## _cr1553

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### Executive summary — financial sector soundness and risks
- FSAP mission undertaken during June 10-24, 2014; note prepared by Elsie P. Addo Awadzi and Marc Dobler; systemic liquidity section benefited from contributions from K. Eckhold, D. Murphy, and D. King.
- Key system indicators and events:
  - Return on equity stayed close to 20 percent during the global financial crisis (GFC).
  - NPLs: jumped from 2 percent of total loans at onset of crisis to 6 percent in late 2009; average NPL ratio declined to 3.6 percent in 2013.
  - Regulatory tier one ratio: 13.5 percent in 2013.
  - SARB applies a 1 percent systemic risk surcharge to the large banks.
  - Institutional deposits from insurance companies, pension funds, and other financial institutions represent 29 percent of total deposits.
  - Liquid asset to short-term liabilities ratio: around 35 percent.
  - Average loan-to-deposit ratio: 113 percent.
  - Household sector represented 60 percent of loans in 2012; mortgages accounted for 37 percent of bank credit.
  - Provisioning coverage ratio: approximately 45 percent.
  - African Bank placed under curatorship in August 2014; accounted for 1.5 percent of banking system assets.
  - Top four banks—ABSA Bank, FirstRand Bank, Nedbank, and Standard Bank—account for almost 85 percent of total assets; exceed 90 percent with the fifth largest bank (Investec Bank).
  - Subsidiaries of foreign banks represent about one-third of total banking sector assets.
  - Claims of South African banks on other African countries have more than tripled over the last five years.

### Institutional framework, supervisory reform, and main FSAP recommendations
- Current and proposed architecture:
  - Current supervision: complex and multi-layered; challenges in consolidated/conglomerate supervision.
  - Authorities introducing “twin peaks” model: Prudential Authority (PA) and Market Conduct Authority (MCA); draft 2013 Financial Sector Regulation Bill (FSR Bill) expected to provide legal underpinnings.
  - A resolution bill is being drafted to assign resolution authority and new resolution powers to the SARB.
- Main identified weaknesses:
  - SARB’s early intervention powers require strengthening; limitations to suspend a bank’s license, restrict activities, or remove directors/officers.
  - Curatorship powers require ministerial approval, are not available at early juncture, and lack full range of Financial Stability Board Key Attributes (2010) tools.
  - No mechanism exists for industry funding of depositor protection and resolution costs.
- Priority recommendations (excerpted):
  - Institutional scope:
    - Focus initial SARB resolution authority on all deposit-taking institutions and only other financial institutions currently deemed systemic.
    - Non-deposit-taking financial institutions not found to be systemic should be resolved by the PA or the MCA, whichever is the lead regulator.
  - Coordination:
    - Give interim Financial Stability Oversight Committee (FSOC) statutory backing under twin peaks.
    - Review role of Financial Sector Contingency Forum (FSCF) to remove duplication with FSOC and Council of Financial Regulators (CFR).
    - Expand SARB/FSB MoU to cover dual regulated FMIs (payments and clearing).
    - Scope cross-border cooperation beyond supervision to resolution and crisis management with pre-agreed information exchange, decision-making procedures, and burden-sharing.
    - Explore supervisory colleges for FirstRand Group and Nedbank Group.
  - Early intervention and RRPs:
    - Amend Banks Act urgently to strengthen Registrar’s ability to intervene early with reasonable autonomy.
    - Provide clear statutory basis for Recovery and Resolution Plans (RRPs) and develop comprehensive guidelines.
    - Give PA explicit powers to require structural group changes to enhance resolvability.
  - ELA and systemic NBFIs:
    - Introduce a solvency test in the framework (preferably in the SARB Act); ELA to potentially insolvent banks only with government indemnity.
    - Consider liquidity needs of systemic NBFIs and eligibility for ELA; explicitly define and publicize ELA eligibility.
    - Remove remaining arbitrary collateral prohibitions in the SARB Act; require SARB to follow prudent collateral policies.
    - If equities retained in CLF, adopt haircut of at least 35 percent.
    - SARB should conduct due diligence on self-retained RMBS and apply haircut of at least 15 percent.
  - Resolution:
    - Enhance toolkit to include KAs powers including bridge bank and bail-in powers; triggers should allow early deployment when firm is no longer viable or likely to be no longer viable.
    - FSAP recommends SARB as resolution authority for all licensed deposit takers and systemic NBFIs.
  - Judicial review and legal protection:
    - Remove MoF’s power to overturn fines imposed by Registrar of Banks (RB) or empanel a Review Board to reverse RB’s decisions.
    - Shorten RB action timeframes and limit judicial review so it does not prohibit exercise of resolution powers; relief should be monetary compensation where the authorities acted in bad faith, illegally, or with gross negligence.
    - Extend immunity from personal liability under Banks Act to non-employees appointed to assist in resolution and indemnify relevant officials for defense costs.
  - Depositor protection and funding:
    - Introduce a deposit insurance scheme (DIS) with an ex ante fund sufficient to pay out a number of small and medium-sized banks; fund usable for resolutions and liquidations subject to safeguards.
    - Calibrate scheme with depositor preference and a back-up line of credit from National Treasury (NT) or SARB to address industry concerns about levies in concentrated banking system.

### Financial safety net arrangements — overview and legal gaps
- Rationale:
  - Updating safety net aligns with international best practice to mitigate risks, better distribute costs of instability, provide better incentives for risk management, protect depositors, and reduce contingent public risks.
- Legal framework gaps and institutional prerequisites:
  - SARB Act and Constitution: SARB’s “primary objective” is to protect the value of the currency; no explicit secondary objective for financial stability in law.
  - Government policy since 2010 reflects financial stability responsibility for SARB, but amendments to SARB Act needed to explicitly include a financial stability objective and associated powers.
  - Key prerequisites: clear allocation of roles/responsibilities; sound legal underpinnings; effective domestic and cross-border cooperation mechanisms.

### Domestic cooperation, coordination bodies, and Draft FSR Bill implications
- Existing cooperation provisions:
  - Banks Act section 4(3) empowers Registrar to enter written cooperation arrangements (scope appears limited to supervisory matters).
  - Banks Act section 89 permits information sharing with fellow regulators if essential for their statutory functions.
  - SARB (BSD) and FSB have MoU signed December 1998 for coordination; FSB Act and Financial Markets Act provide additional cooperation powers and obligations.
  - National Treasury (NT) retains ministerial roles including curator appointment and approval for certain public financing acts; section 224 (2) Constitution requires SARB to consult with minister.
  - National Credit Regulator (NCR) empowered to cooperate and coordinate under NCA; concurrent jurisdiction with provincial credit regulators noted.
- Practical coordinating bodies:
  - FSCF: voluntary coordinating body created 2003; chaired by SARB deputy governor; members include NT, SARB, FSB, industry associations; meets ordinarily twice a year; has operational risk and contingency planning sub-committees; conducts crisis exercises (including March 2014).
  - Interim FSOC: informally established; co-chaired by minister and governor; assisted by SARB internal FSC and FSD.
- Draft FSR Bill (December 2013):
  - Reallocates supervision to PA (within SARB) and MCA; provides explicitly for financial stability oversight and resolution by SARB though objective and scope unclear.
  - Statutory mandates for FSOC and CFR envisaged; expected to coexist with FSCF and SARB technical advisory mechanisms.
  - Minister’s proposed roles include crisis management decisions affecting public finances, designating systemic institutions (on FSOC recommendation), and making emergency regulations.
- Areas recommended for strengthening:
  - Amend SARB Act to explicitly include a financial stability objective and delineate SARB functions/powers for that objective ensuring separation from price stability.
  - Reconsider minister’s role in designating systemic institutions and circumscribe exclusive ministerial crisis powers to cases involving public funding/guarantees.
  - Initially focus SARB resolution authority on deposit-taking institutions and only systemic non-deposit-taking institutions.

### Cross-border cooperation, home-host issues, and RRPs
- Effectiveness and gaps:
  - Framework untested for multi-jurisdictional failures involving significant cross-border issues.
  - Existing MOUs and cooperation arrangements focus on supervisory matters and generally do not cover resolution and crisis management measures.
  - Enforcement gap: Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act does not explicitly provide for recognition/enforcement of foreign administrative resolution actions (e.g., bail-in) affecting branches/subsidiaries in South Africa; little flexibility for recognition via administrative action.
- Recommendations to enhance cross-border coordination:
  - Expand legal framework to explicitly cover cross-border resolution and crisis management, pre-agreed information exchange, decision-making procedures, and burden-sharing arrangements.
  - Mandate cooperation not only with foreign supervisory agencies but also foreign resolution, fiscal authorities, deposit insurance schemes, and others involved in crisis management.
  - SARB (with financial stability objective and resolution authority) should take lead in dialogues with foreign authorities, with NT support.
  - Explore hosting supervisory colleges for FirstRand Group and Nedbank Group; create Crisis Management Groups to ensure group-wide RRPs.
  - Consider amending Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act to treat foreign out-of-court resolution decisions as foreign judgments subject to streamlined recognition/enforcement.
  - Empower domestic resolution authority to recognize foreign resolution actions and take supportive domestic measures; explore contractual approaches to support cross-border enforceability of bail-in.
- RRPs:
  - Current legal framework does not require mandatory recovery plans; SARB relies on general Banks Act powers and Guidance Notes (2012) for phased RRP introduction.
  - Recovery plans prepared and initially discussed for systemically important banks; resolution plans on hold pending new resolution powers.
  - Recommended: set clear regulatory basis for RRPs; provide PA powers (in consultation with Resolution Authority) to direct structural changes; develop comprehensive guidance; establish statutory basis to obtain information from overseas entities/authorities.

