## _wp0788

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---

### I. INTRODUCTION — key findings and observations
- Indexes of de jure CBA calculated for 163 central banks, representing 181 countries, as of end-2003.
- Comparable indexes constructed for a subgroup of 68 central banks as of the end of the 1980s.
- Cross-country/time-series lessons:
  - Central banks in advanced economies continue to enjoy greater CBA than those in emerging markets and developing countries.
  - At the end of 2003, all country groups exhibit a higher level of CBA than that reached by advanced economies in the late 1980s.
  - Vast majority of central banks mandated to set price stability as one of the objectives of monetary policy.
  - Most central banks: autonomy to set the policy rate and not required to extend direct credit to the government.
  - Divergence on financial supervision: many emerging market and developing-country central banks retain key supervisory roles; some large advanced countries also retain involvement.
  - Central bank laws often prescribe financial system soundness as an objective subordinated to medium-term price stability.
  - Participation in currency unions (examples: ESCB, BCEAO, BEAC, ECCB) has helped enhance autonomy.
- Forward-looking challenge:
  - Primary challenge is to further boost political autonomy by ensuring governing bodies are appointed with less political interference and for longer terms.

### II. METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING CENTRAL BANK AUTONOMY — framework and samples
- Measures used:
  - GMT (1991): distinguishes political (eight criteria) and economic (seven criteria) autonomy.
  - Cukierman (1992): sixteen criteria focusing on CEO provisions, policy formulation/objectives, and limitations on central bank lending to government.
- Sample/index construction:
  - Late 1980s assessment: GMT full index for 18 OECD countries ("full index"); Cukierman data converted into GMT for remaining 50 countries ("narrow index").
  - End-2003 assessment: relies on the "full index".
  - Results standardized by dividing absolute values by maximum potential score.
- Caveat:
  - Conversion of Cukierman’s data into GMT narrow index introduces qualifications for long-run comparisons (see Appendix Table 7 for mapping details).

### III. SNAPSHOT: LATE 1980s (selected summary statistics)
- Sample composition (late 1980s): 68 central banks — 25 advanced economies, 22 emerging markets, 21 developing countries.
- Selected scores (Table 2, late 1980s):
  - GMT Sample (full index, 18 CB): Political 0.36, Economic 0.59, Overall 0.48.
  - Cukierman Sample (narrow index, 50 CB): Political 0.28, Economic 0.39, Overall 0.33.
  - Advanced (GMT sample): Political 0.36, Economic 0.59, Overall 0.48.
  - Advanced (Cukierman sample, 7 CB): Political 0.33, Economic 0.21, Overall 0.28.
  - Emerging (Cukierman sample, 22 CB): Political 0.27, Economic 0.38, Overall 0.32.
  - Developing (Cukierman sample, 21 CB): Political 0.27, Economic 0.45, Overall 0.35.
- Qualitative points:
  - Overall autonomy generally below 0.50.
  - Economic autonomy exceeded political autonomy.
  - Advanced economies highest overall autonomy; Euro-area countries showed relatively lower autonomy within advanced group.
  - Developing countries slightly higher overall autonomy than emerging markets (when including economies in transition).

### IV. ASSESSMENT: END-2003 (selected aggregates and country-group results)
- Sample (end-2003): 163 central banks — 28 advanced economies, 32 emerging markets, 103 developing countries; combined historical coverage 181 countries.
- Aggregate scores (selected entries from Table 2, 2003):
  - All CB (163): 2003 (full index) Political 0.49, Economic 0.68, Overall 0.59.
  - GMT Sample (18): 2003 (full index) Political 0.74, Economic 0.81, Overall 0.77.
  - Cukierman Sample (50): 2003 (full index) Political 0.66, Economic 0.42, Overall 0.73.
  - Advanced (All CB, 28): 2003 (full index) Political 0.70, Economic 0.81, Overall 0.75.
  - ESCB (13): 2003 (full index) Political 1.00, Economic 0.78, Overall 0.89.
  - Emerging Markets (All CB, 32): 2003 (full index) Political 0.56, Economic 0.75, Overall 0.65.
  - Developing Countries (All CB, 103): 2003 (full index) Political 0.41, Economic 0.63, Overall 0.52.
  - Monetary Unions (3): 2003 (full index) Political 0.54, Economic 0.79, Overall 0.67.
- Cross-country observations:
  - Average CBA across income groups now exceed 0.50.
  - Political autonomy shows larger cross-country dispersion than economic autonomy.
  - Some advanced economies in Asia and the Pacific score low on political autonomy.
  - Central banks in monetary unions register substantially higher autonomy (ESCB near-maximum).

### V. SUBCOMPONENTS — political and economic autonomy (percent satisfying criteria)
- Political autonomy (Table 3) — overall sample percentages:
  - (1) governor appointed without government involvement: 34%
  - (2) governor appointed for more than five years: 40%
  - (3) CBB appointed without government involvement: 31%
  - (4) CBB appointed for more than five years: 38%
  - (5) no mandatory participation of government representatives in CBB: 47%
  - (6) no government approval required for monetary policy formulation: 54%
  - (7) monetary stability is one of CB’s primary objectives: 95%
  - (8) legal protection strengthens CB position in event of conflict: 50%
- Political autonomy by group (selected):
  - Advanced Economies: (1) 57% (2) 71% (3) 57% (4) 64% (5) 75% (6) 64% (7) 96% (8) 75%
  - Emerging Markets: (1) 41% (2) 44% (3) 44% (4) 50% (5) 47% (6) 63% (7) 97% (8) 63%
  - Developing Countries: (1) 26% (2) 30% (3) 20% (4) 27% (5) 40% (6) 49% (7) 94% (8) 39%
- Economic autonomy (Table 4) — overall sample percentages:
  - (1) no automatic CB credit to govt.: 91%
  - (2) when available, credit at market rates: 66%
  - (3) credit is temporary: 93%
  - (4) limited amount: 91%
  - (5) CB does not bid in primary market: 59%
  - (6) CB sets policy rate: 88%
  - (7) CB shares supervisory responsibilities (one point): 23%
  - (7bis) CB has no responsibility (two points): 18%
- Economic autonomy by group (selected):
  - Advanced Economies: (1) 93% (2) 89% (3) 93% (4) 93% (5) 89% (6) 100% (7) 18% (7bis) 57%
  - Emerging Markets: (1) 97% (2) 75% (3) 97% (4) 94% (5) 81% (6) 94% (7) 25% (7bis) 19%
  - Developing Countries: (1) 89% (2) 56% (3) 91% (4) 90% (5) 44% (6) 94% (7) 24% (7bis) 7%
- Interpretation highlights:
  - Few governments have automatic access to central bank credit.
  - Many developing-country central banks participate in primary government securities markets, posing inflation risks in some cases.
  - Most central banks set policy rates freely.
  - Outside advanced economies, many central banks retain supervisory responsibilities.

### VI. REGIONAL PATTERNS (end-2003; selected values from Table 5)
- Aggregate All (end-2003 averages): Political 0.49 / Economic 0.68 / Overall 0.59.
- Selected regional entries (All / Adv. / Emer. / Dev. where given):
  - AFR: Political All 0.33 ; Economic All 0.60 ; Overall All 0.47.
  - APD: Political All 0.35 / Adv. 0.27 / Emer. 0.44 / Dev. 0.34 ; Economic All 0.60 / Adv. 0.67 / Emer. 0.67 / Dev. 0.55 ; Overall All 0.47 / Adv. 0.47 / Emer. 0.55 / Dev. 0.44
  - EUR: Political All 0.79 / Adv. 0.85 / Emer. 0.73 / Dev. 0.79 ; Economic All 0.80 / Adv. 0.84 / Emer. 0.81 / Dev. 0.68 ; Overall All 0.85
  - MCD: Political All 0.45 ; Economic All 0.63 ; Overall All 0.54.
  - WHD: Political All 0.40 / Adv. 0.50 / Emer. 0.54 / Dev. 0.36 ; Economic All 0.73 / Adv. 0.88 / Emer. 0.83 / Dev. 0.69 ; Overall All 0.69
- Regional observations:
  - Europe shows the highest political and economic autonomy.
  - Emerging markets: lowest overall CBA in MCD and AFR.
  - Among developing countries, APD and AFR rank lowest on average.

