## _cr16270 — 4.5 percent since then and remains broadly in line with fundamentals.

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---

### Executive Board assessment and strategic priorities
- Directors commended the Chinese authorities for strong determination to achieve more balanced, sustainable growth.
- Observations:
  - Economic growth continues to moderate and is driven increasingly by services and consumption.
  - Impressive progress on structural reforms in many areas, notably interest rate liberalization, internationalization of the renminbi, and urbanization.
  - Approval of the 13th Five-Year Plan with ambitious goals centered on economic rebalancing.
- Risks and vulnerabilities:
  - Transition will remain complex, challenging, and potentially bumpy amid heightened downside risks and eroding buffers.
  - Need for decisive action to tackle rising vulnerabilities; reduce reliance on credit-financed, state-led investment; and improve governance, risk pricing, and resource allocation in SOE and financial sectors.
  - Consistent, well-coordinated, and clearly-communicated policies are key to a smooth transition.

### Corporate debt and SOE reform: recommended approach
- Urgency and comprehensive approach:
  - Tackle corporate debt through a comprehensive plan across ministries, levels of government, firms, banks, investors, and regions.
  - Establish a well-staffed, high-level group with a clear mandate for policy formulation and communication.
  - Kick-start progress with a few high-profile pilot restructurings/liquidations of weak SOEs.
- Hardening budget constraints and triage:
  - Harden budget constraints on SOEs; triage firms into viable (restructure) and nonviable (liquidate).
  - Liquidate nonviable SOEs with fiscal support to meet welfare costs of laid-off workers (model: RMB 100 billion Restructuring Fund for coal and steel).
  - Viable but insolvent SOEs require restructuring plans and management capable of execution; remove nonmarket objectives and responsibilities.
- Loss recognition and burden sharing:
  - Banks should proactively recognize and manage impaired assets; apply asset quality recognition standards equally to loans and securities whose underlying assets embody credit or market risk.
  - Use tools (debt-equity conversions, NPL securitization, sales to AMCs) if nested in a comprehensive strategy.
  - Allocate losses respecting hierarchy of claims among banks, corporates, and investors—and backstop with government funds if necessary.
- Social and market-entry measures:
  - Complement corporate restructuring with targeted social assistance for displaced workers and measures to facilitate entry of new, dynamic private firms.
  - Facilitate market entry and competition by lowering barriers in services and utilities and by following through on mixed ownership and corporate governance reforms.

### Macroeconomic policy stance and fiscal strategy
- Objective: lower vulnerabilities even if that entails somewhat slower short-term growth.
- Fiscal measures and sequencing:
  - Merit in using on-budget, pro-consumption fiscal measures if growth falls sharply: raising pensions; increasing social, education and health spending; providing restructuring funds; cutting minimum social security contributions.
  - Continue full implementation of the new budget law, improve fiscal transparency, and modernize the tax system.
  - Reallocate fiscal resources from off-budget investment toward on-budget measures that support rebalancing (boost household incomes and consumption) and restructuring.
  - Provincial government quotas for new debt issuance should be set consistent with the overall envelope to curtail off-budget local government borrowing.
  - Staff estimate the large “augmented” deficit should gradually decline towards around 7 percent of GDP over the medium term; projected augmented deficit in 2016 is higher and should be reduced in 2017 unless growth threatens to fall sharply.
- Growth-target guidance:
  - Annual growth targets should be downplayed, set flexibly (wider ranges) and at sustainable levels—for 2017, around 6 percent.

### Financial stability priorities and supervisory reforms
- Banks and provisioning:
  - Encourage banks to proactively recognize loan losses and strengthen capital ratios.
  - Re-examine provisioning and loan classification regulations; conduct focused asset quality reviews.
  - Consider a high countercyclical capital buffer and encourage common equity issuance.
- Liquidity, funding, and shadow banking:
  - Enhance supervisory focus on liquidity risk management and funding stability risks; strengthen liquidity in stress scenarios and focus on Liquidity Coverage Ratio standards.
  - Address vulnerabilities in shadow products and adopt a holistic supervisory approach; implement CBRC Notice 82 and close regulatory arbitrage.
- Capital markets and property:
  - Prioritize orderly functioning and emergency liquidity provision for markets; tighten underwriting and disclosure standards.
  - Consider region-specific macroprudential measures for property markets.
- Crisis preparedness and regulatory structure:
  - Major upgrade of the supervisory framework to foster cross-agency information sharing and policy coordination, reduce scope for regulatory arbitrage, and enhance crisis management capabilities.
  - Allocate coordination of crisis preparedness and management to a high-level forum with a clear implementation plan and communications strategy.

### Exchange rate, capital account, and monetary framework
- Exchange rate assessment and objective:
  - Staff assessment: the renminbi is broadly in line with fundamentals, although the external position in 2015 was moderately stronger than consistent with fundamentals.
  - Steady progress toward an effectively floating exchange rate regime should continue; achieving an effectively floating regime, ideally by 2018, is a key goal.
- Capital account liberalization:
  - Support cautious, phased capital account liberalization carefully sequenced with progress on exchange rate flexibility and financial sector reforms.
- Market-based monetary framework recommendations:
  - Declare the seven-day repo rate the new intermediate policy target and publish a representative market rate.
  - Introduce an explicit medium-term inflation target or range set by the government/State Council with operational independence for the PBC.
  - Improve operational framework (e.g., expand reserve averaging to a multi-week period), set clear standing facilities as backstop, and increase transparency of monetary policy goals and instruments.

### Data, transparency, and communications
- Data improvements requested:
  - Quarterly GDP by expenditure, high-frequency indicators on services and the “new” economy, improved deflation methodology, tracking off-budget spending by local governments, and credit composition by sector.
  - Ensure adequate data on bank/shadow bank linkages and FX exposures for financial stability analysis.
- Communications:
  - Develop a communication strategy integrated with policy decisions to reduce uncertainty and align expectations.
- Assessment of reliability:
  - Evidence points to possible overstatement of growth recently, but overstatement likely moderate; nominal GDP is probably larger than the official estimate (study cited suggesting 13–16 percent underestimation in 2008).
  - High-frequency estimates are about ¼–½ percent lower than official growth data in 2015.

### Outlook, projections, and key numeric scenarios
- Near-term projections (paragraph 5 / Table excerpts):
  - Real GDP: 2016 6.6; 2017 6.2; 2018 6.0; 2019 6.0; 2020 5.9; 2021 5.8.
  - Baseline: growth falls to about 6 percent by 2018 and continues declining thereafter under current policy stance.
  - Near-term growth composition assumptions:
    - Consumption contributes more than half of overall growth.
    - Investment growth: pick up slightly in 2016 then moderate in 2017.
    - Credit growth assumptions: 2016 credit growth assumed at 15 percent year-on-year; 2017 assumed at 13 percent.
- Inflation:
  - Inflation expected to remain contained at 2–2½ this year and next.
  - Medium term: inflation expected to rise gradually to around 3 percent as commodity prices recover and wage pressures build.
- Current account and external balances:
  - Current account surplus: 2015 3.0 percent of GDP; expected to narrow to just under 2½ percent in 2016; projected to fall to around ½ percent of GDP by 2021.
  - Trade surplus: 2015 5.1 percent of GDP; projected 2016 5.1 percent; expected to decline to below 4 percent of GDP over the medium term.
  - Gross official reserves (bn US$): 2015 3,406; 2016 3,181; 2017 3,064; 2018 2,993; 2019 2,890; 2020 2,813; 2021 2,740.
- Rebalancing aggregates (selected):
  - Total capital formation (percent of GDP): 2015 45.0; 2016 43.9; 2017 43.3; 2018 42.8; 2019 42.2; 2020 41.6; 2021 41.0.
  - Gross national saving (percent of GDP): 2015 47.9; 2016 46.3; 2017 44.9; 2018 44.1; 2019 43.2; 2020 42.4; 2021 41.6.
  - Household savings (percent of disposable income): 2015 37.4; 2016 36.9; 2017 35.8; 2018 34.7; 2019 33.7; 2020 32.7; 2021 31.7.
  - Household debt (percent of GDP): 2015 38.4; 2016 41.8; 2017 45.5; 2018 49.1; 2019 52.4; 2020 55.3; 2021 57.5.
  - Nonfinancial corporate domestic debt (percent of GDP): 2015 120.0; 2016 127.4; 2017 133.5; 2018 137.5; 2019 139.7; 2020 140.2; 2021 141.2.

### Risks, scenarios, and spillovers
- Downside near-term risks:
  - Loss of investor confidence, disorderly corporate defaults, sharp asset price falls, quicker fading of stimulus; amplified by financial system, capital outflows, and exchange rate pressure.
- Downside medium-term risks:
  - Slow reform progress and continued reliance on stimulus and unsustainable credit growth would worsen resource misallocation and lead to permanently lower growth.
  - Illustrative “no-reform” scenario implies sustained TFP slowdown and higher nonfinancial private credit/GDP ratio with higher risk of disruptive adjustment.
- Upside “proactive” scenario:
  - Near-term growth could dip to 6 percent reflecting faster adjustment partially offset by high-quality fiscal support (without such support, growth would fall to about 5½ percent).
  - Medium-term growth would rise to 6½ percent with higher TFP growth, reduced credit intensity, and stabilized nonfinancial private debt/GDP ratio by 2021.
- Global spillovers:
  - China accounted for about one-third of global growth in 2015.
  - A 1 percentage point investment-driven drop in China’s output growth reduces G20 growth by ¼ percentage point (staff analysis).
  - China accounted for about 40 percent of global demand for metals in 2014; rebalancing may explain between a fifth and a half of declines in commodity price indices.

### External sector assessment (Appendix I highlights)
- External position and reserves:
  - Gross foreign assets 56 percent of GDP by end-2015, dominated by reserves.
  - Reserves fell from US$3.84 trillion at end-2014 to US$3.33 trillion by end-2015 and to US$3.19 trillion by May 2016.
  - Net IIP declined from 15.2 percent of GDP in 2014 to 14.3 percent at end-2015.
- Staff assessment:
  - External position in 2015 moderately stronger than levels consistent with medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
  - REER: staff EBA REER index regression estimates REER 3.9 percent stronger than warranted by fundamentals, but overall REER assessed as broadly in line with fundamentals (staff: REER is -10 to +10 percent different from the consistent level).
- Policy priorities for external adjustment:
  - Improve social safety net; increase on-budget fiscal support; SOE reform and opening markets; create more market-based financial system; achieve flexible, market-based exchange rate with better communication.
  - Continue moving toward a market-based monetary framework and use reserves to smooth excessive volatility not justified by fundamentals.

### Debt sustainability and contingent liability exposures (Appendix II)
- Two coverage definitions:
  - Narrow coverage (general government) — remains low and broadly stable at around 39-40 percent of GDP over projections.
  - Broad coverage (“augmented” debt including LGFV and off‑budget liabilities) — rises from around 55.8 percent of GDP in 2015 to about 73.5 percent of GDP in 2021.
- Key DSA outcomes:
  - Narrow coverage nominal gross public debt: 2015 = 38.5; 2021 = 39.0 (percent of GDP).
  - Broad coverage nominal gross public debt: 2015 = 51.8; 2021 = 73.5 (percent of GDP).
  - Public gross financing needs (broad coverage): 2015 = 19.6; 2021 = 8.9 (percent of GDP).
- Stress-test / contingent liability shock:
  - Standard contingent liability shock (10 percent of banking system assets) would raise narrow-coverage debt from about 40 percent of GDP in 2015 to about 64 percent in 2018; under broad coverage such a shock could push augmented debt toward about 100 percent of GDP by 2021.
- Policy implications:
  - Debt path critically depends on implementation of the new budget law and curbing off‑budget local government borrowing.
  - Public debt largely domestically financed, which supports manageability under narrow coverage.

### Recent reform progress and implementation status (selected measures)
- Financial sector reforms:
  - Deposit insurance introduced (May 2015).
  - Interest rates formally fully liberalized (October 2015).
  - PBC launched Macro Prudential Assessment (MPA) (January 2016).
  - Pilot securitization programs initiated (February 2016); CBRC Notice 82 (May 2016) equalized capital requirements for certain off- and on-balance sheet activity.
- Structural and fiscal reforms:
  - 13th Five-Year Plan adopted; capacity reduction targets of "10–15 percent of existing capacity over the next 3‒5 years" in coal and steel.
  - RMB 100 billion restructuring fund established for re-employment/resettlement of expected 1.8 million affected workers; close to RMB 30 billion (a third) already disbursed.
  - New budget law implemented; VAT extension to services completed; nationwide carbon emission trading scheme planned for 2017.
- Market opening and external reforms:
  - RMB increasingly referencing a basket of currencies; RMB to be included in the SDR basket effective October 2016.

*IMF staff report for the 2016 Article IV Consultation — People’s Republic of China (July 7, 2016).*

### 4.5 percent since then and remains broadly in line with fundamentals.

### _cr16270 - 4.5 percent since then and remains broadly in line with fundamentals.

### Executive Board Assessment
- Directors commended the Chinese authorities for strong determination to achieve more balanced, sustainable growth.
- Observations on growth and reform:
  - Economic growth continues to moderate and is driven increasingly by services and consumption.
  - Impressive progress on structural reforms in many areas, notably interest rate liberalization, internationalization of the renminbi, and urbanization.
  - Approval of the 13th Five-Year Plan with ambitious goals centered on economic rebalancing.
- Risks and vulnerabilities:
  - Transition will remain complex, challenging, and potentially bumpy amid heightened downside risks and eroding buffers.
  - Need for decisive action to tackle rising vulnerabilities; reduce reliance on credit-financed, state-led investment; and improve governance, risk pricing, and resource allocation in SOE and financial sectors.
  - Consistent, well-coordinated, and clearly-communicated policies are key to a smooth transition.
- Corporate debt and SOEs:
  - Urgency of addressing corporate debt through a comprehensive approach.
  - Encourage hardening budget constraints on SOEs; triage and restructure or liquidate over-indebted firms; recognize losses and share them among relevant parties, including the government if necessary.
  - Piloting a few SOEs recommended to start the process.
  - Complement measures with targeted social assistance for displaced workers and initiatives to facilitate entry of new, dynamic private firms.
- Macroeconomic policy stance:
  - Macroeconomic policies should aim at lowering vulnerabilities, which may entail somewhat slower growth in the short term.
  - Merit in using on-budget, pro-consumption fiscal measures if growth falls sharply: raising pensions; increasing social, education and health spending; providing restructuring funds; cutting minimum social security contributions.
  - Continue efforts to ensure full implementation of the new budget law, improve fiscal transparency, and modernize the tax system.
- Financial stability priorities:
  - Encourage banks to proactively recognize loan losses and strengthen capital ratios.
  - Enhance supervisory focus on liquidity risk management and funding stability risks; address vulnerabilities in shadow products.
  - Major upgrade of the supervisory framework to foster cross-agency information sharing and policy coordination, reduce scope for regulatory arbitrage, and enhance crisis management capabilities.
  - Look forward to forthcoming Financial Sector Assessment Program Update.
- Exchange rate and capital account:
  - Staff assessment: the renminbi is broadly in line with fundamentals, although the external position in 2015 was moderately stronger than consistent with fundamentals.
  - Welcome steps toward an effectively floating exchange rate regime; encourage building on progress while carefully managing the transition and supporting a more market-based monetary framework.
  - Support cautious approach to capital account liberalization, carefully sequenced with progress on exchange rate flexibility and financial sector reforms.
- Data and communications:
  - Encourage continued improvement in data quality and policy communications to reduce uncertainty, align expectations, and guard against market turbulence.

