## 1. Average Annual Economic Growth in Selected Countries

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---

### Introduction
- Transition from a socialist-inward looking economic model to a market oriented one in the early 1990s coincided with a sharp take-off in growth in Guyana.
- Average growth fell from 7.1 percent during 1991–97 to 0.6 percent in 1998–2004, leaving Guyana well behind the Caribbean region and among the lowest growth rates for HIPCs and PRGF-eligible countries.
- The evolution of growth in Guyana is described as radically different from that of other countries that embarked on large scale liberalization programs.

### Stylized facts and context
- Privatization and initial recovery
  - More than 80 percent of government assets were privatized or liquidated between 1990-1994, with only sugar, public utilities, and one commercial bank remaining public.
  - Initial reforms were accompanied by a dramatic increase in foreign direct investment and very rapid economic growth.
- Export concentration and market access
  - The share of the five main export commodities—sugar, gold, rice, timber and bauxite—declined from over 80 percent in 1991 to about 75 percent in 2004.
  - Lack of large deep-sea port facilities and limited air transportation routes constrained diversification.
- Labor and credit constraints
  - Emigration, especially among the highly educated, was very high and accelerated in the late 1990s, producing shortages of skilled workers and a severe brain drain.
  - Nonperforming loans (NPLs) increased from 12 percent in 1996 to a peak of 38 percent in 2001 before declining to about 18 percent in 2004; this contributed to a dramatic decline in private sector credit.
- Infrastructure and utilities
  - Only 7.4 percent of roads are paved.
  - Electricity transmission and distribution losses are about 42 percent of the output; electricity production is highly inefficient and costly, service is unreliable.
  - Water services are expensive and insufficient; telecommunications are relatively better developed but expensive due to near-monopoly.
- Regulatory and institutional environment
  - Regulatory framework remained complex and centralized; enforceability of laws is low and the court system is slow with a large backlog.
  - Acquisition of land for investment remains lengthy and costly; most land remains in government hands.
  - Failed privatization of the public electricity company (privatized in 1999; ownership reverted to government in 2003) negatively affected the investment climate.
  - Some progress: Investment Act, Small Business Bill, establishment of a commercial court.
- Political and security deterioration
  - Longstanding political tensions between the two main political parties increased instability in the latter part of the 1990s, including violent protests after the December 1997 and 2001 elections.
  - A lengthy civil servants strike occurred in 1999; organized crime increased, particularly in 2002-2003.

### Measurement caveats
- GDP measurement issues
  - National accounts are based on the 1988 pre-reform production pattern, underreporting the expansion of the private sector and growth in services.
  - Large informal sector not fully accounted for: one estimate cited about 40 percent; others suggest up to 60 percent of GDP.
  - These data problems imply an increasing underestimation of GDP and GDP growth, which could make the decline between periods appear less sharp but do not explain the break in trend.
- Capital measurement issues
  - A significant part of public investment may be maintenance/repair rather than productive capital.
  - Recent public capital spending increasingly directed to social investment (schools, hospitals), which may overstate productive capital in the short run.
  - Increased spending on security may further overstate productive capital.

### Growth accounting: methodology
- Solow residual (TFP) computed as a function of growth in real GDP, labor, and capital under constant returns to scale and Hicks neutral technology.
- Data sources and proxies:
  - GDP growth rates: Gross Domestic Product at constant prices from the World Economic Outlook database.
  - Labor supply proxied by population from the International Financial Statistics database.
  - Capital stock estimated using gross fixed capital formation at current prices from the World Economic Outlook via the perpetual inventory method.
- Perpetual inventory method specifics:
  - K_{t+1} = (1 - d) K_t + I_{t+1}
  - Depreciation rate d assumed to be 4 percent per annum.
  - Initial capital stock: capital stock in 1990 reaches G$16.06 billion in 1990 prices (following Weisman (2003) approach).
  - Capital share of GDP assumed to be 0.5.
- Caveats:
  - Inability to account for migration effects likely overstates labor supply.
  - Likelihood that capital is smaller than estimated implies the Solow residual (TFP) may be overestimated.
  - Changes in the quality of labor and capital are ignored; this would tend to overestimate the Solow residual.

### Growth accounting: key quantitative findings
- Average growth decomposition for 1991–2004:
  - Average growth rate: 3.9 percent.
  - Contribution from increase in labor force: 0.1 percent.
  - Contribution from capital: 3.9 percent.
  - Contribution from all other factors (Solow residual/TFP and others): approximately 1.8 percent.
- Changes between subperiods:
  - Labor force growth declined from 0.6 percent during 1991–1997 to –0.4 percent in 1998–2004.
  - Capital accumulation fell from 5.8 percent in 1991–1997 to bellow 2 percent in 1998–2004.
- The large change in TFP between the two periods indicates that beyond changes in labor and capital accumulation, other significant factors affected economic performance.