### VII. DEVELOPMENTS OVER TIME — trends and regional changes
- Global/group-level trends:
  - Average CBA scores for global sample increased significantly; overall CBA has about doubled from late 1980s to 2003.
  - Economic autonomy remains ahead of political autonomy.
  - Emerging markets more than doubled overall CBA; developing countries saw significant gains in economic autonomy but only marginal political autonomy gains (per Cukierman sample).
- Quadrant shifts:
  - All groups shifted upward/right in economic vs political autonomy space.
  - Advanced economies: uniform shift concentrated in top-right quadrant.
  - Emerging and developing countries: greater dispersion; 2003 scores generally to the right of advanced-economy late-1980s scores.
- Regional (Table 6 — Cukierman sample, narrow index averages, 1980s → 2003):
  - AFR: Political 0.17 → 0.37 ; Economic 0.52 → 0.72 ; Overall 0,33 → 0,53
  - APD: Political 0.21 → 0.54 ; Economic 0.41 → 0.73 ; Overall 0,30 → 0,63
  - EUR: Political 0.32 → 0.79 ; Economic 0.27 → 0.98 ; Overall 0,30 → 0,88
  - MCD: Political 0.25 → 0.40 ; Economic 0.36 → 0.68 ; Overall 0,30 → 0,53
  - WHD: Political 0.36 → 0.50 ; Economic 0.36 → 0.88 ; Overall 0,36 → 0,67
  - All: Political 0.28 → 0.56 ; Economic 0.38 → 0.84 ; Overall 0,32 → 2003 0,68
- Regional interpretation:
  - Europe gained greatly in both political and economic autonomy.
  - Western Hemisphere progress concentrated in economic autonomy.
  - Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East and Central Asia saw relatively modest gains.

### VIII. CENTRAL BANK AUTONOMY AND INFLATION — empirical results (emerging markets)
- Econometric framework:
  - Probit model: probability of "good inflation performance" (annual inflation below 10 percent) as function of determinants: trade openness, inflation in advanced economies, fiscal balance/financial depth, exchange rate regime, and CBA measures.
  - Sample: 24 emerging market economies, 1960–2004, five-year averages; explanatory variables lagged by one period (except specification (2) where fiscal balance/financial depth is contemporaneous).
- Main probit results (Table 7; selected coefficients and significance):
  - CBA coefficients: specification (1) 0.57* ; specification (2) 0.73** ; specification (4) 0.37.
  - TOR (turnover of central bank governors): specification (3) -5.9 ; specification (4) -2.2.
  - Openness: ranges 0.61** to 0.95*** across specifications.
  - Fiscal balance/Financial depth: reported variably 0.21, 0.53*, 0.07, 0.16 across specs.
  - Inflation in advanced economies: -7.29***, -6.1***, -9.44***, -9.27*** (all highly significant negative effects).
  - Pegged exchange rate regime: 57.4***, 51.1***, 53.8***, 49.0** (large positive effects).
  - Observations by specification: (1) 107 ; (2) 111 ; (3) 85 ; (4) 78.
- Interpretation and magnitudes (authors’ stated interpretation):
  - Greater de jure CBA helps keep inflation low: moving from no autonomy to full autonomy increases likelihood of low inflation by about 50 percent in probit interpretation.
  - An average increase in autonomy for emerging markets from 0.3 to about 0.7 implies an average increase in the likelihood of low inflation by about 20 percentage points (authors’ calculation).
  - CBA and TOR are correlated; including both attenuates coefficients, leaving some ambiguity on comparative statistical dominance.
- Model notes:
  - "All data are five-year averages. Explanatory variables are lagged by one period (i.e. by one five-year average), except in specification (2) where the fiscal balance/financial depth ratio is contemporaneous."
  - Significance notation: "*** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent."

### IX. POLICY-RELEVANT FINDINGS, PRINCIPLES, AND SEQUENCING
- Consensus views — four principles:
  - Principle 1: Set price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy.
    - Almost all central banks legally obliged to pursue price stability; priority status common.
  - Principle 2: Curtail direct lending to governments.
    - Most laws limit unrestricted credit; when allowed, credit should be temporary, limited, and priced at market rates; widespread ban on CB participation in primary public debt markets in recent legislation.
  - Principle 3: Ensure full autonomy for setting the policy rate.
    - Most central banks have full autonomy to set short-term interbank policy rates; autonomy over instrument design is a corollary.
  - Principle 4: Ensure no government involvement in policy formulation.
    - No government approval should be required; conflict-resolution procedures are important complements.
- Role of central banks in bank supervision (departure from literature):
  - Many emerging market and developing-country central banks retain supervisory roles; rationale includes availability of skilled staff and desire to "piggyback" on CB autonomy.
  - Evidence (Arnone and Gambini, 2007) suggests higher compliance with Basel Core Principles where supervision is integrated; some results favor placing integrated supervision inside central bank.
  - Compatibility argument: price stability and financial stability may be compatible long-term if central bank has clear objectives, high autonomy and accountability.
- Sequencing of reforms to enhance CBA:
  - General pattern: establish political foundations → strengthen operational/instrument autonomy → culminate with enhanced political autonomy for policy formulation and appointments.
  - Step 1: Clarify objectives and establish basic instrument autonomy (price stability priority; limits on government access to CB credit).
  - Step 2: Strengthen further instrument autonomy as markets develop (market-rate, short-term credit; develop government securities market and public debt management).
  - Step 3: Strengthen political autonomy (autonomous appointments, longer terms, legal protections).
  - Where full separation not feasible, coordination mechanisms should supplement markets to ensure financial discipline.

### X. CONCLUSIONS — summary of main messages
- Trend: Central banks in most countries were granted higher levels of autonomy over the past couple of decades across income levels.
- Comparative status: Advanced-economy central banks continue to enjoy greater autonomy than emerging markets and developing countries, but by end-2003 all groups had higher political and economic autonomy indexes than advanced economies in the late 1980s.
- Common legal mandates/practices:
  - Almost all central banks: mandated to set price stability as an objective, free to set the policy rate, and not required to provide automatic direct credit to government.
- Exception: Many central banks (especially in emerging markets and developing countries, and some advanced economies) retain responsibilities for financial supervision.
- Empirical payoff:
  - Movement toward greater CBA associated with sustained low average inflation levels in many emerging market and developing countries, holding after controlling for fiscal deficits and price movements abroad; measurement issues and correlation with de facto measures warrant cautious interpretation.
- Regional/currency-union notes:
  - Regional central banks (ESCB, BCEAO, BEAC, ECCB) show higher CBA.
  - Participation in currency unions can foster market development and conditions enabling elimination of direct CB credit to government.
- Forward-looking challenge reiterated:
  - Further boost political autonomy by ensuring governing bodies are appointed with minimal political interference and for longer terms; final stage implies de jure separation between fiscal and monetary policies though coordination remains relevant where full separation is infeasible.

*Source: _wp0788 - References..............................................................................................................*

### References..............................................................................................................

### _wp0788 - References..............................................................................................................

### Tables (listed)
- 1. Matrix of Central Bank Samples and Indexes ...............................................................8
- 2. Scores of Central Bank Autonomy in the Late 1980s and 2003....................................9
- 3. Performance on Sub-Components of the Political Autonomy Index (2003) ...............13
- 4. Performance on Sub-Components of the Economic Autonomy Index (2003) ............14
- 5. Regional Patterns of Central Bank Autonomy (end 2003) ..........................................15
- 6. Regional Trends in Central Bank Autonomy (1980s-2003) ........................................19
- 7.         Inflation in Emerging Markets (Probit Estimates, Five-Year Averages) ....................22

### Figures (listed)
- 1. Autonomy by Income-Level Groups (late 1980s) .......................................................10
- 2. Autonomy by Sub-Groups (late 1980s) .......................................................................10
- 3. Autonomy by Income-Level Groups (2003)................................................................11
- 4. Autonomy by Sub Groups (2003)................................................................................12
- 5. Relative Frequencies of Political Autonomy (2003) ...................................................12
- 6. Relative Frequencies of Economic Autonomy (2003).................................................13
- 7. Global Trends in Central Bank Autonomy ..................................................................17
- 8. Trends in Central Bank Autonomy for Advanced Economies ....................................17
- 9. Trends in Central Bank Autonomy for Emerging Markets .........................................17
- 10. Trends in Central Bank Autonomy for Selected Developing Countries......................17
- 11. Trends in Central Bank Autonomy for all Developing Countries ...............................17
- 12. Trends in the Distribution of Central Bank Autonomy in Advanced Economies .......18
- 13. Trends in the Distribution of Central Bank Autonomy in Emerging Markets ............18
- 14. Trends in the Distribution of Central Bank Autonomy in Developing Countries .......18
- 15. Inflation in Emerging Markets, 1960-2005 .................................................................20

### Statistical Tables (listed)
- 1. Advanced Economies: GMT Political Autonomy Scores (2003)................................29
- 2. Emerging Markets: GMT Political Autonomy Scores (2003) .....................................30
- 3. Developing Countries: GMT Political Autonomy Scores (2003)................................31
- 4. Advanced Economies: GMT Economic Autonomy Scores (2003) .............................34
- 5. Emerging Markets: GMT Economic Autonomy Scores (2003) ..................................35
- 6. Developing Countries: GMT Economic Autonomy Scores (2003).............................36
- 7. Cukierman versus GMT Conversion Table .................................................................39
- 8. Evolution of Autonomy: GMT Sample (Late 1980s-2003).........................................41
- 9. Evolution of Autonomy: Cukierman Sample (Late 1980s-2003)................................42
- 10. Summary Indexes of Central Bank Autonomy (Late 1980s-2003) .............................45
- 11. Classification of Central Banks ...................................................................................48