### Selected Economic Indicators — Key Statistics and Projections (2011–2021)
- NATIONAL ACCOUNTS (Real growth rates and contributions)
  - Real GDP: 9.5; 7.9; 7.8; 7.3; 6.9; 6.6; 6.2; 6.0; 6.0; 5.9; 5.8
  - Total domestic demand: 10.7; 7.9; 8.1; 7.2; 7.2; 7.2; 6.5; 6.2; 6.1; 6.0; 5.9
  - Consumption: 12.2; 8.7; 7.2; 7.2; 8.3; 7.8; 7.7; 7.1; 6.8; 6.6; 6.4
  - Investment: 9.2; 7.1; 9.1; 7.1; 6.1; 6.4; 5.2; 5.2; 5.3; 5.3; 5.3
  - Inventories (contribution): 0.4; -0.7; 0.1; 0.3; -0.2; 0.0; 0.0; 0.0; 0.0; 0.0; 0.0
  - Net exports (contribution): -0.8; 0.2; -0.1; 0.3; -0.1; -0.5; -0.2; -0.1; 0.0; 0.0; 0.0
  - Total capital formation (percent of GDP): 48.0; 47.2; 47.3; 46.7; 45.0; 43.9; 43.3; 42.8; 42.2; 41.6; 41.0
  - Gross national saving (percent of GDP): 49.8; 49.7; 48.8; 49.3; 47.9; 46.3; 44.9; 44.1; 43.2; 42.4; 41.6
- LABOR MARKET
  - Unemployment rate (annual average) 1/: ...; ...; 5.0; 5.1; 5.1; 5.1; 5.1; 5.0; 5.0; 5.0; 5.0
  - Wages: 16.7; 14.0; 12.9; 10.0; 9.9; 9.0; 8.7; 8.5; 8.5; 8.3; 8.1
- PRICES
  - Consumer prices (average): 5.4; 2.6; 2.6; 2.0; 1.4; 2.1; 2.3; 2.4; 2.6; 3.0; 3.0
  - GDP Deflator: 8.1; 3.2; 2.4; 1.2; 0.4; 0.7; 0.9; 1.4; 1.6; 2.0; 2.1
- FINANCIAL RATES
  - 7-day repo rate (percent): 6.4; 4.6; 5.4; 5.1; 2.5; ...; ...; ...; ...; ...; ...
  - 10-year government bond rate (percent): 3.4; 3.6; 4.6; 3.7; 2.9; ...; ...; ...; ...; ...; ...
  - Real effective exchange rate (average): 2.8; 5.6; 6.3; 3.1; 10.1; ...; ...; ...; ...; ...; ...
  - Nominal effective exchange rate (average): 0.1; 5.0; 5.3; 3.1; 9.5; ...; ...; ...; ...; ...; ...
- MACRO-FINANCIAL
  - Total social financing 2/: 18.1; 19.1; 17.5; 14.3; 12.4; 12.7; 11.9; 11.4; 11.0; 10.3; 10.1
  - In percent of GDP (TSF): 157.9; 169.0; 180.0; 189.5; 198.4; 208.3; 217.4; 225.1; 232.0; 236.9; 241.6
  - Domestic credit to the private sector: 16.2; 19.8; 16.6; 13.5; 14.7; 14.7; 13.4; 12.1; 10.9; 9.9; 9.7
  - In percent of GDP (domestic credit): 124.8; 134.3; 141.9; 148.2; 158.3; 169.2; 179.0; 186.5; 192.1; 195.5; 198.7
  - House price 3/: 5.7; 8.7; 7.7; 1.4; 9.1; 8.9; 7.3; 7.0; 7.3; 6.9; 6.8
  - Household disposable income (percent of GDP): 58.3; 59.4; 60.0; 60.7; 62.2; 63.2; 63.6; 63.9; 64.2; 64.2; 64.2
  - Household savings (percent of disposable income): 41.0; 40.8; 38.5; 37.9; 37.4; 36.9; 35.8; 34.7; 33.7; 32.7; 31.7
  - Household debt (percent of GDP): 27.8; 29.6; 33.0; 35.3; 38.4; 41.8; 45.5; 49.1; 52.4; 55.3; 57.5
  - Nonfinancial corporate domestic debt (percent of GDP): 97.0; 104.7; 108.9; 112.8; 120.0; 127.4; 133.5; 137.5; 139.7; 140.2; 141.2
- GENERAL GOVERNMENT (Percent of GDP)
  - Net lending/borrowing 4/: -0.1; -0.7; -0.8; -0.9; -2.7; -3.0; -3.1; -2.9; -2.9; -2.8; -2.7
  - Revenue: 26.9; 27.8; 27.7; 28.0; 28.6; 27.8; 28.1; 28.0; 27.8; 27.7; 27.5
  - Expenditure: 27.0; 28.4; 28.5; 28.9; 31.3; 30.8; 31.2; 30.9; 30.7; 30.4; 30.2
  - Debt 5/: 15.2; 15.2; 15.9; 38.5; 38.3; 38.6; 39.1; 39.3; 39.3; 39.2; 39.0
  - Structural balance: -0.1; -0.5; -0.5; -0.5; -2.4; -2.9; -3.1; -2.9; -2.9; -2.8; -2.7
- BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (Percent of GDP)
  - Current account balance: 1.8; 2.5; 1.5; 2.6; 3.0; 2.4; 1.6; 1.3; 1.0; 0.8; 0.6
  - Trade balance: 3.0; 3.6; 3.7; 4.1; 5.1; 5.1; 4.5; 4.3; 4.0; 3.8; 3.7
  - Services balance: -0.6; -0.9; -1.3; -1.6; -1.6; -2.0; -2.3; -2.6; -2.7; -2.9; -2.9
  - Net international investment position: 22.4; 21.8; 20.7; 15.2; 14.3; 16.5; 16.9; 16.7; 16.3; 15.5; 14.8
  - Gross official reserves (bn US$): 3,256; 3,388; 3,880; 3,899; 3,406; 3,181; 3,064; 2,993; 2,890; 2,813; 2,740
- MEMORANDUM
  - Nominal GDP (bn RMB) 6/: 48,604; 54,099; 59,696; 64,849; 69,630; 74,715; 80,118; 86,159; 92,834; 100,244; 108,246
  - Augmented debt (percent of GDP) 7/: 45.8; 47.1; 51.0; 51.8; 55.8; 60.4; 64.5; 67.8; 70.4; 72.2; 73.5
  - Augmented net lending/borrowing (percent of GDP) 7/: -6.0; -5.1; -7.6; -7.2; -7.8; -8.4; -8.2; -7.8; -7.4; -7.0; -6.6
  - Augmented fiscal balance (percent of GDP) 8/: -8.2; -7.8; -10.3; -9.8; -9.5; -10.1; -9.8; -9.3; -8.8; -8.4; -8.0

### Key Issues, Outlook, and Policy Strategy
- Context and main challenges:
  - China continues its transition to a sustainable growth path; rebalancing progressed on many dimensions but credit growth remains rapid.
  - Reforms have advanced impressively across a wide domain, but lag in some critical areas.
  - Transition is difficult with sizable economic and financial volatility; vulnerabilities are rising and fiscal and foreign exchange buffers are eroding.
- Outlook:
  - Near-term growth outlook improved due to recent policy support.
  - Medium-term outlook clouded by resource misallocation, high and rising corporate debt, structural excess capacity, and an increasingly large, opaque, and interconnected financial sector.
  - Concerns that buffers may be exhausted before sufficient economic adjustment occurs.
- Strategy and recommended policy directions:
  - Slow credit growth by tackling root causes: unsustainably-high growth targets, soft budget constraints on SOEs and local governments, web of implicit and explicit guarantees, and excessive risk taking in parts of the financial sector—while maintaining macro stability.
  - Key elements:
    - Tackling the corporate debt problem with a comprehensive plan: harden budget constraints (especially on SOEs); restructure/liquidate weak firms; recognize and allocate losses; improve governance; facilitate market entry.
    - Adjust macro policies for a moderate slowdown: allow growth to settle at a level consistent with sustainable macro policies; substantially slow credit expansion; switch from off-budget investment to on-budget, pro-reform and pro-consumption fiscal measures.
    - Guard against financial risks: boost bank buffers; recognize losses; improve funding resilience; rein in risks in shadow banks/products; improve supervisory framework and crisis preparedness.
    - Continue progress toward an effectively floating exchange rate regime: progressively greater market-determination with skillful short-term management to avoid excessive volatility.
    - Strengthen transparency, especially in communications and data quality.

### Context: Recent Macro Developments and Reform Progress
- Activity and demand:
  - Activity slowed modestly through early 2016, shored up by accommodative policies; rebalancing progressed with services and consumption gaining share.
  - Supply-side: industrial production moderated; rotation from excess-capacity upstream sectors (cement, steel, glass) to consumer-oriented manufacturing (autos, computers, home appliances).
  - Demand-side: retail sales remained strong; investment stabilized following real estate recovery; consumption accounted for two-thirds of growth in 2015 and 2016:Q1.
- Inflation and prices:
  - Core inflation stable around 1½ percent.
  - Headline CPI accelerated recently due to food prices.
  - Producer price deflation remains sizable but moderated recently.
- Policy support and external pressures:
  - Benchmark lending rates cut five times in 2015.
  - Fiscal policy turned expansionary in second half of 2015; infrastructure spending picked up supported by policy bank lending and local government debt/loan swap.
  - Exports subdued; import volumes weak; current account surplus rose to 3 percent of GDP in 2015 but external accounts under pressure from large capital outflows.
  - Exchange rate: real effective rate appreciated close to 10 percent from mid-2014 through mid-2015 and has declined 4½ percent since then. The renminbi remains broadly in line with fundamentals (Appendix I).
- Reform progress highlights:
  - Monetary framework: interest rate liberalization completed; move toward an interest rate corridor centered on the seven-day repo rate; more market-based RMB fixing mechanism (August 2015) and greater reference to a currency basket (December 2015).
  - Fiscal framework: new budget law being implemented; VAT extension to services completed; nationwide carbon emission trading scheme planned for 2017; social security reforms and review of revenue/spending responsibilities underway.
  - Urbanization: policies to encourage rural residents to settle in urban areas, rural land reforms, central budget allocation for basic public education, portability of pensions, and rollout of new household registration systems in several provinces.
  - Corporate restructuring: small-scale restructuring of unviable “zombie” SOEs has begun at the local level.

*IMF staff report for the 2016 Article IV Consultation — People’s Republic of China (July 7, 2016).*

### 3.      The government adopted a new five-year plan (2016-20), centered on rebalancing the

### 3.      The government adopted a new five-year plan (2016-20), centered on rebalancing the

### Plan objectives and announced measures
- Aims to boost consumption, expand the service sector, protect the environment, further open up the economy, expand public services, and reduce poverty.
- Announced elements of a reform plan for SOEs; capacity reduction targets in the coal and steel sectors of "10–15 percent of existing capacity over the next 3‒5 years."
- Established a RMB 100 billion restructuring fund to re-employ and resettle an expected 1.8 million affected workers.
- Many areas, especially SOE reform, lack further details and guidelines.

### Import slowdown — key findings (Box 1)
- Chinese imports have slowed significantly in real terms over the past two years.
- Weaker investment accounts for about 40–50 percent of the slowdown.
- Weaker exports account for about 40 percent of the slowdown, of which about a quarter is due to stronger RMB.
- In 2015, goods imports were down 9½ percent in RMB nominal terms; real imports were up by only 1 percent.
- The fall in import prices: two thirds attributable to the sharp fall in commodity prices; the commodity price fall alone improves the trade balance by about 1½ percent of GDP.
- Contribution breakdowns to import slowdown include:
  - Machinery and transport imports (about 40 percent of total imports) decelerating due to falling re-export demand and rebalancing away from investment.
  - Commodities (about 30 percent of total imports) decelerating due to slowdown in industry and weak real estate and infrastructure investment.
- Several contributing factors:
  - Moderation of overall domestic demand after post-crisis fiscal stimulus surge.
  - Structural shift toward consumption, which has lower import intensity than investment and exports.
  - Substitution of imports of higher value-added products with domestic production.
  - Sizable currency appreciation eroding export price competitiveness and lowering processing import demand.
- Staff analysis (2002:Q1–2015:Q3) attributing slowdown:
  - Weaker investment: about 40–50 percent of slowdown.
  - Weaker exports: about 40 percent of slowdown, with about a quarter of that due to stronger RMB.
  - Onshoring (processing imports/total exports) has not been an additional drag over this period but continues to slow import growth at a constant pace.

### Recent reforms (Box 2)
- Financial sector reforms:
  - Deposit insurance introduced (May 2015)
  - Interest rates formally fully liberalized (October 2015)
  - PBC launched the Macro Prudential Assessment (MPA) mechanism (January 2016)
  - Pilot programs on securitization initiated (February 2016,)
  - Equalized capital requirements and risk weights for certain off- and on-balance sheet activity (CBRC Notice 82, May 2016)
  - Applied the “period-average” in monitoring financial institutions’ reserve requirements (September 2015)
- Structural reforms:
  - Capacity reduction targets (about 10–15 percent over the next 3–5 years) announced for coal and steel sectors (February 2016)
  - A restructuring fund of RMB 100 billion was established for re-employment and resettlement of affected workers in overcapacity sectors (February 2016)
  - Published guidelines on SOE reforms; ten pilot programs were implemented (September 2015, February 2016)
  - Reduced the number of prices set by central government (December 2015)
  - Relaxed the one-child policy (December 2015)
  - Property rights for rural land clarified, including use as collateral for securing agricultural loans (March 2016)
  - About 30 provinces announced guidelines on “hukou” reforms (April 2016); a new household registration system is being rolled out by end-2016
  - Social housing program extended (May 2016)
  - Certain provinces have commenced restructuring unviable provincial SOEs (June 2016)
  - SOE social functions (provision of certain utilities and property services) to be reduced (June 2016)
- Fiscal reforms:
  - Implementation of the new budget law (January 2015)
  - Business tax fully converted to VAT for remaining services (May 2016)
  - Employer contributions toward social security payments reduced (April 2016)
  - Improved regulation and reduced number of fees paid to various government funds by firms (February 2016)
  - New fiscal accounting framework introduced from January 2016
  - Revised price adjustment mechanism for oil products (January 2016)
  - Expanded zero rating for exports (October 2015)
  - Tax cuts implemented for small and high tech firms (September and November 2015)
  - Reform of the Personal Income Tax to further promote equity and redistribution
  - New environmental protection and resource tax laws; carbon emission trading scheme (will be introduced in 2017)
- External sector reforms:
  - Mutual Recognition of Funds program introduced (July 2015)
  - Access to onshore fixed income and FX markets eased for official sector and qualified institutional investors (July 2015; October 2015; February 2016)
  - RMB increasingly referencing a basket of currencies rather than the U.S. dollar; additional basket of currencies (“CFETS") announced with weights (December 2015)
  - RMB to be included in the SDR basket effective October 2016 (November 2015)
  - RQFII quota announced for United States (June 2016)

### Policy obstacles and rising vulnerabilities
- Policy obstacles:
  - Traditional stimulus: mid-2015 boost to infrastructure spending, real estate activity and credit supported near-term growth but raised vulnerabilities.
  - Growth target for 2016 set at 6½‒7 percent, above staff’s recommended sustainable range of 6–6½ percent.
  - Uneven reform progress: slow on strengthening governance and imposing hard budget constraints for SOEs, tackling excessive corporate debt, and opening state-dominated service sectors; resource misallocation persists.
  - Lack of policy clarity: apparent alternation between prioritizing reform and growth; market concerns about commitment to reform (example: heavy-handed response to equity market correction in June 2015).
  - Tension between allowing the market a “decisive” role and affirming the “dominant” role of the state.
- Rising vulnerabilities:
  - Risk of ‘hard landing’ in overcapacity sectors/regions due to falling demand from real estate, lower global commodity prices, exchange rate appreciation, and higher labor costs; stress most pronounced in SOEs and northern regions.
  - Weakening corporate fundamentals:
    - Industrial profits fell in 2015 for the first year since the late 1990s.
    - Median days for outstanding receivables among listed firms rose to 45 from less than 30 in 2010.
    - Defaults and downgrades increasing.
    - About 14 percent of debt held by firms with profits less than interest payments.
    - Impaired loans, largely to corporates, rising fast, especially in smaller banks.
  - High and rising credit growth:
    - Credit growth accelerated and is growing twice as fast as nominal GDP.
    - Nonfinancial private credit/GDP ratio has risen rapidly, mainly reflecting corporate debt.
    - Deviation of credit growth from its trend reached 20–25 percent of GDP.
    - Potential losses: Global Financial Stability Report (April 2016) estimated potential losses of 7 percent of GDP on corporate loans; additional losses possible in shadow credit products.
    - Credit intensity of growth rising faster in regions with traditional industry concentration, indicating worsening efficiency of credit allocation, weak governance, forbearance, and soft budget constraints.
  - Increasingly large, leveraged, interconnected, and opaque financial system:
    - Bank balance sheets increased by 22 percentage points of GDP in 2015; claims on other financial institutions up from 5 percent of GDP in 2010 to 26 percent of GDP in 2015.
    - Rapid expansion of pledged repo borrowing in the interbank market, with trading volume more than doubling in 2015 (mostly overnight lending).
    - Increasing role of smaller and provincial banks, especially city commercial banks, with greater exposure to shadow credit products.
  - Propensity for asset price booms (property, equity, bonds) driven by large savings searching for yield, rising leverage, and belief in implicit guarantees; strong housing price increases in Tier-1 cities (Shenzhen, Shanghai, Beijing) as bank lending for home purchases increased strongly.
  - Capital outflows:
    - Outflows in 2015 and early 2016 exceeded the current account surplus, prompting a substantial fall in FX reserves.
    - Factors include shift in expectations about relative near-term returns on RMB assets, domestic rate cuts, higher FX volatility, approaching Fed liftoff, higher FX volatility after August 2015 change in exchange rate system, and rising investor concerns about near- and longer-term growth prospects and reform implementation; surge in outward investment noted.

### Outlook and risks
- Staff baseline: growth falls to about 6 percent by 2018 and continues declining thereafter.
- Lack of decisive progress on addressing corporate debt and governance in SOEs in the baseline implies credit-to-GDP ratio continues to rise, with increasing risk of a disruptive adjustment.
- Baseline assumes continued pro-consumption and pro-service reforms, including strengthening the social safety net and deregulating the service sector, shifting the structure of demand and production further toward consumption and services.

### Near-term growth projections (paragraph 5)
- 2016 growth expected at 6.6 percent.
- 2017 growth expected at 6.2 percent.
- Projection assumptions:
  - Domestic demand holds up on generally robust labor market conditions, with consumption contributing more than half of overall growth.
  - Investment growth expected to pick up slightly in 2016—strong infrastructure spending and a rebound in real estate and SOE investment offset weakness in manufacturing and non-SOE investment—but to moderate in 2017 as stimulus measures wane.
  - External demand expected to remain subdued, with net exports dragging growth in 2016‒17; export growth will stay tepid, while imports likely to pick up in line with investment.
  - Policy support provides a positive fiscal impulse in 2016, returning to gradual consolidation in 2017; projection assumes a slightly higher ‘augmented’ deficit relative to last year, from a larger on-budget deficit as well as slightly stronger off-budget local government spending supported through policy bank lending and the new special construction fund.
  - Credit growth assumptions:
    - 2016: credit growth assumed at 15 percent year-on-year, based on authorities’ TSF projection and staff adjustments for local government debt/loan swaps.
    - 2017: credit growth assumed to slow to 13 percent as investment growth moderates and corporate profitability improves with the pick-up in producer price inflation and progress in reducing overcapacity.

