## 1. Impact of Past Pension Reforms on Open Group Liability 2007–2060

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### Executive summary
- Traditional deficit and debt indicators focus on the health of public finances today but fail to capture the future impact of public programs; this asymmetry can create incentives to delay or reverse pension reforms.
- The Staff Discussion Note proposes a new fiscal indicator—the “pension-adjusted” budget balance—which accounts for the intertemporal pension balance and complements traditional indicators.
- Going forward, both overall and pension-adjusted balances should be monitored.

### Measures of pension obligations
- Implicit pension debt = present discounted value of pension obligations; sensitive to the discount rate (measures inversely related to the discount rate).
- For the purposes of this SDN:
  - Discount rate is set at 1 percent.
  - Time horizon used in calculations covers the period up to 2060.
- Three measures of implicit pension debt:
  - The shutdown (accrued) liability: value of already accrued entitlements to current and future pensioners (based on past promises only).
  - The closed group liability: accrued liability plus future obligations projected to be accrued by current participants.
  - The open group liability: closed group liability plus projected benefits to be accrued by all future entrants (present value of all future pension spending).
- Net implicit liability calculation: subtract the present discounted value of all future contributions corresponding to each implicit liability concept.
- Note: In this SDN, “contributions” refer to earmarked taxes (such as payroll taxes) intended to fund pensions.

### The fiscal impact of pension reform
- Parametric reforms (benefit cuts, increases in retirement ages, tightening eligibility, contribution increases) have reduced net implicit liabilities in many advanced economies.
  - Example: France, Germany, and Italy introduced parametric reforms over the past 20 years that reduced net open group liability of pension systems over 2007–2060 by more than 120 percentage points of GDP.
- Reforms introducing mandatory, privately-funded individual accounts (“second pillar”) involve diversion of contributions from payroll taxes to private accounts, generating near-term revenue losses that offset some parametric reform gains.
  - The revenue losses from diversion to the second pillar offset nearly half of the reduction in liability from parametric reforms (as presented in Table 1).
- Reported country impacts (Table 1: Impact of Past Pension Reforms on Open Group Liability 2007–2060). Lines presented as in source:
  - Bulgaria148314545100
  - Estonia35-58946429
  - Latvia-31-825199-48
  - Lithuania58-22814338
  - Hungary181271546193
  - Poland33110123063167
  - Romania192761154967
  - Slovak Rep.1842515953106
  - Average13791296069
- Traditional fiscal indicators do not reflect substantial long-term improvements; introduction of second pillar pensions tends to worsen primary budget deficit and gross debt because of diverted contributions.
- Table 2: Impact of Pension Reform on Budget Balances, 2007 (lines presented as in source):
  - Bulgaria0.1-0.70.8
  - Estonia2.6-1.33.9
  - Latvia-0.3-0.80.5
  - Lithuania-1.0-0.9-0.1
  - Hungary-5.0-1.2-3.8
  - Poland-1.9-1.3-0.6
  - Romania1-5.4-0.3-5.1
  - Slovak Republic-1.9-1.0-0.9
  - Average-1.6-0.9-0.7
- On average, the introduction of the second pillar accounted for more than half of the budget deficit in 2007 in the Central and Eastern European countries presented.

### Introducing the pension-adjusted budget balance
- Definition: pension-adjusted balance = non-pension fiscal balance (budget balance excluding the pension system) + intertemporal pension balance.
- Intertemporal pension balance = net present value of all pension imbalances from today to a specified future date (example horizon: 50 years; in this SDN calculations use up to 2060).
- The pension-adjusted balance depends on implicit liability: higher implicit liability → lower intertemporal pension balance → lower pension-adjusted balance.
- Mechanically, calculation requires (all in percent of GDP):
  - the current-period budget balance;
  - estimates of net implicit pension debt / intertemporal pension balance (see Box 2 methodology).
- Box 2 outlines the formal estimation approach for the intertemporal pension balance assuming zero assets at time t and discounting future pension balances to the present.

### Pension-adjusted budget balance — empirical overview (Table 3, 2007)
- Source: IMF staff calculations; EC (2010). Romania figures correspond to 2008, the year in which the second pillar was introduced.
- Note: Current period overall budget balances come from Table I.1.1 of Public Finances in EMU (EC, 2010); current-period and projected pension balances come from the Aging Report (contributions from Graph 49 of EC (2009a) and spending from Table A.60 of EC (2009b)). The intertemporal pension balance is the constant and permanent balance that in present value equals the net open group liability.

