## Box 1. Virement Regimes in OECD Countries; Box 5. Virements in South Africa

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### Overview of OECD virement practices
- Virements are completely banned in Finland and Sweden; all changes to the budget require parliamentary approval obtained through supplementary appropriations.
- Virements are typically not allowed between ministries, but are sometimes permitted in the case of inter-ministerial appropriations (e.g., inter-ministerial missions in France).
- Virements between programs are typically allowed but with restrictions:
  - Slovenia: line ministries may move funds between programs within their purview subject to a limit of 10 percent of the original allocation, provided the virement does not affect salary provisions.
  - Austria, Australia: a few countries allow unrestricted virements between programs.
- Virements between certain economic categories are often restricted:
  - France: virements into wages are not allowed.
  - United Kingdom: virements are not allowed between current and capital expenditure.
- Controls on virement size:
  - Ceilings specified in percentage or absolute terms; Switzerland uses a combination of the two.
  - Canada, Ireland: do not limit size of virements but may have rules on information provided to the legislature in case a threshold is exceeded (Mexico).
- Decision authority for virements can be exercised by:
  - Cabinet (e.g., France, New Zealand).
  - Ministry of Finance (e.g., Austria for virements between programs within budget chapters, Australia for virements over AUD 5 million, United Kingdom for virements from program to administration subheads).
  - Line ministries (e.g., Austria for virements between subprograms, Australia for virements under AUD 5 million, United Kingdom for virements between program subheads/sections).
  - Budget holders or public administration (e.g., Germany, Turkey).
- Mexico: virements resulting in adjustments in excess of 5 percent of the original budget of an entity are reported to the Congress. The Committee on Budget and Public Accounts of the House of Representatives may issue opinion on such adjustments.

### Design considerations for virement rules
- Flexibility:
  - Virements bring flexibility in budget management and enable budget managers to cater to new or increased funding pressures that arise during the budget year.
- Accountability:
  - Flexibility must be balanced with accountability and conformity with the government’s legislative mandate. Extensive changes to approved appropriations affect the budget’s credibility, undermine budget managers’ accountability to parliament, and reduce the predictability of government expenditure for the ultimate beneficiaries.
- Budget credibility:
  - Virement powers should not be used as a substitute for the preparation of taught and realistic initial budgets. Repeated recourse to uncontrolled and excessive virements can, over the longer term, limit a government’s ability to strategically allocate its resources and undermine incentives for budget-holders to produce credible budgets.
- Transparency:
  - Changes to the appropriations authorized by parliament should be disclosed to the legislature in a timely and comprehensible manner. If virements are frequent and extensive, the executive should regularly summarize the net impact of all virements on overall budget allocations rather than presenting individual changes piecemeal.
- Administrative costs:
  - The transaction costs of seeking legislative approval for all budgetary changes can be quite high. This argues for not setting threshold limits on executive virement power too low.

### Country-specific factors that should inform virement regimes
- Structure and specificity of budgetary appropriations:
  - Countries with fewer, more aggregated appropriations have less need to transfer funds between appropriations. Countries with very detailed, line-item budgets are more likely to need extensive virements and virement rules.
- Stage of development of the budgetary system:
  - A sophisticated budgetary costing process and a robust budget execution system should reduce the need for virements by accurately estimating the cost of government activities and making available necessary provisions.
- Relationship between the legislature and the executive:
  - The allocation of fiscal responsibility between parliament and government influences delegation of in-year budgetary adjustment powers.
  - Examples of legal frameworks influencing this relationship: Germany and USA (written constitution); Austria, France, Italy (organic or quasi-constitutional legislation); Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom (primary legislation). Finland and Sweden: any changes to the budget may have to be authorized by the legislature through a supplementary budget.
- Relationship between the ministry of finance and line ministries:
  - More centralized expenditure control systems tend to retain virement authority within the ministry of finance.
  - More decentralized systems tend to devolve some virement powers to line ministries, although critical controls (such as virements between current and capital expenditure) may still be retained by the ministry of finance.

