## _wp0594

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---

### Introduction and focus
- Regional trade agreements continue to proliferate despite being economically inferior from a global perspective to nondiscriminatory trade liberalization on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis. Multilateral liberalization and regional integration will continue to coexist.
- Paper focus: analyze sequencing between World Trade Organization (WTO) accession (multilateral liberalization) and implementation of customs unions, with emphasis on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC).
- Benchmark for assessment: consumer welfare of individual country members (not consumer welfare of EAEC as a whole).
- EAEC members (as defined in the text): Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, and Tajikistan. Observers: Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

### Key questions examined
- Should EAEC members focus trade integration efforts first on multilateral liberalization through the WTO rather than on a customs union?
- If the customs union is pursued first or in parallel to WTO accession, would customs union membership complicate or delay WTO accession?

### Conceptual issues on sequencing WTO accession and customs union membership
- Customs unions can be consistent with the multilateral framework (Article XXIV GATT/Article V GATS) but must meet requirements (e.g., elimination of duties on “substantially all trade,” inclusion of a plan and schedule within 10 years).
- Potential disadvantages of forming a customs union before WTO accession:
  - Regionalism can entrench protection via political-economy lobbying (Krueger, 1995; Krishna, 1998).
  - Dominant member with higher external tariffs can drive CET upward (Krugman, 1991 and 1993), causing trade diversion and negative welfare effects for more liberal members.
  - Customs union membership can delay WTO accession due to need to reconcile multiple constituencies; delay particularly costly to small open economies.
  - Inconsistencies can arise if some customs union members are WTO members while others are more protectionist unless CET ≤ maximum tariff bindings.
- Potential advantages of forming a customs union first:
  - A regional common position can increase bargaining power in multilateral negotiations.
  - Regional bargaining can lower fixed costs for small states and help avoid intra-group undercutting.
- Practical considerations:
  - Customs union commitments, even if not fully implemented, can shape WTO accession negotiations; parallel accession and customs union formation may be treated in practice as customs union preceding WTO accession.
  - Cooperation vs. dominance: a dominant member may lead accession negotiations and negotiated benefits will vary across countries.

### Regional background: CIS trade integration and EAEC
- Post-Soviet period saw numerous bilateral and regional trade agreements in the 1990s; many remained largely "on paper" because of limited/unclear coverage, exemptions, non-harmonized sensitive lists, enforcement costs (rules of origin), absence of regional institutions, and VAT harmonization issues.
- Box summary — WTO vs regional enforcement: Regional institutions are generally absent in the CIS, weakening enforcement compared with the WTO; cooperative regional equilibria can be fragile if a dominant party has incentives to deviate and renegotiate.
- EAEC:
  - Agreement signed October 2000; entered into force May 2001.
  - Members: Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan. Observers: Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine.
  - EAEC envisages a customs union and eventual common economic area superseding the CIS customs union of the 1990s.
- EAEC CET details:
  - CET agreement signed February 2000; CET coverage cited: 6,156 tariff lines out of 11,086 in EAEC classification system; remaining tariffs unbound and set independently.
  - CET implementation envisaged in stages over five years from entry into force, extendable by mutual agreement.
  - Transitional rules: members compile two lists of goods by tariff-difference thresholds (5 percentage points); sensitive goods lists permitted up to 15 percent of total imports of the preceding year (exception: Tajikistan one sensitive item, alumina, imports not to exceed 25 percent of previous year).
  - Level of harmonization varied: Kyrgyz Republic had the lowest level of harmonization equal to 32 percent of the common tariff schedule in 2003.
- EAEC institutions and voting distribution in interstate council:
  - Russian Federation 4 votes; Belarus and Kazakhstan each 2 votes; Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan each 1 vote.
  - May 2003 meeting to improve customs union agreement and coordinate WTO accession efforts.

### Modeling approach and scenarios
- Partial equilibrium model at the four-digit HS commodity level using commodity-level data.
- Two sequencing scenarios:
  - Scenario 1: adopting the EAEC common external tariff prior to WTO accession.
  - Scenario 2: adopting the EAEC common external tariff after joining the WTO.
- Key model assumptions:
  - EAEC countries apply zero tariff rate to intra-EAEC trade and continue to do so.
  - Products imported from EAEC members are imperfect substitutes for products from the rest of the world.
  - World markets are perfectly competitive; products within each group are perfectly homogeneous.
- Welfare decomposition:
  - ∆Wi = ∆Wi,EAEC + ∆Wi,ROW
  - ∆Wi,ROW = ∆TRi,ROW + ∆CSi,ROW
  - ∆Wi,EAEC = ∆TRi,EAEC + ∆CSi,EAEC
- Calibration draws on elasticities from Hoekman, Ng, and Olarreaga (2002) and Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2004), UN Comtrade imports, and MFN tariffs. World price Pw,i normalized at 1.

