## 1. Brief Chronology of Important Events in the Housing Finance Sector

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### Introduction and paper objectives
- Widespread household access to home finance has long been a government objective in Mexico.
- Historical approach: redistributive, state-sponsored housing funds with inefficiency and poor governance.
- Privatization of the banking sector in the early 1990s led to rapid mortgage growth; the 1994 Tequila crisis and a spike in interest rates triggered defaults and a banking sector near-collapse, followed by lending retrenchment.
- Since 2001, authorities focused on developing framework and infrastructure for primary and secondary mortgage markets, emphasizing market mechanisms such as private mortgage insurance and improved repossession procedures and property registries.
- Paper objectives:
  - Track key legislative and institutional reforms leading to development of primary and secondary mortgage markets in Mexico.
  - Report main features and valuation practices of the RMBS markets.
  - Identify areas warranting close attention to improve outlook of Mexican RMBS market and draw lessons from recent developments in secondary mortgage markets.
- Paper organization: Section II—historical review; Section III—recent reforms; Section IV—institutional roles and RMBS developments; Section V—conclusions and policy recommendations.

### Brief chronology (selected milestones)
- 1933: BANOBRAS created.
- 1954: FONHAPO created.
- 1963: FOVI created.
- 1972: INFONAVIT and FOVISSTE created; funded by mandatory contribution of 5 percent of gross wages.
- 1982: Nationalization of the banking system.
- 1986: Institution of DIM mortgages; institution of FOBAPROA (now Ipab), the deposit insurance scheme.
- 1988: Deregulation of interest rates.
- 1989/1991/1992: Re-privatization of the commercial banking system.
- 1992: Reforms in FOVI and INFONAVIT and the public housing subsidy system.
- 1994: Creation of SOFOLES non-bank financial institutions.
- 2000: Amendments to the General Law on Securities and Credit.
- 2001: SHF commences operations.
- 2002: Law on Guaranteed Credit.
- 2003: First RMBS issued.

### Historical banking and mortgage trends
- 1970s: Six percent of total bank credit directed to housing at fixed/capped nominal rates; oil shocks → high inflation and negative real interest rates → 1981 banking crisis.
- Early 1990s rebound:
  - Between 1989 and 1994:
    - Total bank credit to private sector rose from close to 13 percent of GDP to more than 50 percent of GDP.
    - Bank mortgage lending rose from 1.3 percent of GDP to 2.4 percent of GDP (some 4.7 percent of total bank credit, compared with 10 percent in 1989).
- Tequila crisis fallout:
  - Interest rates climbed to 74 percent, triggering massive defaults and a public sector bank bail-out.
  - Restructuring converted floating-rate and dollar loans to long-term UDIs with fixed real rates, capitalizing inflation component.
- Market structure shifts post-crisis:
  - Sofoles created in 1994 became main issuers of private mortgages.
  - INFONAVIT remained a large presence in the primary mortgage market—about half of the market.
  - INFONAVIT securitizations required 18–23 percent subordination of the residual certificate for the senior certificates.
  - New bank lending represented 7 percent of residential mortgages in 2005 compared to 0.2 percent in 2000.

### Key structural obstacles prior to reforms
- Directed lending practices and interest-rate controls.
- Lack of comprehensive borrower credit histories and framework for sharing credit information.
- Lengthy and uncertain home repossession processes: foreclosures could take up to five months to be filed for and two years for a foreclosure sale to be ordered.
- Cumbersome legal framework for sale/transfer of real estate assets, high fixed notary fees, and priority claims (municipal taxes, unpaid wages) reducing seniority of mortgage liens.
- Real estate guarantee trusts were not allowed to issue debt prior to 2001.

---

### Reforming institutions and market-enabling legislation
- Reforms targeted creditor information, contract enforcement, creditor rights, foreclosure and repossession processes, and legal framework for guarantee trusts.
- Banking secrecy reform and credit reporting:
  - Emergence of one dominant private credit bureau (Buró de Crédito).
  - Law enacted in 2002 (amended in 2003) regulated its activities and privacy protections.
  - More than 1,000 institutions feed Buró de Crédito with positive and negative information on more than 64 million individual accounts and 4 million company accounts.
- 2000 reforms:
  - New Securities Law and Law on Guaranteed Credit allowed guarantee trusts (fideicomisos) to act as full-fledged SPVs; creditors of trusts granted rights over loan collateral with no exclusion; trustees can sell collateral in public auction without judicial foreclosure where no controversy exists.
  - Financial institutions exempted from registration requirements for transfer of mortgage liens if they continue to service credits.
  - Introduction of “certificados bursatiles” or ceburs as flexible securitization vehicles.
- 2003 legislation:
  - Standardized mortgage contract clauses and uniform loan information formats.
  - Introduced prepayment assignment rule (mortgage originator assigns rights to payer in case of anticipated total payment), adding prepayment risk to MBS holders.
  - Revised credit bureau regulations to improve timeliness, depth and quality of borrower information.

