## _cr1529

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### OVERVIEW
- Costa Rica bounced back quickly from the 2008–09 global crisis, but momentum is now slowing and macro vulnerabilities, mainly from the weak fiscal position, are rising.
- After falling modestly in 2009, real GDP surged in 2010–12. Since then, growth has moderated below potential, with the latter also on a declining trend.
- The counter-cyclical budgetary stimulus in 2009 pushed the deficit above 5 percent of GDP in 2010 (mainly through a rise in wages and transfers).
- The deficit has been creeping up since then, placing the public-debt-to-GDP ratio on an unsustainable upward trajectory.
- A fairly inflexible XR has contributed to exacerbate vulnerabilities associated with dollarization in the financial sector, increasing the importance of further improvements in regulation and supervision.

### RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK
- Growth and labor market
  - Real GDP growth: 2012: about 5 percent (source text); 2013: 3½ percent; 2014: growth reckoned to have stayed the same as 2013 amid Intel closure.
  - Growth is below its trend rate of 4¼ percent (Analytical Note 1), leaving a small output gap.
  - Unemployment elevated since the global crisis and increased further in early 2014.
- Inflation and monetary policy
  - Inflation (end-2013): 3.7 percent.
  - BCCR target range lowered from 4–6 percent to 3–5 percent in early 2014.
  - Inflation reached 5.7 percent in October 2014 and anticipated to finish 2014 above the upper limit of the target range.
  - Authorities raised monetary policy rates twice since the beginning of the year (to 5.25 percent in May).
- External sector and reserves
  - Current account deficit: 2013: 5 percent of GDP; expected broadly stable in 2014.
  - Colón depreciation: lost 10 percent between January and March 2014; year-to-date depreciation stood at 7 percent in mid-November 2014.
  - BCCR sold about 6 percent of its end-2013 NIR stock to smooth XR fluctuations; reserves remained well within the IMF adequacy metric at end-2014 (Box 1).
- Competitiveness
  - REER rose by over 30 percent between 2005 and 2013.
  - In 2014 REER declined by 4 percent as nominal depreciation outpaced inflation differentials.
  - Multimethod estimates broadly indicate REER in line with fundamentals but competitiveness concerns remain.
- Fiscal developments
  - Central government deficit increased by 1¼ percentage points of GDP in 2012–13 to 5½ percent of GDP.
  - Debt reached 36 percent of GDP in 2013.
  - Previous administration prepared a roadmap with potential adjustment of about 3½ percent of GDP over five years; new government (took office May 2014) developing strategy focused on strengthening revenue.
  - New draft anti-tax evasion law submitted to Congress; impact on revenues from administrative provisions unclear.
- Monetary and financial conditions
  - Domestic monetary and financial conditions broadly neutral.
  - Credit growth remains robust; credit composition shifted away from foreign currency loans while deposits moved towards foreign currency after XR depreciation.
  - Broad-based Financial Conditions Index (FCI) suggests financial conditions neither propelling nor dragging GDP earlier in 2014.

### EXTERNAL STABILITY ASSESSMENT (BOX 1) — SELECTED FINDINGS
- Current account and reserves
  - Current account close to 5 percent of GDP in recent years.
  - FDI inflows hover at around 5 percent of GDP.
  - IIP negative at over 35 percent of GDP; FDI comprises more than 60 percent of total liabilities.
  - Net international reserves: 5.6 months of non-maquila imports at end-2013.
- Multimethod valuation results (selected as presented)
  - EBA macro balance: sustainable cyclically-adjusted current account deficit of 5.4 percent of GDP; actual cyclically-adjusted deficit of 4.2 percent; implying an undervaluation of 4¾ percent.
  - CGER macro balance: estimated REER undervaluation of barely less than 1 percent.
  - CGER external sustainability: moderate overvaluation of 13¼ percent.
  - If FDI excluded from NFA: assessed undervaluation of little less than 6 percent.
  - WHD staff model: REER broadly in line with fundamentals, undervaluation of about 1½ percent.
  - Staff view: macro-balance-type approaches are most reliable; average across reliable methodologies implies virtually no over- or under-valuation.
- Conclusion: REER broadly in line with fundamentals, but competitiveness concerns (Doing Business, Global Competitiveness Index) indicate need for further reforms.

### FINANCIAL SYSTEM SOUNDNESS AND DOLLARIZATION RISKS
- Soundness indicators
  - Capital well above regulatory requirements.
  - Liquidity indicators generally robust; loan-to-deposit ratio has been rising since mid-2013 and exceeds 100 percent.
  - Non-performing loans remained manageable; profitability declined slightly and remains below regional peers.
- Dollarization and balance-sheet mismatches
  - Large depreciation of the colón may impact asset quality given unhedged liability dollarization of households and corporations.
  - Staff analysis: currency and maturity mismatch risks limited and concentrated in non-financial public and financial sectors.
  - Banks hold a large open position in foreign currencies and have rapidly growing reliance on foreign funding.
- Key quantitative indicators (as presented)
  - Loan-to-deposit ratio: exceeds 100 percent.
  - Impact of 2014 depreciation (7.8 percent) on net FX position: shown in source charts.
  - Monetary policy rate: 5.25 percent.
  - Estimated neutral rate: 5.0–5.1 percent.

### BASELINE MACRO OUTLOOK (FUND STAFF ESTIMATES)
- Real GDP growth (percent): 2013: 3.5; 2014: 3.6; 2015: 3.4; 2016: 4.2; 2017: 4.5; 2018: 4.4; 2019: 4.3
- Output gap (percent of potential GDP): 2013: 0.0; 2014: -0.4; 2015: -0.9; 2016: -0.9; 2017: -0.6; 2018: -0.5; 2019: -0.4
- CPI (percent, end-of-period): 2013: 3.7; 2014: 5.6; 2015: 4.5; 2016: 4.0; 2017: 4.0; 2018: 4.0; 2019: 4.0
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2013: -4.9; 2014: -5.0; 2015: -4.7; 2016: -4.7; 2017: -4.9; 2018: -5.0; 2019: -5.2
- Central government fiscal balance (percent of GDP): 2013: -5.6; 2014: -6.2; 2015: -6.0; 2016: -5.5; 2017: -5.3; 2018: -5.5; 2019: -5.7
- Central government debt (percent of GDP): 2013: 36.0; 2014: 39.4; 2015: 42.3; 2016: 44.6; 2017: 46.5; 2018: 48.5; 2019: 50.6

### FULL FISCAL ADJUSTMENT SCENARIO (INCLUDES ADDITIONAL 1½ PERCENT OF GDP MEASURES)
- Real GDP growth (percent): 2013: 3.5; 2014: 3.6; 2015: 3.3; 2016: 4.1; 2017: 4.7; 2018: 4.5; 2019: 4.4
- Output gap (percent of potential GDP): 2013: 0.0; 2014: -0.4; 2015: -1.0; 2016: -1.1; 2017: -0.6; 2018: -0.3; 2019: -0.2
- CPI (percent, end-of-period): 2013: 3.7; 2014: 5.6; 2015: 4.4; 2016: 3.9; 2017: 4.0; 2018: 4.0; 2019: 4.0
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2013: -4.9; 2014: -5.0; 2015: -4.6; 2016: -4.5; 2017: -4.5; 2018: -4.4; 2019: -4.7
- Central government fiscal balance (percent of GDP): 2013: -5.6; 2014: -6.2; 2015: -5.6; 2016: -4.5; 2017: -3.8; 2018: -3.6; 2019: -3.4
- Central government debt (percent of GDP): 2013: 36.0; 2014: 39.4; 2015: 41.9; 2016: 43.2; 2017: 43.5; 2018: 43.7; 2019: 43.8

### FISCAL CONSOLIDATION: NEEDS, PATHS, AND MEASURES
- Pension system
  - CCSS pension plan and judiciary and teachers plans actuarially imbalanced; preliminary projections suggest adjustment equivalent to about 1½ percent of GDP required for actuarial equilibrium over next 100 years.
  - Joint study to be released in 2015 to determine imbalance size.
- Fiscal adjustment to stabilize public debt
  - Staff estimate: fiscal retrenchment of about 3¾ percent of GDP over the medium term would stabilize public debt ratio.
  - Authorities intend to consolidate public finances by about 4 percent of GDP over the medium term.
- Pace and composition
  - Authorities concurred that about one third of the fiscal adjustment should be in 2015, followed by smaller steps.
  - About two-thirds of needed adjustment (or 2½ percent of GDP) should rely on revenue increases.
- Specific measures and staff assessment
  - Authorities readied legislative proposal to broaden VAT base to include services and basic goods (basic goods at reduced rate).
  - Income tax reform (eliminating exemptions and moving from schedular to global determination) not finalized.
  - Staff recommended raising VAT rate from 13 to 15 percent gradually and increasing marginal rates on higher-income brackets.
  - Authorities committed to expenditure tightening from 2015 focusing on containing current spending growth—particularly wage bill and transfers—via indexation modification, civil service efficiency, and partial employment freeze.
- Quantified consolidation summary (percent of GDP, as presented)
  - Total adjustment (Authorities' plans): 4.0
  - Staff assessment (baseline): 2.2
  - Additional adjustment: 1.5
  - Total adjustment (full): 3.8
  - Revenue (Authorities' plans): 3.1; Staff baseline: 1.5; Additional: 1.0; Total revenue adjustment: 2.5
  - Expenditure (Authorities' plans): -0.9; Staff baseline: -0.7; Additional: -0.6; Total expenditure adjustment: -1.3
- Fiscal consolidation path by year (percent of GDP)
  - Total Adjustment by year: 2015: 1.3; 2016: 1.2; 2017: 0.9; 2018: 0.2; 2019: 0.1; Total: 3.8
  - Baseline by year: 2015: 1.1; 2016: 0.8; 2017: 0.3; 2018: -; 2019: -; Total: 2.2
  - Additional adjustment by year: 2015: 0.2; 2016: 0.5; 2017: 0.6; 2018: 0.2; 2019: 0.1; Total: 1.5

### DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS — KEY POINTS
- Baseline DSA outcome (selected)
  - Public gross financing needs would average almost 10 percent of GDP in 2014–19 in baseline.
  - In baseline, public debt reaches 51 percent of GDP in 2019 and stays on an upward trajectory thereafter (text narrative).
  - Empirical guidance: sustaining debt-to-GDP above 50 percent may be difficult for emerging markets; for Costa Rica target upper bound of 40 to 45 percent of GDP appears justifiable.
- Adjustment scenario
  - Additional measures of 1½ percent of GDP suffice to stabilize debt by 2019 at a level below 45 percent of GDP (assuming significant tightening in credit spreads driven by favorable market reaction).
- Key DSA baseline statistics (selected as reported)
  - Nominal gross public debt (selected series): 2012: 32.3; 2013: 35.1; 2014: 36.0; 2015: 39.4; 2016: 42.4; 2017: 44.8; 2018: 46.8; 2019: 48.8
  - Public gross financing needs: 2012: 11.0; 2013: 14.0; 2014: 11.0; 2015: 10.4; 2016: 12.2; 2017: 10.3; 2018: 8.6; 2019: 8.6
  - Primary (noninterest) revenue (percent of GDP): 2012: 14.3; 2013: 13.7; 2014: 13.6; 2015: 13.5; 2016: 13.9; 2017: 14.6; 2018: 15.0; 2019: 15.1
  - Primary (noninterest) expenditure (percent of GDP): 2012: 13.4; 2013: 16.0; 2014: 16.5; 2015: 16.6; 2016: 16.3; 2017: 16.5; 2018: 16.6; 2019: 16.6

### EXTERNAL DEBT SUSTAINABILITY (ANNEX III) — SELECTED FIGURES
- External debt (percent of GDP): 2011: 26.5; 2012: 32.0; 2013: 35.2; 2014: 29.6; 2015: 26.6; 2016: 25.1; 2017: 23.5; 2018: 22.2; 2019: 21.5
- Current account deficit, excluding interest (percent of GDP): 2011: -4.8; 2012: -4.5; 2013: -4.1; 2014: -4.0; 2015: -3.7; 2016: -3.9; 2017: -4.2; 2018: -4.3; 2019: -4.5
- External debt-to-exports ratio (percent): 2011: 70.8; 2012: 85.8; 2013: 99.1; 2014: 86.2; 2015: 84.3; 2016: 79.4; 2017: 74.4; 2018: 72.2; 2019: 67.6
- Gross external financing need (percent of GDP): 2012: 14.2; 2013: 13.7; 2014: 12.4; 2015: 8.9; 2016: 7.4; 2017: 6.9; 2018: 6.4; 2019: 6.1

### SCENARIOS, SHOCKS, AND RISKS
- Intel withdrawal: estimated to reduce GDP by about ½ to ¾ percentage points in 2014–15; temporary negative effects on potential GDP of ½ and less than ¼ percentage points, respectively.
- Staff analysis: total fiscal adjustment of about 3¾ percent of GDP would stabilize debt with only moderate short-term output costs.
- Risks tilted to the downside
  - External: surges in global financial market volatility, faster U.S. monetary policy normalization, exchange rate depreciation, reduction in availability of foreign funding.
  - Domestic: persistence of large fiscal deficits, large government gross financing requirements, slowdown in FDI due to Intel exit.
- Risk Assessment Matrix (selected concerns and levels)
  - Protracted slower growth in advanced and emerging economies: High concern; High likelihood; High impact if realized.
  - Surges in global financial market volatility: High concern; High likelihood; High impact if realized.
  - Worse-than-anticipated fiscal deficits: High concern; High likelihood; High impact if realized.
  - Sudden unraveling of balance-sheet FX imbalances: Medium concern; Medium likelihood; Medium impact if realized.

