## _sdn1202 - Executive summary

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### Introduction and central concern
- Governments under pressure to reduce deficits can substitute accounting devices for genuine spending cuts or tax increases, reducing the reported deficit today at the expense of future deficits.
- Common devices: selling assets or borrowing and counting proceeds as revenue; deferring unavoidable spending without recognizing a liability.
- Remedies emphasized:
  - Audited financial statements (income statement, cash-flow statement, balance sheet) prepared according to international accounting standards.
  - Empower statisticians with resources, independence, and authority to revise standards.
  - Monitor a variety of alternative fiscal indicators, including change in net worth and high-quality long-term forecasts of the headline deficit under current policy.

### Taxonomy of accounting devices
- Devices improve headline fiscal indicators now while worsening future fiscal outcomes; classified into four types:
  - Hidden borrowing: more revenue now, more spending later.
  - Disinvestment: more revenue now, less revenue later.
  - Deferred spending: less spending now, more spending later.
  - Foregone investment: less spending now, less revenue later.
- Effectiveness and availability depend on accounting standards (cash vs. accrual; statistical definitions such as Maastricht).
- Examples vary by accounting system (e.g., sale of financial assets can reduce debt but often not reduce the deficit under European rules).

### Hidden borrowing — mechanisms and examples
- Governments assume obligations (e.g., pension schemes) where compensating payments count as revenue while future pension obligations are not recognized as liabilities.
  - France assumed France Télécom pension liabilities in 1997 for an upfront payment of €5.7 billion (0.5 percent of GDP) and assumed Electricité de France and Gaz de France liabilities in 2005 for €8.6 billion (0.5 percent of GDP).
  - Portugal used pensions takeover to reduce reported deficits in 2010 and 2011.
- Sale-and-leaseback can hide borrowing relative to constitutional or legal debt limits.
  - Arizona effectively borrowed $1 billion in 2010 by selling and leasing back buildings including the state capitol.
- Off‑market swaps and other derivatives can create liabilities excluded from some debt definitions.
  - Greece reportedly masked €5.3 billion of debt (2.3 percent of GDP) with such arrangements from 2001 to 2007.
  - Similar techniques reported in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Poland.

### Disinvestment — mechanisms and examples
- Privatization or securitization raises proceeds now but eliminates or reduces future revenue (dividends, cash flows).
  - Germany received €15.5 billion from securitization of pension‑related payments from Deutsche Telekom, Deutsche Post, and Deutsche Postbank in 2005–06 but guaranteed the payments; transactions were ultimately recorded as government borrowing.
- Securitizations in the 2000s used rights to future government revenues (lottery proceeds, air‑traffic fees, tax receivables) to reduce reported deficits; guarantees can turn these into de facto borrowing.

### Deferred spending — mechanisms and examples
- Deferring payments reduces the reported deficit for the year but increases it later; achieved by timing payment dates or substituting leasing for acquisition.
  - U.S. examples: postponing a military payday by one day; deferring Medicare payments scheduled at year-end.
  - Proposed Air Force lease of 100 refueling planes: Congressional Budget Office judged lease would effectively be a purchase at a cost greater by 10‒15 percent in present value ($15 billion in 2003 present values) compared with normal procurement.
- PPPs and operating leases can defer public spending recognition; Portugal now spends nearly 1 percent of GDP to meet PPP commitments made earlier.
- Civil‑service defined‑benefit pensions commonly create unrecognized liabilities:
  - For the U.S. federal government, in 2006–10 the estimated full cost of military and civil‑service pensions exceeded cash paid to retirees by an average of 1 percent of GDP a year.
- Recognized liabilities of five central governments, 2010 (percent of GDP) — composition from Table 2:
  - Australia: Debt 14; Civil‑Service Pensions 10; Other Liabilities 8; Total Liabilities 32
  - Canada: Debt 37; Civil‑Service Pensions 13; Other Liabilities 8; Total Liabilities 58
  - New Zealand: Debt 36; Civil‑Service Pensions 5; Other Liabilities 25; Total Liabilities 66
  - United Kingdom: Debt 69; Civil‑Service Pensions 81; Other Liabilities 23; Total Liabilities 173
  - United States: Debt 62; Civil‑Service Pensions 39; Other Liabilities 11; Total Liabilities 113

