## _wp03217

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### Introduction and objectives
- Mongolia transitioned from a centrally planned to a market-based economy beginning in the early 1990s after being closely linked to the Soviet Union from the early 1920s to the late 1980s.
- Paper objective: address three questions:
  - (i) What were Mongolia’s sources of growth before and during transition?
  - (ii) How does Mongolia’s growth and recovery compare with those of other transition economies?
  - (iii) What explains differences in Mongolia’s performance relative to other transition economies?

### Stylized facts and main findings
- From the transition literature (as summarized):
  - Reforms introduced early in transition were typically followed by a temporary period of output declines.
  - Initial conditions are important for the speed of recovery; overindustrialization during the socialist regime may hinder transition.
  - Traditional factor inputs appear to have had a limited role in explaining growth over time and across countries for transition economies; econometric studies found no strong link between the level of aggregate investment and the strength of recovery from the fall in output recorded in the early years of transition.
  - Conclusion drawn from literature: efficiency gains are the main source of growth during the recovery phase of transition, with good institutions and sound economic policies playing an important supportive role.
- Main findings for Mongolia:
  - Mongolia suffered great output losses at the outset of its transition.
  - Subsequently, Mongolia benefited from efficiency gains following market reforms.
  - Mongolia’s transition was relatively smooth compared with other transition economies, likely reflecting the combined effects of:
    - a relatively underindustrialized economy prior to transition,
    - a peaceful and relatively stable social and political environment,
    - sound economic policies.

### Overview of Mongolia’s transition experience (Section V)
- Real GDP and sectoral composition:
  - Real GDP bottomed out in 1993 and began to recover thereafter.
  - By 2000–01, real GDP had reverted to the level prior to the transition.
  - Sectoral developments (1995–2001; data prior to 1995 not available or not reliable):
    - Primary sector (livestock husbandry and crop production) was a principal engine of the quick recovery during the second half of the 1990s, but its share in GDP has been declining since 1999.
    - Tertiary sector (dominated by wholesale and retail trade, transport and communication) grew steeply and by the late 1990s surpassed agriculture as the largest sector.
    - Secondary sector (dominated by mining, manufacturing, and construction) was limited during the 1990s but showed signs of revival since 2000.
- Expenditure composition and vulnerabilities:
  - Investment ratio has been relatively stable at about 30 percent of GDP since the mid-1990s.
  - Consumption share has been growing, accompanied by a widening trade deficit in recent years.
  - Heavy dependence on exports of a few key commodities—including copper, gold and cashmere—creates vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations and natural disasters.
  - The 2000–01 episode: extreme drought, unusually harsh winters, and an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease severely reduced herd stock and depressed GDP growth.
- Inflation, fiscal policy, and public debt:
  - Inflation (annual percent change in consumer prices) peaked at more than 250 percent in 1993 and then fell rapidly, reaching the single-digit range by 2000.
  - Rapid disinflation attributed to consistent tightening of monetary conditions, early liberalization of domestic prices, and establishment of an open exchange and trade system.
  - Post-1991 expansion of public expenditures and wide budget deficits; government borrowing from the domestic banking system was progressively reduced as deficits were largely financed through concessional foreign loans.
  - Public debt rose sharply, reaching the equivalent of 100 percent of GDP by 1999.
  - The yet-to-be settled stock of pre-1991 transferable ruble debt to Russia was equivalent to about 10 times Mongolia’s GDP as of 2001.
  - Implication: a more disciplined fiscal policy is necessary to ensure enduring macroeconomic stability.
- Labor market and social adjustment:
  - Mongolia population around 2.4 million (Appendix reference).
  - As of 2001, around 58 percent of the population was in the labor force, of which about 62 percent was economically active.
  - Total employment fell by a relatively modest 5½ percent during the early 1990s and recovered steadily thereafter, exceeding its pre-transition level by 1999.
  - Unemployment rate estimated about 4½ percent of the economically active population as of 2001.
  - Primary sector accounted for the largest share of the increase in employment since the mid-1990s; tertiary sector employment also increased rapidly.
  - Early privatization of herds and of small- and medium-sized enterprises contributed to reallocation of labor from declining manufacturing/state industries into herding, trading, and services.

