibikorwa byaryo. - English: Article 12: Inciting people to commit terrorism — Commits an offense of terrorism any person who shall take a speech in the meeting of a prohibited organization or one organizing acts of terrorism or use any means to incite a prohibited organization to commit terrorism or determine its operations. - Français: Article 12: Inciter la population à commettre le terrorisme — Commet l‟infraction de terrorisme quiconque prend la parole dans une réunion d‟une organisation interdite ou se préparant à des actes terroristes, ou, qui, par tous les moyens incite une organisation interdite à commettre les actes terroristes ou à les planifier. ### Article 13 : Inama yerekeye iterabwoba / Meeting on terrorism / Réunion sur le terrorisme - Kinyarwanda: “Inama”: iteraniro ry‟abantu babiri cyangwa benshi bahuriye hamwe bategura ibikorwa by‟iterabwoba, bashobora kuba mu cyicaro kimwe cyangwa bahujwe n‟ibikoresho by‟ikoranabuhanga. - English: Article 13: Meeting on terrorism — “Meeting”: group of two or more persons gathered together for planning terrorism acts being in the same place or linked by technological system. - Français: Article 13: Réunion sur le terrorisme — «Réunion» : assemblée de deux ou plusieurs personnes ayant pour objectif de planifier les actes de terrorisme et pouvant se trouver dans un même endroit ou être liées par des voies technologiques. ### Article 14 : Ukwamamaza ishyirahamwe ry’iterabwoba / Advertising a terrorist organization / Publicité en faveur d’une organisation terroriste - Kinyarwanda: Aba akoze icyaha cy‟iterabwoba umuntu wese wamamaje umuryango cyangwa abategura ibikorwa cyangwa ishyirahamwe ry‟iterabwoba. Aba kandi akoze icyaha cy‟iterabwoba iyo yambaye umwambaro, atwaye cyangwa ashyize ahagaragara umwenda, inyandiko, amashusho, amajwi cyangwa ikindi cyose cyamamaza iterabwoba, mu buryo cyangwa mu gihe bituma haba ugukeka gufite ishingiro ko ari umwe mu bagize umuryango wabujijwe gukora cyangwa awutera inkunga. - Ibivugwa mu gika kibanziririza iki biba icyaha iyo uwabikoze yari azi ko biranga agatsiko cyangwa umuryango wemejwe ko ari uw‟iterabwobo. - English: Article 14: Advertising a terrorist organization — Commits the offence of terrorism, any person advertising an organization or organizers of acts or terrorist organization. He/she also commits the offence of terrorism when he/she wears, holds or shows the clothes, documents, visual medium, audio medium or any other medium that propagates terrorism, in a manner or way, which leads to serious presumption that he/she is one of the members of the prohibited organization or finances it. - Acts referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be considered as an offence where the person who commits such acts does so knowing that it identifies a group or a terrorist organization. - Français: Article 14: Publicité en faveur d’une organisation terroriste — Commet une infraction de terrorisme quiconque fait la publicité d‟une organisation ou de ceux qui préparent des actes de terrorisme ou une organisation terroriste. Commet également une infraction de terrorisme quiconque porte une uniforme, porte ou exhibe un tissu, un document, un support visuel, un support audio ou tout autre support qui fait la publicité du terrorisme, de manière et de façon à faire présumer valablement qu‟il est membre d‟une organisation interdite ou qu‟il la finance. Les faits visés à l‟alinéa précédent deviennent une infraction lorsque l‟auteur était au courant que cela représentait une organisation déclarée terroriste. ### Article 15 : Gutera inkunga ibikorwa by’iterabwoba / Supporting terrorist acts / Financement des actes de terrorisme - Kinyarwanda: Umutungo w‟umuntu utera inkunga ibikorwa by‟iterabwoba bivuga : - 1° amafaranga cyangwa undi mutungo ukoreshwa mu iterabwoba, harimo n‟umutungo w‟ishyirahamwe rikora cyangwa ryabujijwe gukora; - 2° ibyavuye mu gikorwa cy‟iterabwoba ; - 3° ibyavuye mu gikorwa cyakozwe hagamijwe gukora iterabwoba hakurikijwe ibiteganywa n‟amasezerano mpuzamahanga u Rwanda rwemeje burundu yerekeranye no kurwanya igikorwa cy‟iterabwoba. - English: Article 15: Supporting terrorist acts — A person‟s property supporting acts of terrorism shall mean: - 1° funds or any other property used to support terrorism including the property of an organization operating or prohibited from operating; - 2° outcomes of a terrorist act; - 3° outcomes of an act carried out with an intention to commit terrorism in accordance with provisions of international conventions Rwanda ratified relating to suppression of terrorism. - Français: Article 15: Financement des actes de terrorisme — Les biens d‟une personne qui finance les actes de terrorisme signifient : 1° capital investi dans l‟acte de terrorisme y compris celui d‟une organisation opérationnelle ou dont les actes sont interdits; 2° produit de l‟acte de terrorisme; 3° produit d‟acte commis avec intention de commettre le terrorisme dans le sens des dispositions de la convention internationale relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme ratifiée par le Rwanda. ### Article 16 : Igikozwe mu bikoresho bihumanya / Toxic materials / Objet fabriqué en matière toxique - Kinyarwanda: Mu bikorwa by‟iterabwoba ikintu gikozwe mu bikoresho bihumanya bivuga ikintu gishobora gutera impinduka mbi ku rusobe rw‟ibinyabuzima. - English: Article 16: Toxic materials — Referred to the terrorist acts, any toxic material shall mean any object, which may bring a negative change on biodiversity. - Français: Article 16: Objet fabriqué en matière toxique — Dans le cadre des actes terroristes, un objet fabriqué en matière toxique signifie un objet susceptible de provoquer un bouleversement dans la biodiversité. ### Article 17 : Iperereza n’abarikora / Investigation and investigators / Enquête et enquêteurs - Kinyarwanda: Iperereza ku bakekwaho ibikorwa by'iterabwoba bisobanura iperereza rikozwe na Polisi y‟Igihugu, Ingabo z‟Igihugu, Urwego rw‟Igihugu Rushinzwe Umutekano cyangwa urundi rwego rubifitiye ububasha byaba bikozwe mu bufatanye cyangwa se abagize urwego rumwe ukwabo, hagamijwe kurwanya iterabwoba no gushyikiriza abakekwa ubucamanza. - English: Article 17: Investigation and investigators — Investigations on terrorism suspects means investigations carried out by the National Police, Rwanda Defence Force, National Security Service or any other competent organ whether done in collaboration or by each organ respectively, with an aim of fighting against terrorism and indicting the suspects. - Français: Article 17 : Enquête et enquêteurs — L‟enquête sur les suspects d‟actes de terrorisme signifie une enquête menée par la Police Nationale, les Forces Rwandaises de Défense, le Service National de Sécurité ou toute autre autorité compétente soit conjointement ou individuellement dans le but de lutter contre le terrorisme et de traduire les suspects en justice. ### CHAPTER II: ACTS OF TERRORISM — Section One: Security of airports and aircrafts (Articles 18–19) - Article 18: Hijacking aircrafts / Détournement d’un aéronef - Commits the offence of terrorism any person using of force, with an intention to intimidate, capture the crew of an aircraft or using the crew of the aircraft with the purpose of achieving one of the following acts: - 1° killing or injuring a person aboard the aircraft; / 1° tuer ou blesser une personne à bord; - 2° transporting any person aboard the aircraft without his/her consent to a place other than the scheduled destination of aircraft; / 2° amener une personne à bord d‟un aéronef à emprunter contre son gré la direction d‟un endroit quelconque autre que la destination initiale de l‟avion; - 3° abducting a person in the aircraft for an illicit gain or forced labor; / 3° se saisir d‟une personne se trouvant à bord pour avoir une rançon ou obtenir de lui une (forced labor/ransom); - 4° changing the aircraft‟s direction; / 4° gutuma indege ihindura inzira yayo; - 5° demolishing the aircraft; / 5° kwangiza indege; - 6° causing insecurity of all on board the aircraft. / 6° guhungabanya umutekano w‟abari mu ndege. - Article 19: Causing insecurity at the airport / Guhungabanya umutekano ku kibuga cy’indege / Causing insecurity at the airport - Commits the offence of terrorism any person using force or threatening to use force at the airport and if such acts of terrorism result into: - 1° killing or injuring a person; / 1° kwica umuntu cyangwa kumukomeretsa ; - 2° demolishing or destroying buildings of an airport; / 2° gusenya cyangwa kwangiza inyubako z‟ikibuga cy‟indege; - 3° stopping certain activities which may have negative consequences on the performance of the airport; / 3° guhagarika imirimo imwe n‟imwe ishobora kugira ingaruka mbi ku migendekere myiza y‟ikibuga ; - 4° Security threats of the airport and its infrastructures. / 4° guhungabanya umutekano w‟ikibuga cy‟indege n‟inyubako. *Excerpt from _cr15221 - Section 2 : Définitions des termes* ### Section 2: Taking hostage ### _cr15221 - Section 2: Taking hostage ### Section 2: Taking hostage / Article 20 - Taking hostage refers to kidnapping, taking, diverting, and directing a person to a known or unknown destination in order for the hijacker to accomplish the interest of a terrorist group. - French: Prise d‟otage — La prise d‟otage signifie enlever, prendre et détourner une personne en vue de l‟amener dans un endroit qui lui est connu ou non pour servir les intérêts d‟un groupe terroriste. - Kinyarwanda fragments present in source: kugira ngo uwamufashe abone inyungu z‟agatsiko k‟iterabwoba. ### Article 19: Atteinte à la sécurité à l’aéroport / Airport security - Commet une infraction de terrorisme quiconque use ou menace d‟user de la force à l‟aéroport lorsque ces actes de terrorisme provoquent: - 1° la mort ou les blessures d‟une personne ; - 2° la destruction ou détérioration des installations d‟un aéroport; - 3° l‟interruption de certaines des activités susceptibles d‟entraver les opérations normales de l‟aéroport; - 4° l‟atteinte à la sécurité de l‟aéroport et de ses installations. - English summary in source: (Article text in French; English wording not provided for Article 19 beyond French). ### Section 3: Accomplices and complicity / Article 21 - Any person involved or participating in the following acts of a terrorist group shall be considered to be an accomplice: - 1° giving, receiving or choosing a person for training; - 2° giving or facilitating the supply of knowledge or expertise in the interest of or in collaboration with a terrorist group; - 3° collecting, giving or facilitating the collection of property, directly or indirectly, or sensitizing a person to give, aid or facilitate the collection of property, funds or other activities related to the interest of that group; - 4° using the property, directly or indirectly, in the interest of that group; - 5° owning property reserved to be used, directly or indirectly, in the interest of that group; - 6° choosing a person for aiding in or committing an act of terrorism; - 7° committing or abstaining from committing an act outside the country to the extent that if it was committed within the country, it would be a terrorist act; - 8° entering or remaining in any country in the interest of or in collaboration with a terrorist group; - 9° sacrificing oneself, by adhering to the instructions given by one of the members of a terrorist group in order to aid or commit a terrorist act. - French and Kinyarwanda parallel texts repeat these categories. ### Article 22: Complicity in terrorism - Any person involved or participating in the following acts of a terrorist group shall be considered to be an accomplice: - 1° using a name, a word, an emblem or any other symbol related to a terrorist group; - 2° being often in the company of the members of a terrorist group; - 3° getting benefits from a terrorist group; - 4° occasionally appearing in the acts ordered by members of a terrorist group. - French: Article 22: Complicité dans le terrorisme — Est considérée comme complice ... telles que: 1° ... 2° ... 3° ... 4° ... ### Section 4: Use of nuclear, chemical weapons and explosives / Articles 23–25 - Article 23: Use of nuclear weapons - Any person who deliberately, and in contradiction with the law, uses or threatens to use mass destruction weapons, attempts to conspire or one who conspires deliberately in order to use nuclear weapons contrary to laws shall be guilty of the terrorist offence. - French equivalent provided. - Article 24: Use of chemical weapons and explosives - Any person commits a terrorist act, deliberately intends to kill, causes bodily injury to another person, destroys property or environment when he/she: - 1° puts toxic substances or any toxic thing in a certain place; - 2° sends toxic substance or any toxic substances from one place to another by use of the postal or any other possible means; - 3° informs a person anywhere in the world that a substance is toxic or any thing that is poisonous is a nuclear weapon. - French equivalent: 1° pose les substances toxiques ou tout autre objet quelconque toxique dans un endroit ; 2° envoie des substances toxiques ... ; 3° fait comprendre ... qu‟un objet constitue une substance toxique ou une arme nucléaire. - Article 25: Owning materials and documents - Any person who owns materials in which chemical weapons may be manufactured, documents on the manufacture and use of such weapons, any equipment that is used in their manufacturing in industries with an intention to seriously harm any other person‟s body, destroying property or environment shall be guilty of a terrorist act. - French equivalent provided. ### Section 5: Aiding terrorist organization or a terrorist group / Articles 26–27 - Article 26: When aiding becomes a terrorist offence - A person aids an act of terrorism when: - 1° he/she knows that he is aiding an act of terrorism; - 2° he/she does so with the knowledge that he is assisting a person, a group or a terrorist organization; - 3° he/she does so knowing that the person he/she is assisting committed terrorism. - French equivalent provided. - Article 27: Financing a prohibited organization - Any person who mobilises funds, property or any other support for an organization prohibited under article 10 of this Law shall be guilty of an offence of terrorism. - Kinyarwanda and French parallel texts reference mobilisation of amafaranga, umutungo cyangwa indi nkunga. ### Section 6: Property to support acts of terrorism / Articles 28–31 - Article 28: Property from acts of terrorism - The property from the acts of terrorism is any or part of property composed of direct or indirect outcomes of such acts of terrorism including compensation or awards