### Regression-based analysis and main determinants
- Purpose and approach
  - Aim: show the decline in growth rates between 1991–1997 and 1998–2004 was largely the result of adverse exogenous shocks (including a decline in terms of trade) and a deterioration of the political and institutional environment, but that a significant unexplained decline in growth remains.
  - Due to only 14 annual observations for Guyana (1991–2004), a panel framework including Guyana and other Caribbean, HIPC, and PRGF-eligible countries is used.
- Growth equation (AR(2) structure) employed:
  - Git = b0 Git-1 + b1 Git-2 + b2 ΔLabor_it + b3 ΔPol_Risk_it + b4 CF_Private_it + b5 CF_Public_it + b6 FDI_it + b7 ToT_gs_it + ε_it
- Key regressors and definitions
  - ΔPol_Risk_it: change in the ICRG Political Risk Index.
  - ToT_gs_it: variations in terms of trade for goods and services.
  - CF_Private_it: private capital formation defined as total private investment net of FDI.
  - CF_Public_it: public capital formation.
  - FDI_it: foreign direct investment flows (net foreign investment excluding debt-creating liabilities).
  - ΔLabor_it: fluctuations in labor force growth (population growth proxy).
- Estimation methods and endogeneity considerations
  - Fixed effects and random effects panel models.
  - Arellano and Bond (1991) first-difference instrumental variable estimator with two lags used to address bias from lagged dependent variables.
  - Political/institutional variables, investments, and FDI treated as exogenous following existing literature; simultaneity bias assessed as weak due to low correlations among these variables in the sample.

### Sample composition and scope
- Caribbean sample includes Suriname, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago (limited by availability of ICRG Political Risk Index).
- HIPC completion point countries in sample include: Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
- PRGF-eligible countries: a subset closer to Guyana in structural features (specific list limited by ICRG availability).

### Key empirical findings — Caribbean sample
- Fixed effects model:
  - Little evidence of an autoregressive structure of economic growth rates.
  - Most explained variation captured by cross-country differences in institutional and political stability and by variations in private domestic and foreign investment.
  - Overall fit: model explains approximately 30 percent of variations in economic growth rates.
- Random effects model:
  - Explains almost 40 percent of economic growth variations.
  - Predicts a strong autoregressive pattern in economic growth.
  - Coefficient for private domestic capital formation is insignificant.
- Hausman test:
  - p-value essentially zero, favoring fixed effects model estimates over random effects.

### Key empirical findings — HIPC sample
- Political stability and institutional quality are important determinants of economic growth.
- Strong statistical dependency of economic performance on variations of labor-force growth rates.
- Public capital formation contributes significantly to higher economic growth:
  - Fixed effects: private capital formation coefficient not statistically significant; public investment coefficient highly significant.
  - Random effects: both private and public investment found equally important.
- Foreign direct investment: strong evidence that FDI is an important determinant of economic growth in HIPC countries.
- Hausman test: favors the fixed effects model.

### Key empirical findings — PRGF-eligible sample
- Qualitatively similar to HIPC sample: variations in both private and public investment are statistically important in explaining growth variations in fixed and random effects regressions.
- Arellano-Bond first-difference IV estimates: numerically similar to fixed and random effects; only coefficients on labor force growth and political/institutional variable are statistically significant.

### Findings on terms of trade
- Variations in terms of trade (ToT_gs_it) appear to have little impact on economic growth in all three samples:
  - Estimated coefficients enter with expected positive sign but are numerically negligible and statistically insignificant.
- Possible explanations:
  - Aggregating volatility in export/import prices into a single weighted average may mask informative variation.
  - Changes in primary commodity prices may affect considered countries in a similar and partially simultaneous manner, reducing cross-country variation.
  - Investment decisions may be based on expected terms of trade rather than contemporaneous changes, weakening contemporaneous relationships.

### Model performance for Guyana and pooled-differences results
- Fixed effects model fitted to HIPC sample:
  - Guyana’s residuals exhibit comparable variance to most other countries—model characterizes Guyana’s economy reasonably well.
  - Outliers in residual distribution: Guinea Bissau, Malawi, and Sierra Leone.
- Pooled regression in differences (Guyana as numeraire) used to identify reasons for growth differences:
  - (G_gt – G_mt) = c0 + c1 (G_gt-1 – G_mt-1) + c2 (G_gt-2 – G_mt-2) + c3 (ΔLabor_gt - ΔLabor_mt) + c4 (ΔPol_Risk_gt - ΔPol_Risk_mt) + c5 (CF_Private_gt - CF_Private_mt) + c6 (CF_Public_gt - CF_Public_mt) + c7 (FDI_gt - FDI_mt) + c8 (ToT_gs_gt - ToT_gs_mt) + ε_gmt
- Explanatory power of pooled regressions:
  - Model explains R-square = 0.55 of growth rate differences between Guyana and other Caribbean countries.
  - Model explains R-square = 0.41 when comparing Guyana to other HIPC countries.
  - Model explains R-square = 0.33 when comparing Guyana to PRGF-eligible countries.
- Coefficients reported for pooled regressions (Guyana numeraire):
  - (ΔPol_Riskgt – ΔPol_Riskmt): 0.26* (Caribbean), 0.26*** (HIPC), 0.20*** (PRGF-eligible).
  - (CF_Privategt – CF_Privatemt): 0.10 (Caribbean), 0.26*** (HIPC), 0.23*** (PRGF-eligible).
  - (CF_Publicgt – CF_Publicmt): 0.40*** (Caribbean), 0.23*** (HIPC), 0.25*** (PRGF-eligible).
  - (FDIgt – FDImt): 0.50*** (Caribbean), 0.46*** (HIPC), 0.33*** (PRGF-eligible).

