## Appendix I. Countries in the Sample ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [Appendix I. Countries in the Sample](https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/_wp07112.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/_wp07112.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/_wp07112.pdf.json) --- ### Sample composition (country, Number of Firms, Percent, Cummulative) - 1 Albania 2012.162.16 - 2 Armenia3403.655.81 - 3 Azerbaijan, Rep. of3333.589.39 - 4 Belarus3043.2712.66 - 5 Bosnia & Herzegovina1912.0514.71 - 6 Bulgaria 2883.0917.80 - 7 Croatia2282.4520.25 - 8 Czech Republic3383.6323.88 - 9 Estonia 2092.2526.13 - 10 Georgia 1912.0528.18 - 11 Hungary 5946.3834.56 - 12 Kazakhstan 5726.1540.71 - 13 Kyrgyz Republic 1942.0842.79 - 14 Latvia 1942.0844.87 - 15 Lithuania 1992.1447.01 - 16 Macedonia, FYR2893.1050.11 - 17 Moldova 3253.4953.60 - 18 Poland 96010.3163.91 - 19 Romania5756.1870.09 - 20 Russia5686.1076.19 - 21 Serbia & Montenegro1952.0978.28 - 22 Slovak Republic 2092.2580.53 - 23 Slovenia2212.3782.90 - 24 Tajikistan1902.0484.94 - 25 Turkey5465.8790.81 - 26 Ukraine5606.0296.83 - 27 Uzbekistan 2943.16100.00 - Total9,308100 ### Key observations from the sample listing and summary statistics - Sample covers 27 named countries plus a reported Total9,308100. - Entries present three numeric columns per country: Number of Firms, Percent, Cummulative (as formatted in source). - Specific numeric summary facts from the sample and dataset: - Number of firms in sample: 9,308. - Real sales growth constructed from survey question ranges from -98 to 300. - On average firms report: 87 percent of their wage bill, 89 percent of their sales, and 90 percent of their workforce to tax authorities. - Over 70 percent of the sample are small firms; 10 percent are large (more than 250 employees). - Firms are on average 16 years old; some in sample are 180 years old. - Informal firms on average report between 69 and 73 percent of their sales, between 64 and 69 percent of their wage bill, and between 68 and 75 percent of their workforce, depending on proxy used. ### Appendix II — Variables and sources (overview) - Sales Growth - Definition: Over the last 36 months how have sales changed (increased/decreased/no changed) and what is the percent of change for your company, in real terms (i.e. After allowing for inflation)? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Percentage of Sales Declared to Tax Authorities - Definition: Recognizing the difficulties many firms face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total annual sales would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports for tax purposes? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Percentage of Workforce Declared to Tax Authorities - Definition: Recognizing the difficulties many firms face in fully complying with labor regulations, what percentage of total workforce would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports for tax purposes? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Percentage of Wage Bill Declared to Tax Authorities - Definition: Recognizing the difficulties many firms face in fully complying with labor regulations, what percentage of total wage bill would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports for tax purposes? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Tax and Regulatory Constraint - Definition: How problematic are tax and regulatory constraints for the operation and growth of your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Financing Constraint - Definition: How problematic is access to financing (e.g. collateral required or financing not available) for the operation and growth of your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Tax Rate Constraint - Definition: How problematic are tax rates for the operation and growth of your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Tax Administration Constraint - Definition: How problematic is tax administration for the operation and growth of your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Organized crime/mafia - Definition: How problematic is organized crime/mafia for the operation and growth of your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Percent of sales in unofficial payments - Definition: On average, what percentage of total annual sales do firms like yours typically pay in unofficial payments/gifts to public officials? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Courts are fair and impartial - Definition: How often do you associate the following descriptions with the court system in resolving business disputes: fair and impartial: (1) always, (2) usually, (3) frequently, (4) sometimes, (5) seldom, (6) never - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Government ownership - Definition: Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any government agency or state body has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm, zero otherwise. - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Firm Size Dummies - Definition: A firm is defined as small if it has between 2 and 49 employees, medium between 50 and 249 employees, and large if it has more than 250 employees. - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Risk - Definition: Country-wide composite risk index capturing measures of political, economic and financial risk produced by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). - Original/Source: ICRG, closest date to 2005 available, ranging from 2003-2006. - Rule of Law - Definition: Synthetic Index, rescaled adding 2 points to the index to avoid negative values where a higher indicator denotes a higher quality