## _wp0595

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### Introduction and research question
- Investigates the extent to which mechanisms for income insurance and consumption smoothing (shock smoothing) contribute to the stability of the CFA zones in Africa.
- Distinguishes institutional channels (tax-transfer systems, pooled reserves, central bank contributions, France’s contributions) and market channels (capital markets, credit markets, remittances) as potential cross-country risk-sharing mechanisms.
- Defines membership:
  - WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union): Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.
  - CEMAC (Central African Economic and Monetary Community): Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.
- Focus: quantify degree of cross-country risk-sharing within each CFA zone and the channels contributing to stability.

### Empirical approach and key determinants
- Framework: two-country continuous-time consumption-based model with CRRA utility; logarithmic utility used for closed-form expressions; follows Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha (1996) and Sorensen and Yosha (1998).
- Identification strategy: decompose cross-sectional variance of log-differenced GDP into contributions from net factor income, national income components, international transfers (excluding ODA/grants for private transfers), and private/public consumption; regression β coefficients measure fraction of shocks smoothed by each channel.
- Data and sample:
  - National accounts (GDP, GNP, DNI, C, G) from World Bank WDI, per capita, in 1995 U.S. dollars; panel covers 1980–2000 (shorter where missing).
  - Reserve regression variables: Real GDP and real imports from WDI; reserves (minus gold) deflated by U.S. GDP deflator; export volatility = volatility of real export receipts (WDI).
  - Central bank contribution data from Banque de France statistics (1983–2000).
  - France aid data from OECD database (1980–2000).
- Reserve determinants highlighted:
  - "The size of international transactions represented by real GDP"
  - "The adjustment costs proxied by the average propensity to import"
- Estimation: regressions include time fixed effects and assume AR(1) errors with a two-step GLS estimator on yearly differenced data (typical sample 1980–2000).

### Main quantitative findings (aggregate)
- Conventional channels (capital markets, credit markets, and remittances combined) smooth "less than 15 percent of shocks."
- Reserve pooling: given estimated optimal reserve holdings and observed reserves, "I find that reserve pooling provides no shock smoothing for the CFA zones."
- Central bank contributions over 1980–2000:
  - "BCEAO contributions smoothed about 7 percent of shocks"
  - "BEAC contributions smoothed about 5 percent of shocks"
- France’s contributions over 1980–2000:
  - "about 63 percent of shocks are smoothed via France’s contributions in the West African CFA zone"
  - "44 percent of shocks are smoothed via the same channel in the Central African CFA zone"

### Results — standard (national-accounts) channels
- Standard channels considered: capital markets (factor income), credit markets (savings), and private current transfers (remittances; excludes ODA/grants).
- Over 1980–2000:
  - CEMAC: about 85 percent of shocks are not absorbed through standard channels (implying about 15 percent smoothed through standard channels).
  - WAEMU: about 87 percent of shocks are not absorbed through standard channels (implying about 13 percent smoothed through standard channels).
- Empirical notes:
  - Coefficients f_β, τ_β, s_β (factor income, transfers, savings) are not significant for CFA zones; u_β (not smoothed) is highly significant.
  - Comparison benchmark: United States shows 81 percent of shocks smoothed through the same standard channels (capital markets alone about 48 percent for 1981–90).
  - Accounting caveat: missing capital depreciation data implies estimated fractions exceed 100 percent by about 9 percent for both CEMAC and WAEMU — interpreted as capital depreciation dis-smoothing (~9 percent).