### Scenario 1: EAEC implementation prior to WTO accession — simulation results (Table 4, in millions of U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated)
- Assumption: EAEC members change MFN tariffs to match current EAEC CET before joining WTO; for unbound lines use the highest current EAEC member rate.
- Kyrgyz Republic already in WTO: results for KGZ interpreted as costs of implementing the EAEC customs union.
- Aggregate change in welfare (∆Wi):
  - BLR 2.6
  - KAZ -31.8
  - KGZ -3.5
  - RUS 142.8
  - TJK -1.8
- Change in welfare by source:
  - EAEC 0.0 for all members (no modeled trade creation from intra-EAEC trade because intra-EAEC tariffs assumed zero initially)
  - Rest of the world: same as aggregate numbers above
- Of which, change in tariff revenues:
  - BLR 3.0
  - KAZ 223.4
  - KGZ 22.8
  - RUS -150.3
  - TJK 12.1
- Change in consumer surplus:
  - BLR -0.4
  - KAZ -255.2
  - KGZ -26.3
  - RUS 293.0
  - TJK -13.8
- Change in tariff revenues (percentage change):
  - BLR 0.99
  - KAZ 0.82
  - KGZ 202.2
  - RUS -2.85
  - TJK 3.0
- Change in imports (percentage change):
  - BLR 0.0
  - KAZ -6.1
  - KGZ -6.6
  - RUS 0.3
  - TJK -3.6
- Change in imports by source (Rest of the world portion):
  - BLR -0.1
  - KAZ -10.3
  - KGZ -13.1
  - RUS 0.3
  - TJK -5.2
- Interpretation: Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan incur welfare losses borne by consumers; no positive consumer surplus change from intra-EAEC trade due to assumed pre-existing zero tariffs. Aggregate net trade diversion for KAZ, KGZ, TJK.

### Scenario 2: EAEC implementation after WTO accession — simulation results (Table 5, in millions of U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated)
- Assumption: prevailing EAEC CET after WTO accession will include existing CET lines and the lowest rates currently effective among EAEC members for lines not yet bound.
- Aggregate change in welfare (∆Wi):
  - BLR 16.9
  - KAZ -2.4
  - KGZ -4
  - RUS 19.0
  - TJK -0.7
- Change in welfare by source:
  - EAEC 0.0 for all members
  - Rest of the world: same as aggregate numbers above
- Of which, change in tariff revenues:
  - BLR -116.3
  - KAZ 16.9
  - KGZ --
  - RUS -2193.1
  - TJK 3.8
- Change in consumer surplus:
  - BLR 133.3
  - KAZ -19.4
  - KGZ -2612.1
  - RUS 4.5
  - TJK -4.5
- Change in tariff revenues (percentage change):
  - BLR -34.4
  - KAZ 6.9
  - KGZ --
  - RUS -40.8
  - TJK 16.6
- Change in imports (percentage change):
  - BLR 2.4
  - KAZ -0.6
  - KGZ -8.5
  - RUS -1.1
  - TJK ?
- Change in imports by source (Rest of the world portion):
  - BLR 7.1
  - KAZ -0.9
  - KGZ -9.7
  - RUS -1.6
- Interpretation: Scenario 2 yields larger welfare gains for Russia and Belarus and smaller consumer surplus losses for KAZ, KGZ, TJK compared to Scenario 1. (Table entries include missing values “--” or “?” where the source table lacked entries.)

### Comparison of EAEC members’ tariff structure with EAEC CET (selected statistics from Table 3)
- EAEC simple average 10.4; BLR 11.0; KAZ 7.4; KGZ 4.5; WTO KGZ 7.3; RUS 11.1
- Agricultural products: EAEC 12.4; BLR 14.1; KAZ 11.7; KGZ 8.5; WTO KGZ 7.9; RUS 13.4
- Alcohol (of which): EAEC 32.1; BLR 21.0; KAZ 100; KGZ 7.9; WTO KGZ 11.8; RUS 21.0
- Tobacco (of which): EAEC 10.8; BLR 11.0; KAZ 11.5; KGZ 3.9; WTO KGZ 12.3; RUS 10.8
- Mining: EAEC 5.1; BLR 5.1; KAZ 4.8; KGZ 4.8; WTO KGZ 9.6; RUS 5.1
- Oil and oil products (of which): EAEC 5.0; BLR 5.0; KAZ 5.0; KGZ 5.0; WTO KGZ 10.0; RUS 5.0
- Manufactures: EAEC 9.7; BLR 10.2; KAZ 6.2; KGZ 3.2; WTO KGZ 6.5; RUS 10.6
- Maximum tariff: EAEC 100; BLR 100; KAZ 100; KGZ 20; WTO KGZ 30; RUS 100
- Minimum tariff: All listed as 0
- Standard Deviation: EAEC 5.8; BLR 6.1; KAZ 6.6; KGZ 4.8; WTO KGZ 4.6; RUS 6.8
- Number of lines: EAEC 6,156; BLR 11,166; KAZ 10,993; KGZ 11,152; WTO KGZ 6,892; RUS 11,166
- Implementation of EAEC tariff schedule implies an increase in simple average tariff and MFN tariff for all EAEC members except Belarus and the Russian Federation; adoption implies higher overall trade protection, particularly dramatic for the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan.
- Tajikistan increased tariff rates in 2003 to comply with EAEC commitments.
- Kyrgyz Republic’s WTO bound rates on many lines are lower than EAEC rates; adopting EAEC rates could be inconsistent with Kyrgyz WTO commitments.

