## _wp05115

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### III. Separation of Political Powers — major findings
- Main dichotomy: presidential versus parliamentary systems; four parliamentary variants identified: Westminster parliamentary monarchies, non-Westminster parliamentary monarchies, parliamentary republics, semipresidential systems.
- Presidential systems:
  - Head of executive (president) directly elected.
  - “Pure” presidential systems lack a prime minister.
  - Cabinet members typically chosen from outside legislative chambers.
- Semi-presidential systems:
  - Both a president and a prime minister.
  - Prime minister usually drawn from the legislature and often more authoritative in budget matters where the president is ceremonial.
- Parliamentary systems:
  - No clear-cut separation of powers between legislature and executive.
  - Government survival depends on parliamentary support; prime minister and Cabinet typically come from parliament.
  - In Westminster systems Cabinet ministers must be members of parliament; this is not necessarily the case in other parliamentary systems.
- Reserve powers of head of state typically exist but are usually exercised on advice of head of government.

### III.B. Separation of political powers and control of the executive — key descriptions
- Seven factors determine the degree of separation of powers; five factors determine control of the executive by the legislature.
- Broadly linear relationship across five forms of government between the separation of powers and legislative control of the executive (Figure 1):
  - Presidential systems: political separation and legislative control are particularly high.
  - Westminster: at the opposite extreme (low separation, low legislative control over executive).
  - Semipresidential, parliamentary republic, non-Westminster parliamentary monarchies occupy intermediate positions.
- Conceptual note: historical notions of separation (Montesquieu) emphasize independence and specialization; later concepts introduced hierarchy which does not always equate to control (Westminster example).

### IV. Authority of the Legislature to Shape the Budget — framework and dimensions
- Framework draws on Oppenheimer (1983); six dimensions including stages of legislative budget processes.
- Ex ante budget powers — key questions:
  - Does the legislature formally approve a binding medium-term budget framework guiding the executive?
  - Does that framework cover broad aggregates (total revenue, total expenditure, overall balance, level of debt) or allocation of spending?
  - Can the legislature amend the annual budget without restriction (revenues, expenditures, balance) or must it adopt the executive’s proposal exactly?
  - Time, committee structure, and research capacity affect the legislature’s ability to formulate alternatives.
- During budget execution:
  - Annual budget law sets legally binding upper limits for discretionary expenditures.
  - Rules for virement within expenditure categories usually prescribed by law; very strong legislative control disallows virement.
  - For non-discretionary spending (social transfers, interest on debt), legislatures often allow executive to exceed indicative limits.
  - Legislatures may restrict executive from reducing approved expenditures when revenue shortfalls occur — more likely in presidential systems.
- Ex post budget authority:
  - Independent external audit office reports to the legislature on budget outcomes and annual financial statements.
  - Strong legislative follow-up on audit recommendations can improve financial management practices.
  - Ex post powers oriented to improving procedures; less likely to affect shape and size of future budgets.
- Index of the legislature’s budgetary authority:
  - Constructed on five particularly important criteria (Annex 2); excludes some variables judged less relevant to shaping annual budget (interim/supplementary budgets, committee questionings, strength of budget-related parliamentary committees).
  - Wehner (2004) used 15 criteria in an alternative index; supplementary budgets noted as an important omitted variable in some countries (e.g., Japan).

### V. Separateness of the Legislature and Its Budget Authority — empirical patterns and determinants
- Broad political separateness and legislative control over the executive do not map one-to-one onto legislative budgetary powers (Figure 2).
  - Selected budgetary powers of non-Westminster monarchies are higher than those of semipresidential systems, contrary to expectations based solely on separation of political powers.
  - Inclusion of two semipresidential countries—Ireland and Greece—with particularly weak legislative budgetary powers materially affects averages.
  - Country-specific influences matter; the shape of results would differ if other semipresidential countries (e.g., Eastern European examples) were in the sample.
- Conclusion: for each form of government, country-specific political, legal, and other factors attenuate or strengthen legislative budgetary powers.