---

### Box 2 — Securitization: mechanics, requirements, benefits
- Main elements and legal/infrastructure requirements:
  - Uniform loan characteristics; speedy and low-cost mortgage foreclosure procedures; full transferability of mortgages with SPV claim seniority; tax neutrality for transfers.
  - SPV must be of “high credit quality”; example practice: SPVs capitalized and legally able to issue securities.
  - SPV servicing fees typically between 0.25 and 0.5 percent of loan balance.
  - Pricing requires historical repayment and default patterns; data on defaults and pre-payments are crucial.
- Main benefits:
  - Immediate funding from sale of loans; broader investor base; risk diversification and transfer; reduced regulatory capital for originators.
- Structuring options:
  - Pass-through securities (mirror underlying loan characteristics, pass prepayment risk to investors).
  - Tranched issues (senior tranches paid first, lower risk; junior tranches absorb earlier losses).
  - Credit enhancement options: structural (over-collateralization) and third-party guarantees.

---

### Box 3 — SHF’s Guarantees Program: instruments and market role
- Guarantees for mortgage borrowers:
  - A swap of UDI for minimum salary payments (VSM) that transforms UDI-denominated loan payments into multiples of minimum salaries; SHF takes UDI risk for a fee, hedging by selling long VSM position to FOVI.
- Guarantees for lenders:
  - Default payment guarantee (GPI) / mortgage insurance pays up to 35 percent of the outstanding balance of the mortgage loan, plus interest and unpaid service/insurance fees, after six consecutive months delinquency and foreclosure.
    - Note: Initially the GPI percentage was 25 percent and it was increased in April 2004.
  - GPI fee is paid by the borrower through the financial intermediary.
  - A mortgage insurance scheme (GI) insures lenders for up to 70 percent of outstanding balance for certain loans with up-front government subsidy.
- Financial guarantees for RMBS issuers:
  - Garantia de Pago Oportuno (GPO) timely payment partial guarantee designed to cover up to 85 percent of outstanding principal and interest for eligible portfolios.
  - Maximum protection acquired by any institution has been 25 percent so far.
  - GPO functions like a credit line/liquidity facility; fee is part of trust expenses.
- Eligibility, underwriting, oversight:
  - To qualify for SHF support mortgages must meet requirements (debt-to-income ratios, loan-to-value ratios, property type/values, reporting).
  - Non-compliant loans require trust reimbursement to SHF for payments made under guarantee.
  - SHF reviews all loans to be securitized before awarding GPO.
- Market entry and competition:
  - Private financial guarantee providers entered market after 2006 regulatory changes; Ambac, Genworth FMO, IFC, MBIA among competitors.
- Data and infrastructure:
  - SHF plans a comprehensive mortgage database and will oversee Mortgage Information Statistics (FIEH) with borrower characteristics, house prices and loan payment history — not fully operative at time of paper.
  - Hipotecaria Total (HiTo) set up to expedite securitization; Danish VP technological platform collaborated with SHF to create HiTo interfacing banks, Sofoles and INDEVAL.
- RMBS market growth:
  - Total structured issues over US$6 billion in 2006—tripling since 2004.
  - RMBS first appeared in late 2003; by 2006 became largest structured asset class, representing over 25 percent of total local structured issues.
  - As of October 2007 there were over US$6.4 billion RMBS issues outstanding by seven Sofoles, two banks and INFONAVIT.
  - SHF acts as market maker and commits to buy Borhis in primary and secondary markets; SHF prices Borhis based on its cash flow and prepayment/default assumptions.

### Re-openable (“fungible”) RMBS
- Originators can re-open existing series during the first year (reopening periods range from one to three years) up to pre-established maximum to increase issue size and liquidity.
- First fungible Borhis appeared in late 2006.

