## _wp0590

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---

### Introduction and objectives
- Purpose: quantify the scope for increasing MENA countries’ external trade in the near-to-medium term using a gravity model incorporating Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) developments.
- Sample and policy context:
  - Panel covering some 90 countries and about 90 percent of total world trade.
  - Focus sample: six MENA countries—Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. Palestinian Authority and Lebanon excluded due to data limitations.
  - Assessment of integration efforts under the Barcelona process (AAEUs, MEDA grants, EIB loans).
- AAEU chronology cited:
  - Palestinian Authority (1997); Tunisia (signed 1995, implementing provisions in 1996; ratified 1998); Morocco (2000); Israel (2000); Jordan (2002); Egypt (2004); Lebanon and Algeria signed in 2002 (await ratification); Syria negotiations concluded in 2003.
- Key research questions:
  - Has the Barcelona process resulted in closer integration between Mediterranean countries and the EU?
  - Has closer integration led to undue concentration of trade toward the EU?
- Preview finding: results are uneven; room remains to enhance integration with the EU, and significant underexploited export markets exist outside the EU (notably the United States).

### Analytical framework and estimation strategy
- Model basis:
  - Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) framework with CES preferences, bilateral import price p_ij = p_i t_ij.
  - Core gravity relation (nominal imports): x_ij = y_j (β_i p_i t_ij / P_j)^(1-σ).
  - Multilateral resistance terms Π_i and P_j enter the gravity equation.
- Estimation equation (log form, time dimension):
  - lnx_itj = constant + a1 ln(y_it y_jt) + a2 ln t_ijt + γ_i + λ_j + τ_t + ε_ijt.
  - γ_i and λ_j are exporter and importer fixed effects controlling for Π_i and P_j; τ_t is a time dummy.
- Bilateral trade resistance specification:
  - ln t_ijt = δ ln d_ij + μ Landl_ij + φ Adj_ij + φ Col_ij + ν Lang_ij + π PrimX_it + θ Border_ij + η_ij.
- Interpretation of multilateral resistance:
  - Π_i measures exporting country’s access to global export markets; P_j measures importing country’s openness to imports.
  - Exporter/importer dummies imply η_ij is estimated after controlling for each country’s overall global trade integration.
- Limitations noted:
  - Model captures trade patterns, not absolute global volumes; absolute values of P indices cannot be interpreted in isolation.
  - General equilibrium effects from large bilateral trade cost changes can be substantial; for limited reductions between small countries these effects are likely small and are ignored (acknowledged as a slight exaggeration of bilateral potentials).

### Definition and measurement of trade potentials
- Definition (verbatim): "Bilateral trade potentials (exports or imports) are defined as the difference between actual trade and the level of trade that would prevail if the particular country pair-specific effects η_ij had been equal to the global average. As η_ij s are normalized to average zero, the trade potential is calculated as “predicted” trade – actual trade = ()ijt xe ij *1− −η."
- Approaches to omitted-variable concerns:
  - Use panel data with country-pair specific effects.
  - Complement with out-of-sample estimates: estimate gravity excluding EU–Mediterranean trade and fit results to EU–Mediterranean data for time-change analysis.
- Interpretation nuances:
  - Trade potential interpreted as gain (or loss) in trade if bilateral trade barriers were at the global integration-adjusted average.
  - Alternative interpretation: bilateral trade discrimination measure.
- Caveat on supply constraints:
  - Supply constraints not treated as binding; argued plausible given high unemployment and access to international capital markets/high reserves, though specialized skilled labor could become binding as diversification proceeds.

### Estimation methods and handling zeros
- Zero-trade observation problem:
  - Logs incompatible with zeros; omission truncates distribution and biases results.
- Methods used:
  - Random effects (RE) Tobit model (maximum likelihood) includes zeros; computational burden led to three-year averages for this approach.
  - Two-step method: fit full panel to RE Tobit excluding exporter/importer dummies; use fitted values to replace zeros; then apply standard linear techniques.
  - Fixed effects (FE) and Hausman and Taylor (HT) estimates also reported for comparison.
- Methodological constraints:
  - RE Tobit requires η_ij uncorrelated with explanatory variables; FE Tobit infeasible due to pair dummies.
  - FE estimation wipes out time-invariant variables; HT accommodates correlation between η_ij and some regressors.
- Preferred model for trade potentials:
  - The RE Tobit model is considered the preferred model for calculating trade potentials, though cross-method comparisons are examined.

