## _wp0628

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---

### Introduction
- Empirical literature indicates real exchange rate misalignment is negatively related to economic growth (Frenkel and Khan (1990), Cotanni et al. (1990), Edwards (1988)).
- Ghura and Grennes (1993) found measures of real exchange rate misalignment and its instability negatively affect growth of real per capita income, exports, agricultural output, and investment in a sample of 33 sub-Saharan African countries including Zimbabwe.
- Misalignment often takes the form of domestic currency overvaluation, hurting tradable activities and encouraging smuggling that reduces legal market supply.
- Cross-country studies may conflate structural differences unrelated to exchange rate misalignment; country-specific analyses are needed to complement cross-country evidence.

### Zimbabwe context and key historical exchange-rate facts
- Prior to fast-track land reform in 2000, official and black market values were close (about Z$40 per US$1).
- In 2000 the black market rate began to deviate from the official rate; the black market premium widened to 600 percent at end-2003.
- Official exchange rate history cited: fixed from October 2000—first at Z$55=US$1 and later at Z$824=US$1—until end-2003.
- De facto depreciation of the official exchange rate from Z$824=US$1 to Z$5,700=US$1 by end-2004 following a managed foreign exchange tender and relaxation of surrender requirements.
- Parallel market premium rose from 13 percent in January 2004 to 53 percent by end-2004.
- Fast-track land reform (initiated in 2000): over 80 percent of former commercial farmland redistributed (often by use of force); nine thousand farms listed for acquisition by end-2004; few farmers compensated; many farms unallocated.
- Agricultural output declined by 30 percent during 2000-04 due to losses in agricultural capital stock and production, uneven distribution of land and infrastructure, lack of security of tenure, and impoverishment of former farm workers.

### Export performance (Section II)
- Trade is a substantial share of GDP; exports are the main source of foreign exchange.
- Agricultural exports traditionally a driver of growth; they declined dramatically in recent years.
- Export growth rates (Table 1, annual average rate, in percent):
  - Zimbabwe: 1991-95 = 6.9; 1996-00 = 15.5; 2001-04 = -1.1; 1991-2004 = 7.7
  - World: 1991-95 = 8.7; 1996-00 = 4.8; 2001-04 = 9.7; 1991-2004 = 7.6
  - Developing countries: 1991-95 = 12.2; 1996-00 = 7.8; 2001-04 = 12.5; 1991-2004 = 10.7
  - Africa: 1991-95 = 2.1; 1996-00 = 9.2; 2001-04 = 10.7; 1991-2004 = 7.1
  - Tanzania: 1991-95 = 11.4; 1996-00 = 1.9; 2001-04 = 16.1; 1991-2004 = 9.4
  - Kenya: 1991-95 = 11.5; 1996-00 = 0.8; 2001-04 = 14.7; 1991-2004 = 8.6
  - Uganda: 1991-95 = 38.0; 1996-00 = -4.2; 2001-04 = 17.7; 1991-2004 = 17.1
- Export performance was high in the late 1990s but turned negative in the early 2000s, with relative deterioration versus developing countries and neighbors.
- Sharp swings in the real exchange rate since 2000 elicited a relatively muted export response, suggesting other limiting factors (internal conflict, poor infrastructure, access to credit, poor governance).
- Manufacturing and agriculture have been less responsive to REER movements than the mineral sector; agricultural production and exports collapsed with disruptions from land reform.

### Data and model specification (Section III.A–B)
- Export data from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS); analysis uses exports to Zimbabwe’s ten major trading partners: United States, Germany, South Africa, United Kingdom, Japan, France, Italy, Netherlands, Canada, Switzerland for 1984:Q1–2004:Q4.
- Parallel exchange rate data from World Currency Yearbook (and predecessors) and Techfin.
- Base model: imperfect substitutes model (Goldstein and Khan (1985)); export demand specified as function of real exchange rate and foreign real income (industrial production index).

### Extended model and qualitative variables (Section III.C)
- Extended to include dual exchange rate regime (official and parallel) and non-price factors (governance, cost of doing business, infrastructure quality, property rights).
- Official market exports (DOTS measure) modeled as function of both real official and real parallel exchange rates.
- qualindexes include measures for corruption, bureaucracy quality, democratic accountability, economic risk, internal conflict, ethnic tensions, law and order, and investment profile.
- Model estimations use quarterly data 1985–2004; panel data model with random effects and robustness checks (dynamic heterogeneous cointegrated panel data models also estimated).

