## _wp05181

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---

### I. Introduction — Motivation and objectives
- Rapid increase in the United States’ net foreign liabilities raised questions about foreign investors’ willingness to continue to hold or acquire U.S. assets.
- Federal Reserve Board officials noted that the decline in the U.S. net international investment position (NIIP) is not sustainable over a longer time period (Ferguson, 2005; Greenspan, 2005).
- Concerns highlighted:
  - Global investment portfolios may contain excessive holdings of U.S. assets.
  - Financing of the current account deficit has recently shifted from equity to debt instruments.
  - Both trends are potential triggers of a disorderly exchange rate adjustment with harmful effects on financial markets and real activity (Cline, 2005; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2004).
- Paper objectives:
  - Analyze indicators of the U.S. NIIP from a portfolio perspective.
  - Examine whether investment portfolios have become more or less internationally diversified over time.
  - Decompose the increase in foreign claims on the United States into growth of U.S. financial markets versus decline in home bias.
  - Compare the share of foreign portfolio exposure to U.S. assets with the benchmark share of U.S. assets in the world portfolio.
  - Compare the U.S. NIIP with that of other countries, including breakdowns by investment category and recent changes.

### II. Measurement of global portfolio shares — Definitions and metrics
- Conceptual benchmark: international capital asset pricing model — investor’s portfolio share in a country equals that country’s weight in the outstanding global financial stock.
- Empirical reality: pronounced investor “home bias.”

- Home bias (domestic investors):
  - BiasHome = (W / (D - W)) * (A* / A)
    - A* = domestic holdings of foreign assets
    - A = domestic holdings of all assets
    - D = size of the domestic market
    - W = size of the world financial market
  - Interpretation:
    - Value of zero = no holdings of foreign assets.
    - Value of one = portfolio perfectly diversified geographically.
    - For small countries denominator is close to one; for large countries (especially the United States) denominator is lower and expected foreign asset share is lower.

- Foreign investors’ bias toward a particular country (issuer perspective):
  - BiasInvestors' Foreign = (W / (D - W)) * (L* / A)
    - L* = foreign holdings of domestic assets

- Overall internationalization of a country’s financial market:
  - Internationalization = 100 * (1/2) * ((W / (D - W)) * (A* / A + L* / A))

- Indebtedness scaled by domestic market:
  - Indebtedness = 100 * ((W / (D - W)) * (L* / A - A* / A))

- Rationale for scaling NIIP by domestic market size:
  - Facilitates examination of indebtedness based on portfolio shares.
  - NIIP typically stated as ratio to GDP mixes stock and flow concepts; scaling by domestic market reveals whether negative NIIP is large relative to domestic market and whether high exposure of foreign investors to domestic assets might constrain further indebtedness.

- Data scope and limitations:
  - Size of domestic financial markets measured as stock of financial instruments outstanding for 45 countries.
  - Analysis of foreign holdings of domestic financial instruments limited to 22 advanced economies.
  - Caveats:
    - Domestic equity outstanding may not include market value of issuance abroad by domestic corporations.
    - Financial stocks not adjusted for derivatives or other complex instruments.
    - Country surveys may not capture final ownership (custodial holdings issues).
    - International holdings data tend to understate assets relative to liabilities, producing an upward bias for net international indebtedness (Bertaut and Griever, 2004).
    - Because U.S. rate of return on foreign claims exceeds the rate it pays on foreign-held claims, the indebtedness concept overstates the economic burden of the U.S. negative NIIP (Cline, 2005).
    - Valuation changes further weaken the link between current account balance and change in NIIP (see Box 1).