### Current status of CIS trade regimes and accession status (selected indicators, 2003 and 2004)
- CIS members generally open except Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; degree of openness varies.
- De jure liberal regimes coexist with unofficial and nontransparent barriers (including corruption).
- Gravity-model identified constraints to trade: economic structure, geographic conditions (landlocked: Belarus, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), unresolved conflicts, transit costs, unofficial payments, excessive regulation, fragmented transport markets, and inconsistent rules of origin.
- Selected trade regime indicators, 2003 (Number of bands; Minimum tariff (%); Maximum tariff (%); Average tariff (%); Custom fees (%)):
  - Armenia: 2; 0.0; 4.0; 4.00; 0.00
  - Azerbaijan: 3; 1.5; 10; 8.0; 0.15
  - Belarus: 8; 0; 100; 11.00; 0.15
  - Georgia: 2; 0; 30; 8.2; 0.15
  - Kazakhstan: 10; 1; 100; 7.4; 0.20
  - Kyrgyz Republic: 5; 0; 20; 4.5; 0.15
  - Moldova: 6; 0; 15; 6.9; 0.00
  - Russia: 10; 0; 100; 11.1; 0.00
  - Tajikistan: 6; 0; 15; 7.6; 0.00
  - Turkmenistan: 6; 10; 100; 5.1; 0.50
  - Ukraine: 5; 0; 70; 12.7; 0.00
  - Uzbekistan: 3; 0; 30; 15.3; 0.20
- WTO accession status, 2004 (Application date; Current status):
  - Armenia: Nov-93; Joined in 2003
  - Azerbaijan: Jul-97; Ongoing negotiations
  - Belarus: Sep-93; Ongoing negotiations
  - Georgia: Jul-96; Joined in 2000
  - Kazakhstan: Jan-96; Ongoing negotiations
  - Kyrgyz Republic: Feb-96; Joined in 1998
  - Moldova: Nov-93; Joined in 2001
  - Russia: Jun-93; Ongoing negotiations
  - Tajikistan: May-01; Ongoing negotiations
  - Turkmenistan: ......; (not specified)
  - Ukraine: Nov-93; Ongoing negotiations
  - Uzbekistan: Dec-94; Ongoing negotiations

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Sequencing matters: joining the WTO before CET implementation may protect consumers if the CET would raise protection.
- If one member is already a WTO member, the common external tariff should be set to the lowest rate among members to minimize incompatibility and reduce risk of trade diversion and higher overall protection.
- Beware that customs union formation can entrench higher protection and create domestic lobbying that resists future multilateral liberalization.
- Dominant member influence (e.g., Russian Federation) may push CET upward to the detriment of smaller members; harmonization may benefit some countries more than others.
- If customs union precedes WTO accession, invest in institutional mechanisms to make regional agreements incentive-compatible and enforceable to avoid renegotiation risk and collapse of cooperation.
- Harmonize transitional provisions (sensitive lists, VAT treatment, rules of origin) to reduce disputes and improve effectiveness of preferential arrangements.
- Coordinate WTO accession strategies among members to reconcile future WTO commitments with EAEC commitments and to avoid delays or inconsistencies.

### Caveats, limitations, and risks
- Welfare effects depend on whether current tariff schedules of each EAEC member are lower or higher than EAEC tariff schedule.
- Scenario 2 does not simulate WTO accession gains per se; it quantifies minimum welfare gain relative to Scenario 1.
- Model uses statutory rates; these may be biased upward relative to actual rates due to exemptions, shuttle trade, bilateral preferences; import duties used in base year may differ from actual collected revenues.
- Model does not assess broader political/economic implications of EAEC membership beyond customs-union tariff effects.
- Risks identified: potential welfare losses from trade diversion, harmonization benefiting some members more than others, customs union pursued first slowing decision-making and strengthening protectionist lobbies, and potential delays to WTO accession—costly for small open economies.

### Conclusions (policy-relevant findings)
- Sequencing between WTO accession and customs union membership should be carefully evaluated; welfare implications vary by country.
- Simulations indicate joining the WTO ahead of implementing the EAEC customs union is welfare improving from a consumer standpoint compared to the reverse sequencing when the customs union implies an increase in the rate of protection for its members.
- Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan are identified as likely to face increased levels of trade protection once EAEC customs union is fully implemented; consumers in these countries would bear costs due to potential tariff increases.
- Implementation prospects of EAEC have already increased overall protection for some (e.g., Tajikistan) to comply with customs union commitments and may have prolonged WTO negotiations.