related to such acts. - French: Le patrimoine provenant des actes de terrorisme signifie l‟ensemble ou une partie des biens composés, directement ou indirectement, des produits de ces actes y compris les prestations ou primes relatives à ces actes. - Article 29: Property of a prohibited organization - The property of a prohibited organization due to reasons related to terrorism implies funds, any other property to be used or on account or one which should be used or kept by the organization. - French equivalent provided. - Article 30: Owning and using patrimony from terrorism - Any person who possesses or uses money or any other property from terrorism and any other person who supports terrorism commits the offence of terrorism. - French equivalent provided. - Article 31: Concealing terrorists / Recel de terroristes - Any person commits the offence of terrorism who doesn‟t inform the security forces and other relevant organs and who suspects any other person to have committed or attempts to commit or to finance acts of terrorism. - Kinyarwanda: umuntu wese utamenyesheje abashinzwe umutekano n‟izindi nzego zibishinzwe kandi azi neza cyangwa akeka ko undi muntu yakoze cyangwa ategura gukora cyangwa gutera inkunga ibikorwa by‟iterabwoba. ### Articles 32–34: Disclosure obligations and protection for informants - Article 32: Disclosing information regarding to money suspected to have resulted from terrorism - Any person who has information to suspect or to confirm that the money or any other property belongs to a terrorist or that it is as a result of acts of terrorism shall notify security organs or other relevant authorities immediately when it comes to his/her knowledge or suspicion. - French and Kinyarwanda equivalents provided. - Article 33: Disclosing information of a terrorist act - Any person concerned with provisions relating to participation in money agreements or any other property shall not have committed an offence if he/she notifies security organs, and other relevant authorities on suspicion or confirmation that the money or any other property belongs to a terrorist, even if he/she suspects while the information of his/her basis confirms so. - French equivalent emphasizes that no offence is committed when reporting even if based on information justifying the suspicion. - Article 34: Disclosing information - Provisions referred to in Article 33 of this Law relating to disclosure of information on a terrorist act shall apply only if the informant is not yet identified. - French: Les dispositions de l‟article 33 ... ne s‟appliquent que si la personne l‟a fait avant qu‟elle ne soit identifiée. - Exception noted in source: Such provisions shall not apply to the person who discloses information and continues commit terrorist acts. / Ibyo ntibikurikizwa ku muntu watanze amakuru agakomeza ibikorwa by‟iterabwoba. ### Articles 35–37: Confiscation and seizure procedures - Article 35: Confiscation of property - The court that tried an accused on an offence of aiding terrorist acts shall issue a deed of confiscation of the property of the accused. - French equivalent provided. - Article 36: Authority of the responsible officer (Icyiciro cya 7 heading) - When seizing money of a person, group or organization suspected to be used to support terrorism, the responsible officer prepares a written record before depositing it in an account at the Bank (Banki Nkuru y‟Igihugu). The written record is made within twenty-four (24) hours of seizure. - A copy of that written record is given to the person whose funds were seized, to the supervisory entities of that officer, and is submitted to the Public Prosecution Office (Ubushinjacyaha Bukuru). - Exact phrasing and institutional names preserved as in source. - Article 37: Continuation of seizure upon request - French/Kinyarwanda/English fragments indicate that Ubushinjacyaha Bukuru may request the competent court for an order to continue holding the seized funds (full procedural text in source). *Source: _cr15221 - Section 2: Taking hostage* ### Section 7: Seizure of terrorist funds ### _cr15221 - Section 7: Seizure of terrorist funds ### Article 36 — Competence of a competent official - Any competent official, in case he/she confiscates funds of a person, a group or an organization suspected to be used in financing terrorism shall make a statement thereof before depositing them on account in the National Bank of Rwanda. - The statement shall be made in a period not exceeding twenty four (24) hours from the time of seizure. - A copy of such a statement shall be given to: - the person whose funds have been confiscated by the superior authorities of such an official; and - the National Public Prosecution Authority. ### Article 37 — Validity of the certificate of the seizure / custody of seized funds - The National Public Prosecution Authority shall request the competent court to provide a certificate to the custody of the seized funds. - The certificate shall be valid last for three (3) months renewable. ### Article 38 — Convicted person in case of seized funds - In case the accused is convicted of financing terrorist acts, when there are seized funds, the court shall take decision on such amount. ### Article 39 — Decision on the seized funds - Where the court finds that the seized funds are meant for being used in terrorist acts, it shall give them to the Government of Rwanda. - The seized funds shall be given to the Country‟s antiterrorist Unit when the final judgement is rendered and when the accused is convicted. - In case the court finds that the funds were not meant for terrorist acts, they shall be given back to the owner. ### Article 40 — Seizure and dispossession of other property - Upon request by a competent officer or the judicial police, or at its own initiative, the National Public Prosecution Authority may request the court to issue a certificate permitting the confiscation of other property of terrorist suspects. - If the Court finds that such property was used or was to be used in terrorism, it shall seize it and thereafter give it to the State. - If the Court finds that the property was not meant for terrorist acts, the property shall be returned to the owner. ### Article 41 — Appeal - The Court decision on the property of terrorist suspects shall be appealed against in accordance with the provisions of the law. - Where the Court finds that confiscated property was used or meant to be used in terrorist acts, the property shall be given to State and be used in accordance with provisions of Article 39 of this Law. - Where the Court finds that the property was not meant for being used in terrorist acts, the property shall be returned to the owner. ### Related procedural provisions affecting seizure (selected provisions) - Article 42: In case there is an area suspected of acts of terrorism, a police officer or any other person in charge of security shall cordon off the area and immediately inform police authorities. The National Police shall demarcate boundaries and mark the place with a sign post with the word “Police”. - Article 43: A police officer or other authorised officer may: - 1° order a person to vacate the cordoned area; - 2° prevent or prohibit pedestrians or vehicles from entering into the cordoned area; - Any person who contradicts Paragraph One shall commit an offence. Displaced persons shall be catered for by the relevant state organs. - Article 44: Security agents may arrest a terrorist suspect without an arrest warrant but shall notify the relevant authorities not later than forty eight (48) hours. - Article 45: A Police officer, a security agent or any other authorised person may arrest without warrant in case of clear reasons for suspecting such a person to have committed or attempts to commit acts of terrorism and shall hand him/her over to the nearest police station in a period not exceeding forty eight (48) hours; they may also enter and search all buildings in which such a suspect lives and inform police authorities within forty eight (48) hours. - Article 46–47: A written authorization to arrest or search shall be signed by one of the listed senior officers; such a warrant shall not exceed seventy two (72) hours. The National Public Prosecution Authority may issue authorization to replace the arrest warrant if necessary. - Article 48: A police officer or any other authorized agent has the right to arrest and to search: - 1° a vehicle; - 2° a driver of such a vehicle; - 3° a passenger on board; - 4° any object in such a vehicle. - Article 50: If competence to arrest and search is authorized verbally, the grantor shall demonstrate it in writing in a period not exceeding twenty four (24) hours even if the act has been completed. - Article 51: A police officer or other authorised worker may forcefully enter a building if owners refuse entry or fail to open, even if demolition or damage to property is necessary. - Article 52: Search experts shall be consulted where necessary in accordance with other laws on the use of experts. - Article 53: A person responsible for a search may seize any object seen in a terrorist act that can be evidence and shall hand it over to the nearest police station. *Source: _cr15221 - Section 7: Seizure of terrorist funds* ### Section 5: Arrest and imprisonment ### Section 5: Arrest and imprisonment ### Article 54: Arrest of the suspect - A security officer or any other authorised person who is in possession of an arrest warrant and for reasons of conducting investigations, shall, on justified grounds arrest a person who is suspected of committing terrorist acts and shall hand him/her over to the nearest police station in accordance with provisions of Article 45 of this Law in a period not exceeding forty-eight (48) hours. ### Procedures and constraints on detention - Arrest requires: - possession of an arrest warrant; and - justified grounds related to conducting investigations. - Post-arrest obligation: - hand the arrested person over to the nearest police station in accordance with Article 45. - Time limit: - transfer to police station must occur in a period not exceeding forty-eight (48) hours. ### CHAPTER IV: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION — Article 55 - The Government of Rwanda shall be in cooperation with other countries in the framework of: - exchange of information; - conduct of investigation; - prosecution with intention of provisional seizure for security; - confiscation and dispossession of property, funds and property relating to money laundering and financing terrorism; - extradition; and - technical cooperation. ### Article 53: Conservation des indices résultant de la perquisition - L‟agent chargé de la perquisition peut saisir toute chose trouvée s‟il a des raisons fondées pouvant lui permettre de croire que cette chose peut servir à commettre des actes de terrorisme et la remettre à la station de police la plus proche. *Source: _cr15221 - Section 5: Arrest and imprisonment* ### Section 5: Arrestation et détention ### _cr15221 - Section 5: Arrestation et détention ### Article 54: Arrestation du suspect / Arrestation du suspect - L‟agent de sécurité ou tout autre agent compétent, muni d‟un mandat, et disposant d‟éléments lui permettant de soupçonner qu‟une personne commet un acte de terrorisme peut arrêter cette personne pour raison d‟enquête et la remettre à la station de police la plus proche dans un délai ne dépassant pas quarante-huit (48) heures conformément à l‟article 45 de la présente loi. ### CHAPITRE IV: COOPERATION INTERNATIONALE — Objet et formes de coopération (Article 55 / Article 56) - Article 55: Coopération avec d’autres Etats - L‟Etat rwandais coopère avec d‟autres Etats dans le cadre de l‟échange d‟informations, de la réalisation d‟une enquête et des poursuites en vue des mesures conservatoires, de saisie, de dépossession des équipements, des capitaux et des biens liés au blanchiment de capitaux et au financement du terrorisme pour des raisons d‟extradition et de coopération technique. - Article 56: Purpose for request of cooperation / Motifs de demande de coopération - The request for mutual legal assistance from a foreign State relating to the offences under this Law shall be carried out in accordance with the principles defined by this Law. - La demande de coopération en matière d‟infractions prévues dans la présente loi se fait conformément aux principes qu‟elle définit. - The cooperation may include / La coopération peut porter sur les éléments suivants : - 1° collection of evidence or statements from persons; / 1° le recueil de témoignages ou de dépositions ; - 2° assistance of foreign state legal authorities in providing access to detained persons or other persons in order to witness or to help in the enquiries; / 2° l‟aide aux autorités judiciaires de l‟Etat étranger en mettant à leur disposition des personnes détenues ou d‟autres personnes, aux fins de témoignage ou d‟assistance dans la conduite de l‟enquête ; - 3° providing of any judicial document; / 3° la remise de tout document judiciaire ; - 4° executing searches and seizures; / 4° les perquisitions et les saisies ; - 5° examining objects and visiting sites; / 5° l‟examen d‟objets et les descentes sur les lieux ; - 6° providing information, and evidentiary items / 6° la fourniture de renseignements et de pièces à conviction ; - 7° providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents, including official documents, bank statements, accounting documents and registers showing the functioning of an enterprise or its commercial activities. / 7° la présentation des originaux ou de copies certifiées conformes aux dossiers et documents pertinents y compris des documents officiels, des relevés bancaires, des pièces comptables, des registres montrant le fonctionnement d‟une entreprise ou ses activités commerciales. ### Refusal of cooperation / Refus de coopération (Article 57) - Request for cooperation may only be rejected where: / La demande d‟entraide ne peut être refusée que si : - 1° it is likely to prejudice the public order, sovereignty, security or fundamental principles of the Republic of Rwanda; / 1° son exécution risque de porter atteinte à l‟ordre public, à la souveraineté, à la sécurité ou aux principes fondamentaux de la République du Rwanda; - 2° the requesting authority is not competent under the requesting state Law; / 2° elle n‟émane pas d‟une autorité compétente selon la législation du pays requérant ; - 3° the facts on which the request is based have already been definitively judged on the territory of the Republic of Rwanda; / 3° les faits sur lesquels elle porte ont déjà fait l‟objet de sanction ou d‟une