rule of law. - Original/Source: Kaufmann et al (2006) - Log GDP per capita - Definition: Log of per capita GDP in constant 2000 US dollars. - Original/Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) - Real interest rate - Definition: Real interest rate (in percent) in 2005 WDI - Original/Source: WDI - Consumer price inflation - Definition: Consumer price inflation in 2005 (in annual percent) - Original/Source: WDI - Cost of Registering Property - Definition: Cost of registering property measured as a percentage of property value. - Original/Source: World Bank Doing Business Survey (2005) - Cost of Dealing with Licenses / Dealing with Licenses Cost - Definition: Dealing with Licenses Cost (in percent of income per capita). - Original/Source: World Bank Doing Business Survey (2005) ### Key empirical findings and policy-relevant implications (extracted from the content) - Sample- and method-level points - Data source: 2005 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS). - Sample: over 9,300 firms in 27 transition countries. - Empirical approaches used: OLS with clustered standard errors, country fixed effects, and instrumental variables (2SLS) with instrument = dummy for originally state-owned enterprise or private subsidiary of formerly state-owned firm. - Reported weak-instrument diagnostics: Cragg-Donald (N-L)*minEval/L2 F-stat = 17.95 (cited earlier); in Table 5 reported Cragg-Donald (N-L)*minEval/L2 F-stat = 16.90 and Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic = 17.013. - Determinants of formality - Firms are more formal if they are state owned and relatively large (more than 250 employees). - Propensity to operate in the formal sector decreases with regulatory burden and financing constraints, and with higher tax rate constraints. - Access to financing constraint coefficients are negative and significant across specifications. - Tax rate constraint coefficients are negative and significant in many specifications. - Formal operations increase with better enforcement quality: fair and impartial courts (positive and often significant), fewer anti-competitive practices (positive effect), and lower levels of corruption (percent of sales in unofficial payments has a large negative association with formality). - Country-level institutional variables: formality increases with Rule of Law (positive coefficient; significant in columns reported) and decreases with regulatory burden measured by cost of registering property (negative coefficient; significant). - Interaction: Rule of law * Cost of registering property has positive coefficient, implying better enforcement quality dampens the negative impact of regulatory burden on formality. - Determinants of firm growth and differential impacts by formality - Pooled-sample correlates of faster growth: firms that are relatively young, private, exporters, and relatively large. - Formal firms grow at a slightly slower pace than informal counterparts (e.g., percent of reported wage bill coefficient on sales growth = -0.134 in Table 4 column 1; also -0.124 in Table 5 column 1). - Formal firms: - Growth negatively affected by tax rate constraints (significant negative coefficients). - Growth negatively affected by financing constraints (access to financing constraint negative and significant). - Growth benefits from better enforcement measured by fair and impartial courts (positive and significant). - Anti-competitive practices constraint reduces growth for formal firms. - Informal firms: - Tax constraints are positively associated with growth in informal firms in some specifications (not robust across all specifications). - Financing constraints are generally insignificant for informal firms. - Organized crime constraint leads to significantly lower sales growth in informal firms while being insignificant for formal firms. - Fair and impartial courts are insignificant for informal firms, suggesting informal firms may be unable to take advantage of legal/judicial systems. - Country-level controls: - Firms in countries with higher GDP per capita or higher real interest rates grow at a slower pace (negative coefficients on log GDP per capita and real interest rate in several specifications). - Consumer price inflation is generally insignificant. - Composite risk (ICRG) is negatively associated with sales growth. - Cost of dealing with licenses decreases firm growth (negative and significant coefficients; e.g., Table 6: Cost of Dealing with Licenses coefficient around -0.004 with significance). - Interaction effect: Percent of reported wage bill * Rule of Law has a positive and sometimes significant coefficient (e.g., Table 6 reports Percent of reported wage bill*Rule of Law coefficient = 0.090, (0.048)*) implying better rule of law mitigates the relatively lower growth performance of formal firms. - Robustness and endogeneity - Country fixed effects specifications (Table 5) yield broadly similar results. - IV (2SLS) regressions instrumenting formality with originally state-owned dummy produce broadly similar results, though the differential growth rates for formal and informal firms are no longer significant in the IV specification (Table 5 column 2). - Tests for weak instruments reject weak instrument null (see reported F-statistics). - Policy-relevant implications - Reducing financial and regulatory constraints and improving legal enforcement reduces incentives to operate informally. - Tax, regulatory, and financing constraints have a differential impact: formal firms are more adversely affected in growth terms by tax and financing constraints than informal firms. - Better rule of law improves growth of formal firms and can partially offset the relatively weaker growth of formal firms vis-à-vis informal firms. - Specific policy directions suggested: lower tax burdens and strengthen tax administration; reduce regulatory burdens (cost of dealing with licenses and cost of registering property); improve access to finance for formal firms; strengthen judicial fairness and enforcement; address organized crime and corruption. *Source: Appendix I and Appendix II of the provided PDF content (_wp07112).