### Practical design choices and common rules
- Virements between ministries or major policy areas:
  - Typically prohibited or severely restricted because such reallocations would fundamentally alter the budget composition approved by the legislature and risk undermining ministerial accountability.
- Virements between programs:
  - Often allowed with restrictions on size and nature of activity.
  - France: virements allowed up to 2 percent of the approved budget for a program, with some restrictions on virements between economic categories.
  - New Zealand: allows virements between outputs within a program-based vote, subject to a limit of 5 percent of the original appropriation.
- Virements between economic categories of expenditure:
  - Permissive in some cases but commonly subject to limits to safeguard fiscal, economic, or expenditure policy objectives.
  - Germany: virements between personnel, non-personnel administrative, and capital expenditure are limited to 20 percent of the original provision.
  - Virements from capital to recurrent expenditure are often prohibited or strictly limited (United Kingdom example during the period of the “golden rule”).
- Common prohibitions within recurrent expenditure:
  - Virement into wages—particularly those that increase workforce and entail ongoing costs—are often restricted or prohibited. France, Greece: salary provisions regulated by parliamentary authority and cannot be increased.
  - Virements into new leases, rental, and contractual agreements that create liabilities in future years are typically restricted.
  - Virements into new programs, projects, or activities not authorized by parliament in the original budget are typically prohibited.
- Virements from items that are statutory obligations or non-discretionary are typically prohibited. These include:
  - Social security benefits and other entitlements to households.
  - Grants or transfers to local governments.
  - Interest payments on government debt.

### Country examples (selected rules and limits)
- Slovenia: limit of 10 percent of the original allocation for line ministries moving funds between programs, provided virement does not affect salary provisions.
- France:
  - Virements between programs within a ministry are subject to a limit of 2 percent of the original allocation under the source program.
  - Within a program, freedom to move funds between subprograms and economic categories except personnel expenditure; virements from personnel to other categories permitted but not vice versa.
- New Zealand:
  - Virements across Votes are prohibited.
  - Within a Vote, virements are allowed only within the appropriation class “output expenses” from one output to another up to a limit of 5 percent of the original allocation under the “receiving” output.
  - Within an output there is no restriction on virement between economic categories, but virements between expenses (current), capital, grants, subsidies, and other transfer payments are prohibited.
- United Kingdom:
  - Departments may vire from DEL to AME but not the other way; from resource (current) to capital but not the other way; from administration to program but not the other way; from Voted to non-Voted (automatic) appropriations but not the other way.
  - Virements can only cover activities clearly authorized in the budget and cannot be undertaken where: (i) the amount involved is significant in relation to the budget as a whole; (ii) the spending might be novel or contentious to Parliament; (iii) it would imply significant liabilities for further spending in future years; (iv) the provision is from a ring-fenced item or Departmental Unallocated Provision; or (v) the virement would lead to an additional cash requirement.
- Australia:
  - Ministry of Finance approves virements over AUD 5 million; line ministries approve viraants under AUD 5 million.
- Germany:
  - Virements between personnel, non-personnel administrative, and capital expenditure are limited to 20 percent of the original provision.
- Mexico:
  - Virements resulting in adjustments in excess of 5 percent of the original budget of an entity are reported to the Congress; the Committee on Budget and Public Accounts of the House of Representatives may issue opinion on such adjustments.

### South Africa — Budget structure and basic virement rule
- Appropriations are approved by ministry or agency (Votes) and are broken down into programs, subprograms, and six broad economic categories: employee compensation, goods and services, other current payments, transfers and subsidies, capital assets, and financial assets.
- Virements are permitted within a Vote from one program to another, subject to a limit of 8 percent of the original allocation under the “giving” program.