### Foregone investment — mechanisms and examples
- Concessions and user‑fee financed private investment shift investment off the public balance sheet during construction but can reduce future government revenue or create later subsidy obligations (minimum‑revenue guarantees).
  - Chile: since the early 1990s, concessions accounted for about $7 billion or 4 percent of current GDP in cumulative investment; government has granted minimum‑revenue guarantees in many cases.
  - Australia: concessions used to build tolled bridges and roads without initially increasing public debt.

### Disappearing government — off‑balance and deconsolidation practices
- Spending and liabilities kept off government books via entities not counted as part of government for reporting purposes (quasi‑government bodies, municipal or regional entities, public enterprises).
  - Eurostat reclassification of Greek bus, railway, and other companies increased Greece’s reported debt by €18.2 billion (7.8 percent of GDP).
  - Ireland’s banking‑crisis‑resolution entity acquired banks’ commercial property loans financed by government‑guaranteed debt amounting to 19.7 percent of GDP at end‑2011 but was classified outside general government under Eurostat criteria.
  - The United Kingdom recognized expected losses in acquiring RBS and Lloyds but does not recognize the banks’ assets and liabilities as its own; the United States does not recognize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac assets and liabilities as its own.
- Subnational borrowing via separate entities and use of national development banks to carry fiscal functions can hide obligations.

### The size of the problem — evidence and indicators
- Inventories and studies provide partial measures of device use:
  - Koen and van den Noord (1993–2003) average annual impact of “one‑offs, ‘creative accounting,’ and reclassifications”:
    - Greece: roughly 2 percent of GDP a year;
    - Italy and Portugal: ⅔ of a percent of GDP a year;
    - Belgium and Spain: ⅓ of a percent of GDP a year.
  - In 36 of 165 cases from that inventory, the deficit was reduced by more than ½ a percent of GDP.
- Revisions of initial deficit estimates:
  - Final estimates of the deficit in the European Union in 1998–2005 were on average ⅓ of a percent of GDP larger than first estimates.
  - Average revisions were nearly 2 percent of GDP in Greece and more than ½ a percent in Austria, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden.
  - Beetsma and others find upward revisions generally smaller in countries with more fiscal transparency.
- Stock‑flow adjustments:
  - In 1980–2010, average stock‑flow adjustment in a sample of 163 countries was 2.6 percent of GDP; unexplained differences correlated with an index of fiscal transparency.
- Evidence from governments publishing alternative deficit measures:
  - U.S. example (1995–2010): the budget (mainly cash‑based) deficit underestimated long‑run costs as measured by the accrual measure by an average of 2 percent of GDP a year.
- Specific monetary amounts from examples:
  - France: €5.7 billion and €8.6 billion pension assumption payments (each cited as 0.5 percent of GDP).
  - Greece: €5.3 billion masked debt (2.3 percent of GDP).
  - Germany: €15.5 billion from securitization in 2005–06.
  - Arizona: $1 billion sale‑and‑leaseback effective borrowing (2010).
  - Ireland: government‑guaranteed debt of 19.7 percent of GDP at end‑2011 related to banking‑crisis entity.