### V.A. Political variables that influence budgetary powers — enumerated mechanisms
- Political parties and voting system:
  - Electoral laws influence number and strength of parties; first-past-the-post favors two-party systems; two-round systems favor two main blocks.
  - Cohesive single-party governments strengthen centralized executive budget authority, often headed by a Minister of Finance.
  - Centralized executives may propose restrictive budget process laws or withhold budget information from the legislature.
- Majority versus minority governments (parliamentary systems):
  - Minority governments must negotiate with parties outside government, increasing legislature’s budget powers relative to majority governments.
- Presidential systems with multiple parties:
  - Risk of deadlock depends on congressional seat share of the president’s party, presidential veto powers, and majorities required to override vetoes.
  - Complications arise if vice-president belongs to a different party than the president.
- Bicameralism:
  - A second chamber, if it has budgetary powers, strengthens the legislature’s budgetary position.
  - Independently elected second chambers with different electoral systems can create inter-house disagreements over budget proposals.
  - Second chamber may be able to veto budget legislation already adopted by government and first chamber (Germany example).

### Cross-cutting implications for budget governance (IV–V)
- Strong central budget authority in the executive and constraints on legislative amendment powers are associated with disciplining legislatures and maintaining sustainable fiscal positions (literature since 1990s; von Hagen, Baldini).
- The capacity of legislatures to shape budgets depends on formal legal powers and on non-legal, country-specific political dynamics (party systems, government majorities, bicameral structures, institutional resources).

### Box 1 — Germany: bicameralism and budget powers (summary)
- Institutional setting and mechanics:
  - Bundestag has strong budgetary powers and a budget committee that actively examines the draft annual budget law.
  - Bundesrat (second chamber, representing Länder) possesses considerable budget powers:
    - No tax legislation can be adopted without Bundesrat approval.
    - In principle, only Bundestag approval is required for adoption of expenditure proposals, but Bundesrat may block the entire budget in practice, particularly when the government does not hold a majority in the Bundesrat.
  - Timing and electoral cycles amplify conflicts: minority parties in the Bundestag typically gain seats in the Bundesrat during Land elections, causing government loss of majority in the Bundesrat.
- Politics, veto players, and outcomes:
  - More veto players can increase fiscal deficits (cited literature); counterexamples exist (Sweden, New Zealand).
- Constitutional and legal constraints:
  - Five constraints form the index of legislature budgetary powers used in the study; legislatures may “win back” powers (examples: United States in 1974; France’s Organic Budget Law in 2001).
- Examples of other institutional mechanisms:
  - United States: three budgetary cycles; 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act created Budget Committees and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
  - Sweden: two-stage budget approval (Spring Fiscal Policy Bill and later detailed appropriations), with committee involvement and timing rules.