### Key estimation results (selected coefficients and diagnostics)
- Economic mass (ln(GDPi*GDPj)):
  - Regression 1: 0.51 ***
  - Regression 2: 0.51 ***
  - Regression 3: 0.66 ***
  - Regression 4: 0.66 ***
  - Regression 5: 0.66 ***
- Distance:
  - Regression 1: -1.37  ***
  - Regression 2: -1.36  ***
  - Regression 4: -1.31  ***
  - Regression 5: -1.52  ***
- Common language:
  - Regression 1: 0.66 ***
  - Regression 2: 0.69 ***
  - Regression 4: 0.71 ***
  - Regression 5: 0.58 ***
- Adjacent:
  - Regression 1: 0.37 ***
  - Regression 2: 0.43 ***
  - Regression 4: 0.23 ***
  - Regression 5: -0.11
- Landlocked:
  - Regression 1: -4.39  ***
  - Regression 2: -4.22  ***
  - Regression 4: -4.81  ***
  - Regression 5: -2.31  ***
- Primary exporter*commodity price:
  - Regression 1: 0.03
  - Regression 2: -0.06
  - Regression 3: 0.07
  - Regression 4: 0.07
  - Regression 5: 0.07
- Colony:
  - Regression 1: 0.73 ***
  - Regression 2: 0.69 ***
  - Regression 4: 0.62 ***
  - Regression 5: 0.73 ***
- Constant (selected):
  - Regression 1: 14.79 ***
  - Regression 2: 14.7 ***
  - Regression 3: -2.76 ***
  - Regression 4: 11.65 ***
  - Regression 5: 11.65 ***
- Estimation details:
  - Techniques reported: RE, Tobit, FE, RE, HT.
  - Number of observations: Regression 1: 28,363; Regression 2: 27,692; Regressions 3, 4, 5: 92,995.
  - Number of groups: Regression 1: 7,455; Regression 2: 7,287; Regressions 3, 4, 5: 7,521.
  - Sigma U (pooled v/s RE): Regression 1: 1.28 ***; Regression 2: 1.29 ***.
- Significance:
  - All variables except the primary exporter dummy interacted with commodity prices are significant at the one percent level in RE Tobit and linear regressions.

### Export potentials and country-level results (in-sample, average 2000–02; Table 2)
- Export potentials to the EU (Total export potential, percent of GDP):
  - Algeria: -21.6
  - Egypt: -0.1
  - Jordan: 3.5
  - Morocco: 4.5
  - Syria: -12.3
  - Tunisia: -13.8
- Actual/predicted exports — Unweighted average (by country):
  - Algeria: 495.7
  - Egypt: 169.1
  - Jordan: 47.7
  - Morocco: 103.0
  - Syria: 276.0
  - Tunisia: 167.4
- Non-EU — Top 5 export potential destinations (selected):
  - Algeria: Saudi Arabia 0.3; Australia 0.1; Colombia 0.0; Malaysia 0.0; Syria 0.0
  - Egypt: Israel 0.2; Iran 0.1; China 0.1; Japan 0.1; Switzerland 0.0
  - Jordan: Israel 5.0; United States 3.3; Estonia 0.5; Canada 0.2; Egypt 0.1
  - Morocco: United States 0.9; Switzerland 0.2; Egypt 0.1; Hong Kong 0.1; Korea 0.1
  - Syria: Iran 0.3; Japan 0.2; United States 0.2; China 0.1; United States 0.2
  - Tunisia: United States 0.8; Japan 0.2; Switzerland 0.1; Hong Kong 0.1; Korea 0.1
- Non-EU — Top 5 over-export destinations (selected; negative indicates over-exporting relative to model):
  - Algeria: United States -4.5; Brazil -2.4; Turkey -1.9; Canada -1.7; Indonesia -0.3
  - Egypt: India -0.2; Saudi Arabia -0.1; United States -0.1; Turkey -0.1; Singapore -0.1
  - Jordan: India -2.6; UAE -1.2; UAE -1.2; China -0.4; Pakistan -0.4
  - Morocco: India -0.9; Japan -0.5; Mexico -0.2; Libya -0.2; New Zealand -0.2
  - Syria: UAE -1.7; Turkey -1.2; Saudi Arabia -0.8; Kuwait -0.4; Algeria -0.3
  - Tunisia: Libya -1.5; India -0.5; Turkey -0.3; Algeria -0.2; Iran -0.2
- Notes:
  - Negative export potentials indicate export beyond model predictions (over-exporting).
  - Export potentials based on average data for 2000–02.