*IMF staff report content as presented in the supplied chapter/section.*

### 6.      Inflation is expected to gradually pick up reflecting the rebound in commodity prices,

### _cr16270 - 6.      Inflation is expected to gradually pick up reflecting the rebound in commodity prices,

### Inflation
- Inflation is expected to remain contained at 2–2½ this year and next.
- Over the medium term, inflation is expected to rise gradually to around 3 percent as commodity prices recover and wage pressures build with the slower growth of the labor force.

### Current Account
- The current account surplus is expected to narrow to just under 2½ percent of GDP in 2016, driven by an increase in the services and income deficit.
- Trade:
  - The trade surplus is projected to remain stable in 2016 at slightly over 5 percent of GDP, with terms of trade effects broadly offsetting the pick-up in imports.
  - Over the medium term, the trade surplus is expected to decline to below 4 percent of GDP as the economy rotates toward private consumption and away from external demand.
- Services and income:
  - The services deficit is expected to continually rise with healthy outward tourism.
  - The income deficit is expected to remain broadly stable.
- Medium-term aggregates:
  - The current account surplus is expected to fall to around ½ percent of GDP by 2021.
  - Savings are projected to decline from 48 percent of GDP in 2015 to around 42 percent by 2021.
    - Drivers: falling household savings (demographic effects and a stronger social safety net), lower corporate savings (as factor costs rise and efficiency diminishes), and a decline in public savings as social spending increases.
  - Investment is expected to decline from 45 percent of GDP in 2015 to around 41 percent of GDP by 2021 (moderating private investment and less excess in public investment).

### Capital Flows
- The volume of capital outflows is expected to be broadly similar to last year as a percent of GDP.
- The large outflow seen in 2015:Q3–2016:Q1 will gradually moderate as the pressure from external debt repayment peters out.
- The secular trend of residents’ acquisition of foreign assets to balance their investment portfolio is expected to continue, but not materially accelerate from current levels.

### Rebalancing
- The high national savings rate is expected to fall gradually due to aging and a stronger social safety net.
- Household consumption is expected to continue to pick up as household savings fall and disposable income rises, driven by labor-intensive services replacing industry on the supply side (also reducing carbon intensity and income inequality).
- Baseline assumes only modest progress on corporate restructuring and SOE reform; credit rebalancing is projected to progress only slowly.

### Medium-term Growth Prospects
- Near-term reliance on policy easing and credit-financed investment, and lack of decisive progress on corporate debt restructuring, SOE reform, and entry of dynamic private firms, is expected to add to vulnerabilities and worsen resource allocation.
- Growth trajectory:
  - Economy likely to slow to 6 percent by 2018 and decline further into the medium term under current policy stance.
- Credit dynamics:
  - Credit intensity of growth projected to decrease only modestly, resulting in a continuously rising nonfinancial private sector credit/GDP ratio.
  - This raises the risk of a disruptive adjustment (banking crisis and/or sharply slower growth).

### Risks (Downside and Upside)
- Downside (near term):
  - Loss of investor confidence, disorderly corporate defaults, a sharp fall in asset prices, quicker fading of stimulus impact.
  - Corporates are especially sensitive to declines in profitability and higher borrowing costs (less so to FX risk given low aggregate FX exposure).
  - These could be amplified by the financial system with renewed capital outflows and exchange rate pressure.
- Downside (medium term):
  - Slow progress on reform and continued reliance on policy stimulus and unsustainable credit growth would add vulnerabilities, worsen resource misallocation, and lead to permanently lower growth.
  - Under an illustrative “no-reform” scenario: sustained TFP growth slowdown, significantly higher nonfinancial private credit/GDP ratio, and higher risk of disruptive adjustment.
- Specific external risk:
  - UK / European Union: direct impact of UK voters’ June 23 decision to exit the EU is likely limited (UK accounts for 2½ percent of China’s exports).
  - Exports to the EU, including via Hong Kong SAR, are equivalent to almost 4 percent of China’s GDP; staff estimates: a 1 percentage point growth slowdown in the EU is associated with a reduction in Chinese growth by about 0.3 percentage points.
- Upside (near term):
  - Stimulus may have a bigger and more sustained impact, with larger pick-up in real estate and slower reduction in overcapacity investment (but would increase medium-term risks).
- Upside (medium term) — “proactive” scenario:
  - Near-term growth could dip to 6 percent reflecting faster adjustment partially offset by high-quality fiscal support (without such support, growth would fall to about 5½ percent).
  - Medium-term growth would rise to 6½ percent driven by higher TFP growth.
  - Improved efficiency would reduce credit intensity further and stabilize the nonfinancial private debt/GDP ratio by 2021 significantly lower compared to the baseline.
  - Faster rebalancing from investment to consumption.

### Buffers and Vulnerabilities
- FX reserves:
  - China used around 20 percent of its FX reserves (relative to the mid-2014 peak) in supporting the currency, but the buffer remains above reserve adequacy metrics.
- Public debt and contingent liabilities:
  - Augmented general government debt remains relatively low at around 60 percent of GDP.
  - Explicitly recognized general government debt at only about 40 percent of GDP, with a highly favorable growth-interest rate differential.
- These buffers have been deployed to combat outflow pressure and support growth; as vulnerabilities grow, contingent liabilities expand, and buffers erode, the window for reforms and preventing downside risks will close.

### Authorities’ Views
- Outlook:
  - Authorities viewed the economy as well on track to achieve the target growth range of 6½ to 7 percent this year.
  - They disagreed that policy support was adding to vulnerabilities, arguing higher infrastructure spending in less developed parts would boost long-term growth.
  - Noted stabilization of momentum and a handoff to private activity with real estate and related sectors taking the lead.
  - Over the medium term, authorities expected growth to remain in the range of 6‒7 percent, consistent with the 2020 goal of doubling income per capita relative to 2010.
- External position:
  - Authorities expected the trade surplus to be broadly unchanged from last year as imports firm with commodity price recovery and improvements in domestic demand.
  - Services deficit expected to widen on stronger tourism outflows.
  - Over the medium term, authorities expected the current account surplus to remain at 2–3 percent of GDP, with investment and savings staying broadly at current levels.
  - Viewed large net outflows in 2015 as mainly due to repayment of liabilities; expected outflows to moderate this year.
- Risks:
  - Authorities acknowledged downside risks from a weak external environment, depressed investment, uncertain prospects in several EMs, sluggish recoveries in AEs, rising geopolitical tensions, and refugee crisis intensification in Europe.
  - Viewed corporate debt as having risen excessively but cited mitigating factors: large pool of domestic savings, largely state-owned entities on both borrower and creditor sides, ample banking system buffers, and ongoing equity market development.
  - Concurred that further substantive progress was needed on deleveraging and capacity reduction to avoid permanently lower medium-term growth.
  - Observed moderation in property prices in Tier 1 cities and equity prices more in line with fundamentals after the substantial correction over the last 12 months.
  - Recognized some financial sector risks and that supervisors were responding proactively.

### Spillovers
- Overall:
  - China’s transition will be positive overall for the global economy, but continue to produce large spillovers that vary by country/region.
  - China continued to account for about a third of global growth in 2015.
- Reform impacts:
  - Sustained progress on reforms and reining-in vulnerabilities will reduce downside risks, boost sentiment, and lift investment in trading partners.
  - Announced capacity reductions in coal and steel, if implemented, could have sizable effects on global capacity (envisaged cuts in steel capacity over the next 3–5 years are broadly equivalent to recent annual steel output of Japan).
- Counterfactual:
  - The counterfactual to China’s transition is much slower growth, and possibly a sharp slowdown, which would have much larger negative spillovers.
- Opportunities:
  - China’s movement up the value chain is creating opportunities for frontier and developing economies (e.g., Cambodia, Lao P.D.R, Myanmar, and Vietnam) to enter lower-end, labor-intensive sectors and satisfy rising Chinese consumption demand.
- Negative spillovers:
  - Trade: economies closely integrated with China through global value chains (e.g., Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan Province of China) are more adversely affected; New Zealand likely to benefit from increased Chinese consumption demand.
  - Staff analysis (April 2016 WEO): a 1 percentage point investment-driven drop in China’s output growth would reduce G20 growth by ¼ percentage point.
  - Commodities: China accounted for about 40 percent of global demand for metals in 2014; China’s rebalancing might account for between a fifth and a half of the declines in broad commodity price indices.
  - Financial markets: financial spillovers from China have increased; shocks to China’s fundamentals have rising impacts on equity returns in EMs and AEs; over the past year China likely transmitted more shocks to other countries than it received.
  - Overall, countries most heavily exposed to China’s slowdown are those within the Asian regional supply chain and heavy commodity and machinery exporters.
- Authorities’ view on spillovers:
  - Authorities acknowledged transitional negative effects on commodity prices and trading partner growth but argued adjustment would benefit the global economy long run.
  - Agreed financial spillovers appeared to be rising but cautioned establishing causality is difficult.
  - Noted other contributing factors to global risk-off episodes (general EM weakness, uncertainty about unconventional monetary policies in AEs, negative interest rate policies affecting bank profitability).

### Policies to Secure the Transition (Intro)
- Preventing downside risks and ensuring the transition to more robust, sustainable medium-term growth requires decisively implementing a proactive and comprehensive policy package.
- Policymakers should focus less on traditional investment stimulus for short-term growth and more on fostering a well-regulated, consumer-oriented private sector to generate stronger, more sustainable medium-term growth.

*Excerpted from IMF staff report contained in the provided PDF content.*

### 20.      International experience, including China’s own in the 1990s, suggests that tackling a

### _cr16270 - 20.      International experience, including China’s own in the 1990s, suggests that tackling a

### Comprehensive strategy for systemic corporate debt
- Tackling a systemic corporate debt problem requires a comprehensive approach across ministries, levels of government, firms, banks, investors, and regions; isolated initiatives (e.g., debt-equity conversions) are likely to fail.
- Recommend establishing a well-staffed, high-level group with a clear mandate for policy formulation and communication.
- Kick-start progress with a few high-profile pilot restructurings/liquidations of weak SOEs in more dynamic regions, building on plans for “zombie” company exits already underway in some provinces.

### High-level decision and fiscal stance
- A high-level decision is needed to stop financing weak firms, strengthen corporate governance, mitigate social costs, and accept the likely lower growth; this should be reflected in coordinated action by SOEs, local governments, and financial supervisors.

### Hardening budget constraints
- Reduce access to credit for weak firms by removing implicit guarantees and subsidies and allocating losses to firms and investors to improve credit allocation and help investors price risk more accurately (evidenced by recent widening of credit spreads).

### Triage: restructure viable, liquidate nonviable
- Triage firms into viable (restructure) and nonviable (liquidate).
- Liquidate nonviable SOEs with fiscal support to meet welfare costs of laid-off workers (modelled on the RMB 100 billion Restructuring Fund for coal and steel).
- Viable but insolvent SOEs require restructuring plans and management capable of execution, likely with greater private sector role; nonmarket objectives and responsibilities should be removed.
- Scale back subsidies (e.g., land use and preferential access to credit) and raise SOE dividend payouts to the budget to the targeted 30 percent.

### Loss recognition and workout tools
- Banks should proactively recognize and manage impaired assets via loan classification and provisioning, bank capital requirements, collateral valuation, prudential reporting, and supervisory review that fosters proactive NPL resolution (restructuring, write off, or sale).
- Asset quality recognition standards should apply equally to loans and to securities whose underlying assets embody credit or market risk, across banks and nonbank financial institutions.
- Once losses are recognized, tools such as debt-equity conversions, NPL securitization, and sales to AMCs can be useful if nested in a comprehensive strategy and properly designed.

### Burden sharing and state role
- Recognizing impaired assets will likely result in significant losses; a plan to allocate losses respecting hierarchy of claims among banks, corporates, and investors—and backstopping them with government funds if necessary—will be critical.
- This calls for an active role for the state.

### Restructuring mechanism and insolvency
- Legal framework for enterprise insolvency is not significantly deviating from international best practice, but application has been extremely limited.
- Large-scale, expedited restructuring requires creative approaches—e.g., an out-of-court debt restructuring mechanism for priority-distressed companies using independent restructuring experts to provide valuations and restructuring/liquidation proposals.
- The process should be market based, transparent, and avoid forced mergers between weak and strong firms.

### Developing a distressed debt market
- A more market-based system for resolving distressed debt would facilitate disposal of NPLs and may require greater involvement of specialist financial institutions and legal workout agencies.
- Better functioning collateral auctions and properly incentivized, independent AMCs can help increase recovery values and jump-start the market.

### Social costs and worker support
- Staff estimate potential employment losses in the excess capacity sectors (aluminum, cement, coal, construction, plate glass, and steel) at close to 8 million—some 1 percent of total employment.
- Given regional concentration of hardship, the central government should bear a portion of welfare costs related to displaced workers.
- Costs of structural unemployment and worker resettlement are best borne by targeted assistance through earmarked funds to complement local social security programs, as exemplified by the RMB 100 billion Restructuring Fund for coal and steel; disbursements have begun with close to RMB 30 billion (a third of the total) already transferred to provinces that provided commitments on capacity reduction.

### Facilitating market entry and competition
- Improving resource allocation requires both exit of nonviable firms and entry of dynamic private firms.
- Make markets more contestable by lowering barriers to entry and dismantling monopolies in services (telecommunications and healthcare) and utilities (electricity, gas, and water).
- Follow through decisively on the recently announced SOE reform strategy (mixed ownership, professional management, improved corporate governance).

### Authorities’ views (summarized)
- Key focus areas in the 13th Five Year Plan: supply-side structural reforms, deleveraging, destocking, reducing energy intensity, facilitating entry, and giving markets a more decisive role.
- A list of state-owned “zombie” companies is being prepared, mostly in coal and steel; capacity reduction is underway.
- Restructuring fund disbursements started: close to RMB 30 billion transferred (a third of the RMB 100 billion fund).
- Authorities caution the process will be slow due to complicated corporate structures and overlapping balance sheets; they favor more market involvement and greater creditor discrimination.
- Authorities state implicit support to SOEs has largely been phased out; mixed ownership reforms expected to attract private participation.
- Approval procedures for capital injection in new growth areas cut by a third.

### Accepting the slowdown: macro policy alignment
- Restructuring will likely entail slower near-term growth; such slowdown should be accepted to achieve higher-quality longer-term growth.
- On-budget, pro-consumption fiscal stimulus can be used if growth threatens to fall excessively.
- Annual growth targets should be downplayed relative to other indicators, set flexibly (wider ranges) and at sustainable levels—for 2017, around 6 percent.
- Credit growth needs to fall substantially to stabilize the nonfinancial private credit/GDP ratio by addressing soft budget constraints on SOEs and local governments, implicit/explicit guarantees, excessive risk taking, and pursuit of unsustainably-high growth.

### Interest rate guidance
- Staff’s monetary policy index suggests rate cuts have gone beyond what historical relationships with output and inflation would imply; short-term rates are barely positive in real terms and likely below the longer-run neutral level.
- Interest rates should rise towards less accommodative levels as inflation picks up, in a data-dependent manner; stronger prudential settings should be the main tool to restrain credit growth, with somewhat higher interest rates playing a complementary role—used with caution because they could intensify corporate distress and worsen credit conditions for SMEs.

### Fiscal stance and structural fiscal reforms
- Staff estimate the large “augmented” deficit should gradually decline towards around 7 percent of GDP over the medium term to slow and stabilize debt.
- The projected increase in the augmented deficit in 2016 is not warranted structurally or cyclically given the growth outlook; for 2017 a moderate reduction of the augmented deficit seems appropriate. Only if growth threatens to fall sharply (well below staff’s projection of 6.2 percent) should the deficit widen.
- On-budget fiscal deficit projected to increase from 2.7 percent of GDP in 2015 to 3 percent of GDP in 2016.
- Reallocate fiscal resources from off-budget investment towards on-budget measures that support rebalancing (boost household incomes and consumption) and restructuring; set fiscal policy within a multi-year budgeting framework and improve coordination among fiscal bodies.
- Provincial government quotas for new debt issuance should be set consistent with the overall envelope to curtail off-budget local government borrowing and bring it on budget.
- Increase on-budget support for consumption: raise pensions, social assistance, education and health spending, unemployment benefits, and provide restructuring funds; cut minimum social security contributions and raise SOE dividend payments. Increases in social benefits should be targeted to ensure progressivity.
- Substantially raising taxes on fossil fuel and pollution (e.g., a carbon or coal tax) would help curtail emissions, improve energy efficiency, raise revenue and prevent almost 4 million premature deaths by 2030 (see Selected Issues).
- Continue structural fiscal reforms: implement new budget law, improve transparency of local government financing, modernize the tax system to be more progressive, expand social security and portability of benefits, liberalize residency restrictions, and improve active labor market policies.
- Authorities note monetary and fiscal policies will provide a supportive environment for supply-side restructuring, expect credit growth to normalize, and emphasize gradual deleveraging to avoid adverse feedback loops. Authorities question the staff’s ‘augmented’ balance and note steps to prohibit local government off-budget spending, while acknowledging remaining guarantees by some local governments (LGFVs).