### Growth accounting: methodology and data
- Production function and decomposition:
  - Cobb-Douglas production function used: Yt = At Kt^α (q_t L_t)^(1−α).
  - Growth-accounting equation: dY/Y = dA/A + α dK/K + (1−α) dL/L + (1−α) dq/q.
  - Physical capital K calculated by perpetual inventory method: K_{t+1} = I_t + (1−δ) K_t (δ is depreciation rate).
- Key parameter and data assumptions:
  - Depreciation rate (benchmark) assumed to be 6 percent.
  - Initial capital stock assumed zero in 1959.
  - Human capital index q measured by average number of years of schooling of population aged 15 or above (data from Living Standards Survey, 1998). Only two survey years (1989 and 1998); other years assumed a constant annual growth rate in human capital.
  - Investment deflator approximated by: investment deflator = w*(construction investment deflator) + (1−w)*(GDP deflator), where w is the share of construction in total investment.
  - Labor input approximated by total employment from NSO.
- Human capital composition (population aged 15 or above):
  - 1989 composition (In Percent): Uneducated (0 Year of Schooling) 9.4; Primary (4 Years of Schooling) 20.5; Incomplete Secondary (8 Years of Schooling) 33.9; Complete Secondary (10 Years of Schooling) 18.1; Special Education (10 Years of Schooling) 9.6; Tertiary (14-15 Years of Schooling) 8.5. Average Number of Years of Schooling: 7.5.
  - 1998 composition (In Percent): Uneducated 4.2; Primary 15.3; Incomplete Secondary 32.2; Complete Secondary 24.5; Special Education 12.3; Tertiary 11.5. Average Number of Years of Schooling: 8.5.
- Estimation of income share of capital α:
  - Regression equation used: ∆ ln y_t = γ + α ∆ ln k_t + ε_t.
  - Regression results (1980–99, Number of observations 20): Intercept = -0.008 (Standard Error 0.009, t = -0.95); α = 0.69 (Standard Error 0.18, t = 3.77). R-squared 0.43.
  - Comment: estimated α = 0.69; comparable empirical studies report average α around 0.53 (Senhadji (1999) sample of 88 countries) and α = 0.63 for China (Heytens and Zebregs (2000)).

### Growth accounting: results and sensitivity analysis
- Productivity trends:
  - Capital productivity (GDP/K) and labor productivity (GDP/L) bottomed out in 1992–93 and improved afterward.
  - By 1995, capital productivity had started to surpass its 1990 level.
  - Labor productivity as of 2001 was still slightly below the level of 1990.
- Decomposition of growth (Annual average contributions to output growth, in percent):
  - 1980–84: Annual Average Growth Rate of Output = 0.43; contributions — Capital 7.11; Employment 7.34; Education 0.50; TFP −1.17.
  - 1985–89: Annual Average Growth Rate of Output = 0.43; contributions — Capital 5.51; Employment 4.98; Education 2.08; TFP −1.98.
  - 1990–94: Annual Average Growth Rate of Output = −3.58; contributions — Capital −4.99; Employment −1.60; Education −0.24; TFP −3.58.
  - 1995–01: Annual Average Growth Rate of Output = 1.72; contributions — Capital 2.54; Employment −0.03; Education 0.42; TFP 1.72.
- Interpretation:
  - Before the transition, capital accumulation was the key engine of growth; its role diminished following market-oriented reforms.
  - Education and employment made limited contributions during the early transition years.
  - TFP was the dominant factor: negative in the 1980s and early transition (primary driver of the collapse in early 1990s), turning positive from the mid-1990s as stabilization and market foundations took hold—consistent with other transition economies where efficiency gains drive recovery.
- Sensitivity analysis (alternative assumptions):
  - A. Alternative initial capital stock (investment/GDP ratio equals 38 percent during 1949–59): results only slightly different from benchmark; main conclusions unchanged.
  - B. Depreciation rate = 4 percent: reported alternative contribution outcomes (1980–84; 1985–89; 1990–94; 1995–2001) show changes in TFP levels but preserve qualitative conclusions.
  - C. Depreciation rate = 10 percent: alternative contribution outcomes reported; main results remain robust.
  - Conclusion: main results are robust to different assumptions about the initial capital stock and depreciation rate.

