## _wp0748

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---

### Introduction and main contributions
- Foreign bank entry surged from US$6 billion during 1990-1996 to almost US$50 billion during 1997-2000 (BIS, 2004), representing roughly one-third of the global amount.
- Mexico: share of banking system assets controlled by foreign institutions rose from 2 percent in 1990 to 82 percent in 2004.
- Regional M&A share (1991-2005): Latin America accounted for 48 percent; Asia accounted for 36 percent.
- Key contributions:
  - Panel of 1,565 banks in 20 Asian and Latin American countries during 1989-2001; total observations = 8,574.
  - Intersects bank sample with comprehensive list of mergers and acquisitions to track ownership evolution.
  - Novel dataset on reserve requirements for sample countries.
- High-level result: Domestic and foreign banks behave roughly similarly on loan and deposit growth and response to economic activity; foreign banks show somewhat lower sensitivity to tighter monetary conditions in some specifications and display less reaction in lending and deposit rates during financial distress.

### Methodology and hypotheses
- Estimation: GLS with bank-level fixed effects, panel-specific AR(1), robust standard errors; separate regressions for regions and dependent variables.
- Dependent variables (yict):
  - Quantity-related: LOAN GROWTH, DEPOSIT GROWTH, LOANS TO DEPOSITS.
  - Price-related: LENDING RATES, DEPOSIT RATES, LENDING MINUS DEPOSIT SPREADS.
- Monetary condition variables (m):
  - MONEY MARKET RATES and RESERVE REQUIREMENTS (index 1 to 5, larger = higher requirements).
  - Alternative specification: DEPRECIATION (yearly percent change of average market exchange rate) and three-month U.S. T-bill rate (series 11160c).
- Controls: GDP GROWTH (country-level), bank SIZE (normalized log assets), asset LIQUIDITY (liquid assets/total assets, normalized), CAPITALIZATION (equity/total assets, normalized).
- Cross-sectional tests: interact variables with FOREIGN dummy (1 for foreign banks, 0 for domestic).
- Subsample splits: Asia vs. Latin America; banks above/below the 75th percentile of capitalization and liquidity (country-specific percentiles).
- Expected lending-channel signs:
  - Financially constrained banks → larger negative coefficients of monetary tightening on LOAN GROWTH and DEPOSIT GROWTH.
  - More constrained banks → larger responses in lending and deposit rates; lending-minus-deposit spread expected to increase under tighter monetary conditions.

### Data and sample construction
- Macro series and IMF IFS identifiers: MONEY MARKET RATES (series 60b), DEPRECIATION (series rf), three-month U.S. T-bill rate (series 11160c), GDP GROWTH (series 99b), CPI (series 64).
- Bank-level data source: Bankscope.
- Country coverage:
  - Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.
  - East Asia: Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan.
- Ownership classification: foreign if ≥ 51 percent of capital held by residents of industrial OECD countries (excluding Mexico and Korea); ownership reconstructed backward using M&A list and Appendix IV algorithm.
- Data processing and outlier filters (total removed = 316 observations):
  - 31 observations where yearly asset growth in constant US dollars exceeded 200 percent in absolute terms.
  - 57 cases where yearly loan growth exceeded 300 percent in absolute terms.
  - 77 cases where yearly deposit growth exceeded 300 percent in absolute terms.
  - 27 cases where loans represented more than 100 times the value of deposits.
  - 66 cases with negative deposits.
  - 94 cases with negative equity capital.
- Measurement:
  - Loan and deposit growth = first difference of log series in constant 1995 local currency.
  - Lending rate = interest revenues / average loan volume.
  - Deposit rate = interest expenses / average deposit volume.
  - Reserve requirements index constructed on a 1–5 scale (Appendices I–III).

### Baseline results (Asia and Latin America)
- Estimation approach: GLS with panel-specific AR(1), robust standard errors, separate regressions for each region and for six dependent variables.
- Quantity findings:
  - LOAN GROWTH and DEPOSIT GROWTH are highly procyclical (especially LOAN GROWTH).
  - No statistically significant differences across domestic and foreign banks in most baseline specifications.
  - LOAN TO DEPOSIT ratio roughly unchanged (loans and deposits move one-for-one at the one-year frequency), independent of cycle, monetary conditions, and bank characteristics, including ownership.
- Monetary conditions:
  - Higher MONEY MARKET RATES associated with lower LOAN GROWTH; foreign banks tend to show somewhat lower sensitivity to MONEY MARKET RATES in both regions.
  - No statistically significant differences in response of LOAN GROWTH to RESERVE REQUIREMENTS across domestic and foreign banks in baseline regressions.
- Price findings:
  - DEPOSIT RATES tend to be countercyclical.
  - Banks with higher liquidity pay lower deposit rates and charge lower spreads, mainly via lower lending rates.
  - During tight monetary conditions, lending and deposit rates increase; foreign banks in the Asian subsample display lower sensitivity of both lending and deposit rates to monetary conditions.
- Robustness: Results qualitatively robust to removal of 58 banks that changed ownership during the period.

### Loan growth: analysis by capitalization and liquidity
- Subsample splits: banks above/below country-specific 75th percentile of CAPITALIZATION and LIQUIDITY.
- Key patterns:
  - Banks with lower capitalization and/or liquidity are more sensitive to MONEY MARKET RATES (larger negative effect on LOAN GROWTH).
  - For lower-capitalized/less-liquid banks, domestic banks’ LOAN GROWTH coefficients on MONEY MARKET RATES are typically negative and significant; foreign banks’ coefficients often not significantly different from zero.
  - Null of equality between domestic and foreign coefficients rejected mainly when partitioning by LIQUIDITY (less so by CAPITALIZATION).
  - Alternative monetary specification (DEPRECIATION and federal funds rate) yields comparable patterns: LOAN GROWTH decelerates with exchange rate depreciation; foreign banks generally display lower sensitivity, differences driven by less liquid and/or less capitalized banks.
  - Coefficients on RESERVE REQUIREMENTS and international interest rates are less conclusive (large standard errors; mixed signs across subsamples).

### Foreign banks during crisis periods
- Crisis definitions: Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001); sensitivity checks with Frankel and Rose (1996), Caprio and Klingebiel (1996).
- Crisis windows: three-year windows centered on crisis year (CRISIS T-1, CRISIS T, CRISIS T+1); some windows longer due to clustering (examples: Mexico 1991–95; Venezuela 1992–96).
- Descriptive patterns:
  - Median country-level loan growth falls sharply at crisis onset and tends to recover toward end of window.
  - Loan growth behavior is remarkably similar across domestic and foreign banks, even during crisis windows.
- Regression evidence (fixed effects panel, split by FOREIGN):
  - LOAN GROWTH and DEPOSIT GROWTH decrease during crisis periods; mild or insignificant differences between domestic and foreign banks.
  - Exception: deposit growth in Asia shows larger contraction for foreign banks.
  - LOANS TO DEPOSITS ratio remains roughly constant during crises for both domestic and foreign banks.
  - LENDING and DEPOSIT RATES increase during crises; foreign banks’ rates tend to react less (smoother patterns) than domestic banks.
  - Lending-minus-deposit SPREADS during crises: inconclusive; no consistent differences by ownership.
  - Year-specific crisis dummies (CRISIS T-1, CRISIS T, CRISIS T+1):
    - LOAN and DEPOSIT GROWTH slightly above average in year preceding crisis, sharply below average in crisis year and after.
    - Mild evidence of less pronounced decline in LOAN GROWTH for foreign banks in Latin America but the opposite in Asia.
    - LENDING RATES rise one year before crises and remain high in crisis window; DEPOSIT RATES react more sluggishly, not increasing significantly in pre-crisis year.
- Sensitivity checks with alternative banking-crisis definitions support main findings.

### Overall interpretation and policy-relevant implications
- Evidence offers only weak support for a strong lending channel driven by ownership differences:
  - Loan and deposit growth primarily driven by economic activity (highly procyclical) with limited systematic differences by ownership.
  - Foreign banks often show somewhat lower sensitivity to tighter monetary conditions (particularly money market rates) and smoother interest-rate reactions during distress.
  - Reserve requirements effects and international interest rate channels produce less definitive evidence due to large standard errors and heterogeneous regional patterns.
- Policy-relevant points:
  - Foreign bank participation in emerging markets has not led to increased instability in credit markets.
  - Monitor bank balance-sheet strength (liquidity and capitalization), since differences in monetary sensitivity are driven by less liquid and/or less capitalized banks.
  - Recognize that foreign banks may exert differential behavior on interest rates and may have advantages in deposit attraction during turmoil.
  - Interpret ownership-related differences as potentially reflecting supply-side constraints rather than inherent instability introduced by foreign participation.