- Table 3 key figures (In percent of GDP):
  - Bulgaria
    - Budget balance (2007): 0.1
    - First pillar balance (2007): -0.6
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): 0.7
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -48
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -1.1
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): -0.4
  - Estonia
    - Budget balance (2007): 2.6
    - First pillar balance (2007): 0.5
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): 2.1
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -6
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -0.1
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): 2.0
  - Latvia
    - Budget balance (2007): -0.3
    - First pillar balance (2007): 1.4
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): -1.7
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -17
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -0.4
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): -2.1
  - Lithuania
    - Budget balance (2007): -1.0
    - First pillar balance (2007): -0.2
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): -0.8
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -20
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -0.5
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): -1.3
  - Hungary
    - Budget balance (2007): -5.0
    - First pillar balance (2007): -2.3
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): -2.7
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -88
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -2.1
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): -4.9
  - Poland
    - Budget balance (2007): -1.9
    - First pillar balance (2007): -4.7
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): 2.8
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -164
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -3.9
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): -1.1
  - Romania (2008)
    - Budget balance (2007): -5.4
    - First pillar balance (2007): -1.5
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): -3.9
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -125
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -3.0
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): -6.9
  - Slovak Republic
    - Budget balance (2007): -1.9
    - First pillar balance (2007): -2.2
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): 0.3
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -78
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -1.9
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): -1.6
  - Average
    - Budget balance (2007): -1.6
    - First pillar balance (2007): -1.2
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): -0.4
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -68
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -1.6
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): -2.0

- Sensitivity of NPV of pension debt to discount rate (footnote 11):
  - The NPV of pension debt is highly sensitive to the discount rate—the average NPV of pension balances goes from -86 percent of GDP for a discount rate of 0 to -68 percent for a discount rate of 1 to -55 percent for a discount rate of 2.
  - The pension-adjusted balance is relatively stable to changes in the discount rate because a higher discount rate lowers the NPV of pension balances but increases the conversion factor from NPV to an annualized intertemporal balance—the average intertemporal pension balance is about -1.6 percent of GDP for discount rates of 0, 1, and 2 percent.

### Illustrative examples of why pension-adjusted balance matters (Table 4)
- Source: IMF staff calculations; EC (2010). These illustrative examples are based on the average budget balances and reforms implemented by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic over the past 15 years.

- Example 1 (Countries A and B):
  - Both have budget balance: -0.7
  - Nonpension balance: -0.5
  - Pension balance: -0.2
  - Net open group liability 2007-2060: 137
  - Pension-adjusted budget balance (Country A): -3.8
  - Country B implements a parametric reform reducing intertemporal pension balance to 9 percent of GDP; after reform:
    - Budget balance: -0.7
    - Nonpension balance: -0.5
    - Pension balance: -0.2
    - Net open group liability 2007-2060: 9
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (Country B after reform): -0.7
  - Interpretation: Traditional budget balance unchanged, pension-adjusted balance shows large improvement for Country B.

- Example 2 (Countries C and D):
  - Both before reform:
    - Budget balance: -0.7
    - Nonpension balance: -0.5
    - Pension balance: -0.2
    - Net open group liability 2007-2060: 137
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance: -3.8
  - Country D after reform diverts 5 percentage points of wages to the second pillar (NPV of revenue losses about 59 percent of GDP) and reduces intertemporal pension balance to 9 percent of GDP; after reform:
    - Budget balance: -2.2
    - Nonpension balance: -0.5
    - Pension balance: -1.7
    - Net open group liability 2007-2060: 68
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (Country D after reform): -2.1
  - Interpretation: Traditional budget balance worsens and would mislead; pension-adjusted balance shows substantial improvement.

- Example 3 (Countries E and F):
  - Country E before reform:
    - Budget balance: -2.2
    - Nonpension balance: -0.5
    - Pension balance: -1.7
    - Net open group liability 2007-2060: 68
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance: -2.1
  - Country F before reform same as E; Country F dismantles the second pillar and returns contributions (5 percent of wages) back to the first pillar; after reform:
    - Budget balance: -0.7
    - Nonpension balance: -0.5
    - Pension balance: -0.2
    - Net open group liability 2007-2060: 107
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (Country F after reform): -3.0
  - Interpretation: Traditional budget balance improves despite worsening long-term liabilities; pension-adjusted balance correctly worsens.