### Countering accounting devices — measures and recommendations
- Strengthen headline measures:
  - Adopt and improve accrual‑based standards to recognize economic value transfer when it occurs rather than when cash changes hands.
  - Ensure statisticians have resources and independence to update standards as new devices arise.
  - Use private‑sector accounting tools: independent standard‑setting, integrated financial statements, detailed footnotes, independent audits stating whether statements present a “true and fair” view, and civil/criminal sanctions for fraudulent reporting.
- Present multiple and alternative indicators:
  - Consider both cash and accrual indicators; use a suite of deficit indicators (cash balance, net operating balance, net lending/borrowing, overall balance, change in net worth).
  - Prepare statistical financial statements for multiple definitions of government (central, general, nonfinancial public sector, public sector).
  - Australia, 2009–10 (percent of GDP) example of multiple balance indicators (Table 4):
    - Net operating balance: General government −2.9; Nonfinancial public sector −2.7; Public sector −3.2
    - Change in net worth: −0.4; −0.4; −0.4
    - Net lending/borrowing: −5.3; −6.4; −6.9
    - Cash balance: −5.1; −6.1; −6.4
- Produce and publish long‑term fiscal forecasts under current policy:
  - Forecast horizons should be long (perhaps 50 years) to expose devices that push costs just beyond the forecast horizon.
  - U.S. 75‑year long‑range projections (present values, 2010):
    - Receipts: Trillion dollars 175; Percent of 75‑year GDP 20.2
      - Social‑security payroll taxes 38 (4.4)
      - Medicare payroll taxes 12 (1.4)
      - Individual income taxes 91 (10.5)
      - Other 34 (4.0)
    - Primary spending: Trillion dollars 192; Percent of 75‑year GDP 22.1
      - Defense discretionary 31 (3.6)
      - Nondefense discretionary 31 (3.6)
      - Social security 49 (5.7)
      - Medicare A 17 (2.0)
      - Medicare B and D 20 (2.4)
      - Medicaid 24 (2.8)
      - Other mandatory 19 (2.2)
    - Receipts less primary spending: −16 (−1.9)
  - Apply standards for preparation of long‑term forecasts to improve reliability (IPSASB referenced).
- Make supplementary information intelligible and influential:
  - Encourage analysts to examine alternative measures and to analyze their significance.
  - Consider independent, expert bodies with authority to analyze and publicize fiscal problems (examples cited: U.S. Congressional Budget Office; UK Office for Budget Responsibility).
  - Require production of tables generating new fiscal indicators alongside traditional ones (comprehensive balance sheets presenting debts, contractual liabilities, noncontractual obligations, and corresponding rights).

### Conclusion
- Headline deficits can be reduced without improving public finances by accelerating revenue or deferring spending, creating a fiscal illusion.
- Two broad strategies to prevent illusions:
  - Ensure headline indicators are rigorously measured according to up‑to‑date accrual standards.
  - Present headline indicators alongside alternative measures and long‑term forecasts.
- Implementing these strategies requires more work for accountants, statisticians, and analysts and will increase complexity, but is necessary because fiscal performance and position are multidimensional and cannot be captured reliably by a single indicator.

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (sdn1202) — IMF PDF provided content.*

### Executive summary ......................................................................................................

### _sdn1202 - Executive summary

### I. Introduction
- Section present on page 4.

### II. A Taxonomy of Accounting Devices
- Section present on page 5.
- Table 1: "Taxonomy of Deficit Devices" referenced on page 5.

### III. Hidden Borrowing
- Section present on page 6.

### IV. Disinvestment
- Section present on page 7.

### V. Deferred Spending
- Section present on page 8.

### VI. Foregone Investment
- Section present on page 10.
- Table 2: "Composition of Recognized Liabilities of Five Central Governments, 2010" referenced on page 10.

### VII. Disappearing Government
- Section present on page 11.

### VIII. The Size of the Problem
- Section present on page 12.
- Figure 1: "European Union: Relationship of Accounting Devices, 1993‒2003 and CDS Spreads, January 2011" referenced on page 13.

### IX. Countering Accounting Devices
- Section present on page 14.
- Figure 2: "Two Measures of the U.S. Federal Government Deficit, 1995–2010" referenced on page 14.

### X. Conclusion
- Section present on page 19.
- Table 3: "U.S. Federal Government’s Summary of Long-Term Fiscal Projections, 2010" referenced on page 17.
- Table 4: "A Suite of Balance Indicators, Australia, 2009–10" referenced on page 18.
- Table 5: "A Comprehensive Balance Sheet" referenced on page 19.