### Appendix I — Reserve requirements: scale and mappings
- Scale mapping rule:
  - IF RESERVE REQUIREMENT IS:
    - BETWEEN 1% AND 15% :1-2
    - BETWEEN 16% AND 30% :2-3
    - BETWEEN 31% AND 70% :3-4
    - BETWEEN 71% AND 100% :4-5
- Sub-category percentage-to-scale examples (selected rows preserved exactly):
  - 1.00% 1.00 | 16.00% 2.00 | 31% 3.00 | 71% 4.00
  - 3.00% 1.20 | 19.50% 2.25 | 40% 3.25 | 80% 4.30
  - 4.50% 1.30 | 23.00% 2.50 | 50% 3.50 | 85% 4.50
  - 6.00% 1.40 | 25.00% 2.60 | 60% 3.75 | 90% 4.60
  - 7.50% 1.50 | 26.50% 2.75 | 70% 3.99 | 100% 4.99
  - 9.00% 1.60 | 29.00% 2.95
  - 10.50% 1.70 | 30.00% 2.99
  - 12.00% 1.80
  - 13.50% 1.90
  - 15.00% 1.99
- Examples that can be extended:
  - 9.00% 1.60 | 10.50% 1.70
  - 9.25% 1.62 | 10.75% 1.72
  - 9.50% 1.64 | 11.00% 1.74
  - 9.75% 1.65 | 11.25% 1.75
  - 10.00% 1.67 | 11.50% 1.77
  - 10.25% 1.69 | 11.75% 1.79
  - 10.50% 1.70 | 12.00% 1.80
- Final scale assignment notes:
  - In cases where reserve requirements on demand deposits in domestic currency were not applicable, or did not show variation, a parallel policy instrument (such as liquidity requirements, reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits, etc.) was also used (second criterium).
  - During years with one or more changes in reserve requirements, the index reflects the weighted average of its intra-year values, using the relative time of the policy regimes as weights.
  - For each country, the policy instrument used to construct the reserve requirement index is specified; most cases use reserve requirement on demand deposits (first criterium).

### Appendix II — Criteria for constructing the reserve requirements index (selected country first/second criterium)
- ARGENTINA: First Criterium: Reserve requirements (minimum cash requirement) until 1994; Minimum liquidity requirements since 1995. Second Criterium: Reserve requirements for deposits in foreign currency.
- BOLIVIA: First Criterium: Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
- BRAZIL: First Criterium: Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency). Second Criterium: Reserve requirements for saving and time deposits in domestic currency, and daily balance to be held in banking reserves.
- CHILE: First Criterium: Reserve requirements on demand deposits (foreign currency). Second Criterium: Reserve requirement on external credits.
- COLOMBIA: First Criterium: Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency). Second Criterium: Reserve requirements for saving and time deposits in domestic currency.
- INDIA: First Criterium: Cash reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency). Second Criterium: Statutory liquidity ratio on demand and time liabilities.
- INDONESIA: First Criterium: Statutory reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency). Second Criterium: Statutory reserve requirement on foreign currency deposits.
- KOREA: First Criterium: Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency). Second Criterium: Marginal reserve requirement in domestic and foreign currency.
- MALAYSIA: First Criterium: Statutory reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency). Second Criterium: Liquidity requirement.
- MEXICO: First Criterium: Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency) until 1988. Liquidity coeffcient from 1989 to 1990. Liquidity coeffcient for deposits in foreign currency 1991 (August) to 1994.
- PARAGUAY: First Criterium: Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
- PERU: First Criterium: Reserve requirement (domestic currency). Second Criterium: Reserve requirements for deposits in foreign currency.
- PHILIPPINES: First Criterium: Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency). The reserve requirement against peso demand is the sum of the statutory and the liquidity reserve ratios.
- SINGAPORE: First Criterium: Minimum cash balance on demand deposits (domestic currency).
- TAIWAN: First Criterium: Reserve requirement ratio on demand deposits (domestic currency). Second Criterium: The required reserve ratio for passbook saving deposits, time saving deposits and time deposits.
- THAILAND: First Criterium: Liquidity requirement ratio on demand deposits (domestic currency). Second Criterium: Minimum reserve requirement on non-resident bath deposits.
- URUGUAY: First Criterium: The remunerated reserve requirement on sight deposits in local currency.
- VENEZUELA: First Criterium: Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).

### Appendix III — Reserve Requirements Index (selected country entries, selected excerpts)
- ARGENTINA:
  - 1986 — Code 4.580 — Reserve requirements were kept at 89,5% on demand deposits.
  - 1989 — Code 4.500 — The average reserve requirement of the system was 71% in June.
  - 1995 — Code 3.082 — As of November 1995, reserve requirements have been replaced by minimum liquidity requirements... uniform 15% liquidity requirement.
  - 1996 — Code 2.100 — The Central Bank increased the minimum liquidity requirement by 2%.
  - 1997 — Code 2.200 — The Central Bank increased the minimum liquidity requirement by 2%.
  - 1998 — Code 2.300 — The Central Bank increased the minimum liquidity requirement by 1%.
  - 2001 — Code 2.188 — In April, the Central Bank reduced the minimum liquidity requirement by 2%.
- BOLIVIA:
  - 1985 — Code 3.500 — Central Bank reduced reserve requirements... From 60% to 50% in the case of demand deposits.
  - 1986 — Code 3.250 — ...From 50% to 40% in the case of demand deposits.
  - 1987 — Code 2.765 — ...homogenized the reserve requirements to 20%...
  - 1994 — Code 1.975 — In July, the Central Bank eliminated the marginal reserve requirement...
  - 1998 — Code 1.757 — In May, Central Bank homogenized the reserve requirements to 12%...
- BRAZIL:
  - 1984 — Code 3.300 — The Central Bank increased reserve requirements from 10% to 22% for time deposits. The average reserve requirement on deposits was 43%.
  - 1994 — Code 4.337 — Under the Real Plan, the Central Bank raised the reserve requirement on demand deposits to 100% in June, reduced to 90% in December.
  - 2000 — Code 3.538 — The reserve requirement on demand deposits was reduced twice during the year to 55% in March and to 45% in June.
- CHILE:
  - 1991 — Code 2.300 — In June, Central Bank established a 20% reserve requirement on external credits for less than 1 year.
  - 1998 — Code 2.300 — In April, Central Bank reduced reserve requirements on external credits from 30% to 10%; in September, reserve requirement on external credits was eliminated.
- COLOMBIA:
  - 1984 — Code 3.300 — RR reduced from 45% to 43% on demand deposits.
  - 1998 — Code 2.292 — In November, RR on demand deposits reduced to 16% and MRR reduced to 16%.
  - 1999 — Code 1.870 — RR on demand deposits reduced to 13% and MRR to 13%.
- MEXICO:
  - 1987 — Code 3.550 — BOM reduced the marginal reserve requirement (MRR) from 77.2% to 51%.
  - 1995 — Code 1.415 — In March, BOM adopted a zero average legal reserve requirement.
  - 1996-2000 — Code 1.300 — No changes.
- PARAGUAY:
  - 1991 — Code 3.330 — RR on demand deposits in local currency was at 42%.
  - 1994 — Code 2.500 — In September, RR on local currency deposits reduced from 25% to 18%.
  - 1995-2000 — Code 2.100 — No changes.
- PERU:
  - 1985 — Code 3.850 — Reserve requirement was 65%.
  - 1992 — Code 1.625 — As of December, reserve requirement at 9.3%; MRR reduced to 0% for domestic currency deposits in March.
  - 1997 — Code 1.470 — Reserve requirement reduced to 7%.
  - 2000 — Code 1.400 — In September, reserve requirement reduced from 7% to 6%, plus 1% minimum reserve requirement in demand deposits at Central Bank.
- URUGUAY:
  - 1991 — Code 1.870 — Remunerated RR on sight deposits in local currency was 13%.
  - 1992 — Code 1.670 — RR reduced to 10%.
  - 1993-2000 — Code 1.670 — No changes.
- VENEZUELA:
  - 1990 — Code 1.927 — In January, RR unified to 12%; in May, raised to 15%.
  - 1997 — Code 2.100 — RR raised to 17% in 1998 entry.
- INDIA:
  - 1987 — Code 1.644 — CRR raised from 9% to 9.5%; CRR on FCNR raised from 3% to 9.5%.
  - 1994 — Code 1.990 — CRR raised from 14% to 15% in three phases.
  - 1999 — Code 1.675 — In November, CRR reduced from 10.25% to 9%.
- INDONESIA:
  - 1988 — Code 1.100 — Reserve requirements reduced from 15% to 2%.
  - 1996 — Code 1.192 — New regulation required commercial banks to maintain 3% of their funds as demand deposit with BOI.
- KOREA:
  - 1985 — Code 1.300 — RR for demand, time and saving deposits 4,5% in domestic currency and 1% in foreign currency.
  - 1997 — Code 1.351 — In February, RR for demand deposits reduced to 5% in domestic currency.
  - 2000 — Code 1.340 — MRR for resident account in foreign currency reduced to 5% (demand deposits).
- MALAYSIA:
  - 1985 — Code 1.288 — SRR for commercial banks reduced from 5% to 4%.
  - 1998 — Code 1.521 — SRR reduced from 13.5% to 10% in February; later reduced to 8% in July and to 4% in September.
- PHILIPPINES:
  - 1985 — Code 2.540 — RR reduced from 24% to 23% in September.
  - 1990 — Code 2.600 — RR on bank deposits increased cumulatively by 5 percentage points from 20% in 1989 to 25% at end of 1990.
  - 1999 — Code 1.950 — RR reduced during year by total of 5 percentage points from 17% to 12% by July.
  - 2000 — Code 1.850 — In October, RR increased to 16%.
- SINGAPORE:
  - 1987 — Code 1.400 — MAS reduced minimum liquid asset ratio from 20% to 18% in May.
  - 1998 — Code 1.300 — In July, MAS reduced minimum cash balance from 6% to 3%.
- TAIWAN:
  - 1978 — Code 2.990 — Required reserve ratio for checking accounts 30%.
  - 1999 — Code 2.006 — In February, RRR reduced to 15%.
  - 2001 — Code 1.855 — In October, RRR reduced to 10.75%.
- THAILAND:
  - 1995 — Code 1.480 — Non-resident bath deposits with maturity <1 year subject to 7% minimum reserve requirement.
  - 1997 — Code 1.447 — BOT reduced liquidity requirement ratio on total deposits from 7% to 6%.
  - 1999-2000 — Code 1.440 — No changes.