### Acronyms
- BCEAO Banque Centrale des États d’Afrique de l’Ouest (Central Bank of West African States)
- BEAC Banque des États d’Afrique Centrale (Bank of Central African States)
- CB Central bank
- CBA Central bank autonomy
- CBB Central bank board
- DMO Debt Management Office
- ECB European Central Bank
- ECCB East Caribbean Central Bank
- ESCB European System of Central Banks
- FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Program
- GMT Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini
- MCM Monetary and Capital Markets Department
- OECD Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation
- ROSC Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes

### I. INTRODUCTION — key findings and observations
- The study calculates indexes of de jure CBA for 163 central banks, representing 181 countries, as of end-2003.
- Comparable indexes of CBA are constructed for a subgroup of 68 central banks as of the end of the 1980s.
- Cross-country and time-series dimensions enable drawing lessons from global trends in CBA over the past couple of decades:
  - Central banks in advanced economies continue to enjoy greater CBA than those in emerging markets and developing countries.
  - At the end of 2003, all country groups exhibit a higher level of CBA than that reached by advanced economies in the late 1980s.
  - A vast majority of central banks have been mandated to set price stability as one of the objectives of monetary policy.
  - Most central banks have autonomy with respect to setting the policy rate and are not required to extend direct credit to the government.
  - There is divergence among central banks on financial supervision: many central banks in emerging markets and developing countries retain key supervisory roles; some large advanced countries also retain involvement in financial supervision.
  - Central bank laws often prescribe the soundness of the financial system as an objective subordinated to medium-term price stability.
  - Participation in currency unions has helped enhance autonomy (examples cited: ESCB, BCEAO, BEAC, ECCB).
- Forward-looking challenge identified:
  - Main challenge is to further boost political autonomy by ensuring central bank governing bodies are appointed with less political interference and for longer terms.

### II. METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING CENTRAL BANK AUTONOMY — framework and samples
- Methodologies used:
  - Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (GMT, 1991): distinguishes political and economic dimensions of autonomy.
  - Cukierman (1992): focuses on chief executive officer provisions; policy formulation and objectives; limitations on central bank lending to government.
- Sample and index construction:
  - Assessment at the end of the 1980s is based on the GMT index for the 18 OECD countries analyzed in GMT (the "full index"); and Cukierman (1992) data converted into the GMT index for the remaining 50 countries (the "narrow index").
  - Assessment at the end of 2003 relies on the "full index".
  - Results are standardized by dividing absolute values by the maximum potential score to ensure comparability.
- Caveat:
  - Due to the method used to transpose Cukierman’s data into the narrow index (conversion details in Appendix Table 7), some qualification is warranted regarding assessment of CBA evolution over time.

### Box 1. GMT and Cukierman Measures of Central Bank Autonomy — variables summarized
- GMT (1991) — Political autonomy (eight criteria):
  - (1) governor is appointed without government involvement;
  - (2) governor is appointed for more than five years;
  - (3) board of directors is appointed without government involvement;
  - (4) board is appointed for more than five years;
  - (5) no mandatory participation of government representative(s) in the board;
  - (6) no government approval is required for formulation of monetary policy;
  - (7) central bank is legally obliged to pursue monetary stability as one of its primary objectives;
  - (8) legal provisions that strengthen the central bank’s position in the event of a conflict with the government.
- GMT (1991) — Economic autonomy (seven criteria):
  - (1) there is no automatic procedure for the government to obtain direct credit from the central bank;
  - (2) when available, direct credit facilities are extended to the government at market interest rates;
  - (3) this credit is temporary;
  - (4) and for a limited amount;
  - (5) the central bank does not participate in the primary market for public debt;
  - (6) the central bank is responsible for setting the policy rate;
  - (7) the central bank has no responsibility for overseeing the banking sector (two points) or shares responsibility (one point).
- Cukierman (1992) — Sixteen criteria grouped:
  - Chief executive officer: (i) length of governor’s term; (ii) entity delegated to appoint him/her; (iii) provisions for dismissal; (iv) ability to hold another office in the government.
  - Policy formulation: (v) whether the central bank is responsible for monetary policy formulation; (vi) rules concerning resolution of conflicts between the central bank and government; (vii) the degree of central bank participation in the formulation of the government’s budget.
  - Objectives: (viii) monetary stability as one of the primary policy objectives.
  - Limitations on lending to government: (ix) advances and (x) securitized lending, (xi) authority having control over the terms (maturity, interest rate and amount) of lending, (xii) width of circle of potential borrowers from the central bank, (xiii) types of limitations on loans, where limits exist, (xiv) maturity of possible loans, (xv) limitations on interest rates applicable to lending (xvi) and prohibitions on central bank participation in the primary market for government securities.
- Technical note:
  - The narrow index is defined as a subset of 11 variables, with 10 of those in Cukierman matching the same subset of 10 variables contained in the full index, and the eleventh one from Cukierman substituting one in GMT. See Appendix Table 7 for details.

### III. LITERATURE ON THE BENEFITS OF CENTRAL BANK AUTONOMY — summarized evidence
- Key empirical findings cited:
  - Alesina and Summers (1993): define an index as the average of GMT and Cukierman indexes; find a significant negative correlation between CBA and the level and variation of inflation.
  - De Haan and Kooi (1997): find CBA, especially instrument autonomy, has considerable impact on inflation performance and little on output variability.
  - Mangano (1998): finds GMT's CBA has a significant impact on inflation.
  - Oatley (1999): finds CBA reduces inflation even when accounting for economic, political or institutional aspects.
- Contrasting evidence:
  - Some researchers find little or no evidence for macroeconomic benefits of CBA—examples include Banaian, Burdekin and Willett (1995), Posen (1995, 1998), Campillo and Miron (1997), Fuhrer (1997), and Crosby (1998).

### IV. CBA: COMPARISON ACROSS COUNTRIES AND EVOLUTION OVER TIME — opening
- Section IV begins the comparative analysis across countries and over time (content continues beyond the provided excerpt).

*Source: _wp0788 - References..............................................................................................................*

### Appendix Tables 1-10 report the full and narrow CBA scores for the countries in our sample.

### _wp0788 - Appendix Tables 1-10 report the full and narrow CBA scores for the countries in our sample.

### Snapshot of central bank autonomy in the late 1980s
- Sample description:
  - Late 1980s snapshot based on GMT and Cukierman data for 68 central banks: 25 advanced economies, 22 emerging markets, 21 developing countries.
  - Cukierman and GMT sources used for averages and subgroup comparisons.

- Key summary statistics (selected from Table 2, late 1980s):
  - GMT Sample (full index, 18 CB): Political 0.36, Economic 0.59, Overall 0.48.
  - Cukierman Sample (narrow index, 50 CB): Political 0.28, Economic 0.39, Overall 0.33.
  - Advanced (GMT sample): Political 0.36, Economic 0.59, Overall 0.48.
  - Advanced (Cukierman sample, 7 CB): Political 0.33, Economic 0.21, Overall 0.28.
  - Emerging (Cukierman sample, 22 CB): Political 0.27, Economic 0.38, Overall 0.32.
  - Developing (Cukierman sample, 21 CB): Political 0.27, Economic 0.45, Overall 0.35.

- Qualitative assessment:
  - Overall autonomy was rather low (i.e., below 0.50).
  - Economic autonomy generally exceeded political autonomy.
  - Advanced economies exhibited the highest overall autonomy, but Euro-area countries showed lower political and economic autonomy relative to other advanced economies.
  - Developing countries exhibited slightly higher overall autonomy than emerging markets (though comparable when excluding economies in transition).

### Assessment of central bank autonomy as of end-2003
- Sample description:
  - End-2003 scores based on authors’ reading of legal documents for 163 central banks: 28 advanced economies, 32 emerging markets, 103 developing countries. Total sample covers 181 countries when combined with historical coverage.

- Aggregate scores (selected entries from Table 2, 2003):
  - All CB (163): Political NA, Economic NA, Overall NA (late 1980s columns NA); 2003 (full index) Political 0.49, Economic 0.68, Overall 0.59.
  - GMT Sample (18): 2003 (full index) Political 0.74, Economic 0.81, Overall 0.77.
  - Cukierman Sample (50): 2003 (full index) Political 0.66, Economic 0.42, Overall 0.73? (table layout indicates 0.66 political, 0.42 economic, 0.73 overall — preserve table ordering).
  - Advanced economies (All CB, 28): 2003 (full index) Political 0.70, Economic 0.81, Overall 0.75.
  - ESCB (13): 2003 (full index) Political 1.00, Economic 0.78, Overall 0.89.
  - Emerging Markets (All CB, 32): 2003 (full index) Political 0.56, Economic 0.75, Overall 0.65.
  - Developing Countries (All CB, 103): 2003 (full index) Political 0.41, Economic 0.63, Overall 0.52.
  - Monetary Unions (3): 2003 (full index) Political 0.54, Economic 0.79, Overall 0.67.