### Specific virement restrictions in South Africa
- Virements to increase provisions for employee compensation, transfers, and subsidies require prior Treasury approval.
- Virements are prohibited:
  - (i) across Votes;
  - (ii) from an item earmarked in the budget as appropriated for a stated purpose;
  - (iii) from amounts appropriated for transfer to institutions;
  - (iv) from capital to current expenditure.
- Except for these restrictions, virements within a program—between subprograms and across economic categories—are unrestricted.
- Source of rules: Public Finance Management Act No. 1 of 1999; Treasury Regulations.

### Virements between line items and contingency reserves (contextual and reporting)
- Virements between individual line items within economic categories are typically allowed, with country-specific exceptions to protect critical items (examples in source: Mauritius, India).
- Ring-fenced or special allocations may be protected from alteration (examples in source: United Kingdom, Mauritius).
- Some countries allow virements from amounts appropriated for transfer payments to a specific institution to other institutions provided funds are applied to the same purpose (example in source: South Africa).
- Virements typically prohibited from or to automatic/“standing” appropriations (debt service, subscriptions, budgets of constitutional entities).
- Transfer of funds from a centrally managed contingency reserve to a ministry or agency responsible for responding to the contingency can be treated and reported as a virement; reporting such transfers as virements enhances transparency and accountability compared with direct expenditure from reserves.

### Authorization, timing, and reporting of virements (South Africa and general practices)
- Virement procedures should specify:
  - When virements can be undertaken.
  - Who has the authority to propose and approve virements.
  - How virements should be recorded and reported to the legislature.
- Timing controls:
  - Some countries prohibit virements in the first few months of the financial year or require finance ministry approval for such virements.
  - Cut-off dates are sometimes set one month or one quarter before the end of the financial year; stricter controls or prohibitions in the last month discourage end-of-year “soaking up” of excess appropriations.
- Authority to effect virements:
  - Examples: cabinet (New Zealand, France, United Kingdom), finance ministry (Australia for larger amounts, Korea), line ministries (Australia for smaller amounts, Austria, Turkey).
  - Typical degrees of approval by level:
    - Line ministries: complete authority to transfer funds between line items, except ring-fenced items.
    - Finance ministry concurrence: usually required for virement between economic categories or programs (except where prohibited).
    - Cabinet approval: often required for virements between ministries or policy areas.
    - Parliament approval: required for changes that exceed statutory limits on executive discretion.

### Limits on total volume (OECD survey statistics)
- Of 31 countries surveyed in an OECD survey:
  - 9 (29 percent) allow line ministries to reallocate funds within their responsibility without any limitation on the size of such reallocations.
  - 17 (55 percent) allow reallocation subject to pre-specified thresholds that usually range from 5 percent to 20 percent of the original allocation.
  - 8 (26 percent) require an ex-ante approval by the legislature for any movement of resources between appropriations.

### Requesting, recording, and audit trail (administrative practices)
- Virement proposals should:
  - Confirm sufficient savings of non-committed expenditure are available in the source appropriation.
  - Establish that the “giving” budget holder(s) will not enter into commitments that would require the reallocated funds.
  - Document reasons for savings and motivation for transfer.
- Administrative practices:
  - Issue each virement as a specific order conveying amounts transferred from and to specific budget items.
  - Record virement orders in the government’s financial management information system.
  - Report virements to the legislature on at least a quarterly basis.
  - Number virement orders serially to ensure auditable tracking.
  - Reflect the effect of virements in detailed cash plans where ministries/agencies prepare them.