### Advantages and limitations
- Advantages:
  - Eliminates incentives to adopt or dismantle particular systems (including second pillar systems with mandatory private accounts) solely to improve current-period indicators.
  - Levels the playing field across different countries and pension systems by incorporating the intertemporal fiscal consequences of pension reforms.
  - Captures long-term sustainability implications of parametric reforms and shifts to or from second-pillar arrangements.
- Limitations and context:
  - Overall balances remain key for evaluating risks surrounding short-term financing needs.
  - The pension-adjusted budget balance should be viewed as a complement, rather than a substitute, for traditional budget balance indicators.
  - While similar intertemporal indicators could in principle be computed for other spending obligations (such as education or health), the specific incentive problems created by second pillar pension reforms are less likely to arise in other areas.

### Implications for fiscal policy design (Section IV)
- The future impact of public programs should be taken into account as part of sustainability analyses. This could include not only pensions, but spending on health care and other government-funded services.
  - The IMF’s Fiscal Monitor provides estimates of the net present value of expected increases in pension and health spending over the next 20 years. These increases, combined with the overall budget balance and the current level of debt, allow for a consistent approach to assess the sustainability of public finances.
- Intertemporal pension balances should be assessed to gauge the sustainability of the fiscal stance. Measures based on today’s budget balance can give a misleading picture of the sustainability of public finances. The staff’s suggested pension-adjusted budget balance provides a method to incorporate the effects of pension reforms on sustainability assessments.
- Both overall and pension-adjusted balances need to be monitored. The short-term macroeconomic consequences of non-pension and intertemporal pension imbalances are quite distinct. Thus, establishing ceilings for overall budget balances in the short and medium term is justified.

*Source: IMF Staff Discussion Note content (excerpts provided from the SDN chapter).*>

### 1. Impact of Past Pension Reforms on Open Group Liability 2007–2060 ................................7

### 1. Impact of Past Pension Reforms on Open Group Liability 2007–2060

### Executive summary
- Traditional deficit and debt indicators focus on the health of public finances today but fail to capture the future impact of public programs; this asymmetry can create incentives to delay or reverse pension reforms.
- The Staff Discussion Note proposes a new fiscal indicator—the “pension-adjusted” budget balance—which accounts for the intertemporal pension balance and complements traditional indicators.
- Going forward, both overall and pension-adjusted balances should be monitored.

### Introduction
- Concern: pension reforms often improve long-term fiscal outlook but can worsen near-term budget balance and government debt.
- Recent policy actions in Central and Eastern Europe (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania) diverted contributions from private funded “second pillar” systems back to unfunded public “first pillar” systems during 2008–2010, reducing short-term fiscal deficits but potentially worsening long-term outlook.
- The pension-adjusted budget balance is proposed to avoid perverse incentives that favor short-term improvements over long-term fiscal sustainability.

### Measures of pension obligations
- Implicit pension debt = present discounted value of pension obligations; sensitive to the discount rate (measures inversely related to the discount rate).
- For the purposes of this SDN:
  - Discount rate is set at 1 percent.
  - Time horizon used in calculations covers the period up to 2060.
- Three measures of implicit pension debt:
  - The shutdown (accrued) liability: value of already accrued entitlements to current and future pensioners (based on past promises only).
  - The closed group liability: accrued liability plus future obligations projected to be accrued by current participants.
  - The open group liability: closed group liability plus projected benefits to be accrued by all future entrants (present value of all future pension spending).
- Net implicit liability calculation: subtract the present discounted value of all future contributions corresponding to each implicit liability concept.
- Note: In this SDN, “contributions” refer to earmarked taxes (such as payroll taxes) intended to fund pensions.

### The fiscal impact of pension reform
- Parametric reforms (benefit cuts, increases in retirement ages, tightening eligibility, contribution increases) have reduced net implicit liabilities in many advanced economies.
  - Example: France, Germany, and Italy introduced parametric reforms over the past 20 years that reduced net open group liability of pension systems over 2007–2060 by more than 120 percentage points of GDP.
- Reforms introducing mandatory, privately-funded individual accounts (“second pillar”) involve diversion of contributions from payroll taxes to private accounts, generating near-term revenue losses that offset some parametric reform gains.
  - The revenue losses from diversion to the second pillar offset nearly half of the reduction in liability from parametric reforms (as presented in Table 1).
- Reported country impacts (Table 1: Impact of Past Pension Reforms on Open Group Liability 2007–2060). Lines presented as in source:
  - Bulgaria148314545100
  - Estonia35-58946429
  - Latvia-31-825199-48
  - Lithuania58-22814338
  - Hungary181271546193
  - Poland33110123063167
  - Romania192761154967
  - Slovak Rep.1842515953106
  - Average13791296069
- Traditional fiscal indicators do not reflect substantial long-term improvements; introduction of second pillar pensions tends to worsen primary budget deficit and gross debt because of diverted contributions.
- Table 2: Impact of Pension Reform on Budget Balances, 2007 (lines presented as in source):
  - Bulgaria0.1-0.70.8
  - Estonia2.6-1.33.9
  - Latvia-0.3-0.80.5
  - Lithuania-1.0-0.9-0.1
  - Hungary-5.0-1.2-3.8
  - Poland-1.9-1.3-0.6
  - Romania1-5.4-0.3-5.1
  - Slovak Republic-1.9-1.0-0.9
  - Average-1.6-0.9-0.7
- On average, the introduction of the second pillar accounted for more than half of the budget deficit in 2007 in the Central and Eastern European countries presented.