### Major findings on Guyana's relative performance and decomposition
- Guyana's economy grew 4.2 percent faster than other Caribbean, other HIPC, and other PRGF-eligible countries, respectively, over the initial period referenced.
- In 1998–2004, the average growth rate in Guyana was 2.5, 3.7, and 3.3 percent below the mean growth rates of comparative groups (Caribbean, HIPC, PRGF-eligible respectively).
- Largest contributors to Guyana’s superior growth in the earlier period:
  - FDI inflows: annual estimated impact averaging 3.7–5.6 percent of additional growth, depending on the control group.
  - Public investment: adding on average another 2.3–4.8 percent to economic growth.
- Drivers of the relative deterioration in 1998–2004:
  - FDI flows: a decline of about 9 percent of GDP in FDI flows relative to the earlier period explains about 3 to 5 percent of the relative deterioration.
  - Domestic private investment: worsening in domestic private investment explains a further 2 to 4 percent of the worsening of the growth differential.
  - Labor force: lagging labor force growth contributed to the 2 to 4 percent worsening noted above.
  - Political and institutional environment: deterioration relative to other countries explains another 0.5 to 1 percent of the relative deterioration.
  - Public capital formation: remained significantly higher relative to peers but insufficient to offset deterioration in other factors.
- Suriname comparison:
  - Qualitative conclusions for Guyana apply to Suriname.
  - Suriname: during 1991–2000 had substantially lower domestic and foreign private investment than other Caribbean countries; post-2001 experienced substantial relative improvements in political stability and private investment.
  - Result: growth rate differentials between Suriname and other Caribbean countries in 2001–2004 are positive and average around 2 percent.

### Quantitative decomposition (selected entries from Tables 6–7)
- Mean level differences (Guyana vs Caribbean):
  - (Ggt-1 – Gmt-1): 5.50 (1991-1997) and -2.51 (1998-2004).
  - (CF_Privategt – CF_Privatemt): -8.71 (1991-1997) and -14.7 (1998-2004).
  - (CF_Publicgt – CF_Publicmt): 12.06 (1991-1997) and 11.63 (1998-2004).
  - (FDIgt – FDImt): 10.59 (1991-1997) and 1.51 (1998-2004).
- Contributions to predicted growth differentials (Guyana vs Caribbean):
  - Actual (Ggt-1 – Gmt-1): 5.50 (1991-1997) predicted 4.88; -2.51 (1998-2004) predicted -1.47.
  - Contribution of (FDIgt – FDImt): 5.29 (1991-1997) and 0.56 (1998-2004).
  - Contribution of (CF_Publicgt – CF_Publicmt): 4.83 (1991-1997) and 5.18 (1998-2004).
  - Contribution of (CF_Privategt – CF_Privatemt): -0.87 (1991-1997) and -1.45 (1998-2004).
  - Contribution of (ΔPol_Riskgt – ΔPol_Riskmt): 0.33 (1991-1997) and -0.16 (1998-2004).
  - Contribution of (ΔLaborgt – ΔLabormt): -0.17 (1991-1997) and -0.45 (1998-2004).

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Revitalizing private investment—domestic and foreign—is key for restoring sustained economic growth in Guyana.
- Increasing private sector investment will require significant improvements in the investment climate.
- Strengthening political stability, governance, and institutional quality should be a priority, as improvements in these areas generate high returns in terms of future economic growth.
- Public investment alone, even when substantially higher than peers, is insufficient to offset deterioration in private investment, labor dynamics, and political/institutional quality.