décision judiciaire coulée en force de chose jugée sur le territoire de la République du Rwanda; - 4° the offence on which the request is based does not exist under the Law of the Republic of Rwanda or does not have common characteristics with an offence existing under the Law of the Republic of Rwanda; / 4° l‟infraction visée dans la demande n‟est pas prévue par la législation de la République du Rwanda ou ne présente pas de caractéristiques communes avec une infraction prévue par la législation de la République du Rwanda; - 5° the requested measures or other measures with similar effects are not authorized under the Law of the Republic of Rwanda or cannot be applied to the offences on which the request is based under the law of the Republic of Rwanda; / 5° les mesures sollicitées ou toutes autres mesures ayant des effets analogues, ne sont pas autorisées par la législation de la République du Rwanda ou ne sont pas applicables aux infractions visées dans la demande d‟après la législation de la République du Rwanda; - 6° the requested measures cannot be decreed or executed because of the prescription of the crime of terrorism or financing terrorism under the Law of the Republic of Rwanda or under the Law of the requesting state; / 6° les mesures demandées ne peuvent être prises ou exécutées pour cause de prescription de l‟infraction de terrorisme ou de financement du terrorisme d‟après la législation de la République du Rwanda ou celle de l‟Etat requérant; - 7° the requested measure to be implemented is not binding under the legislation of the Republic of Rwanda; / 7° la décision dont l‟exécution est demandée n‟est pas exécutoire sous la législation de la République du Rwanda; - 8° the decision from another country has been ordered in conditions that do not offer sufficient guarantees regarding the rights of the defense; / 8° la décision étrangère a été prononcée dans des conditions n‟offrant pas de garanties suffisantes au regard des droits de la défense; - 9° there are substantial grounds for believing that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on the basis of sex, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinions; / 9° il y a de sérieuses raisons de croire que les mesures demandées ou la décision sollicitée ne visent la personne concernée qu‟en raison de son sexe, de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son origine ethnique, de ses opinions politiques ; - 10° the request is based on a political offence or motivated by political consideration; / 10° la demande porte sur une infraction politique ou est motivée par des considérations d‟ordre politique ; - 11° the case is not important enough to justify the requested measures or the enforcement of the foreign court decision. / 11° l‟importance de l‟affaire ne justifie pas les mesures réclamées ou l‟exécution de la décision rendue à l‟étranger. - The Government of the Republic of Rwanda shall communicate immediately the grounds for refusal of the request. / Le Gouvernement de la République du Rwanda communique sans délai au gouvernement étranger les motifs du refus d‟exécution de sa demande. ### Request for conducting investigations / Demande de réalisation d’une enquête (Article 58) - Investigative and trial measures shall be executed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Rwanda unless the competent authorities of another State require that it be proceeded according to a specific form compatible with the legislation of the Republic of Rwanda. - Les mesures d‟enquête et d‟instruction sont exécutées conformément à la législation de la République du Rwanda, à moins que les autorités compétentes d‟un autre Etat n‟aient demandé qu‟il soit procédé selon une procédure particulière compatible avec la législation de la République du Rwanda. - A Judge or a civil servant sent by the requesting State may attend to the enforcement of the measures depending on whether they are executed by a judge or a civil servant. / Un magistrat ou un fonctionnaire délégué par l‟autorité compétente de l‟Etat requérant peut assister à l‟exécution des mesures selon qu‟il s‟agit d‟un magistrat ou d‟un fonctionnaire qui les exécute. ### Request for provisional protective measures / Demande de mesures conservatoires (Article 59) - In case a foreign country requests Rwanda to exercise provisionally protective measures, the competent Court shall order the aforementioned solicited protective measures according to the proper legislation of the Republic of Rwanda. - If the request is written in general terms, the Court shall pronounce the most appropriate protective measures provided for by the legislation of the Republic of Rwanda. - In case the requested measures are not provided for by the Rwandan legislation, the competent Court may substitute them with appropriate measures provided for in the legislation of the Republic of Rwanda. - Lorsqu‟un Etat étranger demande au Rwanda de prendre des mesures conservatoires, la juridiction compétente du Rwanda ordonne lesdites mesures sollicitées conformément à la législation rwandaise. Si la demande est rédigée en termes généraux, la juridiction prononce les mesures les plus appropriées prévues par la législation rwandaise. ### Request for dispossession / Demande de confiscation (Article 60) - In the case of a request for cooperation for the purpose of pronouncing a decision of dispossession, the competent Court shall take a decision upon request of the National Public Prosecutor Authority. - The decision of dispossession shall concern an asset constituting the product or the instrument of an offence taking place on the territory of the Republic of Rwanda, or creating an obligation to pay an amount of money corresponding to the value of this asset. - Dans le cas d‟une demande d‟entraide judiciaire à l‟effet de prononcer une décision de confiscation, la juridiction compétente statue sur saisine de l‟Organe National de Poursuite Judiciaire. La décision de confiscation doit viser un bien constituant le produit ou l‟instrument ayant servi à commettre une infraction se trouvant sur le territoire de la République du Rwanda, ou peut consister en l‟obligation de payer une somme d‟argent correspondant à la valeur de ce bien. - The competent Court dealing with a request relating to the enforcement of a decision of dispossession pronounced abroad shall examine the facts on which the decision is based and can refuse execution of the request only for one of the reasons enumerated in Article 40 of this Law. ### Destiny and restitution of dispossessed property (Articles 61 and 67) - Article 61: Destiny of dispossessed property - The Rwandan State shall have the powers to dispose of dispossessed property on its territory upon request of foreign authorities, unless an agreement concluded with the requesting State provides otherwise. - L‟Etat Rwandais jouit du pouvoir de disposition sur les biens confisqués sur son territoire à la demande d‟autorités étrangères, à moins qu‟un accord conclu avec l‟Etat requérant n‟en décide autrement. - Article 67: Restitution of property - Without prejudice to provisions of the law and rights of third parties, all assets found on the territory of the Republic of Rwanda acquired as a result of the offence committed or that may be required as elements of evidence shall be returned to the requesting State, upon request of the requesting State and if the extradition is granted. - Upon request of the requesting State, the assets set forth in paragraph One this Article may be returned to this State even if the granted extradition cannot be carried out. - Whenever the aforementioned assets shall be susceptible of seizure or dispossession on the territory of the Republic of Rwanda, the State shall be able to maintain temporarily or return them. - A la demande de l‟Etat requérant, ce patrimoine peut être restitué même dans les cas où l‟extradition n‟est pas accordée. - Upon request by the Republic of Rwanda and at any time the legislation of the Republic of Rwanda so provides, and in respect of the rights of third parties, the returned assets shall be brought back to the Republic of Rwanda free of charge, if prosecution is finalised. ### Extradition: scope, dual incrimination, and grounds for refusal (Articles 62–66, 63–66) - Article 62: Request for extradition - The requests for extradition of persons sought for purposes of procedure in a foreign State shall be carried out for the offences envisaged under the provisions of this Law or for purposes to enforce a judicial decision related to such an offence. - The procedures and the principles provided for in the treaty of extradition in force between the requesting State and the Republic of Rwanda shall be applied. - In the absence of a treaty of extradition or legislative provisions, the extradition shall be carried out according to the procedure and respecting the principles defined by the standard treaty of extradition adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution 45/116. - Les procédures et les principes prévus par le traité d‟extradition en vigueur entre l‟Etat requérant et la République du Rwanda sont applicables. - Article 63: Dual incrimination - Under the terms of this Law, the extradition shall be carried out only when the offence giving rise to extradition or a similar offence is envisaged both in the legislation of the requesting State and Republic of Rwanda. - Conformément aux dispositions de la présente loi, l‟extradition des suspects n‟a lieu que lorsque l‟infraction entraînant l‟extradition ou une infraction similaire est reconnue par la législation de la République du Rwanda. - Article 64: Compulsory grounds for refusing extradition / Motifs obligatoires de rejet d’extradition - The request for extradition shall not be granted if: - 1° there are serious reasons to believe that the request for extradition was presented with a view to suing or punishing a person due to his/her race, religion, nationality, ethnic origins, political opinions, sex ou status, or that this situation of such a person may be endangered for one of these reasons; - 2° a final judgement was pronounced in the Republic of Rwanda for the offence in respect of which the extradition is being sought; - 3° the person whose extradition is being sought no longer, due to the legislation of one or the other of these countries in which the person to be extradited committed an offence is located, be sued or punished, due to the elapsed time or an amnesty or any other reason; - 4° the person whose extradition is being sought has been or would be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments; - 5° the person whose extradition is being sought has not received or would not receive the minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings as contained in Article 14 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. - L‟extradition ne peut être refusée au seul motif que l‟infraction est considérée comme portant sur des questions fiscales. - En tout état de cause, l‟extradition d‟un citoyen rwandais ne peut être accordée. - Article 65: Optional grounds for refusing extradition / Motifs facultatifs de refus d'extradition - Extradition may be refused if: - 1° the authorities of the Republic of Rwanda have decided not to proceed with charges against the person concerned for the particular offence for which the extradition is requested or to put an end to the proceedings instituted against the aforementioned person; - 2° proceedings for the offence related to the requested extradition are pending in the Republic of Rwanda; - 3° the offence for which the extradition is requested has been committed outside the territory of either country and, according to the legislation of the Republic of Rwanda, the Rwandan jurisdictions are not competent with regard to the offences committed outside its territory in comparable circumstances; - 4° the person whose extradition is being requested has been judged, had an incident that led him/her not be tried or risked to be judged or convicted in the requesting State by a special jurisdiction; - 5° the Republic of Rwanda, while taking into account the nature of the offence and the interests of the State requesting for extradition, considers that, given the circumstances of the matter, the extradition of the concerned person would be incompatible with the respect of human rights, taking into account the age, the state of health or other personal circumstances of the aforesaid person; - 6° the offence for which the extradition is requested is considered by the legislation of the Republic of Rwanda as committed in all or partly on its entire territory; - 7° the extradition is requested in execution of a final judgment issued in the absence of the person concerned, who has not been able to ensure his/her defense for reasons beyond his/her will. - L'extradition pourra être refusée si: 1° les autorités de la République du Rwanda décident de ne pas poursuivre l‟infraction en raison de laquelle l‟extradition est demandée ou décident de ne pas poursuivre le suspect; - Article 66: Aut dedere aut judicare - When the Republic of Rwanda refuses the extradition for a reason mentioned in Article 64, sub paragraphs 3° and 4° of Paragraph One and Article 38 of this Law, it shall refer the matter to the competent Court so that the person concerned shall be prosecuted. - Lorsque la République du Rwanda refuse l‟extradition de la personne réclamée pour des motifs prévus par l‟article 64 en ses points 3° et 4° de son alinéa 1 et par l‟article 65 de la présente loi, elle introduit l‟action devant la juridiction compétente pour que ladite personne soit poursuivie. ### Transmission and form of requests; urgency (Article 68 and related procedural notes) - Article 68: Kohereza isaba / Kohereza isaba - Isaba rikozwe n‟ubuyobozi bwo mu kindi gihugu bubifitiye ububasha ku mpamvu zo kugaragaza irikorwa ry‟icyaha cy‟iterabwoba, ku mpamvu zo gushyiraho ibyemezo bishingana by‟agateganyo cyangwa ubunyage cyangwa ku mpamvu zo kohererezanya abakurikiranyweho ibyaha rinyuzwa mu nzego z‟ubutwererane. - In case of urgency, the request may be transmitted via INTERPOL or directly; the requesting authorities can transmit to Rwandan magistrates by written message or other expedited means, leaving a copy or equivalent value copy. If a request does not comply with cooperation channels, it shall not be given effect. - Inyandiko zisaba n‟imigereka yazo biherekezwa n‟inyandiko zihinduwe muri rumwe mu ndimi... *Source: _cr15221 - Section 5: Arrestation et détention (extracted text).