### Results — CFA-specific institutions and channels
- Reserve pooling (reserve-holding regression results):
  - Dependent variable: Log Real Reserves.
  - Regression coefficients and statistics:
    - Real GDP coefficient = 0.329 (t = 2.04)
    - Exports volatility coefficient = -0.117 (t = -1.75)
    - Real imports coefficient = 0.702 (t = 3.31)
    - Constant = 8.897 (t = 2.55)
    - Number of observations = 414
    - Number of countries = 13
    - R-squared = 0.12
  - Empirical finding: pooling reserves smoothes no shock in the CFA zones — rpb_β estimated equal to zero and not a determinant for shock smoothing.
- Central bank contributions (CBF):
  - Mechanism: BCEAO and BEAC lend up to 20 percent of preceding-year fiscal revenue at concessional rates to affected members.
  - Estimated smoothing contributions:
    - WAEMU (BCEAO): about 7 percent of shocks smoothed over 1980–2000.
    - CEMAC (BEAC): about 5 percent of shocks smoothed over 1980–2000.
  - cbf_β coefficients are significantly different from zero.
- France’s aid/backing (AIDF):
  - Measured using ODA/grants from France (OECD data); non-project aid is a substantial component.
  - Estimated smoothing contributions:
    - WAEMU: about 63 percent of shocks smoothed via France’s contributions (1980–2000).
    - CEMAC: about 44 percent of shocks smoothed via France’s contributions (1980–2000).
  - Coefficients are highly significant and indicate France’s backing is a key factor for CFA arrangements’ sustainability.
  - Composition note: over 1986–1993, non-project aid averaged about 44 percent of France’s bilateral aid to CFA countries.

### Discussion and interpretation
- Weakness of standard channels in CFA zones:
  - Capital markets: limited cross-border ownership; WAEMU stock market listings concentrated in Côte d’Ivoire (37 of 46 listed firms).
  - Credit markets: low saving rates, pension funds invested domestically, restricted cross-border private lending.
  - Transfers/remittances: limited at national level in CFA countries.
- Reserve pooling provides no shock-smoothing benefit; evidence consistent with CFA countries holding reserves in excess of needs (example: estimated reserve cover ratio ~120 percent in WAEMU vs. minimum requirement of 20 percent).
- Central bank contributions provide modest but meaningful smoothing (5–7 percent).
- France’s ODA/grants provide substantial shock absorption (44–63 percent), playing a hegemon/backing role for the union.

### Policy recommendations
- Deepen capital markets:
  - Promote a critical mass of enterprises and regional listings.
  - Create public/regional venture capital programs to help new firms grow and become listable; regional public venture capital could provide finance and managerial assistance to alleviate credit constraints and foster cross-border ownership.
- Deepen credit markets:
  - Create regional banks or a regional bank of solidarity to pool credit and finance small and medium enterprises across the zone (example: WAEMU initiative with credit ceiling US$50,000).
- Promote labor mobility and incentives for cross-border ownership to enhance risk-sharing channels beyond France’s backing.
- Consider safely reducing excess reserve holdings to free resources for domestic consumption smoothing or other shock-absorption mechanisms.

### Conclusions (empirical summary)
- Standard channels (capital markets, credit markets, remittances) together smooth less than 15 percent of output shocks in CFA zones (CEMAC ~15 percent; WAEMU ~13 percent).
- Reserve pooling provides no shock smoothing in the CFA zones.
- Central bank contributions smooth about 7 percent of shocks in WAEMU and about 5 percent in CEMAC.
- France’s contributions smooth about 63 percent of shocks in WAEMU and about 44 percent in CEMAC.
- Policy implication: deepen capital and credit markets (including regional public venture capital and regional banking) to increase shock-sharing through standard channels.

*Source: _wp0595 - Section IV presents the results and discussion. Finally, Section V concludes. (https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/_wp0595.pdf)*

### References .............................................................................................................

### _wp0595 - References

### Introduction and research question
- Investigates the extent to which mechanisms for income insurance and consumption smoothing (shock smoothing) contribute to the stability of the CFA zones in Africa.
- Notes that central fiscal institutions (tax-transfer systems, grants) and market institutions (cross-ownership of productive assets, developed capital markets) can provide cross-country risk-sharing.
- Situates study in literature: builds on Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992), Eichengreen (1993), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Sorensen and Yosha (1998), Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha (1996), Obstfeld (1994a).
- Defines the two CFA zones and membership:
  - WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union): Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.
  - CEMAC (Central African Economic and Monetary Community): Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.
- Notes BCEAO = Central Bank of West African States; BEAC = Bank of Central African States.
- Focuses on quantifying the degree of cross-country risk-sharing within each CFA zone and the channels contributing to stability.