### Appendix I — Growth accounting and data (model and data specifics)
- Production and measurement assumptions
  - Production function with constant returns to scale and Hicks neutral technology used to estimate discrete-time Solow residual.
  - GDP growth rates from World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database at constant 1988 prices (W366NGDPR).
  - Labor proxied by population from International Financial Statistics (33699Z..ZF... F); population growth rates used as proxy for labor force growth.
  - Investment data from WEO: gross public fixed capital formation (W316NFIG) and gross private fixed capital formation (W316NFIP); series expressed as ratios to GDP. Domestic private investment ratios redefined net of foreign direct investment.
  - FDI data: net foreign investment excluding debt-creating liabilities (W311BFDIX), expressed as ratios to GDP.
  - Political/institutional environment proxied by first difference of the ICRG Composite Political Risk Index (index ranges 0–100; component weights listed in source).
  - Terms of trade from WEO (W311TT); indices reach 100 percent in year 2000; variable defined as percentage change in the reported index.
- Capital accounting specifics
  - Perpetual inventory: K_{t+1} = (1 - d) K_t + I_{t+1}
  - Depreciation rate d = 4 percent per annum.
  - Initial capital stock example: G$16.06 billion in 1990 prices (Weisman (2003) approach referenced).
  - Capital share of GDP = 0.5 (consistent with Sendhadji (2000) and other referenced ranges).
- Limitations reiterated
  - Quality changes in labor and capital ignored, which tends to overestimate Solow residual.
  - Migration effects and emigration not fully captured by population proxy.
- Robustness exercise (Appendix II summary)
  - Sensitivity tests vary initial capital stock (10, 16, 20, 25 billion Guyanese Dollars, 1990 prices) and capital share of GDP (0.3 to 0.6).
  - Results: qualitative conclusions robust; capital and labor accumulation explain some deterioration post-1998 but other factors contributed favorably in 1991–1997 and negatively in 1998–2004.

*Source: _wp0786 - 1. Average Annual Economic Growth in Selected Countries; Appendix I. Growth Accounting and Data.*

### 1. Average Annual Economic Growth in Selected Countries.................................................15

### 1. Average Annual Economic Growth in Selected Countries

### Introduction
- With the transition from a socialist-inward looking economic model to a market oriented one in the early 1990s, growth in Guyana took off sharply.
- Average growth fell from 7.1 percent during 1991–97, to 0.6 percent in 1998–2004, leaving Guyana well behind the Caribbean region and among the lowest growth rates for HIPCs and PRGF-eligible countries.
- The evolution of growth in Guyana is described as radically different from that of other countries that embarked on large scale liberalization programs.

### Stylized facts and context
- Privatization and initial recovery
  - More than 80 percent of government assets were privatized or liquidated between 1990-1994, with only sugar, public utilities, and one commercial bank remaining public.
  - Initial reforms were accompanied by a dramatic increase in foreign direct investment and very rapid economic growth.
- Export concentration and market access
  - The share of the five main export commodities—sugar, gold, rice, timber and bauxite—declined from over 80 percent in 1991 to about 75 percent in 2004.
  - Lack of large deep-sea port facilities and limited air transportation routes constrained diversification.
- Labor and credit constraints
  - Emigration, especially among the highly educated, was very high and accelerated in the late 1990s, producing shortages of skilled workers and a severe brain drain.
  - Nonperforming loans (NPLs) increased from 12 percent in 1996 to a peak of 38 percent in 2001 before declining to about 18 percent in 2004; this contributed to a dramatic decline in private sector credit.
- Infrastructure and utilities
  - Only 7.4 percent of roads are paved.
  - Electricity transmission and distribution losses are about 42 percent of the output; electricity production is highly inefficient and costly, service is unreliable.
  - Water services are expensive and insufficient; telecommunications are relatively better developed but expensive due to near-monopoly.
- Regulatory and institutional environment
  - Regulatory framework remained complex and centralized; enforceability of laws is low and the court system is slow with a large backlog.
  - Acquisition of land for investment remains lengthy and costly; most land remains in government hands.
  - Failed privatization of the public electricity company (privatized in 1999; ownership reverted to government in 2003) negatively affected the investment climate.
  - Some progress: Investment Act, Small Business Bill, establishment of a commercial court.
- Political and security deterioration
  - Longstanding political tensions between the two main political parties increased instability in the latter part of the 1990s, including violent protests after the December 1997 and 2001 elections.
  - A lengthy civil servants strike occurred in 1999; organized crime increased, particularly in 2002-2003.

### Measurement caveats
- GDP measurement issues
  - National accounts are based on the 1988 pre-reform production pattern, underreporting the expansion of the private sector and growth in services; large informal sector not fully accounted for (one estimate cited: about 40 percent; others suggest up to 60 percent of GDP).
  - These data problems imply an increasing underestimation of GDP and GDP growth, which could make the decline between periods appear less sharp but do not explain the break in trend.
- Capital measurement issues
  - A significant part of public investment may be maintenance/repair rather than productive capital.
  - Recent public capital spending increasingly directed to social investment (schools, hospitals), which may overstate productive capital in the short run.
  - Increased spending on security may further overstate productive capital.

### Growth accounting: methodology
- Solow residual (TFP) is computed as a function of growth in real GDP, labor, and capital.
- Data sources and proxies:
  - GDP growth rates: Gross Domestic Product at constant prices from the World Economic database.
  - Labor supply proxied by population from the International Financial Statistics database.
  - Capital stock estimated using gross fixed capital formation at current prices from the World Economic Outlook via the perpetual inventory method.
- Caveats:
  - Inability to account for migration effects likely overstates labor supply.
  - Likelihood that capital is smaller than estimated implies the Solow residual (TFP) may be overestimated.