### Robustness and appendix results (equation 5; Appendix A)
- Appendix results using equation 5 — Export potentials to the EU (Total export potential, percent of GDP):
  - Algeria: -15.4
  - Egypt: -0.5
  - Jordan: 4.7
  - Morocco: 3.9
  - Syria: -11.9
  - Tunisia: -8.0
- Actual/predicted exports — Unweighted average (Appendix):
  - Algeria: 187.8
  - Egypt: 155.3
  - Jordan: 34.8
  - Morocco: 85.1
  - Syria: 231.7
  - Tunisia: 107.6
- Appendix non-EU top potentials (selected):
  - Algeria: Egypt 0.2; India 0.2; China 0.1; Saudi Arabia 0.1; Australia 0.1
  - Egypt: Israel 0.2; China 0.1; Switzerland 0.0; Japan 0.0; Canada 0.0
  - Jordan: Israel 11.2; United States 5.0; Egypt 0.6; Canada 0.2; Turkey 0.2
  - Morocco: United States 1.1; Switzerland 0.3; Egypt 0.1; Hong Kong 0.1; Korea 0.1
  - Tunisia: United States 1.2; Japan 0.3; Switzerland 0.2; China 0.1; Canada 0.1
- Appendix top over-export destinations (selected):
  - United States -3.9 (Algeria); United States -0.3 (Egypt); India -2.5 (Jordan); India -0.9 (Morocco); UAE -1.5 (Syria); Libya -1.4 (Tunisia)
- Note: Appendix results are based on equation 5 and average data for 2000–02; Appendix Figure 1 indicates calculations based on regression 4 instead of regression 5 produce very similar results.

### Market patterns, sectoral composition, and dynamics
- EU integration patterns:
  - Most Mediterranean countries’ total export to the EU surpass model predictions; Jordan is a notable exception.
  - Egypt: relatively small total over-export to the EU; over-exports to smaller EU countries while under-exporting to most large EU countries.
  - Algeria and Syria: large over-exporting to the EU driven by oil and gas.
  - Morocco: exports broadly at par with model predictions; Tunisia: overtrades on average.
- Non-EU and US opportunities:
  - United States is a prominent untapped market for Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia; Algeria and Egypt over-export to the United States.
  - Jordan’s US potential may be exaggerated by recent trade increases not captured in-sample.
  - Recent US-Middle East initiatives: participants include Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and Bahrain (TIFAs); Jordan concluded an FTA with the United States in 2002 and Morocco in 2004.
  - Other untapped markets include Japan and other Asian countries.
- Regional trade:
  - Israel is a significant untapped market for Jordan and Egypt; Egypt–Israel–US arrangement allows certain Egyptian exports with a minimum level of Israeli contents tariff-free entry into the United States.
  - Syria’s potential vis-à-vis Israel could not be evaluated for lack of data but is likely substantial.
  - India and Turkey are major over-export destinations for most Mediterranean countries.
- Export composition and textiles:
  - Commodities are less central in Morocco and Tunisia; exports concentrated in higher value-added manufacturing.
  - Electronics attained around 15 percent of total exports in 2002 in both Morocco and Tunisia.
  - Textiles are a major determinant for Tunisia’s and Morocco’s export performance to the EU.
  - Intra-textiles trade: substantial imports of intermediate goods and exports of finished goods to the same partners, indicating outsourcing/intra-firm trade.
  - Finished goods as share of textile exports (memorandum items):
    - Egypt: 22 30
    - Jordan: 61 95
    - Morocco: 86 94
    - Tunisia: 95 93
  - Egypt’s textile exports to the EU are predominantly intermediate inputs and raw cotton; about 3/4 of textile exports to the EU go to Italy, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
  - Morocco’s finished textile exports to the United Kingdom and Spain increased by factors of 18 and 26 respectively in nominal terms between 1995 and 2002.
- Policy risk:
  - Expiration of the Multifiber Agreement (MFA) on January 1, 2005 will increase competition, especially from China, posing medium-term risks for Tunisia and Morocco’s textiles-dependent exports.

