## _wp04129

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### Introduction and research questions
- Purpose: provide empirical evidence on how foreign banks performed relative to domestic banks during periods of extreme financial fragility, using Malaysia's 1997–98 crisis.
- Key research questions:
  - Did foreign banks weather the crisis better than domestic banks?
  - Were foreign banks quicker than domestic banks to reduce credit once the crisis hit?
  - Did foreign banks receive the same amount of government financial support as domestic banks?

### Context and background
- Malaysian banking system composition (pre-crisis and 1997):
  - Foreign commercial banks accounted for 16.7 percent of banking assets in 1997 (Table 1).
  - Foreign banks prohibited from opening new branches since 1971; last foreign license granted in 1973.
  - Tier system: Tier I introduced in 1994 (paid-up capital at least RM 500 million plus CAMEL-based conditions); at end-1997, 10 Tier I banks, of which 4 were foreign. Two-tier system abolished in April 1999.
- Crisis timeline and policy response:
  - Real growth prior to crisis: average annual real growth rate of 8.5 percent in the 1990s.
  - Non-performing loans (NPLs) rose from 6 percent of net total loans at end-1997 to 22 percent at end-1998.
  - Provisioning as a share of NPLs fell from 66 percent to 42 percent between end-1997 and end-1998.
  - Interbank interest rates rose from 7½ percent in August 1997 to 11 percent at the beginning of 1998.
  - Policy measures included a generalized depositor guarantee (January 1998), cuts in mandatory reserve requirement from 13½ percent to 10 percent (February 1998) and to 8 percent (July 1998), creation of Danaharta and Danamodal (June–July 1998), re-pegging the ringgit and capital outflow controls (September 1998).
  - By June 1999 Danaharta managed RM 39.3 billion in non-performing loans (about 13 percent of GDP); Danamodal injected a total of RM 7.1 billion (2.4 percent of GDP) in 10 institutions.
  - Post-rescue indicators: net NPLs declined to 15.3 percent of total loans at end-2000; provisioning rose to 53.8 percent of bad debt; risk-weighted capital-asset ratio increased to 12.4 percent from 10.5 percent at end-1997.

### Data and sample
- Sample composition:
  - Sample covers 46 Malaysian banking institutions: 18 domestic commercial banks, 11 foreign banks, 7 merchant banks, and 3 finance companies.
  - Table 1 (market structure in 1997) (selected figures):
    - Domestic commercial banks: Number of Institutions 22, Share in Total Assets 57.0 percent, Banks in the Sample 18, Sample Coverage 69 percent.
    - Foreign commercial banks: 13, 16.7 percent, 11, 89 percent.
    - Finance companies: 16, 20.0 percent, 3, 16 percent.
    - Merchant banks: 12, 6.3 percent, 7, 65 percent.
    - Total: 63 institutions, 100 percent share, 39 banks in sample, 61 percent coverage.
- Definitions (Table A.1, exact formulations):
  - Profitability = (Profit /total assets) x 100
  - Interest margin = (Net interest received/total assets) x 100
  - Equity = (equity /total assets) x 100
  - Overhead/assets = (overhead expenses (personnel expenses and other non interest expenses)/ total assets) x 100
  - Non-performing loans = (non performing loans/total loans) x 100
  - Loan growth = (real loans at t+1)-(real loans at t)/(real loans at t) x 100
  - Deposit growth = (real customer deposits at t+1)-(real customer deposits at t)/(real customer deposits t) x 100
  - Support = (Capital injection by Danamodal plus 20% of NPLs sold to Danaharta/total assets) x 100
- Foreign bank classification:
  - Asia-oriented foreign banks: three Singaporean banks, a Thai bank, and two U.K. banks (HSBC and Standard Chartered).
  - Non-Asia-oriented foreign banks: three U.S. banks, one Canadian bank, and one German bank.
- Sectoral composition of loan portfolios (end–1998, percentage points; Table 5):
  - Average of all banks: Broad Property Sector 35.1; Share Purchase 8.9; Manufacturing 15.3.
  - Asia-oriented foreign: Broad Property Sector 34.0; Share Purchase 6.0; Manufacturing 21.5.
  - Other foreign: Broad Property Sector 15.4; Share Purchase 4.1; Manufacturing 34.2.

