## 2. Investment Trends in Selected Asian Emerging Markets

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### I. Introduction
- Malaysia experienced an unprecedented decline in private sector investment after the Asian financial crisis:
  - Private investment rose steadily between 1987 and 1997 to over 30 percent of GDP, collapsed after the crisis, only began a gradual recovery in 2004, and remained at about 10 percent of GDP in 2005.
- With private investment down and a relatively stable savings rate, Malaysia’s current account shifted from a deficit to a substantial and widening surplus since the late 1990s.
- Paper focus:
  - Explain Malaysia’s investment trends and implications for growth.
  - Use aggregate time series (1973–2004) and firm-level data (WorldScope, listed nonfinancial firms, 1995–2004) to assess long- and short-run determinants and deviations of private investment from fundamentals.
- Principal conclusions summarized:
  - Long-run: private investment closely related to real GDP but evidence of sustained overinvestment (notably property) before the crisis.
  - Private investment is unlikely—and unnecessary from a growth perspective—to return to precrisis levels.
  - A shift in investor perceptions (triggered by the crisis or prolonged overinvestment) contributed to the sharp decline.
  - At firm level, profitability is the main determinant of investment across sectors.
  - Firm size generally matters; financing constraints matter especially for smaller firms and services.

### II. Stylized Facts (Aggregate and Firm-level)
- Regional investment swings:
  - Emerging East Asia total gross fixed capital formation rose from under 20 percent of GDP in the early 1970s to over 25 percent in mid-1980s, peaked at over 30 percent prior to the Asian crisis, then declined to around 23 percent in early 2000s.
  - Malaysia: total investment peaked at about 40 percent of GDP in the early 1980s and again prior to the crisis; current trough about 20 percent of GDP (prolonged).
  - Korea and Thailand show similar swings but quicker recoveries after the crisis.
- Drivers:
  - Domestic private investment is the main driver of precrisis booms and postcrisis collapses in Korea, Malaysia, Thailand.
  - Public investment played a relatively greater role after the crisis, partly offsetting private investment collapse.
  - FDI: for most emerging Asian countries FDI averaged less than 15 percent of total gross fixed capital formation over last two decades; average annual FDI inflows in U.S. dollar terms are virtually unchanged precrisis (1990–1996) vs postcrisis (1999–2004) for several markets. Malaysia records a small decline in FDI (trend beginning early 1990s).
- Property overinvestment in Malaysia:
  - Real growth rate of property loans peaked at 30 percent per year during 1996–98, turned negative in 1999, and remained about 5–10 percent per year since 2000.
  - Consumer price index for gross rent rose on average 3–4 percent per year prior to 1998, and by 1 percent per year since.
  - Malaysia’s housing price index rose faster than Thailand and Korea prior to the crisis and then registered the sharpest decline.
  - Trend decline in hotel occupancy rates during the 1990s indicates unsustainable commercial property investment.
- Firm-level evidence (WorldScope, listed nonfinancial firms, 1995–2004):
  - Sample sector counts as of 2004: basic and general industries (391), services (104), utilities, resources, conglomerates (URC, 31), information technology (60), consumer goods (180). GLCs prominent in URC.
  - Corporate investment (median, percent of fixed assets) declined substantially after the Asian crisis; slight recovery in 2003–04.
  - Profitability and market valuation declined broadly 1995–2004:
    - ROE and ROA lower than emerging Asia average since 1997.
    - Tobin’s Q (median) declined: series shows Malaysia below emerging Asia median (charted).
  - Corporate soundness improved postcrisis:
    - Debt-to-equity declined by more than 20 percentage points between 1998–2004.
    - Debt-to-assets declined by more than 7 percentage points between 1998–2004.
    - Liquidity indicators (current ratio, quick ratio) and interest coverage ratio improved.
  - Sector investment patterns:
    - All five sectors show sizable declines in investment after 1998 except IT which had an additional drop after 2000–01.
    - Industrial and services sectors have had the lowest profitability since the crisis.