### Guarding against financial stability risks
- Banks:
  - Re-examine provisioning and loan classification regulations to foster proactive recognition of potential loss (e.g., classifying all loans with overdue payments beyond 90 days as nonperforming).
  - Conduct focused asset quality reviews (random selection or sector-specific).
  - Increase capital ratios and consider a high countercyclical capital buffer and encouraging common equity issuance.
- Funding:
  - Monitor shift toward wholesale, short-tenor, and more volatile instruments; rising interbank funding reliance; leverage in the repo bond market; and deteriorating collateral quality.
  - Strengthen liquidity in stress scenarios, focus on Liquidity Coverage Ratio standards, and pay attention to collateral standards.
- Shadow products:
  - Adopt a holistic supervisory approach; implement “CBRC Notice 82” aggressively and consider additional action to close regulatory arbitrage.
- Capital markets:
  - Prioritize orderly functioning (including emergency liquidity provision) over valuation intervention.
  - Address search-for-yield behavior and excessive liquidity creation; avoid intervention during sell-offs; tighten underwriting and disclosure standards, especially in the bond market.
  - Strengthen resilience of securities firms and regulated institutional investors by capping leverage and improving risk management.
- Property:
  - Consider region-specific policies: tighter macroprudential measures in Tier 1 cities (e.g., lower loan-to-value ratios on mortgages for second homes); restrict new starts in lower-tier cities with multi-year excess inventory by tightening prudential measures on credit to property developers.
- Crisis preparedness:
  - Conduct stress tests and ready the emergency liquidity framework.
  - Prepare strategies and resolution frameworks for distressed financial institutions, especially nonbanks.
  - Institute a clear public funding backstop for the deposit insurance scheme.
  - Ensure adequate data and analysis (bank/shadow bank interlinkages, FX exposures).
  - Allocate coordination of crisis preparedness and management to a high-level forum with a clear implementation plan and communications strategy.
- Regulatory structure:
  - Major upgrade in supervisory cooperation and coordination is necessary to enable seamless information sharing, proactive response to regulatory gaps and arbitrage, and stronger crisis management capabilities.

*Italic: Source—PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (excerpt).*

### 40.      The banking regulator disagreed with staff’s

### _cr16270 - 40.      The banking regulator disagreed with staff’s

### Banking regulator's assessment and views
- Regulator disagreed with staff’s assessment of corporate debt-at-risk; their internal exercise, accounting for the mitigating impact of loan collateral, produced significantly lower estimates.
- Regulator noted unlisted companies—assumed the same as the listed universe in staff’s exercise—were healthier as a group than the listed universe.
- Classification of loans as nonperforming should consider criteria beyond payments overdue beyond 90 days, including judgment about borrowers’ long-term viability and whether cash-flow problems are cyclical or structural.
- Bank exposures to nonstandard credit assets are a key concern; banks were instructed to conduct stringent asset quality classification, requiring them to set aside more reserves against these exposures than against loans.
- Regulator was closely monitoring growing reliance on wholesale funding, but viewed it as an adaptation to growing competition for deposits.
- Regulator argued bank capital ratios were sufficient and stable, and viewed dynamic provisioning (introduced in 2011) as effectively playing a similar role to a countercyclical buffer.

### Securities regulator's position
- Concurred with staff that regulatory focus should be on ensuring smooth functioning of capital markets.
- Emphasized readiness to provide liquidity to distressed securities firms and an intent to avoid indiscriminate and large purchases of securities.
- Information requirements for bond issuers had been raised and onsite inspections increased.

### Deposit insurance and public backstop
- Authorities questioned instituting a public backstop for the deposit insurance scheme, arguing the deposit insurance system is a market-based framework to prevent moral hazard and should not be directly linked to public funding.
- Authorities noted international experience and standards suggested premium contributions—not fiscal resources—should be the main source of financing deposit insurance.
- Legal framework does not preclude public emergency liquidity funding for the deposit insurance system, though such public funding shall be repaid by bank premiums.
- Authorities agreed closer cross-agency coordination was needed to bolster supervision, policymaking, and crisis preparedness; steps were underway, e.g., closer collaboration on issuing new liquidity guidelines for securities firms.

### FX regime: progress toward an effectively-floating exchange rate
- China has made progress toward a more flexible, market-determined exchange rate system, but the transition from many years of stability/gradual appreciation is difficult and potentially bumpy.
- Key staff recommendations and observations:
  - Achieving an effective float within the next couple of years, ideally by 2018, remains a key goal.
  - A more flexible, market-determined exchange rate is needed to allow market forces to play a more decisive role, absorb shocks, and maintain an independent monetary policy as the capital account opens.
  - Staff assesses the current level of the RMB as broadly in line with fundamentals but highlights the value of permitting market forces to guide the exchange rate toward equilibrium levels; the effective exchange rate (relative to a basket) should over time be allowed to move in response to market conditions.
  - Authorities should prevent destabilizing adjustment—overshooting, one-way expectations, and disorderly market conditions; the large buffer of reserves provides ample ammunition for intervention, to be deployed in the event of a significant shock.
  - Possible transition framework: progressively widen a tolerance band around an equilibrium effective rate within which the spot rate could fluctuate; widen the band gradually or in discrete steps; smooth spot rate fluctuations within the band by intervention; adjust the center of the band if the equilibrium effective exchange rate has changed.

### Moving to a more market-based monetary framework
- Key elements recommended:
  - Objectives: Introduce an explicit medium-term inflation target or range (set by the government/State Council) together with operational (instrument) independence for the PBC. Currently the PBC targets multiple objectives (inflation, balance of payments, growth, financial stability).
  - Instrument: Declare the seven-day repo rate the new intermediate policy target and publish a new market rate (seven-day repo) representative of lending conditions for Tier 1 banks. Standing facilities should act as a backstop with unlimited access for banks against appropriate collateral.
  - Operational framework: PBC could improve the operational framework; reserve averaging (introduced in 2015) could be expanded to a 4–5-week period to allow easier liquidity management by banks.
  - Backstop: Put clear standing facilities in place as a backstop; the overnight standing credit facility may function as an important backstop for the payment system; eligibility and collateral requirements for PBC liquidity facilities should be clear.
  - Transparency: Announce monetary policy goals explicitly and use monetary policy instruments to achieve goals in the most transparent manner possible.

### Capital account and controls
- Enforcement of capital controls tightened since last summer; additional measures include the 20 percent unremunerated reserve requirement on FX forwards to stem depreciation pressures.
- Tightening likely contributed to restoration of stability in the capital account but reduced efficiency of corporate treasury management.
- Further liberalization should be phased very cautiously; capital account liberalization depends on a strengthened financial system, enhanced corporate sector governance, and greater exchange rate flexibility.
- Care should be taken that enforcement of existing capital controls does not spill over to affect current account transactions.

### Authorities’ views on FX, monetary framework, and capital account
- Authorities noted exchange market pressures had eased considerably and move to a more market-based exchange rate was progressing, maintaining broad stability against a currency basket while allowing market forces greater role.
- FX intervention had decreased and was used largely to smooth adjustments and curb overshooting.
- Authorities remain committed to gradually liberalizing the capital account over the medium term and may complement such reforms (including the reserve requirement on FX forwards that authorities consider macroprudential measures) to maintain stability and minimize disruptive short-term capital flows.
- Monetary framework adaptations included elevating the role of interest rates: daily open market operations, open bid auctions for liquidity, and 10-day reserve averaging had contributed to increased stability and predictability in money market rates.
- The PBC did not see the need to extend the period over which reserve averaging is calculated, citing banks’ liquidity management had adapted well to the current system.

### Enhancing transparency and communications
- Data gaps: Lack of confidence in macroeconomic data prompts investors to suspect the economy is weaker than officially reported. Progress made (monetary, financial and external statistics; SDDS and CPIS), but important gaps remain.
  - Suggested data improvements: quarterly GDP by expenditure, high-frequency indicators on services and the “new” economy, improved deflation methodology, tracking off-budget spending by local governments and providing expenditure breakdown by economic type, and credit composition by sector.
  - Ensure adequate data on bank/shadow bank linkages and FX exposures for financial stability analysis.
  - Data are broadly adequate for surveillance but barely so and not commensurate with China’s systemic importance.
- Communications: Clear, authoritative, and consistent communications about policy objectives and implementation would reduce uncertainty and align expectations. Develop a communication strategy integrated with policy decisions; identify key audiences; use user-friendly tools and channels; learn from international experience.
- Authorities’ response: Upgrading data collection and dissemination in three main areas—consistency between provincial and national GDP, national balance sheet, and natural resource balance sheet. Exploring publishing expenditure-based quarterly GDP in real terms and high-frequency indicators for services. From financial regulatory perspective, authorities did not see major data gaps in bank/shadow bank linkages or credit allocation by sector; intend to publish more detailed bank credit breakdowns and increase frequency of dissemination. Authorities acknowledged importance of communications and pointed to recent press conferences and media interviews by key policymakers.

### Box 3 — Reliability of China’s output data (highlights)
- Evidence points to possible overstatement of growth recently, but overstatement likely moderate; official national accounts likely provide a broadly reliable picture.
- Nominal GDP is probably larger than the official estimate; a study by the Rhodium Group suggests nominal GDP is underestimated by 13–16 percent in 2008.
- Hard indicators (energy consumption, industrial value added, commodity imports) show more pronounced weakening than official growth data, suggesting volatility may be understated.
- High frequency-based estimates: out-of-sample estimates of growth from high-frequency PMIs and consumption/investment indicators are about ¼‒½ percent lower than official growth data in 2015.
- Private consumption example: retail sales growing by around 10 percent y/y in real terms.

### Staff appraisal: findings, scenarios, and policy recommendations
- Reform and rebalancing amid a bumpy transition:
  - Rebalancing progressed (industry to services; investment to consumption) but less success in reining in credit growth.
  - Reforms advanced across many domains but lagged in some critical areas; transition to sustainable growth is difficult with sizable economic and financial volatility.
  - Vulnerabilities are rising and buffers, while still adequate, are eroding.
- Policy plans:
  - The 13th Five Year Plan aims to boost consumption, expand the service sector, protect the environment, and reduce poverty; supply-side reforms center stage (SOE restructuring, capacity reduction in coal and steel, facilitating firm entry and worker resettlement).
- Growth projections and scenarios:
  - Baseline: Growth expected at 6.6 percent this year, falling to 6.2 percent in 2017, assuming robust consumption and wage growth, slight pick-up in investment this year but moderating next year; net exports likely to drag growth in near term.
  - Medium-term: Under staff’s baseline, growth will decline below 6 percent over the medium term, the credit/GDP ratio will continue rising, and risks of a disruptive adjustment will increase.
  - Alternative, proactive scenario: With decisive measures to tackle corporate debt and reform SOEs, near-term growth would dip below baseline but medium-term growth prospects would improve and the nonfinancial private credit/GDP ratio would stabilize at a significantly lower level than in the baseline.
- Tackling corporate debt:
  - Corporate debt remains manageable but needs decisive action: harden budget constraints; triage excessively indebted firms; restructure viable firms and liquidate nonviable; recognize and share financial losses among firms, banks, other creditors, and, if necessary, the government; absorb social costs of layoffs through earmarked funds; facilitate entry of dynamic private firms.
  - Recommendation to kick-start progress by piloting a few high-profile restructurings/liquidations of weak SOEs in the next few months.
- Macro policy stance:
  - Policies should be consistent with lowering vulnerabilities and the resulting moderately slower near-term growth.
  - Credit growth and investment need to decline, partially offset by increased on-budget measures supporting rebalancing and boosting household consumption.
  - Pro-rebalancing measures include raising pensions, social assistance, education and health spending, providing restructuring funds, and cutting minimum social security contributions.
- Financial stability measures:
  - Proactive recognition of losses in banks’ loan books.
  - Strengthen capital ratios.
  - Enhance supervisory focus on liquidity risk management and funding stability risks.
  - Address risks in shadow products.
  - Major upgrade in supervisory coordination and cooperation to enable cross-agency information sharing, reduce regulatory arbitrage, and enhance crisis management capabilities.

*Source: IMF staff report text provided in the content unit.*

### 56.      Steady progress toward an effectively floating exchange rate regime should

### _cr16270 - 56.      Steady progress toward an effectively floating exchange rate regime should

### Exchange rate regime: move toward effective float
- Steady progress toward an effectively floating exchange rate regime should continue.
- Staff encourages the authorities to build on the progress made over the past year in moving toward a more flexible, market-determined exchange rate system.
- Achieving an effectively floating exchange rate regime, ideally by 2018, will need to combine a clear overarching drive toward progressively greater market-determination and skillful short-term management to avoid excessive volatility.
- The move to greater flexibility should be supported by progress to a more market-based monetary framework.

### Supporting reforms and sequencing
- Further capital account liberalization should be phased carefully.
- Capital account liberalization should be supported by:
  - a strengthened financial system,
  - enhanced corporate governance, and
  - greater exchange rate flexibility.

### Transparency, data, and communications
- Transparency in data and communications:
  - Greater clarity about developments in the economy and the authorities’ policy intentions would reduce uncertainty, align expectations, and help contain market turbulence.
  - This requires more comprehensive and timely dissemination of economic and financial data and a communication strategy integrated with policy decisions, conveyed via a range of user-friendly tools.

*Source: _cr16270 - 56.      Steady progress toward an effectively floating exchange rate regime should*

### 58.      It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation with China take place on the standard

### _cr16270 - 58.      It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation with China take place on the standard 12-month cycle.

### Activity: Slowing Trend, Bumpy
- Consumer spending has held up while private investment has slowed.
- Trade volumes: shown as year-on-year quarterly averages for Exports and Imports across 13Q1–16Q1 (charted within range -20 to 20 percent).
- Real Retail Sales (May-16): Consumer durables, Automobiles, Total (series shown in percent, year-on-year).
- Real Fixed Asset Investment Growth (May-16) (deflated by FAI prices): series for Non-SOE, SOE, Total (In percent, year-on-year).
- Inflation (May-16): PPI (RHS), Core CPI (excl. food and energy), Headline (In percent, year-on-year).
- Residential Housing Growth (May-16): NBS 70-city new constructed residential property price (In percent, year-on-year).
- Industry Value Added and IP: crude steel (no reported data for January and February 2016).

### Rebalancing: Some Progress
- Since 2010, private consumption has grown owing to a rising income share and a decrease in the saving rate.
- Investment has moderated along with national saving, especially in 2015.
- GDP by production (2008–2015): Secondary Industry and Tertiary Industry shares shown (In percent of GDP).
- Real GDP Growth by Activity (2005–2015): Primary industry, Secondary industry, Tertiary industry (In percent, year-on-year growth).
- Employment by Sectors (2005–2015): Primary industry, Secondary industry, Tertiary industry (In percent of total employment).
- Consumption and saving detail: Household saving defined as household saving in percent of disposable income; Disposable income and Private consumption shown in percent of GDP; Household saving (in percent of disposable income, RHS) charted.
- Employment Growth (2005–2015): Secondary industry, Tertiary Industry, Primary industry (In percent, year-on-year growth).

### Corporate Sector: Rising Stress
- Stock of credit outstanding relative to GDP has grown by a third over the last five years.
- Leverage: Leverage ratios (Average Mean) show SOEs and Private firms (2003–2016 Q1) (In percent).
- Profitability: Weak and deteriorating SOE profitability (returns on total assets) for Industrial private enterprises, Local SOEs, Central SOEs.
- Payables Days: Payables Days (median) increased (Number of days; sample China contains 3139 firms (2015E); LTM = last twelve months).
- China Listed Companies' Potentially Impaired Loans (S&P Capital IQ sample): shares of total debt with ICR thresholds (1y,ICR <2; 1y,ICR <1.5; 1y,ICR <1) shown for China and regions (In percent of debt).
- Debt-at-Risk by Sector: Construction-related and upstream sectors account for large portions of debt-at-risk (percent of total debt at risk).

### Credit: Seeking Yield
- Lower nominal rates have contributed to an easing in overall monetary policy.
- Adjusted TSF Stock Growth (2005–2015): Including external debt and Excluding external debt (In percent, year-on-year growth).
- Claims on Government and Other Non-bank Financial Institutions (2012Q1–2016Q1): Claims on other non-bank financial institutions and Claims on government (In percent of GDP).
- Corporate bond market (Jan-15 to May-16): Gross issuance of corporate and enterprise bonds (In billion of RMB) and corporate bond spreads (5-year bonds, in basis points, RHS). Data are up to June 15, 2016.
- Net corporate financing composition (2012Q1–2016Q1): Bank Loans, Shadow banking, Net corporate bond financing, Non-financial enterprise equity, Others, Debt swap contributing to Adjusted TSF.
- Equity Market performance: Shanghai composite, Shenzhen composite, High-tech stock exchange indexes with relative movements versus 2015 peak/troughs and 2014 trough.
- Real Interest Rates and Monetary Policy Index: Real 1Y benchmark lending rate (%) (deflated by CPI and PPI), Monetary policy index (%, pa, RHS). Notes on index construction and interest rate liberalization since October 2015.