### Box 4 — Ireland: inherited features of budget system (summary)
- Inherited Westminster features produce weak parliamentary budgetary powers in Ireland:
  - President follows ministers’ advice; limited independent powers.
  - No separation of political power; Cabinet ministers are members of parliament.
  - Cabinet decides essential budget issues; the Cabinet’s proposed budget cannot be amended.
  - The Dáil may not vote money unless requested by the government.
  - The second chamber has no authority to amend the annual budget.
  - Parliamentary committees are weak; Public Accounts Committee focuses on ex post execution, not ex ante budget.
  - No legal requirement for the budget to be presented by a certain date.
- Comparative institutional mechanisms limiting legislative budget power:
  - Constitutional provisions (example: Mexico’s prohibition on consecutive legislative terms) can impede legislative budgeting expertise.
  - Royal prerogative in the United Kingdom is a source of executive determination of annual appropriations.
  - Presidential systems tend to have separated powers and powerful legislative budget committees (United States example: CBO; statutory 8-month advance submission requirement).
- Non-legal constraints:
  - Coalition agreements and annual budget agreements can voluntarily constrain legislatures (examples: Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden).
  - Such voluntary agreements have exerted powerful influence in reducing deficits and debt levels.
- Other institutional trends:
  - Medium-term fiscal strategies: most OECD countries include at least two-year outlooks; the United States is the only country whose legislature adopts a budget resolution specifying a medium-term macro-fiscal strategy.
  - Fiscal rules and supranational constraints: Maastricht treaty limits—3 percent of GDP deficit and 60 percent of GDP debt for euro area countries.
  - Legislative Budget Offices: examples include United States’ CBO, Mexico’s Center for Public Finance (1998), Korea’s National Assembly Budget Office (law adopted in 2003).
  - Debate length varies across systems (United States: President must present draft 8 months before fiscal year; Indonesia: 4-5 months; parliamentary systems: 2-4 months; Westminster: budget need not be presented prior to fiscal year start).
- Empirical indices and Ireland’s position:
  - Overall Index of Separation of Political Powers (total possible score = 14): 14 7.5 6 5.5 0
  - Legislature’s Budgetary Powers — country-level scoring (selected entries from Annex II, Table 2):
    - Ireland (Type of government: Semipresidential): 1. Medium-term framework = 0; 2. Amendment powers = 0; 3. Time for scrutiny of budget = 0; 4. Technical support to legislature = 0; 5. Restrictions during execution = 0; Total index = 0
    - United States (Presidential): 1. Medium-term framework = 1; 2. Amendment powers = 3; 3. Time for scrutiny of budget = 2; 4. Technical support to legislature = 2; 5. Restrictions during execution = 2; Total index = 10
    - Italy (Parliam. Republic): 1. Medium-term framework = 2; 2. Amendment powers = 3; 3. Time for scrutiny of budget = 1; 4. Technical support to legislature = 0; 5. Restrictions during execution = 1; Total index = 7
    - Sweden (Parlia. Monarchy): 1. Medium-term framework = 1; 2. Amendment powers = 3; 3. Time for scrutiny of budget = 1; 4. Technical support to legislature = 1; 5. Restrictions during execution = 2; Total index = 9
  - Key empirical point: Ireland’s composite score in the Legislature’s Budget Authority index is reported as Total index = 0, reflecting absence or weakness across all five measured dimensions.
- Main conclusions relevant to budgetary design and reform:
  - Strong link between political separation and legislative budget authority exists, but the relationship is neither linear nor stable over time.
  - Country-specific factors (electoral systems, party decision-making, legal frameworks, historical customs) often matter more than formal government form.
  - Strengthening legislative budget authority typically requires a combination of legal/institutional reforms (timing requirements, amendment powers, technical support) and political changes (electoral incentives, party rules) tailored to country-specific context.

*Source: _wp05115 (2005) — contents and selected text provided in the supplied PDF content.*

### 2005. The author is grateful to Professor Hoffman-Martinot (University of Bordeaux), Professor Emeritus

### _wp05115 - 2005. The author is grateful to Professor Hoffman-Martinot (University of Bordeaux), Professor Emeritus Montagnier (University of Lyon), Professor Wehner (London School of Economics), and Céline Allard, Ana Corbacho, Ketil Hviding, Bogdan Lissovolik, James Morsink, Brian Olden, Marc Robinson and Silvana Tendelli (all IMF) for comments on the earlier version. Nataly Sabharwal provided excellent research assistance. Any remaining errors are the author’s.

### III. Separation of Political Powers under Different Forms of Government — major findings
- Main dichotomy: presidential versus parliamentary systems; four parliamentary variants identified (Westminster parliamentary monarchies, non-Westminster parliamentary monarchies, parliamentary republics, semipresidential systems).
- Presidential systems: head of executive (president) directly elected; “pure” presidential systems lack a prime minister; Cabinet members typically chosen from outside legislative chambers.
- Semi-presidential systems: both a president and a prime minister; prime minister usually drawn from the legislature and often more authoritative in budget matters where the president is ceremonial.
- Parliamentary systems: no clear-cut separation of powers between legislature and executive; government survival depends on parliamentary support; prime minister and Cabinet typically come from parliament.
- In Westminster systems Cabinet ministers must be members of parliament; this is not necessarily the case in other parliamentary systems.
- Reserve powers of head of state typically exist but are usually exercised on advice of head of government.

### III.B. Separation of political powers and control of the executive — key descriptions
- Seven factors determine the degree of separation of powers; five factors determine control of the executive by the legislature (see Annex 1).
- Broadly linear relationship across five forms of government between the separation of powers and legislative control of the executive (Figure 1).
  - Presidential systems: political separation and legislative control are particularly high.
  - Westminster: at the opposite extreme (low separation, low legislative control over executive).
  - Semipresidential, parliamentary republic, non-Westminster parliamentary monarchies occupy intermediate positions.
- Conceptual note: historical notions of separation (Montesquieu) emphasize independence and specialization; later concepts introduced hierarchy which does not always equate to control (Westminster example).