Italic: Source: _sdn1202 - Executive summary (IMF PDF), table of contents and list of tables and figures.

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Introduction and central concern
- Governments under pressure to reduce deficits can substitute accounting devices for genuine spending cuts or tax increases, reducing the reported deficit today at the expense of future deficits.
- Accounting devices can include selling assets or borrowing and counting proceeds as revenue, or deferring unavoidable spending without recognizing a liability.
- The result is that the headline reported deficit loses accuracy as a fiscal indicator.
- Remedies include audited financial statements (income statement, cash-flow statement, balance sheet) prepared according to international accounting standards and empowering statisticians with resources, independence, and authority to revise standards.
- Monitoring a variety of alternative fiscal indicators, including change in net worth and high-quality long-term forecasts of the headline deficit under current policy, helps reveal problems suppressed in any single indicator.

### Taxonomy of accounting devices
- Devices improve headline fiscal indicators now while worsening future fiscal outcomes; classified into four types:
  - Hidden borrowing: more revenue now, more spending later.
  - Disinvestment: more revenue now, less revenue later.
  - Deferred spending: less spending now, more spending later.
  - Foregone investment: less spending now, less revenue later.
- The effectiveness and availability of devices depend on accounting standards (cash vs. accrual; statistical definitions such as Maastricht).
- Examples of transactions that can or cannot affect deficit/debt vary by accounting system (e.g., sale of financial assets can reduce debt but often not reduce the deficit under European rules).

### Hidden borrowing — mechanisms and examples
- Governments assume obligations (e.g., pension schemes) where compensating payments count as revenue while future pension obligations are not recognized as liabilities.
  - France assumed France Télécom pension liabilities in 1997 for an upfront payment of €5.7 billion (0.5 percent of GDP) and assumed Electricité de France and Gaz de France liabilities in 2005 for €8.6 billion (0.5 percent of GDP).
  - Portugal used pensions takeover to reduce reported deficits in 2010 and 2011.
- Sale-and-leaseback can hide borrowing relative to constitutional or legal debt limits.
  - Arizona effectively borrowed $1 billion in 2010 by selling and leasing back buildings including the state capitol.
- Off‑market swaps and other derivatives can create liabilities that may be excluded from some debt definitions.
  - Greece reportedly masked €5.3 billion of debt (2.3 percent of GDP) with such arrangements from 2001 to 2007.
  - Similar techniques reported in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Poland.

### Disinvestment — mechanisms and examples
- Privatization or securitization raises proceeds now but eliminates or reduces future revenue (dividends, cash flows).
  - Germany received €15.5 billion from securitization of pension‑related payments from Deutsche Telekom, Deutsche Post, and Deutsche Postbank in 2005–06 but guaranteed the payments; transactions were ultimately recorded as government borrowing.
- Securitizations in the 2000s used rights to future government revenues (lottery proceeds, air‑traffic fees, tax receivables) to reduce reported deficits in some cases; guarantees can turn these into de facto borrowing.

### Deferred spending — mechanisms and examples
- Deferring payments reduces the reported deficit for the year but increases it later; can be achieved by timing payment dates or by substituting leasing for acquisition.
  - U.S. examples: postponing a military payday by one day; deferring Medicare payments scheduled at year-end.
  - Proposed Air Force lease of 100 refueling planes: Congressional Budget Office judged lease would effectively be a purchase at a cost greater by 10‒15 percent in present value ($15 billion in 2003 present values) compared with normal procurement.
- Public‑private partnerships (PPPs) and operating leases can defer public spending recognition; Portugal now spends nearly 1 percent of GDP to meet PPP commitments made earlier.
- Civil‑service defined‑benefit pensions commonly create unrecognized liabilities:
  - For the U.S. federal government, in 2006–10 the estimated full cost of military and civil‑service pensions exceeded cash paid to retirees by an average of 1 percent of GDP a year.
- Table 2 (central governments, 2010, percent of GDP) — recognized liabilities composition:
  - Australia: Debt 14; Civil‑Service Pensions 10; Other Liabilities 8; Total Liabilities 32
  - Canada: Debt 37; Civil‑Service Pensions 13; Other Liabilities 8; Total Liabilities 58
  - New Zealand: Debt 36; Civil‑Service Pensions 5; Other Liabilities 25; Total Liabilities 66
  - United Kingdom: Debt 69; Civil‑Service Pensions 81; Other Liabilities 23; Total Liabilities 173
  - United States: Debt 62; Civil‑Service Pensions 39; Other Liabilities 11; Total Liabilities 113