### Appendix IV — Algorithm to track the evolution of bank ownership (summary)
- Objective: classify banks as "foreign" if branch of foreign-incorporated bank or shareholders settled in foreign country hold ≥ 51 percent of bank capital.
- Step 1: Bankscope search for subsidiaries of banks from OECD countries; identified 304 banks at least partially owned by banks from OECD countries; 189 had > 51 percent ownership by banks headquartered in OECD countries.
- Step 2: Bankscope verification of shareholders settled in OECD countries; filters produced 313 cases; 171 common to the 189 above and taken as foreign banks; remaining 18 checked individually and included.
- Step 3: Matched 801 Bankscope banks with unknown ownership; crossed with transnational banks list and central bank lists; identified 168 additional branches of foreign banks on a case-by-case basis.
- Step 4: Reconstruct chronological ownership changes using SDC Platinum M&A announcements (January 1, 1985–December 31, 2000) targeting SIC codes 6000, 6081, 6029, 6021, 6712.
  - Search produced 1,227 transactions involving 804 target institutions; 404 matched with sample banks.
  - Created nine categories indicating buyer nationality and resulting ownership (foreign OECD, foreign non-OECD, government, domestic resident; ownership outcome: public, domestic, foreign OECD, foreign non-OECD).
- Outcome: Algorithm identified 58 institutions changing ownership over the period.
- Classification note: Acquirers that are public companies (including government-owned companies based in China) are classified as government.

*Source: _wp0748 (IMF Working Paper — chapter and appendices excerpt)*

### References..............................................................................................................

### _wp0748 - References

### Tables
- 1. Sample Coverage by Regions and Bank Ownership ...........................................................24
- 2. Balance Sheet Structure by Regions and Quintiles of Bank Size ........................................25
- 3. Summary Statistics by Regions and Bank Ownership.........................................................26
- 4. Latin-America, GLS Estimates of Selected Variables on Monetary Conditions.................27
- 5. Asia, GLS Estimates of Selected Variables on Monetary Conditions.................................28
- 6. Latin America, GLS Regressions of Loan Growth on Monetary Conditions (I).................29
- 7. Asia, GLS Regressions of Loan Growth on Monetary Conditions (I) ................................30
- 8. Latin America, GLS Regressions of Loan Growth on Monetary Conditions (II) ...............31
- 9. Asia, GLS Regressions of Loan Growth on Monetary Conditions (II) ...............................32
- 10. Latin America, Regressions Using a Crises Window ........................................................33
- 11. Asia, Regressions Using a Crises Window........................................................................34
- 12. Latin America, Regressions Specifying Pre- and Post-Crises Years.................................35
- 13. Asia, Regressions Specifying Pre- and Post-Crises Years.................................................36
- 14. Latin America, Alternative Crises Definitions ..................................................................37
- 15. Asia, Alternative Crises Definitions ..................................................................................38

### Figures
- 1. Money Market Rates and Reserve Requirements, Asian Countries, 1990–2000 ................20
- 2. Money Market Rates and Reserve Requirements, Latin America, 1990–2000...................21
- 3. Loan Growth of Domestic and Foreign Banks and Financial Crises (Kaminsky-Reinhart)22

*Source: _wp0748 - References (PDF)*

### 4. Loan Growth of Domestic and Foreign Banks and Financial Crises (Caprio-Klingebiel and

### 4. Loan Growth of Domestic and Foreign Banks and Financial Crises (Caprio-Klingebiel and Frankel-Rose)

### Introduction and main contributions
- Foreign bank entry surged from US$6 billion during 1990-1996 to almost US$50 billion during 1997-2000 (BIS, 2004), representing roughly one-third of the global amount.
- Example: Mexico’s share of banking system assets controlled by foreign institutions rose from 2 percent in 1990 to 82 percent in 2004.
- Regional M&A share: Latin America accounted for 48 percent of all cross-border M&As targeting banks in emerging markets between 1991-2005; Asia accounted for 36 percent.
- Key contributions:
  - Uses a panel of 1,565 banks in 20 Asian and Latin American countries during 1989-2001 to compare domestic and foreign banks’ sensitivity of loans, deposits, and bank-specific rates to monetary conditions.
  - Tracks bank ownership evolution by intersecting the bank sample with a comprehensive list of mergers and acquisitions.
  - Produces a novel dataset on reserve requirements for sample countries.
- High-level result: Domestic and foreign banks behave roughly similarly on loan and deposit growth and response to economic activity; foreign banks show somewhat lower sensitivity to tighter monetary conditions in some specifications and display less reaction in lending and deposit rates during financial distress.

### Methodology and hypotheses
- General panel regression specification (fixed effects, panel-specific AR(1)):
  - Dependent variables (yict) include quantity-related: LOAN GROWTH, DEPOSIT GROWTH, LOANS TO DEPOSITS; and price-related: LENDING RATES, DEPOSIT RATES, LENDING MINUS DEPOSIT SPREADS.
  - Monetary condition variables (m): MONEY MARKET RATES and RESERVE REQUIREMENTS (index from 1 to 5, larger = higher requirements).
  - Alternative monetary specification: DEPRECIATION (yearly percent change of average market exchange rate) and three-month U.S. T-bill rate (international interest rate proxy).
  - Controls: GDP GROWTH (country-level), bank SIZE (normalized log assets), asset LIQUIDITY (liquid assets/total assets, normalized), CAPITALIZATION (equity/total assets, normalized).
  - Cross-sectional differences tested by interacting variables with FOREIGN dummy (1 for foreign banks, 0 for domestic).
  - Subsample splits: Asia vs. Latin America; banks above/below the 75th percentile of capitalization and liquidity (country-specific percentiles).
- Expected signs under the lending channel:
  - Financially constrained banks (higher sensitivity) → larger negative coefficients of monetary tightening on LOAN GROWTH and DEPOSIT GROWTH.
  - More financially constrained banks → larger responses in lending and deposit rates; lending-minus-deposit spread expected to increase under tighter monetary conditions.