### III. Valuation changes and the NIIP (Box 1)
- Accounting identity (as presented):
  - ∆niip_t ≈ – fa_t + vc_t – NIIP_{t-1} * g_t
    - fa_t = financial account balance as share of GDP (approximate inverse of current account balance)
    - vc_t = sum of valuation changes as share of GDP
    - g_t = growth rate of nominal GDP
- BEA (2005) decomposition splits valuation changes since 1990 into price changes, exchange rate changes, and other valuation changes.
- Empirical observations:
  - Since 1990, net valuation changes have eased the impact of financial flows on the NIIP.
  - Valuation changes in the past three years improved the NIIP by 11.3 percent of GDP, offsetting a large proportion of the financial-flow driven deterioration.
  - Cumulative effect on the NIIP of valuation changes:
    - 1990–2001: a loss of about 1.7 percent of GDP (net valuation changes were also negative in the 1980s).
  - Year-to-year persistence in valuation changes is low: “essentially no correlation between the change in one year and the next.”
  - Correlations:
    - Without valuation changes, expected correlation between a country’s current account balance and the change in its NIIP is 1.
    - In this dataset, the correlation is only 0.1 (the correlation for the United States is also 0.1).
- Mechanisms:
  - Differences in performance of domestic and foreign equity markets and exchange rate movements affect gross foreign assets and liabilities asymmetrically.
  - Example: U.S. foreign assets are mostly denominated in foreign currency and U.S. foreign liabilities in domestic currency; a dollar depreciation boosts dollar value of U.S. asset holdings without changing dollar value of liabilities, improving the NIIP.
- Noted data point:
  - Paper notes a "14.8 percent of GDP deficit in financial flows in those years."

### IV. Financial deepening and internationalization — Trends and magnitudes
- Financial deepening (industrial countries):
  - Stocks of debt, equity, and loans expanded from around 300 percent of aggregate GDP in 1990 to around 450 percent in 2003.
  - Expansion interrupted temporarily by the bursting of the global equity market bubble.
  - The United States relies more heavily on debt and equity financing and less on bank financing relative to other industrial countries, reflecting larger role of U.S. securities markets.

- Portfolio internationalization trends:
  - Holdings of foreign assets more than doubled as a share of GDP since the early 1990s.
  - Portfolio internationalization increased to one-and-a-half times its 1990 level.
  - Rapid growth in global financial markets was a larger contributor to increased foreign asset holdings than the decline in home bias.

- Decomposition of U.S. liabilities and assets (1990–2003):
  - Liabilities:
    - Growth in U.S. markets would have caused foreign holdings to increase from 42 percent of GDP to 64 percent of GDP since 1990.
    - Increased propensity of foreign investors to hold U.S. assets added another 31 percent of GDP (about half the increase in debt securities liabilities).
  - Assets:
    - Growth in foreign markets would have caused U.S. holdings to increase from 37 percent of GDP to 56 percent of GDP.
    - Fall in the home bias of U.S. investors contributed an additional 13 percent of GDP, mainly in equity and FDI.

- Country patterns:
  - Foreign investors’ bias against U.S. assets and U.S. investors’ bias against foreign assets is slightly larger than for other countries.
  - The overall gap between U.S. home bias and that of other countries has widened recently.
  - Highly internationalized portfolios: United Kingdom, Switzerland, Ireland, and Norway (Norway’s international holdings grew rapidly due to accumulating oil wealth).

### V. Determinants of portfolio internationalization — Regression findings
- Regression specification: Ln(Internationalization) = α + β * Ln(Size) + ε.
- Key results (as reported):
  - All countries:
    - Coefficient on Economy size: -0.10 ***
    - Coefficient on Financial market size: -0.08 **
    - Standard error: (0.04)(0.03)
    - U.S. p-value: 0.68 0.90
  - Excluding Japan and U.S.:
    - Coefficient on Economy size: -0.07
    - Coefficient on Financial market size: -0.03
    - Standard error: (0.04)(0.04)
    - U.S. p-value: 0.73 0.37
- Interpretation:
  - Larger and more diverse domestic economies are, on average, less internationalized.
  - Results driven by lower internationalization of Japan; when the two largest economies (United States and Japan) are dropped, coefficient on size loses significance.
  - The internationalization of U.S. investment holdings is close to what would be predicted—within one standard error.

### VI. U.S. share in foreign portfolios and foreign absorption capacity
- Benchmark: U.S. benchmark share equals U.S. share in diversifiable assets outstanding, accounting for domestic assets retained by domestic investors.
- Empirical findings:
  - Non-U.S. portfolios are underweight in U.S. equity/FDI and loans, and marketweight in U.S. debt securities.
  - U.S. equity and FDI as a share of foreign portfolios peaked in late 1990s and have since fallen from slightly overweight to well underweight.
  - Portfolio share of U.S. loans increased steadily until falling back in 2002 and 2003.
  - Share of foreign portfolios in U.S. debt securities peaked in 1997 and 2001 before declining more recently.
- Conclusion:
  - These numbers give little indication that foreign absorption capacity of claims on the United States would be constrained in the near future.