### Issuers and investors (as of October 2007)
- Sofoles: 60 percent of total outstanding RMBS stock.
- Commercial banks: around 5 percent of issues.
- INFONAVIT: around 27 percent of outstanding RMBS stock.
- Local institutional investors dominate: domestic pension funds and insurance companies.
- Reasons for pension fund interest:
  - MBSs typically denominated in UDIs → inflation-linked returns matching liabilities.
  - Credit enhancements, OC and junior tranches help achieve investment-grade ratings.
  - Structured issues carry slightly higher yields than comparable government securities and offer long durations.

### Valuation, rating and data challenges
- High uncertainty in modeling cash flows due to limited/historical data on default rates, prepayment rates, recovery rates, and foreclosure length.
- House value data weak: appraisals often provided by construction companies; need to deter fraudulent appraisals.
- Market reports suggest constant pre-payment rate assumed at 5 percent; SHF White Paper indicates historical prepayments around this level.
- UDI-denominated government bonds (Udibonos) used as benchmarks have been illiquid, complicating price discovery.
- Secondary market price information mostly from local price vendors; SHF is working with vendors to improve practices but is not required to buy bonds at vendor prices.
- Ratings:
  - Early Borhis benefited from SHF partial guarantees, conservative LTVs, mortgage insurance, and UDI-VSM swaps.
  - Junior tranches often enable senior tranches to attain AAA local ratings without financial guarantee.
  - Some senior tranches with total financial guarantee rated AAA on global scale.
  - Rating agencies have relied heavily on SHF’s due diligence for initial ratings; concerns that rating agencies have been slow in proactive review.

### UDI details
- UDI updated daily reflecting CPI changes.
- Bank of Mexico publishes UDI value for the next fifteen days on the 10 and 26 of each month.
- UDI had a value of 1 on April 4, 1995 (as of 4/2007 approximately 3.85).

---

### Box 4 — Main characteristics of Mexican MBS issues
- Originators:
  - Sofoles: issues typically denominated in UDIs, standardized underlying loans, enhancements via SHF or insurers.
  - INFONAVIT: more diverse underlying loans, issues carry no direct financial guarantees but use over-collateralization; perceived implicit government guarantee.
  - Commercial banks: diversified MBS, often fixed-peso characteristics; not all carry mortgage insurance or SHF guarantees; use of international insurers and tranched structures.
- Coupon and spreads:
  - Interest rates on MBS issues averaged between 5 to 6 percent in real terms.
  - Early spreads around 120–140 basis points over UDIbono yield curve.
  - More recent spreads around 80–90 basis points.
  - Issues with total financial guarantee saw spreads around 40–50 basis points above UDIbono.
- Term:
  - RMBS terms ranged from 10 to 30 years, with most recent issues around 30 years.
- Credit enhancements and structure:
  - GPO and GPI/GI commonly used; GPI covers up to 35 percent of losses (initially 25 percent; increased April 2004).
  - LTV caps: 80 percent for UDI loans, 90 percent for peso loans to qualify for GPO.
  - Over-collateralization (OC) varied from 0.8 up to 15 percent; recent deals initial OC close to 1.0 percent with OC building over time.
  - Some issues feature 100 percent liquidity “full wrap” guarantees (liquidity, not default protection).
  - Senior tranches ≈ 80 percent; junior/mezzanine ranged 3 to 12 percent; equity positions between 4 and 8 percent retained by originators.

### Policy observations, infrastructure gaps and risks
- Market foundations improved: inflation-indexed or fixed-peso mortgages, non-deposit originations, standardized issuance and SHF origination practices.
- Infrastructure gaps:
  - Public property registries remain paper-based and unsystematized—raising collateral verification costs.
  - Auditors and rating agencies need strengthening; auditors sometimes check only 5 to 10 percent of portfolio titles.
  - Need standards for due diligence firms reviewing loan files.
  - Centralized prepayment/default databases under development but not fully operational.
- Concentration and incentive risks:
  - Absence of market for lower-rated securities → mezzanine tranches often retained by originators → reduces risk diversification and capital relief.
  - SHF as liquidity provider and market-maker may create contingent fiscal liabilities under stress; no explicit limit on Borhis SHF could buy.
  - Guarantee programs for construction companies may create incentives to relax construction quality standards.
  - Large INFONAVIT securitizations with compressed spreads may reflect perceived implicit public guarantees and could crowd out private issuers—constituting contingent government liabilities.
- Lessons from U.S. events:
  - RMBS valuation complexity amplified by Mexican data limitations.
  - Concerns about rating agencies’ timeliness and reliance on originator due diligence.
  - Transferring loans off-balance sheet can weaken borrower-lender relationships; originators may have to repurchase loans in stress.
  - Fideicomisos may be more vulnerable than capitalized SPVs because they lack own capital.