*Source: IMF working paper — “1. Bilateral Free Trade Agreements in the CIS” (selected chapters and excerpts).*

### 1. Bilateral Free Trade Agreements in the CIS..........................................................................7

### 1. Bilateral Free Trade Agreements in the CIS

### Introduction
- Regional trade agreements continue to proliferate despite being economically inferior from a global perspective to nondiscriminatory trade liberalization on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis. Multilateral liberalization and regional integration will continue to coexist.
- Focus of the paper: analyze sequencing between World Trade Organization (WTO) accession (multilateral liberalization) and implementation of customs unions, with emphasis on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
- EAEC and prospective CES members have expressed a strong commitment to implementing customs unions as a first step toward deeper integration while several members are seeking accession to the WTO.
- Benchmark for assessment: consumer welfare of individual country members (not consumer welfare of EAEC as a whole).

### Key questions examined
- Should EAEC members focus trade integration efforts first on multilateral liberalization through the WTO rather than on a customs union?
- If the customs union is pursued first or in parallel to WTO accession, would customs union membership complicate or delay WTO accession?

### Main analytical approach and headline result
- Uses a simple partial equilibrium model with commodity-level data to estimate welfare impacts under two scenarios:
  - Scenario 1: adopting the EAEC common external tariff prior to WTO accession.
  - Scenario 2: adopting the EAEC common external tariff after joining the WTO.
- Simulation result highlighted: from a consumer standpoint, it would be preferable to join the WTO before implementing the customs union envisaged by the EAEC should the latter imply an increase in the rate of protection for its members.

### EAEC members (as defined in the text)
- Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, and Tajikistan. Observers: Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

---

### Sequencing between WTO accession and customs union membership: conceptual issues
- Customs unions are not inconsistent with the multilateral framework (Article XXIV of the GATT/WTO and Article V of the GATS), but they must meet certain requirements (e.g., elimination of duties on “substantially all trade,” and inclusion of a plan and schedule for formation within 10 years).
- Potential disadvantages of forming a customs union before WTO accession:
  - Regionalism can act as a stumbling block to further multilateral liberalization due to political economy: inefficient firms lobby to retain preferential protection (Krueger, 1995; Krishna, 1998).
  - Customs union first can increase overall level of trade protection for members relative to prior levels; dominant country with higher external tariffs may drive the Common External Tariff (CET) upward (Krugman, 1991 and 1993).
  - Implementation of a customs union may cause more liberal countries to converge toward higher rates, producing trade diversion and negative welfare effects.
  - Customs union membership can delay WTO accession because multilateral negotiations must reconcile interests of several constituencies; delay particularly costly to small open economies.
  - If some customs union members are already WTO members while others are more protectionist, inconsistencies between WTO commitments and CET can arise unless CET is not higher than maximum tariff bindings.
- Potential advantages of forming a customs union first:
  - By entering regional agreement first, countries may increase bargaining power in multilateral negotiations by adopting a common regional position on sensitive issues.
  - Regional bargaining can lower fixed costs for small states in negotiations and prevent undercutting between members.
- Practical sequencing outcomes:
  - Customs union commitments, even if not fully implemented, can affect WTO accession negotiations; parallel accession and customs union formation may be treated as customs union membership preceding WTO accession in practice.
  - Cooperation vs. dominance: dominant members may lead accession negotiations and negotiated benefits will vary across countries.

---

### Regional trade integration in the CIS — background and recent initiatives
- Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, CIS countries signed numerous bilateral and regional trade agreements mainly in the first half of the 1990s.
- Reasons for proliferation: resuscitate previous linkages when market and payment institutions and exchange rate convertibility were not yet functioning; barter arrangements persisted.
- Many CIS preferential trade agreements remained largely "on paper" due to:
  - Limited and unclear coverage; sensitive goods often excluded (e.g., gas and oil for Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation).
  - Exemptions and exceptions not harmonized and granted ad hoc, introducing uncertainty.
  - Rise in conflicts of interest, trade disputes, and retaliation, delaying or blocking implementation.
  - High costs of enforcing rules of origin relative to benefits; importers often forgo claiming preferential rates.
  - Absence of regional institutions historically made agreements self-enforcing and weak.
  - Lack of harmonization in levying the value-added tax (VAT) resulted in numerous trade disputes and suspension of agreements on particular issues.

Box summary — WTO and regional trade integration: theory of incentives
- Regional institutions are generally absent in the CIS; this weakens enforcement compared with the WTO, which can impose penalties within the international trading system.
- Stability concerns: cooperative regional equilibria can be fragile if a dominant party has incentives to deviate and renegotiate, potentially destroying cooperative outcomes.
- Incentive-compatibility is difficult to construct in presence of a dominant player with substantial bargaining power.

---

### The Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC)
- EAEC agreement signed in October 2000; entered into force in May 2001.
- Members: Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, and Tajikistan. Observers: Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
- EAEC envisages implementation of a customs union and eventual common economic area, superseding the CIS customs union of the 1990s.

