## _wp0531

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---

### I. Introduction — purpose and scope
- Antidumping provisions have been a part of U.S. trade law for over eighty years, but have been prominent only in the past two decades.
- Paper’s purpose:
  - Put the recent U.S. antidumping experience in historical perspective, focusing on the period since World War II.
  - Answer: Were few antidumping petitions filed prior to 1980? If so, what explains that low level of activity? What economic and political factors explain the shift toward more intensive use of antidumping remedies over time?
- Core empirical approach:
  - Collect and present data on the annual number of antidumping investigations over time.
  - Use a simple econometric model to examine determinants of the annual number of antidumping investigations.

### II. Major findings
- The numbers of antidumping investigations conducted in the late 1930s and the late 1950s and early 1960s are surprisingly large and comparable to the post-1980s levels of activity.
- Most antidumping investigations prior to the 1970s were dismissed by the Treasury Department as lacking evidence of less-than-fair-value (LTFV) sales; by contrast, now virtually all petitions move on to the injury-determination stage.
- The increase in antidumping cases since the early 1980s is related to the rise of multiple petitions—petitions citing several source countries of dumping the same product in the U.S. market; in fact, the number of products targeted in antidumping cases has fallen since the mid-1980s.
- Proximate determinants of the annual number of antidumping cases:
  - the unemployment rate,
  - the exchange rate,
  - import penetration,
  - and a 1984 legal change that encouraged the filing of multiple petitions.

### III. Evolution of U.S. antidumping law — chronology and legal features
- Precursors and early statutes:
  - Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890: illegal to combine or conspire to monopolize.
  - Clayton Act of 1914: price discrimination illegal if it reduced competition or tended to create a monopoly.
  - Wilson Tariff of 1894: made it unlawful for foreign producers to combine or conspire to monopolize the U.S. market.
  - Antidumping Act of 1916 (part of the Revenue Act of 1916): criminal statute making it illegal to sell imported goods at prices substantially lower than the market value in the exporting country “with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States, or of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the United States.” Remedies: fines (triple damages) and possible imprisonment; rarely invoked and recently ruled inconsistent with WTO obligations.
- Establishment of modern antidumping law:
  - Antidumping Act of 1921 (part of the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921) framed duties when the Secretary of the Treasury finds LTFV sales likely to injure a U.S. industry; elements included LTFV sales, use of foreign costs if foreign market value not ascertainable, requirement that dumping be related to injury, and remedy of higher import duties.
  - 1916 vs. 1921: 1916 focused on predatory intent and criminal enforcement; 1921 focused on price discrimination, injury, and administrative remedies (duties).
- Subsequent legal changes that facilitated filings and increased likelihood of duties:
  - Trade Act of 1974: expanded definition of dumping to include home market sales below the average cost of production.
  - Trade Agreements Act of 1979: repealed the Antidumping Act of 1921 and enacted revised antidumping law as new Title VII to the Tariff Act of 1930; shortened time limits and allowed use of “best information available.”
  - Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: required the International Trade Commission to cumulate imports of all countries subject to an antidumping investigation when making an injury determination—raising benefits of filing multiple petitions.
- Administrative changes:
  - Effective October 1, 1954: Congress shifted the injury investigation from the Treasury Department to the U.S. Tariff Commission (now the International Trade Commission).
  - Effective January 1, 1980: the Carter Administration shifted the LTFV determination to the Department of Commerce (with Congress’s consent), motivated in part by perceived indifference of Treasury to petitioning firms and concerns about “low priority and inadequate staffing levels.”