### Growth accounting: key quantitative findings
- Average growth decomposition for 1991–2004:
  - Average growth rate: 3.9 percent.
  - Contribution from increase in labor force: 0.1 percent.
  - Contribution from capital: 3.9 percent.
  - Contribution from all other factors (Solow residual/TFP and others): approximately 1.8 percent.
- Changes between subperiods:
  - Labor force growth declined from 0.6 percent during 1991–1997 to –0.4 percent in 1998–2004.
  - Capital accumulation fell from 5.8 percent in 1991–1997 to bellow 2 percent in 1998–2004.
- The large change in TFP between the two periods (Figure 5 in the source) indicates that beyond changes in labor and capital accumulation, other significant factors affected economic performance.

### Regression-based analysis and main determinants (summary from the chapter)
- The paper’s panel and pooled-difference regressions attribute the slowdown to multiple factors:
  - Steep falls in investment and labor (including emigration effects).
  - Deterioration of the political and institutional environment relative to other countries.
  - Other country-specific adverse domestic and external developments compounded the decline.

### Overall conclusions
- Much of the slowdown can be explained by declining growth rates in factor accumulation (labor and capital), consistent with massive emigration and dramatic slowdown in foreign and domestic investment.
- A significant portion of the decline is not explained by factor accumulation: changes in TFP and deterioration in political/institutional conditions played an important role.
- Measurement issues (underestimation of GDP and overestimation of capital) complicate precise attribution but do not fully account for the magnitude and persistence of the slowdown.

*Source: _wp0786 - 1. Average Annual Economic Growth in Selected Countries*

### Appendix I provides a more detailed discussion of the model and the data.

### _wp0786 - Appendix I provides a more detailed discussion of the model and the data.

### Regression-based analysis: purpose and approach
- Aim: show that the decline in growth rates between the first (1991–1997) and second (1998–2004) sub-periods was largely the result of adverse exogenous shocks (including a decline in terms of trade) and a deterioration of the political and institutional environment, but that a significant unexplained decline in growth remains.
- Data limitation: only 14 annual observations for 1991–2004 for Guyana; to increase information the analysis uses a panel framework including Guyana and other Caribbean, HIPC, and PRGF-eligible countries.
- Rationale for panel: captures both cross-country differences and within-country changes over time, permitting estimation with fixed and random effects and discrimination via the Hausman test.

### Model specification and variables
- Growth equation (AR(2) structure) used to explain economic growth rates G_it:
  - Git = b0 Git-1 + b1 Git-2 + b2 ΔLabor_it + b3 ΔPol_Risk_it + b4 CF_Private_it + b5 CF_Public_it + b6 FDI_it + b7 ToT_gs_it + ε_it  (equation (1))
- Key regressors and definitions:
  - ΔPol_Risk_it: change in the ICRG Political Risk Index (political and institutional climate).
  - ToT_gs_it: variations in terms of trade for goods and services.
  - CF_Private_it: private capital formation defined as total private investment net of FDI (domestic private component).
  - CF_Public_it: public capital formation.
  - FDI_it: foreign direct investment flows.
  - ΔLabor_it: fluctuations in labor force growth (inclusion critical given Guyana’s significant emigration).
- Model assumption: aside from listed factors, economic growth rates follow an AR(2) process.
- Data specifics and limitations: absence of reliable data for education and health system quality prevents their inclusion; Appendix I describes data specifics.

### Estimation methods and endogeneity considerations
- Estimators used:
  - Fixed effects and random effects panel models.
  - Arellano and Bond (1991) first-difference instrumental variable estimator with two lags used to address bias from inclusion of lagged dependent variables.
- Treatment of potential endogeneity:
  - Political/institutional evolution, private/public investments, and FDI are treated as exogenous following existing literature, acknowledging real-world interconnections.
  - Simultaneity bias assessed as weak due to low correlations among these variables in the sample (Table 4 reports correlations for the HIPC sample; Caribbean and PRGF samples show similar correlations).

### Sample composition and scope
- Caribbean sample: limited by availability of ICRG Political Risk Index; includes Suriname, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago (note: sample described as heterogeneous in macro fundamentals and initial conditions).
- HIPC completion point countries listed in the source include: Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
- PRGF-eligible countries: a subset closer to Guyana in structural features (specific list limited by ICRG availability as noted).

### Key empirical findings — Caribbean sample
- Fixed effects model:
  - Little evidence of an autoregressive structure of economic growth rates.
  - Most explained variation captured by cross-country differences in institutional and political stability and by variations in private domestic and foreign investment.
  - Overall fit: model explains approximately 30 percent of variations in economic growth rates.
- Random effects model:
  - Explains almost 40 percent of economic growth variations.
  - Predicts a strong autoregressive pattern in economic growth.
  - Coefficient for private domestic capital formation is insignificant.
- Hausman test:
  - p-value essentially zero, favoring fixed effects model estimates over random effects.