### III. Determinants of Private Investment

#### A. Aggregate Trends (Vector Error Correction Model)
- Conceptual anchor: neoclassical investment theory (Jorgenson (1971); Pelgrin et al. (2002)). Long-run relationship expected between gross investment, output and cost of capital.
- Data and measurement caveats:
  - Annual private fixed capital formation series only 1973–2004; official data 1973–85 repeatedly revised.
  - No long series of long-term interest rates—average real bank lending rates used as proxy for capital cost, adjusted by investment deflator relative to GDP-deflator.
- Augmented variables to capture market imperfections: private sector credit/GDP, stock market capitalization/GDP, public investment, exchange rate volatility.
- Main empirical findings:
  - Stable long-run relationship: real private fixed capital formation cointegrates with real GDP; estimated long-run coefficient on real GDP ~ -1.023 to -1.180 in various specifications.
  - Output growth:
    - In the long run, output level translates one-to-one into private investment.
    - In the short run, 1 percent higher growth leads to between 2–4 percent higher investment (model coefficients: ∆(Real GDP) reported as 3.794, 3.709, 4.182, etc. in Table 3).
  - Overinvestment prior to crisis: model-based calculations indicate significant private overinvestment of more than 10 percent of GDP per year for about four years prior to 1998.
  - Slow adjustment: error-correction coefficients mostly between -0.1 and -0.17 imply adjustment takes about 6–10 years; deviations (over- and underinvestment) can be sustained.
  - Crisis dummy:
    - Statistically significant and negative in all specifications where included.
    - Coefficient consistently above 0.7 implies the crisis ceteris paribus caused private investment to drop by half.
    - Dummy captures uncertainty, shift in investor sentiment, and worsened perceptions of governance.
  - Exchange rate volatility: not statistically significant when crisis dummy included.
  - Capital cost: no clear short-run negative impact found; including capital cost makes the error-correction term insignificant—interpretation limited by measurement problems. Tobin’s Q decline may capture increased relative cost of equity.
  - Financing availability (market capitalization or credit/GDP): no firm short-run impact on aggregate investment growth.
  - Public investment growth: no statistically significant short-run impact on private investment.

#### B. Firm Investment (Panel Fixed Effects on WorldScope firms)
- Canonical firm investment specification estimated:
  - I/K = α + β Q + γ' Z + ε, where Z includes sales, cash flow, stock of liquid assets, leverage (debt-to-assets), and firm size.
- Estimation approach and data handling:
  - Fixed effects preferred (Hausman-Wu and Breusch-Pagan reject random effects at 5 percent).
  - Outliers trimmed (>2 standard deviations).
  - Sample period 1995–2004.
- Key empirical results:
  - Full sample (Table 4):
    - Tobin’s Q: coefficient 1.81* (standard error 0.50).
    - Cash flow: coefficient 0.03* (standard error 0.01).
    - GLC dummy × debt-to-equity: -0.18* (standard error 0.09).
    - Size dummy (top 25th percentile): 3.49* (standard error 0.49).
  - Size-group differences (Table 5):
    - All firms: Tobin’s Q 1.81*; Cash flow 0.03.
    - Small firms (bottom 25th percentile): Tobin’s Q 1.01*; Cash flow 0.03*; leverage negative and significant.
    - Medium firms (25th–75th): Tobin’s Q 4.43*; Cash flow insignificant; sales relevant.
    - Large firms (top 75th): Tobin’s Q 3.27*; Cash flow insignificant; GLC dummy relevant.
    - Interpretation: Tobin’s Q effect grows with size (by a factor up to 3); cash flow effect concentrated in small firms; leverage constrains small firms (and GLCs).
  - Sectoral results (Table 6) — selected findings:
    - Industrial sector:
      - Sales: 0.38* (standard error 0.02).
      - Tobin’s Q: 2.60* (standard error 0.82).
      - Size dummy: 3.50* (standard error 0.81).
      - Cash flow and liquidity not significant.
    - Services sector:
      - Cash flow: 0.04* (standard error 0.01).
      - Liquidity: 0.24* (standard error 0.08).
      - Size dummy: 4.58* (standard error 1.03).
      - Tobin’s Q and sales not significant.
    - IT sector:
      - Cash flow: 0.19* (standard error 0.10).
      - Tobin’s Q not significant; size effect positive but not significant.
    - Consumer goods:
      - Size and Tobin’s Q positive and significant; cash flow and liquidity not significant.
- Overall firm-level interpretation:
  - Profitability (Tobin’s Q) and firm size are primary determinants of corporate investment.
  - Cash flow matters, especially for small firms and for services/IT sectors, indicating internal funds and liquidity constraints are important where external financing is limited.
  - Leverage negatively associated with investment for small firms and GLCs, implying deleveraging could support investment recovery for these groups.