### IV. Antidumping activity over time — empirical patterns and interpretation
- Annual case series observations:
  - Antidumping filings were pronounced during the late 1930s and comparable to the large number of cases in the early 1980s and early 1990s.
  - There was a steady stream of cases from the mid 1950s until the mid 1960s.
  - Prior to the early 1980s, most petitions targeted a single product from a single country; since then, multiple petitions have increased substantially.
  - FY 1991: 65 cases filed; multiple petitions example: six petitions concerning carbon steel standard pipe, seven dealing with wire rope, nine related to coated ground wood paper, fourteen addressing ball bearings. Although 65 individual investigations were filed in FY 1991, only 26 different imported commodities were the subject of scrutiny.
  - Surges in antidumping activity in 1992–94 and 1998–2001 are directly related to multiple petitions filed by the steel industry.
- Interpretation of product-targeting trend:
  - After adjusting total petitions for those covering the same product, the number of products targeted by antidumping filings after 1980 does not appear significantly higher than in previous decades.
  - When viewed by number of products targeted, antidumping seems to have peaked around 1985 and declined since then.
- Additional considerations:
  - Antidumping margins have risen significantly since the 1980s, so each antidumping action may have a greater negative impact on trade than in the past.
  - The rise of multiple petitions means imports are more broadly excluded from the market when duties are imposed, reducing opportunities for trade diversion that would occur under single petitions.

### V. Data and methods
- Compiled annual counts of antidumping investigations from 1922 onward (data sources described in the Appendix).
- Post–World War II period examined with greater case detail.

### VI. Potential determinants and economic context
- Macroeconomic determinants examined:
  - Change in real GDP (log of GDP, lagged).
  - Nominal effective U.S. dollar exchange rate (log, lagged).
  - Unemployment rate (alternative macro variable).
- Import-competition measures:
  - Merchandise imports/GDP ratio.
  - Average tariff on dutiable imports.
- Institutional/legal factors:
  - Dummy variables for periods after 1974, 1979, and 1984 to capture legal and administrative changes.
  - 1980 shift: Commerce Department replaced Treasury for LTFV determinations.
  - 1984 legal change: ITC required to cumulate impact of imports from countries against whom a petition had been filed.
- Economic context:
  - Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates in the 1950s–1960s kept real exchange rate movements minimal and business cycle fluctuations relatively mild.
  - Import/GDP ratio: about 3 percent of GDP in the 1950s and 1960s; about 8 percent in the 1980s; more than 10 percent by the end of the 1990s.
  - Correlation between decline in average tariff on dutiable imports and rise in import penetration: -0.94.

### VII. Key econometric findings (negative binomial regressions, FY 1947–2002)
- General results:
  - Changes in real GDP do not appear to be systematically related to annual antidumping filings over the full sample.
  - Unemployment rate is positively related to the number of antidumping petitions.
  - Appreciation in the foreign exchange value of the dollar (log of nominal effective exchange rate, lagged) leads to more antidumping filings.
  - A rise in import penetration (log of import/GDP ratio) increases the number of antidumping filings.
- Effects of legal/administrative dummies:
  - Dummy Variable (starting 1984) is positive and statistically significant: taking the exponential of its coefficient indicates the conditional mean of the number of cases is 2.12 times higher after 1984, implying a 112 percent increase which translates into an additional 22 cases per year from pre 1984 levels.
  - Other dummies (starting 1975 and 1980) are not consistently significant.
- Standardized-variable comparison:
  - A one standard deviation increase in the exchange rate leads to about a 0.23 standard deviation increase in the number of filings — effects of unemployment, exchange rate, and import penetration are roughly comparable in magnitude.
- Subsample results:
  - Pre-1980 sample: unemployment rate, lagged exchange rate, and import penetration ratio all statistically significant with coefficients similar to pooled results.
  - Post-1980 sample: only the lagged exchange rate variable is significant (coefficient 1.26); import penetration becomes statistically insignificant and smaller.
- Selected coefficient notes (FY 1947–2002, dependent = annual number of antidumping cases):
  - Unemployment Rate: coefficients reported include 0.21* (0.06), 0.13* (0.06), 0.08 (0.06), 0.20* (0.08), 0.25* (0.08); standardized coefficient 0.25* (0.08).
  - Log of Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (-1): coefficients include -0.60 (0.69), -0.60 (0.59), 1.62* (0.71), 1.72* (0.72), 1.77* (0.73); standardized coefficient 0.23* (0.09).
  - Log of Import/GDP Ratio: 0.81* (0.18) in column (3); standardized coefficient 0.22 (0.14) reported in column (5).
  - Log of Average Tariff (Dutiable Imports): -1.24* (0.27) when substituted for import penetration in column (4).
  - Dummy Variable (starting 1984): 0.75* (0.28); standardized 0.61* (0.22).
  - Pseudo R2 values across columns range from 0.52 to 0.57; Log Likelihoods include -235.0, -234.4, -226.3, -225.4, -222.8.
- Table 4 (dependent variables: number of products; number of injury determinations):
  - 1947–2002 (Number of Products): Unemployment Rate 0.20* (0.07); Log of Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (-1) 1.83* (0.57); Log of Import to GDP Ratio 0.85* (0.49); Dummy (starting 1984) 0.40* (0.21). Pseudo R2 0.32; Log Likelihood -192.8.
  - 1947–2002 (Number of Injury Determinations): Unemployment Rate 0.23* (0.10); Log of Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (-1) 1.35* (0.84); Log of Import to GDP Ratio 2.22* (0.64); Dummy (starting 1984) 0.83* (0.32). Pseudo R2 0.70; Log Likelihood -183.7.
  - Time-period specific results: Number of Products pre-1980 and post-1980 reported separately in columns (1) and (2) with differing coefficients; Pseudo R2 values 0.38 and 0.22 respectively.