### Introducing the pension-adjusted budget balance
- Definition: pension-adjusted balance = non-pension fiscal balance (budget balance excluding the pension system) + intertemporal pension balance.
- Intertemporal pension balance = net present value of all pension imbalances from today to a specified future date (example horizon: 50 years; in this SDN calculations use up to 2060).
- The pension-adjusted balance depends on implicit liability: higher implicit liability → lower intertemporal pension balance → lower pension-adjusted balance.
- Mechanically, calculation requires (all in percent of GDP):
  - the current-period budget balance;
  - estimates of net implicit pension debt / intertemporal pension balance (see Box 2 methodology).
- Box 2 outlines the formal estimation approach for the intertemporal pension balance assuming zero assets at time t and discounting future pension balances to the present.

*Source: IMF Staff Discussion Note content (excerpts provided from the SDN chapter).*

### 2. Therefore, a measure of the overall balance at time (t) adjusting for the intertemporal pension balance

### 2. Therefore, a measure of the overall balance at time (t) adjusting for the intertemporal pension balance

### Definition and purpose
- A measure of the overall balance at time (t) adjusting for the intertemporal pension balance at (t) should account for:
  - the current-period pension balance of the first pillar (contributions minus pension spending); and
  - the path for pension balances of the first pillar, including contributions and expenditures.
- The intertemporal pension balance is the constant and permanent balance that in present value equals the net open group liability (see Box 2).

### Pension-adjusted budget balance — empirical overview (Table 3, 2007)
- Source: IMF staff calculations; EC (2010). Romania figures correspond to 2008, the year in which the second pillar was introduced.
- Note: Current period overall budget balances come from Table I.1.1 of Public Finances in EMU (EC, 2010); current-period and projected pension balances come from the Aging Report (contributions from Graph 49 of EC (2009a) and spending from Table A.60 of EC (2009b)). The intertemporal pension balance is the constant and permanent balance that in present value equals the net open group liability.

- Table 3 key figures (In percent of GDP):
  - Bulgaria
    - Budget balance (2007): 0.1
    - First pillar balance (2007): -0.6
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): 0.7
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -48
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -1.1
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): -0.4
  - Estonia
    - Budget balance (2007): 2.6
    - First pillar balance (2007): 0.5
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): 2.1
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -6
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -0.1
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): 2.0
  - Latvia
    - Budget balance (2007): -0.3
    - First pillar balance (2007): 1.4
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): -1.7
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -17
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -0.4
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): -2.1
  - Lithuania
    - Budget balance (2007): -1.0
    - First pillar balance (2007): -0.2
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): -0.8
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -20
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -0.5
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): -1.3
  - Hungary
    - Budget balance (2007): -5.0
    - First pillar balance (2007): -2.3
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): -2.7
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -88
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -2.1
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): -4.9
  - Poland
    - Budget balance (2007): -1.9
    - First pillar balance (2007): -4.7
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): 2.8
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -164
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -3.9
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): -1.1
  - Romania (2008)
    - Budget balance (2007): -5.4
    - First pillar balance (2007): -1.5
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): -3.9
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -125
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -3.0
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): -6.9
  - Slovak Republic
    - Budget balance (2007): -1.9
    - First pillar balance (2007): -2.2
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): 0.3
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -78
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -1.9
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): -1.6
  - Average
    - Budget balance (2007): -1.6
    - First pillar balance (2007): -1.2
    - Non pension budget balance (2007): -0.4
    - NPV of pension balances (2007-2060): -68
    - Intertemporal pension balance (2007-2060): -1.6
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (2007): -2.0

- Sensitivity of NPV of pension debt to discount rate (footnote 11):
  - The NPV of pension debt is highly sensitive to the discount rate—the average NPV of pension balances goes from -86 percent of GDP for a discount rate of 0 to -68 percent for a discount rate of 1 to -55 percent for a discount rate of 2.
  - The pension-adjusted balance is relatively stable to changes in the discount rate because a higher discount rate lowers the NPV of pension balances but increases the conversion factor from NPV to an annualized intertemporal balance—the average intertemporal pension balance is about -1.6 percent of GDP for discount rates of 0, 1, and 2 percent.