* ### CHAPTER V: GENERAL PROVISIONS ### CHAPTER V: GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO REQUEST FOR COOPERATION AND EXTRADITION ### Article 68 — Transmission of request - Requests addressed by foreign competent authorities for purposes of establishing the perpetration of an offence of terrorism, pronouncing provisional protective measures or a dispossession or for purposes of extradition shall be transmitted through diplomatic channels. - In urgent cases, they may be communicated through INTERPOL or directly by the foreign authorities to the judicial authorities of the Republic of Rwanda, either by mail, or by any other faster means of transmission, leaving a hard copy or equivalent material. - The request shall only be considered if cooperation requirements are fully met. - The requests and their annexes shall be accompanied by a translation in one of the official languages of the Republic of Rwanda. ### Article 69 — Contents of extradition request forms - The requests shall specify: - 1° the authority requesting for the measure; - 2° the required authority; - 3° the subject of the request and any relevant remark on its context; - 4° the facts justifying the request; - 5° all known elements likely to facilitate the identification of the persons concerned and in particular the civil status, the nationality, the address and the profession; - 6° all necessary information to identify and locate the person, instruments, resources or property concerned; - 7° the text of the legal provision instituting the offence or, if needed, a report of the law applicable to the offence, and the indication of the sentence incurred for the offence; - 8° a description of the required assistance and the detail of any particular procedure that the requesting State wishes to see applied. - The request shall also contain the following elements in some particular cases: - 1° in the case of a request for a protective measure, a description of the protective order requested; - 2° in case of a request for a decision for confiscation, a report of the relevant facts and arguments allowing the judicial authorities to pronounce the confiscation, according to the provisions of national law. - 3° In case of a request for enforcement of a decision of a provisional protective measure or of confiscation, the requests shall be further accompanied by: - a. a certified true copy of the decision setting out such grounds and, if it does not state them, an explanatory note of such a decision; - b. a certificate according to which the decision is enforceable and not subject to ordinary means of redress; - c. the indication of the limits within which the decision shall be carried out and, where appropriate, the amount of money to reclaim for the asset(s); - d. if applicable and if possible, all indications related to the rights that third parties can demand on the instruments, resources, property or other. - 4° In the case of a request for extradition of a person declared guilty of an offence, the request shall be accompanied with the judgment or a certified copy conform to the judgment proving that the concerned person has been recognized guilt and indicative of the sentence pronounced, the fact that the judgment is enforceable or the extent to which the sentence has not been carried out. ### Article 70 — Analysis / Treatment of the extradition request - The Ministry in charge of justice, after having verified the legitimacy of the request, shall submit it to the National Public Prosecution Authority of the location where the investigations shall be carried out or where the person whose extradition is requested is located. - The National Public Prosecution Authority shall refer to the competent civil servants for the requests for investigation and the competent Court with regard to the requests related to protective orders, confiscations and extradition. - A judge or a civil servant delegated by the competent requesting State can attend the enforcement of the protective measures depending on whether they are executed by a judge, a prosecutor or an authorized civil servant. ### Article 71 — Additional information - The Minister in charge of justice or the National Public Prosecution Authority to which the matter has been addressed, dealing with the case, either on own initiative or upon request of the competent Court, may solicit, through diplomatic channels or directly, the foreign competent authority for purposes to providing all additional information necessary to carry out the request or facilitate its enforcement. ### Article 72 — Request for confidentiality - When the requesting State asks that the existence and the contents of its request be kept confidential, this must be done. - If it is impossible, the requesting authority shall be informed without delay. ### Article 73 — Prohibition of using pieces of evidences for other purposes - For investigations or procedures other than those provided for by the foreign State request, the use of the elements of evidence is prohibited and may lead to nullity of the said investigations and procedures, unless there is a prior consent of the foreign Government. ### Article 74 — Payment for activities performed - Costs computed for the execution of the requests under this Chapter are borne by the requesting State unless it is agreed otherwise. ### UMUTWE WA VI (CHAPTER VI) — Penalties (selected provisions) - Ingingo ya 75: - A person who is a member, a leader, or participates knowingly in activities of an association committing terrorism or who contributes in any way to increasing the capacity of any association committing terrorism to facilitate or carry out a terrorist act is punishable by imprisonment from "kuva ku myaka makumyabiri (20) kugeza kuri mirongo itatu n‟itanu (35)". - Ingingo ya 76: - A person who knowingly assists in a terrorist act is punished by the same penalty as that provided for the perpetrator of that offence (i.e., the penalty provided by this law for that offence). - Ingingo ya 77: - A person who commits an offence provided by this law while leading or in collusion with a terrorist group or in its interests is punishable by imprisonment from "kuva ku myaka makumyabiri (20) kugeza kuri mirongo itatu n‟itanu (35)". - If the person is the leader of the group or otherwise played a major role, the penalty is life imprisonment ("gufungwa burundu"). *Source: _cr15221 - CHAPTER V: GENERAL PROVISIONS* ### CHAPTER VI: PENALTIES ### _cr15221 - CHAPTER VI: PENALTIES ### Overview - Chapter VI enumerates criminal offences related to terrorism and the corresponding penalties, specifying exact prison terms and life imprisonment for the most serious offences. - Penalties are frequently expressed as ranges and exact terms such as "twenty (20) to thirty five (35) years", "fifteen (15) to twenty (20) years", "ten (10) to twenty (20) years", and "life imprisonment". ### Participation, complicity, and command (Articles 75–77) - Article 75: Participating in the acts of a terrorism association - Any person whether a principal author or an accomplice who joins or deliberately participates in the acts of a terrorism association or one which operates in building capacities of any association that conducts terrorist acts shall be liable to an imprisonment of twenty (20) to thirty five (35) years. - Article 76: Complicity in a terrorist act - Any person who deliberately assists in a terrorist act shall be punished by a sentence this Law imposes on a person who commits such an offence. - Article 77: Terrorism under the command of a terrorist group - Any person who commits an offence provided for by this Law by order or in collaboration with a terrorist association or in its interests shall be liable to an imprisonment between twenty (20) and thirty five (35) years. - Where the offence involves a leader of the group or any other person who played a significant role, it shall be punished by life imprisonment. ### Direction, harbouring, membership, and hijacking (Articles 78–82) - Article 78: Giving directives in an act of terrorism - Any person who knowingly gives orders to another, directly or indirectly, to commit a terrorist act under directives or in collaboration with a group of terrorists, for the reasons of supporting a group of terrorists in order to aid or commit an act of terrorism, shall be liable to a life imprisonment. - Article 79: Harbouring a terrorist - Any person who harbours another person knowing that he/she has committed or attempted to commit a terrorist act shall be sentenced by a life imprisonment. - Article 80: Membership in a terrorist organization - Any person who joins or admits to be member in a terrorist organization shall be liable to an imprisonment from fifteen (15) to twenty (20) years. - Article 81: Hijacking of an aircraft - Any person using of force, with an intention to intimidate, capture the crew of an aircraft or using the crew of the aircraft with the purpose of achieving one of the following acts shall be liable to a life imprisonment: - 1° killing or injuring a person aboard the aircraft; - 2° transporting any person aboard the aircraft without his/her consent to a place other than the scheduled destination of aircraft; - 3° abducting a person in the aircraft for an illicit gain or forced labor; - 4° changing the aircraft‟s direction; - 5° demolishing the aircraft; - 6° causing insecurity of all on board the aircraft. - Article 82: Destabilizing security at the airport - Any person using of force or threatens to use force at the airport in case such terrorist acts result into the following shall be liable to a life imprisonment: - 1° death or injury to a person; - 2° demolishing or destructing buildings of international airports; - 3° stopping certain activities which may have negative consequences on the performance of the airport; - 4° destabilisation of the security of the airport and its installations. ### Explosives, hostage-taking, attacks on protected persons, and diplomats (Articles 83–87) - Article 83: Illegal use of explosives in gatherings - Any person who deliberately gives, ambushes, throws or blasts an explosive or any other noxious substance in a public place, in an illegal manner or who causes disorder in the same place and demolishes government buildings and other infrastructure with an intention to commit the following offences, shall be liable to a life imprisonment: - 1° causing death or injury; - 2° destroying, demolish a place or a building which may result into a significant economic, private or public property loss. - Article 84: Taking hostage - Any person who takes hostage with intention to use force against the State, international organization or a leader or any other person with a threat to kill, injure or proceed to take hostage in case of failure to give or fulfill the demand by the hijacker shall be liable to an imprisonment of twenty (20) to thirty-five (35) years. - If taking hostage results into death of the person hijacked, the hijacker shall be liable to a life imprisonment. - Article 85: Terrorism against internationally protected person - Any person, involved in terrorism, who kills or kidnaps an internationally protected person shall be liable to life imprisonment. - Article 86: Attacking diplomats - Any person who attacks or violates diplomats shall be liable to: - 1° a life imprisonment if the attacks resulted into death; - 2° an imprisonment from twenty (20) to thirty-five (35) years if the attacks caused serious injury. - Article 87: Demolishing buildings - Any person who willfully destroys or demolishes in any other way other than guns or bombs shall be liable to life imprisonment in cases of: - 1° public and private buildings, transportation of internationally protected persons; - 2° other buildings used or which should be used by an internationally protected person or his/her property. ### Threats, unlawful entry, chemical and explosive weapons (Articles 88–92) - Article 88: Threatening to commit terrorism - Any person who threatens to commit any act which may result into a terrorist crime shall be liable to an imprisonment of ten (10) to twenty (20) years. - Where the threat caused death to people, the criminal shall be liable to life imprisonment. - Article 89: Entering State and Diplomats premises for the purpose of committing terrorism - Any person who enters or attempts to enter into a house or premises in which the Government carries out its activities, or diplomats or international organization or into an internationally protected person‟s premises in an illegal way, with an intention to threaten, use force, intimidate or harass persons shall be liable to an imprisonment of twenty (20) to thirty five (35) years. - Article 90: Possession of weapons and writings indicating how chemical weapons are used - Any person who possesses chemical weapons, documents on its functionality or use, materials utilized to manufacture those weapons shall be liable to an imprisonment of twenty (20) to thirty five (35) years. - Any person who makes chemical weapons or tries to make them in industries, for the purpose of causing serious physical injuries to a person, demolishing property or geographical features shall be liable to a life imprisonment. - Article 91: Use of chemicals - Any person who deliberately intends to kill, causes bodily injury to another person, destroy property or environment commits a terrorist act and shall be liable to an imprisonment of twenty (20) to thirty five (35) years if: - 1° he/she puts toxic substances or any toxic thing in a certain place; - 2° he/she sends toxic substance or any toxic substances from one place to another by use of the postal or any other possible means; - 3° he/she informs a person anywhere in the world that a substance is toxic or a thing is poisonous or a nuclear weapon. - Article 92: Providing false information regarding terrorism act - Any person who gives information knowing or thinking that the information is not true for the purpose of letting any person in the world to know that a toxic substance or nuclear material, harmful or nuclear weapons are located in certain area whenever it happens during the time of giving information or after, shall be liable to an imprisonment of twenty (20) to thirty five (35) years. ### Conspiracy, nuclear threats, financing, laundering, and related offences (Articles 93–100) - Article 93: Conspiracy and threats - Any person who willfully uses, threatens, conspires for purpose of using nuclear weapons, unlawfully and with intent, shall be liable to life imprisonment sentence if: - 1° he/she attacks a citizen or any other person within the country; - 2° he/she attacks acquired property, leased or used by the State, service or institution of the state, whether that property is within or outside