### VIII. Institutional and policy interpretations
- Administrative change in 1980 (Commerce replacing Treasury for LTFV determinations) likely increased probability of LTFV findings and thus petitions; Treasury was perceived as relatively indifferent while Commerce was expected to be more sympathetic to domestic firms.
- 1984 legal change requiring cumulation of imports’ impact provided firms incentive to file multiple petitions against different countries for the same product, contributing substantially to the post-1984 rise in filings.
- Empirical focus exclusively on post-1979 period may understate the role of earlier legal and administrative changes and bureaucratic incentives in driving antidumping activity.
- Sector-specific contingent protection (antidumping) can substitute for high average tariffs as a mechanism to insure import-competing firms and workers from import shocks.

### IX. Conclusions and implications
- Many antidumping petitions were filed in earlier decades (late 1950s–early 1960s and early 1970s), but most did not result in antidumping duties.
- The recent greater number of petitions reflects firms filing multiple petitions rather than a broader rise in distinct products targeted.
- Two macroeconomic drivers of antidumping activity: unemployment rate (positive relationship) and exchange rate appreciations (positive relationship).
- Increased import penetration (associated with declining average tariffs) and legal/administrative changes also raised the number of antidumping cases.

### X. Key statistics and series (exact values preserved)
- Import/GDP ratio: about 3 percent of GDP in the 1950s and 1960s; about 8 percent in the 1980s; more than 10 percent by the end of the 1990s.
- Correlation between tariff decline and import penetration: -0.94.
- Post-1984 conditional mean of number of cases: 2.12 times higher (112 percent increase → additional 22 cases per year).
- Table 1 administrative responsibilities:
  - 1921–1954: Dumping Determination — Treasury Department; Injury Determination — Treasury Department.
  - 1954–1979: Dumping Determination — Treasury Department; Injury Determination — Tariff Commission.
  - 1979–present: Dumping Determination — Commerce Department; Injury Determination — International Trade Commission.
- Table 2 outcomes 1934–54:
  - Total Cases 146;
  - No Basis for Finding under AD Law 139 (95 percent);
  - No Sales at LTFV 90 (62 percent);
  - De minimis, complaint withdrawn, etc. 28 (19 percent);
  - No Injury 21 (14 percent);
  - Findings under Antidumping Act 7 (5 percent).
- During the period cited, only 5 percent of all cases resulted in import duties.
- In more than 80 percent of all cases, a finding of no dumping was made, either because imports were not found to be priced at LTFV, dumping margins were minimal, or petitions were withdrawn.
- Only a quarter of the remaining cases (five percent of all cases) had an affirmative injury finding.

*Source: _wp0531 - References..............................................................................................................*

### References..............................................................................................................