### IV. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
- Aggregate diagnosis:
  - Significant overinvestment prior to 1998 (exceeding 10 percent of GDP for about four years) followed by a collapse in private investment; slow adjustment implies sustained underinvestment since crisis.
  - Overhang concentrated in property sector (more durable capital stock) and compounded by a shift in investor sentiment and worsened governance perceptions.
- Corporate sector diagnosis:
  - Low corporate profitability (Tobin’s Q and other valuation measures) has been a drag on private investment across sectors.
  - Market valuation indicators signal expectations of continued weak profitability, contributing to sluggish investment.
  - Improved corporate balance sheets (reduced leverage, improved liquidity and interest coverage) indicate progress in corporate soundness.
  - Financing constraints bind smaller firms and services sector firms: cash flow and liquidity matter more there.
- Policy implications:
  - Address investor perceptions of the investment climate (political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law) to restore confidence and reduce the crisis-induced investment haircut.
  - Enhance prospects for corporate profitability to stimulate investment—this could include measures that improve firm-level returns and market valuations.
  - Improve access to external finance for smaller firms and services sector firms (where cash flow and liquidity constraints are evident).
  - Recognize that returning to precrisis investment levels is neither desirable nor necessary for sustaining growth; policy should focus on efficient, profitable investment rather than quantity alone.
- Final assessment:
  - Both macro factors (growth, crisis-induced sentiment shifts, sectoral overhang in property) and micro factors (Tobin’s Q, cash flow, firm size, leverage) played significant roles in Malaysia’s investment slump and slow recovery.

*Source: _wp06190 - "2. Investment Trends in Selected Asian Emerging Markets" (IMF Working Paper)._*

### 1.  Nonfinancial Corporate Sector Soundness Indicators, 1995–2004 .............................19

### 1.  Nonfinancial Corporate Sector Soundness Indicators, 1995–2004 .............................19

### Major sections (headings and page locations)
- 2.  Unit Root Tests ............................................................................................................20
- 3. Vector Error Correction Models ..................................................................................20
- 4.         Investment         Equation ....................................................................................................21
- 5.  Investment Equation—Size Groups.............................................................................21
- 6. Investment Equation by Sector ....................................................................................22
- Appendix..................................................................................................................................23
- References................................................................................................................................25

### Figures (listed in source)
- 1. Aggregate Investment Ratio in East Asian Emerging Markets .....................................5

*Source: _wp06190 - 1.  Nonfinancial Corporate Sector Soundness Indicators, 1995–2004 (PDF).*

### 2. Investment Trends in Selected Asian Emerging Markets..............................................5

### 2. Investment Trends in Selected Asian Emerging Markets

### I. Introduction
- Malaysia experienced an unprecedented decline in private sector investment after the Asian financial crisis: private investment rose steadily between 1987 and 1997 to over 30 percent of GDP, collapsed after the crisis, only began a gradual recovery in 2004, and remained at about 10 percent of GDP in 2005.
- With private investment down and a relatively stable savings rate, Malaysia’s current account shifted from a deficit to a substantial and widening surplus since the late 1990s.
- Paper focus:
  - Explain Malaysia’s investment trends and implications for growth.
  - Use aggregate time series (1973–2004) and firm-level data (WorldScope, listed nonfinancial firms, 1995–2004) to assess long- and short-run determinants and deviations of private investment from fundamentals.
- Principal conclusions summarized:
  - Long-run: private investment closely related to real GDP but evidence of sustained overinvestment (notably property) before the crisis.
  - Private investment is unlikely—and unnecessary from a growth perspective—to return to precrisis levels.
  - A shift in investor perceptions (triggered by the crisis or prolonged overinvestment) contributed to the sharp decline.
  - At firm level, profitability is the main determinant of investment across sectors.
  - Firm size generally matters; financing constraints matter especially for smaller firms and services.