---

### Key statistics and figures (as reported)
- Mandatory worker contribution funding INFONAVIT and FOVISSTE: 5 percent of gross wages.
- Bank mortgage lending: 1.3 percent of GDP (1989) → 2.4 percent of GDP (1994).
- Total bank credit to private sector: close to 13 percent of GDP (1989) → more than 50 percent of GDP (1994).
- Interest rate spike during Tequila crisis: 74 percent.
- INFONAVIT securitizations required 18–23 percent subordination of residual certificate.
- GPI mortgage insurance pays up to 35 percent of outstanding balance (initially 25 percent; increased April 2004).
- GPO designed to cover up to 85 percent of outstanding principal and interest; maximum protection acquired by any institution has been 25 percent so far.
- Buró de Crédito: data from more than 1,000 institutions covering more than 64 million individual accounts and 4 million company accounts.
- Total structured issues in 2006: over US$6 billion (tripling since 2004).
- RMBS outstanding as of October 2007: over US$6.4 billion issued by seven Sofoles, two banks and INFONAVIT.
- RMBS share of total local structured issues by 2006: over 25 percent.
- Assumed constant prepayment rate cited in market reports: 5 percent.
- UDI value: 1 on April 4, 1995; as of 4/2007 approximately 3.85.
- MBS coupons averaged between 5 to 6 percent in real terms.
- Early RMBS spreads: around 120–140 basis points; more recent spreads: 80–90 basis points; full-wrap guaranteed issues: around 40–50 basis points.
- RMBS terms: 10 to 30 years (most recent around 30 years).
- Over-collateralization levels: variable in order of 0.8 up to 15 percent; recent deals initial OC close to 1.0 percent.
- Senior tranche share: about 80 percent; junior/mezzanine: 3 to 12 percent; equity retained: 4 to 8 percent.

*Source: IMF working paper content unit titled "1. Brief Chronology of Important Events in the Housing Finance Sector."*

### 1. Brief Chronology of Important Events in the Housing Finance Sector................................ 5

### 1. Brief Chronology of Important Events in the Housing Finance Sector

### I. Introduction
- Widespread household access to home finance has long been a goal of governments in Mexico.
- Historical Mexican approach emphasized redistributive schemes implemented through state-sponsored housing funds, characterized by inefficiency and poor governance.
- Privatization of the banking sector in the early 1990s led to very rapid growth in mortgage loans; the 1994 Tequila crisis and subsequent sharp increase in interest rates contributed to record defaults and near-collapse of the banking sector, followed by a long period of lending retrenchment.
- Since 2001 authorities focused on developing framework and infrastructure to support primary and secondary mortgage markets, emphasizing market mechanisms such as private mortgage insurance and improvements in housing repossession procedures and property registries.
- Paper objectives:
  - Track key legislative and institutional reforms leading to development of primary and secondary mortgage markets in Mexico.
  - Report main features and valuation practices of the RMBS markets.
  - Identify areas warranting close attention to improve outlook of Mexican RMBS market and draw lessons from recent developments in secondary mortgage markets.
- Paper organization (sections referenced):
  - Section II: Experiences of housing finance mechanisms over past three decades and historical landmarks.
  - Section III: Recent reforms enabling new instruments for housing finance and comparisons with other countries.
  - Section IV: Roles and functioning of institutions providing housing finance and developments in local RMBS market.
  - Section V: Conclusions identifying developmental hurdles and policy recommendations.