EAEC Common External Tariff (CET) and harmonization details
- CET agreement signed February 2000; envisaged CET would consist of tariff lines common to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia at that time, subject to further amendments, with remaining tariff lines to be set later.
- CET implementation envisaged in stages over a period of five years from entry into force, extendable by mutual agreement.
- Current EAEC tariff schedule coverage cited: 6,156 tariff lines out of the 11,086 identified in the EAEC classification system. The remaining tariffs are not bound and are set independently by each member.
- Transitional harmonization rules:
  - Each member to compile two lists of goods: one where differences in tariff rates among EAEC members do not exceed 5 percentage points, and one where they do.
  - During transitional period, each member may determine a list of sensitive goods for which it is free to establish its own rates; such a list should not exceed 15 percent of the total imports of the country in the preceding year.
  - Exception: Tajikistan has only one sensitive item, alumina, for which imports should not exceed 25 percent of the corresponding imports of the previous year.
- Level of harmonization varied across countries; the Kyrgyz Republic had the lowest level of harmonization equal to 32 percent of the common tariff schedule in 2003.

EAEC institutions and decision-making
- Regional institutions: interstate council (supreme body), integration committee, interparliamentary assembly.
- Voting distribution in interstate council: Russian Federation 4 votes; Belarus and Kazakhstan each 2 votes; the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan each 1 vote.
- In May 2003, EAEC members met to improve their customs union agreement and coordinate efforts to gain WTO accession.

---

### Modeling approach and scenarios (as described)
- A partial equilibrium model is used to simulate welfare effects from implementation sequencing.
- Two scenarios modeled:
  - Scenario 1: Impact on welfare of adopting the EAEC common external tariff prior to WTO accession.
  - Scenario 2: Impact on welfare of adopting the EAEC common external tariff following WTO accession.
- The simulations use commodity-level data.
- Reported implication from simulations: From a consumer standpoint, joining the WTO before implementing the customs union is preferable if the customs union implies an increase in the rate of protection for its members.

---

### Policy implications and considerations
- For policymakers in EAEC/CIS:
  - Consider sequencing carefully: joining WTO before CET implementation may protect consumers if the CET would raise protection.
  - Beware that customs union formation can entrench higher protection and create domestic lobbying that resists future multilateral liberalization.
  - Consider the bargaining dynamics: a dominant member (e.g., Russian Federation) may influence CET and negotiation positions to the potential detriment of smaller members.
  - If customs union precedes WTO accession, invest in institutional mechanisms to make regional agreements incentive-compatible and enforceable to avoid renegotiation risk and collapse of cooperation.
  - Harmonize transitional provisions (sensitive lists, VAT treatment, rules of origin) to reduce disputes and improve the effectiveness of preferential arrangements.
  - Coordinate WTO accession strategies among members to reconcile future WTO commitments with EAEC commitments and to avoid delays or inconsistencies.

*Source: IMF working paper — “1. Bilateral Free Trade Agreements in the CIS” (selected chapters and excerpts).*

### Section V).

### _wp0594 - Section V)

### Common Economic Space (CES) and Regional Integration Initiatives
- On September 19, 2003 Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine met in Yalta to sign a draft agreement to create a CES over 5–7 years.
- CES implementation process involves three stages:
  - coordination of customs duties and harmonization of trade and custom regulations;
  - lifting of current trade barriers and creation of the customs union;
  - liquidation of internal customs boundaries to be replaced by a common customs boundary and creation of a supra-national regulating institution.
- Ukraine's position is not fully defined because Ukraine has also expressed interest in joining the EU.
- EAEC and CES initiatives overlap for some members; membership in different customs unions is not possible.

### Other Regional Cooperation Initiatives
- GUUAM: initially set up to develop hydrocarbon pipeline projects; more recently proposed a free trade area.
- Shanghai Cooperation Organization: originally focused on regional security; more recently approved programs to promote trade and investment.
- Central Asia Cooperation Organization (CACO): at the October 2004 summit Uzbekistan proposed a Central Asian Common Market; in February 2005 Kazakhstan proposed creation of a Central Asian Union based on the EU model.

### Current Status of the CIS Trade Regimes
- CIS members, with the exception of Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, are generally open economies; degree of openness varies.
- Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation are more restrictive; the CIS-5 are the most liberal.
- De jure liberal trade regimes coexist with unofficial and nontransparent barriers (including corruption) that impede liberal trade.
- Tariff level is not always the main obstacle; lack of transparent customs valuation procedures is a key constraint.
- Gravity model simulations suggest CIS countries do not trade “enough” relative to other transition economies due to:
  - economic structure (reliance on natural resources for some);
  - geographic conditions (landlocked countries: Belarus, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan);
  - unresolved external and internal conflicts (e.g., Armenia–Azerbaijan, within Georgia, within the Russian Federation);
  - cost of transit trade (rail, roads, poor infrastructure, air transport; fragmented transport markets);
  - existence of unofficial payments and excessive regulation;
  - large number of free trade agreements and inconsistent rules of origin increasing scope for corruption and uncertainty.