### VII. The U.S. NIIP — Composition, magnitudes, and cross-country context
- Aggregate NIIP movements:
  - NIIP moved from a negative position of 3 percent of U.S. market value to 9 percent in 2003, and appears poised to fall further due to continued current account deficits.
- Asset-class specifics:
  - Net equity and FDI position: slightly positive and near industrial country average.
  - Net loan position: slightly negative and near industrial country average.
  - Net debt securities position: weakened substantially, falling to 25 percent of the outstanding market from 13 percent in 1990 (industrial country average is 11 percent).
  - Decline in net debt securities position appears driven mainly by an influx of foreign investment into U.S. debt securities.
- Reserve holdings:
  - At end-2003:
    - Treasuries held as international reserves accounted for over 20 percent of all Treasuries held by the public.
    - 8 percent of agency bonds were also held as reserves.
    - In 1990 these figures were 11 percent and 1 percent, respectively.
  - Excluding reserves:
    - Net debt securities position was –6 percent of the outstanding market in 1990 and –16 percent in 2003.
    - Debt securities excluding reserves accounted for 10 percentage points of the 12 point deterioration in the net debt securities position over the period; reserves accounted for 2 percentage points.

- Cross-country regressions (|NIIP| scale):
  - Regressions: Ln |niip| = α + β * Ln (Size) + ε.
  - All countries:
    - Coefficient on Economy size: -0.40 ***
    - Coefficient on Financial market size: -0.42 **
    - Standard error: (0.19)(0.15)
    - U.S. p-value: 0.17 0.11
  - Excluding Japan and U.S.:
    - Coefficient on Economy size: -0.72 ***
    - Coefficient on Financial market size: -0.75 **
    - Standard error: (0.23)(0.18)
    - U.S. p-value: 0.01 0.00
- Interpretation:
  - Negative relationship between size of the economy and absolute NIIP is statistically significant.
  - The U.S. NIIP is larger than would be predicted given economy and financial market size.
  - In the full sample, the U.S. observation is within two standard errors of the mean; excluding U.S. and Japan, the U.S. observation is more than two standard errors away from the mean.

### VIII. Conclusions and policy-relevant implications
- Key conclusions:
  - United States has experienced financial deepening and internationalization similar to other industrial countries.
  - U.S. markets remain less internationalized than other countries even after adjusting for the U.S. large share of the global market; explained by greater variety of U.S. economic activities reducing need for geographic diversification.
  - Global portfolio data give mixed signals regarding foreigners’ exposure to U.S. assets.
  - The decline in the U.S. net debt position is a cause for concern.
  - While foreign portfolios contain about the expected proportion of U.S. assets and U.S. indebtedness ranks near the middle of industrial countries in most asset classes, the U.S. NIIP is weaker than expected given economy and market size, and the net debt securities position is particularly large.
  - The overall NIIP and the net debt securities position are deteriorating rapidly, and the large current account deficit implies that foreign claims on the United States will continue to mount.

_Source: _wp05181 - References_

### References..............................................................................................................

### _wp05181 - References

### I. Introduction
- Rapid increase in the United States’ net foreign liabilities has raised questions about foreign investors’ willingness to continue to hold or acquire U.S. assets.
- Federal Reserve Board officials have noted that the decline in the U.S. net international investment position (NIIP) is not sustainable over a longer time period (Ferguson, 2005; Greenspan, 2005).
- Concerns highlighted:
  - Global investment portfolios may contain excessive holdings of U.S. assets.
  - Financing of the current account deficit has recently shifted from equity to debt instruments.
  - Both trends are seen as potential triggers of a disorderly exchange rate adjustment with harmful effects on financial markets and real activity (Cline, 2005; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2004).
- Paper objectives:
  - Analyze indicators of the U.S. NIIP from a portfolio perspective.
  - Examine whether investment portfolios have become more or less internationally diversified over time.
  - Decompose the increase in foreign claims on the United States into growth of U.S. financial markets versus decline in home bias.
  - Compare the share of foreign portfolio exposure to U.S. assets with the benchmark share of U.S. assets in the world portfolio.
  - Compare the U.S. NIIP with that of other countries, including breakdowns by investment category and recent changes.