### II. A Brief Review of Housing Finance in Mexico
- Government-sponsored financing of low-income housing has been channeled through multiple institutions:
  - 1933: Banco de Obras Publicas (BANOBRAS) created to finance low-income housing.
  - 1954: Fideicomiso del Fondo Nacional de Habitaciones Populares (FONHAPO) created.
  - 1963: Fondo de Operación y Financiamento Bancario de la Vivienda (FOVI) created within the central bank to provide low interest mortgages for low to moderate income households; funded by the central bank and the World Bank; operated as a second-tier bank providing funding and guarantees (up to 45 percent of loss-given default) to banks extending mortgages to targeted households and low-cost housing developers.
  - 1972: Instituto de Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores (INFONAVIT) and Fondo de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado (FOVISSTE) created; funded by a mandatory contribution of 5 percent of gross wages; long-standing workhorses of government-sponsored low-income housing finance. INFONAVIT still has a large presence in the primary mortgage market—about half of the market (see Figure 1 referenced in source).
- Directed lending and interest rate caps:
  - Late 1960s and 1970s: Six percent of total bank credit had to be directed to housing finance at fixed or capped nominal interest rates.
  - 1970s oil shocks led to high inflation, negative real interest rates, large portfolio losses for banks, contributing to 1981 banking crisis; banking sector nationalized in 1982 and losses absorbed by government.
- 1980s environment:
  - Government securities crowded out private credit instruments; banks authorized to issue “dual index mortgages” (DIM) allowing negative amortization linked to minimum wage index (VSM) and CPI differences were capitalized.
  - 6 percent minimum credit allocation to housing remained binding; government securities represented 70 percent of banks’ total assets.
  - Re-privatization of banking in early 1990s did not immediately stimulate private mortgage market; DIM mortgages faded due to erosion in purchasing power and rising loan balances increasing credit and market risks.
- Early 1990s reforms and rebound:
  - By 1993, legal reforms, inflation-indexed mortgages and benign international liquidity led to rebirth of private mortgage market.
  - 1992 legal reforms modernized housing deeds; capital inflows stimulated mortgage lending growth.
  - Between 1989 and 1994:
    - Total bank credit to private sector increased from close to 13 percent of GDP to more than 50 percent of GDP.
    - Bank mortgage lending jumped from 1.3 percent of GDP to 2.4 percent of GDP (some 4.7 percent of total bank credit, compared with 10 percent in 1989).
- Tequila crisis impact:
  - Sharp interest rate spike post-Tequila crisis: interest rates climbed to 74 percent, triggering massive defaults and a public sector bank bail-out.
  - Restructuring converted outstanding floating rate and dollar denominated loans to long-term loans in UDIs carrying a fixed real interest rate, while inflation component was capitalized.
- Post-crisis market structure shifts:
  - Commercial banks largely relinquished origination of real estate mortgages to non-bank financial institutions and public sector entities.
  - 1994: Non-bank financial intermediaries specializing in real estate mortgages (Sofoles) created, focusing on low income households; Sofoles’ main source of funding was FOVI, which also supervised them and determined underwriting and service requirements.
  - Since second half of 1990s, Sofoles became main issuers of private mortgages.
  - INFONAVIT management and governance improved substantially; it launched “Apoyo INFONAVIT” program allowing members to leverage INFONAVIT savings to obtain market-based mortgage finance.
  - INFONAVIT securitizations have required 18–23 percent subordination of the residual certificate for the senior certificates.
  - Traditional bank mortgage activity concentrated on middle to upper income segments; Sofoles’ success prompted some commercial banks to acquire large Sofoles.
  - New bank lending represented 7 percent of residential mortgages in 2005 compared to only 0.2 percent in 2000.

### Box 1: Brief Chronology of Important Events in the Housing Finance Sector
- 1933: BANOBRAS was created as the first public housing institution.
- 1954: FONAHPO
- 1963: FOVI
- 1972: INFONAVIT and FOVISSTE created as government-sponsored private and public (respectively) workers’ housing funds
- 1982: Nationalization of the banking system
- 1986: Institution of the DIM mortgages
- 1986: Institution of FOBAPROA (now Ipab), the deposit insurance scheme
- 1988: Deregulation of interest rates
- 1989: Re-privatization of the commercial banking system
- 1989: Abolishment of the quantitative lending requirements and of the interest rate controls.
- 1991/2: Re-privatization of the banking sector.
- 1992: Reforms in FOVI and INFONAVIT and the public housing subsidy system.
- 1994: Creation of SOFOLES non bank financial institutions licensed to lend to particular sectors for specific types of activity.
- 2000: Amendments to the General Law on Securities and Credit.
- 2001: SHF commences operations.
- 2002: Law on Guaranteed Credit.
- 2003: First RMBS issued.