### Appendix II — South Africa: illustrative reporting format and examples (selected figures preserved)
- Reporting columns: FROM: (Programme by economic classification; Motivation; R thousand) → TO: (Programme by economic classification; Motivation; R thousand).
- Selected programme examples (values preserved exactly as in source):
  - Programme 1 (12,656) → Programme 1 12,656
    - FROM: Compensation of employees — Non-critical posts at head office were not filled (12,656)
    - TO: Goods and services — Machinery and equipment; Upgrading of computer equipment; Office equipment such as photocopiers 12,545; 111
    - Shifts within the programme as a percentage of the programme budget 0.1%
    - Virements to other programmes as a percentage of the programme budget 0%
  - Programme 2 (130,000) → Programme 2 20,000
    - FROM: Goods and services — Funds earmarked for the new passport system were reclassified (130,000)
    - TO: Machinery and equipment — Network infrastructure and hardware 20,000
    - TO: Departmental agencies and accounts — Government Printing Works for new passport system 110,000
    - Shifts within the programme as a percentage of the programme budget 0.1%
    - Virements to other programmes as a percentage of the programme budget 0.6%
  - Programme 3 (1,233,430) → Programme 2 1,233,430
    - FROM: Software and other intangible assets — Funds earmarked for HANIS Smart ID Card were reclassified (1,213,430) (20,000)
    - TO: Goods and services — Smart ID card 1,205,430; New client contact centre 8,000; New passport system 20,000
    - Shifts within the programme as a percentage of the programme budget 0%
    - Virements to other programmes as a percentage of the programme budget 2
    - Overall percentage shown: 8.3%
  - Total (1,376,086) 1,376,086
- Footnotes preserved from source:
  - 1 National Treasury approval has been obtained.
  - 2 Only the legislature may approve this virement in terms of the Public Finance Management Act, (Act 1 of 1999).
  - 7 Source: Government of South Africa, 2015, “Technical Guidelines for the Preparation of Adjusted Estimates of National Expenditure.”

*Source: Box 1. Virement Regimes in OECD Countries; Box 5. Virements in South Africa, Technical Notes and Manuals 16/04 | 2016.*

### Box 1. Virement Regimes in OECD Countries

### Box 1. Virement Regimes in OECD Countries

### Overview of OECD virement practices
- Virements are completely banned in Finland and Sweden; all changes to the budget require parliamentary approval obtained through supplementary appropriations.
- Virements are typically not allowed between ministries, but are sometimes permitted in the case of inter-ministerial appropriations (e.g., inter-ministerial missions in France).
- Virements between programs are typically allowed but with restrictions:
  - In Slovenia line ministries have the power to move funds between programs within their purview subject to a limit of 10 percent of the original allocation, with the condition that the virement does not affect salary provisions.
  - A few countries (e.g., Austria, Australia) allow unrestricted virements between programs.
- Virements between certain economic categories are often restricted:
  - In France virements into wages are not allowed.
  - In the United Kingdom virements are not allowed between current and capital expenditure.
- Controls on virement size:
  - Ceilings can be specified in percentage or absolute terms; some countries (Switzerland) use a combination of the two.
  - A few countries (Canada, Ireland) do not limit size of virements but may have rules regarding the information provided to the legislature in case a certain threshold is exceeded (Mexico).
- Decision authority for virements can be exercised by:
  - Cabinet (e.g., France, New Zealand).
  - Ministry of Finance (e.g., Austria for virements between programs within budget chapters, Australia for virements over AUD 5 million, United Kingdom for virements from program to administration subheads).
  - Line ministries (e.g., Austria for virements between subprograms, Australia for virements under AUD 5 million, United Kingdom for virements between program subheads/sections).
  - Budget holders or public administration (e.g., Germany, Turkey).
- Mexico: virements resulting in adjustments in excess of 5 percent of the original budget of an entity are reported to the Congress. The Committee on Budget and Public Accounts of the House of Representatives may issue opinion on such adjustments.