### Data and sample construction
- Macro series sources and IMF IFS series identifiers referenced: MONEY MARKET RATES (series 60b), DEPRECIATION (series rf), three-month U.S. T-bill rate (series 11160c), GDP GROWTH (series 99b), CPI (series 64). (Alternative money market proxies used where needed.)
- Bank-level data from Bankscope: panel of 1,565 banks in 20 countries during 1989-2001; total observations = 8,574.
- Country coverage:
  - Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.
  - East Asia: Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan.
- Ownership classification: a bank classified as foreign in a year if ≥ 51 percent of capital held by residents of industrial OECD countries (excluding Mexico and Korea); ownership reconstructed backward using M&A list and Appendix IV algorithm.
- Data processing and outlier filters:
  - Converted to constant 1995 local currency using CPI.
  - Removed observations with extreme changes or deficiencies: total removed = 316 observations.
  - Specific filters applied (counts):
    - 31 observations where yearly asset growth in constant US dollars exceeded 200 percent in absolute terms.
    - 57 cases where yearly loan growth exceeded 300 percent in absolute terms.
    - 77 cases where yearly deposit growth exceeded 300 percent in absolute terms.
    - 27 cases where loans represented more than 100 times the value of deposits.
    - 66 cases with negative deposits.
    - 94 cases with negative equity capital.
- Measurement notes:
  - Loan and deposit growth: first difference of log series in constant 1995 local currency.
  - Lending rate = interest revenues / average loan volume; deposit rate = interest expenses / average deposit volume.
  - Reserve requirements index constructed on a 1–5 scale (Appendices I–III provide details).

### Baseline results (Asia and Latin America)
- Estimation approach: GLS with panel-specific AR(1), robust standard errors, separate regressions for each region and for six dependent variables.
- Quantity variables:
  - LOAN GROWTH and DEPOSIT GROWTH are highly procyclical (especially LOAN GROWTH); no statistically significant differences across domestic and foreign banks in most baseline specifications.
  - Loans and deposits move roughly one-for-one at the one-year frequency (LOAN TO DEPOSIT ratio unchanged), independent of cycle, monetary conditions, and bank characteristics, including ownership.
- Monetary conditions:
  - Tighter monetary conditions (higher MONEY MARKET RATES) associated with lower LOAN GROWTH; foreign banks tend to show somewhat lower sensitivity to MONEY MARKET RATES in both regions.
  - No statistically significant differences in response of LOAN GROWTH to RESERVE REQUIREMENTS across domestic and foreign banks in baseline regressions.
- Price variables:
  - DEPOSIT RATES tend to be countercyclical; banks with higher liquidity pay lower deposit rates and charge lower spreads, mainly via lower lending rates.
  - During periods of tight monetary conditions, lending and deposit rates increase; foreign banks in the Asian subsample display lower sensitivity of both lending and deposit rates to monetary conditions.
- Robustness: Results qualitatively robust to removal of 58 banks that changed ownership during the period.

### Loan growth: deeper analysis by capitalization and liquidity
- Subsample splitting: banks above/below country-specific 75th percentile of CAPITALIZATION and LIQUIDITY.
- Key patterns:
  - Banks with lower capitalization and/or liquidity are more sensitive to MONEY MARKET RATES (larger negative effect on LOAN GROWTH).
  - For banks with lower capitalization/liquidity, domestic banks’ LOAN GROWTH coefficients on MONEY MARKET RATES are typically negative and significant; foreign banks’ coefficients often not significantly different from zero.
  - Null of equality between domestic and foreign coefficients rejected mainly when partitioning by LIQUIDITY (less so by CAPITALIZATION).
  - Alternative monetary specification (DEPRECIATION and federal funds rate) yields comparable patterns: LOAN GROWTH decelerates with exchange rate depreciation; foreign banks generally display lower sensitivity, differences driven by less liquid and/or less capitalized banks.
  - Coefficients on RESERVE REQUIREMENTS and international interest rates are less conclusive (large standard errors; mixed signs across subsamples).

### Foreign banks during crisis periods
- Crisis definitions used: currency and banking crises from Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and debt crises from Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001); additional crisis definitions (Frankel and Rose (1996), Caprio and Klingebiel (1996)) used for sensitivity checks.
- Crisis windows:
  - Initial approach: three-year windows centered on crisis year (CRISIS T-1, CRISIS T, CRISIS T+1). In practice some windows span longer due to clustering (examples: Mexico 1991–95; Venezuela 1992–96).
- Descriptive patterns:
  - Median country-level loan growth falls sharply at crisis onset and tends to recover toward the end of the window.
  - Loan growth behavior is remarkably similar across domestic and foreign banks, even during crisis windows.
- Regression evidence (fixed effects panel, split by FOREIGN):
  - Both LOAN GROWTH and DEPOSIT GROWTH decrease during crisis periods; mild or insignificant differences between domestic and foreign banks, with exception: deposit growth in Asia shows larger contraction for foreign banks.
  - LOANS TO DEPOSITS ratio remains roughly constant during crises, indicating loans and deposits move one-for-one for both domestic and foreign banks.
  - LENDING and DEPOSIT RATES increase during crises; foreign banks’ rates tend to react less (smoother patterns) than domestic banks.
  - Lending-minus-deposit SPREADS during crises: results inconclusive and show no consistent differences between domestic and foreign banks.
  - Using year-specific crisis dummies (CRISIS T-1, CRISIS T, CRISIS T+1) yields:
    - LOAN and DEPOSIT GROWTH slightly above average in year preceding crisis, sharply below average in crisis year and after.
    - Mild evidence of less pronounced decline in LOAN GROWTH for foreign banks in Latin America but the opposite in Asia.
    - LENDING RATES rise one year before crises and remain high in crisis window; DEPOSIT RATES react more sluggishly, not increasing significantly in pre-crisis year.
- Sensitivity checks with alternative banking-crisis definitions support main findings.

### Overall interpretation
- Evidence provides only weak support for a strong lending channel driven by ownership differences:
  - Loan and deposit growth are primarily driven by economic activity (highly procyclical) with limited systematic differences by ownership.
  - Foreign banks often show somewhat lower sensitivity to tighter monetary conditions (particularly money market rates) and smoother interest rate reactions during distress, suggesting foreign bank participation did not increase instability in credit markets and may have had stabilizing effects in some dimensions.
  - Reserve requirements effects and international interest rate channels produce less definitive evidence due to large standard errors and heterogeneous regional patterns.

*Source: IMF working paper chapter "4. Loan Growth of Domestic and Foreign Banks and Financial Crises (Caprio-Klingebiel and Frankel-Rose)".*

### conclusions, in the sense that no systematic differences in loan and deposit growth arise between

### _wp0748 - conclusions, in the sense that no systematic differences in loan and deposit growth arise between

### VIII. Concluding remarks
- The increase of foreign bank presence in emerging markets has generated debate on potential effects on financial stability and the transmission of domestic and external shocks into credit markets.
- The results reported in the paper "tend to fall on neutral grounds."
- There is some evidence that loan growth of foreign banks is less sensitive to changes in monetary conditions in host countries.
- The reduced sensitivity of foreign banks to monetary conditions is driven by banks with lower asset liquidity and/or capitalization.
- Among banks with stronger balance sheets, there is a strong similarity in the response of loans and deposits to monetary conditions across domestic and foreign banks.
- These findings offer evidence supporting the existence of supply-side effects in credit markets, provided that:
  - differences in bank ownership are a good proxy for financial constraints on banks, and
  - no systematic differences arise in loan demand across domestic and foreign banks.
- Because the observed differences are driven by less liquid and/or less capitalized banks, this offers additional support for a supply-side interpretation.
- At a general level, foreign bank participation in emerging markets has not led to increased instability in credit markets.
- The response of credit to economic activity and monetary conditions seems to be roughly similar across domestic and foreign banks.
- Differences, if any, are more closely related to the behavior of interest rates:
  - deposit and lending rates of foreign banks tend to be less sensitive to changes in monetary conditions, and smoother during periods of financial turmoil in host countries.
  - this suggests that foreign banks may have an advantage over domestic peers in attracting deposits.

### Empirical design and relevant measures (as described in the source)
- Crisis windows: a three-year period around either a currency, banking or debt crisis (based on various crisis definitions).
- Reserve requirements indicator: an index that goes from 1 to 5, where a higher number indicates higher reserves.
- Monetary condition indicators used in regressions:
  - money market rate
  - reserve requirements index
  - US Federal Funds Rate (in some specifications)
  - yearly variation of the exchange rate depreciation (+)
- Estimation methods referenced:
  - GLS panel regressions with bank-level fixed effects, allowing for panel-specific AR(1) errors.
  - Regressions run for regional subsamples (Asia; Latin America) and for the whole sample.
  - Samples drawn from BankScope and span selected emerging economies (sample covers 20 emerging economies in Asia and Latin America; temporal coverage indicated in tables).

