## _wp0446 - 1.  Domestic and External Debt, 1980–2000

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### I. Introduction and study objectives
- Study objective: discuss long-term developments and identify key characteristics of African domestic debt markets using a newly collected database for 27 non-CFA sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries covering 1980–2000.
- Main focus areas:
  - Development in domestic debt markets relative to GDP, foreign debt, and broad money.
  - Investor base of debt markets: degree to which bank and nonbank sectors hold domestic debt.
  - Development in real treasury bill interest rates amid financial sector reforms.
  - Maturity structure of domestic debt portfolios, including comparison with more developed countries.
  - Impact of domestic borrowing on government budgets and private sector credit.
- Specific interest in differences between HIPCs and non-HIPCs, given HIPCs’ access to highly concessional foreign resources and generally underdeveloped financial systems.

### II. Description of the database
- Coverage: gross securitized domestic government debt (treasury bills, development stocks, bonds) for 27 non-CFA SSA countries, 1980–2000.
- Exclusions: domestic debt from domestic arrears accumulation and direct advances from the central bank and commercial banks (though attempts were made to collect central bank debt where available).
- Additional database content: maturity structure, holdings by sector, real treasury bill interest rates, domestic interest burden to the budget.
- Country selection: non-CFA countries only; Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe did not have domestic government debt markets at time of collection.
- Completeness: complete series obtained for all countries except Guinea.
- Primary data sources: individual IMF country reports, central bank reports, IMF country desk economists.

### III. Important aspects of domestic debt management (concepts highlighted)
- Need for domestic debt issuance:
  - Financing budget deficits when foreign financing is insufficient or not usable for recurrent expenditures.
  - Instrument for monetary policy to sterilize large aid or export inflows.
- Macroeconomic risks of extensive domestic borrowing:
  - Domestic debt service can consume significant government revenues because domestic interest rates are higher than foreign rates.
  - In shallow financial markets, increases in domestic debt can rapidly raise domestic interest rates.
  - Narrow investor base increases monopoly power of investors and roll-over risk; broadening investor base recommended (retail investors, pension/retirement funds).
  - Crowding out: government borrowing taps domestic savings, potentially raising interest rates or causing credit rationing; effect aggravated by capital account restrictions and dominance of commercial bank holdings.
- Maturity-structure considerations:
  - Short-term dominated portfolios increase roll-over risk, administrative costs, and investor difficulties in matching liabilities.
  - Barriers to issuing long-term debt: unwilling market due to inflation/default risk, absence of institutional investors, and potentially higher long-term interest rates.
  - Importance of providing longer-term paper for investors and banks to manage interest rate risk.

### IV. Characteristics and developments in domestic debt markets (1980–2000)
- Aggregate and distributional facts:
  - Average domestic debt rose from 11 percent of GDP in the 1980s to 15 percent by late 1990s; median rose from 4 percent to 10 percent.
  - Number of countries with domestic debt/GDP > 20 percent increased from 3 at the beginning of 1980 to 9 by 2000.
  - Country groups:
    - Long-standing domestic debt users: Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
    - No/very recent markets: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe.
    - Rapid recent increase or small markets: The Gambia, Ghana, Seychelles, Namibia.
- HIPCs vs non-HIPCs:
  - HIPCs average domestic debt ≈ 8 percent of GDP (increased slightly in late 1990s because of Ghana and The Gambia); some HIPCs reduced domestic debt ratios (Ethiopia, Zambia).
  - Non-HIPCs average domestic debt rose from 14 percent in 1980s to 23 percent by end-1990s.
- Domestic vs external debt:
  - Domestic debt accounted for just over a fifth of total debt in late 1990s (slightly lower than in 1980s).
  - Divergence in 1990s: domestic debt fell to < 10 percent of total debt in HIPCs, increased to almost 40 percent in non-HIPCs by end-1990s.
- Financial sector depth and scope:
  - Financial sectors generally small; HIPCs smaller than non-HIPCs.
  - “Deepest” financial sectors in late 1990s: Cape Verde, Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa (broad money > 50 percent of GDP).
  - Ratio of domestic debt to broad money very large in end-1990s in The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa, Zimbabwe (Ghana > 100 percent).
  - Average ratio of domestic debt to broad money nearly same in HIPCs and non-HIPCs.