### _wp0531 - References

### I. Introduction — purpose and scope
- Antidumping provisions have been a part of U.S. trade law for over eighty years, but have been prominent only in the past two decades.
- The paper’s purpose: put the recent U.S. antidumping experience in historical perspective, focusing on the period since World War II, to answer:
  - Were few antidumping petitions filed prior to 1980?
  - If so, what explains that low level of activity?
  - What economic and political factors explain the shift toward more intensive use of antidumping remedies over time?
- Core empirical approach:
  - Collect and present data on the annual number of antidumping investigations over time.
  - Use a simple econometric model to examine determinants of the annual number of antidumping investigations.

### II. Major findings (explicit bullets preserved from text)
- The numbers of antidumping investigations conducted in the late 1930s and the late 1950s and early 1960s are surprisingly large and comparable to the post-1980s levels of activity.
- Most antidumping investigations prior to the 1970s were dismissed by the Treasury Department as lacking evidence of less-than-fair-value (LTFV) sales; by contrast, now virtually all petitions move on to the injury-determination stage of the process.
- The increase in antidumping cases since the early 1980s is related to the rise of multiple petitions—petitions citing several source countries of dumping the same product in the U.S. market; in fact, the number of products targeted in antidumping cases has fallen since the mid-1980s.
- The proximate determinants of the annual number of antidumping cases are:
  - the unemployment rate,
  - the exchange rate,
  - import penetration,
  - and a 1984 legal change that encouraged the filing of multiple petitions.

### III. Evolution of U.S. antidumping law — chronology and legal features
- Precursors and early statutes:
  - Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890: illegal to combine or conspire to monopolize.
  - Clayton Act of 1914: price discrimination illegal if it reduced competition or tended to create a monopoly.
  - Wilson Tariff of 1894: made it unlawful for foreign producers to combine or conspire to monopolize the U.S. market.
  - Antidumping Act of 1916 (part of the Revenue Act of 1916): made it illegal to sell imported goods at prices substantially lower than the market value in the exporting country “with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States, or of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the United States.” This 1916 law is a criminal statute (remedies: fines (triple damages) and possible imprisonment) and is rarely invoked; it was recently ruled inconsistent with WTO obligations.
- Establishment of modern antidumping law:
  - Antidumping Act of 1921 (part of the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921):
    - Provides that duties may be levied when “the Secretary of the Treasury finds that an industry in the United States is likely to be injured, or is prevented from being established, by reason of the importation into the United States of foreign merchandise, and that merchandise of such class or kind is being sold or is likely to be sold in the United States or elsewhere at less than its fair value.”
    - Elements included: less-than-fair-value (LTFV) sales, use of foreign costs of production if foreign market value is not ascertainable, requirement that dumping be related to injury, remedy of higher import duties.
  - Differences between 1916 and 1921 laws emphasized: 1916 focused on predatory intent and criminal enforcement; 1921 focused on price discrimination, injury, and administrative remedies (duties).
- Subsequent legal changes that facilitated filings and increased likelihood of duties:
  - Trade Act of 1974: expanded definition of dumping to include home market sales below the average cost of production.
  - Trade Agreements Act of 1979: repealed the Antidumping Act of 1921 and enacted revised antidumping law as new Title VII to the Tariff Act of 1930; shortened time limits and allowed use of “best information available.”
  - Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: required the International Trade Commission to cumulate imports of all countries subject to an antidumping investigation when making an injury determination—raising benefits of filing multiple petitions.
- Administrative changes:
  - Effective October 1, 1954: Congress shifted the injury investigation from the Treasury Department to the U.S. Tariff Commission (now the International Trade Commission).
  - Effective January 1, 1980: the Carter Administration shifted the LTFV determination to the Department of Commerce (with Congress’s consent), motivated in part by perceived indifference of Treasury to petitioning firms and concerns about “low priority and inadequate staffing levels.”