### Policy-relevant conclusions and recommendations
- Untapped markets and diversification:
  - Significant untapped export markets exist within and outside the EU; the United States emerges as possibly the most important untapped market (exceptions: Algeria and Egypt over-export to the United States).
  - Market and product diversification are important, especially for Algeria and Syria where near-to-medium term challenge is export-base diversification rather than trade policy.
- EU integration assessment:
  - Barcelona process and AAEUs produced mixed results; country-level success (Tunisia, Morocco) linked to AAEU implementation and existing production networks.
  - Substantial export potentials remain within the EU for all countries except Algeria and Syria; small potentials remain for Tunisia.
  - Jordan under-exports to virtually all EU countries, indicating need for stepped-up integration efforts across the board.
  - Targeted country strategies:
    - Morocco: target France and Germany; increase integration with Spain.
    - Egypt: target France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
- Structural and policy priorities:
  - Structural reforms, trade liberalization, and policies supporting private sector initiatives and international production networks are central to improving export performance.
  - Trade openness supports productivity via resource allocation, technology transfer, input access, competitive pressure, and scale effects.
  - Export-driven growth is important for external sustainability for small MENA markets.
  - Anticipate and manage adjustment to MFA expiration through diversification and support for international production networks.

*Source: _wp0590 - References (PDF)_*

### References..............................................................................................................

### _wp0590 - References

### Introduction
- Purpose: quantify the scope for increasing MENA countries’ external trade in the near-to-medium term using a gravity model incorporating Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) developments.
- Dataset: panel covering some 90 countries and about 90 percent of total world trade.
- Policy context: assessment of integration efforts between the (pre-2004 accession) European Union (EU) and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries under the Barcelona process (AAEUs, MEDA grants, EIB loans).
- AAEU chronology cited in the text:
  - Palestinian Authority (1997)
  - Tunisia (signed 1995, implementing provisions in 1996; ratified 1998)
  - Morocco (2000)
  - Israel (2000)
  - Jordan (2002)
  - Egypt (2004)
  - Lebanon and Algeria signed in 2002 (await ratification)
  - Syria negotiations concluded in 2003
- Focus sample: six MENA countries—Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. Palestinian Authority and Lebanon excluded due to data limitations.
- Key research questions:
  - Has the Barcelona process resulted in closer integration between Mediterranean countries and the EU?
  - Has closer integration led to undue concentration of trade toward the EU?
- Finding preview: results are uneven; room remains to enhance integration with the EU, and significant underexploited export markets exist outside the EU (notably the United States).

### Analytical framework
- Model foundation: Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) framework where each country produces a unique bundle, consumers maximize a CES utility, and bilateral import price p_ij = p_i t_ij.
- Core gravity formulation (in the text):
  - Nominal imports x_ij solution: x_ij = y_j (β_i p_i t_ij / P_j)^(1-σ)  (equation (3) in text)
  - Consumer price index P_j defined in equation (4)
  - Market clearance leads to gravity equation with multilateral resistance terms Π_i and P_j (equation (5) in text)
- Estimation equation used (log form, time dimension):
  - lnx_itj = constant + a1 ln(y_it y_jt) + a2 ln t_ijt + γ_i + λ_j + τ_t + ε_ijt  (equation (6) in text)
  - γ_i and λ_j are exporter and importer fixed effects controlling for Π_i and P_j; τ_t is a time dummy.
- Bilateral trade resistance specification:
  - ln t_ijt = δ ln d_ij + μ Landl_ij + φ Adj_ij + φ Col_ij + ν Lang_ij + π PrimX_it + θ Border_ij + η_ij  (equation (7) in text)
  - Variables: distance (d), number of landlocked countries (Landl), adjacency (Adj), colonial ties (Col), common language (Lang), commodity exporter dummy interacted with a commodity price index (PrimX), border dummy (Border), and pair-specific residual η_ij.
- Interpretation of multilateral resistance (equations (9) and (10) in text):
  - Π_i and P_j are functions of bilateral trade costs t_ij and country income shares θ_i; Π_i measures exporting country’s access to global export markets; P_j measures importing country’s openness to imports.
  - Inclusion of exporter/importer dummies implies that η_ij is estimated after controlling for each country’s overall degree of global trade integration.
- Limitations highlighted:
  - Model studies trade patterns, not absolute global volumes; absolute values of P indices cannot be interpreted in isolation.
  - General equilibrium effects from large bilateral trade cost changes (e.g., full elimination of borders) can be substantial, but for limited reductions between small countries and a few partners these effects are likely small and are ignored (with recognition this slightly exaggerates bilateral trade potentials).