### II. Stylized Facts (Aggregate and Firm-level)
- Regional investment swings:
  - Emerging East Asia total gross fixed capital formation rose from under 20 percent of GDP in the early 1970s to over 25 percent in mid-1980s, peaked at over 30 percent prior to the Asian crisis, then declined to around 23 percent in early 2000s.
  - Malaysia: total investment peaked at about 40 percent of GDP in the early 1980s and again prior to the crisis; current trough about 20 percent of GDP (prolonged).
  - Korea and Thailand show similar swings but quicker recoveries after the crisis.
- Drivers:
  - Domestic private investment is the main driver of precrisis booms and postcrisis collapses in Korea, Malaysia, Thailand.
  - Public investment played a relatively greater role after the crisis, partly offsetting private investment collapse.
  - FDI: for most emerging Asian countries FDI averaged less than 15 percent of total gross fixed capital formation over last two decades; average annual FDI inflows in U.S. dollar terms are virtually unchanged precrisis (1990–1996) vs postcrisis (1999–2004) for several markets. Malaysia records a small decline in FDI (trend beginning early 1990s).
- Property overinvestment in Malaysia:
  - Real growth rate of property loans peaked at 30 percent per year during 1996–98, turned negative in 1999, and remained about 5–10 percent per year since 2000.
  - Consumer price index for gross rent rose on average 3–4 percent per year prior to 1998, and by 1 percent per year since.
  - Malaysia’s housing price index rose faster than Thailand and Korea prior to the crisis and then registered the sharpest decline.
  - Trend decline in hotel occupancy rates during the 1990s indicates unsustainable commercial property investment.
- Firm-level evidence (WorldScope, listed nonfinancial firms, 1995–2004):
  - Sample sector counts as of 2004: basic and general industries (391), services (104), utilities, resources, conglomerates (URC, 31), information technology (60), consumer goods (180). GLCs prominent in URC.
  - Corporate investment (median, percent of fixed assets) declined substantially after the Asian crisis; slight recovery in 2003–04.
  - Profitability and market valuation declined broadly 1995–2004:
    - ROE and ROA lower than emerging Asia average since 1997.
    - Tobin’s Q (median) declined: series shows Malaysia below emerging Asia median (charted).
  - Corporate soundness improved postcrisis:
    - Debt-to-equity declined by more than 20 percentage points between 1998–2004.
    - Debt-to-assets declined by more than 7 percentage points between 1998–2004.
    - Liquidity indicators (current ratio, quick ratio) and interest coverage ratio improved.
  - Sector investment patterns:
    - All five sectors show sizable declines in investment after 1998 except IT which had an additional drop after 2000–01.
    - Industrial and services sectors have had the lowest profitability since the crisis.

### III. Determinants of Private Investment
A. Aggregate Trends (Vector Error Correction Model)
- Conceptual anchor: neoclassical investment theory (Jorgenson (1971); Pelgrin et al. (2002)). Long-run relationship expected between gross investment, output and cost of capital.
- Data and measurement caveats:
  - Annual private fixed capital formation series only 1973–2004; official data 1973–85 repeatedly revised.
  - No long series of long-term interest rates—average real bank lending rates used as proxy for capital cost, adjusted by investment deflator relative to GDP-deflator.
- Augmented variables to capture market imperfections: private sector credit/GDP, stock market capitalization/GDP, public investment, exchange rate volatility.
- Main empirical findings (from Table 3 and discussion):
  - Stable long-run relationship: real private fixed capital formation cointegrates with real GDP; estimated long-run coefficient on real GDP ~ -1.023 to -1.180 in various specifications (Table 3).
  - Output growth: in long run, output level translates one-to-one into private investment; in short run, 1 percent higher growth leads to between 2–4 percent higher investment (model coefficients: ∆(Real GDP) ranges reported, e.g., 3.794, 3.709, 4.182, etc. in Table 3).
  - Overinvestment prior to crisis: model-based calculations (Table 3, column 1) indicate significant private overinvestment of more than 10 percent of GDP per year for about four years prior to 1998.
  - Slow adjustment: error-correction coefficients mostly between -0.1 and -0.17 imply adjustment takes about 6–10 years; deviations (over- and underinvestment) can be sustained.
  - Crisis dummy: statistically significant and negative in all specifications where included; coefficient consistently above 0.7 implies the crisis ceteris paribus caused private investment to drop by half. Dummy captures uncertainty, shift in investor sentiment, and worsened perceptions of governance.
  - Exchange rate volatility: not statistically significant when crisis dummy included.
  - Capital cost: no clear short-run negative impact found; including capital cost makes the error-correction term insignificant—interpretation limited by measurement problems. Tobin’s Q decline may capture increased relative cost of equity.
  - Financing availability (market capitalization or credit/GDP): no firm short-run impact on aggregate investment growth.
  - Public investment growth: no statistically significant short-run impact on private investment.