### Money market operations, CLF design, and ELA framework
- SARB operational toolkit:
  - Structural cash reserve requirement: 2.5 percent on certain bank liabilities.
  - Standing facility: overnight repo/reverse repos at repo rate ±100 basis points.
  - Fixed-rate repurchase auctions: one-week maturities at repo rate.
  - Supplementary “square-off auctions” and tom-next FX swaps used for liquidity management.
  - 22 banks have settlement accounts with the SARB.
- CLF and Basel III LCR phasing:
  - LCR phasing: start in 2015 at 60 percent of banks' net cash flow over a 30-day period; rise 10 percent annually to reach 100 percent in 2019.
  - SARB offering a Committed Liquidity Facility (CLF) from 2015 to enable banks to meet LCR; CLF access capped at maximum of 40 percent of a bank's total HQLA requirement; SARB will review 40 percent cap annually.
  - SARB estimated shortfall to meet 100 percent LCR at approximately R140 billion (SARB Guidance Note 6/2013, Aug, 2013).
  - CLF fees: scaled commitment fee between 10 and 45 basis points; drawdowns incur interest of SARB repo rate plus 100 basis points; drawdown maturity of 31 days.
- CLF eligible collateral and haircuts (as stated):
  - Listed debt South African securities (sovereign and parastatal issues) with minimum domestic credit rating of A– (equivalent to BBB– on an international scale): haircuts varying, by rating and maturity, from 0.5 percentage points (ppt) to 6 ppt for sovereign, and 1 to 12 ppt for other issuers.
  - Self-securitized rand-denominated RMBS (compliant with SARB guidelines): No haircut if issue complies with SARB guidelines.
  - Self-securitized rand-denominated CMBS: may be accepted on a case-by-case basis.
  - Securitized notes of retail loans (e.g., vehicle or asset finance): on a case-by-case basis.
  - Equities listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange main exchange and included in South Africa's Top 40 index: 15 percent haircut.
- ELA framework, internal guidelines, and legal constraints:
  - CLF does not prevent SARB providing ELA on wider terms; ELA lacks a formal framework and statutory solvency requirement.
  - SARB internal guidelines envisage a solvency test for non-systemic banks but permit ELA to systemic banks that may not be solvent subject to Governor’s Committee decision; guidelines discussed at FSCF but not formally adopted or public.
  - Remaining legal constraints: prohibitions removed for mortgage collateral in 2013; prohibitions remain on commercial paper over 120 days and agricultural bonds over six months; cap on amount of South African government bonds SARB can hold.
- FSAP recommendations on systemic liquidity provision:
  - Introduce explicit solvency requirement in SARB Act (or via ministerial regulation); ELA only to institutions judged solvent and forward-looking viability assessment should be used.
  - Make explicit that ELA to possibly insolvent banks requires government indemnity.
  - Define explicitly entities eligible for ELA and publish transparent ELA framework; consider systemic NBFIs and limit ELA eligibility typically to central-bank-regulated NBFIs.
  - Remove remaining arbitrary collateral prohibitions and require prudent valuation/haircut policies.
  - If equities retained in CLF, adopt haircut of at least 35 percent (noting central banks typically avoid equities); SARB should perform its own due diligence on self-retained RMBS and apply haircut of at least 15 percent.
  - Review CLF commitment fee structure annually to incentivize balance-sheet adjustments and reduce long-term CLF reliance.
  - FSAP team recommends requesting technical assistance from IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department to review framework and costs.

### Orderly and effective resolution — current regime, reform needs, and recommended special resolution regime
- Current regime and limitations:
  - Curatorship under Section 69 of Banks Act: curator appointed by MoF with broad powers; some powers require prior MoF approval.
  - Insolvent banks: RB may petition for liquidation under court supervision (Section 68); court-based liquidation uses ordinary corporate insolvency framework without financial stability objective.
  - Current powers used for small bank failures but lack critical features for systemic cases, early deployment, and minimizing taxpayer risk.
  - Historical public support examples include Bankcorp (1985), Alpha Bank (1990), Saambou Bank (2002), BoE Bank (2002), and African Bank (2014) where authorities announced ZAR 7 billion injection from SARB and proposals to restructure deposits/liabilities.
- FSAP recommended special resolution regime (Section 42 summary):
  - Powers: full range including ability to override shareholder/creditor rights; special resolution regime administered by SARB allowing liquidation under special regime instead of court-supervised corporate insolvency.
  - Resolution toolkit to include all powers listed in the Key Attributes (KAs): RRPs, structural change mandates, management replacement, appointment of administrator, transfer of assets/liabilities to bridge bank or AMC, bail-in creditors, timely payout of insured depositors (e.g., 7 days), deviation from pari passu, temporary disclosure exemptions, temporary stay (48 hours) on early termination rights, compel group entities to continue essential services, “no creditor worse off” compensation arrangements.
  - Triggers: harmonize at earlier juncture based on non-viability rather than conservatorship; include quantitative and qualitative triggers.
  - Scope: cover all deposit takers and systemic NBFIs; extend to holding companies, non-regulated operational entities significant to the group, and branches of foreign firms.
  - Institutional arrangements:
    - Single resolution authority recommended for deposit takers; avoid splitting responsibility across two institutions.
    - RA should prepare a resolution manual/handbook and draft contractual arrangements (bridge bank, asset transfers).
  - NBFIs:
    - Sequenced approach: focus first on deposit takers and systemic NBFIs.
    - Amend sectoral legislation for non-systemic NBFIs to strengthen early remedial and resolution powers without ministerial approval; lead regulator (PA or MCA) should be RA for non-systemic NBFIs.
    - Seek technical assistance from IMF and World Bank when drafting new legislation.
  - Review and legal protection:
    - Ensure resolution decisions are not restrained/suspended while under review.
    - Limit judicial/administrative review to enquiries about bad faith, illegality, or gross negligence; relief limited to monetary compensation.
    - Amend Banks Act to dispense with minister’s power to suspend/overturn fines and reconsider minister’s appointment role for Review/Appeals Boards.
    - Engage stakeholders early, including judiciary, to build consensus and explain jurisprudential shifts.
  - Legal protection for officials and curators:
    - Liability to apply only for gross negligence or willful misconduct.
    - Amend Section 88 to clarify curator responsibility, extend indemnity to curator, persons assisting curator, commissioners under section 69A, and NT employees/officers for lawful/good faith acts; provide indemnity for legal defense costs.

### Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS) design, funding, and operational considerations
- Recommendation:
  - Introduce an ex-ante funded DIS as part of reforms.
- Scope and membership:
  - Membership compulsory for all deposit-taking institutions regulated by the PA.
  - Include all retail deposit takers supervised by the PA, including Postbank.
  - Potential separate funds for nine commercial banks versus three mutual banks and 18 cooperatives if mutual sector grows significantly.
- Coverage design:
  - Target protecting depositors most in need; exclude foreign currency deposits given low levels.
  - Retail deposits covered independently of nationality/residency; SMEs may be covered; wholesale and large-firm deposits could be excluded.
  - Insurance cap at R50,000 would:
    - provide adequate protection to small depositors;
    - cover 96 percent of retail and SME depositors in full and 22 percent by value.
- Funding and operational design:
  - Ex-ante funded scheme with credible back-up funding from the state; unsecured credit line from NT at market interest rates recommended as back-up while fund builds up.
  - House scheme within SARB, narrow mandate: collect/invest levies; pay out depositors in liquidation; make funds available to RA for resolution.
  - IADI Guidance suggests target level sufficient to cover about “five or six small banks or several medium-sized banks.”
- Use of DIS in resolution:
  - DIS fund should be available to fund resolution powers subject to strict safeguards:
    - A statutory least-cost test required for any DIS resolution funding, net of estimated recoveries.
    - DIS funding limited to supporting resolution measures once resolution regime triggered; DIS resources cannot be used to provide solvency or liquidity support to an open bank not placed into resolution.
- Operational requirements:
  - Single customer view (SCV) recordkeeping required for members to enable rapid payout (target seven-day payout or less); phase-in period of one to two years suggested for members to implement systems.
  - Communication strategy and budget to raise public awareness of scheme coverage and limits.
- Depositor preference (DP):
  - Introduce DP to improve recoveries for DIS after payouts and to facilitate resolution options (P&A, bail-in) by reducing compensation/litigation risks.
  - DP should not discriminate by location or nationality; form informed by quantitative impact assessment.
  - Short-run effects: possible higher cost or reduced availability of wholesale funding; long-run average bank funding costs might not change significantly.

### DIS fund safeguards, rapid payout illustration, and recovery/loss examples
- DIS funding safeguards:
  - KA6.3 requires privately-financed deposit insurance or resolution funds, or ex post recovery mechanisms for temporary financing costs of resolution.
  - International experience: open bank assistance costs often larger than expected; strict least-cost statutory test recommended.
- Rapid payout and SCV:
  - SCV necessary to facilitate seven-day or less reimbursement; without SCV payouts delayed.
  - Members should be given reasonable phase-in (e.g., one to two years).
- Illustrative recovery/loss example (figure explanation):
  - Example balance-sheet: Assets $100; Liabilities include $40 retail deposits, $50 wholesale creditors, $8 subdebt, $2 equity; $30 losses on assets leave $70 remaining asset value.
  - P&A example: purchaser accepts $2 more of liabilities than assets; $38 of assets transferred with $40 retail deposits (retail deposits $0 loss); wholesale creditors recover $32 (64 percent of $50) instead of $39 (78 percent of $50).
  - Bail-in example: equity and subordinated creditors written down to zero; portion of wholesale creditors written down and converted; wholesale creditors incur extra loss of $16 minus market value of equity stake compared to insolvency.
  - Preserve numeric relationships and illustrative panel values as presented in the source figures.