* ### Appendix I. Countries in the Sample .................................................................................... ### Appendix I. Countries in the Sample ### Listings in this content unit - Appendix I. Countries in the Sample .......................................................................................21 - Appendix II. Variables and Sources ........................................................................................22 *Source: _wp07112 - Appendix I. Countries in the Sample* ### References.............................................................................................................. ### _wp07112 - References ### I. Introduction — research focus and motivation - Examines relationship between informality, firm growth, and policy obstacles using firm-level data for 27 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. - Research questions: - Determinants of informality using different proxies for informality. - Whether tax, regulatory, financing, and legal constraints have differential impacts on growth of formal and informal firms. - Role of institutional environment for firm performance and economic development. - Theoretical context: - Inadequate enforcement of property rights, financial and legal constraints, and cumbersome regulations adversely affect firm growth and investment. - Tax, regulatory, legal, and financial obstacles are determinants of informality (see Dabla-Norris et al 2007). - Informality can lead firms to remain sub-optimally small, adopt less productive technologies, and be locked out of finance, technology, and legal protection; aggregate productivity and economic growth may suffer. ### II. Data and summary statistics - Data source and sample: - 2005 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) conducted by the World Bank and the EBRD. - Sample: over 9,300 firms in 27 transition countries (the paper constrains sample to growth rates less than 300 percent to avoid outliers). - Specific numeric facts: - Number of firms in sample: 9,308. - Real sales growth constructed from survey question ranges from -98 to 300. - On average firms report: 87 percent of their wage bill, 89 percent of their sales, and 90 percent of their workforce to tax authorities. - Over 70 percent of the sample are small firms; 10 percent are large (more than 250 employees). - Firms are on average 16 years old; some in sample are 180 years old. - Informal firms on average report between 69 and 73 percent of their sales, between 64 and 69 percent of their wage bill, and between 68 and 75 percent of their workforce, depending on proxy used. - Proxies for formality (three survey questions): - Percent of total annual sales reported for tax purposes. - Percent of total workforce reported for tax purposes. - Percent of the actual wage bill reported for tax purposes. - Firm-perceived constraints and institutional measures: - Firm obstacle ratings quantified from 1 (no obstacle) to 4 (major obstacle); courts fairness rated from 1 (always) to 6 (never); percent of sales in unofficial payments also recorded. - Country-level institutional indicators used: composite ICRG risk index, Rule of Law index (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2006), cost of registering property (% of property value), cost of dealing with licenses (% of per capita income), and country controls (real GDP per capita, real interest rates, CPI inflation in 2005). ### III. Empirical strategy and key results - Empirical approach: - OLS regressions with clustered standard errors to analyze determinants of formality (share of wage bill/workforce/sales reported). - OLS with clustered standard errors for determinants of sales growth (real percentage change over last 36 months). - Instrumental variables (2SLS) approach to address potential endogeneity of formality; instrument: dummy equal to one if firm was originally established as a state-owned enterprise or as a private subsidiary of a formerly state-owned firm. - First-stage weak instrument tests reported: F-test on excluded variables — Cragg-Donald (N-L)*minEval/L2 F-stat = 17.95 (cited earlier); in Table 5 reported Cragg-Donald (N-L)*minEval/L2 F-stat = 16.90 and Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic = 17.013. - Determinants of formality (summary of empirical findings): - Firms are more formal if they are state owned and relatively large (more than 250 employees). - Propensity to operate in the formal sector decreases with regulatory burden and financing constraints, and with higher tax rate constraints. - Access to financing constraint coefficients are negative and significant across specifications. - Tax rate constraint coefficients are negative and significant in many specifications. - Formal operations increase with better enforcement quality: - Fair and impartial courts (positive and often significant). - Fewer anti-competitive practices (positive effect). - Lower levels of corruption (percent of sales in unofficial payments has a large negative association with formality). - Country-level institutional variables: - Level of formality increases with Rule of Law (positive coefficient; significant in columns reported). - Level of formality decreases with regulatory burden measured by cost