B. Firm Investment (Panel Fixed Effects on WorldScope firms)
- The canonical firm investment specification estimated:
  - I/K = α + β Q + γ' Z + ε, where Z includes sales, cash flow, stock of liquid assets, leverage (debt-to-assets), and firm size.
- Estimation approach and data handling:
  - Fixed effects preferred (Hausman-Wu and Breusch-Pagan reject random effects at 5 percent).
  - Outliers trimmed (>2 standard deviations).
  - Sample period 1995–2004.
- Key empirical results (Tables 4–6):
  - Across full sample (Table 4):
    - Tobin’s Q: coefficient 1.81* (standard error 0.50) — strongly positive and significant.
    - Cash flow: coefficient 0.03* (standard error 0.01) — positive and significant.
    - GLC dummy × debt-to-equity: -0.18* (standard error 0.09) — negative impact for GLCs via leverage.
    - Size dummy (top 25th percentile): 3.49* (standard error 0.49) — large firms invest more.
  - Size-group differences (Table 5):
    - All firms: Tobin’s Q 1.81*; Cash flow 0.03; relevant controls: size, sales.
    - Small firms (bottom 25th percentile): Tobin’s Q 1.01*; Cash flow 0.03*; leverage negative and significant.
    - Medium firms (25th–75th): Tobin’s Q 4.43*; Cash flow insignificant; sales relevant.
    - Large firms (top 75th): Tobin’s Q 3.27*; Cash flow insignificant; GLC dummy relevant.
    - Interpretation: Tobin’s Q effect grows with size (by a factor up to 3); cash flow effect concentrated in small firms; leverage constrains small firms (and GLCs).
  - Sectoral results (Table 6) — selected findings:
    - Industrial sector:
      - Sales: 0.38* (standard error 0.02) — strong accelerator effect, about twice full-sample magnitude.
      - Tobin’s Q: 2.60* (standard error 0.82).
      - Size dummy: 3.50* (standard error 0.81).
      - Cash flow and liquidity not significant.
    - Services sector:
      - Cash flow: 0.04* (standard error 0.01).
      - Liquidity: 0.24* (standard error 0.08).
      - Size dummy: 4.58* (standard error 1.03).
      - Tobin’s Q and sales not significant — suggests financing constraints and limited collateral in services.
    - IT sector:
      - Cash flow: 0.19* (standard error 0.10).
      - Tobin’s Q not significant; size effect positive but not significant.
    - Consumer goods:
      - Size and Tobin’s Q positive and significant; cash flow and liquidity not significant.
- Overall firm-level interpretation:
  - Profitability (Tobin’s Q) and firm size are primary determinants of corporate investment.
  - Cash flow matters, especially for small firms and for services/IT sectors, indicating internal funds and liquidity constraints are important where external financing is limited.
  - Leverage negatively associated with investment for small firms and GLCs, implying deleveraging could support investment recovery for these groups.

### IV. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
- Aggregate diagnosis:
  - Significant overinvestment prior to 1998 (exceeding 10 percent of GDP for about four years) followed by a collapse in private investment; slow adjustment implies sustained underinvestment since crisis.
  - Overhang concentrated in property sector (more durable capital stock) and compounded by a shift in investor sentiment and worsened governance perceptions.
- Corporate sector diagnosis:
  - Low corporate profitability (Tobin’s Q and other valuation measures) has been a drag on private investment across sectors.
  - Market valuation indicators signal expectations of continued weak profitability, contributing to sluggish investment.
  - Improved corporate balance sheets (reduced leverage, improved liquidity and interest coverage) indicate progress in corporate soundness.
  - Financing constraints bind smaller firms and services sector firms: cash flow and liquidity matter more there.
- Policy implications (implied by empirical results and discussion):
  - Address investor perceptions of the investment climate (political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law) to restore confidence and reduce the crisis-induced investment haircut.
  - Enhance prospects for corporate profitability to stimulate investment—this could include measures that improve firm-level returns and market valuations.
  - Improve access to external finance for smaller firms and services sector firms (where cash flow and liquidity constraints are evident).
  - Recognize that returning to precrisis investment levels is neither desirable nor necessary for sustaining growth; policy should focus on efficient, profitable investment rather than quantity alone.
- Final assessment:
  - Both macro factors (growth, crisis-induced sentiment shifts, sectoral overhang in property) and micro factors (Tobin’s Q, cash flow, firm size, leverage) played significant roles in Malaysia’s investment slump and slow recovery.