### II. Measurement of Global Portfolio Shares
- Conceptual benchmark: international capital asset pricing model — to maximize international risk sharing, an investor’s portfolio share in a country equals that country’s weight in the outstanding global financial stock.
- Empirical reality: pronounced investor “home bias” (investors favor domestic markets).

- Home bias measure (domestic investors):
  - BiasHome = (W / (D - W)) * (A* / A)   [Equation (1) as presented]
  - Definitions:
    - A* = domestic holdings of foreign assets
    - A = domestic holdings of all assets
    - D = size of the domestic market
    - W = size of the world financial market
  - Interpretation:
    - Value of zero = no holdings of foreign assets.
    - Value of one = portfolio perfectly diversified geographically.
    - For small countries denominator is close to one; for large countries (especially the United States) denominator is lower and expected foreign asset share is lower.

- Foreign investors’ bias toward a particular country (from issuer perspective):
  - BiasInvestors' Foreign = (W / (D - W)) * (L* / A)   [Equation (2) as presented]
    - L* = foreign holdings of domestic assets

- Overall internationalization of a country’s financial market (assets and liabilities):
  - Internationalization = 100 * (1/2) * ((W / (D - W)) * (A* / A + L* / A))   [Equation (3) as presented]

- Measure of indebtedness scaled by domestic market:
  - Indebtedness = 100 * ((W / (D - W)) * (L* / A - A* / A))   [Equation (4) as presented]

- Rationale for scaling NIIP by domestic market size:
  - Facilitates examination of indebtedness based on portfolio shares.
  - NIIP typically stated as ratio to GDP, mixing stock and flow concepts; scaling by domestic market reveals whether negative NIIP is large relative to domestic market and whether high exposure of foreign investors to domestic assets might constrain further indebtedness.

- Data scope and limitations:
  - Size of domestic financial markets = stock of financial instruments outstanding, estimated for 45 countries.
  - Analysis of foreign holdings of domestic financial instruments limited to 22 advanced economies.
  - Caveats and data issues:
    - Domestic equity outstanding may not include market value of issuance abroad by domestic corporations.
    - Financial stocks not adjusted for derivatives or other complex instruments.
    - Country surveys on international holdings may not capture final ownership of instruments (custodial holdings limits).
    - Data on international holdings tend to understate assets compared to liabilities, often resulting in an upward bias for net international indebtedness (Bertaut and Griever, 2004).
    - Because the rate of return the United States earns on foreign claims exceeds the rate it pays on claims held by foreigners, the indebtedness concept overstates the economic burden of the United States’ negative NIIP (Cline, 2005).
    - Valuation changes further complicate analysis by weakening the link between current account balance and change in NIIP (Box 1).

- Data sources referenced for methodology and context:
  - Karolyi and Stulz (2002) for model and survey.
  - Bertaut and Kole (2004) and Sorenson and others (2005) for recent home bias data.
  - Griever, Lee, and Warnock (2001) for in-depth examination of U.S. international financial holdings.
  - Bertaut and Griever (2004) on bias toward net indebtedness.

### III. Trends in Portfolio Internationalization
- Financial deepening (industrial countries):
  - Stocks of debt, equity, and loans expanded from around 300 percent of aggregate GDP in 1990 to around 450 percent in 2003.
  - Expansion interrupted temporarily by the bursting of the global equity market bubble.
  - The United States relies more heavily on debt and equity financing and less on bank financing relative to other industrial countries, reflecting larger role of U.S. securities markets.

- Home bias patterns:
  - Foreign investors’ bias against U.S. assets and U.S. investors’ bias against foreign assets is slightly larger than for other countries.
  - The overall gap between U.S. home bias and that of other countries has widened recently.
  - Countries with highly internationalized portfolios include the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Ireland, and Norway (Norway’s international holdings grew rapidly due to accumulating oil wealth).

- Data and visualization references in source:
  - Figures cited include measures of financial deepening (Figure 1), internationalization of assets and liabilities (Figure 2), internationalization and country size (Figure 3), and country-specific series through 2003.