### Empirical approach and determinants of reserves
- Applies shock smoothing techniques to quantify contributions of conventional channels (capital markets, credit markets, remittances) and institutional channels (pooled reserves, central bank contributions, France’s contributions).
- Estimates optimal level of reserve holdings in the CFA zones.
- Identifies key determinants of reserve holdings in the CFA zones:
  - "The size of international transactions represented by real GDP"
  - "The adjustment costs proxied by the average propensity to import"

### Main quantitative findings
- Conventional channels (capital markets, credit markets, and remittances combined) smooth "less than 15 percent of shocks."
- Reserve pooling: given estimated optimal reserve holdings and observed reserves, "I find that reserve pooling provides no shock smoothing for the CFA zones."
- Central bank contributions over 1980–2000:
  - "BCEAO contributions smoothed about 7 percent of shocks"
  - "BEAC contributions smoothed about 5 percent of shocks"
- France’s contributions over 1980–2000:
  - "about 63 percent of shocks are smoothed via France’s contributions in the West African CFA zone"
  - "44 percent of shocks are smoothed via the same channel in the Central African CFA zone"

### Interpretation and policy implications
- Concludes that capital and credit markets are not well integrated in either CFA zone.
- Recommends deepening regional capital and credit markets to enhance risk-sharing.
- Suggests that creating public venture capital at a regional level "might help promote free capital flows within each zone and alleviate the apparently insufficient degree of risk-sharing observed through the standard channels."
- Posits that studying the CFA zones’ institutional features can offer lessons for other developing countries considering a common currency, including the African Union’s aspirations.

### Structure of the paper
- Follows with: theoretical background (next section), data and empirical techniques (Section III).

*Source: _wp0595 - References*

### Section IV presents the results and discussion. Finally, Section V concludes.

### _wp0595 - Section IV presents the results and discussion. Finally, Section V concludes.

### Theoretical background and benchmark model
- Framework follows Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha (1996) and Sorensen and Yosha (1998).
- Two-country continuous-time consumption-based model with CRRA utility (u(c) = c^(1-γ)/(1-γ)); logarithmic utility used for closed-form expressions.
- Key benchmark condition: country consumption is a fixed fraction of world consumption:
  - c_Ht = k_H * c_Wt
  - c_Ft = k_F * c_Wt
- Empirical implication: under full risk-sharing, country consumption co-moves with world consumption and is insensitive to idiosyncratic income shocks (see equation (10): log Δc_i = log Δc_W + ...).

### Decomposition of cross-sectional variance and empirical strategy
- National-accounts identities used to decompose log-differenced GDP variance into contributions from:
  - Net factor income (GNP − GDP)
  - National income components (GNP − NI), though capital depreciation data are unavailable for CFA countries
  - International transfers (DNI − NI; current transfers excluding ODA/grants)
  - Private and public consumption (C and G)
- Regression-based interpretation: β coefficients from cross-sectional regressions measure fraction of shocks smoothed by each channel; u_β measures fraction not smoothed.
- Empirical regressions include time fixed effects and assume AR(1) errors with a two-step GLS estimator on yearly differentiated data (typical sample 1980–2000).

### Data and estimation inputs
- National accounts (GDP, GNP, DNI, C, G) from World Bank WDI, per capita, in 1995 U.S. dollars; panel covers 1980–2000 (shorter where missing).
- Reserve regression variables: Real GDP and real imports from WDI; reserves (minus gold) deflated by U.S. GDP deflator; export volatility measured as volatility of real export receipts (WDI).
- Central bank contribution data from Banque de France statistics (1983–2000).
- France aid data from OECD database (1980–2000).
- Note: capital depreciation data unavailable for CFA countries; cannot directly estimate dis-smoothing from depreciation.

### Results — standard (national-accounts) channels
- Standard channels considered: capital markets (factor income), credit markets (savings), and private current transfers (remittances; excludes ODA/grants).
- Over 1980–2000:
  - For the CEMAC: about 85 percent of shocks are not absorbed through standard channels (implying about 15 percent smoothed through standard channels).
  - For the WAEMU: about 87 percent of shocks are not absorbed through standard channels (implying about 13 percent smoothed through standard channels).
- Coefficients f_β, τ_β, s_β (factor income, transfers, savings) are not significant for CFA zones; u_β (not smoothed) is highly significant.
- Comparison: United States over similar decomposition shows 81 percent of shocks smoothed through the same standard channels (capital markets alone about 48 percent for 1981–90).
- Accounting implication: because depreciation data are missing, the sum of estimated fractions exceeds 100 percent by about 9 percent for both CEMAC and WAEMU — interpreted as capital depreciation dis-smoothing (~9 percent, consistent with Sorensen and Yosha (1998) for OECD).