*Source: _cr1553, International Monetary Fund.*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________________________ 5

### _cr1553 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________________________ 5

### Introduction and scope
- This note elaborates on the recommendations made during the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) for South Africa in the areas of contingency planning, crisis management, and bank resolution.
- It summarizes the findings of the FSAP mission undertaken during June 10-24, 2014, and is based upon analysis of the relevant legal and policy documents and extensive discussions with the authorities and private sector representatives.
- The note was prepared by Elsie P. Addo Awadzi and Marc Dobler. The section on systemic liquidity benefited from contributions from K. Eckhold, D. Murphy, and D. King.

### Key findings on financial sector soundness and risks
- No public support was extended to banks during the global financial crisis (GFC) and the recession it triggered in South Africa; banks remained sound and profitable during the crisis with the return on equity staying close to 20 percent.
- NPLs jumped from 2 percent of total loans at the onset of the crisis to 6 percent in late 2009, and the average NPL ratio has declined since to 3.6 percent in 2013.
- The regulatory tier one ratio of 13.5 percent in 2013 compares favorably with banks in other countries, and the SARB applies a 1 percent systemic risk surcharge to the large banks.
- After six years of fiscal accommodation and easy liquidity conditions, public and private balance sheets are more leveraged and exposed to changes in domestic and external conditions.
- Bank credit is funded largely by local deposits, with institutional deposits from insurance companies, pension funds, and other financial institutions representing 29 percent of total deposits.
- The average funding maturity of South African banks has shortened; the liquid asset to short-term liabilities ratio of around 35 percent is low among peer countries and considerably lower than in advanced economies.
- The average loan-to-deposit ratio is 113 percent.
- Bank lending is concentrated in the household sector (representing 60 percent of loans in 2012), with mortgages accounting for 37 percent of bank credit.
- The current provisioning coverage ratio (specific loan loss provisions as a percentage of impaired loans) is relatively low at approximately 45 percent.
- Vulnerabilities were highlighted in August 2014 when African Bank (accounting for 1.5 percent of banking system assets) was placed under curatorship after record losses on unsecured lending to low-income households.
- The top four banks—ABSA Bank, FirstRand Bank, Nedbank, and Standard Bank—account for almost 85 percent of total assets, and exceed 90 percent with the fifth largest bank (Investec Bank). Subsidiaries of foreign banks represent about one-third of total banking sector assets.
- Claims of South African banks on other African countries have more than tripled over the last five years, creating coordination challenges with host supervisory authorities.

### Institutional framework and supervisory reform
- The current structure of supervision is complex and multi-layered, challenging supervision at the consolidated or conglomerate level.
- The authorities are introducing a “twin peaks” model to reduce the number of agencies involved in supervision to a “prudential” and a “conduct” regulator; the draft 2013 Financial Sector Regulation Bill (FSR Bill), expected to be passed into law later this year, will provide the legal underpinnings for the reforms.
- A resolution bill currently being drafted will assign resolution authority and new resolution powers to the SARB.
- Several elements of best practice are missing or have weaknesses:
  - the SARB’s current powers for early intervention in ailing financial institutions require strengthening to address significant limitations to its authority to suspend a bank’s license, restrict a bank’s activities, or remove a director or officer of a bank;
  - the current curatorship powers require the approval of the minister, are not available at a suitably early juncture, and lack the full range of resolution tools recommended in the Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution (2010);
  - no mechanism exists for industry funding of depositor protection and resolution costs.

### Main FSAP recommendations (summary)
- Institutional framework and coordination arrangements:
  - The proposed scope of the new resolution regime and of the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) jurisdiction as the resolution authority remains unclear.
  - The authorities should consider, in the first instance, focusing on all deposit-taking institutions and only those other financial institutions that are currently deemed systemic.
  - Non-deposit-taking financial institutions that are not found to be systemic should be resolved by the Prudential Authority (PA) or the Market Conduct Authority (MCA), whichever is the lead regulator.
- Domestic and cross-border cooperation and coordination:
  - The interim Financial Stability Oversight Committee (FSOC) should be given statutory backing, as planned for under the twin peaks regulatory framework.
  - The role of the Financial Sector Contingency Forum (FSCF) should be reviewed to remove any potential duplication with the mandates of the proposed FSOC and Council of Financial Regulators (CFR).
  - The SARB/Financial Services Board (FSB) Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) should be expanded to cover cooperation in relation to dual regulated Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs); e.g., payments and clearing systems.
  - The scope of cross-border cooperation with home and host authorities should go beyond supervision to resolution and crisis management, including pre-agreed mechanisms for the exchange of information, decision-making powers and procedures, and burden-sharing arrangements to help promote orderly cross-border resolution.
  - Supervisory colleges for the FirstRand Group and the Nedbank Group should be explored.
- Supervisory early intervention and recovery planning:
  - There is an urgent need to amend the Banks Act to strengthen the Registrar’s ability to intervene early in banks, with reasonable autonomy and as few constraints as feasible within constitutional boundaries.
  - The authorities should provide a clear statutory basis for Recovery and Resolution Plans (RRPs), and develop comprehensive guidelines on what the recovery plans should cover.
  - The proposed PA should have explicit powers to require structural changes to group structures to enhance resolvability.
- Emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) and systemic NBFIs:
  - A solvency test should be introduced in the framework, preferably in the SARB Act, such that any ELA to banks that may be insolvent should only take place with an indemnity from the government.
  - The authorities should consider the potential liquidity needs of systemic nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), such as a systemic payments or clearing system, and determine whether they may potentially need to access ELA to preserve systemic functions.
  - Eligibility for ELA should then be explicitly defined and publicly conveyed.
  - Remaining arbitrary collateral prohibitions in the SARB Act should be removed and replaced with a requirement for the SARB to follow prudent collateral policies.
  - If equities are retained as an eligible collateral class in the Committed Liquidity Facility (CLF), a haircut of at least 35 percent should be adopted.
  - The SARB should undertake its own due diligence of self-retained residential mortgage-backed securities, and of the underlying loan assets, and apply a haircut of at least 15 percent.
- Orderly and effective resolution:
  - Under the current resolution regime, powers are assigned to a curator appointed by the Minister of Finance (MoF) when a bank is at the point of or close to insolvency. The Registrar may also petition the court to commence liquidation proceedings in respect of an insolvent bank.
  - While these powers have been used in small bank failures and have been strengthened since the last FSAP, they lack critical features necessary to deal with a systemic case and minimize taxpayer risk.
  - The authorities’ recent intervention of African Bank was effective in limiting contagion but underscored the need to reform the regime to comply with best international practice.
  - As a member of the Financial Stability Board, the authorities are committed to bringing the regime into compliance with the Key Attributes of Effective Resolution (KAs) by end-2015.
  - The resolution toolkit will need to be significantly enhanced to include all the powers listed in the KAs, including bridge bank and bail-in powers.
  - The triggers for these powers should allow for their early deployment when the firm is no longer viable or likely to be no longer viable.
  - The FSAP team recommends that the SARB be made the resolution authority for all licensed deposit takers and for systemic NBFIs.
- Judicial reviews and legal protection:
  - The MoF’s power to overturn fines imposed by the Registrar of Banks (RB) or to empanel a Review Board to review and possibly reverse the RB’s decisions should be removed.
  - The RB should be empowered to take action within a shorter time frame instead of the current ex ante 30 days’ notice that must be provided to affected persons in many instances.
  - Judicial review should not prohibit the exercise of resolution powers, or suspend or reverse actions as a result of the review process.
  - Relief available to claimants should be limited to monetary compensation where the authorities are found to have acted in bad faith, illegally, or with gross negligence, but strict proof must be provided by the claimant.
  - The immunity from personal liability, provided to the SARB officials under the Banks Act, should be extended to non-employees of the SARB appointed to undertake or assist in resolution.
  - Relevant officials should also be indemnified by the RB for the cost of defending legal actions.
- Depositor protection and funding of resolution:
  - International best practice aims to transfer the costs of bank resolution and depositor protection from the public to the private sector.
  - Public funds have been used in past cases to stem depositor contagion in South Africa, and were deployed again in the recent resolution of African Bank.
  - The FSAP team reiterated the recommendation from the 2008 FSAP to establish a deposit insurance scheme (DIS).
  - It also recommended establishing an ex ante fund, sufficient to pay out a number of small and medium-sized banks. This fund should be available for use in funding resolutions as well as in liquidations, subject to strict safeguards.
  - If the scheme is introduced, with depositor preference and a back-up line of credit from the National Treasury (NT) or the SARB, it could be calibrated such that long-standing industry concerns about levies in a highly concentrated banking system might be partly allayed.

### Table 1 — Main Recommendations (excerpted priorities and items)
- Institutional arrangements
  - (i) Limit the role of the Finance Minister in a resolution to only those cases in which public funds are needed to support the resolution. — Priority: Medium
- Domestic and cross-border cooperation and planning arrangements
  - (ii) Require in statute, recovery and resolution plans to be prepared for all firms of systemic importance and provide detailed guidelines. — Priority: Immediate
  - (iii) Amend the legal framework to provide for an administrative process to support mutual recognition and enforcement of cross-border resolution actions. — Priority: Medium
  - (iv) Amend the legal framework to provide clearly for a mandate and necessary information gateways to cooperate on cross-border resolution issues. — Priority: Medium
- Emergency liquidity assistance and early intervention powers
  - (v) Clarify the ELA policy framework, including with regard to solvency and eligibility requirements preferably through an amendment to the SARB Act. — Priority: Immediate
  - (vi) Remove the remaining prohibitions on collateral classes and amend CLF collateral policies to protect the SARB balance sheet. — Priority: Immediate
  - (vii) Remove constraints to early intervention powers and improve legal protection for resolution officials. — Priority: Immediate
- Resolution tools
  - (viii) Introduce a resolution regime compliant with the Key Attributes for, and make the SARB the resolution authority of, all banks and SIFIs. — Priority: Medium
  - (ix) Ensure that the regime triggers allow for the full range of KA resolution powers to be deployed at an early juncture when the institution is no longer viable or likely to be no longer viable, including when liquidity requirements are seriously breached. — Priority: Medium
- Depositor protection
  - (x) Introduce a DIS with ex ante funding that could be used to fund a payout or a resolution, subject to a least cost test set out in legislation. — Priority: Medium
  - (xi) Levy the industry to build up a deposit insurance fund sufficient to make payouts in case of the failure of a number of medium-sized banks, and provide a back-up line of credit from the National Treasury. — Priority: Medium
  - (xii) Adopt depositor preference in the legislation. — Priority: Medium

*Source: _cr1553 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, International Monetary Fund.*

### 7.      Bringing the financial safety net arrangements up-to-date with international best

### _cr1553 - 7.      Bringing the financial safety net arrangements up-to-date with international best

### Overview and rationale
- Updating financial safety net arrangements to align with international best practice would mitigate risks and better distribute the costs associated with financial instability.
- Strengthening the financial safety net would:
  - provide better incentives for financial institutions to manage risk;
  - protect less financially sophisticated participants (depositors);
  - reduce the contingent public risks associated with preserving financial stability.