### IV. Authority of the Legislature to Shape the Budget — framework and dimensions
- Legislative influence frameworks draw on Oppenheimer (1983); six dimensions including stages of legislative budget processes.
- Ex ante budget powers:
  - Does the legislature formally approve a binding medium-term budget framework guiding the executive?
  - Does that framework cover broad aggregates (total revenue, total expenditure, overall balance, level of debt) or allocation of spending?
  - Can the legislature amend the annual budget without restriction (revenues, expenditures, balance) or must it adopt the executive’s proposal exactly?
  - Time, committee structure, and research capacity affect the legislature’s ability to formulate alternatives.
- During budget execution:
  - Annual budget law sets legally binding upper limits for discretionary expenditures.
  - Rules for virement within expenditure categories usually prescribed by law; very strong legislative control disallows virement.
  - For non-discretionary spending (social transfers, interest on debt), legislatures often allow executive to exceed indicative limits.
  - Legislatures may restrict executive from reducing approved expenditures when revenue shortfalls occur — more likely in presidential systems.
- Ex post budget authority:
  - Independent external audit office reports to the legislature on budget outcomes and annual financial statements.
  - Strong legislative follow-up on audit recommendations can improve financial management practices.
  - Ex post powers oriented to improving procedures; less likely to affect shape and size of future budgets.
- Index of the legislature’s budgetary authority:
  - Constructed on five particularly important criteria (Annex 2); excludes some variables judged less relevant to shaping annual budget (interim/supplementary budgets, committee questionings, strength of budget-related parliamentary committees).
  - Wehner (2004) used 15 criteria in an alternative index; supplementary budgets noted as an important omitted variable in some countries (e.g., Japan).

### V. Separateness of the Legislature and Its Budget Authority — empirical patterns and determinants
- Broad political separateness and legislative control over the executive do not map one-to-one onto legislative budgetary powers (Figure 2).
  - Selected budgetary powers of non-Westminster monarchies are higher than those of semipresidential systems, contrary to expectations based solely on separation of political powers.
  - Inclusion of two semipresidential countries—Ireland and Greece—with particularly weak legislative budgetary powers materially affects averages.
  - Country-specific influences matter; the shape of results would differ if other semipresidential countries (e.g., Eastern European examples) were in the sample.
- Conclusion: for each form of government, country-specific political, legal, and other factors attenuate or strengthen legislative budgetary powers.

### V.A. Political variables that influence budgetary powers — enumerated mechanisms
- Political parties and voting system:
  - Electoral laws influence number and strength of parties; first-past-the-post favors two-party systems; two-round systems favor two main blocks.
  - Cohesive single-party governments strengthen centralized executive budget authority, often headed by a Minister of Finance.
  - Centralized executives may propose restrictive budget process laws or withhold budget information from the legislature.
- Majority versus minority governments (parliamentary systems):
  - Minority governments must negotiate with parties outside government, increasing legislature’s budget powers relative to majority governments.
- Presidential systems with multiple parties:
  - Risk of deadlock depends on congressional seat share of the president’s party, presidential veto powers, and majorities required to override vetoes.
  - Complications arise if vice-president belongs to a different party than the president.
- Bicameralism:
  - A second chamber, if it has budgetary powers, strengthens the legislature’s budgetary position.
  - Independently elected second chambers with different electoral systems can create inter-house disagreements over budget proposals.
  - Second chamber may be able to veto budget legislation already adopted by government and first chamber (Germany example referenced in Box 1).

### IV–V cross-cutting implications for budget governance
- Strong central budget authority in the executive and constraints on legislative amendment powers are associated with disciplining legislatures and maintaining sustainable fiscal positions (literature since 1990s; von Hagen, Baldini).
- The capacity of legislatures to shape budgets depends on formal legal powers and on non-legal, country-specific political dynamics (party systems, government majorities, bicameral structures, institutional resources).