### Key empirical findings — HIPC sample
- Political stability and institutional quality are important determinants of economic growth.
- Strong statistical dependency of economic performance on variations of labor-force growth rates.
- Public capital formation contributes significantly to higher economic growth:
  - Fixed effects: private capital formation coefficient not statistically significant; public investment coefficient highly significant and expected to strongly influence economic growth.
  - Random effects: both private and public investment found equally important.
- Foreign direct investment: strong evidence that FDI is an important determinant of economic growth in HIPC countries.
- Hausman test: favors the fixed effects model.

### Key empirical findings — PRGF-eligible sample
- Qualitatively similar to HIPC sample: variations in both private and public investment are statistically important in explaining growth variations in fixed and random effects regressions.
- Arellano-Bond first-difference IV estimates: numerically similar to fixed and random effects; only coefficients on labor force growth and political/institutional variable are statistically significant.

### Finding on terms of trade
- Variations in terms of trade (ToT_gs_it) appear to have little impact on economic growth in all three samples:
  - Estimated coefficients enter with expected positive sign but are numerically negligible and statistically insignificant.
- Possible explanations provided:
  - Aggregating volatility in export/import prices into a single weighted average may mask informative variation.
  - Changes in primary commodity prices may affect considered countries in a similar and partially simultaneous manner, reducing cross-country variation.
  - Investment decisions may be based on expected terms of trade rather than contemporaneous changes, weakening contemporaneous relationships.

### Model performance for Guyana and cross-country residuals
- Fixed effects model fitted to HIPC sample:
  - Figure 6 (described) plots country-specific residuals; Guyana’s residuals exhibit comparable variance to most other countries—model characterizes Guyana’s economy reasonably well.
  - Outliers in residual distribution: Guinea Bissau, Malawi, and Sierra Leone.
  - Qualitatively similar residual results obtained for Caribbean and PRGF-eligible samples.
- Pooled regression in differences used to identify reasons for growth differences between Guyana and comparison countries:
  - (G_gt – G_mt) = c0 + c1 (G_gt-1 – G_mt-1) + c2 (G_gt-2 – G_mt-2) + c3 (ΔLabor_gt - ΔLabor_mt) + c4 (ΔPol_Risk_gt - ΔPol_Risk_mt) + c5 (CF_Private_gt - CF_Private_mt) + c6 (CF_Public_gt - CF_Public_mt) + c7 (FDI_gt - FDI_mt) + c8 (ToT_gs_gt - ToT_gs_mt) + ε_gmt  (equation (2))
  - Subscripts g and m denote Guyana and a comparison country respectively.
- Explanatory power of pooled regressions (Table 5 summarized):
  - Model explains 55 percent (R-square) of growth rate differences between Guyana and other Caribbean countries.
  - Model explains R-square = 0.41 when comparing Guyana to other HIPC countries.
  - Model explains R-square = 0.33 when comparing Guyana to PRGF-eligible countries.
- Interpretation:
  - Cross-country differences in political/institutional environment evolution, labor force dynamics, domestic private/public capital formation, and FDI flows explain a substantial part of the differentials between Guyana’s economic growth and other countries.
  - Tables referenced (Table 6 and Table 7) report mean differences in growth rates, differences in determinants, and average contributions of those determinants to predicted growth differences.

### Summary of methodological caveats and robustness
- Potential endogeneity of political/institutional variables, investments, and FDI acknowledged; treated as exogenous in main estimations but tested via Arellano-Bond IV estimator.
- Simultaneity bias judged weak due to low correlations among regressors in the sample (Table 4 evidence).
- Data limitations: restricted availability of the ICRG Political Risk Index constrains country samples; absence of reliable education and health quality variables limits model scope.

*Source: _wp0786 - Appendix I provides a more detailed discussion of the model and the data.*

### 4.2 percent faster than other Caribbean, other HIPC, and other PRGF-eligible countries,

### _wp0786 - 4.2 percent faster than other Caribbean, other HIPC, and other PRGF-eligible countries,

### Major findings on Guyana's growth performance
- Guyana's economy grew 4.2 percent faster than other Caribbean, other HIPC, and other PRGF-eligible countries, respectively, over the initial period referenced.
- In 1998–2004, the average growth rate in Guyana was 2.5, 3.7, and 3.3 percent below the mean growth rates of comparative groups (Caribbean, HIPC, PRGF-eligible respectively).
- The largest contributors to Guyana’s superior growth in the earlier period were:
  - FDI inflows: annual estimated impact averaging 3.7–5.6 percent of additional growth, depending on the control group.
  - Public investment: adding on average another 2.3–4.8 percent to economic growth.
- These positive contributions were sufficient to offset negative impacts from lower labor force growth and lower rates of domestic private investment in the earlier period.

### Drivers of the relative deterioration in 1998–2004
- FDI flows: a large decrease in FDI flows in the second half of the period — a decline of about 9 percent of GDP relative to the earlier period — explains about 3 to 5 percent in the relative deterioration between the two periods.
- Domestic private investment: dramatic worsening in the accumulation of domestic private investment explains a further 2 to 4 percent of the worsening of the growth differential (together with labor force).
- Labor force: further lagging in labor force growth contributed to the 2 to 4 percent worsening noted above.
- Political and institutional environment: deterioration relative to other countries explains another 0.5 to 1 percent of the relative deterioration.
- Public capital formation: rates remained significantly higher relative to the three control groups but were insufficient to offset the deterioration in other factors.