of registering property (negative coefficient; significant). - Interaction: Rule of law * Cost of registering property has positive coefficient, implying better enforcement quality dampens the negative impact of regulatory burden on formality. - Determinants of firm growth (summary of empirical findings): - Pooled sample findings: - Firms that are relatively young, private, exporters, and relatively large grow significantly faster. - Formal firms grow at a slightly slower pace than informal counterparts (noted particularly when using percent of reported wage bill; percent of reported wage bill coefficient on sales growth = -0.134 in Table 4 column 1; also -0.124 in Table 5 column 1). - Differential impacts by formality: - Formal firms: - Growth is negatively affected by tax rate constraints (significant negative coefficients in multiple specifications). - Growth is negatively affected by financing constraints (access to financing constraint negative and significant for formal firms). - Growth benefits from better enforcement measured by fair and impartial courts (positive and significant for formal firms). - Anti-competitive practices constraint reduces growth for formal firms. - Informal firms: - Tax constraints are positively associated with growth in informal firms in some specifications (interpretation: weaknesses in tax policy and administration foster informality and can accelerate growth of such firms), though this result is not robust across all specifications. - Financing constraints are generally insignificant for informal firms. - Organized crime constraint leads to significantly lower sales growth in informal firms while being insignificant for formal firms. - Fair and impartial courts are insignificant for informal firms, suggesting informal firms may be unable to take advantage of legal/judicial systems. - Country-level controls and institutions: - Firms in countries with higher GDP per capita or higher real interest rates grow at a slower pace (negative coefficients on log GDP per capita and real interest rate in several specifications). - Consumer price inflation is generally insignificant. - Composite risk (ICRG) is negatively associated with sales growth. - Cost of dealing with licenses (regulatory burden) decreases firm growth (negative and significant coefficients; e.g., Table 6: Cost of Dealing with Licenses coefficient around -0.004 with significance). - Interaction effect: Percent of reported wage bill * Rule of Law has a positive and sometimes significant coefficient (e.g., Table 6 reports Percent of reported wage bill*Rule of Law coefficient = 0.090, (0.048)*) implying better rule of law mitigates the relatively lower growth performance of formal firms. - Robustness and endogeneity: - Country fixed effects specifications (Table 5) yield broadly similar results. - IV (2SLS) regressions instrumenting formality with originally state-owned dummy produce broadly similar results, though the differential growth rates for formal and informal firms are no longer significant in the IV specification (Table 5 column 2). - Tests for weak instruments reject weak instrument null (see reported F-statistics). ### IV. Policy-relevant findings and implications - Business environment matters for both informality and firm growth: - Reducing financial and regulatory constraints and improving legal enforcement reduces incentives to operate informally. - Tax, regulatory, and financing constraints have a differential impact: formal firms are more adversely affected in growth terms by tax and financing constraints than informal firms. - Better rule of law improves growth of formal firms and can partially offset the relatively weaker growth of formal firms vis-à-vis informal firms. - Specific policy implications suggested by empirical patterns: - Lower tax burdens and strengthen tax administration to reduce incentives for informality and support formal-firm growth. - Reduce regulatory burdens (e.g., lower cost of dealing with licenses and cost of registering property) to raise firm growth and formalization. - Improve access to finance for formal firms to promote their growth. - Strengthen judicial fairness and enforcement (rule of law and fair and impartial courts) to enable formal firms to benefit from legal protections and to mitigate negative spillovers from informality. - Address organized crime and corruption; organized crime constraints significantly reduce growth in informal firms and corruption (unofficial payments) strongly correlates with lower formality. ### V. Conclusion — synthesis of main contributions - The paper integrates literatures on informality and firm growth using 2005 BEEPS microdata for transition economies. - Main conclusions: - Regulatory burden, legal quality, and efficiency of the formal sector are important determinants of informality across three alternative proxies of formality (percent of sales, wage bill, workforce reported). - Formal firms grow at a slightly slower pace than informal firms; however, growth of formal firms is more sensitive to tax and financing constraints and benefits more from better enforcement quality. - Country-level weak institutions and higher regulatory burden (cost of dealing with licenses) depress firm growth; better rule of law improves formal firm growth. - Policy takeaway: Lowering tax, regulatory, and financing constraints and strengthening legal enforcement can foster growth of formal firms and reduce informality, with potential aggregate productivity benefits. *Source: Author's calculations and analysis based on the BEEPS, 2005; content extracted from _wp07112 - References (IMF PDF).