### IV. Antidumping activity over time — empirical patterns and interpretation
- Annual case series (summary observations from figures and tables described):
  - Antidumping filings were pronounced during the late 1930s and comparable to the large number of cases in the early 1980s and early 1990s.
  - There was a steady stream of cases from the mid 1950s until the mid 1960s.
  - Prior to the early 1980s, most petitions targeted a single product from a single country; since then, multiple petitions have increased substantially.
  - Example: FY 1991 had 65 cases filed; specific multiple petitions included six petitions concerning carbon steel standard pipe, seven dealing with wire rope, nine related to coated ground wood paper, fourteen addressing ball bearings. Although there were 65 individual investigations in FY 1991, only 26 different imported commodities were the subject of scrutiny.
  - Surges in antidumping activity in 1992–94 and 1998–2001 are directly related to multiple petitions filed by the steel industry.
- Interpretation of product-targeting trend:
  - After adjusting total petitions for those covering the same product, the number of products targeted by antidumping filings after 1980 does not appear significantly higher than in previous decades.
  - When viewed by number of products targeted, antidumping seems to have peaked around 1985 and declined since then.
- Additional considerations:
  - Antidumping margins have risen significantly since the 1980s (Blonigen (2003)), so each antidumping action may have a greater negative impact on trade than in the past.
  - The rise of multiple petitions means imports are more broadly excluded from the market when duties are imposed, reducing opportunities for trade diversion that would occur under single petitions.

### V. Data and methods (brief)
- The paper compiles annual counts of antidumping investigations from 1922 onward (data sources described in the Appendix).
- Post–World War II period examined with greater case detail (Figures and Tables referenced in the original text document the counts, dispositions, and determinants).

*Source: _wp0531 - References..............................................................................................................*

### 1954. During that period, only 5 percent of all cases resulted in import duties. In more than

### _wp0531 - 1954. During that period, only 5 percent of all cases resulted in import duties. In more than

### Historical patterns of U.S. antidumping activity
- Between 1934 and 1954: Total Cases 146; No Basis for Finding under AD Law 139 (95 percent); No Sales at LTFV 90 (62 percent); De minimis, complaint withdrawn, etc. 28 (19 percent); No Injury 21 (14 percent); Findings under Antidumping Act 7 (5 percent).
- During the period cited, only 5 percent of all cases resulted in import duties.
- In more than 80 percent of all cases, a finding of no dumping was made, either because imports were not found to be priced at LTFV, dumping margins were minimal, or petitions were withdrawn.
- Only a quarter of the remaining cases (five percent of all cases) had an affirmative injury finding.
- From the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, virtually every case filed reached an injury determination; since the late 1970s roughly half of all ITC injury determinations are affirmative.
- The number of antidumping investigations increased after 1980 largely because of increased propensity of firms to file multiple petitions; the number of imported products targeted for antidumping action has been remarkably stable over time and has declined since the early 1980s.

### Potential determinants and economic context
- Macroeconomic determinants examined:
  - Change in real GDP (log of GDP, lagged).
  - Nominal effective U.S. dollar exchange rate (log, lagged).
  - Unemployment rate (alternative macro variable).
- Import-competition measures:
  - Merchandise imports/GDP ratio.
  - Average tariff on dutiable imports.
- Institutional/legal factors:
  - Dummy variables for periods after 1974, 1979, and 1984 to capture legal and administrative changes.
  - 1980 shift: Commerce Department replaced Treasury for LTFV determinations.
  - 1984 legal change: ITC required to cumulate impact of imports from countries against whom a petition had been filed.
- Economic context:
  - Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates in the 1950s–1960s kept real exchange rate movements minimal and business cycle fluctuations relatively mild.
  - Import/GDP ratio rose from about 3 percent of GDP in the 1950s and 1960s to about 8 percent in the 1980s and reached more than 10 percent by the end of the 1990s.
  - Correlation between decline in average tariff on dutiable imports and rise in import penetration: -0.94.