### Box 1 — Valuation Changes and the International Investment Position
- Change in a country’s NIIP as ratio to GDP:
  - ∆niip_t ≈ – fa_t + vc_t – NIIP_{t-1} * g_t
    - fa_t = financial account balance as share of GDP (approximate inverse of current account balance)
    - vc_t = sum of valuation changes as share of GDP
    - g_t = growth rate of nominal GDP
- BEA (2005) decomposition: valuation changes since 1990 split into changes in the price of assets, exchange rate changes, and other valuation changes.
- Empirical observation:
  - Since 1990, net valuation changes have eased the impact of financial flows on the NIIP.
  - Large positive gains since 2002.
  - Valuation changes in the past three years improved the NIIP by 11.3 percent of GDP, offsetting a large proportion of the (financial-flow driven deterioration).

*Content derived from the source PDF _wp05181 - References..........................................................................................................*

### 14.8 percent of GDP deficit in financial flows in

### _wp05181 - 14.8 percent of GDP deficit in financial flows in

### Valuation changes and the NIIP
- Paper notes a "14.8 percent of GDP deficit in financial flows in those years."
- Valuation changes have tended to have a stabilizing effect on external imbalances (consistent with Gourinchas and Rey (2005)).
- Cumulative effect on the NIIP of valuation changes:
  - 1990–2001: a loss of about 1.7 percent of GDP (net valuation changes were also negative in the 1980s).
- Year-to-year persistence in valuation changes is low; "essentially no correlation between the change in one year and the next," implying valuation changes have not been systematic.
- Correlations:
  - Without valuation changes, expected correlation between a country’s current account balance and the change in its NIIP is 1.
  - In this dataset, the correlation is only 0.1 (the correlation for the United States is also 0.1).
- Mechanisms driving net valuation changes:
  - Differences in performance of domestic and foreign equity markets and exchange rate movements affect gross foreign assets and liabilities asymmetrically.
  - Example: because U.S. foreign assets are mostly denominated in foreign currency and U.S. foreign liabilities in domestic currency, a depreciation of the dollar boosts the dollar value of U.S. asset holdings without changing dollar value of liabilities, improving the NIIP.

### Financial deepening and internationalization of portfolios
- Financial deepening and internationalization trends:
  - Holdings of foreign assets more than doubled as a share of GDP since the early 1990s.
  - Portfolio internationalization increased to one-and-a-half times its 1990 level.
  - Rapid growth in global financial markets was a larger contributor to increased foreign asset holdings than the decline in home bias.
- Decomposition of U.S. liabilities and assets (1990–2003):
  - Liabilities side:
    - Growth in U.S. markets would have caused foreign holdings to increase from 42 percent of GDP to 64 percent of GDP since 1990.
    - Increased propensity of foreign investors to hold U.S. assets added another 31 percent of GDP (about half the increase in debt securities liabilities).
  - Assets side:
    - Growth in foreign markets would have caused U.S. holdings to increase from 37 percent of GDP to 56 percent of GDP.
    - Fall in the home bias of U.S. investors contributed an additional 13 percent of GDP, mainly in equity and FDI.

### Determinants of portfolio internationalization (regression findings)
- Regression specification: Ln(Internationalization) = α + β * Ln(Size) + ε.
- Key regression results (Table 1 summary as reported):
  - All countries:
    - Coefficient on Economy size: -0.10 *** 
    - Coefficient on Financial market size: -0.08 **
    - Standard error: (0.04)(0.03)
    - U.S. p-value: 0.68 0.90
  - Excluding Japan and U.S.:
    - Coefficient on Economy size: -0.07
    - Coefficient on Financial market size: -0.03
    - Standard error: (0.04)(0.04)
    - U.S. p-value: 0.73 0.37
- Interpretation:
  - Domestic economies that are larger and more diverse are, on average, less internationalized.
  - Results are driven by lower internationalization of Japan; when the two largest economies (United States and Japan) are dropped, the coefficient on size loses significance.
  - The internationalization of U.S. investment holdings is close to what would be predicted—within one standard error.