### Design considerations for virement rules
- Flexibility:
  - Virements bring flexibility in budget management and enable budget managers to cater to new or increased funding pressures that arise during the budget year.
- Accountability:
  - Flexibility must be balanced with accountability and conformity with the government’s legislative mandate. Extensive changes to approved appropriations affect the budget’s credibility, undermine budget managers’ accountability to parliament, and reduce the predictability of government expenditure for the ultimate beneficiaries.
- Budget credibility:
  - Virement powers should not be used as a substitute for the preparation of taught and realistic initial budgets. Repeated recourse to uncontrolled and excessive virements can, over the longer term, limit a government’s ability to strategically allocate its resources and undermine incentives for budget-holders to produce credible budgets.
- Transparency:
  - Changes to the appropriations authorized by parliament should be disclosed to the legislature in a timely and comprehensible manner. If such virements are frequent and extensive, the executive should regularly summarize the net impact of all virements on the overall budget allocations rather than presenting individual changes in a piecemeal manner.
- Administrative costs:
  - The transaction costs of seeking legislative approval for all budgetary changes can be quite high. This argues for not setting the threshold limits on the executive power for virements too low.

### Country-specific factors that should inform virement regimes
- Structure and specificity of budgetary appropriations:
  - Countries with fewer, more aggregated appropriations have less need to transfer funds between appropriations. Countries with very detailed, line-item budgets are more likely to need extensive virements and virement rules.
- Stage of development of the budgetary system:
  - A sophisticated budgetary costing process and a robust budget execution system should reduce the need for virements by accurately estimating the cost of government activities in the coming year and making available the necessary provisions in the budget.
- Relationship between the legislature and the executive:
  - The allocation of fiscal responsibility between parliament and government influences the extent to which powers are delegated to the executive to make in-year budgetary adjustments or retained by the legislature.
  - Examples: Germany and USA (written constitution); Austria, France, Italy (organic or quasi-constitutional legislation); Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom (primary legislation). In extreme cases (Finland, Sweden) any changes to the budget may have to be authorized by the legislature through a supplementary budget.
- Relationship between the ministry of finance and line ministries:
  - More centralized expenditure control systems tend to retain virement authority within the ministry of finance.
  - More decentralized systems tend to devolve some virement powers to line ministries, although critical controls (such as virements between current and capital expenditure) may still be retained by the ministry of finance.

### Practical design choices and common rules
- Virements between ministries or major policy areas:
  - Typically prohibited or severely restricted because such reallocations would fundamentally alter the composition of the budget approved by the legislature and risk undermining ministerial accountability.
- Virements between programs:
  - Often allowed with restrictions on size and nature of activity.
  - France: virements allowed up to a limit of 2 percent of the approved budget for a program, with some restrictions on virements between economic categories (see Box 2).
  - New Zealand: allows virements between outputs within a program-based vote, subject to a limit of 5 percent of the original appropriation (see Box 3).
- Virements between economic categories of expenditure:
  - Permissive in some cases but commonly subject to limits to safeguard fiscal, economic, or expenditure policy objectives.
  - Germany: virements between personnel, non-personnel administrative, and capital expenditure are limited to 20 percent of the original provision.
  - Virements from capital to recurrent expenditure are often prohibited or strictly limited (United Kingdom example during the period of the “golden rule”).
- Common prohibitions within recurrent expenditure:
  - Virement into wages—particularly those that increase workforce and entail ongoing costs—are often restricted or prohibited. In some countries (France, Greece) salary provisions are regulated by parliamentary authority and cannot be increased.
  - Virements into new leases, rental, and contractual agreements that create liabilities in future years are typically restricted.
  - Virements into new programs, projects, or activities not authorized by parliament in the original budget are typically prohibited.
- Virements from items that are statutory obligations or non-discretionary are typically prohibited. These include:
  - Social security benefits and other entitlement to households.
  - Grants or transfers to local governments.
  - Interest payments on government debt.