### Key empirical patterns and robustness checks (as described)
- Loan and deposit growth:
  - No systematic differences in loan and deposit growth arise between domestic and foreign banks across crisis and non-crisis definitions (multiple crisis definitions used: Caprio-Klingebiel, Frankel-Rose, Kaminsky-Reinhart; crisis dummies for T-1, T, T+1).
- Sensitivity to monetary conditions:
  - Foreign banks display, in general, a somewhat lower sensitivity to market conditions (e.g., money market rates, reserve requirements), particularly in deposit and lending rates.
  - Differences in loan growth responses by ownership are concentrated among banks with lower asset liquidity and/or capitalization (splits at 75th percentile reported).
- Crisis-period behavior:
  - Deposit and lending rates of foreign banks tend to be less sensitive and smoother during periods of financial turmoil in host countries.
  - Regressions specifying pre- and post-crises years, and regressions using alternative crisis definitions, are reported to check robustness of findings.
- Regional heterogeneity:
  - Separate GLS estimates and crisis-window regressions were run for Latin America and Asia sub-samples, with similar qualitative conclusions about ownership effects and interest-rate behavior.

### Policy-relevant implications (drawn from the source text)
- The presence of foreign banks in emerging markets does not appear to have increased instability in credit markets.
- Policy focus might consider:
  - monitoring bank balance-sheet strength (liquidity and capitalization), since differences in monetary sensitivity are driven by less liquid and/or less capitalized banks.
  - recognizing that foreign banks may exert differential behavior on interest rates (deposit and lending rates) and may have advantages in deposit attraction during turmoil.
  - interpreting ownership-related differences as potentially reflecting supply-side constraints rather than inherent instability introduced by foreign participation.

*Source: _wp0748 - conclusions, in the sense that no systematic differences in loan and deposit growth arise between*

### Appendix I. Scales for Reserve Requirements by Country

### Appendix I. Scales for Reserve Requirements by Country

### I. SCALE — Mapping reserve requirement percentages to scale
- IF RESERVE REQUIREMENT IS:
  - BETWEEN 1% AND 15% :1-2
  - BETWEEN 16% AND 30% :2-3
  - BETWEEN 31% AND 70% :3-4
  - BETWEEN 71% AND 100% :4-5

### I. SUB-CATEGORIES — Percentage to scale mappings (as listed)
- BETWEEN 1% AND 15% / BETWEEN 16% AND 30% / BETWEEN 31% AND 70% / BETWEEN 71% AND 100%
  - 1.00% 1.00 | 16.00% 2.00 | 31% 3.00 | 71% 4.00
  - 3.00% 1.20 | 19.50% 2.25 | 40% 3.25 | 80% 4.30
  - 4.50% 1.30 | 23.00% 2.50 | 50% 3.50 | 85% 4.50
  - 6.00% 1.40 | 25.00% 2.60 | 60% 3.75 | 90% 4.60
  - 7.50% 1.50 | 26.50% 2.75 | 70% 3.99 | 100% 4.99
  - 9.00% 1.60 | 29.00% 2.95
  - 10.50% 1.70 | 30.00% 2.99
  - 12.00% 1.80
  - 13.50% 1.90
  - 15.00% 1.99

### I. EXAMPLES THAT CAN BE EXTENDED FOR OTHER CASES
- 9.00% 1.60 | 10.50% 1.70
- 9.25% 1.62 | 10.75% 1.72
- 9.50% 1.64 | 11.00% 1.74
- 9.75% 1.65 | 11.25% 1.75
- 10.00% 1.67 | 11.50% 1.77
- 10.25% 1.69 | 11.75% 1.79
- 10.50% 1.70 | 12.00% 1.80

### II. HOW THE FINAL SCALE IS ASSIGNED
- 1)
- 2)
- 3) In cases where reserve requirements on demand deposits in domestic currency were not applicable, or did not show variation, a parallel policy instrument (such as liquidity requirements, reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits, etc.) was also used (second criterium). The list of policy instruments used for each country is presented in Appendix 2.
- During years with one or more changes in reserve requirements, the index reflects the weighted average of its intra-year values, using the relative time of the policy regimes as weights.
- For each country, we specify the policy instrument used to construct the reserve requirement index. Most cases use the reserve requirement on demand deposits (first criterium).

---

### Appendix II. Criteria for the Construction of the Reserve Requirements Index

- ARGENTINA
  - First Criterium: Reserve requirements (minimum cash requirement) until 1994; Minimum liquidity requirements since 1995
  - Second Criterium: Reserve requirements for deposits in foreign currency.
- BOLIVIA
  - First Criterium: Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
- BRAZIL
  - First Criterium: Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
  - Second Criterium: Reserve requirements for saving and time deposits in domestic currency, and daily balance to be held in banking reserves.
- CHILE
  - First Criterium: Reserve requirements on demand deposits (foreign currency).
  - Second Criterium: Reserve requirement on external credits.
- COLOMBIA
  - First Criterium: Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
  - Second Criterium: Reserve requirements for saving and time deposits in domestic currency.
- INDIA
  - First Criterium: Cash reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
  - Second Criterium: Statutory liquidity ratio on demand and time liabilities.
- INDONESIA
  - First Criterium: Statutory reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
  - Second Criterium: Statutory reserve requirement on foreign currency deposits.
- KOREA
  - First Criterium: Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
  - Second Criterium: Marginal reserve requirement in domestic and foreign currency.
- MALAYSIA
  - First Criterium: Statutory reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
  - Second Criterium: Liquidity requirement.
- MEXICO
  - First Criterium: Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency) until 1988.
  - Liquidity coeffcient from 1989 to 1990.
  - Liquidity coeffcient for deposits in foreign currency 1991 (August) to 1994.
- PARAGUAY
  - First Criterium: Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
- PERU
  - First Criterium: Reserve requirement (domestic currency).
  - Second Criterium: Reserve requirements for deposits in foreign currency.
- PHILIPPINES
  - First Criterium: Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency). The reserve requirement against peso demand is the sum of the statutory and the liquidity reserve ratios.
- SINGAPORE
  - First Criterium: Minimum cash balance on demand deposits (domestic currency).
- TAIWAN
  - First Criterium: Reserve requirement ratio on demand deposits (domestic currency).
  - Second Criterium: The required reserve ratio for passbook saving deposits, time saving deposits and time deposits.
- THAILAND
  - First Criterium: Liquidity requirement ratio on demand deposits (domestic currency).
  - Second Criterium: Minimum reserve requirement on non-resident bath deposits.
- URUGUAY
  - First Criterium: The remunerated reserve requirement on sight deposits in local currency.
- VENEZUELA
  - First Criterium: Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).

---

### Appendix III. Reserve Requirements Index — Country entries (selected excerpts)

- ARGENTINA
  - 1986 — Code 4.580 — Reserve requirements were kept at 89,5% on demand deposits.
  - 1989 — Code 4.500 — The average reserve requirement of the system was 71% in June. There was a reduction of reserve requirements for deposits in foreign currency.
  - 1990 — Code 4.575 — As from July, reserve requirements were reduced 3% in cases of technical reserves for demand deposits and by 1.5% additional for fixed time deposits. By September, the contractionary monetary policy was further deepened, so the backing figures returned to their previous high levels.
  - 1991 — Code 4.555 — In December, the Central Bank reduced minimum cash requirements to 79% on demand deposits.
  - 1992 — Code 4.120 — There were not substancial variations in minimum cash requirements. Requirements on deposits whose holders belonged to the non-financial public sector were reduced by 6%. As of October 1 the Central Bank reduced by 2% the minimun cash requirement on peso deposits in current accounts and other sight and fixed term operations, at 71%.
  - 1993 — Code 3.354 — The Central Bank homogenized the reserve requirements for current accounts and sight operations in both currencies, implying a substantial reduction in reserve requirements for current accounts in pesos from 71% to 40%. In August, the Central Bank set a 3% increase, to 43%, in cash requirements on current account and saving deposits.
  - 1994 — Code 3.300 — The Central Bank reduced temporarily required minimums covering dollars deposits from 43% for sight deposits dated 12-15-95, to 35% until 1-15-95. For fixed-term deposits the minimum cash requirement dropped from 3% to 1% as of 12-16-94 to be reestablished at 3% as of 2-1-95.
  - 1995 — Code 3.082 — As of November 1995, reserve requirements have been replaced by minimum liquidity requirements (Requisitos Minimos de Liquidez), which may include earning assets. All deposits were subject to a uniform 15% liquidity requirement.
  - 1996 — Code 2.100 — The Central Bank increased the minimum liquidity requirement by 2%.
  - 1997 — Code 2.200 — The Central Bank increased the minimum liquidity requirement by 2%.
  - 1998 — Code 2.300 — The Central Bank increased the minimum liquidity requirement by 1%.
  - 2001 — Code 2.188 — In April, the Central Bank reduced the minimum liquidity requirement by 2%. In June, the Central Bank established a new liquidity regime based on a minimum cash requirement over sight operations, whereas the rules realted to minimum liquidity requirements only involved fixed term deposits.
  - Source: Annual Report of the Argentine Economy- Economic Trends. Consejo Tecnico de Inversiones.