### U.S. share in foreign portfolios and foreign absorption
- Benchmark construction: U.S. benchmark share equals U.S. share in diversifiable assets outstanding, accounting for domestic assets retained by domestic investors.
- Empirical findings:
  - Non-U.S. portfolios are underweight in U.S. equity/FDI and loans, and marketweight in U.S. debt securities.
  - U.S. equity and FDI as a share of foreign portfolios peaked in late 1990s and have since fallen from slightly overweight to well underweight.
  - Portfolio share of U.S. loans increased steadily until falling back in 2002 and 2003.
  - Share of foreign portfolios in U.S. debt securities peaked in 1997 and 2001 before declining more recently.
- Conclusion: These numbers give little indication that foreign absorption capacity of claims on the United States would be constrained in the near future.

### The U.S. Net International Investment Position (NIIP)
- Aggregate NIIP movements:
  - NIIP moved from a negative position of 3 percent of U.S. market value to 9 percent in 2003, and appears poised to fall further due to continued current account deficits.
- Asset-class specifics:
  - Net equity and FDI position: slightly positive and near industrial country average.
  - Net loan position: slightly negative and near industrial country average.
  - Net debt securities position: weakened substantially, falling to 25 percent of the outstanding market from 13 percent in 1990 (industrial country average is 11 percent).
  - Decline in net debt securities position appears driven mainly by an influx of foreign investment into U.S. debt securities.
- Reserve holdings and their contribution:
  - At end-2003:
    - Treasuries held as international reserves accounted for over 20 percent of all Treasuries held by the public.
    - 8 percent of agency bonds were also held as reserves.
    - In 1990 these figures were 11 percent and 1 percent, respectively.
  - Excluding reserves:
    - Net debt securities position was –6 percent of the outstanding market in 1990 and –16 percent in 2003.
    - Debt securities excluding reserves accounted for 10 percentage points of the 12 point deterioration in the net debt securities position over the period; reserves accounted for 2 percentage points.
- Cross-country comparisons and regressions (Table 2 summary):
  - Regressions: Ln |niip| = α + β * Ln (Size) + ε.
  - All countries:
    - Coefficient on Economy size: -0.40 ***
    - Coefficient on Financial market size: -0.42 **
    - Standard error: (0.19)(0.15)
    - U.S. p-value: 0.17 0.11
  - Excluding Japan and U.S.:
    - Coefficient on Economy size: -0.72 ***
    - Coefficient on Financial market size: -0.75 **
    - Standard error: (0.23)(0.18)
    - U.S. p-value: 0.01 0.00
  - Interpretation:
    - Negative relationship between size of the economy and absolute NIIP is statistically significant.
    - The U.S. NIIP is larger than would be predicted given the size of the economy and the financial market.
    - In the full sample, the U.S. observation is within two standard errors of the mean; excluding U.S. and Japan, the U.S. observation is more than two standard errors away from the mean.

### Conclusions and policy-relevant implications
- Key conclusions:
  - The United States has experienced trends toward financial deepening and internationalization similar to other industrial countries.
  - U.S. markets remain less internationalized than other countries even after adjusting for the U.S. large share of the global market; this can be explained by the greater variety of U.S. economic activities reducing the need for geographic diversification.
  - Global portfolio data give mixed signals regarding foreigners’ exposure to U.S. assets.
  - The decline in the U.S. net debt position is a cause for concern.
  - While foreign portfolios contain about the expected proportion of U.S. assets and U.S. indebtedness ranks near the middle of industrial countries in most asset classes, the U.S. NIIP is weaker than expected given economy and market size, and the net debt securities position is particularly large.
  - The overall NIIP and the net debt securities position are deteriorating rapidly, and the large current account deficit implies that foreign claims on the United States will continue to mount.