### Institutional framework
- Key prerequisites for effective crisis management:
  - clear allocation of roles and responsibilities;
  - sound legal underpinnings for mandates;
  - effective mechanisms for domestic and cross-border cooperation and coordination.
- Legal framework gaps:
  - The SARB’s “primary objective” under the 1994 Constitution and the SARB Act is to protect the value of the currency “in the interest of balanced and sustainable growth in the Republic”.
  - No secondary objective for financial stability is explicitly provided for in law.
  - Government policy since 2010 reflects a financial stability and macro prudential responsibility for the SARB, but amendments to the SARB Act are required to provide legal underpinnings for such a mandate.
  - Recommended amendments should explicitly include a financial stability objective and provide for the SARB’s functions and powers to realize that objective.
- Allocation of regulatory and supervisory responsibilities:
  - Responsibility is allocated among a number of independent agencies and self-regulatory organizations (see Box 4 in the Financial System Stability Assessment Report for roles of key institutions).

### Domestic cooperation and coordination
- Legal provisions for cooperation:
  - SARB:
    - Section 4 (3) of the Banks Act empowers the Registrar of Banks to enter into written cooperation arrangements such as MoUs with any supervisor or other person or institution, though scope appears limited to supervisory matters.
    - Section 89 of the Banks Act permits sharing of information by the Registrar of Banks with fellow regulators, provided the Registrar is satisfied the information is essential for the proper performance of a function under any law by the fellow regulator.
    - The SARB (Bank Supervision Department) and the South African FSB have an existing MOU signed in December 1998 for coordination and cooperation; the MOU provides for mutual assistance in supervision, exchange of information, and guidelines for cooperative supervision of financial conglomerates.
  - FSB:
    - The FSB Act empowers the FSB to liaise with any regulatory authority on matters of common interest; participate in proceedings of any regulatory authority; advise or receive advice from any regulatory authority.
    - The FSB is required to notify other relevant regulatory authorities of pending regulatory action affecting their interests and may negotiate and enter into bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements with supervisory authorities (including foreign supervisors).
    - A 2013 amendment allows the FSB to share information in the public interest, or with a regulatory authority (including an organ of state) for purposes including ensuring the safety and soundness of financial institutions and ensuring financial stability.
    - Under the Financial Markets Act of 2012 (FMA), the Registrar of Securities Services within the FSB must make adequate arrangements for effective cooperation with the SARB governor in respect of monitoring and mitigation of systemic risks and must inform the minister and the governor of matters that may pose systemic risks to the financial markets.
  - National Treasury (NT):
    - Minister’s role includes making regulations under sectoral legislation, approving certain supervisory actions, and appointment of a curator under the Banks Act.
    - Section 224 (2) of the Constitution requires the SARB, while maintaining independence in pursuit of its primary objective, to regularly consult with the minister.
    - For public financing of crisis management: minister’s approval is required under section 13 (b) of the SARB Act if acquisition of a bank’s shares by the SARB is contemplated.
    - Under section 66 of the Public Finance Management Act of 1999, the minister has the exclusive mandate to borrow on behalf of the government and to approve any government guarantees if needed for a public purpose.
  - National Credit Regulator (NCR):
    - Regulates consumer credit and registers credit providers under the National Credit Act of 2005 (NCA).
    - NCA empowers the NCR to cooperate with any regulatory authority on matters of common interest and requires the NCR (sections 17 and 57) to enter into agreements with relevant financial sector regulators and to cooperate and coordinate before taking action against a registered credit provider.
    - Footnote: The NCR currently shares concurrent jurisdiction over consumer credit regulation with various provincial government credit regulators who are required to share information on their registrations and supervisory activities with the NCR (Sections 37 and 38 of NCA).

### Coordinating bodies and practical arrangements
- No formal legal framework for financial stability oversight and crisis management exists, but practical arrangements are in place:
  - FSCF (Financial Sector Contingency Forum):
    - Created in 2003 to coordinate plans, mechanisms, and structures for managing financial crises; operates as a voluntary coordinating body and ordinarily meets twice a year.
    - Chaired by the deputy governor of the SARB; membership includes NT, SARB, FSB, Bank Association of South Africa, South African Insurance Association, Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Payments Association of South Africa, SA Bankers Services Company, Strate Limited, and the Association for Savings and Investment South Africa.
    - An MoU defines obligations and expectations; work organized around two sub-committees:
      - Operational risk sub-committee (includes private-sector participants; focuses on infrastructure failures and operational risks).
      - Contingency planning sub-committee (includes SARB and NT representatives; responsible for contingency planning for financial crises and identification of systemic risks).
    - Activities include crisis exercises (including one in March 2014), formation of a small incident-management team, and preparation of a manual emphasizing liquidity issues.
    - Footnote: Under the Multilateral MOU for the FSCF, members agreed in principle to cooperate in processes, initiatives, strategies and activities of the FSCF and to exchange information and execute agreed-upon actions in the broad interest of the financial system as a whole.
  - Interim FSOC:
    - Informally established to coordinate financial stability matters between the SARB, other regulatory agencies, and the NT.
    - Currently co-chaired by the minister and the governor.
    - Assisted by the internal Financial Stability Committee (FSC) within the SARB, chaired by the governor.
    - The recently established Financial Stability Department (FSD) helps identify and evaluate systemic risks and make recommendations and policy proposals to the governor.

### Proposed reforms and the Draft Financial Sector Regulation Bill 2013
- The Draft Financial Sector Regulation Bill (published December 2013 by the NT for public consultation and currently being revised) will:
  - reallocate regulatory and supervisory responsibilities to a Prudential Authority (PA) within the SARB, and a Market Conduct Authority (MCA);
  - provide explicitly for financial stability oversight and resolution by the SARB, although the SARB’s financial stability objective is still unclear, as is the scope of its proposed resolution authority;
  - improve cooperation and coordinating mechanisms through the FSOC as well as with the Council of Financial Regulators (CFR), which will both have statutory mandates; the CFR will coordinate financial sector regulators in areas of common interest, including rule making, inspections, and enforcement.
- Expected interactions with existing bodies:
  - These statutory mechanisms are expected to coexist with the existing FSCF (which includes industry representatives).
  - The technical advisory mechanisms within the SARB (the FSC and the FSD) are expected to remain and support the FSOC.
- Proposed role of the minister under the twin peaks model (prominent responsibilities):
  - taking decisions relating to crisis management that may have an actual or potential impact on public finances, including any likelihood of an increase in public expenditure, an increase, or risk of an increase, in actual or contingent liabilities assumed by the government, or anything that may affect the price at which the government is able to raise money in the debt markets;
  - designating a financial institution as systemically important (on the recommendations of the FSOC);
  - making emergency regulations necessary to facilitate the management of a financial crisis.
- Areas for further strengthening the current proposals:
  - The draft FSR Bill states “The Reserve Bank has primary responsibility for promoting financial stability in terms of section 3 of the Reserve Bank Act.” Given section 3 provides for a price stability objective, the draft language suggests financial stability responsibility would have to be carried out in furtherance of, and only to the extent that it contributes to achieving, price stability. The draft Bill should specifically amend the SARB Act to include an explicit financial stability objective and provide for SARB’s functions and powers to give effect to that objective, ensuring legal and operational separation between price stability and financial stability objectives.
  - The minister’s role in designating institutions as systemic should be reconsidered in light of the proposed financial stability mandate of the SARB.
  - The scope of circumstances giving the minister exclusive power to take crisis-management decisions should be more circumscribed; responsibility for taking crisis-management-related decisions should be shared by the NT, the SARB, and all supervisory authorities. The minister’s exclusive authority should be limited to circumstances where public funding/guarantees will be required.
  - The draft FSR Bill should initially focus SARB’s resolution authority on all deposit-taking institutions, and only on other financial institutions that are deemed systemic. Non-deposit-taking financial institutions that are not found to be systemic should be resolved by the PA or MCA, whichever is the lead regulator.
  - Footnote on SARB objective: Section 224 (1) of the Constitution and section 3 of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) Act assign price stability as the SARB’s primary objective.

### Aligning existing mechanisms with the twin peaks architecture
- Recommended reviews and adjustments:
  - Reconstitute the FSCF to reflect new mandates of the PA and the MCA; determine whether the existing MoU and Terms of Reference for the FSCF require revisions in light of twin peaks arrangements; clarify differences between the FSCF’s role and that of the FSOC.
  - Replace the existing MoU between the BSD and the FSB with a new MoU between the PA and the MCA.