### Key econometric findings (negative binomial regressions, FY 1947–2002)
- General results:
  - Changes in real GDP do not appear to be systematically related to annual antidumping filings over the full sample.
  - Unemployment rate is positively related to the number of antidumping petitions.
  - Appreciation in the foreign exchange value of the dollar (log of nominal effective exchange rate, lagged) leads to more antidumping filings.
  - A rise in import penetration (log of import/GDP ratio) increases the number of antidumping filings.
- Effects of legal/administrative dummies:
  - Dummy Variable (starting 1984) is positive and statistically significant: taking the exponential of its coefficient indicates the conditional mean of the number of cases is 2.12 times higher after 1984, implying a 112 percent increase which translates into an additional 22 cases per year from pre 1984 levels.
  - Other dummies (starting 1975 and 1980) are not consistently significant.
- Standardized-variable comparison:
  - A one standard deviation increase in the exchange rate leads to about a 0.23 standard deviation increase in the number of filings — effects of unemployment, exchange rate, and import penetration are roughly comparable in magnitude.
- Subsample results:
  - Pre-1980 sample: unemployment rate, lagged exchange rate, and import penetration ratio all statistically significant with coefficients similar to pooled results.
  - Post-1980 sample: only the lagged exchange rate variable is significant (coefficient 1.26); import penetration becomes statistically insignificant and smaller.
- Table 3 selected coefficient notes (FY 1947–2002, dependent = annual number of antidumping cases):
  - Unemployment Rate: coefficients reported include 0.21* (0.06), 0.13* (0.06), 0.08 (0.06), 0.20* (0.08), 0.25* (0.08) across columns; standardized coefficient 0.25* (0.08).
  - Log of Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (-1): coefficients include -0.60 (0.69), -0.60 (0.59), 1.62* (0.71), 1.72* (0.72), 1.77* (0.73); standardized coefficient 0.23* (0.09).
  - Log of Import/GDP Ratio: 0.81* (0.18) in column (3); standardized coefficient 0.22 (0.14) reported in column (5).
  - Log of Average Tariff (Dutiable Imports): -1.24* (0.27) when substituted for import penetration in column (4).
  - Dummy Variable (starting 1984): 0.75* (0.28); standardized 0.61* (0.22).
  - Pseudo R2 values across columns range from 0.52 to 0.57; Log Likelihoods include -235.0, -234.4, -226.3, -225.4, -222.8.
- Table 4 (dependent variables: number of products; number of injury determinations):
  - For 1947–2002 (Number of Products): Unemployment Rate 0.20* (0.07); Log of Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (-1) 1.83* (0.57); Log of Import to GDP Ratio 0.85* (0.49); Dummy (starting 1984) 0.40* (0.21). Pseudo R2 0.32; Log Likelihood -192.8.
  - For 1947–2002 (Number of Injury Determinations): Unemployment Rate 0.23* (0.10); Log of Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (-1) 1.35* (0.84); Log of Import to GDP Ratio 2.22* (0.64); Dummy (starting 1984) 0.83* (0.32). Pseudo R2 0.70; Log Likelihood -183.7.
  - Time-period specific results: Number of Products pre-1980 and post-1980 reported separately in columns (1) and (2) with differing coefficients; Pseudo R2 values 0.38 and 0.22 respectively.

### Institutional and policy interpretations
- Administrative change in 1980 (Commerce replacing Treasury for LTFV determinations) likely increased probability of LTFV findings and thus petitions; Treasury was perceived as relatively indifferent while Commerce was expected to be more sympathetic to domestic firms.
- 1984 legal change requiring cumulation of imports’ impact provided firms incentive to file multiple petitions against different countries for the same product, contributing substantially to the post-1984 rise in filings.
- Empirical focus exclusively on post-1979 period may understate the role of earlier legal and administrative changes and bureaucratic incentives in driving antidumping activity.

### Conclusions and implications
- Many antidumping petitions were filed in earlier decades (late 1950s–early 1960s and early 1970s), but most did not result in antidumping duties.
- The recent greater number of petitions reflects firms filing multiple petitions rather than a broader rise in distinct products targeted.
- Two macroeconomic drivers of antidumping activity: unemployment rate (positive relationship) and exchange rate appreciations (positive relationship).
- Increased import penetration (associated with declining average tariffs) and legal/administrative changes also raised the number of antidumping cases.
- Sector-specific contingent protection (antidumping) can substitute for high average tariffs as a mechanism to insure import-competing firms and workers from import shocks.