### Comparison with other transition economies
- Relative performance (1990–2001):
  - Mongolia’s output rose by 0.7 percent during 1990–2001.
  - The Baltics and the CIS suffered cumulative output losses averaging 23.8 percent and 34.2 percent, respectively, during 1990–2001.
  - Mongolia recorded only three years of output decline between 1990 and 2001, compared with four to six years in most of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics, and five to eight years in most of the CIS.
- Comparative patterns and contributors:
  - Mongolia’s output recovery was more sluggish than the best-performing Central and Eastern European countries but generally better than the Baltics, the CIS (except Uzbekistan), and the poorer performers of Central and Eastern Europe.
  - Possible contributing factors to relatively good performance:
    - Mongolia launched market reforms from a relatively rudimentary economic structure (less overindustrialization).
    - Early privatization measures and sectoral reallocation supported employment absorption and sectoral shifts.
    - Mongolia had one of the highest shares of the agricultural sector in GDP over the period 1990–2000 and was the poorest country in terms of PPP-based per capita income (Appendix evidence).
    - Mongolia is a fairly open economy with a high exports-plus-imports-to-GDP ratio and one of the least restrictive trade regimes (Appendix evidence).
    - Authorities implemented a firm monetary policy coupled with a flexible exchange rate system and promptly established an open exchange and trade system.

### Major conclusions and data caveats
- Major conclusions:
  - As in most former socialist countries, capital accumulation appears to have been the primary factor accounting for growth prior to the establishment of a market system, while efficiency gains became the main source of growth during the early stages of transition.
  - Mongolia experienced a transformational recession but its adjustment process has been smoother and less costly in terms of output loss than many former Soviet Union countries with similar geography and history.
  - Favorable economic and noneconomic initial conditions, early adoption of appropriate adjustment policies, and market-oriented reforms likely played key roles in supporting Mongolia’s prompt recovery.
- Data and measurement caveats:
  - Caution is required in interpreting results because of known weaknesses in the quality of national accounts and related data in transition economies.
  - Limitations of GDP statistics for transition economies mean the collapse in economic activity in CIS countries during the 1990s may be considerably overstated; particular features of Mongolia’s economy (for example, the importance of the agricultural sector) may have resulted in a more modest overstatement of the fall in output during the early 1990s, so actual differences in cumulative output performance between Mongolia and CIS countries may be somewhat smaller than suggested.

*Source: _wp03217 - Section V.*

### References .............................................................................................................

### _wp03217 - References .............................................................................................................

### Introduction and objectives
- Mongolia transitioned from a centrally planned to a market-based economy beginning in the early 1990s after being closely linked to the Soviet Union from the early 1920s to the late 1980s.
- Paper objective: address three questions:
  - (i) What were Mongolia’s sources of growth before and during transition?
  - (ii) How does Mongolia’s growth and recovery compare with those of other transition economies?
  - (iii) What explains differences in Mongolia’s performance relative to other transition economies?

### Stylized facts from the transition literature (as summarized in the source)
- Reforms introduced early in transition were typically followed by a temporary period of output declines.
- Initial conditions are important for the speed of recovery; in particular, overindustrialization during the socialist regime may hinder transition.
- Traditional factor inputs appear to have had a limited role in explaining growth over time and across countries for transition economies; econometric studies found no strong link between the level of aggregate investment and the strength of recovery from the fall in output recorded in the early years of transition.
- Conclusion drawn from literature: efficiency gains are the main source of growth during the recovery phase of transition, with good institutions and sound economic policies playing an important supportive role.

### Main findings for Mongolia (as stated in the source)
- Mongolia suffered great output losses at the outset of its transition.
- Subsequently, Mongolia benefited from efficiency gains following market reforms.
- Mongolia’s transition was relatively smooth compared with other transition economies, likely reflecting the combined effects of:
  - a relatively underindustrialized economy prior to transition,
  - a peaceful and relatively stable social and political environment,
  - sound economic policies.

### Analytical framework and paper structure
- The analysis of Mongolia’s growth is conducted within a basic growth accounting framework.
- Paper organization:
  - Section II: brief background discussion on Mongolia’s transition experience.
  - Section III: description of major sources of economic growth in Mongolia since the early 1980s within a growth accounting framework.
  - Section IV: discussion of Mongolia’s post-transition growth performance relative to other transition countries.
  - Main conclusions and caveats summarized subsequently.