- Selected trade regime indicators in the CIS, 2003 (from Table 2):
  - Armenia: Number of bands 2, Minimum tariff (%) 0.0, Maximum tariff (%) 4.0, Average tariff (%) 4.00, Custom fees (%) 0.00
  - Azerbaijan: Number of bands 3, Minimum tariff (%) 1.5, Maximum tariff (%) 10, Average tariff (%) 8.0, Custom fees (%) 0.15
  - Belarus: Number of bands 8, Minimum tariff (%) 0, Maximum tariff (%) 100, Average tariff (%) 11.00, Custom fees (%) 0.15
  - Georgia: Number of bands 2, Minimum tariff (%) 0, Maximum tariff (%) 30, Average tariff (%) 8.2, Custom fees (%) 0.15
  - Kazakhstan: Number of bands 10, Minimum tariff (%) 1, Maximum tariff (%) 100, Average tariff (%) 7.4, Custom fees (%) 0.20
  - Kyrgyz Republic: Number of bands 5, Minimum tariff (%) 0, Maximum tariff (%) 20, Average tariff (%) 4.5, Custom fees (%) 0.15
  - Moldova: Number of bands 6, Minimum tariff (%) 0, Maximum tariff (%) 15, Average tariff (%) 6.9, Custom fees (%) 0.00
  - Russia: Number of bands 10, Minimum tariff (%) 0, Maximum tariff (%) 100, Average tariff (%) 11.1, Custom fees (%) 0.00
  - Tajikistan: Number of bands 6, Minimum tariff (%) 0, Maximum tariff (%) 15, Average tariff (%) 7.6, Custom fees (%) 0.00
  - Turkmenistan: Number of bands 6, Minimum tariff (%) 10, Maximum tariff (%) 100, Average tariff (%) 5.1, Custom fees (%) 0.50
  - Ukraine: Number of bands 5, Minimum tariff (%) 0, Maximum tariff (%) 70, Average tariff (%) 12.7, Custom fees (%) 0.00
  - Uzbekistan: Number of bands 3, Minimum tariff (%) 0, Maximum tariff (%) 30, Average tariff (%) 15.3, Custom fees (%) 0.20

### Comparison of EAEC Members’ Tariff Structure with the EAEC Common External Tariff (Table 3 highlights)
- Implementation of the EAEC tariff schedule implies an increase in simple average tariff and MFN tariff for all EAEC members except Belarus and the Russian Federation; for Belarus and Russia adoption implies a small decrease in their average tariff.
- EAEC members currently have relatively low tariff rates on products they do not produce; adopting EAEC rates implies higher overall trade protection, particularly dramatic for the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan.
- Tajikistan increased its tariff rates in 2003 to comply with EAEC commitments.
- Kyrgyz Republic’s WTO bound rates on many lines are lower than EAEC rates; adopting EAEC rates could be inconsistent with Kyrgyz WTO commitments.
- Selected tariff statistics from Table 3 (EAEC and members):
  - EAEC simple average 10.4; BLR 11.0; KAZ 7.4; KGZ 4.5; WTO KGZ 7.3; RUS 11.1
  - Agricultural products: EAEC 12.4; BLR 14.1; KAZ 11.7; KGZ 8.5; WTO KGZ 7.9; RUS 13.4
  - Alcohol (of which): EAEC 32.1; BLR 21.0; KAZ 100; KGZ 7.9; WTO KGZ 11.8; RUS 21.0
  - Tobacco (of which): EAEC 10.8; BLR 11.0; KAZ 11.5; KGZ 3.9; WTO KGZ 12.3; RUS 10.8
  - Mining: EAEC 5.1; BLR 5.1; KAZ 4.8; KGZ 4.8; WTO KGZ 9.6; RUS 5.1
  - Oil and oil products (of which): EAEC 5.0; BLR 5.0; KAZ 5.0; KGZ 5.0; WTO KGZ 10.0; RUS 5.0
  - Manufactures: EAEC 9.7; BLR 10.2; KAZ 6.2; KGZ 3.2; WTO KGZ 6.5; RUS 10.6
  - Passenger cars (of which): EAEC ...; BLR 16.1; KAZ 7.0; KGZ 0.0; WTO KGZ 10.0; RUS 16.1
  - Maximum tariff: EAEC 100; BLR 100; KAZ 100; KGZ 20; WTO KGZ 30; RUS 100
  - Minimum tariff: All listed as 0
  - Standard Deviation: EAEC 5.8; BLR 6.1; KAZ 6.6; KGZ 4.8; WTO KGZ 4.6; RUS 6.8
  - Number of lines: EAEC 6,156; BLR 11,166; KAZ 10,993; KGZ 11,152; WTO KGZ 6,892; RUS 11,166