### Main empirical approach
- Regression framework:
  - Dependent variables: bank performance/soundness indicators (equity, profitability, interest margin, overhead, NPLs, deposit growth, loan growth), all expressed as percentage of total assets.
  - Key regressors: time dummies, bank fixed effects, interaction terms of (bank-origin dummy) x (banking-crisis dummy).
  - Crisis windows used: 1998; and 1998–2000 (primary specification uses 1996–2001 unbalanced panel).
  - Estimation methods: OLS with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for performance regressions; Tobit for government support regressions due to mass of zeros.
  - Government support measure (used in Tobit): sum of capital injection from Danamodal (if any) plus 20 percent of NPLs sold to Danaharta divided by total assets. Sensitivity analysis assumed 30, 40, or 50 percent instead of 20 percent; results broadly unchanged and quantitatively stronger for higher percentages.

### Key empirical findings (performance)
- Profitability:
  - Non-Asia-oriented foreign banks had profits 2.3–3.5 percentage points higher than the sample average during the crisis.
  - Regression Table 2 Interaction Non-Asia profitability coefficients: 2.258*** (0.727) for Crisis 1998–2000 and 3.418*** (1.32) for Crisis 1998.
  - Asia-oriented foreign banks’ profitability was similar to domestic banks.
- Interest margin:
  - Interaction term for interest margin is strongly significant and positive for both foreign groups, much larger for non-Asia-oriented banks.
  - Table 2 interest-margin interaction coefficients (Crisis 1998–2000 / Crisis 1998): Interaction Non-Asia 1.22*** (0.330) and 2.38*** (0.404); Interaction Asia 0.661*** (0.168) and 0.949*** (0.29).
  - Decomposition indicates differences mainly due to higher interest received rather than lower interest paid.
- Asset quality (NPLs):
  - Interaction NPLs: Interaction Non-Asia shows negative and significant coefficient in some specifications (Table 2 Interaction Non-Asia NPLs –7.51* (4.04) for Crisis 1998–2000).
  - Interaction Asia coefficients positive but not robustly significant (e.g., 5.58 (3.64) for Crisis 1998–2000).
- Overhead / cost efficiency:
  - Non-Asia-oriented foreign banks show statistically significant increases in overhead (Table 2 Interaction Non-Asia overhead 0.48** (0.202) and 0.75** (0.375) depending on crisis window).
  - Increase possibly reflects exchange rate effects on expatriate wage costs rather than operational inefficiency.
- Deposit and loan growth:
  - No clear evidence that depositors reallocated systematically toward better-performing banks (no significant deposit-growth reallocation despite non-Asia foreign banks having higher deposit growth coefficients).
  - Loan growth tended to be higher in non-Asia-oriented foreign banks; significance varies by specification (e.g., Table 2 Interaction Non-Asia Loan Growth 19.84** (10.44) for Crisis 1998–2000).
- Robustness:
  - Results hold in a balanced-panel robustness check (30 banks, 1996–99). Key outcomes persist: non-Asia-oriented foreign banks fared better in capitalization, profitability, and interest margin, and worse in overhead (Table 3).

### Key empirical findings (government support)
- Main result: foreign banks received less government support than domestic banks, even after controlling for the size of non-performing loans and other characteristics.
- Tobit regression coefficients (selected; Table 4):
  - Foreign Non-Asia coefficients: –2.43* (1.47) in specification (1); –2.51* (1.41) in (2); not significant in (3) and (4) where other controls included.
  - Foreign Asia coefficients: –1.84 (1.19) in (1); –1.98* (1.03) in (2); –1.54* (0.88) in (3); –1.27* (0.68) in (4).
- Control variables:
  - Higher NPL ratios associated with greater support (Non-performing loans as a share of assets coefficient 0.11*** (0.035) in specification (1)).
  - Equity negative and significant (Equity (in 1998) –.53*** (.10) in the specification where included).
  - More support went to government-owned banks (textual result consistent with regressions).
- Heterogeneity:
  - The finding that foreign banks received less support is stronger for Asia-oriented foreign banks than for non-Asia-oriented banks; part of the interpretation is that non-Asia-oriented banks may have needed less support.