### MONETARY, EXCHANGE RATE POLICY, AND INSTITUTIONS
- Monetary policy
  - BCCR reduced target range to 3–5 percent in early 2014; policy rate at 5.25 percent (May 2014).
  - Estimated neutral rate: 5.0–5.1 percent.
  - Staff view: monetary stance appropriate but should remain nimble; BCCR urged to be ready to raise rates if inflation persists above target.
- Exchange rate framework
  - Staff recommended allowing more XR flexibility, abandoning the XR band, and adopting a transparent intervention rule while permitting smoothing interventions that do not jeopardize the inflation target.
  - Authorities cautious given high dollarization and unhedged FX borrowing; undecided on publishing intervention rule.
- Preparedness for transition
  - Assessment: "Not well prepared" compared to past transitions.
  - Weaknesses: shallow spot market; unregulated derivatives market; underdeveloped interbank and securities secondary markets; prudential FX framework somewhat obsolete.
  - Recent measures: Central Bank introduced requisitions for public sector FX transactions and discretional replenishment of NIR.

### FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, FSAP RECOMMENDATIONS (ANNEX I)
- Key recommendations (selected)
  - Amend legal framework to provide protection for supervisors.
  - Enable SUGEF to supervise banking groups on a consolidated basis.
  - Apply higher risk weights to unhedged borrowers (implemented gradually to reach 125% for unhedged borrowers and 62.5% for residential mortgages by March 2015).
  - Amend central bank and supervisory laws to grant a wider range of remedial actions and improve early warning systems.
  - Establish a deposit insurance scheme and amend bank resolution framework to include purchase-and-assumption techniques.
  - Voluntary extra-judicial corporate restructuring agreements recommended.
- Implementation status: several critical legislative changes stalled; move to risk-based supervision underway with major reforms expected in 2015–2017.

### STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND COMPETITIVENESS
- Policy priorities and recommendations
  - Productivity-enhancing reforms and wage restraint to support competitiveness.
  - Address infrastructure inadequacies, access to finance, and inefficient government spending.
  - Increase private sector participation in the energy sector and review tariff-setting to enhance cost discipline.
  - Improve quality of public education spending (focus on early childhood education and child care) to raise female labor force participation.
  - Stimulate competition in banking, develop domestic capital market, alleviate infrastructure bottlenecks, and streamline business regulations.
- Estimated gains
  - Efficiency gains from these measures could increase trend growth by up to 2 percentage points and reduce unemployment by 3 percent over the long run (staff estimates).

### CONSOLIDATED POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (STAFF APPRAISAL)
- Near-term macro policy
  - Begin fiscal adjustment in 2015 to buttress macro stability; government plans a correction of about 1¼ percent of GDP in 2015 included in baseline.
  - Implement planned measures timely (speedy adoption of VAT reform and freeze in real salaries).
  - Monetary policy: remain vigilant; BCCR to be ready to raise rates if inflation does not decline.
- Fiscal consolidation priorities
  - Implement ambitious, frontloaded consolidation consistent with permanent improvement in primary balance of 3¾ percent of GDP (excluding pension actuarial deficit).
  - Carry out authorities’ fiscal adjustment plan of about 4 percent of GDP; ensure supporting measures are developed, enacted, and implemented.
  - Broaden VAT base, raise VAT rate from 13 to 15 percent, introduce global income tax with higher marginal rates for upper brackets.
  - Contain growth of current outlays (wage bill and transfers) to free space for infrastructure spending.
- Monetary and financial sector priorities
  - Complete transition to inflation targeting by eliminating XR band, adopting transparent intervention rule, and developing hedging instruments and deeper secondary market for government securities.
  - Resist expanding BCCR mandate to include growth.
  - Enact pending FSAP recommendations urgently; empower Superintendence of Financial Institutions for consolidated and transnational supervision; strengthen bank resolution procedures.
  - Gradually adopt Basel III standards (capital definitions, capital conservation buffer, leverage ratio, market and operational risk requirements).
- Structural reform priorities
  - Step up private sector participation in energy; review tariff procedures.
  - Improve early childhood education and childcare to raise female participation and productivity.
  - Promote banking competition, capital market development, ease infrastructure bottlenecks, and simplify regulatory environment.

### STATISTICAL AND DATA ISSUES (SELECTED)
- Data provision broadly adequate for surveillance; quality improved; ROSC reassessment published February 2010.
- National accounts: updating base year to 2012; project completion by December 2015.
- CPI: lacks owner-occupied housing component; covers urban households in greater San Jose (~46 percent of total population).
- GFS: migrating to GFSM 2001; some classification and residency criterion issues noted.
- Costa Rica in observance with SDDS.

### SELECTED ADDITIONAL NUMERIC HIGHLIGHTS (AS REPORTED)
- Public sector consolidated debt (selected series): 2010: 29.0 (Table 8 consolidated series differs by consolidation); 2013 consolidated public sector debt: 41.9; 2014 proj consolidated public sector debt: 44.5; 2019 proj consolidated public sector debt: 46.6 (Table 8 / Table 6b / text variants provided).
- Net international reserves (millions of U.S. dollars): 2013: 6,857; 2014: 7,331; 2015 proj: 6,865 (Table 3 / Table 10a series).
- Balance of payments (millions of U.S. dollars): Current account 2013: -2,452; 2014: -2,525; 2015: -2,533.
- FDI (percent of GDP): 2010: 4.0; 2011: 5.1; 2012: 4.2; 2013: 4.9; 2014: 4.3; 2015: 4.1 (selected tables).

_International Monetary Fund — Costa Rica: Selected findings from mission report (2014), staff report excerpts and annexes contained in content unit _cr1529.__

### 2014. The mission comprised L. Figliuoli (Head), A. Ivanova, J. Puig,

### 2014. The mission comprised L. Figliuoli (Head), A. Ivanova, J. Puig,

### OVERVIEW
- Costa Rica bounced back quickly from the 2008–09 global crisis, but momentum is now slowing and macro vulnerabilities, mainly from the weak fiscal position, are rising.
- After falling modestly in 2009, real GDP surged in 2010–12. Since then, growth has moderated below potential, with the latter also on a declining trend.
- The counter-cyclical budgetary stimulus in 2009 pushed the deficit above 5 percent of GDP in 2010 (mainly through a rise in wages and transfers).
- The deficit has been creeping up since then, placing the public-debt-to-GDP ratio on an unsustainable upward trajectory.
- A fairly inflexible XR has contributed to exacerbate vulnerabilities associated with dollarization in the financial sector, increasing the importance of further improvements in regulation and supervision.

### RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK — A. Recent Developments
- Growth
  - After expanding by about 5 percent in 2012, activity rose by 3½ percent in 2013, largely on account of weaker domestic consumption and net exports.
  - Growth is reckoned to have stayed the same in 2014, as activity was dampened by closure of Intel manufacturing, announced in April.
  - Growth is below its trend rate of 4¼ percent (Analytical Note 1), leaving a small output gap.
  - The unemployment rate has been elevated since the global crisis and increased further in early 2014, reflecting new and returning entrants into the labor force.
- Potential GDP and output gap
  - Various methodologies reported in the source show potential GDP growth estimates and output gap indications (see figures referenced in the source).
- Inflation and monetary policy
  - Inflation at end-2013 was 3.7 percent.
  - The central bank (BCCR) lowered its target range from 4–6 percent to 3–5 percent in early 2014 to signal commitment to lower inflation.
  - Inflation reached 5.7 percent in October 2014 and is anticipated to have finished 2014 above the upper limit of the target range.
  - Authorities raised monetary policy rates twice since the beginning of the year (to 5.25 percent in May), undoing reductions effected in the second half of 2013.
- External sector, exchange rate, and reserves
  - The current account deficit declined slightly to 5 percent of GDP in 2013 and is expected to remain broadly stable in 2014.
  - In 2012–13 private capital inflows and government Eurobond issuance kept the XR at the bottom of the band with strong accumulation of reserves by the BCCR.
  - In the wake of U.S. monetary policy (USMP) normalization, the colón lost 10 percent of its value between January and March 2014.
  - Year-to-date depreciation stood at 7 percent in mid-November 2014.
  - The BCCR sold about 6 percent of its end-2013 NIR stock to smooth XR fluctuations, while reserves were boosted by government Eurobond issuance in April and resumed purchases by the BCCR towards year-end.
  - Reserves remained well within the IMF adequacy metric at end-2014 (Box 1).
- Competitiveness
  - The REER rose by over 30 percent between 2005 and 2013, largely due to high inflation differentials.
  - In 2014 the REER declined by 4 percent as nominal depreciation outpaced a growing inflation differential.
  - Multilaterally consistent estimates under EBA and CGER approaches suggest Costa Rica’s current account and REER are broadly in line with fundamentals, though some signs of competitiveness problems remain.
  - Policy recommendations noted: productivity-enhancing reforms (¶29) and wage restraint; fiscal consolidation (¶18) would also support long-term external stability.
- Fiscal developments
  - Containment of public spending in 2011 halted in 2012–2013; public debt continued to climb.
  - Central government deficit increased by 1¼ percentage points of GDP in 2012–13 to 5½ percent of GDP.
  - Debt reached 36 percent of GDP in 2013.
  - The new government (took office in May 2014) acknowledges need for fiscal consolidation and is developing a strategy focused on strengthening revenue.
    - The previous administration prepared a roadmap with measures yielding a potential adjustment of about 3½ percent of GDP over five years, but no action was taken before elections.
    - A new draft anti-tax evasion law was submitted to Congress; it includes measures to reduce income tax expenditures and strengthen tax control, but the potential impact on revenues from its administrative provisions remains unclear.
    - A more comprehensive plan has since been developed (¶21).
- Monetary and financial conditions
  - Domestic monetary and financial conditions are broadly neutral.
  - Substantial increase in domestic interest rates in 2012 was driven by large government borrowing and buoyant private sector credit demand.
  - Financial conditions eased in early 2013 as the government reduced reliance on domestic financing with Eurobond placements.
  - Interest rates started rising again in the second half of 2013 as global financial conditions tightened.
  - A broad-based Financial Conditions Index (FCI) suggests financial conditions were neither propelling nor dragging GDP growth earlier in 2014, even before the latest policy rate raise.
  - Growth of credit to the private sector, excluding the impact on the stock of FX credit from devaluation of the colón, has moderated somewhat in H2 2014.
  - Credit growth remains robust and consistent with continued benign financial deepening.
  - Credit composition shifted away from foreign currency loans, while deposits moved towards foreign currency in the wake of XR depreciation.