### Suriname comparison and generality of results
- The qualitative conclusions from Guyana apply to Suriname: weaker growth performance in the earlier sub-period is explained by relatively worse performance in the five key areas (labor dynamics, political/institutional environment, domestic public and private investment, and FDI).
- Suriname specifics:
  - During 1991–2000, Suriname had substantially lower rates of domestic and foreign private investment than observed on average in other Caribbean countries.
  - Post-2001, Suriname experienced substantial relative improvements in political stability and private investment.
  - Despite relatively lower public capital formation, these positive developments appear sufficient to generate higher economic growth: growth rate differentials between Suriname and other Caribbean countries in 2001–2004 are positive and average around 2 percent.

### Econometric evidence (high-level)
- Pooled regressions in differences net out unobserved regional/structural factors common to the numeraire and comparison countries.
- Cross-country panel regressions (Caribbean, HIPC, PRGF-eligible samples) find:
  - ΔPol_Riskt, CF_Privatet, CF_Publict, and FDIt enter with positive and often statistically significant coefficients across specifications.
  - Arellano-Bond (differences) estimates reported for dynamic specifications; Sargan and autocorrelation test results available upon request.
- Pooled regressions in differences with Guyana as numeraire (Table 5) report statistically significant positive coefficients for:
  - (ΔPol_Riskgt – ΔPol_Riskmt): 0.26* (Caribbean), 0.26*** (HIPC), 0.20*** (PRGF-eligible).
  - (CF_Privategt – CF_Privatemt): 0.10 (Caribbean), 0.26*** (HIPC), 0.23*** (PRGF-eligible).
  - (CF_Publicgt – CF_Publicmt): 0.40*** (Caribbean), 0.23*** (HIPC), 0.25*** (PRGF-eligible).
  - (FDIgt – FDImt): 0.50*** (Caribbean), 0.46*** (HIPC), 0.33*** (PRGF-eligible).
- R2 values for these pooled regressions: 0.55 (Caribbean, Guyana numeraire), 0.41 (HIPC), 0.33 (PRGF-eligible).

### Quantitative decomposition of mean differences (Tables 6–7)
- Average differences in levels between Guyana and comparison groups (selected entries):
  - (Ggt-1 – Gmt-1): 5.50 (1991-1997, Guyana vs Caribbean) and -2.51 (1998-2004, Guyana vs Caribbean).
  - (CF_Privategt – CF_Privatemt): -8.71 (1991-1997) and -14.7 (1998-2004) for Guyana vs Caribbean.
  - (CF_Publicgt – CF_Publicmt): 12.06 (1991-1997) and 11.63 (1998-2004) for Guyana vs Caribbean.
  - (FDIgt – FDImt): 10.59 (1991-1997) and 1.51 (1998-2004) for Guyana vs Caribbean.
- Contributions to predicted growth differentials (percent contributions) for Guyana vs Caribbean:
  - Actual (Ggt-1 – Gmt-1): 5.50 (1991-1997) predicted 4.88; -2.51 (1998-2004) predicted -1.47.
  - Contribution of (FDIgt – FDImt): 5.29 (1991-1997) and 0.56 (1998-2004).
  - Contribution of (CF_Publicgt – CF_Publicmt): 4.83 (1991-1997) and 5.18 (1998-2004).
  - Contribution of (CF_Privategt – CF_Privatemt): -0.87 (1991-1997) and -1.45 (1998-2004).
  - Contribution of (ΔPol_Riskgt – ΔPol_Riskmt): 0.33 (1991-1997) and -0.16 (1998-2004).
  - Contribution of (ΔLaborgt – ΔLabormt): -0.17 (1991-1997) and -0.45 (1998-2004).

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Revitalizing private investment—domestic and foreign—is key for restoring sustained economic growth in Guyana.
- Increasing private sector investment will require significant improvements in the investment climate.
- Strengthening political stability, governance, and institutional quality should be a priority, as improvements in these areas generate high returns in terms of future economic growth.
- Public investment alone, even when substantially higher than peers, is insufficient to offset deterioration in private investment, labor dynamics, and political/institutional quality.

