## _cr15229

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### INTRODUCTION
- Discusses the framework for banking resolution and crisis prevention and management in Samoa, evaluating legal powers and operational capabilities of financial sector authorities.
- Aims to increase authorities’ capacity to address serious banking problems while minimizing damage to the financial system and reducing costs for the tax payer and the economy.

### KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (summary)
- The current regulatory framework to deal with financial institutions (FIs) should be reformed.
- Central Bank of Samoa (CBS) issues “Prudential Statements” but lacks general standards for enforcement; enforcement is discretionary and case-by-case.
- Powers under the Central Bank Act (CBA) are insufficient for effective enforcement.
- Financial Institutions Act (FIA) does not permit appropriate resolution actions that preserve valuable banking business and protect the financial system.
- Court supervised management is the only route for direct action short of immediate closure, but it is uncertain and inefficient and places regulator in a weak position.
- Needed: speedy, confidential, and technically based actions—legal framework must be reformed.

### REQUIRED LEGAL AND REGULATORY REFORM OF THE FIA
- Amend the FIA to empower the CBS to:
  - Issue a regime for timely preventive and corrective actions, based on prudential rules and enforcement actions applied incrementally according to gravity of non-compliance.
  - Establish a clear legal basis for indicators to determine non-viability or likelihood of non-viability and to start resolution actions before balance sheet insolvency.
  - Directly take an array of resolution actions, including removal and replacement of senior managers and directors; appointment of an administrator; preservation, restructuring or wind-down of viable banking business.
  - Use key resolution tools: transfer or sale (partial or full) of selected assets and liabilities to a viable entity; establish and operate a temporary bridge institution; override rights of existing shareholders as required.
- Note on lawmaking: Section 29 FIA allows regulations by Head of State on Cabinet advice for “giving full effect to this Act,” but a more precise legal basis is preferable for a full resolution regime.

### DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEME (DIS)
- Recommendation: Consider a funded DIS with industry contributions over the medium-term once pre-conditions are in place.
- Pre-conditions: strengthened bank supervision framework and an upgraded bank resolution regime.
- Funding for the DIS should be available under a well-designed “least cost principle” to support key resolution actions (e.g., transfer of selected assets and liabilities).

### EMERGENCY LIQUIDITY ASSISTANCE (ELA)
- Introduce a proper ELA framework; current arrangements for liquidity provision during stress should be upgraded.
- CBS currently issues securities of varying maturities from 14 to 365 days regularly through auctions; banks can access liquidity through repos and the discount window.
- CBA Section 32 (d) allows CBS to grant advances to banks “for periods nor exceeding 5 years” secured by “such other assets and on such terms and conditions as the Board may specify.”
- Proposed CBA amendments would:
  - Establish CBS as lender of last resort with safeguards protecting CBS financial position in concurrence with the MOF.
  - Regulate lender of last resort function to provide assistance to illiquid but solvent banks with adequate collateral for pre-established periods of, say, 91 days with one possible extension.
  - Empower CBS to provide emergency liquidity assistance in support of an insolvent bank without appropriate collateral, with possible extension of the maximum lending period in cases of systemic implications, subject to specified legal procedures.
- Solvency support should ultimately be the government’s responsibility; if CBS provides solvency support and government cannot timely support, government should provide guarantees and compensation for losses to protect CBS financial condition.

### CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND COORDINATION
- Establish arrangements for contingency planning and crisis management coordination between MOF and CBS at both high and operational levels.
- Create a unit in the CBS responsible for system monitoring and contingency plan design (system-level and FI-specific for systemic implications).
- High level authorities to meet in a Committee at least half yearly (more frequently as needed) to approve contingency planning, review monitoring, and approve simulation exercises and training.
- Committee to decide on exemptions to normal rules when systemic implications exist.
- Establish coordination with foreign supervisors at highest level and operational working-committee level.
- In crises, roles in contingency plan should be strictly followed under general supervision of high level committee.
- Consider emergency financial arrangements for systemic crises.