### Interpretation and mechanisms
- Potential explanations for better performance of non-Asia-oriented foreign banks:
  - Access to parent-bank emergency credit lines and other liquidity/support because parent institutions were less affected by the regional crisis.
  - Different asset portfolios: non-Asia-oriented banks lent more to manufacturing and less to property and share-purchase sectors (Other foreign: Manufacturing 34.2 percent; Broad Property Sector 15.4 percent; Share Purchase 4.1 percent), sectors most affected by the crisis.
  - Managerial herding: Asia-oriented foreign banks may have followed regional peer-group strategies (heavy exposure to property and share-purchase sectors), consistent with herding theories (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). This may explain why Asia-oriented foreign banks resembled domestic banks in risk-taking.
- Limitations:
  - Single-country, single-episode evidence.
  - Alternative explanations (reporting differences, clientele differences) assessed but not definitive.

### Policy-relevant conclusions
- Being a subsidiary of a foreign institution is not a guarantee of immunity from crisis-related problems; outcomes depend on parent-bank health, asset portfolios, managerial incentives, governance, and supervision.
- Empirical evidence for Malaysia indicates:
  - Non-Asia-oriented foreign banks outperformed domestic and Asia-oriented foreign banks on profitability and asset quality during the crisis, while incurring higher overhead.
  - Foreign banks, especially Asia-oriented, received less government bailout support even conditional on financial distress indicators.
  - No evidence that foreign banks abandoned the Malaysian market in the immediate aftermath of the crisis; lending and deposits of non-Asia-oriented foreign banks contracted less than domestic banks in many specifications.
- Policy implications:
  - Supervision, governance, and managerial incentives at both subsidiary and parent levels are crucial in assessing the stabilizing potential of foreign-bank entry.
  - The presence of foreign banks alone should not be presumed to reduce fiscal burdens from banking rescues; government support patterns and parent-bank relationships matter.

*Source: _wp04129 - Appendix Tables (IMF Working Paper content unit).*

### References..............................................................................................................

### _wp04129 - References..............................................................................................................

### Text Tables
- 1. Structure of the Malaysian Banking Market in 1997 and Sample Coverage............. 14
- 2. Regression Results: Unbalanced Panel, 1996-2001................................................... 15
- 3. Regression Results: Balanced Panel, 1996-99........................................................... 16
- 4. Regression Results: Government Support ................................................................. 17
- 5. Sectoral Composition of Bank Loan Portfolios, end-1998 ........................................ 18

### Figure
- 1. Malaysia: Bank Performance Indicators, 1996-2000................................................. 19

*Source: _wp04129 - References..............................................................................................................*

### Appendix Tables

### _wp04129 - Appendix Tables

### Introduction and research questions
- Purpose: provide empirical evidence on how foreign banks performed relative to domestic banks during periods of extreme financial fragility, using Malaysia's 1997–98 crisis.
- Key research questions:
  - Did foreign banks weather the crisis better than domestic banks?
  - Were foreign banks quicker than domestic banks to reduce credit once the crisis hit?
  - Did foreign banks receive the same amount of government financial support as domestic banks?