### Foregone investment — mechanisms and examples
- Concessions and user‑fee financed private investment (e.g., toll roads, airports) shift investment off the public balance sheet during construction but can reduce future government revenue (if government would have collected tolls) or create later subsidy obligations (e.g., minimum‑revenue guarantees).
  - Chile: since the early 1990s, concessions accounted for about $7 billion or 4 percent of current GDP in cumulative investment; government has granted minimum‑revenue guarantees in many cases.
  - Australia: concessions used to build tolled bridges and roads without initially increasing public debt.

### Disappearing government — off‑balance and deconsolidation practices
- Spending and liabilities are sometimes kept off the government’s books via entities not counted as part of government for reporting purposes (quasi‑government bodies, municipal or regional entities, public enterprises).
  - Eurostat reclassification of Greek bus, railway, and other companies increased Greece’s reported debt by €18.2 billion (7.8 percent of GDP).
  - Ireland’s banking‑crisis‑resolution entity acquired banks’ commercial property loans financed by government‑guaranteed debt amounting to 19.7 percent of GDP at end‑2011 but was classified outside general government under Eurostat criteria.
  - The United Kingdom recognized expected losses in acquiring RBS and Lloyds but does not recognize the banks’ assets and liabilities as its own; the United States does not recognize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac assets and liabilities as its own.
- Subnational borrowing via separate entities and use of national development banks to carry fiscal functions can hide obligations.

### The size of the problem — evidence and indicators
- Inventories and studies provide partial measures of device use:
  - Koen and van den Noord (1993–2003) average annual impact of “one‑offs, ‘creative accounting,’ and reclassifications”:
    - Greece: roughly 2 percent of GDP a year;
    - Italy and Portugal: ⅔ of a percent of GDP a year;
    - Belgium and Spain: ⅓ of a percent of GDP a year.
  - In 36 of 165 cases from that inventory, the deficit was reduced by more than ½ a percent of GDP.
- Revisions of initial deficit estimates:
  - Final estimates of the deficit in the European Union in 1998–2005 were on average ⅓ of a percent of GDP larger than first estimates.
  - Average revisions were nearly 2 percent of GDP in Greece and more than ½ a percent in Austria, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden.
  - Beetsma and others find upward revisions generally smaller in countries with more fiscal transparency.
- Stock‑flow adjustments (increases in debt that exceed the recorded deficit) signal underreported fiscal costs:
  - In 1980–2010, average stock‑flow adjustment in a sample of 163 countries was 2.6 percent of GDP; unexplained differences correlated with an index of fiscal transparency.
- Evidence from governments publishing alternative deficit measures:
  - U.S. example (1995–2010): the budget (mainly cash‑based) deficit underestimated long‑run costs as measured by the accrual measure by an average of 2 percent of GDP a year.
- Specific monetary amounts noted in examples:
  - France: €5.7 billion and €8.6 billion pension assumption payments (each cited as 0.5 percent of GDP).
  - Greece: €5.3 billion masked debt (2.3 percent of GDP).
  - Germany: €15.5 billion from securitization in 2005–06.
  - Arizona: $1 billion sale‑and‑leaseback effective borrowing (2010).
  - Ireland: government‑guaranteed debt of 19.7 percent of GDP at end‑2011 related to banking‑crisis entity.