### ENFORCEMENT, PREVENTIVE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- CBS may issue directives to correct unsafe or unsound practices (FIA, Sections 13 (a) and (b)).
- Prudential Statements cover licensing, ownership and management of banks, capital adequacy, asset concentration and risk, large exposures, liquidity, connected lending, provisioning, accounting and internal controls, and foreign currency exposures.
- Prudential Statements include general guidance in some areas and specific ratios, limits, and norms in others; consequences for non-compliance are not specified.
- CBS’s approach: prudential standards “will serve as triggers for discussions with banks” and “the Bank will, if it becomes necessary, assume the role of final arbiter.” (CBS, Prudential Statement No. 1, (5))
- Enforcement regime needs strengthening: Prudential Statements should include clear consequences for non-compliance to introduce certainty and fairness.
- Example—capital adequacy: Prudential Statements prescribe minimum capital ratios and methods, but final procedures and “enforcement proceedings” are unspecified and to be agreed case-by-case.

### LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT BANKING RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK
- FIA, Section 14: if FI is detrimental to depositors/creditors/public or likely unable to meet obligations, CBS Board “shall” exercise one or more powers:
  - direct the FI to take “whatever actions in relation to its business as the CB may specify;”
  - appoint a qualified person to “advise” the FI;
  - revoke the FI’s license;
  - present a petition to the court for winding up.
- To take direct actions not implying immediate closure, CBS must apply for court supervised management; court has broad control (appoint/approve manager, define manager’s powers, supervise, terminate administration “for any reason”).

### COURT-SUPERVISED MANAGEMENT: FINDINGS
- Court-supervised management is the only route for CBS to take direct action short of immediate irreversible closure.
- Process places regulator in weak and uncertain position because FI is effectively fully controlled by the court.
- Court-appointed manager “shall comply with any written direction” of the CBS unless such directions conflict with any order of the court (FIA, section 15, (8) (a)).
- The court should not have power to reverse key resolution actions; right to claim fair compensation in justified cases should be maintained.

### POWERS LACKING UNDER THE CURRENT FIA
- CBS lacks authority for FSB-referenced modern resolution tools:
  - Transfer of selected assets and liabilities to a sound FI.
  - Establishment of a bridge institution to preserve critical functions.
- CBS cannot:
  - Remove and replace senior managers and directors.
  - Directly appoint an administrator to restore firm or part of its business to viability.

### REFORM OBJECTIVE: ESTABLISH A NEW RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK
- Amend FIA to include:
  - Clear regulatory powers for CBS to issue regime for timely preventive and corrective actions.
  - Quantitative and qualitative triggers to start resolution actions before insolvency.
  - Powers to undertake resolution actions in a timely and efficient manner under CBS direct administration.
  - Legal basis for modern resolution tools and for special rules in systemic cases.
  - A complementary DIS and provisions for lender of last resort and official financial assistance.

### PRUDENTIAL REGIME AND TRIGGERS
- Prudential Statements prescribe rules, limits and ratios but leave consequences of non-compliance to discretionary decisions.
- Law should empower CBS to issue an incremental preventive and corrective actions regime.
- Amended FIA should enable development of indicators to determine non-viability or likelihood of non-viability and set precise triggers to start resolution actions before balance sheet insolvency.

### RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION PLANNING
- FIA should empower CBS to require, prepare and monitor recovery and resolution plans:
  - FIs to present time-bound recovery plans for CBS approval with objectives, actions, and measures to restore prudential compliance.
  - CBS to prepare internal resolution plans to identify options if prudential norms or recovery plans fail.

### ADDITIONAL RESOLUTION POWERS RECOMMENDED
- Amend FIA to specifically empower CBS to:
  - Remove and replace senior managers and directors.
  - Appoint an administrator to manage a distressed FI and preserve viable banking business.
  - Restructure or wind down FI operations.
  - Transfer or sell, partially or totally, selected assets and liabilities to a viable entity.
  - Establish and operate a temporary bridge institution.
  - Override rights of existing shareholders as required to recapitalize, restructure and dispose of the FI business or its assets and liabilities.

### TRANSFER OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES; DEPOSITOR PREFERENCE
- Asset/liability transfer is a key tool given four licensed commercial banks each have considerable share of total assets.
- Law should grant CBS power to terminate contracts or temporarily stay exercise of termination rights.
- Law should provide legal preference to deposits in winding up procedures; depositor preferences could allow segregation of total deposits or a category (e.g., insured deposits) as part of transfer packages.

### BRIDGE BANKS
- FIA should provide clear legal basis for establishment of bridge institutions to continue critical functions and viable operations temporarily.