### EXTERNAL STABILITY ASSESSMENT — Box 1 (Summary)
- REER and fundamentals
  - Staff used various approaches: changes in the CPI-based REER, regression-based methods for current account appropriateness, and stability conditions for net foreign assets.
  - A large nominal depreciation in 2014 combined with only a modest inflation increase partially reversed the REER appreciation of the last 10 years.
  - Year-to-date depreciation at 7 percent in mid-November 2014 outpaced inflation (below 6 percent in October), and the REER declined by 4 percent.
  - The current account has hovered close to 5 percent of GDP, with a strong positive services balance partly offsetting a negative non-oil trade balance.
  - Costa Rica has gained export market share during the same period in contrast to other emerging markets.
- Financing and reserve adequacy
  - Current account is mostly financed by FDI inflows, which have hovered at around 5 percent of GDP.
  - The IIP is negative at over 35 percent of GDP, with FDI comprising more than 60 percent of total liabilities.
  - External debt profile presents no sustainability concerns; external debt-to-GDP ratio set to decline into the medium term, with a low share of short-term debt.
  - Net international reserves stood at 5.6 months of non-maquila imports of goods and services at end-2013 and are within the Fund’s composite reserve adequacy metric.
- Multimethod valuation results (selected estimates preserved as presented)
  - EBA macro balance: sustainable cyclically-adjusted current account deficit of 5.4 percent of GDP; actual cyclically-adjusted deficit of 4.2 percent; implying an undervaluation of 4¾ percent.
  - CGER macro balance: estimated REER undervaluation of barely less than 1 percent.
  - CGER external sustainability: moderate overvaluation of 13¼ percent.
  - If FDI is excluded from NFA, an undervaluation of little less than 6 percent is assessed.
  - WHD staff model suggests REER broadly in line with fundamentals, with an undervaluation of about 1½ percent.
  - Staff view: macro-balance-type approaches—pointing to a small undervaluation—are most reliable; average across reliable methodologies implies virtually no over- or under-valuation.
  - Conclusion: Costa Rica’s REER is broadly in line with fundamentals, but competitiveness concerns (Doing Business rankings, Global Competitiveness Index) indicate need for further reforms.
- Specific figures and comparisons (as presented)
  - Current account deficit close to 5 percent of GDP in recent years.
  - FDI inflows about 5 percent of GDP.
  - IIP negative at over 35 percent of GDP.
  - Net international reserves: 5.6 months of non-maquila imports at end-2013.
  - REER appreciation of 30 percent since 2003; REER decline of 4 percent in 2014 after nominal depreciation.

### KEY POLICY-RELEVANT POINTS (from the presented sections)
- Fiscal policy
  - Need for fiscal consolidation to restore sustainability: previously identified potential adjustment of about 3½ percent of GDP over five years.
  - New administration focusing initially on reducing tax evasion and some exemptions; broader plan developed (¶21).
- Monetary and exchange rate policy
  - BCCR reduced target range to 3–5 percent in early 2014; subsequent inflation breach prompted policy rate increases (to 5.25 percent in May).
  - Management of FX reserves and intervention: BCCR sold about 6 percent of end-2013 NIR then resumed purchases; Eurobond issuance also affected reserve dynamics.
- Structural and competitiveness reforms
  - Productivity-enhancing reforms and wage restraint recommended to maintain competitive edge, especially after Intel’s exit.
  - Address infrastructure inadequacies, access to finance, and inefficient government spending to improve competitiveness (Global Competitiveness Index and Doing Business observations).

*International Monetary Fund — Costa Rica: Selected findings from mission report (2014).*

### 9.      The financial system appears sound, though dollarization continues to be a source of

### 9.      The financial system appears sound, though dollarization continues to be a source of

### Financial system soundness and main findings
- Capital is well above regulatory requirements.
- Liquidity indicators are generally robust, though the loan-to-deposit ratio has been rising since mid-2013 and exceeds 100 percent.
- Non-performing loans have remained manageable.
- Profitability declined slightly and remains below that of regional peers.
- Reliance on foreign funding has increased in the past few years, though banks continue to have a long FX position.
- Staff estimates suggest that intensification of sovereign and banking strains in advanced countries would not have a large direct impact on credit in Costa Rica.
- Stress test exercises conducted by bank supervisors yield similar results.

### Dollarization, currency and maturity mismatch risks
- A large depreciation of the colón may impact asset quality, given unhedged liability dollarization of households and corporations.
- Staff analysis indicates risks from currency and maturity mismatches are limited and concentrated in the non-financial public and financial sectors.
- Balance-sheet foreign exchange imbalances pose a medium-level overall concern: corporate and households are exposed to a depreciation of the local currency given their negative foreign exchange positions; banks hold a large open position in foreign currencies and have rapidly growing reliance on foreign funding.

### Key quantitative vulnerabilities and indicators
- Loan-to-deposit ratio: exceeds 100 percent (rising since mid-2013).
- Impact of 2014 depreciation (7.8 percent) on net FX position: shown for Banks/Non-financial private sector (figures presented in source charts).
- Monetary policy rate: 5.25 percent.
- Estimated neutral rate: 5.0–5.1 percent.
- Baseline fiscal consolidation assumed: 2¼ percent of GDP over the medium term.
- Alternative (full) fiscal adjustment estimated to stabilize debt: about 3¾ percent of GDP.

### Baseline macro outlook (Fund staff estimates)
- Real GDP growth (percent): 2013: 3.5; 2014: 3.6; 2015: 3.4; 2016: 4.2; 2017: 4.5; 2018: 4.4; 2019: 4.3
- Output gap (percent of potential GDP): 2013: 0.0; 2014: -0.4; 2015: -0.9; 2016: -0.9; 2017: -0.6; 2018: -0.5; 2019: -0.4
- CPI (percent, end-of-period): 2013: 3.7; 2014: 5.6; 2015: 4.5; 2016: 4.0; 2017: 4.0; 2018: 4.0; 2019: 4.0
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2013: -4.9; 2014: -5.0; 2015: -4.7; 2016: -4.7; 2017: -4.9; 2018: -5.0; 2019: -5.2
- Central government fiscal balance (percent of GDP): 2013: -5.6; 2014: -6.2; 2015: -6.0; 2016: -5.5; 2017: -5.3; 2018: -5.5; 2019: -5.7
- Central government debt (percent of GDP): 2013: 36.0; 2014: 39.4; 2015: 42.3; 2016: 44.6; 2017: 46.5; 2018: 48.5; 2019: 50.6

### Full fiscal adjustment scenario (includes additional 1½ percent of GDP measures)
- Real GDP growth (percent): 2013: 3.5; 2014: 3.6; 2015: 3.3; 2016: 4.1; 2017: 4.7; 2018: 4.5; 2019: 4.4
- Output gap (percent of potential GDP): 2013: 0.0; 2014: -0.4; 2015: -1.0; 2016: -1.1; 2017: -0.6; 2018: -0.3; 2019: -0.2
- CPI (percent, end-of-period): 2013: 3.7; 2014: 5.6; 2015: 4.4; 2016: 3.9; 2017: 4.0; 2018: 4.0; 2019: 4.0
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2013: -4.9; 2014: -5.0; 2015: -4.6; 2016: -4.5; 2017: -4.5; 2018: -4.4; 2019: -4.7
- Central government fiscal balance (percent of GDP): 2013: -5.6; 2014: -6.2; 2015: -5.6; 2016: -4.5; 2017: -3.8; 2018: -3.6; 2019: -3.4
- Central government debt (percent of GDP): 2013: 36.0; 2014: 39.4; 2015: 41.9; 2016: 43.2; 2017: 43.5; 2018: 43.7; 2019: 43.8

### Scenarios, shocks and risks relevant to the financial system
- Intel withdrawal estimated to reduce GDP by about ½ to ¾ percentage points in 2014–15; temporary negative effects on potential GDP of ½ and less than ¼ percentage points, respectively.
- Staff analysis: a total fiscal adjustment of about 3¾ percent of GDP would stabilize debt with only moderate short-term output costs.
- Risks tilted to the downside:
  - External risks: surges in global financial market volatility, faster U.S. monetary policy normalization, exchange rate depreciation, reduction in availability of foreign funding.
  - Domestic risks: persistence of large fiscal deficits (for instance, owing to political difficulties in implementing tax reform), large government gross financing requirements, slowdown in FDI due to Intel exit.
- Risk Assessment Matrix highlights key risks with overall level of concern and impacts:
  - Protracted slower growth in advanced and emerging economies: High concern; High likelihood; High impact if realized.
  - Surges in global financial market volatility: High concern; High likelihood; High impact if realized.
  - Sustained decline in energy prices: Medium concern; Low likelihood; Low impact if realized (modest positive impact).
  - Worse-than-anticipated fiscal deficits: High concern; High likelihood; High impact if realized.
  - Sudden unraveling of balance-sheet FX imbalances: Medium concern; Medium likelihood; Medium impact if realized.
  - Larger-than-anticipated impact from INTEL withdrawal: Low concern; Low/Medium likelihood; Low/Medium impact if realized.

### Policy implications and recommendations (from discussions)
- Begin fiscal adjustment in 2015 to buttress macroeconomic stability and reduce the sustainability gap; government plans a correction of about 1¼ percent of GDP in 2015 (measures included in the baseline, such as VAT reform and cuts in transfers).
- Implement planned measures in a timely manner, including speedy adoption of the VAT reform and freeze in real salaries.
- Monetary policy stance viewed as appropriate but should remain nimble; monetary policy rate at 5.25 percent is close to estimated neutral rate of 5.0–5.1 percent.
- Staff urged Banco Central de Costa Rica (BCCR) to be ready to raise rates if inflation does not decline as anticipated, particularly if it persists above the upper limit of the target range.
- A tighter fiscal stance consistent with restoring debt sustainability would mitigate increases in market rates, allow a more balanced macro policy mix to achieve the inflation target, and reduce the current account deficit.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt (section 9 and related tables and charts).*

### 17.      The authorities also acknowledged that the pension system’s financial position has to

### _cr1529 - 17.      The authorities also acknowledged that the pension system’s financial position has to

### Pension system sustainability
- The CCSS pension plan and those of the judiciary and the teachers are actuarially imbalanced and are projected to turn a cash deficit over the long term due to system maturation and population aging (AN 3).
- Preliminary projections suggest that an adjustment equivalent to about 1½ percent of GDP would be required to ensure actuarial equilibrium of all pension systems for the next 100 years.
- A joint study (by the CCSS and the Superintendence of Pensions) to be released in 2015 would determine the size of the imbalance.
- Authorities acknowledged that in the longer run further parametric adjustment would be needed—including larger contributions, lower replacement rates, and higher retirement age.

### Fiscal adjustment needed to stabilize public debt
- Staff estimate: fiscal retrenchment amounting to about 3¾ percent of GDP over the medium-term would suffice to stabilize the public debt ratio below levels shown to pose risks for macro stability in emerging markets (Annex II).
- Authorities intend to consolidate public finances by about 4 percent of GDP over the medium term.
- Staff cautioned that delaying consolidation increases the improvement in the primary balance required to stabilize the public debt ratio and raises the risk of an abrupt shift in investor sentiment and acute financial market tensions.

### Pace and composition of consolidation; growth trade-offs
- Authorities concurred it would be appropriate to undertake about one third of the fiscal adjustment in 2015 followed by smaller steps in subsequent years.
- Agreement that the pace should balance lowering the sustainability gap and limiting adverse impact on growth; proposed deficit reduction path would have only moderate output cost over the forecast period, even if trading partners also consolidate (AN 2).
- About two-thirds of the needed adjustment (or 2½ percent of GDP) should rely on revenue increases, reflecting Costa Rica’s low revenue effort compared to other upper-middle-income countries.

### Specific fiscal measures and staff assessment
- Authorities have readied a legislative proposal to broaden the base of the VAT to include services and basic goods (the latter at a reduced rate); income tax reform bill (eliminating exemptions and moving from schedular to global determination) not finalized.
- Many expenditure-reduction measures still need full articulation.
- Staff recommended:
  - Raising the VAT rate from 13 to 15 percent gradually.
  - Increasing marginal rates on higher-income brackets to help offset potential regressive impacts of VAT increases.
- Authorities committed to measures to strengthen tax compliance, including a draft anti-tax evasion law.
- Authorities committed to expenditure tightening starting in 2015, concentrating on containing growth of current spending—particularly the wage bill and transfers—by modifying indexation, improving civil service efficiency, and a partial employment freeze; this would support increases in growth-friendly capital spending.
- Staff cautioned about risks from contingent liabilities and additional domestic financing pressures from new off-budget investment vehicles.

### Quantified staff estimates and scenarios
- Staff estimates that measures at a more advanced stage are likely to yield some 2¼ percent of GDP (baseline scenario, ¶10).
- Remaining measures needed to reach the required total adjustment of 3¾ percent of GDP should be defined urgently to obtain reliable impact estimates.