* ### Appendix I. Countries in the Sample ### Appendix I. Countries in the Sample ### Sample composition (country, Number of Firms, Percent, Cummulative) - 1 Albania 2012.162.16 - 2 Armenia3403.655.81 - 3 Azerbaijan, Rep. of3333.589.39 - 4 Belarus3043.2712.66 - 5 Bosnia & Herzegovina1912.0514.71 - 6 Bulgaria 2883.0917.80 - 7 Croatia2282.4520.25 - 8 Czech Republic3383.6323.88 - 9 Estonia 2092.2526.13 - 10 Georgia 1912.0528.18 - 11 Hungary 5946.3834.56 - 12 Kazakhstan 5726.1540.71 - 13 Kyrgyz Republic 1942.0842.79 - 14 Latvia 1942.0844.87 - 15 Lithuania 1992.1447.01 - 16 Macedonia, FYR2893.1050.11 - 17 Moldova 3253.4953.60 - 18 Poland 96010.3163.91 - 19 Romania5756.1870.09 - 20 Russia5686.1076.19 - 21 Serbia & Montenegro1952.0978.28 - 22 Slovak Republic 2092.2580.53 - 23 Slovenia2212.3782.90 - 24 Tajikistan1902.0484.94 - 25 Turkey5465.8790.81 - 26 Ukraine5606.0296.83 - 27 Uzbekistan 2943.16100.00 - Total9,308100 ### Key observations from the sample listing - Sample covers 27 named countries plus a reported Total9,308100. - Entries present three numeric columns per country: Number of Firms, Percent, Cummulative (as formatted in source). ### Appendix II. Variables and Sources — overview of variables, definitions, original source - Sales Growth - Definition: Over the last 36 months how have sales changed (increased/decreased/no changed) and what is the percent of change for your company, in real terms (i.e. After allowing for inflation)? - Original: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS, 2005) - Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Percentage of Sales Declared to Tax Authorities - Definition: Recognizing the difficulties many firms face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total annual sales would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports for tax purposes? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Percentage of Workforce Declared to Tax Authorities - Definition: Recognizing the difficulties many firms face in fully complying with labor regulations, what percentage of total workforce would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports for tax purposes? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Percentage of Wage Bill Declared to Tax Authorities - Definition: Recognizing the difficulties many firms face in fully complying with labor regulations, what percentage of total wage bill would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports for tax purposes? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Tax and Regulatory Constraint - Definition: How problematic are tax and regulatory constraints for the operation and growth of your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Financing Constraint - Definition: How problematic is access to financing (e.g. collateral required or financing not available) for the operation and growth of your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Tax Rate Constraint - Definition: How problematic are tax rates for the operation and growth of your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Tax Administration Constraint - Definition: How problematic is tax administration for the operation and growth of your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Organized crime/mafia - Definition: How problematic is organized crime/mafia for the operation and growth of your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Percent of sales in unofficial payments - Definition: On average, what percentage of total annual sales do firms like yours typically pay in unofficial payments/gifts to public officials? - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Courts are fair and impartial - Definition: How often do you associate the following descriptions with the court system in resolving business disputes: fair and impartial: (1) always, (2) usually, (3) frequently, (4) sometimes, (5) seldom, (6) never - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Government ownership - Definition: Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any government agency or state body has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm, zero otherwise. - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Firm Size Dummies - Definition: A firm is defined as small if it has between 2 and 49 employees, medium between 50 and 249 employees, and large if it has more than 250 employees. - Original/Source: BEEPS, 2005 - Risk - Definition: Country-wide composite risk index capturing measures of political, economic and financial risk produced by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). - Original/Source: ICRG, closest date to 2005 available, ranging from 2003-2006. - Rule of Law - Definition: Synthetic Index, rescaled adding 2 points to the index to avoid negative values where a higher indicator denotes a higher quality rule of law. - Original/Source: Kaufmann et al (2006) - Log GDP per capita - Definition: Log of per capita GDP in constant 2000 US dollars. - Original/Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) - Real interest rate - Definition: Real interest rate (in percent) in 2005 WDI - Original/Source: WDI - Consumer price inflation - Definition: Consumer price inflation in 2005 (in annual percent) - Original/Source: WDI - Cost of Registering Property - Definition: Cost of registering property measured as a percentage of property value. - Original/Source: World Bank Doing Business Survey (2005) - Cost of Dealing with Licenses / Dealing with Licenses Cost - Definition: Dealing with Licenses Cost (in percent of income per capita). - Original/Source: World Bank Doing Business Survey (2005) *Source: Appendix I and Appendix II of the provided PDF content.* --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/_wp07112.pdf_