### Estimating trade potentials
- Definition (verbatim from source):
  - "Bilateral trade potentials (exports or imports) are defined as the difference between actual trade and the level of trade that would prevail if the particular country pair-specific effects η_ij had been equal to the global average. As η_ij s are normalized to average zero, the trade potential is calculated as “predicted” trade – actual trade = ()ijt xe ij *1− −η."
- Approaches to address criticisms (Egger, 2002) and omitted variable concerns:
  - Use panel data with country-pair specific effects to explicitly account for unobservable omitted effects.
  - Complement panel-with-pair-effects approach with out-of-sample estimates: estimate the gravity equation excluding EU–Mediterranean trade and then fit results to EU–Mediterranean data for time-change analysis.
- Interpretation nuance:
  - Trade potential interpreted as gain (or loss) in trade between two countries if their bilateral trade barriers (after controlling for distance etc.) were brought to the global integration-adjusted average.
  - Alternative interpretation: measure of bilateral trade discrimination (difference between actual level and level if neither country discriminated against the other).
- Caveat on supply constraints:
  - Supply constraints are not treated as binding; assumption argued plausible given high unemployment and access to international capital markets/high reserves, but specialized skilled labor supply could become a constraint as diversification proceeds.

### Empirical results — estimation issues and methodological choices
- Zero-value observations problem in gravity estimation:
  - Taking logs incompatible with zero trade observations; omitting such observations truncates distribution and introduces bias.
  - Methods used:
    - Random effects (RE) Tobit model (maximum likelihood) includes zero observations. Computational burden led to use of three-year averages for this approach.
    - Two-step alternative: fit full panel to RE Tobit excluding exporter/importer dummies; use fitted values to replace zeros; then apply standard linear techniques. This removes arbitrariness in replacing zeros.
    - Fixed effects (FE) and Hausman and Taylor (HT) estimates also reported for comparison.
- Methodological caveats:
  - RE Tobit requires η_ij uncorrelated with explanatory variables; FE Tobit infeasible due to need for pair dummies; thus could not test random vs fixed effects in Tobit framework.
  - FE wipes out time-invariant variables (distance, dummies); HT accommodates correlation between η_ij and some regressors.

### Empirical results — key estimation findings
- Significance and signs:
  - All variables (except the primary exporter dummy interacted with commodity prices) are significant at the one percent level with expected signs in the RE Tobit and linear regressions reported.
- Economic mass coefficient:
  - Coefficient on economic mass reported as 0.51 in one specification (RE Tobit), substantially lower than unity implied by basic theory.
  - Coefficient rises to 0.66 in regressions 3–5, indicating sensitivity to methods handling zero observations.
  - These estimates align with Coe, Subramanian, and Tamirisa (2004), who found the coefficient declined from about 0.8 in the late 1970s to around 0.5 in the 1990s using nonlinear panel techniques.
- Preferred model for trade potentials:
  - The RE Tobit model is considered the preferred model for calculating trade potentials, though results across methods are examined and reported.

### Policy-relevant implications and analytical points emphasized
- Trade openness can contribute to productivity growth via:
  - More efficient allocation of resources, technology transfers, access to a wider range of inputs, competitive pressure, and scale effects.
- Export-driven growth is important for external sustainability and demand given external vulnerabilities and small local markets in many MENA countries.
- Need for economic diversification to reduce dependence on commodity or agricultural exports, mitigate terms-of-trade and climatic shocks, and improve productivity (citing Feenstra and others, 1999; Berthélemy and Söderling, 2001).
- Barcelona process effects:
  - Uneven results across Mediterranean countries; scope remains to enhance integration with the EU.
  - Significant untapped export opportunities exist outside the EU, notably the United States.
- Methodological caution for policy simulations:
  - Limited bilateral trade cost reductions for small countries can be analyzed with partial-equilibrium approximations; large or comprehensive integration measures require explicit modeling of general equilibrium effects through Π and P indices and σ, which is complex.

*Source: _wp0590 - References (PDF)_*

### Appendix using regression 5 as the basis for calculations.

### Appendix using regression 5 as the basis for calculations.

### Methodology
- Regression 5 uses the two-step method with the HT regression in the second step, allowing for any potential correlation between the country-pair effects and economic mass and distance.
- 14

### Key findings
- While the magnitudes of the estimated trade potentials vary somewhat between the different methods, the overall findings do not.