### Cross-border cooperation and coordination
- Cross-border challenges:
  - Crisis management and resolution are more complex in a cross-border context because banks are increasingly part of larger international groups and home-host coordination faces diverging incentives.
  - The Key Attributes of Effective Resolution (KAs) state statutory mandates of resolution authorities should empower and strongly encourage cooperative solutions with foreign resolution authorities wherever possible.
- Legal framework supportive elements:
  - Registrar of Banks’ power under section 4(3) of the Banks Act covers entering into written cooperation arrangements with host or home supervisors; scope covers supervisory matters.
  - FSB’s power to cooperate and share information extends to foreign regulatory authorities; powers explicitly cover cooperation and information sharing for supervisory matters and for ensuring safety and soundness of financial institutions and financial stability (Section 22 (2) (dd) (ee) (B), (C), (D)).
- Current cross-border arrangements:
  - MoUs:
    - SARB’s operational policies for foreign banks require establishment of an MOU with the foreign supervisor as part of authorization/registration.
    - Number of MOUs increased from 10 in 2008 to 25 in 2012, with another 12 currently being negotiated.
    - Protocol on Finance and Investment signed by 14 heads of state or government of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) provides a framework for cooperation and coordination in banking regulatory and supervisory matters in SADC countries.
  - Supervisory colleges:
    - Used as a platform by home country supervisors to share information with BSD as host country supervisor.
    - BSD organized supervisory colleges for the Standard Bank Group (operations in 17 other African countries).
    - A supervisory college was planned for Barclays Africa Group Limited during November 2014 (presence in eight other African countries).
    - No plans for hosting supervisory colleges for FirstRand Group and Nedbank Group (which have eight and five subsidiaries, respectively, in Africa).
    - BSD participates in supervisory colleges of foreign banks as a host supervisor and holds ad hoc meetings with supervisors from other jurisdictions (notably the Prudential Regulation Authority in the United Kingdom).
  - Crisis management groups:
    - South Africa participates in two Crisis Management Groups for G-SIFIs: Barclays (for ABSA Bank) and Old Mutual (for Nedbank).

*Source: _cr1553 - 7.      Bringing the financial safety net arrangements up-to-date with international best practice*

### 21.      The authorities’ framework for home-host cooperation in the context of crisis

### 21.      The authorities’ framework for home-host cooperation in the context of crisis

### Effectiveness and key gaps in the existing framework
- The effectiveness of the existing framework is untested, given that there has not been any failure of a multi-jurisdictional institution of which South Africa was the home or host jurisdiction, which involved significant cross-border issues.
- Key identified gaps:
  - Existing cooperation arrangements and MOUs with foreign authorities deal with supervisory issues only and, as yet, not with resolution and crisis management related issues.
  - The existing statutory framework in South Africa, which provides for the enforcement of foreign judicial actions by domestic courts under certain conditions, may not support enforcement of administrative resolution actions, such as bail-in by a foreign resolution authority of a foreign bank with operations in South Africa.
  - Under the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, South African courts may recognize and give effect to foreign judgments, but it appears not to provide specifically for the recognition and enforcement of foreign administrative resolution actions that may affect a branch or subsidiary in South Africa.
  - There appears to be no flexibility for the recognition and enforcement of such decisions through administrative action by the resolution authorities.
  - The KAs contemplate that procedures for the recognition or support of foreign measures should be transparent and expedited, provisional on the equitable treatment of creditors in the foreign resolution proceeding. Where courts are involved in giving effect to resolution actions, the process should not impede prompt resolution.

### Advance planning and international precedent
- Advance planning can help align incentives so home and host authorities consider international spillovers.
- Illustration: Australia and New Zealand have statutory arrangements for prudential regulators to support each other and to consult, where practicable, before taking action that might have a detrimental effect on financial system stability in the other country.

### Recommendations to enhance cross-border coordination and information sharing (particularly for resolution)
- Expand scope of cross-border cooperation under the legal framework to explicitly cover:
  - Cooperation and coordination in respect of cross-border resolution and crisis management arrangements generally, and in respect of specific institutions/groups with cross-border operations.
  - Pre-agreed arrangements for the exchange of information, decision-making powers and procedures to promote orderly resolution.
  - Mandate to cooperate not only with foreign supervisory agencies, but also with all foreign resolution, fiscal authorities, deposit insurance schemes, and others that share responsibility for crisis management and burden-sharing arrangements.
- Institutional lead:
  - With a financial stability objective and designated resolution authority under the proposed twin peaks legislation, and with the support of the NT, the SARB should be in a strong position to take the lead in initiating a dialogue with foreign authorities.
- Host supervisory colleges and Crisis Management Groups:
  - Explore feasibility of hosting supervisory colleges for the FirstRand Group and the Nedbank Group, given their substantial presence in other African countries.
  - In the context of all supervisory colleges, spearhead establishment of Crisis Management Groups for the various banking groups to ensure relevant information is shared and that recovery and resolution plans are prepared and updated on a group-wide basis.
- Mutual recognition and enforcement:
  - Legal framework should support mutual recognition and enforcement of resolution actions (preferably through administrative measures) between South African authorities and their foreign counterparts, subject to non-discriminatory treatment of foreign creditors.
  - Consider amendment to the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act to provide that decisions of foreign resolution authorities made out-of-court be considered as foreign judgments subject to recognition and enforcement through streamlined procedures already in place.
  - Resolution legal framework should empower the resolution authority to recognize foreign resolution actions and to take measures under the domestic resolution regime that support and are consistent with measures taken by the foreign home resolution authority.
  - Explore contractual solutions to support cross-border enforceability of resolution actions such as bail-in affecting cross-border banks.
  - Cooperation agreements with foreign counterparts should cover cooperation for mutual recognition and enforcement (through administrative processes) of resolution actions, including through contractual approaches (voluntary and through regulatory requirements), where feasible.
- Strategic imperative:
  - As home jurisdiction for a number of South African banks operating in Sub-Saharan Africa and host jurisdiction to foreign bank branches and subsidiaries, South African authorities should engage proactively with counterparts in home and host jurisdictions to ensure statutory, contractual, and cooperative mechanisms facilitate enforcement of resolution actions with cross-border implications.

### Resolution and Recovery Planning (RRPs)
- Legal basis and current practice:
  - The existing legal framework does not require mandatory recovery plans to be prepared by banks.
  - The SARB currently relies on its general powers under the Banks Act to request recovery plans from banks.
  - The Registrar of Banks published Guidance Notes in 2012 announcing phased-in introduction of recovery and resolution planning, expecting recovery plans to be developed over a two- to three-year period with guidance from the BSD.
- Status:
  - Recovery plans have been prepared and initially discussed with the SARB for the systemically important banks, while resolution plans are on hold until new resolution powers are introduced.
- Recommended actions:
  - Set out a clear regulatory basis for recovery and resolution plans (RRPs).
  - Provide the PA with powers (in consultation with the Resolution Authority) to direct a bank/group to make structural changes to promote resolvability.
  - Develop comprehensive guidelines on what recovery plans should cover.
  - Address potential difficulty in obtaining relevant information from overseas entities or authorities by establishing a clear statutory basis for RRPs.

### Supervisory early intervention in banks — constraints and gaps
- The existing legal framework provides the Registrar of Banks (RB) with a range of early intervention powers, but these are constrained in key respects.
- Key specific constraints:
  - The RB lacks operational autonomy to cancel or revoke a banking license, approve a merger or acquisition, remove a director or officer of a bank, or impose a fine in many circumstances.
  - The RB is required to obtain prior consent from the minister for cancellation or suspension of the authorization of a branch of a foreign bank (Section 18B of the Banks Act).
  - The RB must consult with the minister in the case of a bank that has ceased to conduct the business of a bank or is no longer in operation (Section 23 (3) of the Banks Act).
  - The minister’s approval is required for bank mergers and the acquisition of more than 25 percent of the assets, liabilities or assets and liabilities of a bank (except under an approved securitization scheme) (Section 54 (1); (1A) of the Banks Act).
  - The RB is required to obtain a court order for the cancellation or suspension of a banking license, including for unsatisfactory conduct of business, undesirable business practices, or non-compliance under the Banks Act — recourse to the courts would seem an unnecessary fetter on early intervention.
  - The RB must seek approval from an arbitrator to remove a director or officer of a bank where the affected person makes representations challenging the intended action, or fails to make any representations; the arbitrator has discretion under section 60 (6) to determine the RB’s proposal lacks merit.
- Due process timing constraints:
  - Prior notice and a waiting period of 30 days is required to allow an affected bank to make representations to the RB as to why he/she should not cancel/suspend a bank’s registration, restrict its activities, or impose a fine for non-compliance under the Act (Sections 23 (2); 24; 91A).
  - In the case of action to remove a director or officer, the notice and waiting period is reduced to 14 days, although the Registrar must submit the matter to arbitration if, within the 14-day period, the affected person makes representations against the intended action or makes no representations at all.
  - There is no power given to the RB to reduce this timeframe or waive it, except in the case of administrative fines for a breach of regulatory requirements where the RB may waive notice requirements.
  - These timing requirements could lead to further deterioration in a bank’s financial condition with likely contagion effects.
- Other gaps:
  - Triggers (quantitative and qualitative) for graduation from minor to more intrusive intervention are somewhat unclear.
  - RB’s discretion to “condone the failure or inability” to meet minimum capital, unimpaired reserves, or minimum liquidity requirements leaves unclear when corrective action is required.
  - RB can impose fines on a bank but has no power to impose fines on persons associated with banks (including shareholders, directors, and management).
  - RB can remove but not replace directors and/or officers of a bank.