- Cross-country patterns and observations:
  - Average CBA across income groups now exceed 0.50; central banks in advanced economies achieve greater autonomy than those in emerging markets and developing countries.
  - Some advanced economies in Asia and the Pacific score low relative to peers, mainly due to limited political autonomy.
  - Central banks of countries in transition often reach CBA scores comparable with or higher than advanced economies, aided by political regime changes and EU/ECB proximity.
  - Central banks in monetary unions (e.g., ESCB) show autonomy significantly greater than income-group averages (ESCB overall close to maximum).
  - Political autonomy shows larger cross-country dispersion than economic autonomy.

### Subcomponents: political autonomy (Table 3) and economic autonomy (Table 4)
- Political autonomy — percentage of central banks satisfying specific criteria (Table 3):
  - Criteria: (1) governor appointed without govt. involvement; (2) governor appointed for more than five years; (3) central bank board (CBB) appointed without govt. involvement; (4) CBB appointed for more than five years; (5) no mandatory participation of govt. representatives in CBB; (6) no govt. approval needed for monetary policy formulation; (7) monetary stability is one of CB’s primary objectives; (8) legal protection strengthens CB position in event of conflict with govt.
  - Overall Sample: (1) 34% (2) 40% (3) 31% (4) 38% (5) 47% (6) 54% (7) 95% (8) 50%
  - Advanced Economies: (1) 57% (2) 71% (3) 57% (4) 64% (5) 75% (6) 64% (7) 96% (8) 75%
  - Emerging Markets: (1) 41% (2) 44% (3) 44% (4) 50% (5) 47% (6) 63% (7) 97% (8) 63%
  - Developing Countries: (1) 26% (2) 30% (3) 20% (4) 27% (5) 40% (6) 49% (7) 94% (8) 39%

- Economic autonomy — percentage of central banks satisfying specific criteria (Table 4):
  - Note: Criteria include (1) no automatic CB credit to govt.; (2) when available credit is at market rates; (3) temporary; (4) limited amount; (5) CB does not bid in primary market for govt. securities; (6) CB sets policy rate; (7) CB shares supervisory responsibilities (one point); (7bis) no responsibility (two points).
  - All central banks: (1) 91% (2) 66% (3) 93% (4) 91% (5) 59% (6) 88% (7) 23% (7bis) 18%
  - Advanced Economies: (1) 93% (2) 89% (3) 93% (4) 93% (5) 89% (6) 100% (7) 18% (7bis) 57%
  - Emerging Markets: (1) 97% (2) 75% (3) 97% (4) 94% (5) 81% (6) 94% (7) 25% (7bis) 19%
  - Developing Countries: (1) 89% (2) 56% (3) 91% (4) 90% (5) 44% (6) 94% (7) 24% (7bis) 7%

- Interpretation highlights:
  - Few governments have automatic access to central bank credit; when credit is available, interest rates are often close to market rates, but practices differ across developing countries.
  - Many developing-country central banks participate in primary government securities markets (criterion 5), posing inflation risks in some cases.
  - Most central banks set policy rates freely (criterion 6).
  - Except among advanced economies, many central banks retain key roles in banking supervision (criterion 7bis).

### Regional patterns (Table 5) — end-2003
- Regional political, economic, and overall autonomy (selected values from Table 5; cells reflect All / Adv. / Emer. / Dev. where given):
  - AFR: Political All 0.33 / Adv. -- / Emer. 0.25 / Dev. 0.33 ; Economic All 0.60 / Adv. -- / Emer. 0.63 / Dev. 0.61 ; Overall All 0.46? (table row shows mixed ordering—preserve presented values: AFR overall 0.47 in some cells)
  - APD: Political All 0.35 / Adv. 0.27 / Emer. 0.44 / Dev. 0.34 ; Economic All 0.60 / Adv. 0.67 / Emer. 0.67 / Dev. 0.55 ; Overall All 0.47 / Adv. 0.47 / Emer. 0.55 / Dev. 0.44
  - EUR: Political All 0.79 / Adv. 0.85 / Emer. 0.73 / Dev. 0.79 ; Economic All 0.80 / Adv. 0.84 / Emer. 0.81 / Dev. 0.68 ; Overall All 0.85 / Adv. 0.77 / Emer. 0.73
  - MCD: Political All 0.45 / Adv. -- / Emer. 0.25 / Dev. 0.48 ; Economic All 0.63 / Adv. -- / Emer. 0.63 / Dev. 0.64 ; Overall All 0.54 / Adv. -- / Emer. 0.44 / Dev. 0.56
  - WHD: Political All 0.40 / Adv. 0.50 / Emer. 0.54 / Dev. 0.36 ; Economic All 0.73 / Adv. 0.88 / Emer. 0.83 / Dev. 0.69 ; Overall All 0.69 / Adv. 0.56 / Emer. 0.69 / Dev. 0.52
  - Aggregate All: Political 0.49 / Economic 0.68 / Overall 0.59 (All countries, end-2003 averages)

- Regional observations:
  - Europe shows the highest CBA scores in both economic and political autonomy.
  - In emerging markets, overall CBA is lowest in Middle East and Central Asia (MCD) and Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR).
  - Among developing countries, Asia and Pacific (APD) and Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR) rank lowest on average.

### Developments over time: trends and regional changes
- Global and group-level trends:
  - Average CBA scores for the global sample of 163 central banks increased significantly; overall CBA has about doubled from late 1980s to 2003.
  - Economic autonomy remains ahead of political autonomy.
  - Advanced economies strengthened political autonomy further (political component increased though still trailing economic).
  - Emerging markets more than doubled overall CBA; economic autonomy remains above political autonomy.
  - In developing countries, political autonomy improved only marginally per the Cukierman sample; economic autonomy increased significantly.

- Quadrant shifts:
  - All groups shifted upward and to the right in economic vs political autonomy space (more autonomy in both dimensions).
  - Advanced economies show a more uniform shift, concentrated in the top-right quadrant.
  - Emerging and developing countries show greater dispersion, but 2003 scores for these groups generally lie to the right of advanced-economy late-1980s scores.

- Regional trends (Table 6 — 1980s vs 2003; averages based on Cukierman sample and the “narrow” CBA index):
  - AFR: Political 1980s 0.17 → 2003 0.37 ; Economic 1980s 0.52 → 2003 0.72 ; Overall 1980s 0,33 → 2003 0,53
  - APD: Political 1980s 0.21 → 2003 0.54 ; Economic 1980s 0.41 → 2003 0.73 ; Overall 1980s 0,30 → 2003 0,63
  - EUR: Political 1980s 0.32 → 2003 0.79 ; Economic 1980s 0.27 → 2003 0.98 ; Overall 1980s 0,30 → 2003 0,88
  - MCD: Political 1980s 0.25 → 2003 0.40 ; Economic 1980s 0.36 → 2003 0.68 ; Overall 1980s 0,30 → 2003 0,53
  - WHD: Political 1980s 0.36 → 2003 0.50 ; Economic 1980s 0.36 → 2003 0.88 ; Overall 1980s 0,36 → 2003 0,67
  - All: Political 1980s 0.28 → 2003 0.56 ; Economic 1980s 0.38 → 2003 0.84 ; Overall 1980s 0,32 → 2003 0,68

- Regional interpretation:
  - Increase in CBA is global but uneven.
  - Europe gained greatly in both economic and political autonomy.
  - Western Hemisphere progress concentrated in economic autonomy.
  - Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR) and Middle East and Central Asia (MCD) have seen relatively modest gains.

### Central bank autonomy and inflation: empirical results (emerging markets)
- Context and approach:
  - Focus on emerging markets and developing economies where inflation volatility has been large.
  - Econometric exercise: probit model linking likelihood of "good inflation performance" (annual inflation below 10 percent) to determinants including trade openness, inflation in advanced economies, fiscal balance scaled by financial depth, exchange rate regime, and two CBA measures.
  - Sample: 24 emerging market economies, 1960–2004, five-year averages (24-country list provided in source).