### Results — CFA-specific institutions and channels
- Reserve pooling:
  - Reserve-holding regression (Dependent: Log Real Reserves):
    - Real GDP coefficient = 0.329 (t = 2.04)
    - Exports volatility coefficient = -0.117 (t = -1.75)
    - Real imports coefficient = 0.702 (t = 3.31)
    - Constant = 8.897 (t = 2.55)
    - Number of observations = 414
    - Number of countries = 13
    - R-squared = 0.12
  - Estimated reserve-pooling benefit (RPB) used in subsequent regression.
  - Empirical finding: pooling reserves smoothes no shock in the CFA zones — rpb_β estimated equal to zero and not a determinant for shock smoothing.
- Central bank contributions (CBF):
  - BCEAO (WAEMU) and BEAC (CEMAC) lend up to 20 percent of preceding-year fiscal revenue at concessional rates to affected members.
  - Estimated contributions to shock smoothing:
    - WAEMU (BCEAO): about 7 percent of shocks smoothed over 1980–2000.
    - CEMAC (BEAC): about 5 percent of shocks smoothed over 1980–2000.
  - cbf_β coefficients are significantly different from zero.
- France’s aid/backing (AIDF):
  - Measured using ODA/grants from France (OECD data); non-project aid is a substantial component.
  - Estimated contributions to shock smoothing:
    - WAEMU: about 63 percent of shocks smoothed via France’s contributions (1980–2000).
    - CEMAC: about 44 percent of shocks smoothed via France’s contributions (1980–2000).
  - These coefficients are highly significant and indicate France’s backing is a key factor for CFA arrangements’ sustainability.
- Composition note: over 1986–1993, non-project aid averaged about 44 percent of France’s bilateral aid to CFA countries, indicating responsive/non-project interventions.

### Discussion and interpretation
- Standard channels (capital, credit, transfers) are weak in CFA zones:
  - Capital markets not well integrated: limited cross-border ownership; WAEMU stock market listings concentrated in Côte d’Ivoire (37 of 46 listed firms).
  - Credit markets limited: low saving rates, pension funds invested domestically, restricted cross-border private lending.
  - Transfers/remittances are limited at national level in CFA countries.
- Reserve pooling provides no shock-smoothing benefit, consistent with observation that CFA countries may hold reserves in excess of needs (example: estimated reserve cover ratio ~120 percent in WAEMU vs. minimum requirement of 20 percent), suggesting potential to safely reduce reserves and redeploy resources.
- Central bank contributions provide modest but meaningful smoothing (5–7 percent).
- France’s ODA/grants provide substantial shock absorption (44–63 percent), fulfilling a hegemon/backing role for the union.

### Policy recommendations
- Deepen capital markets:
  - Promote a critical mass of enterprises and regional listings; public/regional venture capital programs to help new firms grow and become listable.
  - Regional public venture capital could provide finance and managerial assistance to alleviate credit constraints and foster cross-border ownership.
- Deepen credit markets:
  - Create regional banks or a regional bank of solidarity to pool credit and finance small and medium enterprises across the zone (example: WAEMU initiative with credit ceiling US$50,000).
- Promote labor mobility and incentives for cross-border ownership to enhance risk-sharing channels beyond France’s backing.
- Consider safely reducing excess reserve holdings to free resources for domestic consumption smoothing or other shock-absorption mechanisms.

### Conclusions (summary of empirical findings)
- Standard channels (capital markets, credit markets, remittances) together smooth less than 15 percent of output shocks in CFA zones (CEMAC ~15 percent; WAEMU ~13 percent).
- Reserve pooling provides no shock smoothing in the CFA zones.
- Central bank contributions smooth about 7 percent of shocks in WAEMU and about 5 percent in CEMAC.
- France’s contributions smooth about 63 percent of shocks in WAEMU and about 44 percent of shocks in CEMAC.
- Recommendation: deepen capital and credit markets (including regional public venture capital and regional banking) to increase shock-sharing through standard channels.