### Empirical results (Section III.D and Table 2)
- Table 2 econometric results (Dependent variable: Real official exports; Balanced panel; No. of observations = 840):
  - Real official exchange rate: Estimate = 0.110**; Std. Err. = 0.050; Prob = 0.03
  - Real parallel exchange rate: Estimate = -0.262***; Std. Err. = 0.050; Prob = 0.00
  - Industrial production index: Estimate = 0.155; Std. Err. = 0.220; Prob = 0.47
  - Ethnic tensions: Estimate = 0.045**; Std. Err. = 0.020; Prob = 0.02
  - Constant: Estimate = 1.651*; Std. Err. = 0.100; Prob = 0.10
  - Seasonal dummies: yes
  - Random effects: yes
  - Wald Chi2 = 77.67; Prob = 0.00
- Interpretation of coefficients:
  - Elasticity of official exports with respect to official real exchange rate = 0.11.
  - Elasticity with respect to parallel market real exchange rate = -0.26.
  - Income elasticity (industrial production index) small and insignificant.
  - Ethnic tension coefficient significant, indicating higher ethnic tensions adversely affect export performance (index from International Country Risk Guide measures degree of tension attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions).
- Economic interpretation:
  - Depreciation of the official exchange rate generates a positive price effect, increasing official export demand.
  - A more depreciated parallel exchange rate incentivizes smuggling and underinvoicing, shifting sales away from official channels and reducing recorded official exports.
  - The larger (in absolute value) coefficient on the parallel rate suggests widening parallel premium shifts exports away from the official market.
  - Ethnic tensions plausibly capture adverse impacts of fast-track land reform on exports.

### Comparative measures of competitiveness (Section IV and Table 3)
- Sources: Growth Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum) and Snapshot of the Business Climate (World Bank); results summarized in Table 3.
- Key comparative findings:
  - Zimbabwe ranks below neighboring countries in the overall Growth Competitiveness Index largely due to the lowest score on the Macroeconomic Environment Index among 104 countries.
  - Zimbabwe also scores worst compared with neighboring countries (except Uganda) on the Public Institutions Index (including corruption and rule of law measures).
  - Microeconomic conditions for doing business are comparable to regional averages, but:
    - Costs in terms of GNI per capita of starting a business and registering property are higher than the regional average.
    - Labor market is less rigid than the regional average but performs worse than Zambia, Uganda, and Botswana.
- Selected figures from Table 3 (Business Climate, 2004) — preserved exactly as reported:
  - Growth Competitiveness Index (rank order): Zimbabwe 99; South Africa 41; Zambia 83; Uganda 79; Botswana 45; ...
  - Technology Index: Zimbabwe 86; South Africa 40; Zambia 90; Uganda 77; Botswana 64; ...
  - Public Institutions Index: Zimbabwe 73; South Africa 35; Zambia 66; Uganda 86; Botswana 63; ...
  - Macroeconomic Environment Index: Zimbabwe 104; South Africa 48; Zambia 89; Uganda 57; Botswana 54; ...
  - Business Competitiveness Index: Zimbabwe 82; South Africa 25; Zambia 78; Uganda 71; Botswana 62; ...
  - Starting a business — Number of procedures: Zimbabwe 10; South Africa 9; Zambia 6; Uganda 17; Botswana 11
  - Starting a business — Duration (days): Zimbabwe 9; South Africa 6; Zambia 3; Uganda 8; Botswana 5; Regional average 10
  - Starting a business — Cost (% of GNI per capita): Zimbabwe 304.7; South Africa 9.1; Zambia 22.8; Uganda 13; Botswana 131.3; Regional average 225.2
  - Registering Property — Number of procedures: Zimbabwe 4; South Africa 6; Zambia 6; Uganda 8; Botswana 6; Regional average 7
  - Registering Property — Duration (days): Zimbabwe 30; South Africa 20; Zambia 70; Uganda 48; Botswana 69; Regional average 114
  - Registering Property — Cost (% property value): Zimbabwe 18.1; South Africa 11.3; Zambia 1.3; Uganda 9.2; Botswana 5.5; Regional average 13.2
  - Getting credit — Cost to create collateral (% of income pc): Zimbabwe 2.4; South Africa 2.3; Zambia 19.2; Uganda 11.9; Botswana 2; Regional average 41.8
  - Getting credit — Legal rights index: Zimbabwe 7; South Africa 6; Zambia 6; Uganda 5; Botswana 9; Regional average 4.6
  - Protecting Investors — Disclosure Index: Zimbabwe 6; South Africa 6; Zambia 1; Uganda 2; Botswana 5; Regional average 2.1
  - Enforcing Contracts — Number of procedures: Zimbabwe 33; South Africa 26; Zambia 16; Uganda 15; Botswana 26; Regional average 35
  - Enforcing Contracts — Duration (days): Zimbabwe 350; South Africa 277; Zambia 274; Uganda 209; Botswana 154; Regional average 434
  - Enforcing Contracts — Cost (% of debt): Zimbabwe 19.1; South Africa 11.5; Zambia 28.7; Uganda 22.3; Botswana 24.8; Regional average 43.0
  - Closing a business — Duration (years): Zimbabwe 2.2; South Africa 2.7; Zambia 2.1; Uganda 2.2; Botswana 3.6
  - Closing a business — Cost (% of estate): Zimbabwe 181; South Africa 88; Zambia 38; Uganda 81; Botswana 82; Regional average 20.5
  - Closing a business — Recovery rate (cents on the dollar): Zimbabwe 9.2; South Africa 31.8; Zambia 19.4; Uganda 35.5; Botswana 50.9; Regional average 17.1