- Main econometric findings (Table 7, probit estimates; dependent variable: probability of achieving low inflation):
  - Central bank autonomy (CBA) coefficient in specification (1): 0.57*.
  - Central bank autonomy (CBA) coefficient in specification (2): 0.73**.
  - Central bank autonomy (CBA) coefficient in specification (4): 0.37.
  - TOR (turnover of central bank governors) coefficient in specification (3): -5.9 ; in specification (4): -2.2.
  - Openness coefficient ranges: 0.61** to 0.95*** across specifications.
  - Fiscal balance/Financial depth coefficient reported variably (e.g., 0.21, 0.53*, 0.07, 0.16) across specifications.
  - Inflation in advanced economies coefficients: -7.29***, -6.1***, -9.44***, -9.27*** (statistically significant negative effects).
  - Pegged exchange rate regime coefficients: 57.4***, 51.1***, 53.8***, 49.0** (positive large effects).
  - Sample periods: 1960-2004. Number of observations: specification (1) 107, (2) 111, (3) 85, (4) 78.

- Interpretation and magnitudes:
  - Estimates suggest greater de jure CBA helps keep inflation low: moving from no autonomy to full autonomy increases the likelihood of low inflation by about 50 percent in the probit model interpretation provided.
  - An average increase in autonomy for emerging markets from 0.3 to about 0.7 implies an average increase in the likelihood of low inflation by about 20 percentage points (per the authors’ calculation).
  - CBA and TOR are correlated; when both included, coefficients attenuate (CBA reduced by about 1/3 when TOR included; TOR falls by about 2/3 when CBA included), leaving some ambiguity in comparative statistical dominance.

### Policy-relevant findings and implications (synthesized from analysis)
- Legal strengthening of central bank autonomy has been broad-based and substantial since the late 1980s, especially in economic autonomy.
- Political autonomy remains the weaker and more dispersed dimension across countries and regions; reforms targeting appointment processes, board insulation, tenure length, and legal protections (criteria 1–5 and 8) appear most consequential.
- Economic autonomy reforms (limiting automatic credit to governments, restricting central bank participation in primary government securities markets, strengthening central bank control over policy rates) have progressed widely and are associated with lower inflation risk.
- Monetary unions and countries in transition have tended to adopt high-de jure autonomy consistent with best practices; proximity to strong regional institutions (e.g., ECB) reinforces reform incentives.
- Empirical evidence is supportive but not definitive: stronger de jure CBA is associated with a higher probability of achieving low inflation after controlling for other determinants, but measurement error and correlation with de facto measures (e.g., TOR) warrant cautious interpretation.

*Source: GMT (1991), Cukierman (1992) and authors’ estimates presented in the Statistical Tables.*

### 100. All data are five-year averages. Explanatory variables are lagged by one period (i.e. by one five-year

### VI. LESSONS EMERGING FROM GLOBAL TRENDS

### Probit model notes and key empirical findings
- "All data are five-year averages. Explanatory variables are lagged by one period (i.e. by one five-year average), except in specification (2) where the fiscal balance/financial depth ratio is contemporaneous."
- Significance notation: "*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level, and * denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level."
- Model conclusions:
  - Increase in average openness from approximately 30 to 60 percent over the past four decades increased the probability of low inflation by about 20 percentage points in the whole group of emerging markets.
  - Disinflation in advanced economies in the early 1980s is estimated to have increased the likelihood of low inflation in emerging markets by 30 percentage points or more.
  - Fiscal policy is identified as an important determinant of inflation.
  - A fixed exchange rate regime can on average improve chances of attaining low inflation, although sustaining currency pegs in emerging markets has proven difficult in the long term.

### A. Consensus Views — four broad principles identified
- Principle 1: Set price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy
  - Almost all central banks are legally obliged to pursue price stability as one of their primary objectives.
  - Price stability is frequently given priority status and is formulated as the most effective way the central bank can contribute to economic growth.
  - Entrusting price stability to an autonomous central bank helps strengthen credibility by addressing time-inconsistency problems.

- Principle 2: Curtail direct lending to governments
  - Most central bank laws limit unrestricted credit to the government; when allowed, lending must be temporary and subject to quantitative limits.
  - A widespread ban on central bank participation in the primary market for public debt has emerged in recent legislation.
  - When central bank credit to government is available, setting interest at market rates is a common practice.
  - Consensus view: direct central bank lending to the government should be limited in nature (generally short-term or temporary) with restrictions on amount; market-rate pricing strengthens central bank autonomy.
  - Direct central bank credit is intended mainly to facilitate short-term Treasury cash management in countries with shallow money markets or weak public debt management.

- Principle 3: Ensure full autonomy for setting the policy rate
  - Most central banks have full autonomy to set their policy rate (typically a short-term inter-bank interest rate).
  - Full autonomy over the design of monetary policy instruments is a corollary to setting the policy rate.

- Principle 4: Ensure no government involvement in policy formulation
  - No government approval should be required for monetary policy formulation.
  - Existence of procedures to resolve conflicts between central bank and government is an important complement; government representation on policy boards is not necessary when such procedures exist.
  - High correlation observed between scores for no government approval, conflict resolution procedures, and related criteria.

### B. Departure from the literature: the role of central banks in bank supervision
- Empirical observation:
  - Many emerging market and developing country central banks have retained key roles in banking supervision; the practice is present, though less pervasive, in some advanced economies.
- Rationale and practical considerations:
  - Availability of skilled staff and resources at central banks often influenced the decision to retain supervisory functions.
  - Given increased CBA, locating supervisory functions in the central bank may allow supervisors to "piggyback" on central bank autonomy.
  - Central bank focus on financial stability supports retention of supervisory responsibilities.
- Empirical evidence cited:
  - Arnone and Gambini (2007) find higher compliance with the Basel Core Principles where supervision of banks is integrated with securities and/or insurance supervision, and some statistically significant results favor placing integrated supervision inside the central bank.
- Compatibility argument:
  - Price stability and financial sector soundness may be compatible, at least in the longer term.
  - Entrusting monetary policy implementation and financial supervision to the central bank may be desirable when the central bank has clear objectives and high autonomy and accountability, reducing temptation to use monetary policy as a second-best instrument for financial stability.

### C. Sequencing of reforms to enhance Central Bank Autonomy (CBA)
- General pattern:
  - Improvement in CBA generally begins with establishing political foundations of autonomy, followed by strengthening operational/instrument autonomy, and culminates with enhanced political autonomy for policy formulation and appointments.
- Step 1: Clarify objectives and establish basic instrument autonomy
  - Early clarification of objectives (price stability as primary objective) is critical.
  - Minimum economic autonomy required; instrument autonomy (ability to conduct liquidity management independently of budget financing) is an important first step.
  - Early limits on government access to central bank credit and commercial bank discretionary access to central bank credit help central banks control their balance sheets and the money supply.
- Step 2: Strengthen further instrument autonomy
  - As financial markets develop, direct central bank credit to government should be at market rates and intended for short-term cash management.
  - Conditions for full autonomy include development of a government securities market and public debt management capacity at the Treasury, enabling the phasing out of direct central bank credit.
- Step 3: Strengthen further political autonomy
  - Final stage involves legal provisions to reduce political interference: more autonomous appointments of governors and central bank boards, longer terms, and fewer opportunities for political interference.
  - Only advanced economies in the sample achieved political autonomy levels above 50 percent for appointments of management of governing bodies.
  - Where complete separation is not feasible (due to lack of efficient money and government securities markets), coordination mechanisms should supplement markets to ensure financial discipline.

### VII. CONCLUSIONS — summary of main messages
- Trend: Central banks in most countries have been granted higher levels of autonomy over the past couple of decades across income levels.
- Comparative status: Central banks in advanced economies continue to enjoy greater autonomy than those in emerging markets and developing countries, but by end-2003 all country groups had political and economic autonomy indexes higher than advanced economies in the late 1980s.
- Common legal mandates and practices:
  - Almost all central banks: mandated to set price stability as an objective, free to set the policy rate, and not required to provide automatic direct credit to government.
  - These reflect a policymaker "consensus view" about CBA.
- Exception: Many central banks (especially in emerging markets and developing countries, and some advanced economies) retain responsibilities for financial supervision.
- Empirical payoff: Movement toward greater CBA has been associated with sustained low average inflation levels in many emerging market and developing countries, holding after controlling for other determinants such as fiscal deficits or price movements abroad.
- Regional banks and currency unions:
  - Regional central banks (e.g., ESCB, BCEAO, BEAC, ECCB) show higher CBA scores.
  - Participation in currency unions can be beneficial for market development and for reaching conditions (active money markets) that enable elimination of direct central bank credit to government.
- Forward-looking challenge:
  - Main challenge is to further boost political autonomy of central banks by ensuring governing bodies are appointed with minimal political interference and for longer terms.
  - Final stage of CBA implies de jure complete separation between fiscal and monetary policies, though coordination mechanisms remain relevant—especially in countries that cannot attain full separation.