### V. Investor base and holdings
- Composition and concentrations:
  - Commercial banks hold more than half of the outstanding domestic debt (summary statements in source indicate commercial banks hold about half; elsewhere table details vary).
  - Nonbank sector holds about one-third of outstanding debt; larger nonbank roles in Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, South Africa (insurance companies, pension funds, building societies, post office savings, public enterprises, general public).
  - Central banks hold modest shares except in Burundi, Nigeria, Tanzania.
- Policy implication: broaden investor base (retail investors, pension/retirement funds) to reduce cost, volatility, and crowding out risk.

### VI. Financial sector reforms and real treasury-bill rates
- Financial liberalization effects:
  - Reforms in late 1980s and 1990s moved markets from negative real bond rates in pre-reform period to positive real treasury-bill rates by late 1990s.
  - Financial development improved in virtually all countries (Gelbard and Leite indices); largest improvements in HIPCs from a low base.
- Real treasury-bill rates (end-1990s observations):
  - By end-1990s, all countries had positive real treasury-bill rates except Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone.
  - The Gambia and Kenya had real treasury-bill rates > 10 percent at end-1990s.
  - HIPCs’ average real treasury-bill rates rose from -32 percent in 1980s to 4 percent by end-1990s; non-HIPCs experienced smaller increases.

### VII. Maturity structure of domestic debt
- Short-term dominance:
  - Three-month bills account for almost 50 percent of outstanding debt.
  - 12-month paper ≈ 20 percent; 6-month ≈ 10 percent.
- Average maturities:
  - Average maturity: 231 days across sampled African countries.
  - HIPCs average maturity: 177 days.
  - Country extremes: Burundi 77 days; Uganda 93 days; South Africa 1,748 days; Swaziland 1,145 days.
  - Developed/emerging market comparison: six developed/emerging market countries average maturity ≈ 1,945 days.
- Risks: short average maturity increases roll-over and market risks; governments may roll over debt amounting to a quarter of GDP three or four times a year.

### VIII. Impact on the budget and domestic interest burdens
- Domestic interest burden and trends:
  - Average interest payments increased as percent of revenues in both HIPCs and non-HIPCs over 1980–2000.
  - Countries that cut interest payments significantly as debt stocks fell: Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Nigeria, Rwanda.
  - Countries with sharp increases in domestic interest payments to > 15 percent of revenues: The Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe.
  - Average domestic interest payments relative to GDP: more than 2 percent (1980–2000 averages shown in Table 6: 1.8, 2.0, 2.3 in successive periods).
  - HIPCs average interest payments (% of GDP): 1.5, 1.3, 1.6 across periods; Non-HIPCs: 2.1, 2.9, 3.4 across periods.
- Domestic versus foreign interest payments and implicit rates:
  - Domestic interest payments are as large as foreign ones despite lower domestic debt stocks.
  - Domestic interest payments exceeded foreign interest payments in 10 of 22 countries with data.
  - Domestic interest payments as percent of total interest payments in HIPCs remained around 40 percent throughout the period despite decline in domestic share of total debt.
  - Implicit domestic interest rate (interest payments / debt stock * 100) averaged about 18 percent at end-1990s; implicit foreign interest rate averaged about 2 percent.
  - Implicit domestic interest rates higher in HIPCs than in non-HIPCs.
- Reasons for domestic borrowing despite higher costs:
  - External amortization requires foreign exchange; raising external debt increases external vulnerability.
  - Fund-supported programs often cap nonconcessional borrowing; insufficient concessional aid forces governments to rely on domestic borrowing.