### Conclusions and policy implications (Section V)
- Overvaluation of the official exchange rate has reduced Zimbabwe’s competitiveness and negatively affected exports.
- Most notable empirical findings:
  - Negative relationship between parallel market rate depreciation and value of legal (official) exports (elasticity -0.262***).
  - Official exchange rate depreciation raises legal exports (elasticity 0.110**).
  - Ethnic tensions significantly affect export performance (ethnic tensions coefficient 0.045** interpreted as adverse impact).
- Main policy lessons:
  - Policies that widen the parallel market premium (such as maintaining an overvalued exchange rate and lax monetary and fiscal policies) would, other things equal, adversely affect performance of official exports.
  - Exchange rate unification and tight macroeconomic policies can be expected to improve export performance.
  - Policies that improve governance and reduce ethnic tensions (notably an orderly resolution of land issues in this context) can be expected to have a beneficial impact on exports.

### Appendix I. Description of Sources and Transformation
- Data definitions and variable construction:
  - X_it: Real exports of Zimbabwe to country i: Direction of Trade Statistics and International Financial Statistics, IMF.
  - I_it: Industrial production index of country i: Real Sector and Government Data (GSTS), IMF.
  - R_it: Real official exchange rate of country i.
  - R^*_it: Real parallel exchange rate with country i.
  - i_e: Nominal official exchange rate with country i: Information Notice System, IMF.
  - i_e (parallel): Nominal parallel exchange rate with country i: World Currency Yearbook and Techfin.
  - i_P: Consumer price of country i: Information Notice System, IMF.
  - d_P: Price of domestic goods: Information Notice System, IMF.
  - t_qualindexes: Contains measures for corruption, bureaucracy quality, democratic accountability, economic risk, internal conflict, ethnic tensions, law and order, and investment profile: International Country Risk Guide.
- Real exchange rate formulas: formula text preserved verbatim as in source.
- References cited: selection of cited works preserved as listed in the source.

*Source: _wp0628 - References (IMF working paper content provided in the source PDF).*

### References..............................................................................................................

### _wp0628 - References..............................................................................................................

### Introduction
- Empirical literature indicates real exchange rate misalignment is negatively related to economic growth (Frenkel and Khan (1990), Cotanni et al. (1990), Edwards (1988)).
- Ghura and Grennes (1993) found measures of real exchange rate misalignment and its instability negatively affect growth of real per capita income, exports, agricultural output, and investment in a sample of 33 sub-Saharan African countries including Zimbabwe.
- Misalignment often takes the form of domestic currency overvaluation, hurting tradable activities and encouraging smuggling that reduces legal market supply.
- Cross-country studies may conflate structural differences unrelated to exchange rate misalignment; country-specific analyses are needed to complement cross-country evidence.