### External Sector: A Reversal of Trends?
- Current account surplus has grown as terms of trade improved and real imports softened.
- Broad balance of payments deteriorated with large net capital outflows in 2015.
- Capital outflows (2011Q1–2015Q3 and 2015Q4) charted in In billion of US dollars.
- Outflows reflect weaker inflows by nonresidents and larger gross outflows by residents.
- Exchange rate expectations and China-US yield differential compression partially explain outflows: Exchange Rate (Implied 12-month return) and 1-year interest differential: China T-bill minus US T-bill; Carry trade indicators (12M onshore June-2016).
- External Debt (2011Q1–2015Q3): Deposits and Loans series and Total external debt (USD Billions) with Total external debt (RHS).
- Assets Outflows (2011Q1–2015Q4): Portfolio investment, Other investment, Errors and omission, Direct investment (In billion of US dollars).
- Current Account components (2011Q1–2016Q1): Goods Balance, Service Balance, Income Balance, Current Account Balance (In billion of US dollars).

### FX and Stock Markets: Pressures Easing?
- Capital outflows rose since 2014:Q2 and accelerated in 2015:H2, prompting large and unprecedented intervention to arrest depreciation pressures after the August 2015 exchange rate policy shift.
- Net Capital Flows and Loss of Reserves (2014Q1–2016Q1) shown in In billion of US dollars.
- RMB depreciation: RMB-USD Monthly Average Spot Rate (Jan-14 to May-16) month-on-month percent changes.
- RMB Exchange Rates vs. the US Dollar and CFETS Index: RMB/USD daily central parity fixing (RHS) and CFETS Index (Dec 31, 2014 baseline) through June-16.
- China Equity Market Indices (Jan-14 to June-16): Shanghai composite index and Shenzhen composite index (RHS).
- Market expectations: RMB Implied 1-year Depreciation/Appreciation (1-year NDF and 1-year onshore) show markets continue to price in further depreciation, although expectations have eased somewhat (June-16).

### Table 1 — Selected Economic Indicators (excerpted key series and projections)
- Real GDP: 2011 9.5; 2012 7.9; 2013 7.8; 2014 7.3; 2015 6.9; 2016 6.6; 2017 6.2; 2018 6.0; 2019 6.0; 2020 5.9; 2021 5.8.
- Consumption: 2011 12.2; 2012 8.7; 2013 7.2; 2014 7.2; 2015 8.3; 2016 7.8; 2017 7.7; 2018 7.1; 2019 6.8; 2020 6.6; 2021 6.4.
- Investment: 2011 9.2; 2012 7.1; 2013 9.1; 2014 7.1; 2015 6.1; 2016 6.1; 2017 6.5; 2018 5.2; 2019 5.3; 2020 5.3; 2021 5.3.
- Total social financing (TSF): 2011 18.1; 2012 19.1; 2013 17.5; 2014 14.3; 2015 12.4; 2016 12.7; 2017 11.9; 2018 11.4; 2019 11.0; 2020 10.3; 2021 10.1.
- Household disposable income (percent of GDP): 2011 58.3; 2012 59.4; 2013 60.0; 2014 60.7; 2015 62.2; 2016 63.2; 2017 63.6; 2018 63.9; 2019 64.2; 2020 64.2; 2021 64.2.
- Household savings (percent of disposable income): 2011 41.0; 2012 40.8; 2013 38.5; 2014 37.9; 2015 37.4; 2016 36.9; 2017 35.8; 2018 34.7; 2019 33.7; 2020 32.7; 2021 31.7.
- Household debt (percent of GDP): 2011 27.8; 2012 29.6; 2013 33.0; 2014 35.3; 2015 38.4; 2016 41.8; 2017 45.5; 2018 49.1; 2019 52.4; 2020 55.3; 2021 57.5.
- Non-financial corporate domestic debt (percent of GDP): 2011 97.0; 2012 104.7; 2013 108.9; 2014 112.8; 2015 120.0; 2016 127.4; 2017 133.5; 2018 137.5; 2019 139.7; 2020 140.2; 2021 141.2.
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2011 1.8; 2012 2.5; 2013 1.5; 2014 2.6; 2015 3.0; 2016 2.4; 2017 1.6; 2018 1.3; 2019 1.0; 2020 0.8; 2021 0.6.
- Gross official reserves (bn US$): 2011 3,256; 2012 3,388; 2013 3,880; 2014 3,899; 2015 3,406; 2016 3,181; 2017 3,064; 2018 2,993; 2019 2,890; 2020 2,813; 2021 2,740.
- Nominal GDP (bn RMB): 2011 48,604; 2012 54,099; 2013 59,696; 2014 64,849; 2015 69,630; 2016 74,715; 2017 80,118; 2018 86,159; 2019 92,834; 2020 100,244; 2021 108,246.
- Augmented debt (percent of GDP): 2011 45.8; 2012 47.1; 2013 51.0; 2014 51.8; 2015 55.8; 2016 60.4; 2017 64.5; 2018 67.8; 2019 70.4; 2020 72.2; 2021 73.5.

### Table 2 — Balance of Payments (selected series and projections)
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2011 1.8; 2012 2.5; 2013 1.5; 2014 2.6; 2015 3.0; 2016 2.4; 2017 1.6; 2018 1.3; 2019 1.0; 2020 0.8; 2021 0.6.
- Trade balance (percent of GDP): 2011 3.0; 2012 3.6; 2013 3.7; 2014 4.1; 2015 5.1; 2016 5.1; 2017 4.5; 2018 4.3; 2019 4.0; 2020 3.8; 2021 3.7.
- Exports (percent of GDP): 2011 24.0; 2012 23.0; 2013 22.3; 2014 21.3; 2015 19.2; 2016 18.1; 2017 17.1; 2018 16.1; 2019 15.2; 2020 14.3; 2021 13.5.
- Imports (percent of GDP): 2011 21.0; 2012 19.4; 2013 18.6; 2014 17.1; 2015 14.1; 2016 13.0; 2017 12.6; 2018 11.8; 2019 11.1; 2020 10.5; 2021 9.8.
- Financial account (percent of GDP): 2011 3.5; 2012 -0.4; 2013 3.6; 2014 -0.5; 2015 -4.3; 2016 -4.4; 2017 -2.6; 2018 -1.9; 2019 -1.7; 2020 -1.3; 2021 -1.0.
- Net foreign direct investment (percent of GDP): 2011 3.1; 2012 2.1; 2013 2.3; 2014 1.4; 2015 0.6; 2016 -0.4; 2017 -1.2; 2018 -1.8; 2019 -1.8; 2020 -1.5; 2021 -1.2.
- Gross reserves (Billion of US$): 2011 3,255.8; 2012 3,387.9; 2013 3,880.4; 2014 3,899.3; 2015 3,406.1; 2016 3,181.4; 2017 3,063.6; 2018 2,993.4; 2019 2,889.8; 2020 2,813.1; 2021 2,739.9.
- External debt (Billion of US$): 2011 1,047.1; 2012 1,162.8; 2013 1,532.8; 2014 1,788.1; 2015 1,416.2; projections to 2021 up to 1,868.1. As percent of GDP: 2011 13.9; 2012 13.6; 2013 15.9; 2014 16.9; 2015 12.7; 2016 10.2; 2017 9.6; 2018 9.8; 2019 10.0; 2020 10.3; 2021 10.5.
- Nominal GDP (Billion of US$): 2011 7,522.2; 2012 8,570.3; 2013 9,635.2; 2014 10,557.6; 2015 11,181.6; 2016 11,354.8; 2017 12,279.6; 2018 13,461; 2019 14,777.4; 2020 16,294.6; 2021 17,852.9.

### Table 3 — External Vulnerability Indicators (selected)
- General government debt (percent of GDP) 2011 15.2; 2012 15.2; 2013 15.9; 2014 38.5; 2015 38.3.
- Broad money (M2: annual percentage change): 2011 17.3; 2012 14.4; 2013 13.6; 2014 11.0; 2015 13.3.
- Stock exchange capitalization (percent of GDP): 2011 54.2; 2012 53.5; 2013 51.6; 2014 70.3; 2015 94.8.
- Gross reserves to imports of goods & services (months): 2011 28.3; 2012 22.3; 2013 24.0; 2014 22.1; 2015 18.1.
- Gross reserves to broad money (M2) (percent): 2011 24.7; 2012 22.0; 2013 21.7; 2014 19.5; 2015 15.2.
- Total external debt (percent of GDP): 2011 13.9; 2012 13.6; 2013 15.9; 2014 16.9; 2015 12.7.
- Total external debt (billions of US$): 2011 1,047.1; 2012 1,162.8; 2013 1,532.8; 2014 1,788.1; 2015 1,416.2.

### Table 4 — Monetary and Credit Developments (selected)
- Net foreign assets contributions (2011–2015): Monetary authority contribution and Depository institutions contribution (series showing shifts; 2015 monetary authority -10.8).
- Domestic credit (annual change): 2011 17.1; 2012 17.1; 2013 15.1; 2014 16.2; 2015 23.7; 2016 25.4 (contributions listed).
- Broad money (M2): 2011 17.3; 2012 14.4; 2013 13.6; 2014 11.0; 2015 13.3; 2016 13.4.
- TSF components and levels: TSF growth and TSF percent of GDP: TSF 2011 18.1; 2012 19.1; 2013 17.5; 2014 14.3; 2015 12.4; TSF percent of GDP 2011 157.9; 2012 169.0; 2013 180.0; 2014 189.5; 2015 198.4; 2016 204.7.
- Memo: Nonperforming loans ratio: 2011 1.0; 2012 1.0; 2013 1.0; 2014 1.3; 2015 1.7; 2016 1.8. Provision coverage ratio (2011–2016): 278.1; 295.5; 282.7; 232.1; 181.2; 175.0.

### Table 5 — General Government Fiscal Data (selected)
- Authorities' revenue (RMB billions): 2011 10,537; 2012 12,020; 2013 13,036; 2014 14,137; 2015 16,027; 2016 15,892; projections to 2021 up to 23,553.
- Authorities' expenditure (RMB billions): 2011 11,387; 2012 12,820; 2013 14,276; 2014 15,497; 2015 17,647; 2016 18,072; projections to 2021 up to 26,841.
- Authorities' fiscal balance (1)-(2) in RMB: 2011 -850; 2012 -800; 2013 -1,240; 2014 -1,360; 2015 -1,620; 2016 -2,180.
- Staff estimates — Revenue (RMB billions): 2011 13,081; 2012 15,016; 2013 16,538; 2014 18,158; 2015 19,944; 2016 20,735.
- Staff estimates — Expenditure (RMB billions): 2011 14,234; 2012 16,838; 2013 18,651; 2014 20,463; 2015 22,995; 2016 24,202.
- General government net borrowing/lending (staff): 2011 -47 (RMB billions) and -0.1 percent of GDP; 2015 -1,877 (RMB billions) and -2.7 percent of GDP; 2016 -2,247 (RMB billions) and -3.0 percent of GDP.
- Augmented balance (including additional local government infrastructure spending financed by debt): 2011 -3,999 (RMB billions) -8.2 percent of GDP; 2015 -6,623 (RMB billions) -9.5 percent of GDP; 2016 -7,517 (RMB billions) -10.1 percent of GDP.
- General government debt (MOF definition and staff estimates): Augmented debt (RMB billions) 2011 22,273; 2012 25,470; 2013 30,450; 2014 33,611; 2015 38,877; 2016 45,103. General government debt (staff estimate, RMB billions) 2011 16,081; 2012 18,405; 2013 22,045; 2014 25,830; 2015 29,885; 2016 34,738. Augmented debt (percent of GDP) rises from 45.8 (2011) to 60.4 (2016) and to 73.5 (2021).

### Table 6 — Nonfinancial Sector Debt (selected)
- Coverage in RMB trillion (2014 vs 2015):
  - Total: 134 (2014) and 153 (2015); as percent of GDP 206 (2014) and 220 (2015).
  - Central government: 10 (2014) and 11 (2015); percent of GDP 15 (2014) and 15 (2015).
  - Households: 23 (2014) and 27 (2015); percent of GDP 35 (2014) and 38 (2015).
  - Corporates (domestic): 73 (2014) and 84 (2015); percent of GDP 113 (2014) and 120 (2015).
  - Corporates (external): 4 (2014) and 4 (2015); percent of GDP 6 (2014) and 6 (2015).
  - Corporates (including LGFV): 86 (2014) and 100 (2015); percent of GDP 133 (2014) and 144 (2015).
  - Nominal GDP: 65 (2014) and 70 (2015).

*International Monetary Fund — PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (selected figures and charts from the IMF staff report).*

### Appendix I. China: External Sector Report

### Appendix I. China: External Sector Report

### Foreign asset and liability position and trajectory
- Gross foreign assets were 56 percent of GDP by end-2015, dominated by foreign reserves.
- Gross liabilities were 41 percent of GDP, mainly representing FDI liabilities.
- Reserve assets fell to US$3.33 trillion by end-2015 and to US$3.19 by May 2016 (about 28.5 percent of 2015 GDP), from US$3.84 trillion at end-2014 (about 36.4 percent of 2014 GDP), due to net sales of reserve assets and valuation losses.
- Net IIP declined from 15.2 percent of GDP in 2014 to 14.3 percent of GDP at end-2015; the ratio has been declining since the global financial crisis because of much-reduced CA surpluses, valuation changes, and still fast growth of GDP.
- Assessment: NIIP to GDP ratio expected to be close to 15 percent of GDP over the medium term, consistent with the CA surplus.
- Assessment: NIIP is not a major source of risk currently given large foreign reserves and FDI-dominated liabilities, but there is the possibility that capital outflow pressure could persist and reserves fall further.

### Overall Assessment
- The external position in 2015 was moderately stronger compared with the level consistent with medium-term fundamentals and desirable policy settings.
- The renminbi was broadly in line with fundamentals and desirable policies, although its assessment is subject to a high degree of uncertainty.
- Developments through June 2016 do not suggest a change in this assessment.
- The assessment reflects still-large policy gaps that affect the saving-investment imbalance, such as social spending.
- Uncertainties about the assessment of the renminbi reflect factors outside the models such as shifts in expectations and the nature of recent capital flows.

### Potential policy responses
- Achieving a lasting balance in the external position will require continued progress in closing the remaining domestic policy gaps.
- Successful implementation of the authorities’ reform agenda and consistent macroeconomic policies would move the economy to a more sustainable growth path with higher consumption and lower overall saving.
- Priorities include:
  - improving the social safety net;
  - increasing on-budget fiscal support;
  - SOE reform and opening markets to more competition;
  - creating a more market-based financial system;
  - achieving a flexible, market-based exchange rate with a better communication strategy.
- Continue moving toward a more market-based and transparent monetary policy framework to ensure an orderly transition to a float.
- May require use of foreign exchange reserves to some degree to smooth excessive volatility not justified by fundamentals during transition.

### Current account
- Background: The CA surplus in 2015 was 3.0 percent of GDP (3.0 percent of GDP cyclically adjusted), about 0.3 percent of GDP higher than 2014.
- Drivers of the 2015 CA increase: weak real import growth and favorable terms of trade (the gain was about 1 percent of GDP in 2015), despite sizeable REER appreciation and a rise in outward tourism.
- Long-run context: CA surplus has fallen substantially from about 10 percent of GDP in 2007, reflecting strong investment growth, REER appreciation, weakness in major advanced economies, and a trend widening of the services deficit.
- Assessment:
  - The EBA CA regression approach estimates the cyclically-adjusted CA is stronger (by about 2.4 percent of GDP) than consistent with medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
  - The estimated total policy gap has declined substantially; identified policy gaps remain in health expenditure, fiscal policy, FX intervention and capital controls.
  - The total gap is mostly driven by the residual, reflecting factors not captured by EBA, including distortions that encourage excessive savings.
  - Large uncertainty about China’s cyclical position implies staff assesses the CA gap is 1-3 percent of GDP stronger than implied by fundamentals and desirable policies.

### Real exchange rate
- Background: In 2015, the average REER appreciated by about 10 percent relative to the 2014 average, mainly driven by the appreciation in the NEER and reflecting the link to the US dollar.
- Through June 2016, driven by the change of NEER, the REER has depreciated by 6 percent relative to its 2015 average.
- Assessment:
  - The EBA REER index regression estimates China’s REER to be 3.9 percent stronger than levels warranted by fundamentals and desirable policies.
  - The REER gap and the minus 0.1 percent policy gap are small relative to the statistical errors of EBA regressions, suggesting the REER is broadly in line with fundamentals and desirable policy settings.
  - Assessment subject to large uncertainties because EBA focuses on savings-investment factors and does not capture other factors affecting demand for a country’s assets (e.g., shifts in expectations, portfolio allocation preferences).
  - Overall staff assessment: the REER is -10 to +10 percent different from the level consistent with fundamentals and desirable policies.

### Capital and financial accounts: flows and policy measures
- Background:
  - In the past year, China liberalized its financial account further, including granting onshore access to official sector investors.
  - China’s financial account is relatively open in FDI and other investment; restrictions remain, particularly with respect to portfolio flows.
  - After long period of net capital inflows (averaging US$80 billion per year over 2000-14), the financial account recorded a net outflow of US$673 billion in 2015.
  - Net direct investment flows remained positive—at US$ 62 billion—but well below the 2000-14 average (US$114 billion).
  - The large deficit in errors and omissions is included as capital outflows as they are likely to be unrecorded capital rather than current account transactions.
- Assessment:
  - Over the medium term, a well-sequenced loosening of capital controls consistent with domestic financial liberalization and exchange rate flexibility would be appropriate.
  - Further opening of the capital account is likely to lead to sizable gross flows in both directions.
  - The adjustment path is hard to predict; equilibrating balance sheet adjustments and shifts in market sentiment argues for moving to a flexible exchange rate as soon as practical, while also using foreign reserves to a limited degree in the interim to smooth excessive volatility not justified by fundamentals.