### IX. Impact on private sector credit
- Key empirical findings and country examples:
  - Regression analysis (27 countries, 1980–2000) examined private sector lending (percent of broad money) on domestic debt (percent of broad money); source text omits the estimated coefficient (text cuts off before the coefficient is stated).
  - Separate numeric findings reported elsewhere in the source:
    - 0.15 percent.
    - The Gambia: private sector lending ratio to broad money fell from about three-quarters to about one-third during 1980–2000.
    - The ratio of domestic debt to broad money rose to 106 percent by the end of the 1990s from an average of 13 percent in the 1980s (The Gambia example).
    - Malawi: sharp reduction in private sector lending in the latter half of the 1990s; domestic debt assumed a relatively large proportion of broad money despite a relatively small ratio of domestic debt to GDP.
    - South Africa: ratio of credit to the private sector increased despite expansion in domestic debt, attributed to small commercial bank holdings of government debt.
  - Aggregate observations:
    - The ratio of domestic debt to broad money has been constant at about 40 percent throughout the period, with some countries observing ratios of almost 100 percent.
    - Commercial banks hold more than half of the outstanding domestic debt.
    - Thin and shallow financial markets amplify crowding-out effects of domestic borrowing.

### X. Key empirical summaries and policy implications
- Key empirical points:
  - In 1980, 18 out of 27 non-CFA sub-Saharan African countries had domestic debt markets; by 2000 this number increased to 21.
  - The ratio of domestic debt increased from 11 percent in the 1980s to 15 percent of GDP by the end of the 1990s.
  - Most domestic markets were short-term; the most common maturity was three months; the average maturity for fifteen SSA countries with data was 231 days.
  - Domestic interest payments, on average, assumed about one-tenth of total revenue.
  - Countries setting aside more than 15 percent of their revenues to pay interest on domestic debt include: The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.
  - HIPCs have accumulated less domestic debt but have almost a similar ratio of domestic debt to broad money compared with non-HIPCs due to smaller financial intermediation.
  - Domestic debt financing was much more expensive than foreign borrowing; domestic interest payments almost equal foreign ones in HIPCs despite smaller amounts of domestic debt.
- Policy implications and reform options:
  - Consider debt reduction schemes for domestic debt similar in objective to the HIPC Initiative but designed to avoid injecting liquidity into the domestic system (example approach noted: donor-financed trust fund used to retire domestic debt while absorbing liquidity through foreign exchange operations, as in Cape Verde).
  - Extend the maturity structure of domestic debt to reduce market and rollover risks, acknowledging potential higher debt-service costs from longer-term bonds.
  - Accompany maturity extension with reforms to increase demand for long-term paper:
    - Strengthen and expand the insurance and pension sector.
    - Strengthen corporate governance and institutions.
  - Improve foreign access to holdings of domestic debt to strengthen competition, reduce financing costs, and introduce financial technology and innovation.

*Italic: Source: _wp0446 - References (IMF staff; compiled database and analysis, 1980–2000).*

### 1.  Domestic and External Debt, 1980–2000 ......................................................................8

### _wp0446 - 1.  Domestic and External Debt, 1980–2000 ......................................................................8

### Major sections (chapter/section headings and page references)
- 1.  Domestic and External Debt, 1980–2000 — page 8
- 2.  Financial Sector Depth and Domestic Debt, 1980–2000 — page 10
- 3.  Holdings of Government Debt Across Sectors — page 12
- 4.  Financial Development, Real Treasury Bill Rates, and Private Sector Credit, 1980–2000 — page 13
- 5.  Average Maturity for Selected African Countries and Emerging Markets — page 15
- 6.  Domestic Interest Payments, 1980–2000 — page 17
- 7.  The Cost of domestic and Foreign Borrowing — page 18

### Figures
- Figure 1.  Average Maturity Structure of Domestic Debt in 14 Non-CFA SSA Countries — page 14

*Source: _wp0446 - 1.  Domestic and External Debt, 1980–2000 (PDF). Canonical URL: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/_wp0446.pdf*

### References..............................................................................................................

### _wp0446 - References..............................................................................................................