### Zimbabwe context and key historical exchange-rate facts
- Prior to fast-track land reform in 2000, official and black market values were close (about Z$40 per US$1).
- In 2000 the black market rate began to deviate from the official rate; the black market premium widened to 600 percent at end-2003.
- Official exchange rate history cited: fixed from October 2000—first at Z$55=US$1 and later at Z$824=US$1—until end-2003.
- De facto depreciation of the official exchange rate from Z$824=US$1 to Z$5,700=US$1 by end-2004 following a managed foreign exchange tender and relaxation of surrender requirements.
- Parallel market premium rose from 13 percent in January 2004 to 53 percent by end-2004.
- Fast-track land reform (initiated in 2000): over 80 percent of former commercial farmland redistributed (often by use of force); nine thousand farms listed for acquisition by end-2004; few farmers compensated; many farms unallocated.
- Agricultural output declined by 30 percent during 2000-04 due to losses in agricultural capital stock and production, uneven distribution of land and infrastructure, lack of security of tenure, and impoverishment of former farm workers.

### Export performance (Section II)
- Trade is a substantial share of GDP; exports are the main source of foreign exchange.
- Agricultural exports traditionally a driver of growth; they declined dramatically in recent years.
- Export growth rates (Table 1, annual average rate, in percent):
  - Zimbabwe: 1991-95 = 6.9; 1996-00 = 15.5; 2001-04 = -1.1; 1991-2004 = 7.7
  - World: 1991-95 = 8.7; 1996-00 = 4.8; 2001-04 = 9.7; 1991-2004 = 7.6
  - Developing countries: 1991-95 = 12.2; 1996-00 = 7.8; 2001-04 = 12.5; 1991-2004 = 10.7
  - Africa: 1991-95 = 2.1; 1996-00 = 9.2; 2001-04 = 10.7; 1991-2004 = 7.1
  - Tanzania: 1991-95 = 11.4; 1996-00 = 1.9; 2001-04 = 16.1; 1991-2004 = 9.4
  - Kenya: 1991-95 = 11.5; 1996-00 = 0.8; 2001-04 = 14.7; 1991-2004 = 8.6
  - Uganda: 1991-95 = 38.0; 1996-00 = -4.2; 2001-04 = 17.7; 1991-2004 = 17.1
- Export performance was high in the late 1990s but turned negative in the early 2000s, with relative deterioration versus developing countries and neighbors.
- Sharp swings in the real exchange rate since 2000 elicited a relatively muted export response, suggesting other limiting factors (internal conflict, poor infrastructure, access to credit, poor governance).
- Manufacturing and agriculture have been less responsive to REER movements than the mineral sector; agricultural production and exports collapsed with disruptions from land reform.

### Data and model specification (Section III.A–B)
- Export data from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS); analysis uses exports to Zimbabwe’s ten major trading partners: United States, Germany, South Africa, United Kingdom, Japan, France, Italy, Netherlands, Canada, Switzerland for 1984:Q1–2004:Q4.
- Parallel exchange rate data from World Currency Yearbook (and predecessors) and Techfin.
- Base model: imperfect substitutes model (Goldstein and Khan (1985)); export demand specified as function of real exchange rate and foreign real income (industrial production index).

### Extended model and qualitative variables (Section III.C)
- Extended to include dual exchange rate regime (official and parallel) and non-price factors (governance, cost of doing business, infrastructure quality, property rights).
- Official market exports (DOTS measure) modeled as function of both real official and real parallel exchange rates.
- qualindexes include measures for corruption, bureaucracy quality, democratic accountability, economic risk, internal conflict, ethnic tensions, law and order, and investment profile.
- Model estimations use quarterly data 1985–2004; panel data model with random effects and robustness checks (dynamic heterogeneous cointegrated panel data models also estimated).

### Empirical results (Section III.D and Table 2)
- Table 2 econometric results (Dependent variable: Real official exports; Balanced panel; No. of observations = 840):
  - Real official exchange rate: Estimate = 0.110**; Std. Err. = 0.050; Prob = 0.03
  - Real parallel exchange rate: Estimate = -0.262***; Std. Err. = 0.050; Prob = 0.00
  - Industrial production index: Estimate = 0.155; Std. Err. = 0.220; Prob = 0.47
  - Ethnic tensions: Estimate = 0.045**; Std. Err. = 0.020; Prob = 0.02
  - Constant: Estimate = 1.651*; Std. Err. = 0.100; Prob = 0.10
  - Seasonal dummies: yes
  - Random effects: yes
  - Wald Chi2 = 77.67; Prob = 0.00
- Interpretation of coefficients:
  - Elasticity of official exports with respect to official real exchange rate = 0.11.
  - Elasticity with respect to parallel market real exchange rate = -0.26.
  - Income elasticity (industrial production index) small and insignificant.
  - Ethnic tension coefficient significant, indicating higher ethnic tensions adversely affect export performance (index from International Country Risk Guide measures degree of tension attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions).
- Economic interpretation:
  - Depreciation of the official exchange rate generates a positive price effect, increasing official export demand.
  - A more depreciated parallel exchange rate incentivizes smuggling and underinvoicing, shifting sales away from official channels and reducing recorded official exports.
  - The larger (in absolute value) coefficient on the parallel rate suggests widening parallel premium shifts exports away from the official market.
  - Ethnic tensions plausibly capture adverse impacts of fast-track land reform on exports.