- Costa Rica: Fiscal Consolidation Measures (summary in percent of GDP)
  - Total adjustment (Authorities' plans): 4.0
  - Staff assessment (baseline): 2.2
  - Additional adjustment: 1.5
  - Total adjustment (full): 3.8
  - Revenue (Authorities' plans): 3.1; Staff assessment baseline: 1.5; Additional adjustment: 1.0; Total revenue adjustment: 2.5
  - Expenditure (Authorities' plans): -0.9; Staff assessment baseline: -0.7; Additional adjustment: -0.6; Total expenditure adjustment: -1.3
  - Staff note: proposals at a more advanced stage are included in the baseline; the full adjustment scenario includes additional measures at a less advanced stage (e.g., increases in VAT rate and marginal income tax rates).

- Costa Rica: Fiscal Consolidation Path (In percent of GDP)
  - Total Adjustment by year: 2015: 1.3; 2016: 1.2; 2017: 0.9; 2018: 0.2; 2019: 0.1; Total: 3.8
  - Baseline by year: 2015: 1.1; 2016: 0.8; 2017: 0.3; 2018: -; 2019: -; Total: 2.2
  - Baseline revenue by year: 2015: 0.4; 2016: 0.8; 2017: 0.3; 2018: -; 2019: -; Total: 1.5
  - Baseline expenditure by year: 2015: 0.7; 2016: -; 2017: -; 2018: -; 2019: -; Total: 0.7
  - Additional adjustment by year: 2015: 0.2; 2016: 0.5; 2017: 0.6; 2018: 0.2; 2019: 0.1; Total: 1.5
  - Additional revenue by year: 2015: -; 2016: 0.4; 2017: 0.5; 2018: 0.1; 2019: -; Total: 1.0
  - Additional expenditure by year: 2015: 0.2; 2016: 0.1; 2017: 0.1; 2018: 0.1; 2019: 0.1; Total: 0.6

### Political economy and implementation risks
- Most deficit-reducing measures require parliamentary approval; government has a minority representation in Congress.
- New administration should use high political capital early in its mandate to push reforms and persuade public sector unions to accept sacrifices.
- Containment of public sector wages does not require parliamentary approval and could be leveraged to secure revenue increases.
- Lingering resentments from the presidential campaign raise concerns about legislative approval of VAT and income tax reforms; nonetheless, broad consensus exists that fiscal retrenchment is needed.

### Monetary and exchange rate policy framework
- Achievements: inflation lowered and maintained within BCCR target range of 4–6 percent since 2009; range reduced to 3–5 percent in 2014.
- Recent depreciation episode showed inflation expectations are not well-anchored; perceived exchange rate stability encouraged dollarization, building vulnerabilities via foreign currency mismatches.
- FX intervention rule (aiming to avert excessive volatility and counter deviations from medium-term fundamentals) remains undisclosed; lack of transparency may undermine confidence in subordination of XR management to the inflation target.
- Authorities aim to move towards full-fledged inflation targeting while maintaining significant role for active XR management.
- Staff recommended:
  - Allowing more XR flexibility to strengthen inflation as the undisputed monetary anchor and lower XR pass-through to inflation.
  - Abandoning the XR band (opportune given subsided appreciation pressures), while permitting FX interventions to smooth short-term sharp XR fluctuations and strengthen NIR, provided interventions do not jeopardize the inflation target.
- Authorities agreed in principle but emphasized vigilance about impacts on financial stability and inflation expectations given high dollarization and unhedged FX borrowing; cautious about making the intervention rule public due to fear of facilitating speculation.

### Preparedness for transition to greater exchange rate flexibility
- Table assessment (Costa Rica (2014)) characterizes overall preparedness as "Not well prepared" in comparison to past transitions (Chile, Israel, Poland, Brazil, Czech Rep., Uruguay).
- Noted weaknesses and observations:
  - Spot market relatively shallow; central bank does not comprehensively collect information on spot transactions on a regular basis.
  - Derivatives market is unregulated; private sector does not routinely use derivatives to hedge exposures and market participants are not accustomed to assessing FX risks from regular market volatility.
  - Interbank market underdeveloped with low market depth.
  - Securities market largely limited to primary market in government securities, secondary market in repos of government securities, and a very thin stock market.
  - Prudential framework to control overall FX risk exposure of banks exists but is somewhat obsolete.
  - While no capital controls currently in place, a recently adopted law empowers the executive, upon consultation with the Central Bank, to impose temporary restrictions on inflows of short-term capital through taxation and compulsory deposits with the Central Bank.
  - Transmission mechanism from policy rates to market rates is rather weak despite monetary framework largely in place.
  - After the 2014 depreciation episode, the Central Bank introduced measures to smooth volatility in the FX market, including new requisitions for the buying/selling of FX by public sector entities; before June 2014 the Central Bank participated in the FX market to replenish NIR withdrawn by the public sector; now the Central Bank can decide discretionally when and how to do this replenishment.

*Source: _cr1529 - 17.      The authorities also acknowledged that the pension system’s financial position has to (PDF chapter).*

### 25.      Steady progress has been made to create a favorable environment for inflation

### _cr1529 - 25.      Steady progress has been made to create a favorable environment for inflation targeting

### Monetary policy and inflation targeting
- Steady progress has been made to create a favorable environment for inflation targeting, but more may be needed.
- Staff recommended:
  - Elimination of the XR band and concurrent adoption of a more transparent intervention rule to establish the inflation target as the undisputed bearing of monetary policy while allowing for smoothing out exchange rate volatility.
  - Avoid expanding the BCCR’s mandate to include growth, which "could generate confusion as to the main target of monetary policy."
  - Foster development of tools necessary to underpin greater XR flexibility, including hedging instruments and a deeper secondary market for government securities.
  - Fortify BCCR credibility further, including by fortifying its balance sheet (AN 4).
- Authorities’ actions and circumstances:
  - Bank supervision stipulations adopted in 2013 aimed at a more thorough assessment of credit risks related to XR exposures and associated need for higher provisions were welcomed by staff.
  - Higher XR flexibility would help lower the XR pass-through to inflation and force market participants to internalize currency risks, discouraging dollarization.
  - Current monetary policy is expected to support the reentry of inflation within the target band, though vigilance is warranted if inflation does not decline in line with projections.

### Financial stability and supervision
- Key findings:
  - Limited progress has been made in implementing pending recommendations from the 2008 FSAP update (Annex 1); advances have been slow, largely due to a crowded legislative agenda.
  - Legislation aimed at empowering the Superintendence of Financial Institutions to conduct consolidated supervision, providing adequate protection to bank supervisors, and strengthening bank resolution procedures has been stalled in Congress for 8 years.
  - Introduction of further legal protection for bank supervisors faces strong opposition and may run into court challenges.
  - Progress made towards full implementation of risk-based supervision was endorsed by staff, but stepping up efforts to bring it up to best practices was encouraged.
- Basel III and regional supervision:
  - Authorities concurred that gradual adoption of Basel III standards would further improve resilience of the financial system.
  - Immediate priorities identified: introduction of Basel III definitions of capital, a capital conservation buffer, a leverage ratio, and incorporation of market and operational risk capital requirements.
  - Staff assessment suggests that only a few banks are not yet in full compliance with Basel III standards (AN 7) and that adopting Basel III capital requirements would have negligible growth impact in Costa Rica.
  - Regional initiatives to upgrade cross-border consolidated supervision are important, but additional improvements are needed to alleviate lingering spillover risks due to incomplete understanding of financial linkages, data limitations, and legal restrictions on information sharing.
  - Costa Rica’s large conglomerate BCT operates in Panama; officials emphasized a data sharing agreement with Panama, but staff noted cross-border consolidated supervision seems overall less advanced in Costa Rica compared to other countries in the region.
  - Costa Rica participates in the system of multilateral MoUs and in the newly created Central American Council of Banking Supervisors; staff urged speedier implementation of actions recommended in the 2008 FSAP (¶26).

### Fiscal sustainability and near-term adjustment
- Long-term fiscal challenge:
  - With long-term fiscal trends unsustainable, ambitious fiscal consolidation is needed, though it can be implemented at a measured pace.
  - Excluding the pension system actuarial deficit, a permanent improvement in the fiscal primary balance of 3¾ percent of GDP is required to stabilize the public debt ratio after 2019 at a prudent level and safeguard macroeconomic stability.
  - Given output is close to potential, the rapid growth of public debt calls for significant upfront fiscal tightening, with about a third of the overall budget adjustment in 2015 followed by smaller steps in subsequent years.
  - Postponing consolidation would result in larger tightening needs to stabilize debt-to-GDP and increase the probability of disorderly adjustment in the event of an adverse turn in investor sentiment.
  - The social security actuarial deficit could be addressed at a later stage, but the longer the correction is delayed, the larger it will be.
- Authorities’ fiscal plan:
  - Authorities’ fiscal adjustment plan of about 4 percent of GDP is suitable, but supporting measures still need to be fully developed and implemented.
  - The plan’s emphasis on revenue enhancement is well-founded given Costa Rica’s low revenue effort compared to other upper-middle-income countries.
  - Proposals at a more advanced phase of elaboration are likely to yield only some 2¼ percent of GDP; other measures still need to be fleshed out and virtually all have to be enacted.
  - Recommended revenue-side measures include broadening the VAT base and raising the VAT rate from 13 to 15 percent, and increasing marginal tax rates on higher income brackets as part of the introduction of a global income tax to address distributional concerns.
  - Efforts to contain growth of current outlays, particularly the wage bill and transfers, should be stepped up to create space for infrastructural spending.
  - Recent actions to strengthen tax compliance are positive, but associated revenue gains are likely to materialize only in the longer term.

### Structural reforms and competitiveness
- Authorities support structural reforms to buttress competitiveness and promote inclusive growth.
- Key observations:
  - Costa Rica has been the regional leader in attracting foreign direct investment, but the recent withdrawal of Intel suggests further steps are needed to maintain the country’s competitive edge.
  - More than 80 percent of electricity comes from renewable sources; technical losses are relatively low; industrial tariffs are the lowest in the region.
  - The cost of electricity is high compared to Asian competitors, which are generally more efficient at electricity production.
- Staff recommendations:
  - Increase private sector participation in the energy sector and review tariff setting procedures to enhance cost discipline.
  - Improve the quality of public education spending with emphasis on quality child care and early childhood education to facilitate female return to the labor force, foster productivity improvements, and lower inequality.
  - Stimulate competition in the banking sector, foster development of the domestic capital market, address infrastructure bottlenecks, and streamline business regulations to accelerate potential growth and improve financial inclusion.
- Estimated gains:
  - According to staff estimates, efficiency gains from these measures could increase trend growth by up to 2 percentage points, while reducing unemployment by 3 percent over the long run.

### Staff appraisal — consolidated recommendations
- Near-term macro policy:
  - Implement a tighter fiscal policy stance and maintain vigilance over inflation to buttress macroeconomic stability.
  - Place public finances on a sustainable path, strengthen the monetary policy framework, and enhance banking sector supervision and regulation.
- Fiscal consolidation priorities:
  - Implement ambitious, frontloaded fiscal consolidation consistent with a permanent improvement in the fiscal primary balance of 3¾ percent of GDP (excluding the pension actuarial deficit).
  - Carry out the authorities’ fiscal adjustment plan of about 4 percent of GDP, ensuring supporting measures are developed, enacted, and implemented.
  - Broaden the VAT base, raise the VAT rate from 13 to 15 percent, and introduce a global income tax with higher marginal rates for upper brackets to address distributional concerns.
  - Contain growth of current outlays, especially the wage bill and transfers, to free space for infrastructure investment.
- Monetary and financial sector priorities:
  - Complete the transition to inflation targeting by eliminating the XR band, adopting a transparent intervention rule, and developing hedging instruments and a deeper secondary market for government securities.
  - Resist expanding BCCR’s mandate to include growth.
  - Enact pending FSAP recommendations urgently, empower the Superintendence of Financial Institutions for consolidated and transnational supervision, provide adequate protection to bank supervisors, and strengthen bank resolution procedures.
  - Gradually adopt Basel III standards (definitions of capital, capital conservation buffer, leverage ratio, market and operational risk capital requirements).
- Structural reform priorities:
  - Step up private sector participation in the energy sector and review tariff setting procedures.
  - Improve early childhood education and quality childcare to raise female labor force participation, stimulate productivity, and reduce inequality.
  - Promote banking sector competition, facilitate capital market development, alleviate infrastructure bottlenecks, and simplify the regulatory environment to boost competitiveness and potential growth.