### TRIGGERS FOR SYSTEMIC CASES AND DECISION PROCESS
- Basic quantitative and qualitative triggers should be in Law; regulator to specify numeric triggers modifiable over time.
- Exceptions for systemic implications should allow different resolution actions to preserve financial stability.
- Preconditions to declare “systemic implications”:
  - Existence of an inter-institutional committee comprising management of CBS and MOF to take decision.
  - Development of indicators of systemic implications by technical CBS staff.
  - If DIS exists, use of funds beyond “least cost principle” limits only triggered by High Level Committee’s declaration of systemic implications.

### DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEME (DIS): DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS
- Consider a funded DIS with industry contributions over the medium-term once pre-conditions are satisfied.
- Safety-net elements should be in place “before or in concert with the adoption or reform of a deposit insurance system.”
- DIS should have legal power to contribute financially to “preserve critical banking functions,” including facilitating acquisition by a sound FI of assets and assumption of liabilities.
- DIS funds should be used to integrate packages of assets and liabilities into a sound entity during resolution operations under a well-designed “least cost principle.”
- Key DIS design decisions: target size of the Fund, coverage, premiums and other funding sources, starting funding, possible transitory public support during start-up.
- Given constraints, DIS fund should be administered within CBS as a specialized fund with safeguards for operational autonomy.

### CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS (detailed)
- Adopt institutional, legal and operational arrangements for prevention and management of crises, including coordination, legal regimes, and preparation/training.
- Create a permanent coordination mechanism between CBS and MOF:
  - High level Committee to monitor system, analyze risks, and discuss mitigation policies; comprise Minister of Finance, Governor of CBS, and possibly their two key deputies.
  - Committee to meet regularly, at least every half a year in normal times, more frequently in crisis.
- Create a technical committee (CBS and MOF) to monitor system, prepare contingency strategies, and supervise execution of resolution programs; supported by CBS staff and ad-hoc working groups.
- High level Committee to supervise coordination with foreign regulators and design, review and update MOUs.
- Create a financial stability unit at CBS to assess stability, prepare draft contingency planning, design and supervise Recovery and Resolution plans, and conduct Resolvability Assessments.
- Unit to develop indicators of systemic importance based on size, interconnectedness, substitutability, complexity, and cross-border operations.
- Develop training and simulation exercises involving domestic entities and ideally foreign regulatory agencies; create crisis management groups.
- Explore temporary official financial assistance sources for systemic crises after private sources exhausted.

### TABLE 1 — KEY RECOMMENDATIONS (as presented)
- Issue a complete set of prudential regulations, including specific enforcement actions applied incrementally; appropriate amendment of the FIA required. Time: ST
- Amend the FIA to reflect a complete and efficient resolution framework, including triggers, key resolution powers, and powers for asset/liability transfer and depositor preference. Time: ST
- Create an appropriate scheme of Emergency Liquidity Assistance starting from a well-designed lender of last resort function. Time: ST
- Create inter-agency arrangements for monitoring and coordination, contingency plan development and enforcement, and determination of official assistance in systemic crisis. Time: MT
- Create a Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS) as an element of the reformed banking resolution framework, once pre-conditions are in place. Time: MT
- Timing legend: ST = Short-term (ST), Medium-term (MT)

*Source: _cr15229 - 9. The court supervised management is uncertain and inefficient. Under the current FIA,*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________________________ 4

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### INTRODUCTION
- This Note discusses the framework for banking resolution and crisis prevention and management in Samoa, and provides comments and recommendations for its improvement.
- As part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program for Samoa, this technical note evaluates the current legal powers and operational capabilities at the disposal of the financial sector authorities for confronting serious banking problems, and for crisis prevention and management.
- Comments and recommendations are provided, aimed at increasing the authorities’ capacity to address such problems in a way that minimizes damages to the financial system and reduces costs for the tax payer and for the economy as a whole.

### KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- The current regulatory framework to deal with financial institutions (FIs) should be reformed.
- The Central Bank of Samoa (CBS) has issued “Prudential Statements” containing some prudential rules, ratios and limits applicable to FIs, but there are no general standards for their enforcement, which is done on a purely discretional case-by-case basis.
- The powers from the Central Bank Act (CBA) are not strong enough to enable the CBS to take enforcement actions.
- For a FI at risk of becoming insolvent, the legal powers of the Financial Institutions Act (FIA) do not allow the regulator to take appropriate resolution actions while preserving valuable banking business and protecting the financial system.
- Under Section 14 of the FIA, if a FI is in serious financial distress the CBS has a few possible options:
  - Direct the FI to take “whatever action in relation to its business as the [CBS] may specify.” This option is described as so wide and imprecise that it becomes a very weak legal basis to take specific actions, especially if those actions affect personal and/or property rights (e.g., ordering changes in management and/or ownership, mandatory reduction of capital for restructuring process).
  - Appoint an advisor, which is ineffective because it does not allow the CBS to take directly any of the actions the situation would require.
  - Revoke the FI’s license, or petition the court for the winding up of the FI, which are deemed too extreme and do not allow the regulator appropriate time and legal powers to perform effective resolution actions while preserving valuable banking business and protecting the financial system.
  - Apply for a court supervised management, which is uncertain and not efficient; the court keeps the powers to decide (i) who will be the administrator; (ii) the extent of powers that the administrator should have; and (iii) when and how the administration has to be terminated “for any reason.” This process places the regulator in a weak and uncertain position because it is, in essence, fully controlled by the court.
- Considering the need for speedy, confidential, and technically based actions to confront serious financial problems, the current framework clearly needs to be reformed.

### REQUIRED LEGAL AND REGULATORY REFORM OF THE FIA
- A fully amended legal and regulatory banking resolution framework is needed for the CBS to be able to deal effectively with serious banking problems. The FIA should be amended to:
  - Empower the CBS to issue an appropriate regime for timely preventive and corrective actions, based on prudential rules and enforcement actions to be applied incrementally according to the gravity of the non-compliance by the respective FI.
  - Provide a clear legal basis for the regulator to develop indicators to determine whether a FI is non-viable or whether it is likely to become so. Based on those indicators, the CBS should be given the power by the law to start taking resolution actions before the FI becomes balance sheet insolvent.
  - Empower the CBS to directly take an array of resolution actions, including: to remove and replace senior managers and directors; to appoint an administrator to take control and manage the distressed FI; and to undertake all necessary actions to preserve its viable banking business, and to restructure or wind down the FI’s operations.
  - Grant the CBS the power to use key resolution tools, including: to transfer, or to sell, partially or fully, selected assets and liabilities of the distressed FI to a viable entity; to establish and operate a temporary bridge institution to continue certain critical and viable operations of the distressed FI while the resolution is completed; and powers to override rights of existing shareholders, as required, to recapitalize, restructure and dispose of the FI business or of its assets and liabilities as needed.
- Note on lawmaking: Under current Section 29 FIA, the Head of State, on the advice of the Cabinet, may issue regulations required for “giving full effect to this Act.” Although some regulations could be tried under this provision, a more precise legal basis would be needed to provide a firm legal basis for a fully effective resolution regime.

### DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEME (DIS)
- A funded Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS) with contributions from the industry should be considered over the medium-term once pre-conditions are in place.
- Pre-conditions include a strengthened bank supervision framework and an upgraded bank resolution regime.
- Funding for the DIS, under a well-designed “least cost principle,” should be readily available to help in the efficient performance of key resolution actions like the transfer of selected assets and liabilities from a distressed FI to a sound entity.

### EMERGENCY LIQUIDITY ASSISTANCE (ELA)
- A proper emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) framework should be introduced.
- The Central Bank has in place basic instruments to conduct open market activities and repo transactions, but arrangements for provision of liquidity during stress should be upgraded.
- The amended CBA shall establish the CBS as lender of last resort with adequate safeguards against potential losses, enabling the CBS to grant financial assistance against collateral to illiquid but solvent banks or special financing to a bank to preserve systemic financial stability, with adequate protection for the CBS financial position in concurrence with the Ministry of Finance (MOF).
- Footnote: Following a TA mission from the IMF Legal Department (January 2013), the CBS has prepared a draft law amending the CBA, which is currently being considered by the Government before being presented to the legislative for consideration and enactment.

### CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND COORDINATION
- Arrangements for contingency planning and crisis management coordination should be in place.
- Arrangements for coordination between the MOF and the CBS in the monitoring of the system should be in place both, at the highest level and at the operational level.
- A unit in the CBS should be in charge of monitoring the system, and designing and developing a contingency plan both at the system level and specific for FIs with systemic implications.
- High level authorities shall meet in a Committee at least half yearly (more frequently in cases of need) to approve the contingency planning, to review the monitoring of the system, and to make recommendations and approve actions like simulation exercises and appropriate training.
- The Committee should take decisions whenever exemptions to the application of normal rules are to be taken based on systemic implications.
- Coordination with foreign supervisors should also be established at the highest level and be made operational at the level of working committees.
- In times of crisis the roles and responsibilities established in the contingency plan should be strictly followed under the general supervision of the high level committee.
- Consideration should be given to emergency financial arrangements to be used in times of systemic crisis.