### Notes on out-of-sample estimates
- The equivalent regression excluding EU-Mediterranean trade (unreported) is used for out-of-sample estimates in

*Source: _wp0590 - Appendix using regression 5 as the basis for calculations.*

### Appendix Figure 1. Basing the calculations on regression 4 instead of regression 5 produces very similar results

### _wp0590 - Appendix Figure 1. Basing the calculations on regression 4 instead of regression 5 produces very similar results

### Gravity equation estimations (Table 1)
- Key estimated coefficients (selected):
  - Economic mass: ln(GDPi*GDPj)
    - Regression 1: 0.51 ***
    - Regression 2: 0.51 ***
    - Regression 3: 0.66 ***
    - Regression 4: 0.66 ***
    - Regression 5: 0.66 ***
  - Distance
    - Regression 1: -1.37  ***
    - Regression 2: -1.36  ***
    - Regression 4: -1.31  ***
    - Regression 5: -1.52  ***
  - Common language
    - Regression 1: 0.66 ***
    - Regression 2: 0.69 ***
    - Regression 4: 0.71 ***
    - Regression 5: 0.58 ***
  - Adjacent
    - Regression 1: 0.37 ***
    - Regression 2: 0.43 ***
    - Regression 4: 0.23 ***
    - Regression 5: -0.11
  - Landlocked
    - Regression 1: -4.39  ***
    - Regression 2: -4.22  ***
    - Regression 4: -4.81  ***
    - Regression 5: -2.31  ***
  - Primary exporter*commodity price
    - Regression 1: 0.03
    - Regression 2: -0.06
    - Regression 3: 0.07
    - Regression 4: 0.07
    - Regression 5: 0.07
  - Colony
    - Regression 1: 0.73 ***
    - Regression 2: 0.69 ***
    - Regression 4: 0.62 ***
    - Regression 5: 0.73 ***
  - Constant (selected regressions)
    - Regression 1: 14.79 ***
    - Regression 2: 14.7 ***
    - Regression 3: -2.76 ***
    - Regression 4: 11.65 ***
    - Regression 5: 11.65 ***
- Estimation details:
  - Estimation technique: RE, Tobit, FE, RE, HT (as reported per column)
  - Number of observations:
    - Regression 1: 28,363
    - Regression 2: 27,692
    - Regression 3, 4, 5: 92,995
  - Number of groups:
    - Regression 1: 7,455
    - Regression 2: 7,287
    - Regression 3, 4, 5: 7,521
  - Sigma U (pooled v/s RE)
    - Regression 1: 1.28 ***
    - Regression 2: 1.29 ***
- Notes:
  - The dependent variable is nominal bilateral imports.
  - Equation 3 is estimated with heteroskedasticity consistent error terms.
  - *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
  - Time, country, and bilateral effects are not reported.

### Overview of Mediterranean countries’ export potentials (Table 2; in-sample estimates using equation (8))
- Export potentials to the EU (Total export potential, percent of GDP, mapping: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia):
  - Algeria: -21.6
  - Egypt: -0.1
  - Jordan: 3.5
  - Morocco: 4.5
  - Syria: -12.3
  - Tunisia: -13.8
- Actual/predicted exports — Unweighted average (by country):
  - Algeria: 495.7
  - Egypt: 169.1
  - Jordan: 47.7
  - Morocco: 103.0
  - Syria: 276.0
  - Tunisia: 167.4
- Non-EU — Top 5 export potentials (selected entries reported under each country)
  - Algeria: Saudi Arabia 0.3; Australia 0.1; Colombia 0.0; Malaysia 0.0; Syria 0.0
  - Egypt: Israel 0.2; Iran 0.1; China 0.1; Japan 0.1; Switzerland 0.0
  - Jordan: Israel 5.0; United States 3.3; Estonia 0.5; Canada 0.2; Egypt 0.1
  - Morocco: United States 0.9; Switzerland 0.2; Egypt 0.1; Hong Kong 0.1; Korea 0.1
  - Syria: Iran 0.3; Japan 0.2; United States 0.2; China 0.1; United States 0.2
  - Tunisia: United States 0.8; Japan 0.2; Switzerland 0.1; Hong Kong 0.1; Korea 0.1
- Non-EU — Top 5 over-export destinations (selected entries)
  - Algeria: United States -4.5; Brazil -2.4; Turkey -1.9; Canada -1.7; Indonesia -0.3
  - Egypt: India -0.2; Saudi Arabia -0.1; United States -0.1; Turkey -0.1; Singapore -0.1
  - Jordan: India -2.6; UAE -1.2; UAE -1.2; China -0.4; Pakistan -0.4
  - Morocco: India -0.9; Japan -0.5; Mexico -0.2; Libya -0.2; New Zealand -0.2
  - Syria: UAE -1.7; Turkey -1.2; Saudi Arabia -0.8; Kuwait -0.4; Algeria -0.3
  - Tunisia: Libya -1.5; India -0.5; Turkey -0.3; Algeria -0.2; Iran -0.2
- Notes:
  - Export potentials are calculated based on average data for 2000–02.
  - Negative export potentials indicate export beyond model predictions (over-exporting).