- BOLIVIA
  - 1985 — Code 3.500 — Central Bank reduced reserve requirements on demand deposits, saving deposits and time deposits, all in domestic currency. From 60% to 50% in the case of demand deposits.
  - 1986 — Code 3.250 — Central Bank reduced reserve requirements on demand deposits, saving deposits and time deposits, all in domestic currency. From 50% to 40% in the case of demand deposits.
  - 1987 — Code 2.765 — In July. Central Bank homogenized the reserve requirements to 20% for different types of deposits and currencies.
  - 1994 — Code 1.975 — In July, the Central Bank eliminated the marginal reserve requirement for deposits in domestic currency. The marginal reserve requirement was 10% for demand and saving deposits, and 6% for time deposits (less than 365 days).
  - 1998 — Code 1.757 — In May, Central Bank homogenized the reserve requirements to 12% for different types of deposits and currencies.
  - Source: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Bolivia.

- BRAZIL
  - 1984 — Code 3.300 — The Central Bank increased reserve requirements from 10% to 22% for time deposits. The average reserve requirement on deposits was 43%.
  - 1985 — Code 3.170 — The rate of reserve requirements on demand deposits in the commercial banks dropped from an average of 43% to 36%.
  - 1988 — Code 3.180 — Reserve requirements are rationalized, requirements differing according to bank size. As of December, the average implicit reserve requirement represented 37% of deposits.
  - 1993 — Code 3.458 — The percentage of the reserve requirement moved from 40% to 50% but had little impact on the banking system's capacity to grant credit, since demand deposits represented less than 1% of GDP.
  - 1994 — Code 4.337 — Under the Real Plan, the Central Bank raised the reserve requirement on demand deposits to 100% in June, which was reduced to 90% in December. The reserve requeriment on time deposits was raised from 20% to 30% in August and then reduced to 27% in December. For saving deposits, the reserve requirement was raised from 20% to 30% in August.
  - 1995 — Code 4.500 — The reserve requirement on demand deposits was reduced from 90% to 83% in July, for time deposits the rate was reduced to 20% in August, and for saving deposits the rate was reduced to 15%.
  - 1996 — Code 4.200 — The criteria for reserve requirements and obligatory reserves on demand deposits were altered and a schedule was defined according to which the rate would gradually decline from 83% to 78% as of December.
  - 1997 — Code 4.150 — In January, the reserve requirement on demand deposits was reduced from 78% to 75%.
  - 1999 — Code 4.075 — In October, the reserve requirement on demand deposits was reduced from 75% to 65%.
  - 2000 — Code 3.538 — The reserve requirement on demand deposits was reduced twice during the year to 55% in March and to 45% in June.
  - Source: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Brazil (Banco Central do Brasil).

- CHILE
  - 1991 — Code 2.300 — In June, the Central Bank stablished a 20% reserve requirement on external credits for less than 1 year.
  - 1992 — Code 2.588 — In January, the Central Bank stablished a 20% reserve requirement on demand and term deposits in foreign currency. In March, the reserve requirement was increased to 30% for financial entities not in the Chapter XIV of CNCI (Compendium of Regulations Governing Foreign Exchange). In August, the reserve requirement for external credits was increased to 30%.
  - 1996 — Code 2.990 — In December, credit and financial investment operations between US$ 10,000 and US$ 200,000 done under the Chapter XIV of CNCI were released of the 30% reserve requirement.
  - 1998 — Code 2.300 — In April, the Central Bank reduced the reserve requirements on external credits from 30% to 10%. In September, the reserve requirement on external credits was eliminated (unremunerated reserve requirement for short-term capital inflows). In December, there was a reduction of reserve requirements to deposits in foreign currency. From 30% to 19% for demand deposits, and from 30 to 13.6% for term deposits. 10% of the reserve requirement in foreign currency was remunerated.
  - Source: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Chile.

- COLOMBIA
  - 1984 — Code 3.300 — The monetary authority reduced the reserve requirement (RR) from 45% to 43% on demand deposits. Also, it was reduced the RR of term deposits of and above six months from 10% to 6%.
  - 1987 — Code 3.350 — The RR of demand deposits was raised to 44%.
  - 1988 — Code 3.250 — The RR of demand deposits was reduced from 44% to 40%, and also it was reduced the RR of demand deposits with entities of the public sector from 65% to 61%.
  - 1989 — Code 3.230 — The RR of demand deposits was reduced from 40% to 39%, and also it was reduced the RR of demand deposits with entities of the public sector from 61% to 53%.
  - 1990 — Code 3.100 — The RR of demand deposits was reduced from 39% to 33.5%, and also it was reduced the RR of demand deposits with entities of the public sector from 56% to 52.5%.
  - 1991 — Code 3.280 — In January, marginal reserve requirements of 100% were imposed on all new deposits. These reserves were held as interest-bearing central bank bonds. In September, the marginal reserve requirement was replaced by an increase in reserve requirement on most deposits. RR of demand deposits was raised from 33.5% to 41%, and from 53.5% to 70% (public sector).
  - 1992 — Code 3.260 — The RR for saving deposits was reduced from 31% to 10%, and from 23% to 10% in the case of term deposits.
  - 1995 — Code 3.250 — RR of demand deposits was reduced from 41% to 40%, and from 70% to 60% (public sector). A marginal reserve requirement (MRR) of 21% was stablished for demand deposits, and 10% for saving deposits and term deposits.
  - 1996 — Code 2.350 — The RR on deposits was homogenized to 21%. The RR on term deposits was reduced to 5% and the MRR was reduced to 7%.
  - 1998 — Code 2.292 — In November, the monetary authority determined the following changes: The RR on demand deposits was reduced to 16% and the MRR was reduced to 16%.
  - 1999 — Code 1.870 — The RR on demand deposits was reduced to 13% and the MRR was reduced to 13%.
  - 2000-2001 — Code 1.870 — No changes.
  - Source: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Colombia (Banco de la Republica).

- MEXICO
  - 1987 — Code 3.550 — The Bank of Mexico (BOM) reduced the marginal reserve requirement (MRR) from 77.2% to 51%. The distribution was: 10% in cash, 35% in credits to the Federal Government, and 6% to development banks.
  - 1988 — Code 3.500 — The BOM determined liquidity coefficients. 30% of liabilities (aceptaciones bancarias) had to be invested in remunerated demand deposits in the BOM and other securities (CETES, BONDES). The distribution of MRR required investment was: 10% in cash, 31% in credits to the Federal Government, and 10% to development banks.
  - 1989 — Code 2.990 — Liquidity coefficient applied also to liabilities coming from traditional bank instruments. Promisory notes denominated in US dollars required a liquidity coefficient of 30%.
  - 1991 — Code 2.903 — In August, the BOM eliminated the existing liquidity coefficient on bank liabilities in domestic currency. In June, the BOM established a 50% compulsory liquidity coefficient on foreign currency liabilities to be constitued with liquid foreign assets. In August, the BOM determined an ascendent scale of the liquidity coefficient from 0% to 50% depending on the maturity of deposits.
  - 1992 — Code 2.143 — In April, the liquidity coefficient, which went from 0% up to 50% according to the maturity of the deposits, was replaced by a 15% requirement.
  - 1995 — Code 1.415 — In March, the BOM adopted a zero average legal reserve requirement.
  - 1996-2000 — Code 1.300 — No changes.
  - Source: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Mexico (Banco de Mexico).