### III. Reforming Institutions: The Foundations for Private Mortgage Markets
- Obstacles hindering emergence of primary private mortgage market until mid-1990s:
  - Directed lending practices.
  - Lack of comprehensive borrower credit history records to estimate historical default probabilities.
  - Absence of framework for sharing borrowers’ credit information across banks; public credit registry (SENICREB) operated by Bank of Mexico existed but its use in supporting credit decisions was limited.
  - Lengthy and uncertain home repossession processes: foreclosures could take up to five months to be filed for and two years for a foreclosure sale to be ordered; owners would not be liable for any remaining amount if foreclosed property sold for less than lien amount owed.
- Obstacles to development of secondary mortgage market through securitization:
  - Lack of standardization in mortgage loans—each commercial bank offered its own lending terms, making pooling for securitization impractical.
  - No government agency or public institution in charge of directing or overseeing loan standards.
  - Lack of comprehensive credit history made estimation of default and pre-payment probabilities difficult.
  - Legal framework for sale of real estate assets cumbersome:
    - Transfer of real estate titles (such as mortgages) had to be registered with a central registry office, a lengthy and costly process given high fixed notary fees.
    - By law, borrower notification was required during a sale of real estate assets, delaying the process.
    - When a lien is registered to secure a mortgage loan, such lien did not give absolute seniority to mortgage originator; law identified categories of creditors with seniority over mortgage lender for sale amount, e.g., municipalities for tax amounts and employees for unpaid wages.
  - Real estate guarantee trusts existed as legal entities functioning as trustees and were not allowed to issue debt—a key element for securitization—prior to 2001.

*Source: IMF working paper content unit titled "1. Brief Chronology of Important Events in the Housing Finance Sector."*

### Box 2.  Securitization

### _wp08105 - Box 2.  Securitization

### Main elements
- Mortgage securitization allows mortgage issuers to access fresh funding and transfer market and credit risk embedded in existing loans by selling a loan portfolio to an independent special purpose company or vehicle (SPE or SPV).
- SPV funding comes from issues of securities to capital market investors; cash flow from interest and principal repayments services mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), and the mortgages act as collateral.
- Legal steps and infrastructure requirements for efficient mortgage securitization:
  - Loans in the pool should have uniform characteristics, including terms of the loan, documentation, credit quality and performance history.
  - Mortgage foreclosure procedures must be relatively speedy and of low cost to ensure high creditworthiness of the securities.
  - Mortgages must be fully transferable so the SPV acquires full rights over receivables and its claim on collateral is senior to any other claim, voiding originator creditors’ claims on collateral if the originator defaults.
  - Tax system must allow transfer of assets to be securitized without generating costs from the mere swap of funds from the loan originator to the SPV issuer.
- SPV characteristics:
  - The SPV must be an entity of “high credit quality.”
  - Example: in the U.S. SPVs must be capitalized and legally empowered to issue securities.
  - SPVs perform mortgage servicing and are paid between 0.25 and 0.5 percent of the loan balance.
- Pricing and data requirements:
  - Pricing of MBSs should reflect historical patterns of repayments and defaults in the loan origination areas.
  - Data on default rates and pre-payment history (particularly in the absence of pre-payment penalty) are crucial for accurate pricing.
  - Collection of such data and agreement for financial institutions to share credit information are necessary for MBS market development.

### Main Benefits
- Immediate funding: mortgage originators can book proceeds from sale of mortgages immediately as cash, generating funding for new lending.
- Broader investor base: transforming loans into securities allows access to a broader pool of private sector savings.
- Risk diversification and transfer:
  - Removing loans from balance sheets achieves diversification of credit and market risk.
  - Remaining mismatches in asset and liability cash flows and credit risk are removed from the originator and dispersed across market investors.
- Regulatory capital: regulatory capital requirements of mortgage originators are typically reduced as loans are taken off their balance sheets.
- Structuring options for MBSs:
  - Pass-through securities:
    - Present same characteristics as underlying loans in coupon, term, duration and market risk.
    - Have the same pre-payment risk as underlying loans; all market and credit risk passed to investors.
  - Tranched issues:
    - Paid sequentially according to seniority; higher tranches receive pre-payments first, have shorter duration and lower risk; lower tranches redeemed after higher tranches are redeemed in full.
    - Provide investors choices on expected duration or risk.
  - Investment-grade targeting: MBSs typically aim for an investment grade rating to market to institutional investors.
  - Credit enhancement:
    - Mortgage securitization transactions typically require credit enhancement to achieve investment grade or a rating higher than the originator bank.
    - Enhancements can be structural (e.g., over-collateralization where principal of underlying pool > principal value of securities issued) or third-party partial guarantees.