*Source: _wp05115 (2005) — contents and selected text provided in the supplied PDF content.*

### Box 1. Germany—Bicameralism and Budget Powers of the Legislature

### Box 1. Germany—Bicameralism and Budget Powers of the Legislature

### Institutional setting and mechanics
- The house of representatives (Bundestag) has strong budgetary powers and a Bundestag budget committee actively examines the draft annual budget law.
- New legislative proposals that affect the budget have to be approved by the government, enabling parties of coalition governments to have their budgetary policies adopted in the Bundestag.
- The second chamber (Bundesrat), representing the interests of the regions (Land), possesses considerable budget powers:
  - No tax legislation can be adopted without Bundesrat approval.
  - In principle, only the approval of the first chamber (Bundestag) is required for adoption of expenditure proposals of the annual federal budget.
  - In practice, the Bundesrat may block the entire budget already approved by the government and the Bundestag, particularly when the government does not hold a majority in the Bundesrat.
- Timing and electoral cycles amplify the problem:
  - The issue is acute during the latter half of the Bundestag’s electoral cycles, as minority parties in the Bundestag typically gain seats in the Bundesrat during Land elections (which have a different electoral cycle from the federation), causing the government to lose its majority in the Bundesrat.
- Empirical correlation noted:
  - Fluctuations in the size of the consolidated deficit of all levels of government appears to be correlated with the government’s majority (or lack thereof) in the Bundesrat.

### Politics, veto players, and outcomes
- Multiparty systems and bicameralism illustrate broader theories on political influence over budgetary powers:
  - Some authors show that an increasing number of veto players can increase the size of fiscal deficits (Heller, 1997; Tsebelis, 1995).
  - Counterexamples exist where many veto players did not prevent deficit reduction—Sweden in the 1990s reduced a fiscal deficit to a surplus despite opposition veto power.
  - New Zealand, after adopting German-style mixed member proportional (MMP) representation in 1996, continued to maintain fiscal surplus under MMP, contrasting with large deficits experienced under the prior majoritarian system (Boston et. al., 2003).

### Constitutional and legal constraints on executive budgetary powers (contextual points from the chapter)
- Five constraints form the index of legislature budgetary powers used in the study; constitutional or legal constraints on executives arise for several reasons:
  - The legislature may seek to “win back” powers lost in earlier periods, especially under divided government (example: United States in 1974; France’s Organic Budget Law in 2001).
  - Parliamentary systems allow governments to initiate laws and therefore potentially strengthen their own budgetary powers; majoritarian governments with unicameral legislatures are particularly likely to approve government budget proposals.
  - Constitutional constraints can be imposed to reduce political instability and improve budget control (examples: France in 1958; Germany amended the constitution in the 1960s to incorporate Keynesian exceptions to the prohibition of deficits on current transactions).

### Examples of institutional mechanisms from other countries (contextual)
- United States (Box 2 summary):
  - Three budgetary cycles identified: Pre-1921 (legislature controlled), 1921-1973 (executive dominated), Post-1973 (legislature regained dominance).
  - In 1974, Congress adopted the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act which:
    - prevented the executive from refusing to spend congressionally-approved budget programs;
    - limited deferrals of approved expenditures into the next fiscal year;
    - established a Budget Committee in each chamber with powers to establish the annual budget framework;
    - created a new non-partisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) with some 250 staff, providing Congress with independent budget analyses.
- Sweden (Box 3 summary; two-stage budget approval introduced by 1996 State Budget Law):
  - April: government proposes “top-down” expenditure ceilings in a Spring Fiscal Policy Bill; May: Riksdag examines Bill; June: non legally-binding decision.
  - September: Government presents Budget Bill; Opposition presents alternatives.
  - November: Riksdag decides expenditure ceiling for the next few years; Committee on Finance proposes ceilings for each of the 27 separate expenditure areas and takes a position on taxes and revenues; other committees give opinions; committees propose allocations.
  - Mid-December: Riksdag takes formal decision on detailed annual budget appropriations.