### Country examples (selected rules and limits)
- Slovenia: limit of 10 percent of the original allocation for line ministries moving funds between programs, provided virement does not affect salary provisions.
- France:
  - Virements between programs within a ministry are subject to a limit of 2 percent of the original allocation under the source program.
  - Within a program, freedom to move funds between subprograms and economic categories except personnel expenditure; virements from personnel to other categories permitted but not vice versa.
- New Zealand:
  - Virements across Votes are prohibited.
  - Within a Vote, virements are allowed only within the appropriation class “output expenses” from one output to another up to a limit of 5 percent of the original allocation under the “receiving” output.
  - Within an output there is no restriction on virement between economic categories, but virements between expenses (current), capital, grants, subsidies, and other transfer payments are prohibited.
- United Kingdom:
  - Departments may vire from DEL to AME but not the other way; from resource (current) to capital but not the other way; from administration to program but not the other way; from Voted to non-Voted (automatic) appropriations but not the other way.
  - Virements can only cover activities clearly authorized in the budget and cannot be undertaken where: (i) the amount involved is significant in relation to the budget as a whole; (ii) the spending might be novel or contentious to Parliament; (iii) it would imply significant liabilities for further spending in future years; (iv) the provision is from a ring-fenced item or Departmental Unallocated Provision; or (v) the virement would lead to an additional cash requirement.
- Australia:
  - Ministry of Finance approves virements over AUD 5 million; line ministries approve viraants under AUD 5 million.
- Germany:
  - Virements between personnel, non-personnel administrative, and capital expenditure are limited to 20 percent of the original provision.
- Mexico:
  - Virements resulting in adjustments in excess of 5 percent of the original budget of an entity are reported to the Congress; the Committee on Budget and Public Accounts of the House of Representatives may issue opinion on such adjustments.

*Source: Box 1. Virement Regimes in OECD Countries, Technical Notes and Manuals 16/04 | 2016.*

### Box 5. Virements in South Africa

### Box 5. Virements in South Africa

### Budget structure and basic virement rule
- Appropriations are approved by ministry or agency (called Votes) and are broken down into programs, subprograms, and six broad economic categories: employee compensation, goods and services, other current payments, transfers and subsidies, capital assets, and financial assets.
- Virements are permitted within a Vote from one program to another, subject to a limit of 8 percent of the original allocation under the “giving” program.

### Specific virement restrictions in South Africa
- Virements to increase provisions for employee compensation, transfers, and subsidies require prior Treasury approval.
- Virements are prohibited:
  - (i) across Votes;
  - (ii) from an item earmarked in the budget as appropriated for a stated purpose;
  - (iii) from amounts appropriated for transfer to institutions;
  - (iv) from capital to current expenditure.
- Except for these restrictions, virements within a program—between subprograms and across economic categories—are unrestricted.
- Source of rules: Public Finance Management Act No. 1 of 1999; Treasury Regulations.

### Virements between line items and other country practices (contextual)
- Virements between individual line items within economic categories are typically allowed, with country-specific exceptions to protect critical items (examples in source: Mauritius, India).
- Ring-fenced or special allocations may be protected from alteration (examples in source: United Kingdom, Mauritius).
- Some countries allow virements from amounts appropriated for transfer payments to a specific institution to other institutions provided funds are applied to the same purpose (example in source: South Africa).
- Virements typically prohibited from or to automatic/“standing” appropriations (debt service, subscriptions, budgets of constitutional entities).

### Virements and contingency reserves
- Transfer of funds from a centrally managed contingency reserve to a ministry or agency responsible for responding to the contingency can be treated and reported as a virement.
- Reporting such transfers as virements enhances transparency and accountability compared with direct expenditure from reserves.