*Source: IMF staff appraisal and related sections in the provided content unit.*

### 36.      It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard 12-

### _cr1529 - 36.      It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

### Real sector: recent developments and prospects
- Recommendation: next Article IV consultation on the standard 12-month cycle.
- Real GDP growth:
  - 2010: 4.5
  - 2011: 5.2
  - 2012: 3.5
  - 2013: 3.6
  - 2014 (forecast): 3.4
  - Table 10a projections (selected): 2015: 4.2; 2016: 4.5; 2017: 4.4; 2018: 4.3; 2019: 4.3
- Output gap (percent of potential GDP): 2010: -0.3; 2011: 0.6; 2012: 0.0; 2013: -0.4; 2014: -0.9 (Table 2a: -0.4 in 2014, -0.9 in 2015)
- Drivers and shocks:
  - 2013 deceleration largely on account of weaker net exports and domestic consumption.
  - In part driven by weaker U.S. growth (about 1 percentage point) to which Costa Rica is historically sensitive.
  - INTEL plant closure expected to keep growth subdued in 2014–15; longer-term consequences expected to be limited.
- Labor-market linked to potential growth:
  - Structural reforms could raise potential growth by 2 percentage points over the medium term and reduce unemployment by 3 percentage points.

### Nominal exchange rate and inflation
- Large nominal exchange rate (XR) depreciation in early 2014 by regional standards; XR lifted from bottom of band since late 2010 but remained below the upper bound.
- Central Bank intervention to smooth daily fluctuations; reserves boosted by April 2014 government Eurobond issuance and remain adequate.
- Inflation:
  - Broad-based increase in inflation followed XR depreciation, boosting inflation expectations above the upper bound.
  - Consumer prices (end of period, Table 10a): 2013: 5.8; 2014: 4.7; 2015 (proj): 4.6
  - CPI inflation (period average, Table 4a central government): 2013: 4.5; 2014: 2.3; 2015: 4.0 (table context shows historical variability)

### External sector
- Real depreciation in 2014 due to large nominal XR depreciation and only modest inflation increase, pushing XR closer to equilibrium.
- Despite substantial REER appreciation over the past decade (driven largely by inflation differentials), Costa Rica retained and gained market share relative to peers, leading regionally in knowledge-intensive exports.
- Current account has been broadly stable and largely financed by FDI.
- Current account (Table 2a, percent of GDP):
  - 2010: -5.4
  - 2011: -5.3
  - 2012: -4.9
  - 2013: -5.0
  - 2014 (proj): -4.7
- Trade balance (percent of GDP, Table 3): 2013: -11.3; 2014F: -11.6; 2019 projection: -13.1
- Net international reserves (millions of U.S. dollars, Table 3 / Table 10a): 2013: 6,857; 2014: 7,331; 2015 proj: 6,865; later projections show 7,210 (consistent across tables).

### Fiscal sector: trajectory, risks, and scenarios
- Public expenditures in 2013 continued growing rapidly while revenues only caught up with income, resulting in further fiscal deterioration.
- Public debt has grown substantially since the onset of the global financial crisis and is expected to continue rising in the medium term with risks tilted to the upside and increasing likelihood of a debt spiral.
- Consolidated public sector debt (Table 8, percent of GDP):
  - 2010: 29.0
  - 2011: 32.9
  - 2012: 38.5
  - 2013: 41.9
  - 2014 proj: 44.5
  - 2019 proj: 46.6
- Central government debt (percent of GDP, Table 4a):
  - 2010: 29.1
  - 2011: 30.6
  - 2012: 35.1
  - 2013: 36.0
  - 2019 proj (partial adjustment): 42.3
- Baseline (partial fiscal adjustment) central government overall balance (percent of GDP, Table 4a): 2013: -5.6; 2014: -6.2; 2015: -6.0
- Two scenarios analyzed:
  - Partial fiscal adjustment: includes expenditure cuts equivalent to 0.3 percent of GDP, transfer cuts, partial hiring freeze, broadening VAT base from second half of 2015, move towards global income tax, miscellaneous cuts in exemptions, and moderate gains from reducing tax evasion.
  - Full fiscal adjustment: adds measures to contain wage-bill growth and increases VAT rate and marginal income tax rates in outer years.
- Under full adjustment, consolidated public sector debt (percent of GDP, Table 6b) falls relative to baseline projections by end-2019 (projected consolidated public sector debt 2019: 18.9 percent of GDP in absolute terms; percent series show reduction in consolidated deficit).

### Banking and financial sector
- After early-2014 XR depreciation, monetary policy tightened and domestic lending rates began rising.
- Credit shifts away from foreign currency; overall credit growth adjusted for depreciation continued to outpace nominal GDP growth.
- Foreign-currency credit comprises a large share of total credit, making system vulnerable to XR shocks; banks’ reliance on foreign financing raises susceptibility to external financing shocks.
- Systemic indicators (Table 11, 2013):
  - Risk-adjusted capital ratio: 15.1 (2013); month series through 2014 show range ~16.0–17.3.
  - Nonperforming loans to total loans: 1.5 (2013) with month series around 1.6–2.0.
  - Regulatory capital to RWA (Figure note): banks meet minimum regulatory capital norms; NPLs are low.
- Stress and spillover analysis:
  - Financial system generally robust to spillovers from asset-quality shocks in advanced countries; U.S. shocks have most pronounced impact on Costa Rica.

### Impact of U.S. monetary policy normalization
- Costa Rica has strong trade ties with the U.S.; real exports growth strongly correlated with U.S. real GDP growth.
- Market perception of risk increased significantly since “tapering talk” in mid-2013; EMBI spreads remained elevated.
- Simulation notes:
  - In absence of substantial market volatility, faster U.S. growth likely to outweigh tighter global financial conditions, producing a positive short-run impact on Costa Rica GDP.
  - Simulation entailed positive U.S. real GDP growth surprise of about 1 percent relative to baseline through 2015, triggering earlier Fed tightening and a rise in market interest rates due to an increase in risk premium outside the U.S. equal to one standard deviation (for Costa Rica = 100 basis points).

### Key projections and memoranda (selected)
- Table 2a Baseline scenario highlights (annual percent unless noted):
  - Real GDP growth: 2013: 3.6; 2014: 3.4; 2015: 3.3
  - Consumer prices (end of period): 2013: 5.8; 2014: 4.7; 2015: 4.6
  - Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2013: -4.9; 2014: -5.0; 2015: -4.7
  - Net international reserves (millions of U.S. dollars): 2013: 6,857; 2014: 7,331; 2015: 6,865
  - Consolidated public sector debt (percent of GDP): 2013: 41.9; 2014 proj: 44.5; 2019 proj: 46.6
- Table 3 Balance of Payments (millions of U.S. dollars, selected):
  - Current account 2013: -2,452; 2014: -2,525; 2015: -2,533
  - Export of goods (f.o.b.) 2013: 11,554; 2014: 11,078; 2019 proj: 13,090
  - Import of goods (f.o.b.) 2013: 17,178; 2014: 16,886; 2019 proj: 22,229

*Source: IMF staff estimates and tables as presented in the Costa Rica staff report (_cr1529) excerpt.*

### Annex I. Costa Rica. Financial System Assessment Program (FSAP)

### Annex I. Costa Rica. Financial System Assessment Program (FSAP)

### A. Prudential Supervision and Regulation
- Recommendation: Amend the legal framework in order to provide protection for supervisors while performing their responsibilities in good faith.
  - Comment: Art. 28 of Insurance Law 8653 of August 7, 2008, provides legal protection to insurance supervisors. The reform to provide protection for bank supervisors was originally included in a draft reform of the BCCR law but subsequently dismissed. Currently, there is only legal protection for auditors.
- Recommendation: Introduce pertinent laws for the Superintendency of Banks (SUGEF) to be able to supervise banking groups (including offshore structures) on a consolidated basis. Upon the approval of such laws the SUGEF should issue without delay operational regulations to ensure its rapid implementation by the banking system.
  - Comment: This reform was originally included in a draft reform of the BCCR law but subsequently dismissed.
- Recommendation: Apply higher risk weight ratios to unhedged borrowers for capital adequacy purposes.
  - Comment: Amendment to capital adequacy regulation took effect in August 2013. This implemented gradual increases in the percentages over 18 months, to reach final levels of 125% for unhedged borrowers and 62.5% for those with residential mortgages by March 2015.
- Recommendation: Modify the funding arrangements for supervision, in line with international best practices.
  - Comment: A draft legislation to recapitalize the central bank also addresses the increase in the financing share of the industry.

### B. Crisis Management and Bank Crisis Resolution Framework
- Recommendation: Amend article 155 of the Central Bank law in order to grant the SUGEF an appropriate range of supervisory tools to require a bank to take prompt remedial action and to impose penalties in accordance with the gravity of a situation.
  - Comment: This reform was originally included in a draft reform of the BCCR law but subsequently dismissed.
- Recommendation: Amend the rating system for prompt corrective actions, to include new directives that allow the SUGEF to take an appropriate range of remedial actions and supervisory decisions.
  - Comment: The authorities intend to amend the rating system once risk-based supervision is fully in place (currently expected in 2017, with major reforms to be conducted in 2015 and 2016).
- Recommendation: Improve the early warning system, to allow the adoption of remedial actions in a timely manner.
  - Comment: The authorities will review the possibility of taking a broader range of remedial actions within the scope of the existing law.
- Recommendation: Eliminate the emergency loan window and improve the design and operational arrangements of the ordinary rediscount window, including by establishing prudential limits in terms of regulatory capital.
  - Comment: The emergency line introduced during the 2008-09 crisis was discontinued and two high-access rediscount windows were created in 2011: (i) using bonds already included in the money market collateral pool; and (ii) using commercial credit portfolio as collateral (with strict rules on quality and haircuts). Both lines are available in US dollars and in colones. However, the rediscount windows are activated only when a central bank committee considers that there is a systemic risk; operational procedures need to be further streamlined; and repo operations are still to be linked to prudential limits in terms of regulatory capital.
- Recommendation: Establish a deposit insurance scheme, in line with international best practices.
- Recommendation: Amend the bank resolution legal framework to include purchase and assumption type techniques.
- Recommendation: Enable voluntary, extra-judicial corporate restructuring agreements.
  - Comment: Approval of the Law on Execution on October 2007 did not address the weaknesses of the current procedural rules.

- Note: 1/ Staff’s preliminary assessment based on updated information provided by the authorities.

*Source: Superintendence of Financial Institutions.*

### 4.3 percent. The baseline scenario assumes fiscal adjustment of about 2¼ of GDP based on the

### _cr1529 - 4.3 percent. The baseline scenario assumes fiscal adjustment of about 2¼ of GDP based on the

### Baseline scenario and medium-term adjustment
- Baseline assumes fiscal adjustment of about 2¼ of GDP based on the staff’s assessment of measures at a more advanced stage of elaboration in the medium-term adjustment plan announced by the authorities.
- Improvement in the primary balance is smaller due to the projected deterioration in the fiscal position under a passive scenario, driven mostly by increases in expenditure on education to reach expenditure targets defined under the constitution.
- Headline deficit remains close to 6 percent of GDP in 2019 in the baseline.
- Public gross financing needs would average almost 10 percent of GDP in 2014–19.
- In the baseline, public debt reaches 51 percent of GDP in 2019 and stays on an upward trajectory thereafter.

### Debt target and rationale
- The document notes difficulty in justifying a unique threshold for debt-to-GDP; sustainability requires future primary surpluses sufficient to service outstanding debt.
- Operational definition from WEO (2003): a public debt level is sustainable if it satisfies the government’s budget constraint (in NPV terms) without unrealistically large future corrections in the primary balance, and liquidity conditions matter.
- Empirical guidance: for emerging market economies, sustaining a debt-to-GDP ratio above 50 percent of GDP may be difficult; WEO (2003) finds the median public debt-to-GDP ratio for emerging markets in the year before a default was about 50 percent of GDP.
- Because Costa Rica has low and fairly volatile revenue-to-GDP ratio and has not demonstrated ability to achieve substantial expenditure consolidation in the past decade, the debt threshold for Costa Rica should be significantly lower than 50 percent of GDP.
- Targeting an upper bound to the public debt ratio of 40 to 45 percent of GDP appears justifiable for Costa Rica.

### Adjustment scenario and required measures
- Adjustment scenario: additional measures of 1½ of GDP, as part of a gradual but frontloaded consolidation plan, suffice to stabilize debt by 2019 at a level below 45 percent of GDP.
- This outcome assumes significant tightening in credit spreads driven by favorable market reaction to a frontloaded adjustment plan with credible measures.