*IMF Working Paper content: "2. Investment Trends in Selected Asian Emerging Markets" (chapter/section).*

### References

### References

### Cited works
- Akkina, Krishna, and Mehmet Celebi, 2002, “The Determinants of Private Fixed Investment and the Relationship between Public and Private Capital Accumulation in Turkey,” Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 243–54.
- Caballero, R., 1999, “Aggregate Investment” in Handbook of Macroeconomics (Amsterdam: Elsivier), J. Taylor and M. Woodford eds., pp. 813–62.
- Calcagnini, Giorgio, and Enrico Saltari, 2003, “Labour and Financial Market Determinants of Investment Decisions in Europe,” EIFC Working Paper No. 03–26 (Rome: European Integration Financial Systems and Corporate Performance).
- Campos, Nauro, and Jeffrey Nugent, 2003, “Aggregate Investment and Political Instability: An Econometric Investigation,” Economica, Vol. 70, pp. 533–49.
- Collyns, Charles, and Abdelhak Senhadji, 2002, “Lending Booms, Real Estate Bubbles, and the Asian Crisis,” IMF Working Paper 02/20 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Ghura, Dhaneshwar, and Barry Goodwin, 2000, “Determinants of Private Investment: A Cross-Regional Empirical Investigation,” Applied Economics, Vol. 32, pp. 1819–29.
- Hayashi, F., 1982, “Tobin’s Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Interpretation,” Econometrica, Vol. 50, pp. 213-224.
- Hubbard, G., 1998, “Capital Market Imperfections and Investment,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 36, pp.193-225.
- Kannapiran, Chinna, 2001, “Determinants of Private Sector Investment in Papua New Guinea: An Error Correction Model Analysis,” Pacific Economic Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 86–94.
- Kolstad, Ivar, and Espen Villanger, 2004, “Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Services,” Chr. Michelsen Institute Working Paper WP 2004:2, (Bergen, CMI).
- Mercerau, Benoit, 2005, “FDI Flows to Asia: Did the Dragon Crowd out the Tigers?” (unpublished; Washington: International Monetary Fund), April.
- Naqvi, Naveed, 2002, “Crowding-In or crowding-Out? Modelling the Relationship between Public and Private Fixed Capital Formation Using Co-Integration Analysis: The Case of Pakistan 1964–2000,” Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 41, pp. 255–76.
- Nicolas, Françoise, 2004, “Which Exchange-Rate Policy to Help Boost Foreign Direct Investment-Led Growth in ASEAN?” in Economic Integration and Multinational Investment Behaviour, ed. by Pierre-Bruno Ruffini (Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar), 2004, pp. 272-292.
- Oshikoya, Temitope, 1994, “Macroeconomic Determinants of Domestic Private Investment in Africa: An Empirical Analysis,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 573–96.
- Pelgrin, Florian, Sebastian Schich, and Alain de Serres, 2002, “Increases in Business Investment Rates in OECD Countries in the 1990s: How Much Can Be Explained by Fundamentals?” Economics Department Working Papers No. 237 (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development).
- Putrajaya Committee, 2005, Catalyzing GLC Transformation to Advance Malaysia’s Development—GLC Transformation Manual. Available via the Internet: http://www.pcg.gov.my/trans_manual.asp
- ––––––, 2005, Intensifying Performance Management—Blue Book. Available via the Internet: http://www.pcg.gov.my/trans_manual.asp
- Ramirez, C.D., and L.H. Tan, 2003, “Singapore Inc. Versus the Private Sector: Are Government-Linked Companies Different?” IMF Working Paper 03/156 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Robertson, Peter, 2000, “Diminished Returns? Growth and Investment in Asia,” Economic Record, Vol. 76, pp. 343–53.
- Song, Haiyan, Zinan Liu, and Ping Jiang, 2001, “Analyzing the Determinants of China’s Aggregate Investment in the Reform Period,” China Economic Review, Vol. 12, pp. 227–42.

### Primary topics represented (as expressed in titles)
- Determinants of Private Fixed Investment
- Relationship between Public and Private Capital Accumulation
- Aggregate Investment
- Labour and Financial Market Determinants of Investment Decisions
- Aggregate Investment and Political Instability
- Lending Booms, Real Estate Bubbles, and the Asian Crisis
- Cross-Regional Determinants of Private Investment
- Tobin’s Marginal q and Average q
- Capital Market Imperfections and Investment
- Error Correction Model Analysis of Private Sector Investment
- Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Services
- FDI Flows to Asia
- Crowding-In or crowding-Out of Public and Private Fixed Capital Formation
- Exchange-Rate Policy and FDI-Led Growth in ASEAN
- Macroeconomic Determinants of Domestic Private Investment in Africa
- Business Investment Rates in OECD Countries in the 1990s
- GLC Transformation and Performance Management
- Government-Linked Companies versus Private Sector
- Growth and Investment in Asia
- Determinants of China’s Aggregate Investment in the Reform Period

*Source: _wp06190 - References*

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