### FX intervention and reserves level
- Background:
  - After a long period of reserve accumulation, FX reserves declined by US$513 billion (4.6 percent of GDP) in 2015, of which intervention accounted for about US$342 billion (3.1 percent of GDP).
  - FX reserves further declined by US$139 billion to US$3.19 trillion (about 28.5 percent of 2015 GDP) at end-May 2016.
- Assessment:
  - Reserves stood at 118 percent of the IMF’s composite metric unadjusted for capital controls at end-2015 (down from 149 percent in 2014).
  - Relative to the metric adjusted for capital controls, reserves stood at 190 percent (down from 238 percent in 2014).
  - Given China’s progress in capital account liberalization, the appropriate metric is shifting toward the one unadjusted for capital controls.
  - By any metric, the current reserve level remains adequate, although the rapid decrease of reserves since August, if continued, could alter this assessment.

### Technical Background Notes (selected key points)
- 1/ The total CA gap from EBA is 2.4 percent of GDP for 2015, smaller than the gap in 2014 (3.1 percent of GDP).
  - The contribution of identified total policy gaps is minus 0.3 percent of GDP (versus 1.8 percent of GDP in 2014), but individual policy gaps remain in health expenditure, fiscal policy, FX intervention and capital controls.
  - The EBA REER Index model estimates a total REER gap of 3.9 percent, with identified policy gaps of minus 0.1 percent.
  - The EBA REER Level model estimates a total REER gap of 16.3 percent, with identified policy gaps of 2.9 percent; that estimate is discarded from consideration because the model fit of the EBA Level model is very poor for China.
- 2/ In August 2015, the PBC required market makers to submit quotes that take account of the closing (onshore) spot rate of the previous day as well as supply and demand in the market, for determining the central parity of the +/-2 percent trading band that it announces before the market opens. Previously, market makers were supposed to quote to the PBOC exchange rates based on their sense of the market in the morning, an opaque system that allowed substantial discretion and, in practice, resulted in the central parity barely moving from day to day.
- 3/ Factors not captured by EBA (examples): changing expectations about monetary and exchange rate policy; re-evaluation of a government’s reform agenda; desire by residents to diversify into foreign assets can trigger large changes in capital flows and exchange rate pressures even without significant changes in fundamentals as captured by EBA (GDP growth, employment, etc). China recently appears to have experienced such capital account pressures on the exchange rate that are not well explained by the EBA framework.

*Appendix I. China: External Sector Report — IMF country report content*

### Appendix II. Debt Sustainability Analysis

### Appendix II. Debt Sustainability Analysis

### Overview
- The debt sustainability analysis (DSA) assesses government debt under two definitions because of uncertainty about the size of contingent liabilities: a narrow coverage (general government debt as reported) and a broad coverage (“augmented” debt that includes estimated LGFV and other off‑budget liabilities).
- Key summary outcomes:
  - General government debt under the narrow coverage remains low and broadly stable at around 39-40 percent of GDP over the projection period.
  - Augmented debt (broad coverage) rises to about 74 percent of GDP in 2021 from around 55 percent of GDP in 2015.
  - The risk of debt stress depends crucially on the implementation of the new budget law that aims to curb off‑budget spending by local governments.

### Public debt coverage assumptions
- Two definitions of government debt are used:
  - Narrow coverage scenario:
    - Includes central government debt and “on‑budget” local government debt identified by the authorities.
    - For 2004–13, general government debt includes central government debt and local government bonds (issued by the central government). From 2014, general government debt includes central government debt and explicit local government debt (local government bonds and other off‑budget liabilities incurred by end‑2014).
    - The change in 2014 reflects a change of official data coverage (recognition of off‑budget local government debt borrowed previously).
  - Broad coverage scenario (“augmented” debt):
    - Adds other types of local government borrowing, including off‑budget liabilities (explicit or contingent) borrowed by Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs) via bank loans, bonds, trust loans and other funding sources, estimated by staff.
    - Augmented fiscal data are a complement to general government data and are an upper bound because some LGFV borrowing may be commercial (nongovernment activity).

### Macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions
- Growth and price assumptions:
  - Real GDP growth is projected to gradually slow to about 6 percent y/y by 2021.
  - GDP deflator is assumed to be about 2 percent.
- Fiscal assumptions differ by coverage:
  - Narrow coverage (on‑budget):
    - Projected fiscal deficits are the same as projected on‑budget deficits if the new budget law is strictly implemented and all spending is on budget.
    - Fiscal deficits are assumed to decline from around 3 percent of GDP in 2016 and 2017 to around 2¾ percent of GDP in 2021.
  - Broad coverage (augmented):
    - Decline of off‑budget local government spending is assumed to be gradual.
    - The augmented fiscal deficit (on‑budget deficit plus off‑budget spending financed by land sales revenue and debt) is projected to decline from around 10 percent of GDP in 2016 to around 8 percent of GDP by 2021.
    - Local government expenditure to GDP ratio is projected to decline owing to: (i) lower expenditure financed by net land sales; and (ii) authorities’ reforms to limit local government borrowing.
- Local government financing assumption:
  - Future financing needs are assumed to be increasingly met by bond issuance, in line with the authorities’ plan to replace all local government debt with bonds within three years.
- Interest rates and amortization:
  - Interest rates for central government and local government bonds are assumed to be about 3–4 percent.
  - Interest rates of off‑budget borrowing (only in the augmented scenario) are assumed to be about 6–7 percent.
  - Amortization profile is not central to the analysis because all maturing debt is assumed rolled over.

### Narrow coverage (general government) results
- Debt path:
  - General government debt under narrow coverage is broadly stable at around 39-40 percent of GDP over the projection period.
  - Off‑budget local government spending is assumed to stop immediately after implementation of the new budget law in 2015.
  - The growth–interest rate differential contributes to the decline of the debt‑to‑GDP ratio.
- Revisions:
  - General government debt‑to‑GDP ratios (under narrow coverage) are higher than in the 2015 DSA because authorities included off‑budget local government debt borrowed before end‑2014 into official statistics since September 2015.
- Selected table figures (narrow coverage):
  - Nominal gross public debt: 2015 = 38.5; 2021 = 39.0 (percent of GDP).
  - Public gross financing needs: 2015 = 10.6; 2021 = 3.8 (percent of GDP).
  - Real GDP growth: 2016 = 6.9; 2021 = 5.8 (percent).
  - Inflation (GDP deflator): 2016 = 0.4; 2021 = 2.1 (percent).
  - Effective interest rate: 2016 = 6.8; 2021 = 4.2 (percent).

### Broad coverage (augmented) results
- Debt path:
  - Augmented debt rises to about 74 percent of GDP in 2021 from around 55 percent of GDP in 2015.
  - Augmented debt measures an “upper bound” of government liabilities because some LGFV borrowing is potentially on a commercial basis and may not be government liabilities.
- Fiscal aggregates (broad coverage):
  - Primary (noninterest) revenue and grants: stable around 28.6–27.5 (percent of GDP) across projection years listed.
  - Primary (noninterest) expenditure rises (e.g., 2015 = 35.1; 2021 = 32.1 (percent of GDP) as shown in the table).
- Selected table figures (broad coverage):
  - Nominal gross public debt: 2015 = 51.8; 2021 = 73.5 (percent of GDP).
  - Public gross financing needs: 2015 = 19.6; 2021 = 8.9 (percent of GDP).
  - Real GDP growth: 2016 = 6.9; 2021 = 5.8 (percent).
  - Inflation (GDP deflator): 2016 = 0.4; 2021 = 2.1 (percent).
  - Effective interest rate: 2016 = 5.8; 2021 = 5.0 (percent).

### Stress tests and contingent liability shocks
- Contingent liability shock assumptions:
  - The standard contingent liability shock in the IMF DSA toolkit assumes that 10 percent of banking system assets stock would turn into government liabilities.
  - The banking system assets stock was about 210 percent of GDP in 2015.
  - It also assumes that real GDP growth in 2017 and 2018 would be 2–2.5 percent lower.
- Impact under narrow coverage:
  - A contingent liability shock in 2017 will result in a sharp increase from about 40 percent of GDP in 2015 to about 64 percent of GDP in 2018.
  - Without any extra fiscal consolidation, the debt‑to‑GDP ratio will stay around 66 percent of GDP over the medium term under a contingent liability shock.
  - Gross financing needs would increase and could be sensitive to market financing conditions.
- Impact under broad coverage:
  - The augmented debt level is sensitive to a contingent liability shock (beyond those already captured in the broader coverage), which would push debt to around 100 percent of GDP in 2021.

### Policy implications and key vulnerabilities
- Overall risk assessment:
  - China faces relatively low risks to debt sustainability under the narrow coverage baseline, but is vulnerable to contingent liability shocks.
- Dependence on budget law implementation:
  - The debt profile crucially depends on the implementation of the new budget law:
    - If the new budget law is strictly implemented and future LGFV borrowing is completely on a commercial basis, debt‑to‑GDP will be stable around 40 percent of GDP.
    - If local governments continue to incur off‑budget liabilities, the debt profile will move closer to the broad coverage scenario and debt‑to‑GDP will continue to rise in the medium term.
- Financing characteristics:
  - The public debt stock is largely financed domestically, which supports manageability under narrow coverage.
- Examples of potential off‑budget developments:
  - National Development and Reform Commission launched a special fund for financing local investment; local entities can use it to leverage more borrowing from commercial banks. If local governments are held responsible for repayment, it could substitute for LGFV borrowing and create contingent liabilities.

*Source: IMF staff.*

### 1. Structurally weak growth in key advanced and emerging economies. Weak demand and persistently low inflation

### 1. Structurally weak growth in key advanced and emerging economies. Weak demand and persistently low inflation

### Risk assessment and channels
- Structural causes: failure to fully address crisis legacies and undertake structural reforms, leading to low medium-term growth and persistent financial imbalances in the euro area and Japan.
- Global financial conditions: the end of easy global financial conditions and insufficient reform progress undermine medium-term growth in emerging markets and suppress commodity prices.
- Spillovers to China: the weak growth in key advanced and emerging economies is likely to be a drag on China’s export growth.
- UK / EU specific channel: in the event of significant impact on EU activity, the adverse effect on China’s exports and growth could be material.
- Short-term risks (could materialize within 1 year): a loss of investor confidence, a wave of disorderly corporate defaults, a sharp fall in asset prices, and a quicker fading of the stimulus impact; these could be amplified by the financial system, with renewed capital outflows and exchange rate pressure. Relative likelihood: High.
- Medium-term risks (could materialize within 3 years): slow progress on reform and continued reliance on policy stimulus and unsustainable credit growth, would add to vulnerabilities, worsen resource misallocation, and lead to permanently lower growth.
- Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) guidance: “low” indicates probability below 10 percent, “medium” between 10 and 30 percent, and “high” between 30 and 50 percent. The RAM reflects staff views as of the time of discussions with the authorities. Nonmutually exclusive risks may interact and materialize jointly.

### Likelihood indicators shown in source
- Low
- Medium
- High

---

### Appendix IV — Implementation of Main Recommendations from the 2010–11 FSAP for China: Executive summary of progress
- Authorities have made steady progress since the 2015 Article IV Consultation in advancing implementation of high priority recommendations from the 2010–11 FSAP.
- Market-oriented reforms introduced focusing on interest rate and foreign exchange market liberalization; most importantly, the ceiling of renminbi deposit interest rates has been abolished.
- Regulatory efficiency and capacity enhanced via greater interdepartmental collaboration and a comprehensive restructuring of the banking regulator.
- Financial stability and liquidity framework strengthened by introducing the Macroprudential Assessment (MPA) and expanding stress test coverage.
- Efforts to build a representative yield curve continued with more regular issuance of bonds across maturities.

### Accelerating market-oriented reforms (FSAP Recommendation 1 and related measures)
- Recommendation 1 (Priority: High, Timeframe: MT): continue reforms on interest and exchange rates, while ensuring that financial institutions are able to provide appropriate credit risk management.
  - Interest Rate Reform:
    - On August 26, 2015, caps for floating rate term deposits with terms of a year or more were lifted.
    - On October 24, 2015, ceilings for term deposits were cancelled, indicating that interest rate controls had officially been liberalized.
    - In June 2015, certificates of deposit were issued for enterprises and individuals.
  - Exchange Rate Formation Mechanism Reform:
    - On August 11, 2015, PBC completed the RMB’s central parity exchange rate quotation mechanism.
    - On December 11, 2015, CFETS officially issued the CFETS RMB Exchange Rate Index.
    - Since February 2016, initial steps were taken to develop the formation mechanism for the RMB’s central parity exchange rate against the US dollar based on “closing exchange rates + exchange rate changes for a basket of currencies.”
  - Credit Risk Management:
    - In June 2015, CBRC issued CBRC No. 95 [2015] Notice Concerning Strengthening Customer Risk Information Sharing.
    - In May 2016, CBRC issued CBRC No. 89 [2016] Notice Concerning Further Strengthening the Integrity of the Banking Industry.

- Recommendation 2 (Priority: Medium, Timeframe: MT): clear distinction between policy financial institutions and commercial financial institutions.
  - Reform plans approved for China Development Bank, China Export and Import Bank, and the Agricultural Development Bank of China; orientation and function of each bank underscored.

- Recommendation 3 (Priority: Medium, Timeframe: MT): transform the four asset management companies into commercial entities and require regular publication of financial statements and management reports.
  - China Huarong Asset Management Company was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in October 2015.
  - China Great Wall Asset Management Corporation and China Orient Asset Management Corporation are proactively advancing commercial reform and transformation.

### Improving efficiency of institutions and the regulatory framework
- Recommendation 4 (Priority: High, Timeframe: MT): give PBC and the three regulatory commissions specialized mandates, operational autonomy and flexibility, adequate capital and skilled personnel, and increase interdepartmental collaboration.
  - Joint Ministerial Conference on Financial Regulation convened twelve times on over 50 research and discussion topics; introduced policies and institutional arrangements to enhance effectiveness and prevent systemic or regional financial risks.

- Recommendation 5 (Priority: Medium, Timeframe: NT): set up regulatory framework for financial holding companies, financial group companies and informal financial enterprises; require M&A approvals during transition.
  - No updates.

- Recommendation 6 (Priority: Medium, Timeframe: NT): practice a more forward-looking assessment of credit risk within CBRC's risk rating system.
  - On December 29, 2015, CBRC issued a revised Interim Measures for Offsite Regulations clarifying forward-looking requirements for regulatory ratings.
  - CBRC developed a CARPALS indicator system for large banks and is researching enhancements to forward-looking credit risk indicators.

- Recommendation 7 (Priority: Medium, Timeframe: NT): establish formal mechanism for CSRC to conduct regular on-site inspections of securities exchanges.
  - In 2015, CSRC formulated a program for inspecting futures exchanges covering daily operations, frontline regulation, and processing of violations.

- Recommendation 8 (Priority: Medium, Timeframe: MT): institute a risk capital solvency regime for insurers that prohibits new business if solvency level is lower than 100%, with transitional period.
  - On January 1, 2016, CIRC implemented 17 rules for the Chinese Risk-oriented Solvency System (“Solvency II”) and introduced a new data system; insurance companies submitted solvency reports in accordance with Solvency II rules.

- Recommendation 9 (Priority: Medium, Timeframe: NT): develop clear and transparent regulations to facilitate exit from market by insurance companies.
  - No updates.

- Recommendation 10 (Priority: Medium, Timeframe: MT): develop a law governing payment systems to provide protection of the finality of payments and settlement of derivatives and securities contracts.
  - PBC developing the Payment and Settlement Regulations; revisions to Securities Law and Futures Law underway; Payment and Settlement Regulations listed in 2016 State Council Legislative Work Plan.

- Recommendation 11 (Priority: High, Timeframe: MT): ensure sufficient and accurate information on beneficial ownership and control, available to competent authorities.
  - No updates.

- Recommendation 12 (Priority: High, Timeframe: MT): improve information sharing and collaborative arrangements between PBC and other agencies on AML and other regulatory issues.
  - China established the Ministerial Joint Conference on Anti-Money Laundering (AML) with twenty-three ministries and commissions; held the eighth inter-ministerial meeting on July 24, 2015.

### Framework for enhancing financial stability, systemic risk monitoring, system liquidity, and crisis management
- Recommendation 13 (Priority: High, Timeframe: MT): establish a Financial Stability Board, with PBC as secretariat.
  - No updates.

- Recommendation 14 (Priority: Medium, Timeframe: NT): improve data collection on financial institutions, including leverage, liabilities, off-balance sheet positions, unregulated products and cross-border and sectoral exposures.
  - PBC advanced construction of robust statistical infrastructure and improved macroprudential policy framework; altered verification algorithm for financial statistics monitoring system in 2015.
  - Off-balance sheet statistics: in 2016, PBC amended the off-balance sheet business statistical system to include indicators for secured, pledged, financial asset services, and financial derivatives.
  - Bond statistical system developed to link securities products, participants, and prices; preliminary integration steps taken and 2016 plans for data submission tests and historical data tracing.
  - In mid-October 2015, CSRC developed a statistical system for market funds and established data transfer mechanisms with CBRC.
  - Launched pilot Program of Comprehensive Financial Statistics in Tianjin, Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Anhui; since 2016, monthly data released on scale of social financing.
  - CBRC increased monitoring of off-balance sheet and investment business; increased report frequency for group reports from six months to one quarter per BCBS Net Stable Funding Ratio alignment.
  - CSRC upgraded interim and post-event supervision systems for securities and futures institutions.