### Recommended legal and institutional reforms for early intervention and resolution
- General objective:
  - Amend the Banks Act to strengthen the RB’s ability to intervene early in banks where necessary, with reasonable autonomy and as few constraints as feasible within constitutional boundaries.
- Specific recommendations:
  - Right to fair hearing:
    - Consider legislative amendments to the Banks Act to:
      - (i) reduce the ex ante 30-day and 14-day notice and hearing requirements to a much shorter period (24 hours, if possible); and/or
      - (ii) empower the RB, on a case-by-case basis, to waive ex ante notice and hearing requirements on the basis of necessity; or
      - (iii) remove the requirement for ex ante notice and provide an ex post mechanism for notifying the person affected and providing the right to redress if the action of the RB is found to have no merit.
    - Section 3(4) and (5) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) would seem to support such changes; authorities should seek local expert legal advice to ensure changes fit constitutional jurisprudence.
  - Ministerial approvals and court/arbitrator constraints:
    - Amend Section 54 of the Banks Act to dispense with the minister’s power to approve mergers and acquisitions of the assets and liabilities of a bank.
    - Amend the Banks Act to dispense with the requirement for the RB to:
      - (i) seek a court order for the cancellation or suspension of a banking license (section 23 (3) and section 25); and
      - (ii) obtain approval from an arbitrator in order to remove a director or officer of a bank (section 60 (6)).
  - Clarify triggers:
    - Amend the Banks Act or secondary legislation to clarify quantitative and qualitative triggers for the exercise of more intrusive intervention powers.
    - Triggers should reflect a graduated regime from simple enforcement to intrusive corrective powers, and should clarify the point of non-viability where an institution moves from early intervention to resolution, to avoid indefinite stays in early intervention.
  - Re-alignment with twin peaks:
    - Re-align early intervention and resolution powers under existing legal framework with proposed institutional changes under the twin peaks approach.
    - As part of twin peaks implementation, streamline early intervention powers in sectoral legislation for banking, insurance, securities, and FMIs to align with the new regulatory architecture.

*Source: _cr1553 - 21.      The authorities’ framework for home-host cooperation in the context of crisis*

### 32.      The SARB uses a range of instruments to keep money market rates close to the

### _cr1553 - 32.      The SARB uses a range of instruments to keep money market rates close to the

### Money market operations and liquidity management
- The SARB uses a range of instruments to keep money market rates close to the monetary policy rate and aims to compel banks to borrow from the SARB.
- Structural and operational tools:
  - Structural cash reserve requirement: 2.5 percent on certain bank liabilities.
  - Open-market instruments: SARB debentures, reverse repos, foreign-exchange swaps, and movement of government funds between the SARB and the market to create a liquidity shortage (the “liquidity requirement”).
  - Standing facility: available on an automated basis as overnight repo or reverse repos; interest rate set at a spread of 100 basis points above and below the prevailing repo rate.
  - Fixed-rate repurchase (repo) auctions: one-week maturities at the repo rate set by the Monetary Policy Committee.
  - Supplementary “square-off auctions” may be offered to clearing banks (22 banks have settlement accounts with the SARB) when unexpected large shifts in liquidity conditions occur.
  - Use of tom-next foreign exchange swaps for domestic liquidity management purposes.
- The SARB transacts regularly to drain liquidity; resulting short-term liquidity needs of banks are met through refinancing operations with the SARB.

### Refinements to open market operations since 1998
- Collateral eligibility history:
  - 2007: widened to include non-government bonds issued by state-owned enterprises.
  - 2011: reverted to rand-denominated government bonds and treasury bills, SARB-issued debentures, and Land Bank bills.
- February 2012 changes after year-end rate volatility:
  - Increased range of maturities of instruments.
  - Allocated excess orders on a pro rata basis.
- August 2013 announcement: SARB would gradually increase the money market shortage over time; caused short-term volatility in money market rates.
- SARB interventions:
  - Year-end volatility observable in 2013; SARB injected rand liquidity via FX swaps in response.
  - Some SARB liabilities pay lower interest (e.g., SARB debentures pay less than the repo rate; bank reserves pay no interest); cost to SARB of manipulating bank reserves can be significant due to relative volumes.
- Recommendation: FSAP team recommends the authorities request technical assistance from the Fund’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department to review the current framework and its cost.

### Basel III liquidity standards, LCR phasing, and CLF design
- SARB commitment to Basel III liquidity standards and offering a Committed Liquidity Facility (CLF) from 2015 to enable banks to meet the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR).
- Implementation challenges: limited supply of government bonds; illiquid and small corporate debt market complicate LCR and NSFR implementation.
- LCR phasing:
  - Start in 2015 at 60 percent of banks' net cash flow over a 30-day period.
  - Rise 10 percent annually to reach 100 percent in 2019.
- CLF characteristics:
  - SARB will accept significantly wider collateral classes in the CLF than at its open market and standing facilities.
  - Access conditions: available to all banks that apply at the discretion of the SARB; capped at a maximum of 40 percent of a bank's total HQLA requirement.
  - Banks required to meet level 1 asset requirements without assistance.
  - SARB will review the 40 percent cap annually and may reduce it if HQLA supply increases.
  - SARB estimated the shortfall in meeting 100 percent LCR requirement at approximately R140 billion (SARB Guidance Note 6/2013, Aug, 2013).
  - Fees and maturity: scaled commitment fee between 10 and 45 basis points; drawdowns incur interest of the SARB repo rate plus 100 basis points; drawdown maturity of 31 days.
- CLF eligible collateral and haircuts (as stated):
  - Listed debt South African securities (sovereign and parastatal issues) with a minimum domestic credit rating of A– (equivalent to BBB– on an international scale): haircuts varying, by rating and maturity, from 0.5 percentage points (ppt) to 6 ppt for sovereign, and 1 to 12 ppt for other issuers.
  - Self-securitized rand-denominated RMBS (compliant with SARB guidelines): No haircut if issue complies with SARB guidelines.
  - Self-securitized rand-denominated CMBS: may be accepted on a case-by-case basis.
  - Securitized notes of retail loans (e.g., vehicle or asset finance): on a case-by-case basis.
  - Equities listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange main exchange and included in South Africa's Top 40 index: 15 percent haircut.
- Banks will face challenges meeting the NSFR standard; implementation not until 2018 and details yet to be finalized.
- Authorities should encourage balance sheet improvements via adherence to LCR and NSFR and by adjusting CLF fee structure.

### ELA framework, internal guidelines, and legal constraints
- CLF does not prevent the SARB from providing Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) on wider terms; however, ELA lacks a formal framework.
- SARB may provide liquidity against other collateral (e.g., individual loans) and on longer maturities than 31 days.
- SARB Act allows secured lending but prescribes no legislative or public requirements regarding solvency or types of firms eligible for ELA.
- Uncertainty exists regarding relationship between CLF drawdowns and whether they trigger similar regulatory responses or stigma risk as ELA.
- SARB internal guidelines for handling liquidity stress:
  - Assign responsibilities to SARB departments and coordination with the NT.
  - Framework envisages a solvency test for non-systemic banks but permits ELA to systemic banks that may not be solvent subject to Governor’s Committee decision.
  - Guidelines discussed at the FSCF but not adopted formally or made public.
- Legal constraints in SARB Act:
  - Prohibition against accepting mortgage collateral was removed in 2013.
  - Prohibitions remain against taking commercial paper over 120 days and agricultural bonds over six months of maturity.
  - Cap remains on amount of South African government bonds the SARB can hold, whether obtained via primary or secondary purchases.

### FSAP recommendations to enhance systemic liquidity provision framework
- Solvency requirements:
  - Consider introducing an explicit solvency requirement in the SARB Act, or via regulations made by the minister under the SARB Act.
  - ELA should be given only to institutions judged to be solvent but temporarily illiquid to the best knowledge of the supervisor, based on a forward-looking assessment (e.g., of viability) rather than historic book values.
  - Make explicit that provision of ELA to banks that may not be solvent could only take place with an indemnity from the government.
- Eligible entities:
  - Define explicitly which firms are eligible for ELA and convey publicly in a transparent ELA framework.
  - Consider potential liquidity needs of systemic nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), such as a systemic FMI, and under what circumstances access to ELA may be required to preserve financial stability.
  - Framework should clearly establish that a decision to provide ELA to an NBFI should rest with the SARB and that such NBFIs typically should be regulated by the central bank to be eligible.
- Collateral:
  - Remove remaining arbitrary prohibitions in the SARB Act and replace with a requirement for the SARB to apply prudent valuation and haircut policies.
- CLF terms and conditions:
  - Central banks typically do not take equities due to increased market risk; in stress scenarios equity prices can move significantly more than the announced 15 percent haircut (example: LCH Clearnet applies a 35 percent haircut).
  - Banks do not hold significant volumes of equities; given revisions to LCR definition, equities could be dropped without material impact on banks’ compliance with the LCR.
  - If equities retained, adopt a haircut of at least 35 percent.
  - SARB should not rely solely on banks and their auditors to confirm compliance with eligibility guidelines for self-retained RMBS; SARB should perform its own diligence checks (e.g., sampling underlying loan assets).
  - Apply a haircut of at least 15 percent to self-retained asset-backed securities given structure risks.
  - Review CLF commitment fee structure annually to incentivize banks to restructure balance sheets and not rely on the CLF long term.