### Listed empirical materials (tables and figures included in the source)
- Tables (by title): Composition of Population Aged 15 or Above by Educational Status; Regression Results for the Income Share of Capital; Growth Accounting; Growth Accounting Sensitivity Analysis; Appendix Tables including Population and Labor Statistics; Estimates of Real GDP and Factor Inputs, 1980–2001; GDP Performance in Transition Economies; Growth Performance and Location; Growth Performance and Share of Agriculture in GDP; Growth Performance and PPP-Based Per Capita Income Level; Growth Performance and Openness; Trade Restrictiveness Ratings and Average Tariffs, 1997–2001.
- Figures (by title): Real GDP, 1990–2001; Composition of Real GDP; Composition of GDP by Expenditure; Consumer Prices; Capital and Labor Productivity; Comparative GDP Performance in Transition Economies, 1990–2001.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/_wp03217.pdf*

### Section V.

### Section V.

### Overview of Mongolia’s transition experience
- Real GDP evolution:
  - Real GDP bottomed out in 1993 and began to recover thereafter.
  - By 2000–01, real GDP had reverted to the level prior to the transition.
- Sectoral composition (1995–2001; data prior to 1995 not available or not reliable):
  - Primary sector (livestock husbandry and crop production) was a principal engine of the quick recovery during the second half of the 1990s, but its share in GDP has been declining since 1999.
  - Tertiary sector (dominated by wholesale and retail trade, transport and communication) grew steeply and by the late 1990s surpassed agriculture as the largest sector.
  - Secondary sector (dominated by mining, manufacturing, and construction) was limited during the 1990s but showed signs of revival since 2000.
- Expenditure composition and vulnerabilities:
  - Investment ratio has been relatively stable at about 30 percent of GDP since the mid-1990s.
  - Consumption share has been growing, accompanied by a widening trade deficit in recent years.
  - Heavy dependence on exports of a few key commodities—including copper, gold and cashmere—creates vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations and natural disasters.
  - The 2000–01 episode: extreme drought, unusually harsh winters, and an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease severely reduced herd stock and depressed GDP growth.
- Inflation and stabilization:
  - Inflation (annual percent change in consumer prices) peaked at more than 250 percent in 1993 and then fell rapidly, reaching the single-digit range by 2000.
  - Rapid disinflation attributed to consistent tightening of monetary conditions, early liberalization of domestic prices, and establishment of an open exchange and trade system.
- Fiscal policy and public debt:
  - Post-1991 expansion of public expenditures and wide budget deficits; government borrowing from the domestic banking system was progressively reduced as deficits were largely financed through concessional foreign loans.
  - Public debt rose sharply, reaching the equivalent of 100 percent of GDP by 1999.
  - A looming burden: the yet-to-be settled stock of pre-1991 transferable ruble debt to Russia was equivalent to about 10 times Mongolia’s GDP as of 2001.
  - Implication: a more disciplined fiscal policy is necessary to ensure enduring macroeconomic stability.
- Labor market and social adjustment:
  - Mongolia population around 2.4 million (Appendix reference).
  - As of 2001, around 58 percent of the population was in the labor force, of which about 62 percent was economically active.
  - Total employment fell by a relatively modest 5½ percent during the early 1990s and recovered steadily thereafter, exceeding its pre-transition level by 1999.
  - Unemployment rate estimated about 4½ percent of the economically active population as of 2001.
  - Primary sector accounted for the largest share of the increase in employment since the mid-1990s; tertiary sector employment also increased rapidly.
  - Early privatization of herds and of small- and medium-sized enterprises contributed to reallocation of labor from declining manufacturing/state industries into herding, trading, and services.