- Recommendation 15 (Priority: High, Timeframe: NT): establish a macroprudential framework to measure and manage systemic risk, including increasing resources at PBC and regulatory agencies and regular stress tests.
  - PBC progress:
    - In 2016, PBC started to use the dynamic adjustment mechanism “upgrades” on differential reserves for the “macroprudential assessment system” (MPA) for counter-cyclical adjustment.
    - Constructed and improved macroprudential policy framework for cross-border capital flow: reserve tools to suppress short-term speculation, levy risk reserve on banks’ foreign exchange loans, expand cross-border financing and macroprudential management pilots, enforce deposit-reserve ratios for overseas financial institutions, and establish permanent mechanism for counter-cyclical adjustment of cross-border RMB capital flow.
    - Improved medium and large bank stress testing framework: test subjects include commercial banks with at least RMB 500 billion in assets; dynamically adjust exposure and stress scenarios.
  - CBRC actions:
    - Constructing a banking monitoring system combining micro- and macroprudential approaches.
    - Developing a more robust early warning system and utilizing stress tests per Guidelines on Stress Testing China’s Banking Industry.
    - Dynamically adjusting down payment of personal real estate loans (loan-to-value) and other credit policies with PBC to control real estate loan risks.
  - CSRC actions: researching improvements to industry risk stress test framework for securities and futures sectors and market infrastructure.
  - CIRC actions: in 2015 issued Interim Guidelines on Domestic Systemically Important Insurance Companies for public consultation; expected implementation in 2016. In early 2016, CIRC developed an insurance sector stress test based on “C-ROSS” and completed data collection.

*Source: 1. Structurally weak growth in key advanced and emerging economies. Weak demand and persistently low inflation*

### 16. Enhanced hedging

### 16. Enhanced hedging

### Enhanced hedging of structural liquidity and indirect monetary tools
- Recommendation 16: Enhanced hedging of structural liquidity through market-based tools and managing spillovers from systemic liquidity. Priority: High. Timeframe: NT. Status: No updates.

### Average reserve system to facilitate liquidity management
- Recommendation 17: Implementation of an average reserve system to facilitate liquidity management and to improve stability and efficiency. Priority: High. Timeframe: NT.
- Measures adopted:
  - In September 2015, PBC reserve appraisal system underwent reform and implemented the average reserve system method for reserve appraisal.
  - During the maintenance period, the value of the average daily arithmetic mean of the financial institution’s deposit reserve must meet statutory requirements.
  - After the maintenance period, the financial institution deposit reserve will not be required to meet statutory requirements on a daily basis.

### Targeted short-term repo rate trial and open-market operations
- Recommendation 18: Launching a trial run of the targeted short-term repo rate, as an experiment of indirect liquidity management, and starting daily open market operations. Priority: High. Timeframe: NT.
- Measures adopted:
  - Since mid-2015, PBC continued to carry out open-market reverse repurchase transactions for a 7-day period that effectively regulated banking system liquidity, strengthened the guidance and regulation of short-term money market interest rates, and assessed the effectiveness and fairness of using the 7-day repurchase rate as the central bank policy rate.
  - On February 18, 2016, the PBC adopted the open market operations at a daily frequency.

### Real-time deposit and lending operations; uniform collateral
- Recommendation 19: Ensuring the deposit and lending operations at the PBC is on a real time and automatic basis, with uniform collateral requirements for all domestically registered entities. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: NT. Status: No updates.

### Deposit insurance system
- Recommendation 20: The implementation of a deposit insurance system to provide support for the orderly shutdown of financial institutions; and assistance for sorting out contingent liabilities. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: NT. Status: No updates.

### Developing securities markets by channeling deposits to contract and pooling investment institutions
- Recommendation 21: Ensuring consistency of regulatory rules and assigning regulatory responsibilities in support of developing the fixed-income market. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: MT.
- Measures adopted:
  - National Development Reform Commission issued Opinions on Simplifying the Approval and Reporting Procedures for Corporate Bonds to Strengthen Risk Prevention and Reform the Regulation Mode.
  - The third meeting for the Joint Ministerial Conference on Credit Debt Market was convened on December 29, 2015, discussing bond market risks, regulation coordination, market infrastructure, and law enforcement uniformity; a consensus was reached for several issues.

### Treasury issuance strategies and yield curve improvement
- Recommendation 22: Continued improvement of bond issuing strategies by the Ministry of Finance and the PBC, to help improve the existing market-making activities in products of various maturities on the yield curve. Priority: High. Timeframe: MT.
- Measures adopted:
  - Authorities publicly announced key terms and the short end of the Treasury yield curve and further improved the long end of the Treasury yield curve.
  - The Treasury bond renewal mechanism was established and enhanced. Key terms Treasury bonds and 30-year Treasury bonds were renewed after initial issuance.
  - The government increased the frequency of short-term Treasury bond issuance.
  - In 2016, the 30-year bond issuance program was developed and issued as planned and Treasury yield curve was improved by adding 30-year Treasury bond yields.
  - Treasury bond market monitoring and system construction were improved, a Treasury market monitoring template was designed and system development completed to gradually construct a more complete and systematic monitoring system.

### Repo market management and market liquidity
- Recommendation 23: Enhancing the management and operational framework of the repo market, in order to improve market liquidity and risk management, in addition to strengthening the linkage between money market rates and bond market rates. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: NT.
- Measures adopted:
  - Foreign Exchange Trading Center launched the Interbank Bond Market Anonymous Click Repurchase Transactions Secured by Bond Pledge service (X-Repo System) to increase efficiency of interbank market pledge repurchase transactions and improve the repurchase price formation mechanism.
  - By late 2015, X-Repo had a total of 14,000 turnovers worth RMB 16 trillion.

### Relaxing corporate bond issuance restriction
- Recommendation 24: Relaxing the restriction that accumulated balance of market-issued bond of a company may not exceed 40% of net assets, in order to expand its capacity for direct financing. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: MT. Status: No updates.

### Interoperability among bond market and stock exchanges
- Recommendation 25: Improving the interoperability among the inter-bank bond market and the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, by upgrading the linkage between the China Central Depository & Clearing Co., Ltd. (CCDC) and the China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited (SD&C). Priority: Medium. Timeframe: MT. Status: No updates.

### Multi-pillared pension system
- Recommendation 26: Building a multi-pillared pension system, focusing on a basic pension system that is fully funded. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: MT.
- Measures adopted:
  - On August 17, 2015, the State Council issued Measures for the Administration of Investment in Basic Pension Insurance Funds (State Council 2015 No. 48) authorizing delegation of basic pension insurance funds for investment subject to market-oriented, diversified, and professional principles to ensure security and increase value.

### Improving alternative financing channels and accessibility — rural, small, and microenterprises
- Recommendation 27: Reviewing existing governmental programs to determine their effectiveness in promoting financing for rural, small, and microenterprises, and developing a comprehensive and coherent strategy on such financing. Priority: High. Timeframe: MT.
- Measures and outcomes for Rural Financial Services:
  - Authorities optimized combination of monetary, credit, and other policy tools.
  - Different reserve policies were used as incentives: deposit reserve ratios for financial institutions were reduced by 2.5 percentage points; targeted reduction of reserve ratios was implemented five times in 2015.
  - Additional cumulative reductions of reserve ratio reached 0.5 to 1 percentage point for banks that satisfied prudential management requirements and “Three Rurals” or small and micro-enterprise loan requirements.
  - Additional cumulative reduction of deposit reserve ratio for rural financial institutions was 2 to 2.5 percentage points.
  - As of late April 2016, the required deposit reserve ratio for county firms, rural cooperative banks, rural credit cooperatives, and rural banks is lower than state-owned commercial banks by 5, 8, 8, and 8 percentage points, respectively.
  - Guidance on credit policy strengthened; comprehensive balance of agricultural loans is RMB 26.9 trillion, an increase of 8.8 percent over the previous year. The proportion of these loans accounted for 27.1 percent of all loan types.
  - By the end of March 2016, new rural financial institutions opened nationwide numbered 1,395, including 1,333 rural banks, 14 loan businesses, and 48 rural mutual cooperatives.
  - Rural bank loans amounted to RMB 617.1 billion, including rural households loans of RMB 278 billion and small and microenterprise loans of RMB 294.5 billion; together they accounted for 93 percent of rural loans and a total of 72.2 percent of private capital holdings.
  - Rural basic financial services: since 2009, 1,532 rural institutional gaps were resolved and 708 rural service gaps in basic financial services were covered.
- Measures and outcomes for Financial Services for Small and Micro-Enterprises:
  - As of the end of April 2016, small and microenterprise loan amounts totaled RMB 18.7 trillion for an increase of 14 percent over the previous year.
  - Nationwide banking institutions issued entrepreneurial secured loans totaling RMB 75.3 billion as of the end of March 2016.
  - By the end of 2015, number of small and micro-enterprise loans was 13.226 million. The ratio of successful loan applications to total application was 92.8 percent.
  - In more than half of the provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), the coverage of small and microenterprise loans surpassed 20 percent.
  - SME credit information improvements: as of the end of March 2016, national accumulation and supplementing of information for SMEs without a credit relationship with any bank numbered 2.595 million. Nearly 454,000 SMEs have received bank loans for a balance of RMB 10.3 trillion.
  - Deepening capital market services: CSRC issued Several Opinions on Further Promoting the Development of the National Small and Medium Enterprise Share Transfer System (CSRC Public Notice [2015] No. 26). As of May 6, 2016, nationwide share transfer systems listed 7,056 companies; total share capital amounted to 411.7 billion shares with a total market value of RMB 2.98 trillion. About 2,800 listed companies carried out direct issuance of shares 4,113 times. The total issuance of shares amounted to 35.48 billion shares with a total financing amount of RMB 185.8 billion.

### Rural credit cooperatives reform
- Recommendation 28: Further reforms of rural credit cooperatives, to enhance their efficiency and sustainability as commercial providers of financial products and services. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: MT.
- Measures adopted:
  - Promoted restructuring of rural credit cooperatives and establishment of rural commercial banks. By the end of March 2016, combined number of rural commercial banks and rural cooperative banks was 1,052.
  - Assets, liabilities, and owners’ equity accounted for 66.0 percent, 65.5 percent, and 72.7 percent of rural cooperative financial institutions, respectively.
  - By April 2016, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Jiangsu, Anhui, and Hubei had completed the task of establishing rural commercial banks.
  - Asset quality improved: percentage of nonperforming loans for all of China’s rural credit cooperatives was 4.3 percent and capital adequacy was at 11.1 percent as of late March 2016.

*People’s Republic of China — Main FSAP Recommendations, Chapter 16: Enhanced hedging (extract).*

### 29. Completing the

### 29. Completing the reform of the Postal Savings Bank by optimization of the ownership structure, marketization and the establishment of effective corporate governance.

### Implementation status and actions
- Medium MT 
- Postal Savings Bank established the "three boards and one management" corporate governance structure and introduced ten domestic and foreign strategic investors in December 2015 to achieve equity diversification.
- 1/ Information as reported by the authorities, with IMF staff providing translation and minor edits.

### Key findings and implications
- Establishment of the "three boards and one management" corporate governance structure is the primary governance reform measure implemented for the Postal Savings Bank.
- Introduction of ten domestic and foreign strategic investors in December 2015 is intended to achieve equity diversification.

### Policy recommendations / next steps (implied by reform objective)
- Continue optimization of the ownership structure to support marketization.
- Strengthen and operationalize effective corporate governance consistent with the "three boards and one management" framework.
- Use strategic investor participation to enhance equity diversification and market discipline.

*People’s Republic of China — Staff Report for the 2016 Article IV Consultation — Informational Annex (excerpt).*

### 5.      Teams have the following requests for information from their counterparts:

### _cr16270 - 5.      Teams have the following requests for information from their counterparts:

### Requests for information
- The Fund team requests to be kept informed of progress in the above macroeconomic structural reform areas, as milestones are reached and at least on a semiannual basis.
- The Bank team requests to be kept informed of the Fund’s assessments of macroeconomic policies and prospects in the context of the Article IV consultation and staff visits, and at least semiannually.

### Bank Work Program (June 2016 to June 2017)
- Building a Modern Fiscal System Technical Assistance Project to support implementation of central government’s public finance reforms.
  - Status: Ongoing
- China Economic Reform Implementation Project (umbrella TA project, including various subprojects with MOF, PBC, and provincial finance bureaus).
  - Status: Ongoing
- China Economic Update
  - Status: Ongoing
- “Just-in-time” Policy Notes for MOF
  - Status: Delivered on demand
- TA on Mid-term Macrofiscal Framework
  - Status: Ongoing
- Subnational Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationship
  - Status: Ongoing
- Municipal Financing and Local Debt Management
  - Status: Ongoing
- Inclusive Finance Academy
  - Status: Ongoing
- Financial Consumer Protection and Consumer Literacy
  - Status: Ongoing
- Financial Reform Strategy
  - Status: Ongoing
- Capital Market Development
  - Status: Ongoing
- Deepening health reform in China-building high quality and value-based service delivery
  - Status: Ongoing
- Strengthening China’s social protection and labor systems
  - Status: Ongoing

### Fund Work Program (June 2016 to June 2017)
- December Staff Visit
  - Expected Delivery Date: Dec 2016
- 2017 Article IV Consultation
  - Expected Delivery Date: May/June 2017
- Cooperation Program for Fiscal Reforms (FAD)
  - Status: Ongoing

### Joint Work Program
- Financial Sector Assessment Program
  - Expected Delivery Date: 2017

### Relations with the Asian Development Bank (AsDB) — key findings and figures
- The PRC became a member of AsDB in March 1986. By the end of 2015:
  - Cumulative borrowing from AsDB reached $29.2 billion with 226 loans for public sector projects.
  - Of the total public sector loans:
    - 55.7 percent was allocated to the transport sector,
    - 12.6 percent to agriculture and natural resources,
    - 12.6 percent to water and other municipal infrastructure services,
    - 11.9 percent to energy,
    - 2.3 percent to industry and trade,
    - 2.3 percent to finance,
    - 1.0 percent to education,
    - 1.6 percent to multisector.
  - AsDB financed 27 private sector projects in the PRC totaling $4.96 billion.
  - AsDB provided a total of $464.4 million for 802 technical assistance projects, consisting of $147.4 million for preparing projects and $317.0 million for policy advice and capacity development.
- Implementation performance and project management:
  - The PRC has demonstrated strong capabilities in implementing projects, showing strong project ownership among agencies and a rigorous screening process for development projects proposed for external financing.
  - Loan disbursement and contract award performance is good.
- PRC contributions and funds:
  - The PRC contributed to the Asian Development Fund, established the $20 million PRC Poverty Reduction and Regional Cooperation Fund (the PRC Fund), and replenished another $20 million to the PRC Fund.
  - The PRC Fund provides technical assistance projects to support subregional cooperation initiatives, particularly Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) and Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) programs.
- AsDB Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) 2016–2020:
  - Endorsed by AsDB Board of Directors in February 2016.
  - CPS 2016–2020 is aligned with the PRC’s 13th Five-Year Plan 2016–2020, the Midterm Review of AsDB’s long-term Strategy 2020, and AsDB’s approach to supporting upper middle-income countries.
  - CPS strategic priorities: managing climate change and the environment; promoting regional cooperation and integration; supporting inclusive economic growth focusing on the remaining poor; fostering knowledge cooperation; supporting institutional and governance reform.
  - AsDB's sovereign and nonsovereign operations will support activities within these strategic priorities.
- Projected public sector lending in 2016–2018:
  - Total projected lending: about $4.56 billion.
  - Sectoral distribution:
    - 30 percent will support agriculture, natural resources, and rural development;
    - 6 percent will support education;
    - 8 percent will support energy;
    - 5 percent will support health;
    - 29 percent will support transport;
    - 22 percent will support water and other urban infrastructure and services sectors.
  - Geographic focus: Over 90 percent of the projects are located in the western, central and north-eastern regions in line with the CPS’s priorities of promoting inclusive growth and environmentally sustainable growth.

*Prepared by Asian Development Bank staff.*

### 6.      AsDB’s technical assistance will complement the lending program to improve the sector

### _cr16270 - 6.      AsDB’s technical assistance will complement the lending program to improve the sector

### AsDB technical assistance objective
- AsDB’s technical assistance will:
  - Complement the lending program to improve the sector policy environment.
  - Support governance and capacity development.
  - Strengthen the knowledge base and innovative features of lending operations.