the country. - Article 94: Conspiracy outside the country - Any person who knowingly uses, threatens to use, tries to conspire or conspires for the purpose of using nuclear weapons outside the country shall be liable to a life imprisonment. - Article 95: Conspiring and mobilizing - Any person who commits treason, mobilizes others to commit or attempts to commit one of the acts of terrorism, where treason is directly or indirectly carried out, commits an offence and shall be liable to a life imprisonment. - Article 96: Hijacking ships - Any person who stops by force, hijacks ships or uses islands as his/her base in order to commit an act of terrorism, shall be liable to an imprisonment of twenty (20) to thirty-five (35) year. - Where the hijack caused death to people, the criminal shall be liable to a life imprisonment. - Article 97: Damaging ships - Any person who damages a ship for the purpose of terrorism shall be liable to an imprisonment of twenty (20) to thirty-five (35) year. - Where the damage has caused death the criminal shall be liable to life imprisonment. - Article 98: Propagating, financing and receiving property resulting from terrorism - Any person who instigates another person to offer financial support or any other assets, suspecting or having relevant evidence that they can be used for terrorist purpose, shall be liable to a life imprisonment. - Any person who receives financial support or any other assets, suspecting or having relevant evidence that they can be used for terrorist purpose, shall be liable to a life imprisonment. - Any person who offers money or any other assets, expecting that it can be used, or having relevant evidence that they can be used for terrorist purpose, shall be liable to life imprisonment. - In this Article, receiving money or any other assets implies offering it, receiving a loan or saving. - Article 99: Agreements facilitating terrorism - Any person who engages in agreement or has an interest in it with a view of acquiring funds or any other assets, or enabling a person to acquire money or support, with knowledge or having relevant evidence that they can be used for terrorist purpose, shall be liable to a life imprisonment. - Article 100: Money laundering activities in terrorism - Any person who facilitates another to benefit from laundering of one‟s property that supports terrorism or that can be used for terrorism, by concealing it, shifting it from one place to another, taking it to other people, or any other related way shall be liable to a life imprisonment. ### Political, religious, obstruction, and concluding provisions (Articles 101–103, 104–105) - Article 101: Terrorism for political purposes - Any person who commits terrorism for political purposes intending to have the Government change its course of action shall be liable to a twenty (20) to an imprisonment of thirty-five (35) years. - Where such terrorist act causes death, the criminal shall be liable to a life imprisonment. - Article 102: Terrorism based on religious interests or other ideologies - Any person who commits terrorism for any religious or ideological purposes shall be liable to an imprisonment of twenty (20) to thirty-five (35) years. - Where such terrorist act causes death of one person or more or damages infrastructure, the criminal shall be liable to a life imprisonment. - Article 103: Jeopardizing the procedure of providing information about terrorism - Any person who knowingly does not respect instructions relating to an area cordoned for the purpose of evidence protection or asserts pressure against another person preventing him/her from providing information about terrorism shall be liable to an imprisonment of twenty (20) to thirty-five (35) years. - Article 104: Repeal of inconsistent laws - Ingingo zose z‟amategeko abanziriza iri kandi zinyuranyije na ryo zivanyweho. - Article 105: Entry into force - Iri tegeko ritangira gukurikizwa ku munsi ritangarijweho mu Igazeti ya Leta ya Repubulika y‟u Rwanda. - Kigali kuwa 09/09/2008; President KAGAME Paul (signature). *Source: _cr15221 - CHAPTER VI: PENALTIES* ### CHAPTER VII: FINAL PROVISIONS ### _cr15221 - CHAPTER VII: FINAL PROVISIONS ### Article 104: Abrogating provisions / Disposition abrogatoire - "All prior legal provisions contrary to this Law are hereby repealed." - "Toutes les dispositions légales antérieures contraires à la présente loi sont abrogées." ### Article 105: Commencement / Entrée en vigueur - "This Law shall come into force on the date of its publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda." - "La présente loi entre en vigueur le jour de sa publication au Journal Officiel de la République du Rwanda." - "Kigali, on 09/09/2008" - "Kigali, le 09/09/2008" ### Signatures and Seals / Signataires et sceaux - "The President of the Republic" - "KAGAME Paul" - "(sé)" - "Minisitiri w‟Intebe" - "MAKUZA Bernard" - "(sé)" - "Bibonywe kandi bishyizweho Ikirango cya Repubulika :" - "Minisitiri w‟Ubutabera/Intumwa Nkuru ya Leta" - "KARUGARAMA Tharcisse" - "(sé)" - "The Prime Minister" - "MAKUZA Bernard" - "(sé)" - "Seen and sealed with the Seal of the Republic:" - "The Minister of Justice/Attorney General" - "KARUGARAMA Tharcisse" - "(sé)" - "Le Premier Ministre" - "MAKUZA Bernard" - "(sé)" - "Vu et scellé du Sceau de la République :" - "Le Ministre de la Justice/Garde des Sceaux" - "KARUGARAMA Tharcisse" - "(sé)" ### Document identifiers and publication - "OG N°14 OF 06 04 2009" - Page numbers appearing in source: "325", "326" ### Related legislative headings and table of contents excerpts (multilingual) - "ITEGEKO N°59/2008 RYO KUWA 10/09/2008 RIKUMIRA KANDI RIHANA IHOHOTERWA IRYO ARI RYO RYOSE RISHINGIYE KU GITSINA" - "LAW N°59/2008 OF 10/09/2008 ON PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF GENDER- BASED VIOLENCE" - Table of contents excerpts (English and Kinyarwanda / French headings): - "CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL PROVISIONS" - "Article One: Purpose of the Law" - "Article 2: Definitions of terms" - "UMUTWE WA MBERE: INGINGO RUSANGE" - "Ingingo ya mbere: Icyo itegeko rigamije" - "Ingingo ya 2: Ibisobanuro by’amagambo" - "UMUTWE WA II: GUKUMIRA NO KURINDA IHOHOTERWA RISHINGIYE KU GITSINA" - "Ingingo ya 3: Gukangisha kubura ibyo afitaho uburenganzira" - "Ingingo ya 4: Kubuza umudendezo uwo bashyingiranywe" - "Ingingo ya 5: Gukoresha ku gahato imibonano mpuzabitsina uwo bashyingiranywe" - "Ingingo ya 6: Ihohoterwa nk’impamvu y’ubutane" - "Ingingo ya 7: Kurinda umwana ihohoterwa rishingiye ku gitsina" *Source: _cr15221 - CHAPTER VII: FINAL PROVISIONS* ### CHAPTER II: PREVENTION AND ### CHAPTER II: PREVENTION AND PROTECTION AGAINST GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE ### Scope: Chapter II (Articles listed) - Article 3: Threatening by way of deprivation of certain rights - Article 4: Distorting tranquility of one’s spouse - Article 5: Conjugal rape - Article 6: Violence as the cause of divorce - Article 7: Protecting a child against gender based violence - LOI N°59/2008 DU 10/09/2008 PORTANT PREVENTION ET REPRESSION DE LA VIOLENCE BASEE SUR LE GENRE ### Law references and legislative context - Organic Law instituting the penal code: Itegeko Ngenga / Organic Law / Loi Organique N° 01/2012/OL ryo kuwa 02/05/2012 / N° 01/2012/OL of 02/05/2012 / Organic Law instituting the penal code / N° 01/2012/OL du 02/05/2012 - Official Gazette nº Special of 14 June 2012 - Adoption / sanctioning: - We, KAGAME Paul, President of the Republic; - The Chamber of Deputies, in its session of 04 April 2012; - The Senate, in its session of 04 April 2012; - Constitution cited: Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 04 June 2003, with specific Articles referenced: 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 46, 48, 49, 62, 66, 67, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 108, 113 and 201 (preserved exactly as listed) - Other reviewed laws (preserved exact numbering and dates where provided): - Organic Law n° 16/2003 of 27/06/2003 (Article 46) - Organic Law n° 04/2005 of 08/04/2005 (Articles 85, 86, 87, 95–109) - Organic Law n° 08/2005 of 14/07/2005 (Articles 83, 84 and 85) - Organic Law n° 61/2008 of 10/09/2008 (Articles 22–30) - Law n° 33/91 of 05/08/1991 (Article 9) - Law n° 47/2001 of 18/12/2001 (Articles 5–13) - Law n° 14/2003 of 23/05/2003 (Articles 14–16) - Law n° 23/2003 of 07/08/2003 (Articles 10–41) - Law n° 25/2005 of 04/12/2005 (Articles 64 and 65) - Law n° 12/2007 of 27/03/2007 (Articles 176 and 178) - Law n° 50/2007 of 18/09/2007 (Articles 117–128) - Law n° 14/2008 of 04/06/2008 (Articles 12 and 13) - Law n° 18/2008 of 23/07/2008 (Articles 4–13) - Law n° 19/2008 of 14/07/2008 (Article 8) - Law n° 34/2008 of 08/08/2008 (Articles 29 and 30) - Law n° 37/2008 of 11/08/2008 (Articles 102–111) - Law n° 45/2008 of 09/09/2008 (Articles 75–103) - Law n° 47/2008 of 09/09/2008 (Articles 4, 48–53, 57–59 and 61) - Law n° 54/2008 of 10/09/2008 (Article 159) - Law n° 56/2008 of 10/09/2008 (Articles 21–24) - Law n° 57/2008 of 10/09/2008 (Article 7) - Law n° 58/2008 of 10/09/2008 (Articles 29–33) - Law n° 59/2008 of 10/09/2008 (Articles 2, 14–27, 29–36) - Law n° 62/2008 of 10/09/2008 (Articles 83–89) - Law n° 07/2009 of 27/04/2009 (Articles 361–371 and 373) - Law n° 13/2009 of 27/05/2009 (Article 167) - Law n° 22/2009 of 12/08/2009 (Articles 73–83 and 88) - Law n° 31/2009 of 26/10/2009 (Articles 261, 263 and 264) - Law n° 33/2009 of 18/11/2009 (Articles 65–70) - Law n° 03/2010 of 26/02/2010 (Article 24) - Law n° 04/2010 of 16/04/2010 (Articles 17–21) - Law n° 18/2010 of 12/05/2010 (Articles 58–65) - Law n° 27/2010 of 19/06/2010 (Articles 187–203) - Law n° 01/2011 of 10/02/2011 (Articles 64–72) - Law n° 04/2011 of 21/03/2011 (Articles 37–49) - Law n° 21/2011 of 23/06/2011 (Articles 50 and 51) - Law n° 33 bis/2003 of 06/09/2003 (punishing genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) - Decree-Law n° 21/77 of 18/08/1977 (instituting the Penal Code) ### Selected provisions and excerpts (English text preserved verbatim) - Article One: Purpose of this Organic Law - "This Organic Law sets out offences and provide for penalties applicable to offenders, co-offenders and accomplices." - Article 2: Offence - "An offence is an act prohibited or an omission which manifests itself as a breachof the public order and which the law sanctions by a punishment." - Article 3: No punishment without law - "A person shall not be punished on account of an act or omission that did not constitute an offence at the time of commission under national or international law. A person shall not be penalized for a heavier penalty than that which was provided for by law at the time the offence was committed. An offence shall not be punishable by penalties which were not provided for by the law published before its commission." - Article 4: Interpretation of criminal laws - "Criminal laws shall not be interpreted to extensively, they must be construed strictly. Courts are not allowed to pronounce sentences by analogy." - Article 5: Law applied in case of several laws applicable to the same offence - "When several laws punish the same offence, the specific law shall take precedence over the general law, unless the law provides otherwise." - Article 6: Prohibition of double jeopardy - "A person shall not be punished twice for the same offence." ### Chapter II articles (French/Rwandan headings retained in table of contents) - CHAPITRE II: PREVENTION ET PROTECTION CONTRE LA VIOLENCE BASEE SUR LE GENRE - Article 3 : Menace de priver une personne de ses droits - Article 4: Atteinte à la tranquilité du conjoint - Article 5 : Viol conjugal - Article 6: Sévices comme cause de divorce - Article 7 : Protection de l’enfant contre la violence basée sur le genre *Source: _cr15221 - CHAPTER II: PREVENTION AND (Official Gazette nº Special of 14 June 2012; Organic Law N° 01/2012/OL of 02/05/2012; LOI N°59/2008 DU 10/09/2008)* ### CHAPTER II: APPLICATION OF A ### CHAPTER II: APPLICATION OF A CRIMINAL LAW ### When the law ceases to be applicable; conflict between laws; prohibition of double incrimination - Article 7: The law ceases to be applicable to offences committed during its validity when it is repealed before the handing down of the final judgment in relation to such offences, unless the new law provides otherwise. - Article 8: In case of conflict of two criminal laws including the old one under which the offence was committed and the new one enacted after the offence was committed but before the final judgment is delivered, the new law shall be applied, if it provides for a lesser penalty. - Article 6 (French): Nul ne peut être puni deux fois du chef de la même infraction. ### Nationality, international and cross-border crimes; jurisdiction and list of specified crimes - Article 14: The Rwandan referred to under Articles 9, 11 and 13 of this Organic Law is the one who had a Rwandan nationality at the time of the commission of the offence. - Article 15: Definitions - An international crime means any crime characterized as such by International Conventions. - A cross- border crime means a crime for which one of its constituent elements is accomplished outside Rwanda‟s borders. - Article 16: Jurisdiction and scope — Any person, whether Rwandan or foreigner, a Rwandan or foreign non-governmental organization or association, that commits, inside or outside the Rwandan territory, or cross-border crimes may, if apprehended on the territory of the Republic of Rwanda, be prosecuted and tried by Rwandan Courts in accordance with Rwandan laws as if any of the following crimes had been committed in Rwanda: - 1° terrorism; - 2° hostage-taking; - 3° piracy; - 4° drug trafficking; - 5° illicit manufacturing and trafficking in arms; - 6° money laundering; - 7° cross-border theft of vehicles with the intent of selling them abroad; - 8° information and communication technology related offences; - 9° trafficking in human beings especially children; - 10° slavery and torture; - 11° cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; - 12° genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; - 13° genocide denial or revisionism; - 14° encouraging, mobilizing, assisting, facilitating or participating in any other manner, whether directly or indirectly, in the commission of any of the offences specified in this Article or any other related offences. ### Prosecution of offences committed abroad - Article 17: The prosecution of a felony or misdemeanour committed abroad may only be instituted at the request of the Public Prosecution or any other interested persons. ### Classification of offences and penalties - Article 21: Offences are