### Orderly and effective bank resolution: current regime and needed reforms
- Current resolution regime:
  - When a bank is, or will become, unable to repay depositors, the RB may recommend to the MoF that it be placed under the control of a curator (Section 69 of the Banks Act).
  - Curator is appointed by the MoF and has broad powers to take control of the bank and its assets; some powers require prior MoF approval.
  - Curator powers include temporary relief from obligations (Section 69(6) of the BA); cancelling contracts; suspending or cancelling interest payments to creditors; and making payments to creditors “in such order and such manner as the curator may deem fit” (Section 69(3) of the BA).
  - Curator may dispose of bank assets or make other decisions (e.g., approve a merger) if authorized by the MoF.
  - If bank is insolvent, RB may apply for liquidation under court supervision (Section 68 of the BA); liquidator appointment proposed by RB; liquidators are selected from large auditing firms and generally are legally qualified.
  - Court-based liquidation process is based on ordinary corporate insolvency framework which does not have financial stability as an objective; liquidator remains under exclusive court supervision with no role for Registrar/SARB to direct liquidation to promote financial stability.
- Limitations for systemic cases:
  - Current powers have been used for relatively small bank failures but lack features necessary to deal with systemic cases and to minimize risks to public funds.
  - Need for wider range of strong resolution powers deployable at an earlier juncture to reduce contingent risks to taxpayers and facilitate resolution of systemic financial institutions while reducing need for public support.
- Reform needs and actions:
  - Resolution powers should be available at an earlier juncture; facilitate a wider range of resolution options (e.g., bridge banks); and not be at risk of suspension or reversal upon appeal.
  - Authorities committed to reforming regime to comply with Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution (KAs) by end-2015.
  - Draft FSR Bill (published December 2013) proposes establishing SARB as resolution authority for systemic financial institutions, including systemic banks and insurance companies and bank holding companies.
  - A Resolution Policy Working Group comprising the NT, the SARB, and the FSB-SA, with technical assistance from the World Bank, is formulating reforms for a new resolution bill planned for 2015; authorities plan to issue a consultation paper on key issues possibly by end-2014.

### Historical examples of public support to problem banks (selected cases)
- Bankcorp (1985): SARB provided covert “lifeboat” loan at significantly below market rates; repaid in 1995 after purchase by ABSA Bank.
- Alpha Bank (1990): SARB provided R150 million to protect depositors; after four years of curatorship the bank was liquidated.
- Cape Investment Bank (1991): SARB provided R5 million to compensate depositors on a pro rata basis.
- Pretoria Bank (1991): SARB fully repaid all deposits.
- Sechold Bank (1994): SARB extended liquidity; later purchased by Investec.
- Islamic Bank Limited (1997): SARB compensated depositors up to a maximum of R50,000 per depositor, which covered 80 percent of the deposits.
- Saambou Bank (2002): Deposits of R12.8 billion transferred to First National Bank along with R4.9 billion of mortgages; SARB guaranteed a claim on the receivership of Saambou for R7.9 billion.
- BoE Bank (2002): SARB provided liquidity and issued joint guarantee with NT of depositors; bank later acquired by NedBank with SARB support.
- African Bank (2014): Wholesale-funded African Bank placed under curatorship on August 10, 2014; authorities announced public support including a ZAR 7 billion injection from the SARB and proposals to restructure deposits and liabilities (details under negotiation at time of writing).

*International Monetary Fund — Selected section from PDF chapter _cr1553*

### 42.      The FSAP team recommends introducing a special resolution regime for banks and

### 42. The FSAP team recommends introducing a special resolution regime for banks and systemic NBFIs

### A. Resolution regime design: powers, triggers, and scope
- Powers
  - The full range of resolution powers should be available, including:
    - the power to override shareholder and creditor rights;
    - the power to liquidate a failed bank/SIFI under a special resolution regime administered by the SARB instead of court-supervised corporate insolvency proceedings.
  - The resolution toolkit should include all of the powers listed in the KAs (Figure 2).
  - Example resolution tools listed in the source include:
    - Require recovery and resolution planning.
    - Require changes to firms’ business practices, structures, or organization to enhance resolvability.
    - Replace management, claw-back salaries/bonuses, etc.
    - Appoint an administrator.
    - Assume shareholders rights to approve merger, sale, or capital injection.
    - Transfer assets, liabilities to an existing entity, a bridge bank or an asset management company (AMC).
    - Bail-in creditors to recapitalize the failed bank or successor entity.
    - Liquidate with timely payout of insured depositors (e.g., 7 days).
    - Deviate from pari passu treatment.
    - Allow for temporary exemptions from market disclosure requirements.
    - Temporarily stay (for 48 hours) early termination rights.
    - Oblige group entities to continue essential services and support functions.
    - No creditor worse off and associated compensation arrangements.
- Triggers
  - Triggers for resolution tools should be harmonized at a significantly earlier juncture, based upon non-viability rather than under the current conservatorship regime.
  - Triggers should include both:
    - quantitative triggers (tied to capital adequacy and liquidity ratios, etc.); and
    - qualitative triggers (e.g., breaches of laws and regulations, carrying on business in a manner detrimental to the interests of depositors).
- Scope of regime
  - The resolution regime should cover:
    - all deposit takers; and
    - systemic (at the point of failure) NBFIs.
  - In line with the KAs, the regime should also extend to:
    - (i) holding companies of the firm in resolution;
    - (ii) non-regulated operational entities within the financial group or conglomerate that are significant to the business of the group or conglomerate; and
    - (iii) branches of foreign firms.

### B. Institutional arrangements and operational preparedness
- Single resolution authority
  - Only one authority should be assigned responsibility for the resolution of deposit takers.
  - The FSAP team cautions against dividing responsibility between two institutions for deposit takers because determination of systemic risk is context-specific and can change rapidly given the “run risk” inherent in banks’ balance sheets.
- Resolution manual and preparedness
  - The designated RA for deposit takers should develop internal guidelines and procedures (including preparing draft contractual arrangements for a bridge bank and a transfer of assets and liabilities) for undertaking the new resolution powers, e.g., in the form of a resolution handbook.
  - The manual should be tailored to the South African context but may build on other countries’ approaches and guidelines, potentially through technical assistance.

### C. Resolution of Nonbank Financial Institutions (NBFIs)
- Sequencing and use of existing powers
  - Consider a sequenced approach focusing first on deposit takers and only systemic NBFIs.
  - Existing sectoral legislation for nonbank sectors provides supervisors with powers which, with amendments, may be adequate and benefit from an established track record for non-systemic cases (Appendix II).
- Recommended amendments for non-systemic NBFIs
  - Strengthen powers to provide for autonomy of supervisory authorities to require early remedial action and to initiate resolution actions such as the appointment of a curator or to exercise transfer powers without ministerial approval.
  - For NBFIs deemed non-systemic at the point of failure, the RA should be the lead regulator of the firm (either the PA or the MCA depending upon the institution).
  - Require arrangements for close coordination and cooperation between the RAs.
  - Seek technical assistance from the Fund, in conjunction with ongoing assistance from the World Bank, when drafting the new legislation.

### D. Review and legal protection: judicial and administrative review
- Best-practice approach to review
  - Legal framework should ensure resolution decisions may not be restrained or suspended while under review by courts or administrative tribunals.
  - Limit the scope of judicial or administrative review to enquiries as to whether supervisory or resolution authorities acted in bad faith, unconstitutionally (or otherwise illegally), or with gross negligence.
  - Relief for successful claimants should be limited to monetary compensation and should not include suspension, variation, or reversal of the actions complained about.
- Existing legal framework concerns
  - The Constitution and PAJA provide broad administrative justice remedies allowing courts to prohibit, confirm, set aside, vary, or remit administrative decisions; courts may also direct administrative agencies to act in specified ways.
  - Under section 9(1) of the Banks Act, an aggrieved person may apply for review to the Board of Review under section 9(2); the Board may confirm, set aside, or vary decisions.
  - Under the Banks Act, any fine imposed by the Registrar on a bank or controlling company may be overturned by the minister or the High Court.
  - The FSB Appeals Board under section 26 of the FSB Act may confirm, set aside, or vary FSB decisions and remit matters for further consideration; an order of the Appeals Board is enforceable in civil proceedings against the FSB in a division of the High Court.
- FSAP recommendations to limit review constraints
  - Dispense with the minister’s power to suspend or overturn administrative fines imposed by the RB as it undermines operational autonomy of the Registrar.
  - Reconsider the minister’s role in appointing the Review Board of the SARB and the FSB Appeals Board to promote operational authority of the supervisory authorities.
  - Circumscribe the power of Review Board and Appeals Board to suspend or overturn Registrars’ decisions; at least in early intervention and resolution, limit their power to making recommendations to the SARB or FSB and to pay compensation if claims have merit.
  - Amend the Banks Act to explicitly provide for judicial review of early intervention or resolution actions that ensures:
    - (i) courts do not restrain the Registrar, a curator, or a resolution authority from exercising such powers, or suspend or reverse any such actions as a result of the review process;
    - (ii) the standard for review is limited to an enquiry as to the good faith, constitutionality or legality of the action;
    - (iii) courts defer to the technical competence of the authority involved; and
    - (iv) the only relief available to a claimant is monetary compensation, if a claim is found to have merit.
- Stakeholder engagement
  - The FSAP team urges authorities to use effective stakeholder engagement early on to build broad consensus and adopt a communications strategy to explain the need for a shift in legal system and jurisprudence toward a balanced approach to judicial review.
  - Early engagement with the judiciary (in particular, the Constitutional Court) is recommended.

### E. Legal protection for officials and curators
- Liability standard and indemnity
  - Liability for supervisory and resolution authorities, directors, officers, and employees should accrue only in the event of gross negligence or willful misconduct.
  - Persons should have recourse to resources for defending proceedings and be indemnified for legal costs and expenses where actions are found to be in good faith and lawful.
- Existing protections and gaps
  - Section 88 of the Banks Act provides immunity from liability for members of the SARB Board, officers, or employees of the SARB for any loss or damage resulting from bona fide performance of functions under the Act; immunity explicitly extends to the RB, bank inspectors, and a repayment administrator under section 84.
  - Section 88 does not contain clear language providing indemnity for the costs of defending actions by the persons covered under the immunity.
  - No legislative provisions explicitly extend legal protection to key persons involved in management of a bank under curatorship, specifically:
    - (i) a curator;
    - (ii) a person appointed by the Registrar to assist the curator in the management of a bank under section 69 of the Banks Act;
    - (iii) a commissioner appointed by the Registrar under section 69A to investigate the affairs of a bank under curatorship; and
    - (iv) the minister, for their good faith actions and within the boundaries of applicable law.
  - It is unclear whether curators act as agents of the minister or the SARB.
- FSAP recommendations on indemnity and curator responsibility
  - The Banks Act should clarify who is responsible for the actions of the curator, and that the SARB as the resolution authority should appoint the curator and be responsible for the curator.
  - Section 88 of the Banks Act should be amended to explicitly provide for indemnity for:
    - (i) a curator;
    - (ii) a person appointed by the Registrar to assist the curator in the management of a bank under section 69;
    - (iii) a commissioner appointed under section 69A to investigate the affairs of a bank under curatorship; and
    - (iv) any employees or officers of the National Treasury (including the minister who may be involved in crisis management) for their lawful and good faith actions.
  - Section 88 should also provide for indemnity for the costs of legal suits; persons covered by the immunity should be indemnified by the SARB for the costs of defending legal actions that are found to be in good faith and lawful under the Banks Act.