### AsDB’s Commitments and Disbursements (Public Sector Loans), 1993–2015 (In millions of U.S. dollars)
- 1993 — Commitments 1,031; Disbursements 371
- 1994 — Commitments 1,618; Disbursements 492
- 1995 — Commitments 2,304; Disbursements 558
- 1996 — Commitments 3,282; Disbursements 707
- 1997 — Commitments 4,033; Disbursements 715
- 1998 — Commitments 4,518; Disbursements 818
- 1999 — Commitments 5,337; Disbursements 792
- 2000 — Commitments 6,159; Disbursements 832
- 2001 — Commitments 6,748; Disbursements 1,313
- 2002 — Commitments 7,563; Disbursements 782
- 2003 — Commitments 8,075; Disbursements 705
- 2004 — Commitments 8,733; Disbursements 636
- 2005 — Commitments 11,060; Disbursements 892
- 2006 — Commitments 11,794; Disbursements 988
- 2007 — Commitments 13,214; Disbursements 1,190
- 2008 — Commitments 14,519; Disbursements 1,234
- 2009 — Commitments 15,623; Disbursements 1,342
- 2010 — Commitments 16,964; Disbursements 1,342
- 2011 — Commitments 18,244; Disbursements 1,580
- 2012 — Commitments 19,476; Disbursements 1,343
- 2013 — Commitments 20,416; Disbursements 1,063
- 2014 — Commitments 21,748; Disbursements 1,303
- 2015 — Commitments 23,096; Disbursements 1,152

- Notes:
  - 1/ Refers to cumulative contract awards.
  - 2/ Refers to disbursements for the year.

### Assessment of Data Adequacy for Surveillance (as of June 16, 2016)
- General:
  - Data are broadly adequate for surveillance, but only barely so.
  - China subscribed to the SDDS in October 2015.
  - Key gaps hamper surveillance, mainly in national accounts and government finance statistics.

- National Accounts:
  - NBS compiles annual GDP by activity in current and constant prices (2010) and quarterly GDP estimates.
  - Transition from 1993 SNA to 2008 SNA; 2008 SNA applied for some industries (e.g., FISIM).
  - Since 2015, quarterly national accounts are compiled on a discrete basis (January–March, April–June, July–September, October–December).
  - Techniques for deriving volume measures of GDP are not sound and need improvement.
  - GDP by expenditure compiled at current and constant prices, but constant price estimates are not published.
  - Expenditure components of GDP are not available quarterly.
  - NBS improved exhaustiveness of GDP by activity; further improvements planned with no target dates.
  - Decentralized statistical system restricts ability to change data collection systems.
  - Monthly industrial production, retail sales, and fixed investment indices use previous-year base periods; no chain-linked indices produced.
  - Data revisions often made without publishing entire revised series.

- Price Statistics:
  - CPI covers approximately 500 areas (around 200 counties and around 300 cities).
  - Current CPI is a chained Laspeyres price index compiled and disseminated since 2001.
  - Weights derived from urban and rural households’ surveys every five years; current weights are for 2008-2010.
  - Weights are price-updated every month.
  - PPI survey covers 40 percent of total industry turnover including 60,000 enterprises in 31 provinces and over 430 cities.
  - Prices cover 1702 product groups (basic sub-categories); current base year is 2010.
  - PPI definitions are consistent with PPI manual (2010).
  - PPI is not seasonally adjusted.

- Government Finance Statistics:
  - Serious data shortcomings hamper fiscal analysis.
  - Social security and extra budgetary funds data provided only annually and with a long lag.
  - Expenditure classification needs improvement; data by economic type are not published.
  - Authorities intend to begin collecting these data and to develop accrual-based measures of fiscal performance over the medium term while strengthening compilation of cash-based GFS.

- Monetary and Financial Statistics:
  - Improvements in recent years, but surveys lack sufficient detail on bank claims on government, hampering fiscal deficit estimation from the financing side.
  - PBC reported net foreign assets position does not include exchange rate valuation effects and interest earnings on foreign reserves.
  - Since April 2005, PBC ceased reporting separate data on central government deposits in its balance sheet, causing breaks in monetary base and aggregate series.
  - Monetary and financial statistics missions (March 2015) recommended accelerating PBC’s implementation of SRFs.
  - Authorities plan to finalize SRF data for depository corporations by end of 2015 and begin regular reporting after PBC review and approval.
  - China reports financial soundness indicators (FSIs) to the Fund; scope expanded in early 2015 by including two encouraged FSIs for deposit takers.
  - Periodicity of FSI data improved in May 2015 from annual to semi-annual.

- External Sector Statistics:
  - Historic series compiled (in U.S. dollars) largely in accordance with BPM5; STA converted BOP and IIP series into BPM6 for IFS dissemination.
  - From 2015, data compiled and disseminated largely in accordance with BPM6.
  - Authorities improving coverage of direct investment transactions in BOP and IIP; progress ongoing.
  - International Transactions Reporting System is major BOP data source; regular training for SAFE provincial offices recommended.
  - China commenced participation in CDIS in 2011 (only inward direct investment positions recorded).
  - At end-2015, China initiated reporting for the CPIS.
  - Need to strengthen external debt monitoring and compilation despite modest external vulnerability.
  - In 2010, China started submitting total and public external debt data for QEDS.

### Data Standards and Quality
- China began subscription to the Special Data Dissemination Standard in October 2015.

### Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (As of June 15, 2016) — selected entries and reporting frequencies
- Exchange rates — Date of Latest Observation 05/16; Date Received 06/16; Frequency D; Frequency of Reporting D; Frequency of Publication D
- International reserve assets and reserve liabilities of the monetary authorities — Date of Latest Observation 04/16; Date Received 05/16; Frequency of Data M; Frequency of Reporting M; Frequency of Publication M
- Reserve/base money — Date of Latest Observation 04/16; Date Received 05/16; Frequency of Data Q, M; Frequency of Reporting Q, M; Frequency of Publication Q, M
- Broad money — Date of Latest Observation 04/16; Date Received 05/16; Frequency of Data M; Frequency of Reporting M; Frequency of Publication M
- Central bank balance sheet — Date of Latest Observation 04/16; Date Received 05/16; Frequency of Data M; Frequency of Reporting M; Frequency of Publication M
- Consolidated balance sheet of the banking system — Date of Latest Observation 04/16; Date Received 05/16; Frequency of Data M; Frequency of Reporting M; Frequency of Publication M
- Consumer price index — Date of Latest Observation 04/16; Date Received 05/16; Frequency of Data M; Frequency of Reporting M; Frequency of Publication M
- Revenue, expenditure, balance and composition of financing — general government — Date of Latest Observation 2013; Date Received 03/14; Frequency of Data A; Frequency of Reporting A; Frequency of Publication A
- External current account balance — Date of Latest Observation Q4/15; Date Received 06/16; Frequency of Data Q; Frequency of Reporting A, Q; Frequency of Publication A, Q
- Exports and imports of goods and services — Date of Latest Observation Q4/15; Date Received 06/16; Frequency of Data M; Frequency of Reporting M; Frequency of Publication M
- International investment position — Date of Latest Observation Q4/15; Date Received 06/16; Frequency of Data A, Q; Frequency of Reporting A, Q; Frequency of Publication A, Q

- Footnotes (selected, preserved verbatim from source):
  - 1 Any reserve assets that are pledged of otherwise encumbered should be specified separately. Also, data should comprise short-term liabilities linked to a foreign currency but settled by other means as well as the notional values of financial derivatives to pay and to receive foreign currency, including those linked to a foreign currency but settled by other means.
  - 2 Both market based and officially determined, including discount rates, money market rates, rates on treasury bills, notes and bonds.
  - 3 Only 12-month growth rates are reported (price indices are not available).
  - 4 Data on financing (foreign, domestic bank and domestic nonbank financing) is not available.
  - 5 The general government consists of the central (budgetary funds, extra budgetary funds, and social security funds) and state and local governments.
  - 6 Including currency and maturity composition.
  - 7 Goods trade data are provided monthly. Services trade data are released with the current account statistics.
  - 8 For real GDP, level data are available only on an annual basis (growth rates are available on a quarterly, cumulative basis).
  - 9 Daily (D), Weekly (W), Monthly (M), Quarterly (Q), Annually (A); Irregular (I); Not Available (NA).
  - 10 Interest rates change only infrequently; these changes are publicly announced.

### Technical Assistance and Training Summary (selected themes, 2001–2016)
- Technical assistance covered multiple departments and themes, including:
  - Tax System Reform and Tax Administration Reform (FAD missions and seminars on VAT, personal income tax, IT modernization, Golden Tax Project).
  - Public Financial Management, Treasury and Accounting Reform, Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (FAD missions, seminars, expert visits).
  - Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Local Government Borrowing Framework (FAD missions, workshops).
  - Statistics: extensive STA missions and seminars on GDDS/SDDS, balance of payments, IIP, BPM6, government finance statistics, monetary and financial statistics, financial soundness indicators, quarterly national accounts, TSF indicators, and SDDS assessments.
  - Monetary Policy, Bank Supervision, AML/CFT, and Financial Sector Surveillance (MFD, LEG, MCM missions and courses).
  - Training and courses delivered by INS/ICD, STA, FAD, MFD, MCM on topics including financial programming and policies, banking supervision, macroeconomic management, monetary and financial statistics, external vulnerabilities, and fiscal analysis and forecasting.
- ICD formation note:
  - 1/ The new Institute for Capacity Development (ICD) was formed from the merger of the former IMF Institute (INS) and Office of Technical Assistance Management (OTM) on May 1, 2012.

*Statement by the IMF Staff Representative on the People’s Republic of China — Executive Board Meeting July 27, 2016*

### 1. This statement contains information that has become available since the staff report

### _cr16270 - 1. This statement contains information that has become available since the staff report

### Recent data and near-term indicators
- Q2 GDP growth was 6.7 percent (y/y), driven by continued strong consumption growth (contributing two-thirds of GDP growth), while overall investment growth stabilized (contributing one-third of GDP growth).
- High-frequency indicators for June:
  - Retail sales: 10.6 percent (y/y).
  - Industrial production: 6.2 percent (y/y).
  - Fixed asset investment: 9.0 percent (y/y).
  - Profits of industrial enterprises: rose by 6.4 percent (y/y) in the first five months of this year.
- Trade and external sector:
  - Export growth (in USD terms) in June: -4.8 percent (y/y).
  - Import growth in June: -8.4 percent (y/y).
  - FX reserves increased by US$14 billion, to US$3,205 billion.
  - Central bank’s FX purchase position fell by the equivalent of US$15 billion.
- Credit and monetary aggregates:
  - Total social financing growth of 12.3 percent (y/y) in June.
  - Adjusting for the local government bond swap, total social financing moderated to 16.3 percent (y/y) in June.
- Inflation:
  - Headline CPI inflation: 1.9 percent (y/y) in June.
  - PPI inflation: -2.6 percent (y/y) in June.

### Financial markets after UK referendum
- Shanghai composite index: after a 1.3 percent loss on June 24, rose by 6.5 percent as of July 21.
- Exchange rates and FX markets as of July 21:
  - Onshore exchange rate against the USD had weakened by 1.5 percent since June 23.
  - CFETS basket RMB index depreciated 0.2 percent.
  - Spread between RMB/USD exchange rates in Mainland China (CNY) and Hong Kong SAR (CNH) markets remained below 0.7 percent during this period.
- Financial markets remain stable after UK voters’ June 23 decision to exit the European Union.

### Key assessments from the authorities’ statement
- Growth and labor market:
  - China is undertaking a determined transition to a more balanced and sustainable growth trajectory.
  - Economic growth moderated to 6.7 percent in the first half of 2016.
  - CPI growth anchored at around 2 percent.
  - Labor market robust: 13 million new urban jobs in 2015; seven million more created during the first half of 2016.
- Rebalancing and sectoral shifts:
  - Consumption’s contribution to GDP growth reached 73 percent, up by 13 percentage points over the last year.
  - Current account surplus stayed below 3 percent of GDP.
  - Service industry contribution: 54 percent of GDP in the first half, up by 2 percentage points over the last year.
  - High-tech sector growth outpaced the industrial average by 70 percent.
  - E-commerce continued double-digit growth.
  - Overcapacity beginning to phase out in coal and steel sectors.
- Indicators of revival:
  - PPI strengthened month-on-month.
  - Industrial inventory declined for the first time since 2010.
  - Growth of industrial value-added picked up month-on-month.
  - Sales of housing and automobiles increased markedly.

### Return to growth potential (authorities’ view)
- Projected sustainable growth range: around 6 to7 percent.
- Demand-side potential:
  - Capital/labor ratio, urbanization ratio, and infrastructure (especially in per capita terms) are still far below the AEs’ level, implying large gaps to close and lasting demand for investment.
  - Continued migration from rural to urban areas will support employment shifting and income convergence.
- Supply-side fundamentals:
  - National savings remain high by global standards.
  - Manufacturing sector with largest capacity and complete supply chain supports rising demand.
  - Labor force will generate more human capital with an increasing share of educated graduates and skilled workers.
  - Strong investment in new technologies and “new economies”; China’s top ranking in new patent applications and registrations and movement up the world’s export value chain.
- Policy implication:
  - Existing policy space could be tapped to avoid a “hard landing.”
  - Decisive structural reforms on the supply side would further unlock potential, notably SOE reforms, streamlining administrative approvals, and enhancing the role of market forces based on broad entry, smooth exit, proper pricing, and effective oversight.

### Tackling the high leverage issue
- Overall leverage:
  - Based on BIS data (Table 1), overall leverage in China is high but not particularly outstanding compared to peers.
  - Leverage is prominent in the corporate sector; leverage is rather low in the government and in households.
  - 97 percent of leverage in China is financed by domestic savings.
  - Debt-to-asset ratio of China’s industrial corporate sector averaged at 56 percent in June.
- Table 1 excerpts (Total Credit at end-2015, % of GDP, BIS):
  - Total reporting countries: Non-financial sector 235.3; General government 83.2; Households and NPISHs 59.6; Non-financial corporations 92.5.
  - Emerging economies: 179.3; 42.3; 33.1; 103.6.
  - China: 254.8; 44.4; 39.5; 170.8.
  - Korea: 234.8; 40.4; 88.4; 106.0.
  - Singapore: 247.4; 104.7; 60.3; 82.4.
  - Advanced economies (aggregate): 268.2; 107.0; 75.2; 86.0.
  - US: 250.6; 100.1; 79.2; 71.2.
  - Japan: 388.2; 221.0; 65.9; 101.3.
  - Euro Area: 266.3; 104.3; 59.3; 102.8.
  - France: 290.2; 108.8; 56.5; 124.9.
  - UK: 265.5; 105.2; 87.3; 73.0.
  - Italy: 275.1; 153.7; 42.5; 79.0.
- Authorities’ response:
  - Comprehensive package of deleveraging and restructuring worked out.
  - Staff’s proposed solution (triage, loss recognition, restructuring, market-based disposal) considered helpful and constructive.
  - Authorities contest staff’s presumed potential loss of 7 percent of GDP from corporate debt at risk as possibly overstated due to narrow samples, oversimplified insolvency measure, and high loss ratio assumption.
  - Even at 7 percent of GDP, potential losses viewed as absorbable by banking system capital, provisioning, and profit margins; worst scenario would not challenge fiscal debt sustainability.
- Signs of improvement:
  - 52-month PPI deflation has begun to moderate.
  - Growth of overall profit margins of industrial enterprises rebounded to 6.4 percent.
  - Debt-to-asset ratio saw a decline of 0.5 percent in May.

### Policy outlook and recommendations
- Monetary policy:
  - Continue prudent monetary policy aimed at appropriate liquidity and reasonable growth of credit and total financing.
  - Money market fairly liquid with interest rates stabilizing at around 2 to 2.5 percent.
  - M2 growth slowed to 11.8 percent in June.
  - Credit growth slowed to 13 percent in June—the lowest since last June.
  - Prevailing lending rates remain high in real terms if adjusted by PPI deflation.
  - Reasonably low nominal interest rates help reduce debt-service burden and facilitate deleveraging.
- Fiscal policy:
  - Mild expansion of budget deficit appropriate given emphasis on social spending and infrastructure investment for long-term potential.
  - Fiscal support also needed for supply-side reforms, reduction of corporate debt and overcapacity, and incentives for innovation and the “new economy.”
  - Caution in interpreting the “augmented” deficit; large part of local government’s liability corresponds to assets that will generate financial and economic return.
  - Historical payment ratio for local government’s contingent liability has been only 20 percent.
  - Increased transparency, hardened budget constraint, and standardization of local government finance expected to improve quality and efficiency of spending.
  - Very unlikely “upper bound” of the “augmented” debt—74 percent of GDP—is still low by international standards.
  - Full adoption of VAT in the service sector would entail an estimated tax reduction of RMB 600 billion.
  - Fiscal reforms in the pipeline: new fiscal federalism system and a more direct, broader, more progressive tax system expected to improve revenue prospects.
- Financial sector and supervision:
  - Overall banking sector adequately capitalized, well provisioned, and properly supervised in accordance with Basel III.
  - Authorities implementing FSAP recommendations, especially high priorities.
  - Close watch on rising NPLs and booming nonbank financing; enhanced early warning, mitigation, and stocktaking of financial institutions’ risk profiles.
  - Macroprudential framework in place; coordination among regulatory authorities and communications enhanced to guard against systemic risks and guide public expectations.
- Structural reforms emphasized:
  - SOE reforms, streamlining administrative approvals, enhancing market forces, broad entry, smooth exit, proper pricing, and effective oversight to unlock productivity and potential.

*Statement by Mr. Zhongxia Jin, Executive Director for the People’s Republic of China; Mr. Ping Sun, Alternate Executive Director; and Mr. Jing Chen, Senior Advisor July 27, 2016*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/_cr16270.pdf_