### Main findings on export performance and markets
- EU integration:
  - Table 2 shows most Mediterranean countries’ total export to the EU surpassing model predictions; Jordan is a notable exception, with exports attaining only one half of the benchmark for the EU on average.
  - Egypt’s total over-export to the EU is relatively small despite a high average ratio of actual to predicted exports because Egypt over-exports to smaller EU countries while under-exporting to most large EU countries.
  - Algeria and Syria, both predominantly hydrocarbon exporters, over-export significantly to the EU.
  - Morocco exports broadly at par with model predictions; Tunisia overtrades on average.
- United States and other non-EU markets:
  - The US figures prominently as a major untapped export market for Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia; Algeria and Egypt over-export to the United States.
  - Jordan’s estimated trade potential with the United States may be exaggerated by recent sharp increases in trade not captured by in-sample estimates.
  - Recent US-Middle East free trade initiative participants include Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and Bahrain (TIFAs as first step); Jordan concluded an FTA with the United States in 2002 and Morocco in 2004.
  - Other important untapped non-EU markets include Japan and a number of other Asian countries.
- Regional trade:
  - Israel presents a significant untapped market, particularly for Jordan but also for Egypt; Egypt, Israel, and the United States recently signed an agreement allowing certain Egyptian exports with a minimum level of Israeli contents tariff-free entry into the United States.
  - Syria’s trade potential vis-à-vis Israel could not be evaluated for lack of data but is likely to be substantial.
  - On the over-export side, India and Turkey emerge as major trading partners for most Mediterranean countries.

### Mediterranean countries’ integration with the EU — patterns and dynamics
- Time variation and heterogeneous integration:
  - Out-of-sample estimates of EU-Mediterranean trade potentials (allowed to vary over time) show mixed integration results during 1991–2002.
  - Tunisia: implemented an AAEU early and “appears to have benefited on balance” — export performance to France, Italy, Belgium, and Spain improved substantially during 1991–2002, offsetting loss vis-à-vis Germany.
  - Morocco: also implemented an AAEU later, saw surges vis-à-vis the United Kingdom and Spain while losing ground with most other EU countries (droughts may have affected agricultural exports).
  - Algeria and Syria: generally favorable export performance to the EU but dominated by oil and gas; difficult to attribute gains to integration policy.
  - Jordan: continues to export very little to the EU (a total of just over $170 million in 2002 according to IMF DOTS).
  - Egypt: has become less integrated with the EU during the 1990s.
- Heterogeneity across EU partners:
  - Despite uniform EU trade policy, Mediterranean countries’ export performance varies significantly across EU member states; no single EU country consistently more integrated with the MENA region.
  - Example: Morocco under-exports to France and over-exports to the United Kingdom; Tunisia shows the opposite pattern.