### Authorization, timing, and reporting of virements
- Virement procedures should specify:
  - When virements can be undertaken.
  - Who has the authority to propose and approve virements.
  - How virements should be recorded and reported to the legislature.
- Timing controls:
  - Some countries prohibit virements in the first few months of the financial year or require finance ministry approval for such virements.
  - Cut-off dates are sometimes set one month or one quarter before the end of the financial year; stricter controls or prohibitions in the last month discourage end-of-year “soaking up” of excess appropriations.
- Authority to effect virements:
  - Examples of approving authorities: cabinet (New Zealand, France, United Kingdom), finance ministry (Australia for larger amounts, Korea), line ministries themselves (Australia for smaller amounts, Austria, Turkey).
  - Typical degrees of approval by level:
    - Line ministries: complete authority to transfer funds between line items, except ring-fenced items.
    - Finance ministry concurrence: usually required for virement between economic categories or programs (except where prohibited).
    - Cabinet approval: often required for virements between ministries or policy areas.
    - Parliament approval: required for changes that exceed statutory limits on executive discretion.
- Limits on total volume:
  - Of 31 countries surveyed in an OECD survey:
    - 9 (29 percent) allow line ministries to reallocate funds within their responsibility without any limitation on the size of such reallocations.
    - 17 (55 percent) allow reallocation subject to pre-specified thresholds that usually range from 5 percent to 20 percent of the original allocation.
    - 8 (26 percent) require an ex-ante approval by the legislature for any movement of resources between appropriations.
  - Chart indicators in source material show common approval requirements include: MoF approval, need ex-ante approval of legislature, need ex-post approval of legislature, need other approvals.

### Requesting, recording, and audit trail
- Virement proposals should:
  - Confirm sufficient savings of non-committed expenditure are available in the source appropriation.
  - Establish that the “giving” budget holder(s) will not enter into commitments that would require the reallocated funds.
  - Document reasons for savings and motivation for transfer.
- Administrative practices:
  - Issue each virement as a specific order conveying amounts transferred from and to specific budget items.
  - Record virement orders in the government’s financial management information system.
  - Report virements to the legislature on at least a quarterly basis.
  - Number virement orders serially to ensure auditable tracking.
  - Reflect the effect of virements in detailed cash plans where ministries/agencies prepare them.

### Appendix II — South Africa: illustrative reporting format and examples (selected figures preserved)
- Reporting columns: FROM: (Programme by economic classification; Motivation; R thousand) → TO: (Programme by economic classification; Motivation; R thousand).
- Selected programme examples (values preserved exactly as in source):
  - Programme 1 (12,656) → Programme 1 12,656
    - FROM: Compensation of employees — Non-critical posts at head office were not filled (12,656)
    - TO: Goods and services — Machinery and equipment; Upgrading of computer equipment; Office equipment such as photocopiers 12,545; 111
    - Shifts within the programme as a percentage of the programme budget 0.1%
    - Virements to other programmes as a percentage of the programme budget 0%
  - Programme 2 (130,000) → Programme 2 20,000
    - FROM: Goods and services — Funds earmarked for the new passport system were reclassified (130,000)
    - TO: Machinery and equipment — Network infrastructure and hardware 20,000
    - TO: Departmental agencies and accounts — Government Printing Works for new passport system 110,000
    - Shifts within the programme as a percentage of the programme budget 0.1%
    - Virements to other programmes as a percentage of the programme budget 0.6%
  - Programme 3 (1,233,430) → Programme 2 1,233,430
    - FROM: Software and other intangible assets — Funds earmarked for HANIS Smart ID Card were reclassified (1,213,430) (20,000)
    - TO: Goods and services — Smart ID card 1,205,430; New client contact centre 8,000; New passport system 20,000
    - Shifts within the programme as a percentage of the programme budget 0%
    - Virements to other programmes as a percentage of the programme budget 2
    - Overall percentage shown: 8.3%
  - Total (1,376,086) 1,376,086
- Footnotes preserved from source:
  - 1 National Treasury approval has been obtained.
  - 2 Only the legislature may approve this virement in terms of the Public Finance Management Act, (Act 1 of 1999).
  - 7 Source: Government of South Africa, 2015, “Technical Guidelines for the Preparation of Adjusted Estimates of National Expenditure.”

*Source: Box 5. Virements in South Africa, Technical Notes and Manuals 16/04 | 2016*

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