### ENFORCEMENT, PREVENTIVE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- The CBS may issue directives to correct unsafe or unsound practices by Financial Institutions (FI) (FIA, Sections 13 (a) and (b)).
- The CBS has issued Prudential Statements under powers given by the CBA (CBA, Section 9, (2); see also FIA sections 3(2) and 3(3)), covering licensing, ownership and management of banks, capital adequacy, asset concentration and risk, large exposures, liquidity, connected lending, provisioning, accounting and internal controls, and foreign currency exposures.
- In some areas the Prudential Statements contain general recommendations and guidance; in others they contain specific ratios, limits, norms for calculation, etc.
- Consequences for non-compliance are not specified; under CBS’s “approach to supervision” the prudential standards “will serve as triggers for discussions with banks on particular aspects of their operations” and “[t]he objective is to develop a consensus because prudential standards can constrain banks’ commercial judgments concerning the volume and quality of assets that they may hold and this can affect banks’ profitability. However, the Bank will, if it becomes necessary, assume the role of final arbiter.” (CBS, Prudential Statement No. 1, (5))
- The enforcement regime in the preventive and corrective area needs to be strengthened: Prudential Statements need to include clear consequences for non-compliance to introduce certainty and fairness to the system.
- Specific example on capital adequacy: Prudential Statements prescribe minimum capital ratios, risk weightings, treatment of off-balance sheet items, and detailed forms for measurement of capital and risk weighting. For calculation of final capital ratios, it is stated that specific procedures will be agreed with individual banks failing to comply, and that specific plans will be required; unspecified “enforcement proceedings” will be included where bank management fails to develop or adhere to an acceptable remedial plan.

### LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT BANKING RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK
- If the CBS determines a FI is carrying on business “detrimental to the interest of its depositors, creditors, or the public” or likely to be unable to meet obligations when due, the CBS Board “shall” issue a resolution exercising one or more powers (FIA, Section 14):
  - direct the FI to take “whatever actions in relation to its business as the CB may specify;”
  - appoint a qualified person to “advise” the FI in the proper conduct of its business;
  - revoke the license of the FI;
  - present a petition to the court for the winding up of the FI.
- If the CBS wants to take direct actions not implying immediate closure, it must apply for court supervised management; the court decides whether to accept the request and may approve or not the person suggested as manager, define the scope of the manager’s powers, give directions to and supervise the administrator, and decide when to terminate the administration “for any reason.” The CBS can apply to the court to terminate the administrator and “present a petition” for winding up the FI under administration.

### TABLE 1 — KEY RECOMMENDATIONS (AS PRESENTED)
- Issue a complete set of prudential regulations, including specific enforcement actions by the regulator, to be applied incrementally according to the gravity of the non-compliance. Those enforcement actions should be applied in a general manner providing certainty and fairness to the whole regime. An appropriate amendment of the FIA would be required to provide a firmer legal basis for preventive and corrective actions. Time: ST
- Amend the FIA in order to reflect a complete and efficient resolution framework, including: (i) quantitative and qualitative triggers for the regulator to start resolution actions; (ii) key resolution powers for the regulator to take direct actions to confront serious financial distress; and (iii) specific powers to make effective key resolution tools, such as the transfer of assets and liabilities of a distressed FI to a sound entity. Those powers should include modification in the priority of payments laws to provide special preference to deposits and/or to selected groups of deposits (e.g., insured deposits). Time: ST
- Create an appropriate scheme of Emergency Liquidity Assistance starting from a well-designed lender of last resort function. Time: ST
- Create inter agency arrangements for monitoring and coordination on systemic financial sector issues and institutions, development and enforcement of a crisis contingency plan, and determination of official assistance in cases of systemic financial sector crisis. Time: MT
- Create a Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS) as an element of the reformed banking resolution framework, once pre-conditions are in place. Time: MT
- Footnote for timing legend: ST = Short-term (ST), Medium-term (MT)