### Export composition, textiles, and intra-firm trade (Table 3 and Figure 2)
- Export composition differences (selected points):
  - Commodities play a less central role in Morocco and Tunisia; these countries’ exports are concentrated in reasonably high value-added manufacturing.
  - Electronics have emerged as a major export category in both Morocco and Tunisia, “attaining around 15 percent of total exports in 2002 in both cases.”
  - Textiles are a major determinant for Tunisia’s and Morocco’s export performance to the EU.
- Intra-textiles trade patterns:
  - Both Morocco’s and Tunisia’s textiles trade show “substantial imports of intermediate goods from a few countries and export of finished goods to those same countries,” implying outsourcing and/or intra-firm trade.
  - Tunisia’s intra-firm textile trade is particularly pronounced with France, Italy, Germany, and Belgium — the countries to which Tunisia over-exports most.
  - Morocco’s exports of finished textile goods to the United Kingdom and Spain were multiplied by 18 and 26 respectively in nominal terms between 1995 and 2002.
  - Finished goods as share of textile exports (memorandum items):
    - Egypt: 22 30
    - Jordan: 61 95
    - Morocco: 86 94
    - Tunisia: 95 93
- Egypt’s distinct pattern:
  - Egypt’s textile exports to the EU are predominantly intermediate inputs and raw cotton; about 3/4 of textile exports to the EU are directed to Italy, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
  - Egyptian textile exports to the EU are relatively small (some $200 million in 2002) compared with combined $2.5 billion imports of intermediate textile goods by Tunisia and Morocco, suggesting possible hub-and-spoke production relationships but limited scope.
- Policy-relevant structural concern:
  - The expiration of the Multifiber Agreement (MFA) on January 1, 2005 will expose the textiles sector to increasing competition, especially from China, posing medium-term risks for Tunisia and Morocco’s textiles-dependent export performance.
  - The established intra-firm ties and outsourcing relationships may provide transitional adjustment time.

### Conclusions and policy implications
- Untapped export markets:
  - Significant untapped export markets exist for Mediterranean countries both within and outside the EU; the United States emerges as possibly the most important untapped market (exceptions: Algeria and Egypt over-export to the United States).
  - Success of US integration efforts (including recent FTAs for Jordan and Morocco) could be crucial for future export performance.
- EU integration outcomes and priorities:
  - Mediterranean integration efforts with the EU have yielded mixed results overall; notable country-level successes (Tunisia, Morocco) are linked to AAEU implementation and pre-existing production networks.
  - Substantial export potentials remain within the EU for all countries except Algeria and Syria; only small potentials remain for Tunisia.
  - For Algeria and Syria, the near-to-medium term challenge is export-base diversification rather than trade policy per se; broad-based structural reforms to improve productivity and flexibility are emphasized.
  - Jordan under-exports to virtually all EU countries — suggesting need for stepped-up integration efforts across the board.
  - Targeted strategies:
    - Morocco could increase exports by targeting France and Germany; increased integration with Spain aligns with significant remaining export potential to Spain.
    - Egypt could make gains by targeting France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
- Diversification and adjustment:
  - Morocco’s and Tunisia’s experiences indicate that the Barcelona process and AAEUs have not created serious distortions; both countries over-export to many non-EU countries while under-exporting to several EU countries.
  - Market diversification and product diversification will likely become increasingly important as MFA effects materialize.
  - Structural reforms, trade liberalization, and policies supporting private sector initiatives and international production networks are central to improving export performance.

### Appendix A — Results based on equation 5 (comparison with Table 2; Table A-1 and Figure A1)
- Table A-1 — Export potentials to the EU (Total export potential, percent of GDP, mapping: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia):
  - Algeria: -15.4
  - Egypt: -0.5
  - Jordan: 4.7
  - Morocco: 3.9
  - Syria: -11.9
  - Tunisia: -8.0
- Actual/predicted exports — Unweighted average (Appendix table A-1):
  - Algeria: 187.8
  - Egypt: 155.3
  - Jordan: 34.8
  - Morocco: 85.1
  - Syria: 231.7
  - Tunisia: 107.6
- Non-EU — Top 5 export potentials and over-export destinations (selected appendix entries):
  - Algeria: Egypt 0.2; India 0.2; China 0.1; Saudi Arabia 0.1; Australia 0.1
  - Egypt: Israel 0.2; China 0.1; Switzerland 0.0; Japan 0.0; Canada 0.0
  - Jordan: Israel 11.2; United States 5.0; Egypt 0.6; Canada 0.2; Turkey 0.2
  - Morocco: United States 1.1; Switzerland 0.3; Egypt 0.1; Hong Kong 0.1; Korea 0.1
  - Tunisia: United States 1.2; Japan 0.3; Switzerland 0.2; China 0.1; Canada 0.1
  - Top over-export destinations (selected): United States -3.9 (Algeria); United States -0.3 (Egypt); India -2.5 (Jordan); India -0.9 (Morocco); UAE -1.5 (Syria); Libya -1.4 (Tunisia)
- Note: Appendix results are obtained using equation 5 in Table 1 and should be compared to the results in Table 2 and Figure 1; export potentials are based on average data for 2000–02.

*Source: Author's calculations (as presented in the supplied document).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/_wp0590.pdf_