### Other legal mechanisms and trends (from the chapter)
- Medium-term fiscal strategies:
  - In most OECD countries, a medium fiscal outlook covering at least two years beyond the new budget year accompanies the proposed annual budget law.
  - The United States is the only country whose legislature adopts a budget resolution specifying a medium-term macro-fiscal strategy.
  - Italy’s parliament approves a medium-term strategy prepared by the government; binding limits relate only to the year following the budget year.
  - Sweden’s parliament approves a medium-term strategy where expenditure limits may be binding for a number of years.
- Fiscal rules and supranational constraints:
  - Many countries have adopted laws with fiscal rules—quantitative or qualitative constraints on deficits, expenditure or debt.
  - The Maastricht treaty imposes limits on general government deficits (3 percent of GDP) and debt (60 percent of GDP) for euro area countries; the European Commission scrutinizes national budgets for conformity.
- Legislative budget offices and debate length:
  - Laws may create a Budget Office at the Legislature; examples: United States’ CBO, Mexico’s Center for Public Finance (1998), Korea’s National Assembly Budget Office (law adopted in 2003).
  - Debate length varies by system:
    - United States: President must present a draft budget 8 months before the new fiscal year begins (statutory).
    - Indonesia: law requires presentation to Congress 4-5 months before the new fiscal year begins.
    - Most parliamentary systems: 2-4 months to debate the annual budget in parliament.
    - In Westminster countries, the annual budget law does not have to be presented to parliament prior to the beginning of the new fiscal year.

### Non-legal constraints: coalition and annual agreements
- Coalition agreements—majoritarian government:
  - In parliamentary systems with proportional representation, inter-party agreements are important; examples include the Netherlands and Finland, where coalition agreements can specify detailed budgetary rules.
  - Coalition agreements have exerted powerful influence in reducing fiscal deficits and debt levels (Hallerberg, 2004; Schick, 2002b).
- Annual budget agreements—minority governments:
  - Minority governments often reach annual budget agreements with selected opposition parties prior to the presentation of the draft budget (examples: Denmark, Norway, Sweden).
  - These agreements can specify annual expenditure ceilings and effectively constrain legislative amendments during parliamentary debate.
- Voluntary nature of agreements:
  - Coalition government agreements or minority government budget agreements are voluntary constraints; legislatures in non-Westminster monarchies (Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden) often voluntarily constrain amendments despite having unrestricted legal powers.

### Other country-specific factors
- Inheritance from former ruling powers:
  - Budget systems are often modeled on former colonial rulers, notably in anglophone and francophone Africa; absent strong pressures, balances of budgetary powers can remain unchanged for long periods (example: Ireland retaining Westminster features).

*Sources: Decressin and Braumann, 2004; OECD, 2003; Wehner, 2001.*

### Box 4. Ireland—Inherited Features of Budget System

### Box 4. Ireland—Inherited Features of Budget System

### Inherited features of Ireland’s budget system
- Ireland’s Parliament (the Dáil) has weak budgetary powers. Many features of the role of parliament and the head of state are due to the inheritance of the Westminster system. The strong budgetary powers of the Irish executive are mirrored in the British budget system. In particular:
  - The President of Ireland has very few independent powers and always follows the advice of his/her ministers.
  - There is no separation of political power. The President is an integral part of Parliament. All Cabinet ministers must also be members of the Irish parliament.
  - The Cabinet of Ministers decides all essential budget issues. The Cabinet’s proposed budget cannot be amended.
  - The Dáil may not vote money unless it is so requested by the government.
  - The second chamber of the Dáil has no authority to amend the annual budget.
  - Parliamentary committees are weak. The most influential committee is the Public Accounts Committee, which focuses on ex post budget execution, not on the ex ante budget.
  - There is no legal requirement for the budget to be presented by a certain date.
- Source: Ireland (2005)