*Source: _wp0786 - 4.2 percent faster than other Caribbean, other HIPC, and other PRGF-eligible countries, (excerpts from the provided PDF content).*

### APPENDIX I. GROWTH ACCOUNTING AND DATA

### APPENDIX I. GROWTH ACCOUNTING AND DATA

### The Growth Accounting Model
- Assumes a production function with constant returns to scale and Hicks neutral technology, yielding a discrete time estimate of the growth rate of the Solow residual.
- GDP growth rates are calculated from data on Gross Domestic Product at constant 1988 prices reported in the World Economic Outlook database.
- Labor input:
  - In the absence of data on the labor force and emigration, population data from the International Financial Statistics database is used as a proxy variable.
  - The work force is assumed to be affected in an equivalent way as the general public by net birth and net emigration.
  - Note: Migration effects may be biased toward underestimation due to omitted effects on both the quantity of the labor force and on the quality of migrating workers.
- Capital input:
  - For investment, World Economic Outlook data on gross fixed capital formation at current prices, deflated by the GDP deflator, is used.
  - Capital stock is calculated by the perpetual inventory method:
    - K_{t+1} = (1 - d) K_t + I_{t+1} (equation as presented in source)
  - The rate of depreciation is assumed to be 4 percent per annum.
    - This rate is used by Weisman (2003) as well as Senhadji (2000) and is consistent with estimates of the consumption of fixed capital in the national accounts compiled by the Bureau of Statistics for Guyana.
  - Initial capital stock assumption:
    - Following Weisman (2003) approach, the capital stock in the year 1990 reaches G$16.06 billion in 1990 prices.
    - Weisman (2003) uses 1951 as the base year and assumes an arbitrary amount of the capital stock of G$ 200 million (or G$ 9.8 billion in 1990 prices), and indicates the series is not sensitive to the initial capital stock level because over time it depreciates to zero.
  - The capital share of GDP is assumed to be 0.5.
    - This is broadly consistent with estimates by Sendhadji (2000) of 0.55 for 66 countries, and of 0.24 to 0.81 estimated for Latin American countries.
- Limitations:
  - Changes in the quality of labor and capital are ignored because of data constraints.
  - This lack of differentiation concerning the quality of labor (e.g., by level of education) and capital (e.g., long-lived vs short-lived capital) would tend to overestimate the Solow residual.

### Data
- GDP growth:
  - Growth Rates for Guyana (Figure A1) and other Caribbean, HIPC, and PRGF countries were calculated from data on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at constant 1988 prices from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database (W366NGDPR).
- Labor force proxy:
  - Labor Force size was proxied by population data from the International Financial Statistics (33699Z..ZF... F).
  - Population growth rates are used as a proxy for the growth rate of the labor force (Figure A2).
- Domestic investment:
  - Data from the World Economic Outlook on gross public fixed capital formation (W316NFIG) and gross private fixed capital formation (W316NFIP).
  - These series are redefined to be expressed as ratios to GDP (Figure A3).
  - Domestic private investment ratios used in the analysis are further redefined to be expressed net of foreign direct investment.
- Foreign direct investment:
  - Data on Foreign Direct Investment are taken from the World Economic Outlook Database.
  - Net foreign investment excluding debt-creating liabilities (W311BFDIX) is used.
  - FDI data are redefined to be expressed as ratios to GDP (Figure A4).
- Political and institutional environment:
  - Proxied by a Composite Political Risk Index constructed by the ICRG Risk Rating System.
  - The ICRG index varies between zero and one hundred and is created by assigning risk points to a pre-set group of factors with these component weights:
    - Government Stability (12 points)
    - Socioeconomic Conditions (12 points)
    - Investment Profile (12 points)
    - Internal Conflict (12 points)
    - External Conflict (12 points)
    - Corruption (6 points)
    - Military in Politics (6 points)
    - Religion in Politics (6 points)
    - Law and Order (6 points)
    - Ethnic Tensions (6 points)
    - Democratic Accountability (6 points)
    - Bureaucracy Quality (4 points)
  - The variable used in the analysis is the first difference of the ICRG Composite Political Risk Index (Figure A5).
- Terms of trade:
  - Data on Terms of Trade are from the World Economic Outlook database - terms of trade for goods and services (W311TT).
  - These series consist of indices reaching 100 percent in the year 2000.
  - Terms of trade are defined as the price deflator for exports of goods and services over the price deflator of imports of goods and services.
  - The terms of trade variable is defined as the percentage change in the reported index.

### Robustness Exercise (Appendix II)
- Purpose: Test sensitivity of growth accounting results to assumed initial capital stock and to the assumed capital share of GDP.
- Initial capital stock sensitivity:
  - Average Solow residuals for both sub-samples are reported when initial capital stock takes values of 10, 16, 20, and 25 billion Guyanese Dollars (in 1990 prices).
  - Figure A6 shows Solow residuals for 1991-1997 and 1998-2004 across these initial capital stock values.
- Capital share sensitivity:
  - Average Solow residuals for the two sub-periods computed with a capital share of GDP varying from 0.3 to 0.6.
  - Figure A7 shows Solow residuals for 1991-1997 and 1998-2004 across these capital share values.
- Robustness conclusions:
  - For both robustness exercises, the general results are qualitatively similar to the original results.
  - While capital and labor accumulation is capable of explaining some part of growth deterioration in the post-1998 period, other factors have contributed favorably to economic performance of Guyana’s economy in 1991–1997 and negatively in 1998–2004.

*Source: APPENDIX I. GROWTH ACCOUNTING AND DATA (as provided).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/_wp0786.pdf_