*Source: _wp0595 - Section IV presents the results and discussion. Finally, Section V concludes. (https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/_wp0595.pdf)*

### References

### _wp0595 - References

### International Reserves and Currency Crises
- Aizenman, Joshua, and Nancy Marion, 2002, “The High Demand for International Reserves in the Far East: What’s Going On?” NBER Working Paper No. 9266 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- Aizenman, Joshua, and Nancy Marion, 2002, “International Reserves Holding with Sovereign Risk and Costly Tax Collection,” NBER Working Paper No. 9154 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- Disyatat, P., and D. Mathieson, 2001, “Currency Crises and the Demand for Foreign Reserves,” IMF Working Paper 01/49 (Washington: International Monetary Fund)
- Edwards, Sebastian, 1984, “The Demand for International Reserves and Monetary Equilibrium: Some Evidence from Developing Countries,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 66 (August), pp. 495–500.
- Flood, Robert P., and Nancy Marion, 2001, “Holding International Reserves in an Era of High Capital Mobility,” in Brookings Trade Forum 2001, ed. by Susan M. Collins and Dani Rodrik (Washington: Brookings Institution).
- Frenkel, J., and B. Jovanovic, 1981, “Optimal International Reserves: A Stochastic Framework,” Economic Journal, Vol. 91 (June), pp. 507–14.

### Risk-Sharing, Consumption Smoothing, and Insurance
- Arreaza, Adriana, Bent E. Sorensen, and Oved Yosha, 1998, “Consumption Smoothing Through Fiscal Policy in OECD and EU Countries,” NBER Working Paper No. 6372 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- Asdrubali Pierfederico, Bent E. Sorensen, and Oved Yosha, 1996, “Channels of Interstate Risk-Sharing: United States 1963–1990,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 111 (November), pp. 1081–1110.
- Cochrane, John H., 1991, “A Simple Test of Consumption Insurance,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 99 (October), pp. 957–76.
- Hayashi, Fumio, Joseph Altonji, and Laurence Kotlikoff, 1996, “Risk-Sharing Between and Within Families,” Econometrica, Vol. 64 (March), pp. 261–94.
- Mace, Barbara J., 1991, “Full Insurance in the Presence of Aggregate Uncertainty,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 99 (October), pp. 928–56.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, 1994a, “Are Industrial-Countries Consumption Risks Globally Diversified?” in Capital Mobility: The Impact on Consumption, Investment, and Growth, ed. by Leonardo Leiderman and Assaf Razin (New York: Cambridge University).
- Obstfeld, Maurice, 1994b, “Evaluating Risky Consumption Paths: The Role of International Substitutability,” European Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 7, pp. 1471–86.
- Townsend, Robert M., 1994, “Risk and Insurance in Village India,” Econometrica, Vol. 62 (May), pp. 539–91.
- Sorensen, Bent E., and Oved Yosha, 1998, “International Risk-Sharing and European Monetary Unification,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 211–38.

### Monetary Union, Fiscal Federalism, and Political Economy
- Cohen, Benjamin J. 2003. “Monetary Union: The Political Dimension,” in James W. Dean, Dominik Salvatore, and Thomas D. Willett (eds), The Dollarization Debate (Oxford University Press).
- Cohen, Benjamin J. 1993. “Beyond EMU: The Problem of Sustainability,” Economics and Politics, Vol. 5 (July), No. 2, pp 187-202.
- Eichengreen, B., 1993, “European Monetary Unification,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 31 (September), pp. 1321–57.
- Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini, 1996, “Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk-Sharing and Moral Hazard,” Econometrica, Vol. 64 (May), pp. 623–46.
- Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, and Jeffrey Sachs, 1992, “Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe from the United States,” in Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the U.S., ed, by Matthew Cansoneri, Vittorio Grilli, and Paul Masson (London: Cambridge University).

### Public Finance, Venture Capital, and Related Institutional Studies
- Secrieru, Oana, and Marianne Vigneault, 2004, “Public Venture Capital. Occupational Choice, and Entrepreneurship,” Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 4, No 1, Article 25.
- Vaillancourt, François, 1997, “Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Funds in Canada: Institutional Aspects, Tax Expenditures, and Employment creation,” in Growth in Canada, ed. by Halpern, Industry Canada Research Series (Calgary: University of Calgary).
- Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff, 1996, Foundations of International Macroeconomics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press).

*References listed in _wp0595 - References*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/_wp0595.pdf_