### Comparative institutional observations and mechanisms limiting legislative budget power
- Specific constitutional provisions may prevent a strong legislature:
  - Example: Mexico’s constitution prohibits consecutive legislative terms by members of the chamber of deputies. Hence, they can never become experienced and influential on congressional budget-related committees. The Mexican legislature has not established a dedicated budget committee. In the past Mexico’s chamber of deputies served to legitimize the president’s budget proposals (Meyers, 2000). The anti-reelection heritage is a barrier to the development of legislative budgeting expertise.
- Royal prerogative and Westminster legacy:
  - In the United Kingdom, the “royal prerogative” comprises powers unique to the executive that the courts recognise it possesses for carrying out government business. With respect to the budget, it is a reason why the executive (not parliament) determines the structure of the annual appropriations and a source of strong Treasury control over expenditures (Daintinth and Page, 1999).
- Presidential systems vs. Westminster parliamentary monarchies:
  - Presidential systems tend to have strongly separated powers and powerful legislatures with influential budget-related committees (United States example).
  - United States specifics: An independent nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office provides a powerful counterweight to the President’s Office of Budget Management. This budget must be submitted to the legislature by the President eight months before the beginning of the new fiscal year—much further in advance than any other country.
- Intermediate/other forms of government:
  - Differences in budget powers among semipresidential forms, parliamentary republics, and non-Westminster parliamentary monarchies vary considerably and are often determined by country-specific factors rather than form of government.
  - Electoral and voting systems (two-party, coalition, minority governments), the budget powers of a second chamber, and political party decision-making processes are important determinants of relative executive/legislative strength in budgeting.
  - In multi-party systems, party agreements and the need to preserve fragile coalitions or minority government arrangements often constrain legislatures from fully exercising formal budget amendment powers.
- Legal and constitutional constraints:
  - Constitutions and laws may include explicit limitations on the legislature’s ability to amend draft budgets.
  - Laws with legally binding quantitative limits on deficits or debt have been adopted in some countries, with varying degrees of success; other countries prefer qualitative fiscal rules in budget systems laws.
- Cultural and historical factors:
  - Country-specific traditions and long-standing conventions (e.g., the “royal prerogative” in the United Kingdom, budgetary consensus mechanisms in Japan) can shape the balance of budgetary power and may vary over time.

### Empirical indices and Ireland’s position
- Overall Index of Separation of Political Powers (total possible score = 14) as reported in the source:
  - 14 7.5 6 5.5 0
- Legislature’s Budgetary Powers—country-level scoring (selected entries from Annex II, Table 2):
  - Ireland (Type of government: Semipresidential): 1. Medium-term framework = 0; 2. Amendment powers = 0; 3. Time for scrutiny of budget = 0; 4. Technical support to legislature = 0; 5. Restrictions during execution = 0; Total index = 0
  - United States (Presidential): 1. Medium-term framework = 1; 2. Amendment powers = 3; 3. Time for scrutiny of budget = 2; 4. Technical support to legislature = 2; 5. Restrictions during execution = 2; Total index = 10
  - Italy (Parliam. Republic): 1. Medium-term framework = 2; 2. Amendment powers = 3; 3. Time for scrutiny of budget = 1; 4. Technical support to legislature = 0; 5. Restrictions during execution = 1; Total index = 7
  - Sweden (Parlia. Monarchy): 1. Medium-term framework = 1; 2. Amendment powers = 3; 3. Time for scrutiny of budget = 1; 4. Technical support to legislature = 1; 5. Restrictions during execution = 2; Total index = 9
- Key empirical point for Ireland: Ireland’s composite score in the Legislature’s Budget Authority index is reported as Total index = 0, reflecting absence or weakness across all five measured dimensions (medium-term framework, amendment powers, time for scrutiny, technical support, restrictions during execution).

### Main conclusions relevant to budgetary design and reform
- There is a strong link between the political powers of legislatures and the degree of separation of the legislative and executive branches; Westminster parliamentary monarchies exhibit extremely weak separation and correspondingly weak legislative budgetary authority.
- Presidential systems (example: United States) concentrate budgetary initiation in the executive but are counterbalanced by strong, multiple legislative committees and independent budget analysis institutions.
- The relationship between separation of powers and legislative budgetary authority is neither linear nor stable over time; country-specific factors (electoral systems, party decision-making arrangements, legal frameworks, historical customs) are often more important than formal governmental form in determining legislative budget powers.
- Practical implication: Strengthening legislative budget authority typically requires a combination of legal/institutional reforms (timing requirements, amendment powers, technical support) and political changes (electoral incentives, party rules) tailored to country-specific context.

*Source: _wp05115 - Box 4. Ireland—Inherited Features of Budget System*

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