*Source: Excerpt from the provided IMF PDF content unit.*

### Appendix Table 1. Advanced Economies: GMT Political Autonomy Scores (2003)

### _wp0788 - Appendix Tables: GMT Political and Economic Autonomy Scores (2003)

### Appendix Table 1 — Advanced Economies: GMT Political Autonomy Scores (2003)
- Key summary statistics:
  - Average 0.70
  - Satisfaction Ratio: 57% 71% 57%      64%      75%      64%      96%      75%
- Selected country standardized scores (from table):
  - ECB: 1.00
  - Austria: 1.00
  - Belgium: 1.00
  - Finland: 1.00
  - France: 1.00
  - Germany: 1.00
  - Greece: 1.00
  - Ireland: 1.00
  - Italy: 1.00
  - Luxembourg: 1.00
  - Netherlands: 1.00
  - Portugal: 1.00
  - Spain: 1.00
  - Sweden: 0.88
  - Switzerland: 0.88
  - US: 0.63
  - Japan: 0.13
- Notes on political autonomy criteria (as defined in the table footnote):
  - (1) governor appointed without government involvement
  - (2) governor appointed for more than five years
  - (3) central bank board (CBB) appointed without government involvement
  - (4) CBB appointed for more than five years
  - (5) no mandatory participation of government representatives in the CBB
  - (6) no government approval is required for formulation of monetary policy
  - (7) central bank legally obliged to pursue monetary stability as one of its primary objectives
  - (8) legal protections that strengthen the central bank’s position in the event of a conflict with government

### Appendix Table 2 — Emerging Markets: GMT Political Autonomy Scores (2003)
- Key summary statistics:
  - Average 0.56
  - Satisfaction Ratio: 41% 44% 44%      50%      47%      63%      97%      63%
- Selected country standardized scores (from table):
  - Argentina: 0.75
  - Brazil: 0.50
  - Bulgaria: 1.00
  - Chile: 0.50
  - China: 0.38
  - Croatia: 1.00
  - Czech Rep.: 0.88
  - Estonia: 0.63
  - Hungary: 0.88
  - India: 0.25
  - Indonesia: 0.63
  - Latvia: 1.00
  - Lithuania: 0.88
  - Mexico: 0.63
  - Russia: 0.50
  - Turkey: 0.63
  - Venezuela: 0.50
- Note: Same political autonomy criteria as listed in Appendix Table 1.

### Appendix Table 3 — Developing Countries: GMT Political Autonomy Scores (2003)
- Key summary statistics:
  - Average 0.41
  - Satisfaction Ratio: 26% 30% 20%      27%      40%      49%      94%      39%
- Selected country standardized scores (from table):
  - Afghanistan: 0.50
  - Albania: 0.75
  - Algeria: 1.00
  - Angola: 0.25
  - Armenia: 0.88
  - Aruba: 0.75
  - Azerbaijan: 0.75
  - Bangladesh: 0.00
  - Bosnia Herzegovina: 1.00
  - Burundi: 0.38
  - Cambodia: 0.38
  - Ecuador: 0.88
  - ECCB (regional): 0.63
  - El Salvador: 0.63
  - Georgia: 0.88
  - Guinea Rep.: 0.63
  - Iran: 0.00
  - Iraq: 0.50
  - Kyrgyz Rep.: 1.00
  - Macedonia: 1.00
  - Moldova: 0.75
  - Mongolia: 1.00
  - Nepal: 0.38
  - Papua New Guinea: 0.63
  - Trinidad and Tobago: 0.38
  - Tunisia: 0.63
  - Uganda: 0.50
  - Ukraine: 0.88
  - Uruguay: 0.63
  - Uzbekistan: 0.75
  - Zambia: 0.38
  - Zimbabwe: 0.25
- Notes and special entries:
  - BCEAO includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinée Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.
  - BEAC includes Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.
  - ECCB includes Anguilla, Antigua-Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent-the-Grenadines.
  - Indexes for Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia Montenegro and Macedonia for the late 1980s are those of Yugoslavia at the time.
- Note: Same political autonomy criteria as listed in Appendix Table 1.

### Appendix Table 4 — Advanced Economies: GMT Economic Autonomy Scores (2003)
- Key summary statistics:
  - Average 0.81
  - Satisfaction Ratio (table format): 93% 89% 93% 93% 89% 57%
  - Additional notes in table: (1 pt. in 7th crit.) 18%  (2 pts. In 7th crit.) 57%
- Selected country standardized scores and examples (from table):
  - ECB: 1.00
  - Australia: 1.00
  - Denmark: 1.00
  - Iceland: 1.00
  - Norway: 1.00
  - Sweden: 1.00
  - Switzerland: 1.00
  - UK: 1.00
  - Austria: 0.88
  - Belgium: 0.88
  - Canada: 0.88
  - Finland: 0.88
  - France: 0.88
  - Germany: 0.75
  - Greece: 0.63
  - Ireland: 0.63
  - Italy: 0.63
  - Japan: 0.75
  - Korea: 0.88
  - Luxembourg: 0.88
  - Netherlands: 0.75
  - New Zealand: 0.63
  - Portugal: 0.63
  - Spain: 0.75
  - US: 0.88
  - Hong Kong: 0.38
  - Singapore: 0.38
- Economic autonomy criteria (table footnote):
  - (1) no automatic procedure for government to obtain direct credit from central bank
  - (2) when available, credit extended to government at market interest rates
  - (3) credit is temporary
  - (4) and for limited amount
  - (5) central bank does not participate in primary market for public debt
  - (6) central bank responsible for setting policy rate
  - (7) central bank has no responsibility to oversee banking sector (two points) or shares responsibility with other institutions (one point)

*Source: _wp0788 - Appendix Tables (GMT Political and Economic Autonomy Scores, 2003).*

### Appendix Table 5. Emerging Markets: GMT Economic Autonomy Scores (2003)

### Appendix Table 5. Emerging Markets: GMT Economic Autonomy Scores (2003)

### Scores by country
- Argentina — Score: 6; Standardized Score: 0.75
- Brazil — Score: 6; Standardized Score: 0.75
- Bulgaria — Score: 6; Standardized Score: 0.75
- Chile — Score: 7; Standardized Score: 0.88
- China — Score: 6; Standardized Score: 0.75
- Croatia — Score: 6; Standardized Score: 0.75
- Czech Rep. — Score: 7; Standardized Score: 0.88
- Egypt — Score: 5; Standardized Score: 0.63
- Estonia — Score: 8; Standardized Score: 1.00
- Hungary — Score: 8; Standardized Score: 1.00
- India — Score: 6; Standardized Score: 0.75
- Indonesia — Score: 6; Standardized Score: 0.75
- Israel — Score: 5; Standardized Score: 0.63
- Jordan — Score: 4; Standardized Score: 0.50
- Latvia — Score: 8; Standardized Score: 1.00
- Lithuania — Score: 6; Standardized Score: 0.75
- Malaysia — Score: 6; Standardized Score: 0.75
- Malta — Score: 7; Standardized Score: 0.88
- Mexico — Score: 6; Standardized Score: 0.75
- Morocco — Score: 6; Standardized Score: 0.75
- Pakistan — Score: 5; Standardized Score: 0.63
- Peru — Score: 8; Standardized Score: 1.00
- Philippines — Score: 5; Standardized Score: 0.63
- Poland — Score: 7; Standardized Score: 0.88
- Romania — Score: 6; Standardized Score: 0.75
- Russia — Score: 3; Standardized Score: 0.38
- Slovak Rep. — Score: 6; Standardized Score: 0.75
- Slovenia — Score: 6; Standardized Score: 0.75
- South Africa — Score: 3; Standardized Score: 0.38
- Thailand — Score: 3; Standardized Score: 0.38
- Turkey — Score: 8; Standardized Score: 1.00
- Venezuela — Score: 7; Standardized Score: 0.88

### Aggregate statistics and satisfaction ratios
- Average: 0.75
- Satisfaction Ratio (1 pt. in 7th crit.): 97% (column 1), 75% (column 2), 97% (column 3), 94% (column 4), 81% (column 5), 94% (column 6)
- Satisfaction Ratio (1 pt. in 7th crit.) summary value: 25%
- Satisfaction Ratio (2 pts. in 7th crit.): 19%

### Scoring note (criteria definitions)
- (1) no automatic procedure for government to obtain direct credit from central bank;
- (2) when available, credit extended to government at market interest rates;
- (3) credit is temporary;
- (4) and for limited amount;
- (5) central bank does not participate in primary market for public debt;
- (6) central bank responsible for setting policy rate; and
- (7) central bank has no responsibility to oversee banking sector (two points) or shares responsibility with other institutions (one point).