### Results and assessment of risks
- Under baseline: higher interest bill from rising public debt offsets improvement in primary balance; headline deficit close to 6 percent of GDP in 2019.
- Under stressed scenarios, debt and gross financing needs approach the debt burden benchmarks:
  - Debt rises above 60 percent of GDP under the combined macro-fiscal shock.
  - Particularly high sensitivity to growth and fiscal shocks.
- Debt profile indicators highlight risks from:
  - Relatively high spreads on external bonds.
  - Elevated financing needs.
  - Significant external and FX debt.
- Market perception risk: recent loss of the sovereign’s only investment grade rating and warnings of potential downgrades by other main agencies could intensify credit risk perceptions.

### Mitigating factors
- Stable investor base: about 60 percent of domestic debt is held by captive local institutional investors (social security system, nonfinancial public sector institutions, and banks).
- Share of external and FX debt:
  - External debt represents about 20 percent of total debt (benchmark range 15 to 45).
  - FX debt represents about 30 percent of total debt (benchmark range 20 to 60).
- These shares are at the low end of the reference ranges for moderate risk countries.

### Key DSA baseline statistics (selected, as reported)
- Nominal gross public debt: 32.3 (2012), 35.1 (2013), 36.0 (2014), 39.4 (2015), 42.4 (2016), 44.8 (2017), 46.8 (2018), 48.8 (2019) — table shows 51.0 in text narrative for 2019.
- Public gross financing needs: 11.0 (2012), 14.0 (2013), 11.0 (2014), 10.4 (2015), 12.2 (2016), 10.3 (2017), 8.6 (2018), 8.6 (2019).
- Real GDP growth (percent): 4.9 (2012), 5.2 (2013), 3.5 (2014), 3.6 (2015), 3.4 (2016), 4.2 (2017), 4.5 (2018), 4.4 (2019), 4.3 (final column).
- Inflation (GDP deflator, percent): 9.4 (2012), 4.1 (2013), 5.0 (2014), 5.5 (2015), 5.5 (2016), 4.1 (2017), 4.1 (2018), 4.3 (2019), 4.2 (final column).
- Effective interest rate (percent): 11.8 (2012), 8.3 (2013), 8.5 (2014), 9.4 (2015), 9.6 (2016), 9.2 (2017), 9.1 (2018), 9.3 (2019), 9.5 (final column).
- Change in gross public sector debt (cumulative): -1.1 (2012), 4.5 (2013), 0.9 (2014), 3.4 (2015), 3.0 (2016), 2.4 (2017), 1.9 (2018), 2.0 (2019), 2.2 (cumulative 14.9 over horizon).
- Primary (noninterest) revenue and grants (percent of GDP): 14.3 (2012), 13.7 (2013), 13.6 (2014), 13.5 (2015), 13.9 (2016), 14.6 (2017), 15.0 (2018), 15.1 (2019), cumulative 87.2.
- Primary (noninterest) expenditure (percent of GDP): 13.4 (2012), 16.0 (2013), 16.5 (2014), 16.6 (2015), 16.3 (2016), 16.5 (2017), 16.6 (2018), 16.6 (2019), cumulative 99.2.

### Stress tests and alternative scenarios
- Stress tests examined: Primary Balance Shock; Real GDP Growth Shock; Real Interest Rate Shock; Real Exchange Rate Shock; Combined Macro-Fiscal Shock.
- Examples of stressed-path assumptions (selected):
  - Real GDP growth under Real GDP Growth Shock: 3.6 (2014), 0.7 (2015), 1.5 (2016), 4.5 (2017), 4.4 (2018), 4.3 (2019).
  - Effective interest rate under Real Interest Rate Shock: 9.4 (2014), 10.0 (2015), 9.6 (2016), 9.8 (2017), 10.3 (2018), 10.7 (2019).
  - Combined Shock effective interest rate: 9.4 (2014), 10.0 (2015), 9.6 (2016), 9.8 (2017), 10.3 (2018), 10.7 (2019).
- Under the combined macro-fiscal shock, debt rises above 60 percent of GDP.

### Adjustment scenario results (selected)
- Under the adjustment scenario:
  - Nominal gross public debt path: 32.3 (2012), 35.1 (2013), 36.0 (2014), 39.4 (2015), 42.0 (2016), 43.4 (2017), 43.8 (2018), 44.0 (2019), 44.1 (final column).
  - Public gross financing needs: 11.0 (2012), 14.0 (2013), 11.0 (2014), 10.4 (2015), 11.9 (2016), 9.3 (2017), 6.9 (2018), 6.3 (2019), 5.1 (final column).
  - Change in gross public sector debt (cumulative): -1.1 (2012), 4.5 (2013), 0.9 (2014), 3.4 (2015), 2.6 (2016), 1.4 (2017), 0.4 (2018), 0.2 (2019), cumulative 8.1 over horizon.
  - Identified debt-creating flows cumulative: 5.4 over the projection horizon.
  - Primary deficit path improved relative to baseline, with primary deficit cumulating 6.3 under adjustment scenario.

### Consolidated public sector baseline (selected)
- Consolidated nominal gross public debt: 38.0 (2012), 38.5 (2013), 41.9 (2014), 45.1 (2015), 47.9 (2016), 50.1 (2017), 51.7 (2018), 53.4 (2019), 55.2 (final column).
- Consolidated public gross financing needs: 3.8 (2012), 10.5 (2013), 10.9 (2014), 10.6 (2015), 12.6 (2016), 10.6 (2017), 8.7 (2018), 8.7 (2019), 7.9 (final column).
- Consolidated primary (noninterest) revenue and grants (percent of GDP): 22.1 (2012), 22.1 (2013), 22.7 (2014), 22.6 (2015), 22.7 (2016), 23.4 (2017), 23.8 (2018), 23.9 (2019), cumulative 140.3.
- Consolidated primary (noninterest) expenditure (percent of GDP): 21.3 (2012), 24.5 (2013), 25.4 (2014), 25.8 (2015), 25.4 (2016), 25.5 (2017), 25.5 (2018), 25.5 (2019), cumulative 153.2.

*Source: Fund staff estimates and projections as presented in the provided DSA text.*

### Annex III. Costa Rica: External Debt Sustainability Assessment

### Annex III. Costa Rica: External Debt Sustainability Assessment

### Baseline external debt dynamics (2011–19)
- External debt (percent of GDP): 26.5 (2011); 32.0 (2012); 35.2 (2013); 29.6 (2014); 26.6 (2015); 25.1 (2016); 23.5 (2017); 22.2 (2018); 21.5 (2019).
- Change in external debt (percentage points): 1.2 (2011); 5.5 (2012); 3.2 (2013); -5.5 (2014); -3.0 (2015); -1.5 (2016); -1.6 (2017); -1.2 (2018); -0.7 (2019).
- Identified external debt-creating flows (4+8+9) (percentage points): -2.9 (2011); -2.2 (2012); -3.3 (2013); -0.1 (2014); -2.0 (2015); -1.3 (2016); -1.2 (2017); -1.0 (2018); -0.8 (2019).

### Components of debt-creating flows and residuals
- Current account deficit, excluding interest payments (percent of GDP): -4.8 (2011); -4.5 (2012); -4.1 (2013); -4.0 (2014); -3.7 (2015); -3.9 (2016); -4.2 (2017); -4.3 (2018); -4.5 (2019).
- Deficit in balance of goods and services (percent of GDP): -4.8 (2011); -4.3 (2012); -3.2 (2013); -3.3 (2014); -3.0 (2015); -3.1 (2016); -3.4 (2017); -3.6 (2018); -3.8 (2019).
- Exports (percent of GDP): 37.4 (2011); 37.3 (2012); 35.5 (2013); 34.4 (2014); 31.5 (2015); 31.5 (2016); 31.6 (2017); 31.8 (2018); 31.9 (2019).
- Imports (percent of GDP): 42.1 (2011); 41.6 (2012); 38.7 (2013); 37.7 (2014); 34.5 (2015); 34.6 (2016); 35.1 (2017); 35.4 (2018); 35.7 (2019).
- Net non-debt creating capital inflows (negative, percent of GDP): -5.3 (2011); -5.1 (2012); -5.5 (2013); -4.8 (2014); -4.6 (2015); -4.5 (2016); -4.5 (2017); -4.5 (2018); -4.6 (2019).
- Automatic debt dynamics (percent of GDP): -2.4 (2011); -1.6 (2012); -1.9 (2013); 0.6 (2014); -1.1 (2015); -0.7 (2016); -0.9 (2017); -0.8 (2018); -0.7 (2019).
  - Contribution from nominal interest rate (percent of GDP): 0.6 (2011); 0.9 (2012); 0.8 (2013); 1.1 (2014); 1.0 (2015); 0.9 (2016); 0.7 (2017); 0.7 (2018); 0.7 (2019).
  - Contribution from real GDP growth (percent of GDP): -1.0 (2011); -1.2 (2012); -1.0 (2013); -1.3 (2014); -0.9 (2015); -1.1 (2016); -1.1 (2017); -1.0 (2018); -0.9 (2019).
  - Contribution from price and exchange rate changes (percent of GDP): -2.0 (2011); -1.2 (2012); -1.7 (2013).
- Residual, incl. change in gross foreign assets (2-3) (percent of GDP): 4.1 (2011); 7.7 (2012); 6.4 (2013); -5.4 (2014); -1.0 (2015); -0.2 (2016); -0.4 (2017); -0.2 (2018); 0.1 (2019).

### Key ratios and financing needs
- External debt-to-exports ratio (in percent): 70.8 (2011); 85.8 (2012); 99.1 (2013); 86.2 (2014); 84.3 (2015); 79.4 (2016); 74.4 (2017); 72.2 (2018); 67.6 (2019).
- Gross external financing need (in billions of US dollars): 0.0 (2011); 6.5 (2012); 6.8 (2013); 6.2 (2014); 4.8 (2015); 4.3 (2016); 4.2 (2017); 4.2 (2018); 4.3 (2019).
- Gross external financing need (in percent of GDP): 0.0 (2011); 14.2 (2012); 13.7 (2013); 12.4 (2014); 8.9 (2015); 7.4 (2016); 6.9 (2017); 6.4 (2018); 6.1 (2019).

### Scenario with key variables at historical averages
- External debt (percent of GDP) under the historical-average scenario: 29.6 (2011); 25.3 (2012); 22.0 (2013); 18.8 (2014); 16.0 (2015); 13.6 (2016); -6.3 (note: as presented in source).

### Key macroeconomic assumptions underlying baseline
- Real GDP growth (in percent): 4.5 (2011); 5.2 (2012); 3.5 (2013); 3.6 (2014); 3.4 (2015); 4.2 (2016); 4.5 (2017); 4.4 (2018); 4.3 (2019).
- GDP deflator in US dollars (change in percent): 8.7 (2011); 4.6 (2012); 5.6 (2013); -2.3 (2014); 4.1 (2015); 2.0 (2016); 2.3 (2017); 2.3 (2018); 2.2 (2019).
- Nominal external interest rate (in percent): 2.9 (2011); 3.5 (2012); 2.9 (2013); 3.1 (2014); 3.7 (2015); 3.4 (2016); 3.2 (2017); 3.2 (2018); 3.3 (2019).
- Growth of exports (US dollar terms, in percent): 11.4 (2011); 9.8 (2012); 4.0 (2013); -2.0 (2014); -1.2 (2015); 6.3 (2016); 7.2 (2017); 7.2 (2018); 6.9 (2019).
- Growth of imports (US dollar terms, in percent): 17.9 (2011); 8.6 (2012); 1.7 (2013); -1.4 (2014); -1.4 (2015); 6.6 (2016); 8.2 (2017); 7.6 (2018); 7.5 (2019).
- Current account balance, excluding interest payments (percent of GDP): -4.8 (2011); -4.5 (2012); -4.1 (2013); -4.0 (2014); -3.7 (2015); -3.9 (2016); -4.2 (2017); -4.3 (2018); -4.5 (2019).
- Net non-debt creating capital inflows (percent of GDP): 5.3 (2011); 5.1 (2012); 5.5 (2013); 4.8 (2014); 4.6 (2015); 4.5 (2016); 4.5 (2017); 4.5 (2018); 4.6 (2019).

