## _wp03144

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### Key References Listed
- Rotenberg, J. J., and M. Woodford, 1997, “An Optimization-Based Econometric Framework for the Calculation of Monetary Policy,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Vol. 12, pp. 297-346.
- Schellekens, P., 2002, “Caution and Conservatism in the Making of Monetary Policy,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 34, pp. 160-77.
- Svensson, L.E.O., 1997, “Optimal Inflation Target, ‘Conservative’ Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts,” American Economic Review, Vol. 87, pp. 98-114.
- Vickers, J., 1998, “Inflation Targeting in Practice: The UK Experience,” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 38, pp. 368-75.
- Waller, C.J., and C.E. Walsh, 1996, “Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths,” American Economic Review, Vol. 86, pp. 1139-53.
- Walsh, C.E., 1998, Monetary Theory and Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Walsh, C.E., 1995, “Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers,” American Economic Review, Vol. 85, pp. 150-67.
- Wilson, J.Q., 1989, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, Basic Books, New York.
- Woodford, M., 2003, Interest and Prices (unpublished; Princeton University).

### Thematic Grouping of Sources
- Monetary policy design and calculation
  - Rotenberg and Woodford, 1997
  - Woodford, 2003
- Central bank incentives, contracts, and conservatism
  - Svensson, 1997
  - Walsh, 1995
  - Schellekens, 2002
- Central-bank independence and institutional design
  - Waller and Walsh, 1996
  - Wilson, 1989
- Inflation targeting practice and country experience
  - Vickers, 1998
- Textbook treatment and synthesis
  - Walsh, 1998

### Implications for Policy and Analysis (as indicated by titles)
- Optimization and econometric frameworks are central to calculating monetary policy rules (Rotenberg and Woodford, 1997).
- Consideration of caution and conservatism in decision-making influences monetary-policy design (Schellekens, 2002).
- Optimal inflation targets, conservative central-bank behavior, and contract design are linked (Svensson, 1997; Walsh, 1995).
- Practical experience with inflation targeting offers lessons for implementation (Vickers, 1998).
- Institutional features such as independence and term lengths affect economic behavior and central-bank performance (Waller and Walsh, 1996; Wilson, 1989).
- Comprehensive treatments of monetary theory and policy provide synthesis and tools for analysis (Walsh, 1998; Woodford, 2003).

*Source: _wp03144*

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