### Financial Sector Reforms to Boost Private Mortgage Markets (Mexico)
- Legislative and regulatory efforts focused on improving creditor information, contract enforcement, and creditor rights; clarifying and streamlining foreclosures and repossession processes; and developing legal framework for guarantee trusts in securitization.
- Banking secrecy reform enabled sharing of customer credit information, boosting the credit reporting industry:
  - Emergence of one dominant private credit bureau (Buró de Crédito) owned by financial and non-financial institutions.
  - A law enacted in 2002 (amended in 2003) regulated its activities and privacy protections.
  - More than 1,000 institutions feed Buró de Crédito with positive and negative information on more than 64 million individual accounts and 4 million company accounts.
  - Banks and lenders can obtain real-time data to better differentiate borrower risk (calibration of scoring models) and expand credit.
- 2000 reforms:
  - New Securities Law together with the Law on Guaranteed Credit allowed guarantee trusts (fideicomisos) to act as full-fledged SPVs.
  - Creditors of trusts were granted rights over loan collateral with no exclusion, increasing legal protection of creditors’ rights over trusts relative to other creditors.
  - Foreclosure procedures simplified for trusts: trustees can sell loan collateral in a public auction without following judicial foreclosure where no controversy exists; in cases of controversy, trustees must undergo formal judicial process.
  - Financial institutions could act as trustees and beneficiaries of the trust; banks and non-banks (Sofoles) may hold title to property through a trust and foreclose via out-of-court procedures if borrower defaults.
  - Financial institutions exempted from registration requirements for transfer of mortgage liens if they continue to service credits, streamlining securitization procedures.
  - The Securities Law introduced “certificados bursatiles” or ceburs, sufficiently flexible to be used as a vehicle for securitized issues.
- 2003 legislation:
  - Established standard financial clauses for every mortgage contract and required loan information in standardized format for comparability across contracts.
  - Provided that the mortgage originator, in case of an anticipated total payment, would assign all rights derived from the credit to the payer, introducing prepayment risk to MBS holders.
  - Regulations for credit bureau operations revised to improve timeliness, depth and quality of borrower information.

### Mexico’s secondary mortgage market features and SHF role
- Mexican secondary market launched with government-sponsored initiatives but differs from U.S. model:
  - U.S. model: government-sponsored agencies buy mortgages from originators who comply with standards, pool them and back securities.
  - Mexico: originators issue MBSs directly in the market and benefit from credit enhancements provided by SHF in the form of financial guarantees to mortgage originators meeting SHF’s origination standards.
- Use of private credit enhancements in Mexico parallels U.S. practices; private global companies providing enhancements include MBIA, FIGC, AIG, Genworth and AMBAC.
- Danish model features that attracted attention:
  - High liquidity due to large pools of securitized loans with uniform characteristics (coupon, amortization rate, loan-to-value ratios).
  - Market-making scheme where ten commercial banks trade open-for-issuance mortgage bonds at a common price.
  - Issuance and trading through the Danish Central Depository Institution (VP); pass-through bonds have the same characteristics as the underlying mortgage pools.
  - Prepayment risk in Denmark is reduced by a borrower’s ability to deliver a bond in lieu of mortgage payment (not adopted in Mexico).
  - Regulation in Denmark requires strict matching of cash flows between underlying loan and bond servicing flows, so prepayment risk is held by investors who accept larger duration fluctuations.
  - Mexico’s adoption of VP’s technological platform is expected to help liquidity and smooth trading of the RMBS market.
  - As in the U.S. and Mexico, Denmark has penalty-free prepayment clauses; unlike Denmark, Mexico has no provisions to fend against prepayment risk.

### The Mexican way: from FOVI to SHF and support measures
- SHF created in 2001 to develop the secondary mortgage market; originally similar to U.S. Federal Housing Agencies but designed to reduce direct second-tier bank role over time and shift toward supporting direct issuance of MBSs by financial institutions.
- SHF interventions:
  - Selling partial financial guarantees and mortgage insurance to Sofoles.
  - Main guarantee programs:
    - Partial financial guarantee (Garantia de Pago Oportuno or GPO) provides protection for timely payment of MBS obligations, similar to a credit line.
    - Default payment guarantee (GPI) or mortgage insurance pays the financial intermediary or trust up to 35 percent of the outstanding balance of the mortgage loan, plus interest thereon, and unpaid service and insurance fees, after a mortgage loan is delinquent for six consecutive months.
      - Note: Initially the GPI percentage was 25 percent and it was increased in April 2004.
  - Guarantees designed to provide bond insurance to MBS investors.
  - SHF also offers a swap to meet housing finance needs of low to medium-income households: SHF sells a swap of UDI for minimum salary payments, allowing borrowers to make payments in multiples of minimum salaries against UDI denominated mortgages; SHF hedges UDI risk by selling the long VSM position to FOVI, which would eventually bear such losses.
- Effects of SHF criteria:
  - Criteria for sale of GPI or GPO induce standardization in mortgage products; mortgages must meet SHF standards (criteria continue beyond excerpt).