### I. INTRODUCTION
- Study objective: discuss long-term developments and identify key characteristics of African domestic debt markets using a newly collected database for 27 non-CFA sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries covering 1980–2000.
- Main focus areas:
  - Development in domestic debt markets relative to GDP, foreign debt, and broad money.
  - Investor base of debt markets: degree to which bank and nonbank sectors hold domestic debt.
  - Development in real treasury bill interest rates amid financial sector reforms.
  - Maturity structure of domestic debt portfolios, including comparison with more developed countries.
  - Impact of domestic borrowing on government budgets and private sector credit.
- Specific interest in differences between HIPCs and non-HIPCs, given HIPCs’ access to highly concessional foreign resources and generally underdeveloped financial systems.

### II. DESCRIPTION OF DATABASE
- Coverage: gross securitized domestic government debt (treasury bills, development stocks, bonds) for 27 non-CFA SSA countries, 1980–2000.
- Exclusions: domestic debt from domestic arrears accumulation and direct advances from the central bank and commercial banks (though attempts were made to collect central bank debt where available).
- Additional database content: maturity structure, holdings by sector, real treasury bill interest rates, domestic interest burden to the budget.
- Country selection: non-CFA countries only; Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe did not have domestic government debt markets at time of collection. Complete series obtained for all countries except Guinea.
- Primary data sources: individual IMF country reports, central bank reports, IMF country desk economists.

### III. IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF DOMESTIC DEBT MANAGEMENT
- Need for domestic debt issuance:
  - Financing budget deficits when foreign financing is insufficient or not usable for recurrent expenditures.
  - Instrument for monetary policy to sterilize large aid or export inflows.
- Macroeconomic risks of extensive domestic borrowing:
  - Domestic debt service can consume significant government revenues because domestic interest rates are higher than foreign rates.
  - In shallow financial markets, increases in domestic debt can rapidly raise domestic interest rates.
  - Narrow investor base increases monopoly power of investors and roll-over risk; broadening investor base recommended (retail investors, pension/retirement funds).
  - Crowding out: government borrowing taps domestic savings, potentially raising interest rates or causing credit rationing; effect aggravated by capital account restrictions and dominance of commercial bank holdings.
- Maturity structure considerations:
  - Short-term dominated portfolios increase roll-over risk, administrative costs, and investor difficulties in matching liabilities.
  - Barriers to issuing long-term debt: unwilling market due to inflation/default risk, absence of institutional investors, and potentially higher long-term interest rates.
  - Importance of providing longer-term paper for investors and banks to manage interest rate risk.

### IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF DOMESTIC DEBT MARKETS IN NON-CFA SSA COUNTRIES
A. Developments in Domestic Debt: 1980–2000
- Aggregate and distributional facts:
  - Average domestic debt rose from 11 percent of GDP in the 1980s to 15 percent by late 1990s; median rose from 4 percent to 10 percent.
  - Number of countries with domestic debt/GDP > 20 percent increased from 3 at the beginning of 1980 to 9 by 2000.
  - Distinct country groups:
    - Long-standing domestic debt users: Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
    - No/very recent markets: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe.
    - Rapid recent increase or small markets: The Gambia, Ghana, Seychelles, Namibia.
- HIPCs vs non-HIPCs:
  - HIPCs average domestic debt ≈ 8 percent of GDP (increased slightly in late 1990s because of Ghana and The Gambia); some HIPCs reduced domestic debt ratios (Ethiopia, Zambia).
  - Non-HIPCs average domestic debt rose from 14 percent in 1980s to 23 percent by end-1990s.
- Domestic vs external debt:
  - Domestic debt accounted for just over a fifth of total debt in late 1990s (slightly lower than in 1980s).
  - Divergence in 1990s: domestic debt fell to < 10 percent of total debt in HIPCs, increased to almost 40 percent in non-HIPCs by end-1990s.
- Financial sector depth and scope for domestic debt (Table 2 findings summarized):
  - Financial sectors generally small; HIPCs smaller than non-HIPCs.
  - “Deepest” financial sectors in late 1990s: Cape Verde, Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa (broad money > 50 percent of GDP).
  - Ratio of domestic debt to broad money very large in end-1990s in The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa, Zimbabwe (Ghana > 100 percent).
  - Average ratio of domestic debt to broad money nearly same in HIPCs and non-HIPCs, implying limited scope to expand domestic debt in HIPCs without crowding out.