### Bound tests and shock analysis (summary from Figure A3.1)
- Baseline external debt in percent of GDP: 22 (average projection shown in figure boxes for baseline).
- Historical scenario average presented: 14 (historical) and 22 (baseline) in figure annotations.
- Individual shocks applied include:
  - Interest rate shock: permanent one-half standard deviation shocks; figure shows baseline: 22; scenario: 22; historical: 15 (annotations present).
  - Growth shock: permanent one-half standard deviation shocks; baseline: 22; scenario: 22; historical: 15; figure annotations show baseline/projection averages: 4.2 (baseline), 2.8 (scenario), 4.7 (historical) (labels in figure).
  - Current account (non-interest) shock: baseline: 22; scenario: 26; historical: 15; figure annotations show baseline: -4.1, scenario: -5.0, historical: -4.0.
  - Combined shock (permanent 1/4 standard deviation shocks applied to real interest rate, growth rate, and current account balance): baseline: 22; scenario: 24; historical: 15.
  - Real depreciation shock: one-time real depreciation of 30 percent (occurred in 2010); baseline: 22; scenario: 33; historical: 15.

### Key policy recommendations and related macro policy assessment (from Annex and staff text)
- Fiscal policy:
  - Rebuild fiscal buffers used during the global crisis and implement fiscal consolidation to safeguard fiscal sustainability over the medium and long term.
  - An early fiscal correction of about 1-1½ percent of GDP would be appropriate, with greater consolidation necessary into the medium term.
  - Consolidation strategy should center on both revenue-enhancing measures and expenditure restraint; with a slant towards revenue enhancement.
  - Key elements for a successful adjustment plan include broadening the base for the VAT, increasing VAT rates, raising marginal tax rates on high earners, and containing growth of the public sector wage bill.
- Monetary and foreign exchange policy:
  - Phase out the exchange rate band and establish the inflation target as the sole nominal anchor of the economy; allow foreign exchange market interventions insofar as they do not undermine the inflation target.
  - Transition to a more flexible exchange rate system is being considered; authorities have intervened to reduce volatility and stabilize the exchange rate.
  - Inflation developments: after ending 2013 at 3.7 percent, inflation climbed to 5.5 percent in August 2014 (above the 3-5 percent central bank target range), reflecting pass-through from exchange rate depreciation; authorities raised the monetary policy rate twice in 2014 to contain second-round effects.
- Financial sector:
  - Accelerate implementation of the 2008 FSAP recommendations.
  - Introduce risk-based supervision, strengthen capital quality, and raise liquidity and capital requirements consistent with Basel III.
  - Critical legislation to enhance consolidated supervision and strengthen bank resolution remains to be approved; measures have been enacted to move toward full implementation of risk-based supervision.

*Source: National authorities and Fund staff estimates, Annex III. Costa Rica: External Debt Sustainability Assessment (staff report).*

### 2. Future plans. During the 2013 the IDB expects to continue the implementation of its

### 2. Future plans.

### IDB program and 2013 lending approvals
- The IDB expects to continue the implementation of its 2011–2014 Country Strategy for Costa Rica, focused on the areas of Transportation, Energy, Citizen Security, Early Childhood Development, Health and Innovation.
- In 2013 the IDB expects to approve two Sovereign Guarantee loans for a total amount of US$338.0 million on Transportation and Logistics/Regional Integration.

### Loan Disbursements (Sovereign Guaranteed Operations) — historical disbursements, amortization, interest, net cash flow
- (In millions of U.S. dollars)
- Years: 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012*
- Disbursements: 12.9 18 40.6 55.7 121.0 94.2
- Amortization: 81.4 289.3 ** 46.0 45.3 47.0 61.4
  - **Includes an anticipated repayment of US$200 million
- Interest and charges: 23.6 24.1 13.8 11.4 10.4 17.1
- Net cash flow: -92.1 -295.4 -19.2 -1.0 61.5 14.3
- * Projections (December 2012).

### Lending Program for 2013 (tentative)
- (In millions of U.S. dollars)
- Projects and Amount:
  - Border Crossing: 40.0
  - Second Road Infrastructure Program: 298.0
  - Total: 338.0

### Sovereign Guaranteed Operations (as of December 03, 2012)
- (In millions of U.S. dollars)
- Aggregate status:
  - Approved: 1360.7
  - Disbursed: 270.1
  - Obligated: 20.7
  - Available: 1069.8
- Specific projects (Approved / Disbursed / Obligated / Available):
  - Cadaster and Registry Regularization: 65.0 / 59.1 / 0.0 / 5.9
  - Sustainable Development of the Binational Watershed Rio Sixaola: 9.2 / 0.9 / 0.0 / 8.3
  - Tourism Program in Protected Areas: 19.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 19.0
  - First Electric Power Sector Development Program 2008-2011: 250.0 / 131.6 / 20.7 / 97.7
  - First Road Infraestructure Program: 300.0 / 66.6 / 0.0 / 233.4
  - Cantonal Road Network Program: 60.0 / 12.0 / 0.0 / 48.0
  - Water and Sanitation Program: 73.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 73.0
  - Violence Prevention and Social Inclusion Promotion Program: 132.4 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 132.4
  - Innovation and Human Capital for Competitiveness Program: 35.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 35.0
  - Power Sector Development Program 2012-16 (Reventazon Hydroelectric Project): 250.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 250.0
  - Education Infrastructure Construction and Equipment Program: 167.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 167.0
  - Nonreimbursable Technical Cooperations: 15.5 / 6.5 / 0.5 / 8.6
- Total: 1376.2 / 276.6 / 21.2 / 1078.4

### Statistical issues — overview and planned improvements (as of December, 2014)
- General:
  - Data provision is broadly adequate for surveillance.
  - The quality of macroeconomic data has continued to improve in recent years; this was confirmed by a reassessment of the Data Module Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) published in February 2010.
  - Further statistical improvements are being pursued in the real, monetary, fiscal and balance of payments sectors.
  - The Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Institute of Statistics and Census make data available to the public through regular official publications on their websites (www.bccr.fi.cr, www.hacienda.go.cr, and www.inec.go.cr).
- National accounts:
  - Compiled generally in accordance with the System of National Accounts 1993 (SNA 1993).
  - Issues identified:
    - Reference year 1991 for the series at constant prices is outdated; important for estimating the effect of the Intel withdrawal on real GDP estimates.
    - Estimation of rentals for owner occupied dwellings should be improved.
    - Accounting depreciation is used instead of estimating consumption of fixed capital.
    - Double deflation method is not applied.
    - Changes in inventories are obtained as residuals.
    - Chow Lin (without indicator) method is applied for benchmarking quarterly value added of activities, comprising a third of GDP.
    - Non-observed/informal activities are not properly covered.
  - Ongoing work:
    - The Central Bank is changing the base year to 2012 and implementing relevant recommendations of the System of National Accounts 2008 (2008 SNA).
    - Project scheduled for completion by December, 2015.
- Price statistics:
  - CPI compilation generally employs concepts and definitions from the 1993 SNA and the international CPI manual.
  - Issues identified:
    - CPI lacks a market basket component to measure the cost of owner-occupied housing.
    - CPI covers only urban households located in greater San Jose, which comprise approximately 46 percent of the total population and 72 percent of the urban population of Costa Rica.
    - Individual price index data are not generally verified against similar data from other databases such as the PPI and agricultural price indices.
  - Practices:
    - Atypical movements in the data are investigated and corrected when necessary.
  - PPI:
    - Compiled by product aggregations (not by economic activity) based on concepts from the 1993 SNA and the international PPI Manual.
    - Weights, establishment sample, and product sample introduced in 2000 are based on 1997 sales data and need updating.
    - A comprehensive assessment of source data is being carried out to guide production of new source data to update the PPI and national accounts.
    - The export and import and import price indices as well as the PPI are currently being updated.
- Government finance statistics (GFS):
  - Concepts and definitions generally follow GFSM 1986 guidelines.
  - Issues identified:
    - Financing data and government debt use national concepts that combine instruments and holders, not in accordance with international standards.
    - Migration path to GFSM 2001 adopted in the context of the GFS harmonization project for Central America, Panama, and the Dominican Republic.
    - Monthly fiscal statistics compiled and disseminated only for budgetary central government; annual statistics compiled and disseminated for the entire public sector and its subsectors.
    - The place of issue (Costa Rica or abroad) criterion is followed to classify domestic and foreign debt, instead of the internationally recommended residency criterion.
    - Fiscal data discrepancies among national compilers on particular items are not regularly reconciled, though large fluctuations or discrepancies are investigated.
    - Fiscal statistics are not regularly reconciled with monetary statistics or other macroeconomic statistics.
- Monetary statistics:
  - Broadly in line with the methodology of the MFSM.
  - Classification/sectorization follows the MFSM with some exceptions:
    - Social security system accounts are not presented within the central government, but aggregated with other public sector accounts.
    - Some financial assets and liabilities are not disaggregated by economic sector.
    - Accrued interest is not classified together with its underlying instrument.
- Balance of Payments:
  - Broadly follows concepts and definitions in the BPM5.
  - Source data are incomplete to compile some services in the current account, financial transactions of the nonfinancial private sector, and remuneration of employees.
  - Foreign direct investment transactions and positions are valued on a cash basis instead of the recommended accrual basis.
  - Services are recorded at the time the service is provided.
  - Other income transactions are recorded on an accrual basis, but interest on public external debt is recorded on the due date; no adjustment is made to convert interest to accrued values.
  - Transfer prices in some cases are not converted to market prices.
- Data Standards and Quality:
  - Costa Rica is in observance with the Special Data Dissemination Standards (SDDS).
  - Data Module Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) was published in February 2010.

### Costa Rica: Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (As of December 1, 2014) — selected entries
- Date of latest observation / Date received / Frequency of Data / Frequency of Reporting / Frequency of Publication / Data Quality – Methodological soundness / Data Quality – Accuracy and reliability
  - Exchange Rates: Dec 14 / Dec 14 / D / D / D / (blank)
  - International Reserve Assets and Reserve Liabilities of the Monetary Authorities1: Dec 14 / Dec 14 / D / D / D / (blank)
  - Reserve/Base Money: Dec 14 / Dec 14 / D / D / D / O, LO, LO, LO O, O, O, LO, O
  - Broad Money: Nov 14 / Nov 14 / M / M / M / (blank)
  - Central Bank Balance Sheet: Nov 14 / Nov 14 / M / M / M / (blank)
  - Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Banking System: Oct 14 / Dec 14 / M / M / M / (blank)
  - Interest Rates2: Dec 14 / Dec 14 / D / D / D / (blank)
  - Consumer Price Index: Oct 14 / Dec 14 / M / M / M / O, LO, O, O LO, O, LO, LO,O
  - Revenue, Expenditure, Balance, and Composition of Financing – Central Government3: Oct 14 / Dec 14 / M / M / M / LO, LNO, LO, LO LO, O, O, LO, O
  - Stocks of Central Government and Central Government-Guaranteed Debt4: Oct 14 / Dec 14 / M / M / M / (blank)
  - External Current Account Balance: Jun 14 / Oct 14 / Q / Q / Q / O, LO, O, LO LO, O, LO, O, LNO
  - Exports and Imports of Goods and Services: Jun 14 / Oct 14 / Q / Q / Q / (blank)
  - GDP/GNP: Jun 14 / Oct 14 / Q / Q / Q / O, LO, LNO, O LO, O, LNO, O, LO
  - Gross External Debt: Jun 14 / Oct 14 / Q / Q / Q / (blank)
  - International Investment Position: Jun 14 / Oct 14 / Q / Q / Q / (blank)
- Footnotes (as presented):
  - 1 Includes reserve assets pledged or otherwise encumbered as well as net derivative positions.
  - 2 Both market-based and officially-determined, including discounts rates, money market rates, rates on treasury bills, notes, and bonds.
  - 3 Foreign, domestic bank, and domestic nonbank financing.
  - 4 Including currency and maturity composition.
  - 5 Frequency codes: Daily (D); weekly (W); monthly (M); quarterly (Q); annually (A); irregular (I); and not available (NA).
  - 6 Reflects the assessment provided in the data ROSC, published in February, 2010 and based on the findings of the mission that took place in April, 2012, for the dataset corresponding to the variable in each row. The assessment indicates whether international standards concerning concepts and definitions, scope, classification/sectorization, and basis for recording are fully observed (O); largely observed (LO); largely not observed (LNO); not observed (NO); and not available (NA).
  - 7 Same as footnote 7, except referring to international standards concerning source data, assessment of source data, statistical techniques, assessment and validation of intermediate data and statistical outputs, and revision studies.