### Context and background
- Malaysian banking system composition (pre-crisis and 1997):
  - Foreign commercial banks accounted for 16.7 percent of banking assets in 1997 (Table 1).
  - Domestic policy history: foreign banks prohibited from opening new branches since 1971; last foreign license granted in 1973.
  - Tier system: Tier I introduced in 1994 (paid-up capital at least RM 500 million plus CAMEL-based conditions); at end-1997, 10 Tier I banks, of which 4 were foreign. Two-tier system abolished in April 1999.
- Crisis timeline and policy response:
  - Real growth prior to crisis: average annual real growth rate of 8.5 percent in the 1990s.
  - Non-performing loans (NPLs) rose from 6 percent of net total loans at end-1997 to 22 percent at end-1998.
  - Provisioning as a share of NPLs fell from 66 percent to 42 percent between end-1997 and end-1998.
  - Interbank interest rates rose from 7½ percent in August 1997 to 11 percent at the beginning of 1998.
  - Policy measures included a generalized depositor guarantee (January 1998), cuts in mandatory reserve requirement from 13½ percent to 10 percent (February 1998) and to 8 percent (July 1998), creation of Danaharta and Danamodal (June–July 1998), re-pegging the ringgit and capital outflow controls (September 1998).
  - By June 1999 Danaharta managed RM 39.3 billion in non-performing loans (about 13 percent of GDP); Danamodal injected a total of RM 7.1 billion (2.4 percent of GDP) in 10 institutions.
  - Post-rescue indicators: net NPLs declined to 15.3 percent of total loans at end-2000; provisioning rose to 53.8 percent of bad debt; risk-weighted capital-asset ratio increased to 12.4 percent from 10.5 percent at end-1997.

### Data and sample
- Sample composition:
  - Sample covers 46 Malaysian banking institutions: 18 domestic commercial banks, 11 foreign banks, 7 merchant banks, and 3 finance companies.
  - Table 1 (market structure in 1997): Domestic commercial banks: Number of Institutions 22, Share in Total Assets 57.0 percent, Banks in the Sample 18, Sample Coverage 69 percent. Foreign commercial banks: 13, 16.7 percent, 11, 89 percent. Finance companies: 16, 20.0 percent, 3, 16 percent. Merchant banks: 12, 6.3 percent, 7, 65 percent. Total: 63 institutions, 100 percent share, 39 banks in sample, 61 percent coverage.
- Definitions (Table A.1, exact formulations):
  - Profitability = (Profit /total assets) x 100
  - Interest margin = (Net interest received/total assets) x 100
  - Equity = (equity /total assets) x 100
  - Overhead/assets = (overhead expenses (personnel expenses and other non interest expenses)/ total assets) x 100
  - Non-performing loans = (non performing loans/total loans) x 100
  - Loan growth = (real loans at t+1)-(real loans at t)/(real loans at t) x 100
  - Deposit growth = (real customer deposits at t+1)-(real customer deposits at t)/(real customer deposits t) x 100
  - Support = (Capital injection by Danamodal plus 20% of NPLs sold to Danaharta/total assets) x 100
- Foreign bank classification:
  - Asia-oriented foreign banks: three Singaporean banks, a Thai bank, and two U.K. banks (HSBC and Standard Chartered).
  - Non-Asia-oriented foreign banks: three U.S. banks, one Canadian bank, and one German bank.
- Sectoral composition of loan portfolios (end–1998, percentage points; Table 5):
  - Average of all banks: Broad Property Sector 35.1; Share Purchase 8.9; Manufacturing 15.3.
  - Asia-oriented foreign: Broad Property Sector 34.0; Share Purchase 6.0; Manufacturing 21.5.
  - Other foreign: Broad Property Sector 15.4; Share Purchase 4.1; Manufacturing 34.2.

### Main empirical approach
- Regression framework:
  - Dependent variables: bank performance/soundness indicators (equity, profitability, interest margin, overhead, NPLs, deposit growth, loan growth), all expressed as percentage of total assets.
  - Key regressors: time dummies, bank fixed effects, interaction terms of (bank-origin dummy) x (banking-crisis dummy).
  - Crisis windows used: 1998; and 1998–2000 (primary specification uses 1996–2001 unbalanced panel).
  - Estimation methods: OLS with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for performance regressions; Tobit for government support regressions due to mass of zeros.
  - Government support measure (used in Tobit): sum of capital injection from Danamodal (if any) plus 20 percent of NPLs sold to Danaharta divided by total assets. Sensitivity analysis assumed 30, 40, or 50 percent instead of 20 percent; results broadly unchanged and quantitatively stronger for higher percentages.