B. The Investor Base
- Composition:
  - Commercial banks hold about half of all outstanding domestic debt (Table 3 average: Central Bank ?, Commercial Banks 70 percent, Nonbank sector 30 percent — table headings indicate banking sector split but summary states commercial banks hold half).
  - Nonbank sector holds about one-third of outstanding debt; larger nonbank roles in Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, South Africa (insurance companies, pension funds, building societies, post office savings, public enterprises, general public).
  - Central banks hold modest shares except in Burundi, Nigeria, Tanzania (central bank holdings may be used for monetary policy but equate to monetization of deficits).
- Policy implication: broaden investor base to reduce cost, volatility, and crowding out risk.

C. Real Treasury Bill Rates and Financial Sector Reforms
- Financial sector reforms in late 1980s and 1990s liberalized markets, moving from negative real bond rates in pre-reform period to positive real treasury-bill rates by late 1990s.
- Financial development improved in virtually all countries (Gelbard and Leite indices); largest improvements in HIPCs from a low base.
- Real treasury-bill rates:
  - By end-1990s, all countries had positive real treasury-bill rates except Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone.
  - The Gambia and Kenya had real treasury-bill rates > 10 percent at end-1990s.
  - HIPCs’ average real treasury-bill rates rose from -32 percent in 1980s to 4 percent by end-1990s; non-HIPCs experienced smaller increases since their markets were relatively liberal earlier.

D. Maturity Structure
- Short-term paper dominates:
  - Three-month bills account for almost 50 percent of outstanding debt.
  - 12-month paper ≈ 20 percent; 6-month ≈ 10 percent.
- Average maturity: 231 days (about 10 months) across sampled African countries (Table 5).
  - HIPCs average maturity: 177 days.
  - Country extremes: Burundi 77 days; Uganda 93 days; South Africa 1,748 days; Swaziland 1,145 days.
- Comparison with developed/emerging markets:
  - Six developed/emerging market countries average maturity ≈ five and half years (about 1,945 days), roughly seven times longer than African average.
- Risks: short average maturity increases roll-over and market risks; frequent rollovers (governments may roll over debt amounting to a quarter of GDP three or four times a year).

### V. THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC DEBT ON THE BUDGET AND PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT
A. Budget Implications
- Domestic interest burden:
  - Average interest payments increased as percent of revenues in both HIPCs and non-HIPCs over 1980–2000 (Table 6).
  - Countries that cut interest payments significantly as debt stocks fell: Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Nigeria, Rwanda.
  - Countries with sharp increases in domestic interest payments to > 15 percent of revenues: The Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe.
  - Average domestic interest payments relative to GDP: more than 2 percent (1980–2000 averages: 1.8, 2.0, 2.3 in successive periods shown in Table 6).
  - HIPCs average interest payments (% of GDP): 1.5, 1.3, 1.6 across periods; Non-HIPCs: 2.1, 2.9, 3.4 across periods.
- Domestic vs foreign interest payments:
  - Domestic interest payments are as large as foreign ones despite lower domestic debt stocks.
  - Domestic interest payments exceeded foreign interest payments in 10 of 22 countries with data.
  - Domestic interest payments as percent of total interest payments in HIPCs remained around 40 percent throughout the period despite decline in domestic share of total debt.
- Cost comparisons:
  - Implicit domestic interest rate (interest payments / debt stock * 100) averaged about 18 percent at end-1990s; implicit foreign interest rate averaged about 2 percent.
  - Implicit domestic interest rates higher in HIPCs than in non-HIPCs.
- Reasons governments borrow domestically despite higher costs:
  - External amortization requires foreign exchange; raising external debt increases external vulnerability.
  - Fund-supported programs often cap nonconcessional borrowing; insufficient concessional aid forces governments to rely on domestic borrowing.