*Source: Appendix Table 5. Emerging Markets: GMT Economic Autonomy Scores (2003).*

### Appendix Table 7. Cukierman versus GMT Conversion Table

### Appendix Table 7. Cukierman versus GMT Conversion Table

### Political Indicator — Mapping of Cukierman (1992) scores to GMT (1991) scale
- App: Who appoints the governor?
  - Appointed by board of the central bank. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 1 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Appointed by a board composed of members of executive branch, parliament, and the board of the central bank. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.75 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Appointed by the legislative branch. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.5 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Appointed by the executive branch. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.25 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0
  - Appointed by one or two members of the executive branch. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0

- Too: Length of governor’s term of office, in years (Governor appointed for more than 5 years)
  - Greater than or equal to 8. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 1 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Between 8 and 6. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.75 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Equal to 5. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.5 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0
  - Equal to 4. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.25 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0
  - Less than 4. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0

- Off: Possibility for governor to hold government office (Diss: Legal protections against dismissal of governor)
  - Governor prohibited by law from holding government office. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 1 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Prohibited unless authorized by the government. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.5 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0
  - No prohibitions of law in this matter. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0

- Monpol: Who formulates monetary policy? (Government approval not required in formulating monetary policy)
  - Central bank alone has this authority. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 1 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Authority is shared by government and central bank. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.66 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0
  - Central bank has advisory role in setting policy. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.33 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0
  - Only government has this power. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0

- Obj: Objectives of central bank (Central bank is required to pursue monetary stability as one of its primary objectives)
  - Price stability sole/main objective; takes precedence if conflict. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 1 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Price stability the only objective. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.8 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Price stability mentioned together with other objectives that do not conflict with it. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.6 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Price stability mentioned together with other objectives that may potentially conflict with it. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.4 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Central bank law does not include objectives of this type. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.2 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0
  - Central bank law identifies objectives but not price stability. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0

- Conf: Government directives and conflict resolution (Legal protections exist to strengthen the central bank’s position in event of conflict with the government)
  - Central bank has final authority on matters explicitly defined by law as its objectives. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 1 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Government has ultimate authority only on policy matters not explicitly defined as objectives of the central bank, or in the event of internal conflict within the central bank. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.8 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - In case of conflict, the final decision lies with a body comprising members of the central bank, the legislative branch, and the executive branch. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.6 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Legislative branch has final authority in policy matters. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.4 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Executive branch has final authority in policy matters, but is subject to possible opposition by the central bank. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.2 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0
  - Executive branch has unconditional final authority. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0

- Excluded variables (from Political Indicator conversion)
  - (3) Board not appointed by government.
  - (4) Board is appointed for more than five years.
  - Diss: Legal protections against dismissal of governor
  - Adv: Does central bank has advisory role in formulating government budget?

### Economic Indicator — Mapping of Cukierman (1992) scores to GMT (1991) scale
- Lla: Limitations on advances (Direct credit is not automatically extended to the government)
  - Advance lending to the government is prohibited. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 1 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Advances are possible but limited in absolute terms, or subject to other types of similarly restrictive limitations. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.66 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Advances are possible and subject to more accommodating limitations. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.33 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - No legal limitations on advances; amount is periodically negotiated between the central bank and the government. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0

- Lls: Limitations on guaranteed loans to the government (Same distinctions as for Lla)

- Lint: Limitations on interest rates applicable to loan by central bank (Direct credit provided at market interest rates)
  - Loan is possible only at market rates. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 1 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Minimum level applies to interest rate paid by the government. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.75 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0
  - Ceiling applies to interest rates paid by the government. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.5 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0
  - No explicit legal provisions on interest applied to loans by the central bank. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.25 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0
  - Law does not provide for the government to pay interest on loans from the central bank. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0

- Lmat: Maturity of possible loans (Direct credit is explicitly temporary)
  - Limited to six months. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 1 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Limited to one year. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.66 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Limit of more than one year. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.33 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - No legal limit on maturity of loan. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0

- Ltype: Types of limitations on loans, where limits exist (Direct credit subject to limitations on amount)
  - Limit on loan amount is prescribed in absolute terms. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 1 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Limit on loan amount is prescribed in terms of capital or other liabilities of the central bank. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.75 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Limit on loan amount is prescribed in terms of percentage of government’s revenues. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.5 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Limit on loan amount is prescribed in terms of percentage of government expenses. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0.25 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - No limit (NA). — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0

- Lprm: Prohibitions on lending on the primary market (Central bank does not participate in the primary market for public debt securities)
  - Central bank prohibited from underwriting public debt securities on the primary market. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 1 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 1
  - Central bank may underwrite public debt securities on the primary market. — Cukierman’s Score (1992): 0 — Conversion to GMT Scale: 0

- Excluded variables (from Economic Indicator conversion)
  - (6) Central bank sets discount rate autonomously.
  - (7) Banking supervision is not the responsibility of central bank, or is not responsibility of central bank alone.
  - Ldec: Who has authority to control terms and conditions of loans to the government?
  - Lwidth: Who has access to loans granted by the central bank?

*Source: GMT (1991), and Cukierman (1992).*

### Appendix Table 9. Evolution of Autonomy: Cukierman Sample (Late 1980s-2003)

### Appendix Table 9. Evolution of Autonomy: Cukierman Sample (Late 1980s-2003)

### Overview
- Presents country-level Political Autonomy and Economic Autonomy component scores for a sample of central banks in the Late 1980s and at End 2003.
- Political Autonomy components (numbered headings shown in table): 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 with an aggregated "Score" and "Standar. Score".
- Economic Autonomy components (numbered headings shown in table): 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 with an aggregated "Score" and "Standar. Score".
- The weight of Cukierman's (1992) missing variables (“NA”), which is always 1 as the index is un-weighted, is divided by the number of the remaining variables and then added to the variables that have meaningful entries.

### Key country-level entries (selected rows preserved exactly as shown)
- Late 1980s — example country entries (as in table):
  - Argentina: 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.60
  - Costa Rica: 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.60
  - China (Late 1980s entry spans columns): 1.50 1.50 0.25 1.00 1.002.00 0.40
  - Singapore (Late 1980s): 1.50 1.50 0.25 1.25 1.25 0.25
  - Zimbabwe (Late 1980s): 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.17 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.60

- End 2003 — example country entries (as in table):
  - Argentina (End 2003): 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 1.00
  - Bolivia (End 2003): 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 1.00
  - Chile (End 2003): 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 1.00
  - Finland (End 2003): 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 1.00
  - Korea (End 2003): 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 1.00

### Regional aggregates and summary statistics (preserved verbatim from table)
- Late 1980s regional lines (exact sequences as shown):
  - AFR 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.62 0.12 1.04 0.17 0.800.000.90 0.90 0.002.60 0.52
  - APD 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.17 1.24 0.21 0.440.000.92 0.56 0.112.03 0.41
  - EUR 0.46 0.37 0.17 0.08 0.70 0.17 1.94 0.32 0.330.080.58 0.33 0.001.33 0.27
  - MCD 0.20 0.24 0.44 0.00 0.60 0.00 1.48 0.25 0.200.200.80 0.60 0.001.80 0.36
  - WHD 0.40 0.13 0.63 0.08 0.76 0.13 2.13 0.36 0.600.000.60 0.60 0.001.80 0.36
  - All 0.28 0.19 0.29 0.04 0.72 0.13 1.65 0.28 0.510.040.73 0.59 0.021.89 0.38

- End 2003 regional lines (exact sequences as shown):
  - AFR 0.00 0.10 0.60 0.30 0.90 0.30 2.20 0.37 1.000.600.90 0.90 0.203.60 0.72
  - APD 0.11 0.33 0.67 0.56 1.00 0.56 3.22 0.54 0.890.670.89 0.89 0.333.67 0.73
  - EUR 0.75 0.63 0.88 0.75 0.94 0.81 4.75 0.79 1.000.881.00 1.00 1.004.88 0.98
  - MCD 0.20 0.20 0.60 0.40 1.00 0.00 2.40 0.40 0.800.400.80 0.80 0.603.40 0.68
  - WHD 0.00 0.47 0.80 0.40 0.93 0.40 3.00 0.50 0.930.800.93 0.93 0.804.40 0.88
  - All 0.25 0.40 0.75 0.51 0.95 0.49 3.35 0.56 0.950.730.93 0.93 0.654.18 0.84

### Notes on interpretation (as stated in table)
- 1/ Political variables: see Appendix Table 7 for the specification of the variables.
- 2/ Economic variables: see Appendix Table 7 for the specification of the variables.
- The regional classification of central banks follows the organization of the IMF area departments.