### Key empirical findings (performance)
- Profitability:
  - Non-Asia-oriented foreign banks had profits 2.3–3.5 percentage points higher than the sample average during the crisis (textual summary; regression Table 2 reports Interaction Non-Asia profitability coefficients: 2.258*** (0.727) for Crisis 1998–2000 and 3.418*** (1.32) for Crisis 1998).
  - Asia-oriented foreign banks’ profitability was similar to domestic banks.
- Interest margin:
  - Interaction term for interest margin is strongly significant and positive for both foreign groups, much larger for non-Asia-oriented banks.
  - Table 2 interest-margin interaction coefficients (Crisis 1998–2000 / Crisis 1998): Interaction Non-Asia 1.22*** (0.330) and 2.38*** (0.404); Interaction Asia 0.661*** (0.168) and 0.949*** (0.29).
  - Decomposition indicates differences mainly due to higher interest received rather than lower interest paid.
- Asset quality (NPLs):
  - Interaction NPLs: Interaction Non-Asia shows negative and significant coefficient in some specifications (Table 2 Interaction Non-Asia NPLs –7.51* (4.04) for Crisis 1998–2000); Interaction Asia coefficients positive but not robustly significant (e.g., 5.58 (3.64) for Crisis 1998–2000).
- Overhead / cost efficiency:
  - Non-Asia-oriented foreign banks show statistically significant increases in overhead (Table 2 Interaction Non-Asia overhead 0.48** (0.202) and 0.75** (0.375) depending on crisis window). Increase possibly reflects exchange rate effects on expatriate wage costs rather than operational inefficiency.
- Deposit and loan growth:
  - No clear evidence that depositors reallocated systematically toward better-performing banks (no significant deposit-growth reallocation despite non-Asia foreign banks having higher deposit growth coefficients).
  - Loan growth tended to be higher in non-Asia-oriented foreign banks; significance varies by specification (e.g., Table 2 Interaction Non-Asia Loan Growth 19.84** (10.44) for Crisis 1998–2000).
- Robustness:
  - Results hold in a balanced-panel robustness check (30 banks, 1996–99). Key outcomes persist: non-Asia-oriented foreign banks fared better in capitalization, profitability, and interest margin, and worse in overhead (Table 3).

### Key empirical findings (government support)
- Main result: foreign banks received less government support than domestic banks, even after controlling for the size of non-performing loans and other characteristics.
  - Tobit regression coefficients (selected; Table 4):
    - Foreign Non-Asia coefficients: –2.43* (1.47) in specification (1); –2.51* (1.41) in (2); not significant in (3) and (4) where other controls included.
    - Foreign Asia coefficients: –1.84 (1.19) in (1); –1.98* (1.03) in (2); –1.54* (0.88) in (3); –1.27* (0.68) in (4).
  - Control variables: higher NPL ratios associated with greater support (e.g., Non-performing loans as a share of assets coefficient 0.11*** (0.035) in specification (1)); equity negative and significant (e.g., Equity (in 1998) –.53*** (.10) in specification where included).
  - More support went to government-owned banks (textual result consistent with regressions).
  - The finding that foreign banks received less support is stronger for Asia-oriented foreign banks than for non-Asia-oriented banks; part of the interpretation is that non-Asia-oriented banks may have needed less support.

### Interpretation and mechanisms
- Explanations considered for better performance of non-Asia-oriented foreign banks:
  - Access to parent-bank emergency credit lines and other liquidity/support because parent institutions were less affected by the regional crisis.
  - Different asset portfolios: non-Asia-oriented banks lent more to manufacturing and less to property and share-purchase sectors (Table 5 shows Other foreign: Manufacturing 34.2 percent; Broad Property Sector 15.4 percent; Share Purchase 4.1 percent), which were the sectors most affected.
  - Managerial herding: Asia-oriented foreign banks may have followed regional peer-group strategies (heavy exposure to property and share-purchase sectors), consistent with herding theories (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). This may explain why Asia-oriented foreign banks resembled domestic banks in risk-taking.
- Limitations: single-country, single-episode evidence; alternative explanations (reporting differences, clientele differences) assessed but not definitive.