### Model for Estimating Welfare Effects of EAEC Customs Union Membership
- A partial equilibrium model at the four-digit HS commodity level simulates welfare impact under two sequencing paths:
  - Scenario 1: adopting the EAEC common external tariff prior to WTO accession.
  - Scenario 2: adopting the EAEC common external tariff after joining the WTO.
- Key model assumptions:
  - EAEC countries apply zero tariff rate to intra-EAEC trade and continue to do so.
  - Products imported from EAEC members are imperfect substitutes for products traded with the rest of the world.
  - World markets are perfectly competitive.
  - Products within each group (EAEC members and rest of world) are perfectly homogeneous.
- Welfare change for member i decomposed as:
  - ∆Wi = ∆Wi,EAEC + ∆Wi,ROW
  - ∆Wi,ROW = ∆TRi,ROW + ∆CSi,ROW
  - ∆Wi,EAEC = ∆TRi,EAEC + ∆CSi,EAEC
- Import demand specification and calibration uses elasticity η, world price Pw,i normalized at 1, and MFN tariff ti; demand parameter Ai calibrated using elasticities from Hoekman, Ng, and Olarreaga (2002) and Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2004), UN Comtrade imports, and MFN tariffs.

### Scenario 1: EAEC Implementation Prior to WTO Accession (Table 4 results; in millions of U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated)
- Assumption: EAEC members change MFN tariffs to match current EAEC CET before joining WTO; for unbound lines use the highest current EAEC member rate.
- Kyrgyz Republic already in WTO: results for KGZ interpreted as costs of implementing the EAEC customs union.
- Aggregate outcomes (Table 4):
  - Change in welfare:
    - BLR 2.6
    - KAZ -31.8
    - KGZ -3.5 (note: KGZ is the Kyrgyz Republic)
    - RUS 142.8
    - TJK -1.8
  - Change in welfare by source:
    - EAEC 0.0 for all
    - Rest of the world same as aggregate numbers above
  - Of which, Change in tariff revenues:
    - BLR 3.0
    - KAZ 223.4
    - KGZ 22.8
    - RUS -150.3
    - TJK 12.1
  - Change in consumer surplus:
    - BLR -0.4
    - KAZ -255.2
    - KGZ -26.3
    - RUS 293.0
    - TJK -13.8
  - Change in tariff revenues (percentage change):
    - BLR 0.99
    - KAZ 0.82
    - KGZ 202.2
    - RUS -2.85
    - TJK 3.0
  - Change in imports (percentage change):
    - BLR 0.0
    - KAZ -6.1
    - KGZ -6.6
    - RUS 0.3
    - TJK -3.6
  - Change in imports by source:
    - EAEC 0.0 for all
    - Rest of the world:
      - BLR -0.1
      - KAZ -10.3
      - KGZ -13.1
      - RUS 0.3
      - TJK -5.2
- Interpretation: Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan incur welfare losses borne by consumers; no positive consumer surplus change from intra-EAEC trade due to assumed pre-existing zero tariffs (no modeled trade creation). Aggregate net trade diversion for KAZ, KGZ, TJK.

### Scenario 2: EAEC Implementation after WTO Accession (Table 5 results; in millions of U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated)
- Assumption: prevailing EAEC CET after WTO accession will include existing CET lines and the lowest rates currently effective among EAEC members for lines not yet bound.
- Aggregate outcomes (Table 5):
  - Change in welfare:
    - BLR 16.9
    - KAZ -2.4
    - KGZ -4
    - RUS 19.0
    - TJK -0.7
  - Change in welfare by source:
    - EAEC 0.0 for all
    - Rest of the world same as aggregate numbers above
  - Of which, Change in tariff revenues:
    - BLR -116.3
    - KAZ 16.9
    - KGZ --
    - RUS -2193.1
    - TJK 3.8
  - Change in consumer surplus:
    - BLR 133.3
    - KAZ -19.4
    - KGZ -2612.1
    - RUS 4.5
    - TJK -4.5
  - Change in tariff revenues (percentage change):
    - BLR -34.4
    - KAZ 6.9
    - KGZ --
    - RUS -40.8
    - TJK 16.6
  - Change in imports (percentage change):
    - BLR 2.4
    - KAZ -0.6
    - KGZ -8.5
    - RUS -1.1
    - TJK ?
  - Change in imports by source (Rest of the world portion):
    - BLR 7.1
    - KAZ -0.9
    - KGZ -9.7
    - RUS -1.6
- Interpretation: Scenario 2 yields larger welfare gains for Russia and Belarus and smaller consumer surplus losses for KAZ, KGZ, TJK compared to Scenario 1. (Table 5 entries include placeholder values “--” or missing entries in source table where applicable.)

### Caveats and Model Limitations
- Welfare effects depend on whether current tariff schedules of each EAEC member are lower or higher than EAEC tariff schedule.
- Scenario 2 does not simulate WTO accession gains per se; it quantifies minimum welfare gain relative to Scenario 1.
- Model uses statutory rates; these may be biased upward relative to actual rates due to exemptions, shuttle trade, bilateral preferences; import duties used in base year may differ from actual collected revenues.
- Model does not assess welfare implications of joining EAEC as a political/economic entity beyond customs union tariff effects.