### Growth accounting: methodology and data
- Production function and decomposition:
  - Cobb-Douglas production function used: Yt = At Kt^α (q_t L_t)^(1−α) (equation presented in text).
  - Growth-accounting equation derived: dY/Y = dA/A + α dK/K + (1−α) dL/L + (1−α) dq/q.
  - Physical capital K calculated by perpetual inventory method: K_{t+1} = I_t + (1−δ) K_t (δ is depreciation rate).
- Key parameter and assumptions:
  - Depreciation rate (benchmark) assumed to be 6 percent.
  - Initial capital stock assumed zero in 1959.
  - Human capital index q measured by average number of years of schooling of population aged 15 or above (data from Living Standards Survey, 1998). Only two survey years (1989 and 1998); other years assumed a constant annual growth rate in human capital.
  - Investment deflator approximated by: investment deflator = w*(construction investment deflator) + (1−w)*(GDP deflator), where w is the share of construction in total investment.
  - Labor input approximated by total employment from NSO.
- Human capital composition (population aged 15 or above, Table 1):
  - 1989 composition (In Percent): Uneducated (0 Year of Schooling) 9.4; Primary (4 Years of Schooling) 20.5; Incomplete Secondary (8 Years of Schooling) 33.9; Complete Secondary (10 Years of Schooling) 18.1; Special Education (10 Years of Schooling) 9.6; Tertiary (14-15 Years of Schooling) 8.5. Average Number of Years of Schooling: 7.5.
  - 1998 composition (In Percent): Uneducated 4.2; Primary 15.3; Incomplete Secondary 32.2; Complete Secondary 24.5; Special Education 12.3; Tertiary 11.5. Average Number of Years of Schooling: 8.5.
- Estimation of income share of capital α:
  - Regression approach based on transformed production function; regression equation: ∆ ln y_t = γ + α ∆ ln k_t + ε_t (equation (4) in text).
  - Regression results (Table 2): Intercept = -0.008 (Standard Error 0.009, t = -0.95); α = 0.69 (Standard Error 0.18, t = 3.77). Number of observations 20 (1980–99). R-squared 0.43.
  - Comment: estimated α = 0.69; comparable empirical studies report average α around 0.53 (Senhadji (1999) sample of 88 countries) and α = 0.63 for China (Heytens and Zebregs (2000)).

### Growth accounting: results and sensitivity analysis
- Productivity trends:
  - Capital productivity (GDP/K) and labor productivity (GDP/L) bottomed out in 1992–93 and improved afterward.
  - By 1995, capital productivity had started to surpass its 1990 level.
  - Labor productivity as of 2001 was still slightly below the level of 1990.
- Decomposition of growth (Table 3: Annual average contributions to output growth, in percent):
  - 1980–84: Annual Average Growth Rate of Output = 0.43; contributions — Capital 7.11; Employment 7.34; Education 0.50; TFP −1.17.
  - 1985–89: Annual Average Growth Rate of Output = 0.43; contributions — Capital 5.51; Employment 4.98; Education 2.08; TFP −1.98.
  - 1990–94: Annual Average Growth Rate of Output = −3.58; contributions — Capital −4.99; Employment −1.60; Education −0.24; TFP −3.58.
  - 1995–01: Annual Average Growth Rate of Output = 1.72; contributions — Capital 2.54; Employment −0.03; Education 0.42; TFP 1.72.
- Interpretation:
  - Before the transition, capital accumulation was the key engine of growth; its role diminished following market-oriented reforms.
  - Education and employment made limited contributions during the early transition years.
  - TFP was the dominant factor: negative in the 1980s and early transition (primary driver of the collapse in early 1990s), turning positive from the mid-1990s as stabilization and market foundations took hold—consistent with other transition economies where efficiency gains drive recovery.
- Sensitivity analysis (Table 4 variants; average annual percentage changes):
  - A. Assuming the investment/GDP ratio equals 38 percent during 1949–59 (alternative initial capital stock): results only slightly different from benchmark; main conclusions unchanged.
  - B. Assuming a depreciation rate of 4 percent:
    - 1980–84: Output growth 0.36; contributions — Capital 7.11; Employment 7.19; Education 0.42; TFP −0.87.
    - 1985–89: Output growth 0.36; contributions — Capital 5.51; Employment 5.08; Education 1.74; TFP −1.67.
    - 1990–94: Output growth 0.36; contributions — Capital −4.99; Employment −1.76; Education −0.20; TFP −3.38.
    - 1995–2001: Output growth 0.36; contributions — Capital 2.54; Employment −0.09; Education 0.42; TFP 1.92.
  - C. Assuming a depreciation rate of 10 percent:
    - 1980–84: Output growth 0.54; contributions — Capital 7.11; Employment 6.40; Education 0.63; TFP −0.47.
    - 1985–89: Output growth 0.54; contributions — Capital 5.51; Employment 4.02; Education 2.61; TFP −1.67.
    - 1990–94: Output growth 0.54; contributions — Capital −4.99; Employment −3.04; Education −0.30; TFP −2.19.
    - 1995–2001: Output growth 0.54; contributions — Capital 2.54; Employment −0.50; Education 0.53; TFP 1.97.
  - Conclusion: main results are robust to different assumptions about the initial capital stock and depreciation rate.