*Source: Cukierman (1992) and authors’ estimates.*

### Appendix Table 10. Summary Indexes of Central Bank Autonomy (Late 1980s-2003)

### Appendix Table 10. Summary Indexes of Central Bank Autonomy (Late 1980s-2003)

### All Central Banks — sample aggregates
- Full Sample (163) — End-2003 (narrow index) NA NA NA; (full index) NA NA NA; (Central Banks: overall) 0.49 0.68 0.59
- GMT Sample (18) — Late 1980s (narrow index for GMT) 0.36 0.59 0.48; End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.74 0.81 0.77
- Cukierman Sample (50) — Late 1980s (narrow index for Cukierman) 0.28 0.39 0.33; Late 1980s (full index for GMT) 0.52 0.82 0.66; End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.42 0.73 0.57

### Advanced Economies — country examples and aggregates
- ESCB (13) — End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 1.00 0.78 0.89
- Full Sample (27) — End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.70 0.81 0.75
- GMT Sample (18) — End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.74 0.81 0.77
- Cukierman Sample (7) — Late 1980s (narrow index for Cukierman) 0.33 0.21 0.28; Late 1980s (full index for GMT) 0.67 0.89 0.77; End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.64 0.86 0.75
- Selected country-level End-2003 (Political Economic Overall):
  - ECB — 1.00 1.00 1.00
  - Germany — 0.75 0.88 0.81
  - US — 0.63 0.88 0.75
  - UK — 0.13 0.63 0.38 (Late 1980s narrow index shown in table); End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.38 1.00 0.69
  - Japan — 0.13 0.63 0.38 (Late 1980s narrow index shown in table); End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.13 0.75 0.44

### Emerging Markets — country examples and aggregates
- Full Sample (32) — End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.56 0.75 0.65
- Cukierman Sample (22) — Late 1980s (narrow index for Cukierman) 0.27 0.38 0.32; Late 1980s (full index for GMT) 0.56 0.87 0.70; End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.47 0.75 0.61
- Selected country-level End-2003 (Political Economic Overall):
  - Argentina — 0.33 0.60 0.45 (Late 1980s narrow index shown in table); End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.75 0.75 0.75
  - Brazil — 0.17 0.00 0.09 (Late 1980s narrow index shown in table); End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.50 1.00 0.64
  - Chile — 0.17 0.20 0.18 (Late 1980s narrow index shown in table); End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.50 1.00 0.73
  - Russia — 0.50 0.38 0.44
  - Mexico — 0.50 0.20 0.36 (Late 1980s narrow index shown in table); End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.63 0.75 0.69
  - Turkey — 0.50 0.60 0.55 (Late 1980s narrow index shown in table); End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.63 1.00 0.81

### Developing Countries — country examples and aggregates
- Full Sample (103) — End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.41 0.63 0.52
- Cukierman Sample (21) — Late 1980s (narrow index for Cukierman) 0.27 0.45 0.35; Late 1980s (full index for GMT) 0.42 0.75 0.57; End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.29 0.67 0.48
- Monetary Unions (3) — End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.54 0.79 0.67
- Selected country-level End-2003 (Political Economic Overall):
  - Ecuador — 0.88 1.00 0.94
  - El Salvador — 0.63 1.00 0.81
  - Costa Rica — Late-1980s narrow 1.00 0.60 0.82; End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.50 0.88 0.69
  - Ukraine — 0.88 0.75 0.81
  - Kazakhstan — 0.63 0.88 0.75
  - Zambia — Late-1980s narrow 0.33 0.40 0.36; Late-1980s (full index for GMT) 0.67 0.60 0.64; End-2003 (Central Banks: overall) 0.38 0.50 0.44

### Cross-sample comparisons and notable points from the table
- Aggregate End-2003 overall indexes show higher autonomy in Advanced Economies (Full Sample 0.70 0.81 0.75) than in Emerging Markets (0.56 0.75 0.65) and Developing Countries (0.41 0.63 0.52).
- ESCB (13) registers very high End-2003 indexes: 1.00 0.78 0.89.
- Several individual countries exhibit maximum or near-maximum End-2003 overall values, e.g., ECB 1.00 1.00 1.00; Ecuador 0.88 1.00 0.94; Latvia 1.00 1.00 1.00 (listed in table).
- Many developing-country entries report low Late-1980s narrow indexes alongside considerably higher End-2003 full-index values (examples include Costa Rica, El Salvador, and several transition economies).

*Source: Appendix Table 10. Summary Indexes of Central Bank Autonomy (Late 1980s-2003) — _wp0788 - Appendix Table 10. Summary Indexes of Central Bank Autonomy (Late 1980s-2003)*

### Appendix Table 11. Classification of Central Banks

### Appendix Table 11. Classification of Central Banks

### Classification by Region and Income Level
- AFR — Developing:
  - Angola
  - BCEAO
  - BEAC
  - Botswana
  - Burundi
  - Cape Verde
  - Comoros
  - Eritrea
  - Ethiopia
  - Ghana
  - Guinea Rep.
  - Kenya
  - Lesotho
  - Liberia
  - Madagascar
  - Malawi
  - Mauritius
  - Mozambique
  - Namibia
  - Nigeria
  - Rwanda
  - São Tomé Príncipe
  - Seychelles
  - Sierra Leone
  - Tanzania
  - Uganda
  - Zambia
  - Zimbabwe
- AFR — Emerging:
  - South Africa

- APD — Advanced:
  - Australia
  - Hong Kong
  - Japan
  - Korea
  - New Zealand
  - Singapore
- APD — Developing:
  - Bangladesh
  - Bhutan
  - Cambodia
  - Fiji
  - Laos
  - Macau
  - Mongolia
  - Myanmar
  - Nepal
  - Papua New Guinea
  - Solomon Islands
  - Sri Lanka
  - Suriname
  - Timor-Leste
  - Tonga
  - Vanuatu
- APD — Emerging:
  - China
  - Belize
  - Bermuda
  - Cayman Islands
  - Malaysia
  - Philippines
  - Thailand
  - Vietnam

- EUR — Advanced:
  - Austria
  - Belgium
  - Cyprus
  - Denmark
  - ECB
  - Finland
  - France
  - Germany
  - Greece
  - Iceland
  - Ireland
  - Italy
  - Luxembourg
  - Netherlands
  - Norway
  - Portugal
  - Spain
  - Sweden
  - Switzerland
  - UK
- EUR — Developing:
  - Albania 2/
  - Belarus 2/
  - Bosnia Herz 2/
  - Bulgaria 2/
  - Czech Rep. 2/
  - Estonia 2/
  - Hungary 2/
  - Latvia 2/
  - Lithuania 2/
  - Macedonia 2/
  - Moldova 2/
  - Montenegro 2/
  - Poland 2/
  - Romania 2/
  - Russia 2/
  - Serbia Montenegro 2/
  - Slovak Rep. 2/
  - Slovenia 2/
  - Ukraine 2/
- EUR — Emerging:
  - Croatia 2/
  - Malta
  - Cyprus (also listed under Advanced in source)
  - Estonia 2/ (also listed under Developing in source)
  - Latvia 2/ (also listed under Developing in source)
  - Lithuania 2/ (also listed under Developing in source)
  - Poland 2/ (also listed under Developing in source)
  - Romania 2/ (also listed under Developing in source)
  - Russia 2/ (also listed under Developing in source)
  - Slovak Rep. 2/ (also listed under Developing in source)
  - Slovenia 2/ (also listed under Developing in source)
  - Turkey

- MCD — Developing:
  - Afghanistan
  - Algeria
  - Armenia 2/
  - Azerbaijan 2/
  - Bahrain
  - Comoros (also listed under AFR Developing in source)
  - Djibouti (not explicitly listed in source content provided)
  - Egypt
  - Iran
  - Iraq
  - Jordan
  - Kazakhstan 2/
  - Kuwait
  - Kyrgyz Rep. 2/
  - Lebanon
  - Libya
  - Morocco
  - Oman
  - Pakistan
  - Palestine
  - Qatar
  - Saudi Arabia
  - Sudan
  - Syrian Arab Rep.
  - Tajikistan 2/
  - Tunisia
  - Turkmenistan 2/
  - United Arab Emirates
  - Uzbekistan 2/
  - Yemen Rep.
- MCD — Emerging:
  - Egypt (also appears under Developing in source)
  - Jordan (also appears under Developing in source)
  - Morocco (also appears under Developing in source)
  - Pakistan (also appears under Developing in source)

- WHD — Advanced:
  - Canada
  - United States
- WHD — Developing:
  - Aruba
  - Bahamas
  - Barbados
  - Belize (also listed under APD Emerging in source)
  - Bermuda (also listed under APD Emerging in source)
  - Cayman Islands (also listed under APD Emerging in source)
  - Cuba
  - Dominican Rep.
  - Ecuador
  - El Salvador
  - Guatemala
  - Haiti
  - Honduras
  - Jamaica
  - Netherlands Antilles
  - Nicaragua
  - Panama
  - Paraguay
  - Trinidad and Tobago
  - Uruguay
  - Venezuela
- WHD — Emerging:
  - Argentina
  - Brazil
  - Chile
  - Mexico
  - Peru

### Notes and Footnotes
- 1/ The regional classification of central banks follows the organization of the IMF area departments.
- 2/ Economies in transition.

*Appendix Table 11. Classification of Central Banks (source content).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/_wp0788.pdf_