classified according to their gravity as follows: - 1.felonies; - 2.misdemeanours; - 3.petty offences. - Article 22: Felony — A felony is an offence punishable under the law by a main penalty of an imprisonment of more than five (5) years. - Article 23: Misdemeanour — A misdemeanour is an offence punishable under the law by a main penalty of an imprisonment of six (6) months to five (5) years. - Article 24: Petty offence — A petty offence is an offense punishable under the law by a main penalty of an imprisonment of less than six (6) months. ### Attempt (Section 2) - Article 27: Punishable attempt — An attempt is punishable when the plan to commit an offence has been demonstrated by observable and unequivocal acts constituting the beginning of the offence meant to enable the commission and that were suspended or failed in their purpose only because of circumstances beyond the offender‟s control. - Article 28: Punishable attempt when the objective is not achieved — An attempt shall be punishable even if the objective is not achieved on account of a circumstance unknown to the offender. - Article 29: Voluntarily withdraw of the intention to commit an offence — If a person who attempts to commit an offence voluntarily withdraws the intention to commit an act, he/she may be punished only if the acts already committed constitute an offence. ### Punishable persons; criminal liability (Title IV, Chapter One) - Article 96: Occurrence of criminal liability - Criminal liability is personal. - Unless otherwise provided by the law, only a person who intentionally commits an offence shall be liable to a penalty. - A person who commits an offence intentionally is one who commits it consciously and willingly. - However, where provided by the law, an offence occurs in case of recklessness, negligence or carelessness. - Article 97: Persons who are criminally liable — An offender, co-offender and accomplice are criminally liable. ### Definitions of roles and accomplice liability - Article 98: Definitions - 1° offender: a person who commits an offence; - 2° co-offender: a person who directly cooperates in the commission of an offence; - 3° accomplice: a person knowingly aids or abets the offender in preparing, facilitating or committing the offence, or a person who incites the offender. A person is also considered an accomplice if he/she harbours an offender or aids him/her in the concealing under conditions provided under Article 327 of this Organic Law. - Article 99: Punishment of an accomplice - The accomplice is not subject to the same penalty as the offender or co-offender, except: - 1° the law provides otherwise; - 2° the judge in his/her discretion finds that the accomplice‟s responsibility in the commission of the offence is the same as or greater than that of the principal offender. - The accomplice may be prosecuted even if criminal action cannot be instituted against the offender due to personal reasons like death, insanity or failure to identify him/her. ### Grounds for criminal irresponsibility - Article 100: A child who is under the age of fourteen (14) years shall not be criminally liable. - Article 101: Insanity of the accused — There shall be no criminal liability when the accused was suffering from insanity during the commission of the offence. - However, a person who has voluntarily deprived him/herself of the use of his/her mind during the commission of the offence shall remain criminally liable, even if such deprivation was self-induced. *Official Gazette nº Special of 14 June 2012 — excerpt* ### Section 2: Causes d‟irresponsabilité ### Section 2: Causes d‟irresponsabilité ### Article 100 — Enfant âgé de moins de quatorze (14) ans - Un enfant âgé de moins de quatorze (14) ans est pénalement irresponsable. ### Article 101 — Etat de démence du prévenu - Il n‟y a pas de responsabilité pénale lorsque le prévenu était en état de démence au moment de la commission de l‟infraction. - Exception : celui qui s‟est volontairement privé de l‟usage de ses facultés mentales au moment de la commission de l‟infraction demeure pénalement responsable. ### Article 168 — Publicité des moyens abortifs - Toute personne qui, par tout moyen, fait la publicité des médicaments, du matériel et d‟autres substances connus pour être capables de provoquer l‟avortement, est passible d‟un emprisonnement de six (6) mois à deux (2) ans et d‟une amende de un million (1.000.000) à trois millions (3.000.000) de francs rwandais ou de l‟une de ces peines seulement. ### Chapitre IV — Menaces d‟attentat contre une personne - Article 169 — Menace de commettre un acte qualifié de terrorisme - Quiconque menace de commettre un acte pouvant être qualifié de terrorisme est passible d‟un emprisonnement de trois (3) ans à cinq (5) ans. - Si une telle menace a causé la mort des personnes, il est passible d‟une peine d‟emprisonnement à perpétuité. - Version anglaise précise : Any person who threatens to commit an act which may be qualified as terrorism shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of three (3) years to five (5) years. If the threat causes death of persons, he/she shall be liable to life imprisonment. ### Section 2 — Menaces non qualifiées de terrorisme - Article 170 — Menaces verbales - Si la menace faite avec ordre ou sous condition est verbale : emprisonnement d‟au moins deux (2) mois mais inférieur à six (6) mois et amende de cinq cent mille (500.000) à un million (1.000.000) de francs rwandais ou de l‟une de ces peines seulement. - Si la menace verbale n‟est pas faite avec ordre ou sous condition : emprisonnement d‟au moins deux (2) mois mais inférieur à six (6) mois et amende de cent mille (100.000) à cinq cent mille (500.000) francs rwandais ou de l‟une de ces peines seulement. - Version anglaise précise ranges identiques : two (2) months but less than six (6) months; fines of five hundred thousand (500,000) to one million (1,000,000) or one hundred thousand (100,000) to five hundred thousand (500,000) Rwandan francs. - Article 171 — Menace par gestes, signes, images ou symbole - Lorsque la menace par gestes, signes, images ou symbole a pour intention l‟attentat contre les personnes ou leurs biens : emprisonnement de six (6) mois à deux (2) ans et amende de cinq cent mille (500.000) à deux millions (2.000.000) de francs rwandais ou de l‟une de ces peines seulement. - Version anglaise : six (6) months to two (2) years; fine five hundred thousand (500,000) to two million (2,000,000) Rwandan francs. - Article 172 — Menaces écrites - Par écrit anonyme ou signé, avec ordre ou sous condition, menaçant d‟attenter aux personnes ou de les priver de leurs biens : emprisonnement d‟un (1) an à trois (3) ans et amende d‟un million (1.000.000) à trois millions (3.000.000) de francs rwandais ou de l‟une de ces peines seulement. - Si la menace n‟est accompagnée d‟aucun ordre ou condition : emprisonnement de six (6) mois à un (1) an et amende de cinq cent mille (500.000) à un million (1.000.000) francs rwandais ou de l‟une de ces peines seulement. - Version anglaise précise : one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of one million (1,000,000) to three million (3,000,000) Rwandan francs; or six (6) months to one (1) year and a fine of five hundred thousand (500,000) to one million (1,000,000). ### Article 173 — Chantage / Blackmail - Définition (FR) : obtenir par menace de rapporter ou d‟imputer à quelqu‟un des faits susceptibles de porter atteinte à son honneur ou à sa réputation une signature, un engagement, une renonciation, la révélation d‟un secret, la remise de fonds, de valeurs ou d‟un bien quelconque. - Definition (EN) : Blackmail shall mean the threat of reporting and attributing to someone facts that could damage their honour or reputation as a means to obtain from them signature, commitment, waiver of obligations, disclosure of secret, remittance of funds, securities or any property whatsoever. ### Article 174 — Peine pour chantage / Penalty for blackmail - Toute personne qui commet le chantage est passible d‟un emprisonnement de six (6) mois à un (1) an et d‟une amende de cent mille (100.000) à trois cents mille (300.000) francs rwandais ou de l‟une de ces peines seulement. - Lorsque la personne qui a commis le chantage exécute ses menaces : emprisonnement d‟un (1) an à trois (3) ans et amende de cinq cent mille (500.000) à deux millions (2.000.000) de francs rwandais ou de l‟une de ces peines seulement. - Version anglaise précise corresponding ranges: six (6) months to one (1) year and a fine of one hundred thousand (100,000) to three hundred thousand (300,000) Rwandan francs; if executed, one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of five hundred thousand (500,000) to two million (2,000,000). ### Article 175 — Crainte qu‟il puisse y avoir consommation d‟une infraction / Fear that there may be the commission of an offence - Le juge, à la requête de l‟Organe National de Poursuite / Public Prosecution, peut demander à la personne poursuivie d‟avouer qu‟elle ne commettra pas l‟infraction et l‟astreindre à fournir une caution (argent ou autre bien). - Si refus, le juge peut contraindre par une décision d‟emprisonnement d‟au moins deux (2) mois mais inférieur à six (6) mois et une amende de cinquante mille (50.000) à trois cent mille (300.000) francs rwandais ou de l‟une de ces peines seulement. - Si la personne poursuivie commet, dans un délai de trois (3) ans à compter du jour où la caution a été fournie, une infraction qu‟elle était déterminée à commettre, elle encourt une peine et la caution est saisie au profit du Trésor Public. - Si aucun délit n‟est commis pendant le délai visé, la caution est restituée. ### Article 176 — Torture - Définition (FR) : la torture s‟entend de tout acte par lequel une douleur ou des souffrances aiguës, physiques ou mentales, inhumaines, cruelles ou dégradantes sont intentionnellement infligées à une personne aux fins notamment d‟obtenir des renseignements ou des aveux, de la punir, de l‟intimider ou d‟exercer une pression, ou pour tout autre motif fondé sur une forme de discrimination. - Definition (EN) : For the purposes of this Organic Law, torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, inhuman, cruel or degrading, are intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him/her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him/her, or intimidating or coercing him/her or a third person, or for any other reason based on discrimination of any kind. ### Confiscation liée aux infractions et saisie de la caution - La Cour doit ordonner la confiscation du patrimoine, des produits ou autres actifs résultant de l‟infraction et des profits en résultant, ainsi que d‟autres gains ou de biens dont l‟origine n‟a pas été légalement justifiée. - Dans le cadre de la caution fournie en vertu de l‟Article 175, lorsque l‟avoué commet l‟infraction déterminée, la caution est saisie au profit du Trésor Public. *Source: _cr15221 - Section 2: Causes d‟irresponsabilité (extraits).* ### Section 7: Money laundering and terrorism ### Section 7: Money laundering and terrorism financing ### Definitions of terms — Money laundering (Article 652) - Money laundering means one or several of the following acts committed deliberately: - 1° the conversion, transfer or handling of property whose perpetrator knows that they derive from a misdemeanour or a felony, or from an act of participation in such offences, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illegal origin of the property or of assisting any person involved in the commission of such an offence to escape justice; - 2° the concealment, disguise of the true nature, origin, location, disposition, donation, the owner of the property or the person having rights on it, knowing that such a property is derived from a misdemeanour or a felony or from an act of participation in such offences; - 3° acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of reception, that such a property is derived from a misdemeanour or a felony or from an act of participation in such offences; - 4° participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit, aiding, inciting, abetting, facilitating or counselling the commission of any of the acts mentioned in this Article. - Money laundering is committed even if the original acts leading to the acquisition, disposition or transfer of the property to be laundered or the protection of the offender, are carried out on the territory of a third State. ### Definitions of terms — Financing of terrorism (Article 653) - An offence of financing of terrorism means an act of financing a terrorism enterprise by an individual by providing, collecting or managing funds, assets or any goods or by providing advice to that effect, with the aim of having those assets or goods utilized or knowing that they are intended to be used, entirely or partially in order to commit any of terrorism acts. ### Penalties for money laundering and financing of terrorism (Sub-section 2 — Article 654) - Any person who commits money laundering or an accomplice, shall be liable to: - a term of imprisonment of more than five (5) years to seven (7) years; and - a fine of two (2) to five (5) times the value of the amount of the laundered sums. - Any person who commits financing, shall be liable to: - a term of imprisonment of more than five (5) years to seven (7) years; and - a fine, in Rwandan francs, of two (2) to five (5) times the amount of his/her financial assistance. ### Complicity (Article 655) - Any person who associates with an association with intent to commit acts mentioned in Articles 652 and 653 shall be liable to: - a term of imprisonment of more than five (5) years to seven (7) years; and - a fine of two (2) to ten (10) times the amount of his/her financial assistance. ### Liability of legal entities (Article 656) - Public or private companies, enterprises, organizations or associations with legal personality which commit an offence of money laundering or financing of terrorism, through their representatives, shall be liable to a fine equal to twice the fine applicable to individuals, without prejudice to the liability for complicity of its representatives. - Depending on the gravity of the events, the legal entity may also be sentenced to: - 1° prohibition from direct or indirect involvement in specific professional activities; - 2° suspension for not less than five (5) years; - 3° dissolution when established as a criminal organization. - The court’s decision shall be published in newspapers and through other means used by the media. ### Aggravating circumstances (Article 657) - Penalties mentioned in Articles 654, 655 and 656 may be doubled: - 1° if the