### Comparative measures of competitiveness (Section IV and Table 3)
- Sources: Growth Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum) and Snapshot of the Business Climate (World Bank); results summarized in Table 3.
- Key comparative findings:
  - Zimbabwe ranks below neighboring countries in the overall Growth Competitiveness Index largely due to the lowest score on the Macroeconomic Environment Index among 104 countries.
  - Zimbabwe also scores worst compared with neighboring countries (except Uganda) on the Public Institutions Index (including corruption and rule of law measures).
  - Microeconomic conditions for doing business are comparable to regional averages, but:
    - Costs in terms of GNI per capita of starting a business and registering property are higher than the regional average.
    - Labor market is less rigid than the regional average but performs worse than Zambia, Uganda, and Botswana.
- Selected figures from Table 3 (Business Climate, 2004) — preserved exactly as reported:
  - Growth Competitiveness Index (rank order): Zimbabwe 99; South Africa 41; Zambia 83; Uganda 79; Botswana 45; ...
  - Technology Index: Zimbabwe 86; South Africa 40; Zambia 90; Uganda 77; Botswana 64; ...
  - Public Institutions Index: Zimbabwe 73; South Africa 35; Zambia 66; Uganda 86; Botswana 63; ...
  - Macroeconomic Environment Index: Zimbabwe 104; South Africa 48; Zambia 89; Uganda 57; Botswana 54; ...
  - Business Competitiveness Index: Zimbabwe 82; South Africa 25; Zambia 78; Uganda 71; Botswana 62; ...
  - Starting a business — Number of procedures: Zimbabwe 10; South Africa 9; Zambia 6; Uganda 17; Botswana 11
  - Starting a business — Duration (days): Zimbabwe 9; South Africa 6; Zambia 3; Uganda 8; Botswana 5; Regional average 10
  - Starting a business — Cost (% of GNI per capita): Zimbabwe 304.7; South Africa 9.1; Zambia 22.8; Uganda 13; Botswana 131.3; Regional average 225.2
  - Registering Property — Number of procedures: Zimbabwe 4; South Africa 6; Zambia 6; Uganda 8; Botswana 6; Regional average 7
  - Registering Property — Duration (days): Zimbabwe 30; South Africa 20; Zambia 70; Uganda 48; Botswana 69; Regional average 114
  - Registering Property — Cost (% property value): Zimbabwe 18.1; South Africa 11.3; Zambia 1.3; Uganda 9.2; Botswana 5.5; Regional average 13.2
  - Getting credit — Cost to create collateral (% of income pc): Zimbabwe 2.4; South Africa 2.3; Zambia 19.2; Uganda 11.9; Botswana 2; Regional average 41.8
  - Getting credit — Legal rights index: Zimbabwe 7; South Africa 6; Zambia 6; Uganda 5; Botswana 9; Regional average 4.6
  - Protecting Investors — Disclosure Index: Zimbabwe 6; South Africa 6; Zambia 1; Uganda 2; Botswana 5; Regional average 2.1
  - Enforcing Contracts — Number of procedures: Zimbabwe 33; South Africa 26; Zambia 16; Uganda 15; Botswana 26; Regional average 35
  - Enforcing Contracts — Duration (days): Zimbabwe 350; South Africa 277; Zambia 274; Uganda 209; Botswana 154; Regional average 434
  - Enforcing Contracts — Cost (% of debt): Zimbabwe 19.1; South Africa 11.5; Zambia 28.7; Uganda 22.3; Botswana 24.8; Regional average 43.0
  - Closing a business — Duration (years): Zimbabwe 2.2; South Africa 2.7; Zambia 2.1; Uganda 2.2; Botswana 3.6
  - Closing a business — Cost (% of estate): Zimbabwe 181; South Africa 88; Zambia 38; Uganda 81; Botswana 82; Regional average 20.5
  - Closing a business — Recovery rate (cents on the dollar): Zimbabwe 9.2; South Africa 31.8; Zambia 19.4; Uganda 35.5; Botswana 50.9; Regional average 17.1