### F. Deposit Insurance (DIS): scope, coverage, funding, and operational design
- Recommendation
  - The FSAP team recommends introducing an ex-ante funded DIS as part of reforms.
- Scope
  - Membership should be compulsory to all deposit-taking institutions regulated by the PA.
  - All retail deposit takers supervised by the PA should be covered under the DIS, including Postbank, which is state owned.
  - Given differences in creditor hierarchy, there might be a case to have the deposit insurer establish separate funds for the nine commercial banks versus the three mutual banks and 18 cooperatives if the mutual sector grows significantly.
- Coverage design
  - Only depositors most in need of protection should be covered.
  - Given low levels of foreign currency deposits, these could likely be excluded without undermining financial stability objectives.
  - Retail deposits in South Africa should be covered independently of nationality and residency.
  - Small and medium-sized entities (SMEs) may be covered despite added complexity.
  - Deposits from large firms and wholesale deposits could be excluded.
  - An insurance cap at the R50,000 level would:
    - provide adequate protection to small depositors;
    - cover 96 percent of retail and SME depositors in full and 22 percent by value;
    - compare well to a metric aiming for full protection for approximately 80 percent of depositors, but only 20 percent of deposits by value.
- Funding
  - Establish an ex-ante funded scheme, with credible back-up funding from the state.
  - An unsecured credit line from the authorities, preferably the NT, should be available at market interest rates to ensure credible back-up funding while the fund builds up.
  - The operational footprint and costs should be minimized by housing the scheme within the SARB and giving it a relatively narrow mandate to:
    - collect and invest levies;
    - pay out depositors in the event of liquidation;
    - make funds available to the Resolution Authority (RA) for other types of resolution.
  - A Guidance Paper from the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) suggests aiming for a target level sufficient to cover about “five or six small banks or several medium-sized banks.”
- Use of DIS to facilitate resolution powers
  - The DIS should support resolution by enabling timely payout of insured depositors and making funds available to the RA for resolution actions.

*Source: IMF FSAP assessment excerpt on special resolution regime, legal protection, and deposit insurance.*

### 58.      The DIS fund should be available to fund resolution powers subject to strict

### _cr1553 - 58.      The DIS fund should be available to fund resolution powers subject to strict

### DIS fund: availability and safeguards
- The DIS fund should be available to fund resolution powers, but subject to strict safeguards because "without effective financing mechanisms, the new resolution powers might exist only on paper."
- KA6.3 requires jurisdictions to have privately-financed deposit insurance or resolution funds, or a mechanism for ex post recovery from the industry, of the costs of providing temporary financing to facilitate the resolution.
- International experience indicates the costs of open bank assistance often prove larger than expected because the extent of problems is initially underestimated.
- FSAP recommendation: DIS fund should only be available to support resolution measures under the following conditions:
  - A statutory test should apply that any resolution funding provided by the DIS must be least-cost, net of estimated recoveries.
  - DIS funding should be limited to supporting the resolution powers once the resolution regime has been triggered; DIS resources cannot be used to provide solvency or liquidity support to an open bank that has not been placed into resolution.

### Rapid payout
- DIS members should be required to implement single customer view (SCV) recordkeeping to facilitate a rapid payout.
- SCV recordkeeping is critical to enable quick reimbursement of insured deposits in a seven-day period or less.
- Without SCV, the DIS will have to sort and aggregate accounts itself, significantly delaying payments except for very small deposit takers.
- Members should be given a reasonable period in which to phase in necessary systems and reforms to enable a seven-day payout (e.g., one to two years).

### Public awareness
- A communication strategy should be implemented to explain the scheme to the public.
- A budget should be provided and a program implemented by the scheme manager and member institutions to raise public awareness of the existence and limits of a DIS.
- Communication should focus on clarity about which institutions, instruments, and values are covered, and should convey information through media most accessible to retail depositors.

### Depositor Preference (DP)
- FSAP team recommends introducing depositor preference (DP).
- Under the Insolvency Act, currently all unsecured creditors, including depositors, rank equal (pari passu) after preferred creditors.
- Introducing DP would:
  - Minimize the potential costs of the DIS by increasing recoveries of the DIS following a pay-out and liquidation of assets of a bank.
  - Facilitate resolution powers (e.g., purchase and assumption (P&A) and bail-in) by reducing compensation and litigation risks when treatment of creditors in resolution diverges from insolvency.
- DP rules introduced should not discriminate by location of deposits or nationality of depositors.
- Form of DP should be informed by quantitative impact assessment.
  - In the long run, altering creditor hierarchies might not significantly change average bank funding costs.
  - In the short term, higher cost or reduced availability of wholesale funding might impact wholesale funding costs.

### Illustrative recovery and loss numbers (from Figure explanations)
- Example balance sheet: Assets $100; Liabilities: $40 retail deposits, $50 wholesale creditors, $8 subdebt, $2 equity (implied structure from panels); $30 losses on assets leaving $70 remaining value of assets.
- (B) Recoveries in whole bank liquidation (assuming no liquidation costs): recoveries shown as percentages in figures (e.g., wholesale recoveries 78%).
- (C.i) P&A to purchasing bank:
  - Purchaser accepts $2 more of liabilities than assets; $38 of assets transferred with $40 retail deposits ($0 loss).
  - Wholesale creditors recover $32 (64 percent of $50) instead of $39 (78 percent of $50) — incur an extra loss of $7 compared to whole bank liquidation.
  - Subordinated debt and equity left behind with $0 recovery in the transfer scenario in the example (subdebt $0, equity $0).
- (D) Bail-in:
  - Equity and subordinated creditors written down to zero; portion of wholesale creditors written down and converted.
  - Wholesale creditors incur an extra loss of $16 minus the market value of their equity stake, compared to their losses in insolvency.
  - Panel values illustrated: $7 equity, $23 wholesale creditors (with $27 loss minus value of their $7 equity stake), $40 retail deposits; other panel numbers illustrated in the figure text (e.g., $32 of assets, recoveries shown as percentages and dollar amounts).

### Appendix I — Early Intervention Powers of the Banking Registrar
- The Banking Registrar (RB) may:
  - Issue written directives to a bank or a bank controlling company to take specified action or to refrain from specified conduct. Non-compliance with such directive is an offence under section 6(6)(e).
  - Increase a bank’s capital requirements or require the bank to strengthen its risk management and internal controls (Regulation 38(4) of the Regulations relating to Banks).
  - Restrict the activities of a bank as it deems fit and subject to conditions it may specify.
  - Approve a transaction relating to a merger or transfer of assets and liabilities involving a bank (Section 54(8A) of the Banks Act).
  - Take action in court against bank directors or management for breach of their duties under the Companies Act and use any amounts recovered to repay the Registrar, a deposit insurance scheme, or government body as compensation for losses suffered by depositors.
  - Object to the continued employment of a director, CEO, or executive officer if the Registrar reasonably believes such person is no longer fit and proper or it is not in the public interest to keep them in office (Section 60 (6)).
  - Remove an external auditor of a bank and replace such auditor (Section 61 (3) (b) and section 62 (1)).
  - Impose administrative fines on a bank or controlling company for failure to meet prudential requirements or non-compliance with the Banks Act.
  - Cancel or suspend a banking license:
    - For a foreign branch authorized to operate in South Africa, for non-compliance with authorization conditions, or if its home license is revoked (Section 18B of the Banks Act).
    - For other banks, if it has ceased to conduct banking business or is no longer in operation.
  - Recommend to the minister that the bank be placed under curatorship.

### Appendix II — Resolution legislation for different types of financial entity
- The current framework for failing nonbank financial institutions (NBFI) is being reviewed to identify shortfalls and strengthen the framework where needed.
- KA1 requires any financial institution that could be systemically significant or critical if it fails should be subject to a resolution regime that complies with the KAs.
- Current regimes described as modified insolvency regimes:
  - Securities firms and intermediaries:
    - Under section 38B of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act of 2002 (Act 37), the Registrar (FSB) may apply to court for a liquidation order to protect clients whether or not the institution is insolvent under the Companies Act or the Insolvency Act.
    - On agreement with the firm, the RB may appoint a statutory manager for a financial institution regulated by the FSB (Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 2001, section 5A).
    - The Registrar may apply to court for appointment of a curator for the business (FMA section 96(b) and section 5 of the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act).
  - Insurance firms:
    - The Insurance Acts provide for winding up of an insurer by Court order; provisions of the Companies Act and Insolvency Act apply to winding-up processes.
    - Under s. 42(2) of the Long-Term Insurers Act (Act 52 of 1998) as amended, the Registrar may, with written approval of the minister, apply to court for winding up of a long-term insurer if satisfied it is in the interest of policyholders.
  - Financial market infrastructures (FMI):
    - The Registrar has power under section 60 of the FMA to suspend or revoke the license of an FMI and immediately transfer its business to a similar FMI, or apply to court for a winding up order, in the interests of clearing members, authorized users or participants, or clients.

*Source: _cr1553 - 58.      The DIS fund should be available to fund resolution powers subject to strict*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/_cr1553.pdf_