### Key statistics and series (exact values preserved)
- Import/GDP ratio: about 3 percent of GDP in the 1950s and 1960s; about 8 percent in the 1980s; more than 10 percent by the end of the 1990s.
- Correlation between tariff decline and import penetration: -0.94.
- Post-1984 conditional mean of number of cases: 2.12 times higher (112 percent increase → additional 22 cases per year).
- Table 1 administrative responsibilities:
  - 1921–1954: Dumping Determination — Treasury Department; Injury Determination — Treasury Department.
  - 1954–1979: Dumping Determination — Treasury Department; Injury Determination — Tariff Commission.
  - 1979–present: Dumping Determination — Commerce Department; Injury Determination — International Trade Commission.
- Table 2 outcomes 1934–54: Total Cases 146; No Basis for Finding under AD Law 139 (95); No Sales at LTFV 90 (62); De minimis, complaint withdrawn, etc. 28 (19); No Injury 21 (14); Findings under Antidumping Act 7 (5).

*Source: _wp0531 PDF content provided.*

### REFERENCES

### REFERENCES

### Books and Book Chapters
- Baldwin, Robert E., 1998, “Imposing Multilateral Disciple on Administered Protection.” In Anne O. Krueger (ed.), The WTO as an International Organization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Finger, J. Michael, 1993, “The Origins and Evolution of Antidumping Regulation.” In J. M. Finger (ed.), Antidumping: How It Works and Who Gets Hurt (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).
- Viner, Jacob, 1923, Dumping: A Problem in International Trade (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Cameron, A. Colin, and Pravin K. Trivedi, 1998, Regression Analysis of Count Data (New York: Cambridge University Press).
- Blonigen, Bruce, and Thomas J. Prusa, 2003, “Antidumping.” In E. Kwan Choi and James Harrigan (eds.), Handbook of International Trade (Oxford: Blackwell).

### Journal Articles
- Feinberg, Robert M. “Exchange Rates and Unfair Trade,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 71 (November 1989), pp. 704–707.
- Finger, J. Michael, H. Keith Hall, and Douglas R. Nelson, “The Political Economy of Administered Protection,” American Economic Review, Vol. 72 (June 1982), pp. 452–66.
- Fischer, Ronald D., and Thomas Prusa, “WTO Exceptions as Insurance.” Review of International Economics, Vol. 11 (November 2003), pp. 745–57.
- Hansen, Wendy L., and Thomas J. Prusa, 1996 “Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater than the Whole,” Economic Inquiry, Vol. 34, pp. 746–69.
- Hansen, Wendy L., and Thomas J. Prusa, 1997, “The Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making,” Review of International Economics, Vol. 5 (May 1997), pp. 230–45.
- Irwin, Douglas A, 1998, “Changes in U.S. Tariffs: The Role of Import Prices and Commercial Policies,” American Economic Review, Vol. 88 (September), pp. 1015–26.
- Knetter, Michael M., and Thomas J. Prusa, “Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries.” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 61 (October 2003), pp. 1–18.
- Leidy, Michael, 1997, “Macroeconomic Conditions and Pressures for Protection under Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws: Empirical Evidence from the United States.” International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. 44 (March), pp. 132–44.
- Blonigen, Bruce, 2003, “Evolving Discretionary Practices of U.S. Antidumping Activity,” NBER Working Paper No. 9625 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research).

### Working Papers, Reports, and Institutional Sources
- Congressional Budget Office, 1994, How the GATT Affects U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Policy (Washington, D.C.), September.
- U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 1957, Hearings on Amendments to the Antidumping Act of 1921, as Amended, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: GPO).
- U.S. House of Representatives, 1979, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979. House Report No. 96–585 96th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: GPO).
- U.S. International Trade Commission, 2004 “Value of U.S. Imports for Consumption, Duties Collected, and Ratio of Duties to Values, 1891–2003.” http://usitc.gov/ave.pdf.

*Source: _wp0531 - REFERENCES*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/_wp0531.pdf_