### Illustrative examples of why pension-adjusted balance matters (Table 4)
- Source: IMF staff calculations; EC (2010). These illustrative examples are based on the average budget balances and reforms implemented by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic over the past 15 years.

- Example 1 (Countries A and B):
  - Both have budget balance: -0.7
  - Nonpension balance: -0.5
  - Pension balance: -0.2
  - Net open group liability 2007-2060: 137
  - Pension-adjusted budget balance (Country A): -3.8
  - Country B implements a parametric reform reducing intertemporal pension balance to 9 percent of GDP; after reform:
    - Budget balance: -0.7
    - Nonpension balance: -0.5
    - Pension balance: -0.2
    - Net open group liability 2007-2060: 9
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (Country B after reform): -0.7
  - Interpretation: Traditional budget balance unchanged, pension-adjusted balance shows large improvement for Country B.

- Example 2 (Countries C and D):
  - Both before reform:
    - Budget balance: -0.7
    - Nonpension balance: -0.5
    - Pension balance: -0.2
    - Net open group liability 2007-2060: 137
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance: -3.8
  - Country D after reform diverts 5 percentage points of wages to the second pillar (NPV of revenue losses about 59 percent of GDP) and reduces intertemporal pension balance to 9 percent of GDP; after reform:
    - Budget balance: -2.2
    - Nonpension balance: -0.5
    - Pension balance: -1.7
    - Net open group liability 2007-2060: 68
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (Country D after reform): -2.1
  - Interpretation: Traditional budget balance worsens and would mislead; pension-adjusted balance shows substantial improvement.

- Example 3 (Countries E and F):
  - Country E before reform:
    - Budget balance: -2.2
    - Nonpension balance: -0.5
    - Pension balance: -1.7
    - Net open group liability 2007-2060: 68
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance: -2.1
  - Country F before reform same as E; Country F dismantles the second pillar and returns contributions (5 percent of wages) back to the first pillar; after reform:
    - Budget balance: -0.7
    - Nonpension balance: -0.5
    - Pension balance: -0.2
    - Net open group liability 2007-2060: 107
    - Pension-adjusted budget balance (Country F after reform): -3.0
  - Interpretation: Traditional budget balance improves despite worsening long-term liabilities; pension-adjusted balance correctly worsens.

### Advantages and limitations
- Advantages:
  - Eliminates incentives to adopt or dismantle particular systems (including second pillar systems with mandatory private accounts) solely to improve current-period indicators.
  - Levels the playing field across different countries and pension systems by incorporating the intertemporal fiscal consequences of pension reforms.
  - Captures long-term sustainability implications of parametric reforms and shifts to or from second-pillar arrangements.

- Limitations and context:
  - Overall balances remain key for evaluating risks surrounding short-term financing needs.
  - The pension-adjusted budget balance should be viewed as a complement, rather than a substitute, for traditional budget balance indicators.
  - While similar intertemporal indicators could in principle be computed for other spending obligations (such as education or health), the specific incentive problems created by second pillar pension reforms are less likely to arise in other areas.

### Implications for fiscal policy design (Section IV)
- The future impact of public programs should be taken into account as part of sustainability analyses. This could include not only pensions, but spending on health care and other government-funded services.
  - The IMF’s Fiscal Monitor provides estimates of the net present value of expected increases in pension and health spending over the next 20 years. These increases, combined with the overall budget balance and the current level of debt, allow for a consistent approach to assess the sustainability of public finances.
- Intertemporal pension balances should be assessed to gauge the sustainability of the fiscal stance. Measures based on today’s budget balance can give a misleading picture of the sustainability of public finances. The staff’s suggested pension-adjusted budget balance provides a method to incorporate the effects of pension reforms on sustainability assessments.
- Both overall and pension-adjusted balances need to be monitored. The short-term macroeconomic consequences of non-pension and intertemporal pension imbalances are quite distinct. Thus, establishing ceilings for overall budget balances in the short and medium term is justified.

*Source: IMF staff calculations and text from the provided IMF PDF content.*

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