### Conclusions and policy implications (Section V)
- Overvaluation of the official exchange rate has reduced Zimbabwe’s competitiveness and negatively affected exports.
- The most notable empirical findings:
  - Negative relationship between parallel market rate depreciation and value of legal (official) exports (elasticity -0.262***).
  - Official exchange rate depreciation raises legal exports (elasticity 0.110**).
  - Ethnic tensions significantly affect export performance (ethnic tensions coefficient 0.045** interpreted as adverse impact).
- Main policy lessons summarized:
  - Policies that widen the parallel market premium (such as maintaining an overvalued exchange rate and lax monetary and fiscal policies) would, other things equal, adversely affect performance of official exports.
  - Exchange rate unification and tight macroeconomic policies can be expected to improve export performance.
  - Policies that improve governance and reduce ethnic tensions (notably an orderly resolution of land issues in this context) can be expected to have a beneficial impact on exports.

*Source: _wp0628 - References (IMF working paper content provided in the source PDF).*

### Appendix I. Description of Sources and Transformation

### Appendix I. Description of Sources and Transformation

### Data definitions and variable construction
- X_it: Real exports of Zimbabwe to country i: Direction of Trade Statistics and International Financial Statistics, IMF.
- I_it: Industrial production index of country i: Real Sector and Government Data (GSTS), IMF.
- R_it: Real official exchange rate of country i.
- R^*_it: Real parallel exchange rate with country i.
- i_e: Nominal official exchange rate with country i: Information Notice System, IMF.
- i_e (parallel): Nominal parallel exchange rate with country i: World Currency Yearbook and Techfin.
- i_P: Consumer price of country i: Information Notice System, IMF.
- d_P: Price of domestic goods: Information Notice System, IMF.
- t_qualindexes: Contains measures for corruption, bureaucracy quality, democratic accountability, economic risk, internal conflict, ethnic tensions, law and order, and investment profile: International Country Risk Guide.

### Real exchange rate formulas
- The formulas for the real official exchange rates are presented in the source as:
  - ,,
  - ,iiii
  - itit
  - dd
  - ePeP
  - RR
  - PP
  - ∗∗
  - ==

(Formula text preserved verbatim as in source.)

### References cited (selection from Appendix)
- Alesina, A., A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat and R. Wacziarg, 2003, “Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 155-194.
- Barro, R., 1991, “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 2, pp. 407-443.
- Coorey, S., 1990, “Foreign Exchange Rationing in an Exchange Control Regime,” Harvard University, PhD thesis.
- Cotanni, J. A., D. F. Cavallo, and J. S. Khan, 1990, “Real Exchange Rate Behavior and Economic Performance in LDCs,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 39, No. 1.
- De Grauwe, P., 1988, “Exchange Rate Variability and the Slowdown in Growth of International Trade,” IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 35, pp. 63-84.
- Easterly, W., and R. Levine, 1997, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 4, pp. 1203-1250.
- Edwards, S., 1988, Exchange Rate Misalignment in Developing Countries (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press).
- Frenkel, J. A., and M. S. Khan, 1990, “Adjustment Policies and Economic Development,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 815-820.
- Ghura, D., and T. J. Grennes, 1993, “The Real Exchange Rate and Macroeconomic Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 42, pp. 155-174.
- Goldstein, M., and M. S. Khan, 1985, “Income and Price Effects in Foreign Trade,” Handbook of International Economics, Vol. II, Chapter 20.
- International Currency Analysis, 1993, World Currency Yearbook.
- Ivaschenko, O., 2005, “Land Reform, Agricultural Policies, and Outcomes,” in Zimbabwe: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No. 05/359 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Sheifer, and R. Vishny, 1999, “The Quality of Government,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 222-79.
- Muñoz, S., 2005, “Export Performance: The Impact of the Parallel Market and Governance Factors,” in Zimbabwe: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No. 05/359 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Reif, T., 2004, “External Competitiveness and Export Performance in Tanzania,” in Tanzania: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No. 04/284 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Rodrik, D., 1999, “Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth Collapses?,” Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 4, pp. 385-412.
- Wood, A., and K. Jordan, 2000, “Why Does Zimbabwe Export Manufactures and Uganda Not? Econometrics Meets History,” Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 37, Number 2.

*Source: Appendix I. Description of Sources and Transformation (_wp0628)*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/_wp0628.pdf_