### Countering accounting devices — measures and recommendations
- Strengthen headline measures:
  - Progressive adoption and improvement of accrual‑based standards to recognize economic value transfer when it occurs rather than when cash changes hands.
  - Statisticians must have resources and independence to update standards as new devices arise.
  - Use tools from private‑sector accounting to improve government accounting: independent standard‑setting, integrated financial statements (balance sheet, income statement, cash‑flow statement), detailed footnotes, independent audits stating whether statements present a “true and fair” view, and civil/criminal sanctions for fraudulent reporting.
- Present multiple and alternative indicators:
  - Both cash and accrual indicators should be considered because each can reveal different problems.
  - Use a suite of deficit indicators (cash balance, net operating balance, net lending/borrowing, overall balance, change in net worth) and prepare statistical financial statements for multiple definitions of government (central, general, nonfinancial public sector, public sector).
  - Table 4 (Australia, 2009–10, percent of GDP) example of multiple balance indicators:
    - Net operating balance: General government −2.9; Nonfinancial public sector −2.7; Public sector −3.2
    - Change in net worth: −0.4; −0.4; −0.4
    - Net lending/borrowing: −5.3; −6.4; −6.9
    - Cash balance: −5.1; −6.1; −6.4
- Produce and publish long‑term fiscal forecasts under current policy:
  - Forecast horizons should be long (perhaps 50 years) so that devices that push costs just beyond the forecast horizon are exposed.
  - U.S. summary of 75‑year long‑range projections (present values, 2010):
    - Receipts: Trillion dollars 175; Percent of 75‑year GDP 20.2
      - Social‑security payroll taxes 38 (4.4)
      - Medicare payroll taxes 12 (1.4)
      - Individual income taxes 91 (10.5)
      - Other 34 (4.0)
    - Primary spending: Trillion dollars 192; Percent of 75‑year GDP 22.1
      - Defense discretionary 31 (3.6)
      - Nondefense discretionary 31 (3.6)
      - Social security 49 (5.7)
      - Medicare A 17 (2.0)
      - Medicare B and D 20 (2.4)
      - Medicaid 24 (2.8)
      - Other mandatory 19 (2.2)
    - Receipts less primary spending: −16 (−1.9)
  - Standards for preparation of long‑term forecasts can improve reliability (IPSASB reference in source).
- Make supplementary information intelligible and influential:
  - Encourage analysts to examine alternative measures and to analyze their significance.
  - Consider independent, expert bodies with authority to analyze and publicize fiscal problems (examples: U.S. Congressional Budget Office; UK Office for Budget Responsibility).
  - Require production of tables generating new fiscal indicators alongside traditional ones (comprehensive balance sheets that present debts, contractual liabilities, noncontractual obligations, and corresponding rights).

### Conclusion
- Headline deficits can be reduced without improving public finances by accelerating revenue or deferring spending, creating a fiscal illusion.
- Two broad strategies to prevent illusions:
  - Ensure headline indicators are rigorously measured according to up‑to‑date accrual standards.
  - Present headline indicators alongside alternative measures and long‑term forecasts.
- Implementing these strategies requires more work for accountants, statisticians, and analysts and will increase complexity, but is necessary because fiscal performance and position are multidimensional and cannot be captured reliably by a single indicator.

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (sdn1202) — IMF PDF provided content.*

### REFERENCES

### _sdn1202 - REFERENCES

### References

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- U.S. Treasury, various years, Financial Report of the United States Government, available at http://www.fms.treas.gov/fr/backissues.html.
- van Wijk, Hans, 2001, Bridging the Fault Lines: The Early Years of the Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payments Statistics. Available via the Internet at: http://www.cmfb.org/organisation/history.htm.
- von Hagen, J., 1991, “A Note on the Empirical Effectiveness of Formal Fiscal Restraints,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp 199‒210.

*Source: _sdn1202 - REFERENCES*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/_sdn1202.pdf_