- PARAGUAY
  - 1991 — Code 3.330 — Reserve Requirement (RR) on demand deposits in local currency was at 42%.
  - 1992 — Code 2.990 — The Central Bank reduced the RR for domestic currency deposits to 30%. In June, the Central Bank started to remunerate legal RR on local currency deposits.
  - 1993 — Code 2.600 — The CB reduced the RR on local currency deposits from 30% to 25%. RR on foreign currency deposits was 30%.
  - 1994 — Code 2.500 — In September, the CB reduced the RR on local currency deposits from 25% to 18%. In October, the CB started to remunerate legal RR on local currency deposits in excess of 10%.
  - 1995-2000 — Code 2.100 — No changes.
  - Source: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Paraguay.

- PERU
  - 1985 — Code 3.850 — As of December, the reserve requirement was 65%. In August, The marginal reserve requirement (MRR) was raised from 50% to 75% for liabilities in domestic currency.
  - 1986 — Code 3.760 — As of December, the reserve requirement was 61%. The Central Bank reduced the MRR twice. As of May the MRR was 70% for liabilities in domestic currency, and as October, the MRR was 64%.
  - 1987 — Code 3.580 — As of December, the reserve requirement was 53.1%. In March, the Central bank reduced the MRR from 64% to 50% for liabilities in domestic currency. The reduction only applied to bank branches located outside the Lima to support credit decentralization.
  - 1990 — Code 3.350 — As of December, the reserve requirement was 45%. In June, the Central Bank homogenized and raised the MRR to 80%, but in August it came back to the initial scheme of 64% and 50%. In September, the Central Bank homogenized and reduced the MRR to 40% and then it was reduced to 30% at the end of the year.
  - 1991 — Code 2.600 — The reserve requirement was reduced from 45% to 25.4% at the end of the year. In October, the MRR was reduced to 15% and then reduced to 5% at the end of the year. The Central Bank raised the MRR from 30% to 50% for liabilities in foreign currency.
  - 1992 — Code 1.625 — As of December, the reserve requirement was at the level of 9.3%. There was a unification of the legal and exigible reserve requirement. In March, the MRR was reduced to 0% for domestic currency deposits.
  - 1993 — Code 1.620 — The Central Bank established a reserve requirement of 9% for domestic currency, and reduced the MRR from 50% to 45% for foreign currency.
  - 1997 — Code 1.470 — The Central Bank reduced the reserve requirement to 7%.
  - 1998 — Code 1.470 — The Central Bank reduced the average reserve requirement by 4.5% between October and December for liabilities in foreign currency. In December, the MRR in foreign currency was reduced from 35% to 20%.
  - 2000 — Code 1.400 — In September, the reserve requirement was reduced from 7% to 6%, and a 1% minimum reserve requirement in the form of demand deposits kept at the Central Bank was introduced.
  - Source: Annual Reports of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru.

- URUGUAY
  - 1991 — Code 1.870 — The remunerated reserve requirement (RR) on sight deposits in local currency was 13%.
  - 1992 — Code 1.670 — The RR on sight deposits in local currency was reduced to 10%.
  - 1993-2000 — Code 1.670 — No changes.
  - Source: IMF Staff Country Reports.

- VENEZUELA
  - 1990 — Code 1.927 — In January, the central bank (CB) unified the RR on demand, time and saving deposits to 12%. In May, the CB raised the RR to 15%.
  - 1991 — Code 2.244 — In May, the CB established a special RR of 80% on public sector deposits in commercial banks. In August, the CB raised the RR on demand, savings and time deposits to 25% gradually.
  - 1992 — Code 2.397 — In September, the CB established that the RR on liabilities held until August 30 was 25%, and for liabilities after this date the RR was 15%. Also, the CB reduced the RR on public sector deposits in commercial banks from 80% to 25% gradually. In December, it was adjusted to 15%.
  - 1993 — Code 1.990 — In November, the CB unified the RR scheme. For commercial banks the RR was 15%.
  - 1998 — Code 2.100 — The RR was raised to 17%.
  - Source: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Venezuela.

- INDIA
  - 1987 — Code 1.644 — In February, the cash reserve requirement (CRR) was raised from 9% to 9.5%. In May, the CRR on foreign currency non-resident (FCNR) deposit liabilities was raised from 3% to 9.5%. In October, the CRR was raised from 9.5% to 10% of net demand and time liabilities.
  - 1988 — Code 1.705 — In July, the CRR was raised from 10% to 11% of net demand and time liabilities. In July, the CRR on FCNR was raised from 9.5% to 10%.
  - 1989 — Code 1.866 — In July, the CRR was homogenized at 15% for all net demand and time liabilities.
  - 1990 — Code 1.992 — In September, statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) was raised from 38% to 38.5% of net demand and time liabilities.
  - 1992 — Code 1.980 — In April, SLR was reduced from 38.5% to 37.75% of net demand and time liabilities. In April, banks were exempted from the mantainance of the 10% incremental CRR on net demand and time liabilities.
  - 1993 — Code 1.973 — In September, CRR was reduced from 15% to 14%.
  - 1994 — Code 1.990 — CRR was raised from 14% to 15% in three phases. In October, a CRR of 7.5% on FCNR deposit liabilities was stablished.
  - 1995 — Code 1.982 — In January, CRR of deposit liabilities under Foreign Currency (NR) was raised to 15%. In November and December, the CRR was reduced from 15% to 14%.
  - 1996 — Code 1.848 — In May, the CRR was reduced from 14% to 13%. In July, the CRR was reduced from 13% to 12%. In November, the CRR was reduced from 12% to 11%.
  - 1997 — Code 1.665 — In January, the CRR was reduced from 11% to 10%. In October, the CRR was reduced from 10% to 9.75%.
  - 1998 — Code 1.683 — In March, the CRR was raised from 9.75% to 10.25%.
  - 1999 — Code 1.675 — In November, the CRR was reduced from 10.25% to 9%.
  - Source: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of India.

- INDONESIA
  - 1988 — Code 1.100 — Reserve requirements were reduced from 15% to 2%.
  - 1995 — Code 1.100 — In December, the Bank of Indonesia (BOI) amended the regulation on the reserve requirement to statutory reserve requirement. With this new regulation, the reserve components changed from demand deposits with BOI and cash originally, to only demand deposit with BOI.
  - 1996 — Code 1.192 — In February, the new regulation required commercial banks to maintain 3% of their funds in the form of demand deposit with the BOI.
  - 1997 — Code 1.192 — The statutory reserve requirement for foreign currencies deposits was reduced from 5% to 3%.
  - Source: Annual Reports of the Bank of Indonesia.

- KOREA
  - 1985 — Code 1.300 — the reserve requirement (RR) for demand, time and saving deposits was 4,5% in domestic currency and 1% in foreign currency ( In July, the marginal reserve ratio for resident account in foreign currency was introduced at 20%).
  - 1987 — Code 1.328 — In November, RR for demand, time and saving deposits was raised to 7.0% in domestic currency. In February, the marginal reserve ratio for resident account in foreign currency was reduced to 4.5%.
  - 1988 — Code 1.486 — In December, RR for demand, time and saving deposits was raised to 10.0% in domestic currency.
  - 1989 — Code 1.680 — In May, a 30% marginal reserve requirement (MRR) was introduced for deposits in domestic currency.
  - 1990 — Code 1.762 — In February, RR for demand, time and saving deposits was raised to 11.5% in domestic currency. In March, the marginal reserve ratio for resident account in foreign currency was raised to 11.5%.
  - 1996 — Code 1.621 — In April, RR for demand, time and saving deposits was reduced to 9% in domestic currency. In April, the marginal reserve ratio for resident account in foreign currency was reduced to 9%. In November, RR for demand, time and saving deposits was reduced to 7% in domestic currency. In November, the marginal reserve ratio for resident accounts in foreign currency was reduced to 7%.
  - 1997 — Code 1.351 — In February, RR for demand deposits was reduced to 5% in domestic currency. The RR for time and saving deposits in domestic currency was reduced to 2 %. The Bank of Korea imposed a 2% RR on negotiable certificates of deposits.
  - 2000 — Code 1.340 — In April, the MRR for resident account in foreign currency (demand deposits) was reduced to 5%. The MRR for resident account in foreign currency (time and saving deposits) was reduced to 2%.
  - Source: Annual Reports of the Bank of Korea.