principal offence is punishable (text continues in source). *Source: _cr15221 - Section 7: Money laundering and terrorism financing* ### Section 4. Attendance of parties in Court ### Section 4. Attendance of parties in Court ### Attendance rules (Article 139) - "In felonies and misdemeanours, an accused should appear in person. However, when there are strong reasons prohibiting a person from appearing, he or she can be represented by a duly authorised agent. In contraventions, an accused can be represented by a counsel except when a Judge or Magistrate requires his or her personal appearance." ### Civil-party and damages attendance (Article 140) - "A party liable to pay damages and the civil party can appear in person or through advocates. However, at any stage of the proceedings, a court can order personal appearance of a party to a case. An order for the personal presence of a party as well as the day of appearance is notified to the party by a court clerk." ### Pre-hearing court powers and preparations (Section 5 — Article 141) - "In case the court is seized, before the date of hearing, its President, upon request by one of the parties or suo motto, if the complainant has no capacity to sue, has no counsel or any other legal counsel to represent him or her, can examine or order for the examination of the cost of destroyed property, record or order the recording of statements, do or order for the any other matter which need to be completed to be done." *Source: _cr15221 - Section 4. Attendance of parties in Court* ### Section 2 ### _cr15221 - Section 2 ### Champ d’application / Scope - Iri tegeko rireba amabanki. Rigena ibyo kugira ngo hakorwe imirimo y’amabanki, ibyo amabanki agomba kubahiriza n’igenzura ry’ubushishozi ry’amabanki rikorwa na Banki Nkuru. - Ibiteganywa n’iri tegeko bishobora no kureba ibigo by’imari, ibigo by’imari biciriritse, amakoperative yo kuzigama no kuguriza, n’ibigo byakira amafaranga yo kuzigama, hakurikijwe amabwiriza ashyirwaho na Banki Nkuru. ### Définitions générales / Key definitions (selected, exact wording preserved) - 1. “Banki” : ikigo gikora ubusanzwe imirimo yo kwakira amafaranga ya rubanda kandi kigatanga inguzanyo ku giti cyacyo. Icyakora ntibifatwa nka banki: - a)ibigo by’imari iciriritse; - b)amakoperative yo kuzigama no kuguriza; - c)ibigo byakira amafaranga yo kuzigama. - 2. “Banki y’inyamahanga”: ikigo gifite ubuzimagatozi gikomoka ku kindi kigo cyo mu mahanga cyemerewe gukora nka banki cyangwa ikigo cy’inguzanyo mu gihugu cy’inkomoko. - 3. “banki nyarwanda” : ikigo cyose gifite ubuzima gatozi n’inkomoko yacyo mu Rwanda cyemerewe gukora nka banki hakurikijwe ibiteganywa mu ngingo ya 5 y’iri tegeko. - 4. “Umuntu ufitanye isano na banki” / “Bank-related party”: any natural person or legal entity that maintains with the bank at least one of the following relationships: - a)person who is a member of the Board of Directors or management, or is a senior official of the bank; - b)person who has a direct or indirect qualifying holding in the bank; - c)person who is a member of the Board of Directors or management of an enterprise covered by b, g or h of this Article; - d)any spouse, family member up to the second degree of any of the persons mentioned under a, b, or c of this Article; - e)any enterprise in which any of the persons mentioned under a, b, c, or d is a member of the Board of Directors or management; - f)any enterprise in which any of the persons mentioned under a, b, c, or d above holds directly or indirectly, alone or with others, at least ten (10%) percent of the shares or voting rights; - g)any enterprise that the bank, alone or with others, controls directly or indirectly; - h)any enterprise controlled directly or indirectly by an entity that controls the bank. - The Central Bank specifies by regulation any of the above-mentioned categories and its applicable modalities. - 5. “imari bwite nyayo” / “net worth”: all funds constituted by the capital base and additional equity as defined by Central Bank regulations. - 6. “Banki Nkuru” / “Central Bank”: the National Bank of Rwanda. - 7. “iyezandonke” / “money laundering”: infraction consisting of one or more of the actions enumerated hereinafter: - a)conversion or transfer of capital or other assets for purposes of hiding or disguising their illicit origin, or of helping any person involved in the commission of the crime from which said capital or assets are derived to escape the legal consequences of their actions; - b)concealing or disguising the nature, origin, location, disposal, movement, or ownership of capital or assets known to be of illicit origin; - c)acquisition, possession, or use of capital or assets known to be of illicit origin; - d)participation in any of the acts mentioned in the first three preceding points, association for purposes of committing said acts, attempts to perpetrate said acts, the fact of abetting, inciting, or advising someone to commit said acts, or the fact of facilitating said acts. - 8. “ubugenzuzi” / “control”: method whereby natural persons or legal entities exercise control over another legal entity on account of: - a)holding at least fifty (50) percent in the capital or voting rights; - b)having the right to appoint or remove the majority of the members of the Board of Directors of the legal entity and at the same time are shareholders of the legal entity; - c)having the power to exercise a dominant influence over a legal entity in which they are shareholders, pursuant to a contract entered into with that legal entity, or to a clause in the by-laws of said legal entity. - 9. “inguzanyo” / “credit”: an operation whereby a person, in exchange for compensation, lends or promises to lend funds to another person, or accepts in that person’s interest pledge or use any other form of collateral taking into account the surety’s status. - 10. “koperative yo kuzigama no kuguriza” / “savings and credit cooperative”: a cooperative established for the purpose of accepting deposits from its members in order to increase their value and provide lending and other financial services and products in accordance with this Law. - 11. “amafaranga abikijwe” / “deposit”: funds that an entity receives from the public, namely funds that the entity collects from a third party, whether or not in the form of securities, with the right to dispose of them on its own account and on the condition that they shall be returned. - The following shall not be deemed funds received from the public: - a)funds received from a general partnership or from partners in a partnership or funds received from partners or shareholders holding more than one percent (1%) of the bank’s capital; - b)funds deposited by members of the Board of Directors, managers or accountants as a guarantee of their management; - c)funds received in exchange for bonds or equity securities issued or invested with the public; - d)funds obtained through report operation or discounts on public or private securities or in the form of loans or advances from banks or financial establishments; - e)any other type of funds defined by the Central Bank. - 12. “imyenda” / “exposures”: all types of credits, credit openings, letters of credit, advances, debt securities and similar forms of credits or credit commitments granted by a bank to a client, as well as shares, participation in the capital, and other types of investments in any other undertaking. - 13. “ikigo cy’imari” / “financial institution”: any enterprise other than a bank acting with a pecuniary motive that, habitually and on its own account, carries out, in whole or in part, the following operations: - a)lending, leasing, foreign exchange, and the collection of funds that it uses in investment operations; - b)acting as an intermediary in financial transactions especially as an agent or broker, in one or more of the operations referred to in the preceding paragraph. - 14. “itsinda ry’abakiriya bahujwe n’inyungu” / “group of related clients”: - a)one controls the other or the entire group, directly or indirectly; - b)they are so interrelated that, if one of them were to experience financial problems, the other or all of the others would encounter repayment difficulties. - 15. “imyenda minini” / “large exposures”: exposures of a client, or group of related clients to a bank, which represent at least ten per cent (10%) or more of the bank’s net worth. - 16. “imari iciriritse” / “micro finance”: activity that consists of at least one of the following operations: - a)extending loans to a clientele that is not usually served by the banking system or traditional financial institutions; - b)accepting deposits from a clientele not usually served by the traditional banking system or traditional financial institutions; - c)extending loans and accepting deposits from a clientele not usually served by the traditional banking system; - 17. “igishoro kinini” / “major investment”: holding by a bank in an enterprise that represents at least five percent (5%) of the equity capital of the enterprise, or a shareholding that exceeds five percent (5%) of the net worth of the bank. - 18. “uruhare rugaragara” / “qualifying holdings”: shareholding in a bank that, directly or indirectly, alone or in conjunction with others, represents at least five percent (5%) of the equity capital or voting rights, or that makes it possible to exercise a significant influence over the management of that bank. - 19. “ikigo cyakira amafaranga yo kuzigama” / “savings institution”: financial institution that specializes in gathering resources in the form of savings deposits and of which the purpose is not to extend credit, but instead to use the savings for investment in the capital market. - 20. “icyitegererezo cy’ubushobozi cy’ubwishyu” / “solvency ratio”: the relationship between net worth and all balance sheet and off-balance-sheet assets, weighted according to modalities set out by Central Bank regulations. - 21. “amabwiriza rusange” / “regulation”: text which has the aim of developing the rules posed by the provisions of this law, in order to ensure the application of it. It applies general and obligatory. - 22. “amabwiriza” / “instruction”: text comprising an order addressed to one or more natural persons or entities. - 23. “ibipimo ntarengwa mu igenzura ry’imigabane y’abagize banki” / “supervisory threshold in the shareholding of a bank”: level by which the Central Bank applies a prudential control for the detention of shares within the shareholding of a bank. *Source: _cr15221 - Section 2* ### Section 2 ### Section 2: Scope of application of this law ### Article 2: Scope of application - This Law applies to banks. - It sets forth the conditions on conducting banking activities, standards to which banks are subject, and the prudential controls exercised over banks by the Central Bank. ### Article 3: Other institutions bound to apply this Law - The provisions of this Law may also apply to financial institutions, microfinancing institutions, cooperative savings and loan associations, and savings institutions, in accordance with instructions issued by the Central Bank. ### Article 4: Prohibition to carry out banking activities without licensing - No person or entity may engage in banking activity within the territory of the Republic of Rwanda without being licensed by the Central Bank. - No person or entity may, without being licensed as a bank, claim the status of bank or banker, or use in any language, in its corporate name, trade name, signage or advertising, the terms “bank,” “banker,” or any other term evoking any banking operation. ### Article 5: Prerequisite for licensing of a Rwandan bank - The Central Bank may licence a legal entity incorporated in Rwanda as a bank, if it assesses that the following conditions are met: - 1° the minimum amount of the future bank’s start-up equity capital determined by the Central Bank regulation has been deposited in an escrow account opened on the books of the Central Bank. - 2° the applicant institution has submitted to the Central Bank documents which testify that: - a) the future bank will comply with the provisions of this Law as well as the Central Bank regulations; - b) projections concerning the financial status of the bank are documented and demonstrate a sound financial basis for carrying out operations envisaged by the future bank; - c) the qualifications and experience of the members of the Board of Directors and management of the future bank are relevant, and that all of these individuals are trustworthy and enjoy an impeccable professional reputation; - d) the future bank is a public limited company corporation; - e) the management structure of the future bank is sufficiently transparent to enable an effective prudential supervision; - f) shareholders with a qualifying holding in the future bank possess the qualities necessary to ensure sound and prudent management of the future bank; - g) the structure and administration, policies and procedures of the future bank, are appropriate for the envisaged operations. ### Article 6: Conditions for licensing a foreign bank branch in Rwanda - Without prejudice to Article 7 of this Law, the Central Bank may grant licence to a foreign bank wishing to exercise banking activity in Rwanda through the intermediary of a branch office only if it determines, on the basis of sufficient evidence, that said bank meets the following conditions: - 1° to comply with provisions of Article 5 of this Law; ### Article 9: Transactions related to banking activities - After licencing by the Central Bank, banks may, concomitantly with their banking activities, conduct the following transactions: - 1° issuing monetary guarantees of all types; - 2° issuing, managing, purchase, or sale of money market or capital market instruments, on their own account or on behalf of clients; - 3° providing payment services; - 4° providing financial management services; - 5° conducting foreign exchange transactions; - 6° conducting securities transactions; - 7° issuing or administrating means of payment, such as checks, payment cards, travelers’ checks or bank drafts; - 8° representing a bank or financial institution; - 9° holding securities for third parties; - 10° conducting leasing operations; - 11° carrying out any other activity defined by the Central Bank. - The Central Bank may impose by regulation conditions on the exercise of the aforementioned activities or may limit, the type of operations authorized. ### Article 10: Procedure to be followed in elaborating the license application dossier and deadline for reply - The Central Bank shall, by regulation, specify the detailed procedure to be followed to obtain licence