### Comparison with other transition economies
- Relative performance (1990–2001):
  - Mongolia’s output rose by 0.7 percent during 1990–2001.
  - The Baltics and the CIS suffered cumulative output losses averaging 23.8 percent and 34.2 percent, respectively, during 1990–2001.
  - Mongolia recorded only three years of output decline between 1990 and 2001, compared with four to six years in most of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics, and five to eight years in most of the CIS.
- Comparative patterns:
  - Mongolia’s output recovery was more sluggish than the best-performing Central and Eastern European countries but generally better than the Baltics, the CIS (except Uzbekistan), and the poorer performers of Central and Eastern Europe.
  - Mongolia’s pattern of growth and recovery resembles high-growth Central and Eastern European countries, despite different geography and history.
- Possible contributing factors to relatively good performance:
  - Mongolia launched market reforms from a relatively rudimentary economic structure (less overindustrialization).
  - Early privatization measures and sectoral reallocation (noted elsewhere in the section) supported employment absorption and sectoral shifts.

*Source: _wp03217 - Section V.*

### Appendix Tables 5–6, Mongolia was among the countries with the highest share of the

### _wp03217 - Appendix Tables 5–6, Mongolia was among the countries with the highest share of the

### Major findings and conclusions
- As in most former socialist countries, while capital accumulation appears to have been the primary factor accounting for growth prior to the establishment of a market system, efficiency gains became the main source of growth during the early stages of transition.
- Mongolia, like most other transition economies, experienced a painful, initial “transformational recession” before the economy began to recover.
- Mongolia’s adjustment process has been smooth compared with other transition economies and has been less costly in terms of output loss than those of countries of the former Soviet Union that have similar geographical and historical features.
- While Mongolia’s relatively strong output performance can be partly explained by favorable economic and noneconomic initial conditions, the early adoption of appropriate adjustment policies and market-oriented reforms is likely to have played a key role in supporting the prompt recovery of growth.

### Factors attributed to Mongolia’s performance
- Economic structure:
  - Mongolia had one of the highest shares of the agricultural sector in GDP over the period 1990–2000 and was the poorest country in terms of PPP-based per capita income.
  - A simple economic structure likely reduced the complexity of market reforms, facilitating price liberalization and early enterprise restructuring.
- Noneconomic initial conditions:
  - Mongolia enjoyed a peaceful and relatively stable social and political environment from the early days of the transition, unlike countries affected by civil conflicts, blockades, or sanctions (examples cited: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan).
- Policy choices:
  - The Mongolian authorities promptly established an open exchange and trade system at the outset of transition; Appendix Tables 7 and 8 show Mongolia is a fairly open economy with a high exports-plus-imports-to-GDP ratio and one of the least restrictive trade regimes.
  - Authorities implemented a firm monetary policy coupled with a flexible exchange rate system to contain inflation and external imbalances, creating conditions for rapid expansion of trade and investment without threatening short-term macroeconomic stability.

### Data and measurement caveats
- The paper stresses caution interpreting results because of well-known weaknesses in the quality of national accounts and related data in transition economies.
- Owing to limitations of GDP statistics for transition economies, the collapse in economic activity in CIS countries during the 1990s may be considerably overstated; some particular features of Mongolia’s economy (for example, the importance of the agricultural sector) may have resulted in a more modest overstatement of the fall in output during the early 1990s, so actual differences in cumulative output performance between Mongolia and CIS countries may be somewhat smaller than suggested.

### Empirical evidence referenced in the text
- Appendix Tables 5 and 6: show Mongolia’s high agriculture share in GDP (average, 1990–2000) and Mongolia’s low PPP-based per capita income (period average, 1990–2000) relative to other transition economies.
- Appendix Tables 7 and 8: underpin the claim that Mongolia is relatively open (high exports-plus-imports-to-GDP ratio) and has one of the least restrictive trade regimes among transition economies.
- The paper cites related literature documenting links between openness, sound macroeconomic policies, structural reforms, and growth (examples include Odling-Smee (2003), Iradian (2003), Havrylyshyn et al. (1999)).

* _wp03217 - Appendix Tables 5–6, Mongolia was among the countries with the highest share of the*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/_wp03217.pdf_