*Source: Fund staff calculations, as presented in the supplied content.*

### References

### References

### Cited works
- Bertaut, C., and W. Griever, 2004, “Recent Developments in Cross-Border Investment in Securities,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, Winter 2004 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
- Bertaut, C., and L. Kole, 2004, “What Makes Investors Over or Underweight? Explaining International Appetites for Foreign Equities,” International Finance Discussion Papers, No. 819 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
- Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), 2005, “Aggregate Changes in the Net International Investment Position” (Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce). Available on the Internet at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/di/intinv04_t3.pdf.
- Cline, W., 2005, The United States as a Debtor Nation: Risks and Policy Response (Washington: Center for Global Development and Institute for International Economics), forthcoming.
- Dahlquist, M., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson, 2003, “Corporate Governance and the Home Bias,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 87–110.
- Errunza, V., K. Hogan, and M. Hung, 1999, “Can the Gains from International Diversification Be Achieved without Trading Abroad?” The Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 6, pp. 2075–107.
- Ferguson, R., 2005, “U.S. Current Account Deficit: Causes and Consequences,” Remarks to the Economics Club of the University of North Carolina. Available on the Internet at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050420/default.htm.
- Gourinchas, P., and H. Rey, 2005, “International Financial Adjustment,” NBER Working Paper No. 11155 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- Greenspan, A., 2005, “Globalization,” Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations. Available on the Internet at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050310/default.htm.
- Griever, W., G. Lee, and F. Warnock, 2001, “The U.S. System for Measuring Cross-Border Investment in Securities: A Primer with a Discussion of Recent Developments,” Federal Reserve Bulletin (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), October.
- Karolyi, G.A., and R. Stulz, 2002, “Are Financial Assets Priced Locally or Globally?” NBER Working Paper No. 8994 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- Lane, P., and G. Milesi-Ferretti, 2001, “The External Wealth of Nations: Measures of Foreign Assets and Liabilities for Industrial and Developing Countries,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 55, No. 2, 263–94.
- Lane, P., and G. Milesi-Ferretti, 2005a, “The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities,” mimeo.
- Lane, P., and G. Milesi-Ferretti, 2005b, “A Global Perspective on External Positions,” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5234 (London: Center for Economic Policy Research).
- Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogoff, 2004, “The Unsustainable U.S. Current Account Position Revisited,” NBER Working Paper No. 10869 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- Sorenson, B., Y. Wu, O. Yosha, and Y. Zhu, “Home Bias and International Risk Sharing: Twin Puzzles Separated at Birth” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5113 (London: Center for Economic Policy Research).
- Tille, C., 2003, “The Impact of Exchange Rate Movements on U.S. Foreign Debt,” Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Vol. 9, No. 1 (New York: Federal Reserve Bank).

### Data Appendix — sources and definitions
- Domestic equity market capitalization:
  - Primary source: World Federation of Exchanges (standardizes across countries; excludes the capitalization of foreign companies listed on an exchange; the value of mutual funds and similar shares; and options, futures, and derivatives).
  - Additional sources: Datastream; the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report; Meridian’s World Stock Exchange Factbook; Standard and Poor’s Emerging Stock Markets Factbook.
- Debt securities outstanding:
  - Source: Quarterly Review of the Bank of International Settlements (Basel), Tables 12A and 16A.
- Domestic stock of loans outstanding:
  - Where available: OECD’s National Accounts Volume IIIB, spliced with data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) for missing observations in the former dataset.
  - Non-OECD members: Mainly from the IMF’s Money and Banking Database (based on raw data used in the IFS).
  - Additional data: IFS and published national sources for Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong SAR, Peru, and Taiwan Province of China.
  - Conversion: Data were converted to U.S. dollars using exchange rates from IFS.
- Foreign holdings of financial instruments:
  - Data provided by Philip Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2005a).
  - Method: Combine official data on international investment positions with estimates of external assets and liabilities based on balance of payments flows and various other sources, with appropriate valuation adjustments based on equity price fluctuations and exchange rate changes.
  - Methodology description: See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001).

### Table A.1. List of Countries 1/
- Argentina
- Australia
- Austria
- Belgium
- Brazil
- Canada
- Chile
- China, P.R.: Mainland
- China, P.R.: Hong Kong, SAR
- Colombia
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Greece
- Hungary
- Iceland
- India
- Indonesia
- Ireland
- Italy
- Japan
- Korea
- Malaysia
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Norway
- Peru
- Philippines
- Poland
- Portugal
- Russia
- Singapore
- Slovak Republic
- South Africa
- Spain
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- Taiwan Province of China
- Thailand
- Turkey
- United Kingdom
- United States
- Mexico

- Note: 1/ Italics indicate countries for which international holdings data were analyzed. Non-italicized countries were only included in the totals for global financial stocks.

*Source: _wp05181 - References*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/_wp05181.pdf_