### Statement by the Staff Representative on Costa Rica — Executive Board Meeting January 30, 2014
- This statement provides additional information that has become available since the staff report was issued. It does not alter the thrust of the staff appraisal.
- Headline economic indicators remain broadly in line with the baseline scenario in the staff report.
  - Economic activity slowed down in late 2014, especially in the free trade zone—reflecting faster than expected winding-down of operations at the Intel assembly plant—and in the agriculture sector owing to weather factors.
    - As a result, GDP growth for 2014 as a whole is now estimated at 3.5 percent, marginally lower than the 3.6 percent in the staff report.
    - GDP in 2015 is now projected to expand somewhat faster (3.7 percent) than in the staff report reflecting both lower international oil prices and higher U.S. growth projections.
  - End-2014 inflation was lower than projected—5.1 versus 5.6 percent—mainly the effect of lower oil prices.
    - Second round effects from lower oil prices should bring inflation closer to the center of the 3–5 percent target band earlier than expected in the staff report.
    - End-2015 inflation is currently anticipated at 4.4 percent (versus 4.5 percent), with significant potential for further downward revisions.
  - The decline in international reserves over 2014 was lower than anticipated—about US$0.1 bn, versus expected US$0.5 bn—as the central bank stepped up FX purchases in the latter part of the year in response to stronger demand for colones.
    - The exchange rate has remained stable at around 540 colones per dollar.
    - The current account deficit for 2015 is now expected to be significantly lower than in the staff report after recent downward revisions in international oil price projections.
    - Staff’s assessment that the external position is adequate remains unchanged.

*International Monetary Fund — Costa Rica staff report content unit: 2. Future plans.*

### 3.      The authorities have publicly reiterated their commitment to fiscal adjustment

### 3.      The authorities have publicly reiterated their commitment to fiscal adjustment

### Fiscal adjustment measures and tax reform
- A VAT law has been drafted by the Ministry of Finance to broaden the tax base to include the services sector and to gradually raise the tax rate from 13 to 15 percent.
- The VAT draft is expected to be submitted to Congress shortly, together with the reform of the income tax law.
- The minister of finance publicly committed to other adjustment measures, including base public salary increases below inflation and cuts in transfers.
- The Finance Minister presented a 3.8 percent of GDP fiscal consolidation plan that includes reform of current taxes, rates, and spending measures, as well as a freeze on real salaries.
- Administrative measures enacted since May 2014 to combat tax avoidance/evasion and exemptions:
  - Tax avoidance and tax evasion accounted for 7.75 percent of GDP (2012 estimations).
  - Exemptions account for 6 percent of GDP.
  - Obligation for every firm to withhold 2 percent of each sale as a corporate income tax presumption.
  - Electronic invoice expected to become mandatory in 2015.
  - Anti-tax evasion law and anti-smuggling law sent to congress in July and November 2014 respectively; intended to strengthen controls and sanctions.
- Planned complementary reforms:
  - VAT reform to include services while exempting basic goods, education and health services (basic goods exoneration to be eliminated once subsidy system works; first 3 deciles to be subsidized).
  - Move from a schedular income tax to global determination of tax liability (gradually from 2016 onwards).
  - Exemptions-related reform to streamline setup, incorporate sanctions, and regulate creation of exemptions (including expiration dates) to be presented in first semester of 2015.
- Consolidated adjustment components noted in baseline scenario 1/:
  - Includes expenditure cuts equivalent to 0.3 percent of GDP, other cuts in transfers, a partial hiring freeze, broadening of the VAT base from the second half of 2015, a move towards global income tax, miscellaneous cuts in exemptions, and moderate gains from improvements in tax evasion.

### Expenditure, financing, and fiscal outcomes
- Government actions and outcomes:
  - Fiscal deficit previously projected at 6.3 percent of GDP, closed 2014 at 5.6 percent.
  - Decree to freeze 85 percent of vacancies in July 2014 and other measures reduced spending growth from 14 percent in 2013 to 9.3 percent in 2014.
  - Capital spending grew at 16 percent in 2014; current spending grew at 8.7 percent compared with 13.4 percent in 2013.
  - Government cut the 2015 budget by 0.4 percent of GDP and will maintain the partial hiring freeze; salaries frozen in real terms.
  - Law initiatives planned for 2015 with permanent fiscal effects include a cap on pensions paid out of the budget, a cap on high salaries, and a public employment law.
- Financing plans:
  - Expected placement of one billion dollars in international markets during 2015.
  - Contingent credit lines with World Bank and IADB for 2016 are being negotiated.

### Macroeconomic outlook, projections, and risks
- Baseline scenario and projections discussed by staff:
  - WEO oil price forecast revised from US$73.4 per barrel to US$56.7 per barrel for 2015.
  - Baseline scenario contemplates fiscal consolidation of 2.2percent of GDP over the medium term.
  - Under that scenario, the central government fiscal deficit would stay at about 5.75 percent of GDP, and the public debt ratio would approach 51 percent of GDP by 2019.
  - Inflation projected to hover around 4 percent after returning within the Central Bank’s announced band in early 2015.
  - Current account deficit projected to rise to 5.25percent of GDP by 2019.
- Executive Board assessment and risk considerations:
  - Directors welcomed authorities’ intention to implement a total fiscal adjustment of about 4 percent of GDP, with a front-loaded adjustment in 2015 followed by more incremental steps.
  - Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside:
    - Faster U.S. monetary policy normalization has slightly upside short-run effects via higher U.S. growth, but extreme bouts of market volatility could inflict serious damage given Costa Rica’s weak fiscal position.
    - Further sustained declines in energy prices could have a modest positive effect.
    - Persistence of a large fiscal deficit and rising public debt could render the economy vulnerable to sudden changes in financial market conditions.

### Key social and macroeconomic indicators (selected figures preserved exactly as in source)
- Population (2011, millions): 4.7
- Human Development Index Rank (2011): 70 (out of 187)
- Per capita GDP (2013, U.S. dollars): 10,558
- Life expectancy (2009, years): 79.1
- Unemployment (2011, percent of labor force): 7.7
- Literacy rate (2009, percent of people ages > 15): 96.0
- Poverty (2010, percent of population): 24.2
- Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (2010, percent): 102.0
- Income share held by highest 10 percent of households: 39.4
- Income share held by lowest 10 percent of households: 1.7
- Gini coefficient (2009): 51.0

### Selected macro projections and levels (exact figures preserved)
- Real GDP growth: 2010: 5.0; 2011: 4.5; 2012: 5.2; 2013: 3.5; 2014: 3.5; 2015: 3.7 (Table variants show 2015 as 3.4 in alternate presentation)
- Output gap (percent of potential GDP): 2010: -1.0; 2011: -0.3; 2012: 0.6; 2013: 0.0; 2014: -0.5; 2015: -0.7
- GDP deflator: 2010: 8.0; 2011: 4.5; 2012: 4.1; 2013: 5.0; 2014: 5.4; 2015: 5.7
- Consumer prices (end of period): 2010: 5.8; 2011: 4.7; 2012: 4.6; 2013: 3.7; 2014: 5.1; 2015: 4.4 (alternate table lists 2014: 5.6; 2015: 4.5)
- Monetary base (annual % change): 2010: 11.2; 2011: 11.6; 2012: 16.9; 2013: 10.2; 2014: 9.3; 2015: 11.2
- Broad money (annual % change): 2010: -0.2; 2011: 5.5; 2012: 10.7; 2013: 7.7; 2014: 12.8; 2015: 9.4
- Credit to private sector (annual % change): 2010: 4.4; 2011: 13.7; 2012: 13.4; 2013: 12.2; 2014: 13.9; 2015: 11.8
- Gross domestic investment (percent of GDP): 2010: 20.6; 2011: 21.9; 2012: 21.7; 2013: 21.3; 2014: 21.0; 2015: 19.6
- Gross domestic savings (percent of GDP): 2010: 17.1; 2011: 16.4; 2012: 16.4; 2013: 16.4; 2014: 16.2; 2015: 16.2
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2010: -3.5; 2011: -5.4; 2012: -5.3; 2013: -4.9; 2014: -4.8; 2015: -3.4
- Trade balance (percent of GDP): 2010: -9.5; 2011: -12.5; 2012: -11.9; 2013: -11.3; 2014: -11.5; 2015: -10.1
- Financial and capital account balance (percent of GDP): 2010: 5.5; 2011: 6.3; 2012: 9.7; 2013: 6.5; 2014: 4.5; 2015: 4.0
- Foreign direct investment (percent of GDP): 2010: 4.0; 2011: 5.1; 2012: 4.2; 2013: 4.9; 2014: 4.3; 2015: 4.1
- Change in net international reserves (increase -): 2010: -561; 2011: -132; 2012: -2,110; 2013: -461; 2014: 119; 2015: -345
- Net international reserves (millions of U.S. dollars): 2010: 4,627; 2011: 4,756; 2012: 6,857; 2013: 7,331; 2014: 7,211; 2015: 7,556
- Central government primary balance (percent of GDP): 2010: -3.0; 2011: -1.9; 2012: -2.3; 2013: -2.8; 2014: -3.1; 2015: -2.6
- Central government overall balance (percent of GDP): 2010: -5.4; 2011: -4.3; 2012: -4.6; 2013: -5.6; 2014: -6.2; 2015: -6.1
- Central government debt (percent of GDP): 2010: 29.1; 2011: 30.6; 2012: 35.1; 2013: 36.0; 2014: 39.4; 2015: 42.3
- Consolidated public sector overall balance 2/ (percent of GDP): 2010: -5.4; 2011: -4.3; 2012: -4.6; 2013: -5.4; 2014: -6.4; 2015: -6.5 (alternate table lists 2015: -6.2)
- Consolidated public sector debt 3/ (percent of GDP): 2010: 30.5; 2011: 32.9; 2012: 38.5; 2013: 41.9; 2014: 45.5; 2015: 47.6 (alternate table lists 2015: 46.6)
- External public debt (percent of GDP): 2010: 7.1; 2011: 6.4; 2012: 7.5; 2013: 8.9; 2014: 11.0; 2015: 12.7
- GDP (millions of U.S. dollars) memorandum: 2010: 36,298; 2011: 41,237; 2012: 45,375; 2013: 49,621; 2014: 49,610 (alternate: 50,213); 2015: 54,363 (alternate: 54,053)

### Monetary and exchange rate policy
- Directors considered the current monetary policy stance appropriate and called on the Banco Central de Costa Rica (BCCR) to stand ready to increase its policy rate should inflationary pressure persist.
- Recommended actions included strengthening the monetary policy framework, further steps towards inflation targeting, enhanced exchange rate flexibility, and most Directors supported elimination of the exchange rate band.
- Authorities’ stance and operations:
  - BCCR intervention aims to avoid excessive short-term fluctuations without interfering with medium-term trends.
  - BCCR publishes daily market balance and amounts of intervention (if any); specific intervention criteria are maintained private to limit speculative attacks in a small market dominated by few banks.
  - The Financial Stability Committee is formed by the central bank’s president, manager and relevant directors.
- Monetary policy rate (percent; end of period): shown in tables as ... ; 2011: 5.0; 2012: 5.0; 2013: 4.0; 2014: ...; 2015: ...

### Financial sector and supervision
- Financial system described as sound; “only a few banks are not yet in full compliance with Basel III standards.”
- Directors encouraged implementation of pending FSAP recommendations to strengthen supervision and resilience:
  - Gradual move towards Basel III standards.
  - Strengthening cross-border supervision.
  - Empowering the Financial Institutions Superintendence to conduct consolidated and transnational supervision, providing adequate protection to supervisors, and enhancing bank resolution procedures.
- Authorities requested IMF technical assistance on conglomerate supervision to expedite reform process.

### Structural reforms and competitiveness
- Directors recommended structural reforms to boost productivity, external competitiveness, and inclusive growth:
  - Streamline regulatory environment, increase private sector participation in the energy sector, alleviate infrastructure bottlenecks, and promote capital market development.
  - Improve efficiency of education spending to increase women’s labor force participation, stimulate productivity, and reduce inequality.
- Authorities’ actions and developments:
  - Secured more than USD 1.5 billion from multilateral and bilateral sources to overhaul road infrastructure.
  - Environmental agency granted final approval to begin construction of a USD 1 billion mega-port in the Caribbean coast by APM Terminals.
  - FDI totaled USD 2.2 billion in 2014.
  - Medical sector: 63 firms operating in medical manufacturing technology.
  - Costa Rica began the process of joining the Pacific Alliance on February 10, 2014.
  - Authorities are fully committed to the action plan to become a member of OECD.

*Source: IMF staff report and press release materials as presented in the provided content unit.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/_cr1529.pdf_