*Prepared by Ernesto Aguirre, IMF external expert.*

### 9. The court supervised management is uncertain and inefficient. Under the current FIA,

### _cr15229 - 9. The court supervised management is uncertain and inefficient. Under the current FIA,

### Court-supervised management: findings
- Under the current FIA, the only possibility for the CBS to take direct action to confront serious financial distress in a FI (other than its immediate and irreversible closure) is to apply for a court supervised management.
- The court supervised management process places the regulator in a weak and uncertain position because the FI is effectively fully controlled by the court.
- The court appointed manager “shall comply with any written direction” of the CBS unless such directions conflict with any order of the court (FIA, section 15, (8) (a)).
- The court should not have power to reverse key resolution actions; the right to claim fair compensation in justified cases should be maintained.

### Powers lacking under the current FIA
- The CBS lacks legal authority to use key modern resolution tools referenced by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), including:
  - Transfer of selected assets and liabilities of a distressed entity to a sound FI.
  - Establishment of a bridge institution to preserve critical functions and viable operations of a failed firm.
- Other powers the CBS cannot exercise under the current FIA include:
  - Power to remove and replace senior managers and directors.
  - Power to directly appoint an administrator to manage the affected firm with the purpose of restoring the firm or part of its business to financial viability.

### Reform objective: establish a new resolution framework
- The FIA should be amended to establish a new resolution framework that includes:
  - Clear regulatory powers for the CBS to issue a regime for timely preventive and corrective actions.
  - Quantitative and qualitative triggers to allow the CBS to start resolution actions before the FI becomes insolvent.
  - Powers to undertake required resolution actions in a timely and efficient manner, under its direct administration.
  - Specific legal basis for the use of modern resolution tools.
  - Legal powers to apply special rules in cases with systemic implications.
  - A complementary deposit insurance scheme.
  - Some provisions for the lender of last resort function and official financial assistance.

### Prudential regime and triggers
- Prudential rules currently in “Prudential Statements” prescribe rules, limits and ratios but leave consequences of non-compliance to discretionary case-by-case decisions.
- The Law should empower the CBS to issue an appropriate regime for timely preventive and corrective actions applied incrementally according to the gravity of non-compliance.
- The amended FIA should include the basis to develop indicators to determine whether a FI is non-viable or “it’s likely to be no longer viable and has no reasonable prospects of becoming so.”
- Based on statutory parameters, the CBS should develop precise triggers to start resolution actions before the FI becomes balance sheet insolvent.

### Recovery and resolution planning
- The FIA should empower the CBS to require, prepare and monitor recovery and resolution plans:
  - FIs should present recovery plans for CBS approval; plans should be time bound and contain objectives, actions, and specific measures to restore prudential compliance.
  - The CBS should prepare resolution plans internally to identify options and alternatives for resolution if prudential norms or recovery plans fail.

### Additional resolution powers recommended
- The amended FIA should specifically empower the CBS to:
  - Remove and replace senior managers and directors.
  - Appoint an administrator to take control and manage a distressed FI and preserve viable banking business.
  - Restructure or wind down FI operations.
  - Transfer or sell, partially or totally, selected assets and liabilities of the distressed FI to a viable entity.
  - Establish and operate a temporary bridge institution.
  - Override rights of existing shareholders as required to recapitalize, restructure and dispose of the FI business or its assets and liabilities.

### Transfer of assets and liabilities; depositor preference
- Transfer of selected assets and liabilities to a sound entity should be a key tool given the Samoan banking sector structure where each of the four licensed commercial banks has a considerable share of total assets.
- The law should provide the CBS power to terminate contracts or temporarily stay exercise of termination rights.
- The law should include a provision giving legal preference to deposits in winding up procedures.
- Depositor preferences could allow segregation of total deposits or a category (for example, insured deposits) as part of asset/liability transfer packages.

### Bridge banks
- The FIA should provide clear legal basis for establishment of bridge institutions to continue critical functions and viable operations of distressed entities temporarily.

### Triggers for systemic cases and decision process
- Basic quantitative and qualitative triggers should be included in the Law and the regulator given power to specify numeric triggers that may be modified over time.
- Exceptions should exist for cases with clear systemic implications, allowing different resolution actions to preserve financial stability while resolving the institution.
- Preconditions for declaring “systemic implications” include:
  - Existence of an inter-institutional committee comprising management of the CBS and the MOF to take the decision.
  - Development of indicators of systemic implications by technical CBS staff.
  - If a DIS exists, use of funds beyond limits imposed under a “least cost principle” will only be triggered by the High Level Committee’s declaration of systemic implications.

### Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS): recommendations
- A funded DIS with industry contributions should be considered over the medium-term once pre-conditions are satisfied.
- Other safety-net elements should be in place “before or in concert with the adoption or reform of a deposit insurance system.”
- The DIS should have legal power to contribute financially to “preserve critical banking functions,” including facilitating acquisition by a sound FI of assets and assumption of liabilities of a failed bank.
- The DIS should be able to use funds to help integrate packages of assets and liabilities of a distressed FI into a sound entity during resolution operations.
- Use of DIS funds should be subject to a well-designed “least cost principle,” meaning costs to the DIS of injecting funds should not exceed the cost of payment of insured deposits in case of liquidation.
- Key DIS design decisions include: target size of the Fund, coverage, premiums and other funding sources, starting funding, and possible transitory public support during start-up.
- Given constraints in personnel and financial resources, the DIS fund should be administered within the CBS as a specialized fund with safeguards for operational autonomy.

### Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA)
- Current ELA framework needs upgrading; arrangements for liquidity during stress are not well developed.
- CBS issues securities of varying maturities from 14 to 365 days regularly through auctions; banks can access liquidity through repurchase agreements (repos) and the discount window.
- CBA Section 32 (d) currently allows the CBS to grant advances to banks “for periods nor exceeding 5 years” secured by “such other assets and on such terms and conditions as the Board may specify.”
- Proposed CBA amendments (supported by IMF technical assistance) would:
  - Provide a basis for ELA with safeguards protecting the CBS financial position in concurrence with the MOF.
  - Regulate lender of last resort function to provide assistance to illiquid but solvent banks with adequate collateral for pre-established periods of, say, 91 days with one possible extension.
  - Empower the CBS to provide emergency liquidity assistance in support of an insolvent bank without appropriate collateral and with possible extension of the maximum lending period in cases of systemic implications, subject to specified legal procedures.
- Solvency support should ultimately be the government’s responsibility; if the government cannot provide timely solvency support and the CBS provides it, the government should provide guarantees on, and compensate for losses arising from, the CBS’ solvency support to protect the CBS’ financial condition.

### Contingency planning and institutional arrangements
- Adopt institutional, legal and operational arrangements for prevention and management of financial sector crises, including:
  - Institutional arrangements for coordination, crisis prevention and management.
  - Legal and regulatory regimes and practices for systemic institutions and crisis.
  - Preparation and training to deal with troubled credit institutions and systemic crises.
- Create a permanent coordination mechanism between the CBS and the MOF:
  - A financial stability and contingency planning high level Committee should monitor the financial system, analyze risks, and discuss policies to mitigate risks.
  - The Committee would comprise the Minister of Finance, the Governor of the CBS and, possibly, their two key deputies on the matter.
  - The Committee should meet regularly, at least every half a year in normal times, and more frequently as needed in crisis.
- Create a technical committee (CBS and MOF) to:
  - Monitor the system continuously, prepare contingency strategies for the high level Committee, and supervise execution of resolution programs for FIs with significant systemic risks.
  - Be supported by CBS staff and ad-hoc working groups as needed.
- High level Committee to supervise coordination with relevant foreign regulators and design, review and update Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with foreign regulators, including internal arrangements of Samoan subsidiaries with parent banks.
- Create a financial stability unit at the CBS to:
  - Regularly assess financial stability and support the Committees.
  - Prepare and update draft contingency planning for high level Committee approval.
  - Design and supervise Recovery and Resolution plans for individual FIs and conduct Resolvability Assessments of FIs with significant systemic implications.
- The Unit should develop indicators of systemic importance based on criteria including size, interconnectedness, substitutability, complexity, and cross-border operations to identify domestically systemically important institutions.
- Training and simulation exercises should be developed involving domestic entities (CBS and MOF) and ideally relevant foreign regulatory agencies; creation of crisis management groups with relevant regulatory agencies is an objective.
- Explore possible sources of temporary official financial assistance for systemic crisis that are temporary and used only after private sources are exhausted.

*Source: _cr15229 - 9. The court supervised management is uncertain and inefficient. Under the current FIA,*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/_cr15229.pdf_