### Policy-relevant conclusions
- Being a subsidiary of a foreign institution is not a guarantee of immunity from crisis-related problems; outcomes depend on parent-bank health, asset portfolios, managerial incentives, governance, and supervision.
- Empirical evidence for Malaysia indicates:
  - Non-Asia-oriented foreign banks outperformed domestic and Asia-oriented foreign banks on profitability and asset quality during the crisis, while incurring higher overhead.
  - Foreign banks, especially Asia-oriented, received less government bailout support even conditional on financial distress indicators.
  - No evidence that foreign banks abandoned the Malaysian market in the immediate aftermath of the crisis; lending and deposits of non-Asia-oriented foreign banks contracted less than domestic banks in many specifications.
- Policy implications:
  - Supervision, governance, and managerial incentives at both subsidiary and parent levels are crucial in assessing the stabilizing potential of foreign-bank entry.
  - The presence of foreign banks alone should not be presumed to reduce fiscal burdens from banking rescues; government support patterns and parent-bank relationships matter.

*Italic: Source: _wp04129 - Appendix Tables (IMF Working Paper content unit).*

### References

### _wp04129 - References

### References cited
- Barajas, Adolfo, Roberto Steiner, and Natalia Salazar, 1999, “Foreign Investment in Colombia’s Financial Sector,” IMF Working Paper No. 99/150 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Berger, Allen, Robert De Young, Hesna Gency, and Gregory F. Udell, 2000, “Globalization of Financial Institutions: Evidence from Cross-Border Banking Performance,” Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, Vol. 3.
- Caprio, Gerard, and Daniela Klingebiel, 2003, “Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Financial Crises, unpublished, The World Bank (Washington: The World Bank).
- Claessens, Stijn, Aslı Demirguç-Kunt, and Harry Huizinga 2001, “How Does Foreign Entry Affect the Domestic Banking Market?” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 25(5), pp. 891–911.
- Clarke, George R.G., Robert Cull, and Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria, 2001, “Does Foreign Bank Penetration Reduce Access to Credit in Developing Countries? Evidence from Asking Borrowers,” unpublished, World Bank (Washington: The World Bank).
- Dages, B.G., L.S. Goldberg, and D. Kinney, 2000, “Foreign and Domestic Bank Participation in Emerging Markets: Lessons from Mexico and Argentina,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, September, pp.17–36.
- Demirguç-Kunt, Aslı, and Harry Huizinga, 1999, “Determinants of Commercial Banks Interest Margins and Profitability: International Evidence,” World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 13(2), 379–408 (Washington: The World Bank).
- Focarelli, Dario, and Alberto Pozzolo, 2003, “Where Do Banks Expand Abroad? An Empirical Investigation,” mimeo, Bank of Italy.
- International Monetary Fund, 2000, International Capital Markets: Development, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Laeven, Luc, 1999, “Risk and Efficiency in East Asian Banks,” World Bank Working Paper No. 2255 (Washington: World Bank).
- Levine, Ross, 1996, “Foreign Banks, Financial Development, and Economic Growth,” in Claide E. Barfield (Ed.), International Financial Markets: Harmonization versus Competition (Washington: AEI Press).
- Lindgren, Carl-Johan, Tomás J. T. Baliño, Charles Enoch, Anne-Marie Gulde, Marc Quintyn, and Leslie Teo, 1999, “Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons from Asia,” Occasional Paper No. 188 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Meesok, Kanitta, Il Houng Lee, Olin Liu, Yougesh Khatri, Natalia Tamirisa, Michael Moore, and Mark H. Krysl, 2001, “Malaysia: From Crisis to Recovery,” IMF Occasional Paper No. 207 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Morgan, Donald P., and Philip E. Strahan, 2003, “Foreign Bank Entry and Business Volatility: Evidence from U.S. States and Other Countries,” NBER Working Paper No. 9710 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- Peek, Joe, and Eric S. Rosengren, 2000, “The Role of Foreign Banks in Latin America,” unpublished, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Scharfstein, David, and Jeremy C. Stein, 1990, “Herd Behavior and Investment,” American Economic Review, Vol. 80 (3), pp. 465–479.
- ThomsonWatch, 1999, The Malaysian Banking System (June).

*Source: _wp04129 - References — https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/_wp04129.pdf*

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