### WTO Accession, Negotiation Issues, and Implications for Sequencing
- Many CIS countries still in WTO accession process; within EAEC only the Kyrgyz Republic has acceded to the WTO.
- Sequencing choice depends on how WTO negotiations are handled: individual or cooperative approach.
- Coordinated EAEC approach to WTO accession was explicitly endorsed in May 2003 and reiterated June 2004.
- EAEC members favor cooperative accession to strengthen bargaining power as a group and avoid undercutting each other.
- Coordinated approach can:
  - increase ex post rate of protection for EAEC as a group;
  - eliminate possibility to pursue WTO accession at different paces;
  - disadvantage more liberal countries that would benefit from earlier accession leverage (example: Kyrgyz Republic’s 1998 accession terms perceived to weaken other EAEC members).
- Russia’s dominant position and more protectionist trade policy may incline EAEC toward higher CET; smaller, more liberal members may be inclined to converge toward Russia’s higher rates to pursue common terms of accession.
- Kyrgyz Republic’s WTO bindings are lower than CET under EAEC; full implementation of EAEC CET by Kyrgyz Republic could violate its WTO commitments and lead to demands for compensation from other WTO members.
- Table 6 (WTO accession status, 2004) summary:
  - Armenia: Application Nov-93; Current Status Joined in 2003
  - Azerbaijan: Application Jul-97; Current Status Ongoing negotiations
  - Belarus: Application Sep-93; Current Status Ongoing negotiations
  - Georgia: Application Jul-96; Current Status Joined in 2000
  - Kazakhstan: Application Jan-96; Current Status Ongoing negotiations
  - Kyrgyz Republic: Application Feb-96; Current Status Joined in 1998
  - Moldova: Application Nov-93; Current Status Joined in 2001
  - Russia: Application Jun-93; Current Status Ongoing negotiations
  - Tajikistan: Application May-01; Current Status Ongoing negotiations
  - Turkmenistan: Application ......; Current Status (not specified)
  - Ukraine: Application Nov-93; Current Status Ongoing negotiations
  - Uzbekistan: Application Dec-94; Current Status Ongoing negotiations

### Conclusions and Policy-Relevant Findings
- Sequencing between WTO accession and customs union membership should be carefully evaluated; welfare implications vary by country.
- If one member is already a WTO member, the common external tariff should be set to the lowest rate among members to minimize incompatibility and reduce risk of trade diversion and overall increased protection.
- Analysis suggests Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan will face increased levels of trade protection once EAEC customs union is fully implemented; consumers in these countries would bear costs due to potential tariff increases.
- Simulations indicate joining the WTO ahead of implementing the EAEC customs union is welfare improving from a consumer standpoint compared to the reverse sequencing.
- Net trade diversion differs across members because of differences in current trade protection levels.
- Implementation prospects of EAEC have already increased overall protection for some (e.g., Tajikistan) to comply with customs union commitments and may have prolonged WTO negotiations.
- Risks and concerns from the study:
  - potential welfare losses for some countries from trade diversion due to increased protection;
  - harmonization may benefit some countries more than others;
  - a customs union pursued first slows decision-making, gives protectionist lobbies leverage over more liberal members, and may delay WTO accession—costly for small open economies.

### Annex I — Regional Cooperation Agreements and Initiatives in the CIS (selected entries)
- Economic Cooperation and Organization, 1992: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.
- Black Sea Economic Cooperation, 1992: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine.
- Energy Charter Treaty, 1994: signed by all Central Asian countries and most European countries.
- CIS Free Trade Agreement, 1994: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (not ratified by a number of states).
- GUUAM, 1997: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (initial hydrocarbon pipeline focus; Free Trade Area proposal in 2000).
- Central Asia Cooperation Organization (CAREC), 1997: Azerbaijan, People's Republic of China (Xinjiang), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan.
- Eurasian Economic Community, signed 2000, ratified May 2001: Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan.
- Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2001: China, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan.
- Central Asia Cooperation Organization (CACO), 2002: Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan.
- Common Economic Area, September 2003: draft agreement between Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine.
- EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Moldova (1994, effective 1998), Uzbekistan (1996), the Russian Federation (1998), Turkmenistan (1998).
- Balkan Stability Pact, 1999: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; 2002 admission of Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak Republic.
- Caspian Sea Oil and Gas agreements, November 1999: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan (pipeline projects bypassing Russia and Iran; Baku–Ceyhan oil pipeline; Transcaspian gas pipeline).
- The Silk Road agreement, September 1998: all CIS countries (excluding the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan) plus Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey — coordinated development of transport links between China and Europe and regulation of transport tariffs and customs procedures.

*Source: _wp0594 - Section V).*

### References

### _wp0594 - References

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### Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Regional Integration, and Trade Performance
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### Trade Policy, Tariffs, and Market Access
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### Modeling, Methods, and Country Studies
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- Yang, Y., 2003, “Strategy for Sustained Growth,” in Republic of Kazakhstan, Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, Country Report 03/211, Chapter 3 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

*Source: _wp0594 - References*

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