B. Impact on Private Sector Credit
- Panel regression finding (27 countries, 1980–2000):
  - Regression of private sector lending (percent of broad money) on domestic debt (percent of broad money) found significant support for crowding out: on average, an expansion in domestic debt of 1 percent relative to broad money causes the ratio of lending to the private sector to broad money to decline by [text cuts off in source before stating the estimated coefficient].
  - Interpretation: domestic debt expansions reduce private sector credit availability, consistent with crowding out in shallow financial systems.

*Italic: Source: _wp0446 - References (IMF staff; compiled database and analysis, 1980–2000).*

### 0.15 percent.

### _wp0446 - 0.15 percent.

### Key empirical findings
- 0.15 percent.
- The Gambia: private sector lending ratio to broad money fell from about three-quarters to about one-third during the 20-year period from 1980 to 2000.
- The ratio of domestic debt to broad money rose to 106 percent by the end of the 1990s from an average of 13 percent in the 1980s (The Gambia example).
- Malawi: sharp reduction in private sector lending in the latter half of the 1990s; domestic debt assumed a relatively large proportion of broad money despite a relatively small ratio of domestic debt to GDP.
- South Africa: ratio of credit to the private sector increased despite expansion in domestic debt, attributed to small commercial bank holdings of government debt.
- In 1980, 18 out of 27 non-CFA sub-Saharan African countries had domestic debt markets; by 2000 this number increased to 21.
- The ratio of domestic debt increased from 11 percent in the 1980s to 15 percent of GDP by the end of the 1990s.
- The ratio of domestic debt to broad money has been constant at about 40 percent throughout the period, with some countries observing ratios of almost 100 percent.
- Commercial banks hold more than half of the outstanding domestic debt.
- Most domestic markets were of a short-term nature with the most common maturity being three months; the average maturity for fifteen SSA countries for which data were available was only 231 days.
- Domestic interest payments, on average, assumed about one-tenth of total revenue.
- Countries that have to set aside more than 15 percent of their revenues to pay interest on domestic debt include: The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.
- HIPCs have accumulated less domestic debt but have almost a similar ratio of domestic debt to broad money compared with non-HIPCs due to smaller financial intermediation.
- HIPCs face much higher market risks because of the shorter maturity structure of domestic debt than in non-HIPCs.
- Domestic debt financing was found to be much more expensive than foreign borrowing; domestic interest payments almost equal foreign ones in HIPCs despite smaller amounts of domestic debt.

### Analysis of mechanisms and implications
- Expansion in domestic debt has had a significant negative impact on private sector lending because commercial banks hold more than half of outstanding domestic debt.
- Thin and shallow financial markets amplify the crowding-out effects of domestic borrowing.
- Short average maturities increase market and rollover risks for governments.
- Rising real treasury bill rates following financial liberalization contributed to higher domestic borrowing costs.
- High concessionality of external borrowing reduces the relative cost advantage of domestic debt, making domestic interest burdens similar to foreign ones.
- An outright reduction of domestic debt risks injecting liquidity into the system and endangering macroeconomic stability unless offset by sterilizing operations.

### Policy implications and reform options
- Consider debt reduction schemes for domestic debt similar in objective to the HIPC Initiative, but designed to avoid injecting liquidity into the domestic system (example approach: donor-financed trust fund used to retire domestic debt while absorbing liquidity through foreign exchange operations, as in Cape Verde).
- Extend the maturity structure of domestic debt to reduce market and rollover risks, acknowledging potential higher debt-service costs from longer-term bonds.
- Accompany maturity extension with broader reforms to increase demand for long-term paper:
  - Strengthen and expand the insurance and pension sector.
  - Strengthen corporate governance and institutions.
- Improve foreign access to holdings of domestic debt to:
  - Strengthen competition and reduce financing costs.
  - Introduce financial technology and innovation to raise market efficiency.

*Source: IMF working paper content unit _wp0446 - 0.15 percent.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/_wp0446.pdf_