as well as the information and documents required for compilation of the licence application. - Within a period of seven (7) days following the receipt of the license application, the Central Bank shall inform the applicant in writing that the dossier is complete. ### Supervisory measures and sanctions (extracts) - Disciplinary or sanctioning measures referenced include: - 1° warning; - 2° prohibition from carrying on audit operations of the bank; - 3° withdraw from the roster of external auditors accredited by the Central Bank for a period of three (3) years; - 4° permanent removal from the roster of external auditors fixed by the Central Bank. *Source: _cr15221 - Section 2* ### CHAPTER IV ### CHAPTER IV: PROCEDURE FOR SUPERVISION OF BANKS BY THE CENTRAL BANK ### Article 58 — Supervisory power - The Central Bank shall ensure compliance with legal and regulatory provisions. - Where a bank’s accounts are consolidated with those of one or more other enterprises, the Central Bank shall exercise supervision on a consolidated basis. - The powers devolved to the Central Bank under this law shall also be exercised with regard to any enterprise whose accounts are consolidated with those of the bank. - The Central Bank shall supervise the branches and affiliates of Rwandan banks established in a foreign country, notwithstanding the jurisdiction of the supervisory authority of the host country. - Disciplinary or corrective measures concerning external auditors include: - 1° avertissement ; - 2° interdiction de poursuivre les opérations d’audit de la banque; - 3° radiation de la liste des auditeurs externes agréés par la Banque Centrale, pour une durée de trois (3) ans ; - 4° radiation definitive de la liste des auditeurs externes arrêtée par la Banque Centrale. ### Article 59 — Modalities for communication of information to the Central Bank - Banks are required to submit to the Central Bank any document, declaration, and financial statement by filling out sample forms and in compliance with periodicity requirements determined by the Central Bank. - Banks shall provide any information, clarification, or explanation that the Central Bank may request. - The Central Bank may require that any person having a relationship with a bank provide any document or information concerning that bank. - No person may invoke professional secrecy as grounds for non-disclosure of information required by the Central Bank. ### Article 60 — Supervision of branches of foreign banks in Rwanda - Without prejudice to any cooperation agreement with the supervisory authority of the country of origin, inspectors from the supervisory authority of a foreign country may exercise their functions in Rwanda with regard to the branches and affiliates of their banks upon prior written notification to the supervisory organs of the Central Bank. ### Article 61 — Documents to be submitted to the supervision officers - Banks and their branches shall make available for inspection by inspectors of the Central Bank: - cash in hand; - securities and other portfolio values; - books, minutes, receipts, and other documents. - Inspectors may require hand-over, against a receipt, of the original or a copy of any document for analysis in the premises of the Central Bank. ### Related provisions referenced on institutional mandates (Financial Investigation Unit) - Presidential Order N°27/01 of 30/05/2011 determines the organization, functioning and mission of the Financial Investigation Unit (the “Unit”). - Key institutional points (as stated in the source): - The Unit is supervised by the Ministry in charge of internal security. - The Unit’s head office is located at the Headquarters of the Rwanda National Police in Kigali City. - Upon approval by the Police Council, the Unit can establish branches elsewhere in the country. - Article 5 — Responsibilities of the Unit: - Main responsibilities: collecting, analyzing, disseminating information and investigating to combat money laundering and financing of terrorism in accordance with the Law on prevention and penalizing the crime of money laundering and terrorism financing. - Specific responsibilities include: - 1. to propose to the competent authorities modifications and amendments to laws and regulations related to the prevention and suppression of money laundering and financing of terrorism; - 2. to establish the list of indicators serving to recognize suspicious transactions; - 3. to participate in the professional training of the reporting entities personnel; - 4. to propose measures aimed at reinforcing the fight against money laundering and financing of terrorism; - 5. to coordinate activities of prevention carried out by all institutions in charge. *Official Gazette nº25 of 20/06/2011; Presidential Order N°27/01 of 30/05/2011.* ### 5. coordonner les activités de prévention ### 5. coordonner les activités de prévention ### CHAPTER II: POWERS AND FUNCTIONING OF THE UNIT — Core mandates (Articles 6–10) - Article 6: Suspicious Transactions and Funds Report - The Unit shall receive from reporting entities statements regarding funds or movements of funds that are suspected to be linked with or intended to be used in money laundering activities and/or for financing terrorism, terrorism acts or terrorism organizations. - Article 7: Reception and analysis of information - The Unit shall receive reports transmitted by reporting entities, controlling organs and auditors. - It analyses these reports by taking into consideration all relevant information at its disposal. - Article 8: Access to information and data exchange - The Unit can request any reporting entity to transmit, without charge, the information, documents and registries necessary to exercise their functions as set forth in this Order. - The entity receiving the request is obliged to respond accordingly. - Article 9: Reports submission - Whenever there is reasonable suspicion about the commission of the crime of money laundering and financing of terrorism, the Unit shall immediately investigate and transmit the report to the Public Prosecutor’s Authority for prosecution and appropriate action. - This report shall be accompanied by all useful pieces of information, other than those contained in the suspicious transaction report. - Article 10: Information for the reporting entities - The Unit shall inform the entity which submitted the suspicious transaction report about its outcome. - The Unit shall provide this type of information at the latest ten (10) days after the case is closed or transmitted to the Public Prosecution Authority. ### Procedural protections and directives (Articles 11–13) - Article 11: Prohibition to disclose the identity of the reporting entity - The identification elements of the entity that submitted the report shall not be mentioned on the said report unless: - there are reasons to suspect that the entity or its employees committed the crime of money laundering; or - the information is necessary to establish the facts during a penal procedure and disclosure is requested in writing by the competent court. - Article 12: Directives for the reporting entities - The Unit shall establish directives concerning: - identification of customers; - record-keeping; - the suspicious transaction report; and - other obligations imposed by this Order or the Law on prevention and penalising the crime of money laundering and financing of terrorism. - Article 13: Supervision of reporting entities without specific supervising authority - The Unit shall check whether reporting entities not under any supervising body fulfil responsibilities conferred by this Order or the Law. - Means of verification include examination of tangible evidence and on-site inspections. ### Information sharing and international cooperation (Articles 14–16) - Article 14: Powers of the Unit to transmit information - The Unit can transmit to national or relevant foreign control organs or to authorities responsible for enforcement information resulting directly or indirectly from its examination when it has good reasons to believe the information is suspicious or can contribute to an investigation on non-respect of this Order or the crime of money laundering and financing of terrorism. - Such transmission must be in compliance with the Instructions of the Inspector General of the Rwanda National Police. - Article 15: Relationships with foreign financial investigation units - The Unit can, on its own initiative or upon request, provide, receive or exchange information with a financial investigation unit from another country or other foreign counterparts with similar functions about a suspicious transaction report, provided counterparts are under the same obligations of professional secrecy. - The Unit can conclude cooperation agreements in compliance with the Procedural Manual prepared by the Unit and approved by the Advisory Board. - When the Unit receives a request for information or transmission of financial information from a foreign financial investigation unit, it shall follow up this request within the limits of the power conferred to it under the Law. - Article 16: Information transmitted by the Unit to a foreign authority - Before transmitting personal data to a foreign authority, the Unit must ensure that: - the information is protected by the same provisions of professional secrecy as those applying to national-source information provided to that authority; and - the foreign authority uses the information for purposes envisaged by this Order or the Law on prevention and penalizing the crime of money laundering and financing terrorism. ### CHAPTER III: ORGANIZATION OF THE UNIT — Structure (Articles 17–18) - Article 17: Administrative Organs of the Unit - The Unit shall have the following two (2) Organs: - 1. the Advisory Board; - 2. the Management. - Article 18: Membership of the Advisory Board — composition - The Advisory Board of the Unit is composed of representatives from the following entities: - 1. Ubushinjacyaha Bukuru; - 2. Ubugenzacyaha; - 3. Banki Nkuru y’u Rwanda; - 4. Ikigo cy’Igihugu gishinzwe kwinjiza imisoro n’amahoro; - 5. Minisiteri y’Imari n’Igenamigambi; - 6. Ministeri y’Ububanyi n’Amahanga n’Ubutwererane. *Source: Official Gazette nº25 of 20/06/2011; _cr15221 - 5. coordonner les activités de prévention.* ### 7. Urwego rw’Umuvunyi. ### 7. Urwego rw’Umuvunyi ### I. Composition of the Advisory Board / Inama Ngishwanama (Article 18) - The Advisory Board shall be composed of representatives of the following institutions: - 1. The National Public Prosecution Authority; - 2. The Criminal Investigation Department; - 3. The National Bank of Rwanda; - 4. The Rwanda Revenue Authority; - 5. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning; - 6. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; - 7. The Office of the Ombudsman. - Members of the Advisory Board shall be appointed by the Prime Minister’s Order upon request by the Minister in charge of Internal Security. - Appointment terms: - Mandate of three (3) years which may be renewed. - The Order shall appoint the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the Board and determine its functioning. - The Director of the Unit shall be a member of the Advisory Board and shall serve as the rapporteur. - The Advisory Board shall establish its internal rules and regulations. - Official Gazette reference: Official Gazette nº25 of 20/06/2011 ### II. Responsibilities of the Advisory Board (Article 19) - The Advisory Board shall advise the Unit on: - 1. proposing measures aimed at enabling the Cell to fufil its mission; - 2. updating the legislation relating to the fight against money laundering and financing of terrorism; - 3. establish internal rules and regulations of the Unit; - 4. proposing agreements with other Financial Investigations Units; - 5. monitoring and evaluating achievements in the Unit in order to assess the adequacy of existing measures or to modify them wherever necessary; - 6. giving a quarterly report and at any time deemed necessary to the Minister in charge of internal security. ### III. Daily Activities and Administrative Attachment (Article 20) - The daily activities of the Unit shall be in power of the administration attached to the Office of Inspector General of Police. ### IV. Organizational Structure and Management (Articles 21–22) - Article 21: - The Organizational chart of the Unit shall be determined by the Rwanda National Police Council. - Article 22: - The Unit shall be managed by a Director appointed by the appointing Authority in the Rwanda National Police. ### V. Duties of the Director of the Unit (Article 23) - The Director of the Unit shall have mainly the following duties: - 1. to ensure the daily management of the Unit; - 2. to ensure that all rules and regulations relating to the discipline and carrying out activities and services are observed by the staff of the Unit; - 3. to fulfil the Unit’s responsibilities; - 4. to prepare and submit to the Inspector General of Police the annual budget proposal of the Unit; - 5. to ensure the relationship between the Unit and other organs; - 6. to submit to the Inspector General of Police the annual report on the management of the Unit; - 7. to coordinate control activities and to submit a report to the Inspector General of Police. ### VI. Staff, Employment Terms and Incompatibilities (Articles 24–25) - Article 24: Staff composition - The Staff of the Unit shall consist of: - 1. Police officers of the Rwanda National Police; - 2. Ordinary staff having particular knowledge and governed by contracts of employement in accordance with the law regulating labour. - Article 25: Incompatibilities - Executive officers or employees of the Unit or any other person appointed to one of its posts shall not, parallel to their responsibilities within the Unit: - exercise other functions in a reporting entity; - exercise an elected function; - or engage in any other activity that could jeopardize the independence of their functions. ### VII. Final Provisions (Articles 26–27 and signatures) - Article 26: Repealing provision - All prior provisions contrary to this Order are hereby repealed. - Article 27: Commencement - This Order shall come into force on the date of its publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda. - Kigali, on 30/05/2011 - Signatories recorded in the text: - (sé) KAGAME Paul — President of the Republic - (sé) MAKUZA Bernard — Prime Minister - (sé) KARUGARAMA Tharcisse — Minister of Justice/Attorney General *Source: _cr15221 - 7. Urwego rw’Umuvunyi. Official Gazette nº25 of 20/06/2011.* --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/_cr15221.pdf_