*Appendix titles and entries as presented in the source document.*

### Appendix III. Reserve Requirements Index (

### Appendix III. Reserve Requirements Index (continued)

### MALAYSIA
- 1985 — Code 1.288: In April, the statutory reserve requeriment (SRR) of commercial banks (CB) was reduced from 5% to 4% of total eligible liabilities. For merchant banks (MB), the ratio was raised from 1.5% to 2.5%. The SRR for finance companies (FC) remained unchanged at 2.5%.
- 1986 — Code 1.263: In February, the SRR of FC and MB as increased from 2.5% to 3%. In October, the SRR for CB was reduced from 4% to 3.5%. In February, the liquidity requeriment (LR) of CB was reduced from 20% to 18.5 %. The LR for MB and FC remained unchanged at 10%. In October, the LR for CB was reduced from 18.5% to 17%.
- 1987 — Code 1.238: The Central Bank reduced the liquidity ratio of CB from 10% to 8%, with the LR remaining unchanged at 17% for MB and FC.
- 1988 — Code 1.233: The Central Bank reduced the liquidity ratio of CB from 8% to 5%, and abolished the liquidity ratio for FC.
- 1989 — Code 1.298: In May, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to a uniform 4.5%. In October, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 5.5%.
- 1990 — Code 1.440: In January, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 6.5%.
- 1991 — Code 1.465: In August, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 7.5%.
- 1992 — Code 1.547: In May, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 8.5%.
- 1994 — Code 1.715: In January, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 9.5%. In May, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 10.5%. In July, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 11.5%.
- 1996 — Code 1.873: In February, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 12.5%. In June, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 13.5%.
- 1998 — Code 1.521: In February, the Central Bank reduced the SRR of CB, MB and FC from 13.5% to 10%. In July, the Central Bank reduced the SRR of CB, MB and FC from 10% to 8%. In September, the Central Bank reduced the SRR of CB, MB and FC from 8% to 4%.
- 1999-2000 — Code 1.250: No changes.
- Source: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Malaysia.

### PHILIPPINES
- 1985 — Code 2.540: In September, the reserve requirement (RR) against short-term deposit liabilities of commerical banks (CB) and thrift banks (TB) was reduced from 24% to 23%.
- 1986 — Code 2.438: The RR on long-term deposit instruments of banks was reduced by a total of 2 percentage points from 23% to 21% in May and August.
- 1987 — Code 2.350: No changes.
- 1988 — Code 2.350: No changes.
- 1989 — Code 2.333: In September, the RR on deposits and deposit substitutes was homogenized to 20%.
- 1990 — Code 2.600: A series of upward adjustments in the RR on bank deposits were made during the year with a cummulative increase of 5 percentage points from 20% in 1989 to 25% at the end of 1990 as a contractionary measure.
- 1991 — Code 2.600: No changes.
- 1992 — Code 2.600: No changes.
- 1993 — Code 2.300: A series of downward adjustments in the RR on bank deposits were made during the year with a cummulative reduction of 5 percentage points from 25% in 1992 to 22% at the end of 1993.
- 1994 — Code 2.100: The RR was reduced to 19%.
- 1995 — Code 2.027: In May, the RR was reduced to 17%.
- 1997 — Code 2.100: At the end of the year, the RR was 17%. During the year there were seven changes in the liquidity reserve component of the RR.
- 1998 — Code 2.054: In May, the RR was reduced to 15%. In October, the RR was increased to 17%.
- 1999 — Code 1.950: The RR was reduced during the year by a total of 5 percentage points from 17% in January to reach 12% by July.
- 2000 — Code 1.850: In October, the RR was increased to 16%.
- Source: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Philippines.

### SINGAPORE
- 1987 — Code 1.400: In May, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) reduced the minimum liquid asset ratio from 20% to 18%.
- 1998 — Code 1.300: In July, the MAS reduced the minimum cash balance (MCB) from 6% to 3%. The MCB had been mantained at 6% since 1975. The minimum liquid assets (MLA) requirement of finance companies was raised from 10% to 13%.
- 1999-2000 — Code 1.200: No changes.
- Source: Annual Reports of the Monetary Authority of Singapore.

### TAIWAN
- 1978 — Code 2.990: The required reserve ratio (RRR) for checking accounts (CA) was 30%
- 1979 — Code 2.730: In May, the RRR for CA was reduced to 25%.
- 1982 — Code 2.542: In June, the RRR for CA was reduced to 23%.
- 1988 — Code 2.508: In December, the RRR for CA was raised to 25%.
- 1989 — Code 2.863: In April, the RRR for CA was raised to 29%.
- 1990 — Code 2.929: In August, the RRR for CA was reduced to 28.5%.
- 1991 — Code 2.867: In September, the RRR for CA was reduced to 27.75%.
- 1993 — Code 2.773: In September, the RRR for CA was reduced to 26.25%.
- 1995 — Code 2.692: In November, the RRR for CA was reduced to 23.75%.
- 1996 — Code 2.508: In August, the RRR for CA was reduced to 22%.
- 1997 — Code 2.408: In October, the RRR for CA was reduced to 19.75%.
- 1998 — Code 2.247: In September, the RRR for CA was reduced to 18.75%.
- 1999 — Code 2.006: In February, the RRR for CA was reduced to 15%.
- 2000 — Code 1.975: In October, the RRR for CA was reduced to 13.5%.
- 2001 — Code 1.855: In October, the RRR for CA was reduced to 10.75%.
- Source: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of the Republic of China.

### THAILAND
- 1990 — Code 1.470: To stabilize the money markets and reduce fluctuations of short-term interest rates, the BOT modified the computacional procedure of commercial bank's reserve requirements.
- 1995 — Code 1.480: In August, non-resident bath deposits with maturity of less than one year are subject to a 7% minimum reserve requirement in the form of deposits (with no interest) with the BOT. While reserve requirements on domestic deposits were also 7%, they could be held in the form of interest-bearing public bonds.
- 1997 — Code 1.447: In September, the BOT reduced the liquidity requirement ratio on total deposits from 7 % to 6%. For finance companies the liquidity requirement on total domestic and foreign borrowing was reduced from 7% to 6%. This was also applied to non-resident deposits, or foreign borrowing with maturity of less than one year.
- 1999 — Code 1.440: The BOT announced new rules on liquidity reserve requirement composition and procedure, but not changes in rates.
- 2000 — Code 1.440: No changes.
- Source: Annual Reports of the Bank of Thailand.

### Algorithm to Track the Evolution of Bank Ownership (Appendix IV summary)
- Objective: Identify foreign institutions involved in retail banking and with access to upstream financing from their mother banks (branches and subsidiaries where applicable). Operational definition: a bank is "foreign" if it is a branch of a bank incorporated in a foreign country, or if it has shareholders settled in a foreign country, holding together at least 51 percent of the bank capital.
- Step 1: Use Bankscope search engine to identify subsidiaries of banks from OECD countries; select those with more than 51 percent ownership by foreign banks.
  - Identified 304 banks at least partially owned by banks from OECD countries.
  - Of those, 189 had more than 51 percent in the hands of banks headquartered in OECD countries.
- Step 2: Verify by using Bankscope to identify shareholders settled in OECD countries holding together at least 51 percent of capital. If percentage ownership unavailable, select banks with one or more shareholders from OECD countries and with local shareholders holding together less than 50 percent.
  - These filters produced 313 cases.
  - 171 were common to the 189 above and taken as foreign banks without further check.
  - The remaining 18 were checked individually via web pages and all included in the final list of foreign banks.
- Step 3: Address banks with unknown dependence. Matched 801 banks from Bankscope with unknown ownership.
  - Crossed with list of transnational banks headquartered in OECD countries or the Cayman Islands from www.transnationale.org.
  - Intersected with lists of foreign banks from Central Banks' web pages of Hong Kong, Brazil, Singapore, and Thailand.
  - On a case-by-case basis, identified 168 additional branches of foreign banks.
- Step 4: Reconstruct chronological ownership changes by intersecting the sample with SDC Platinum database of mergers and acquisitions announced between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 2000, targeting SIC codes 6000, 6081, 6029, 6021, and 6712.
  - The search produced 1,227 transactions involving 804 target institutions.
  - Of those, 404 were matched with the sample of banks.
  - Ignored operations where acquirers and nationalities were unknown.
  - Created nine categories indicating buyer nationality (foreign OECD, foreign non-OECD, government, domestic resident) and resulting ownership (public, domestic, foreign OECD, foreign non-OECD).
- Outcome: Algorithm identified 58 institutions changing ownership over the period.
- Note on classification: In cases where the acquirer is a public company (including government-owned companies based in China), the acquirer is classified as government.

*Source: IMF Staff Working Paper — Appendix III and Appendix IV content as provided.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/_wp0748.pdf_