*Source: _wp08105 - Box 2.  Securitization*

### Box 3. SHF’s Guarantees Program

### Box 3. SHF’s Guarantees Program

### Guarantees for mortgage borrowers
- A swap of UDI for minimum salary payments (VSM). This swap allows borrowers in UDI-denominated loans to reduce the risk of mortgage debt by transforming payments in multiples of minimum salaries.
- The structure of the mortgage for the borrower is similar to that of a loan in UDIs. However, the risk that an increase in UDIs is higher than the increase in the minimum wage is taken over by SHF upon payment of a fee.

### Guarantees for lenders
- A default payment guarantee (GPI) or mortgage insurance1 will pay to the relevant financial intermediary or the trust up to 35 percent1 of the outstanding balance of the mortgage loan, plus interest thereon, and for unpaid service and insurance fees, after a mortgage loan is delinquent for six consecutive months and foreclosure takes place.
- The fee for the GPI is paid for by the borrower, through the financial intermediary.
- A mortgage insurance scheme (GI) which insures the lender for up to 70 percent of the outstanding balance of the mortgage loan, plus interest thereon, and for unpaid service and insurance fees for certain loans, including those that contain an up-front subsidy from the government.

### Financial guarantees for RMBS issuers
- A timely payment partial guarantee program, Garantia de Pago Oportuno (GPO), is designed to provide assurance of timely payment of principal and interest up to 85 percent of the outstanding balance of principal and interest for those loan portfolios that comply with certain requirements.
- However, the maximum protection acquired by any institution has been 25 percent so far.
- Timely payment guarantee is a credit enhancement at the deal level of the structure, and is similar to a credit line. If the trust does not have sufficient cash to make a given payment, the line of credit can be drawn to pay both interest and principal. Once the line of credit is repaid, it can be drawn down again, if the need arises.
- The fee to the provider of the GPO is part of the expenses of the trust.

### Eligibility, underwriting, and oversight
- To qualify for SHF’s support, mortgages have to be originated and underwritten following specific requirements–among others, debt-to-income ratios, loan-to-value ratios, property type and values, and reporting requirements for the financial intermediaries.
- Should a loan not comply with the eligibility criteria, the trust would have to reimburse SHF for any payment made under the guarantee for that specific loan.
- In addition, SHF reviews all the loans to be securitized before awarding GPO guarantees.

### Market entry, competition, and regulatory changes
- While initially SHF was the only provider of mortgage insurance and financial guarantees, recently private sector financial guarantee providers have entered the market.
- Regulatory changes in the insurance sector passed in 2006 led to the licensing of two foreign mortgage insurance companies to operate in Mexico.
- Financial guarantee providers such as Ambac, Genworth FMO, IFC and most recently MBIA, have been recently competing with SHF in the provision of these guarantees.

### Mortgage data and securitization infrastructure
- Future plans of SHF include the development of a comprehensive mortgage data base.
- SHF will oversee Mortgage Information Statistics (FIEH), which is designed to include borrower characteristics, house prices and loan payment history.
- All such information will become available to mortgage lenders, insurers and investors in securitized loan pools and will provide an essential tool to enhance transparency and efficiency in the mortgage markets.
- However, this project was not fully operative at the time of this paper was written.
- Recently, Hipotecaria Total (HiTo) was set up with the goal of expediting the securitization process.
- The Danish central depository institution (VP), in collaboration with SHF, set up a technological platform in HiTo to launch a system that is open to any party interested in the securitization of a mortgage portfolio.
- HiTo allows the continuous interface of banks, Sofoles and the Mexican depository institution INDEVAL so as to expedite and reduce risks in the securitization process.

### Securitization and rise of the Mexican RMBS market
- Total issues of structured securities reached over US$6 billion in 2006—tripling in volume since 2004.
- Mortgage backed securities (MBS) based on residential mortgage loans (RMBS) made their first appearance in late 2003 and by 2006 they had become the largest structured asset class, representing over 25 percent of total local structured issues.
- As of October 2007 there were over US$6.4 billion RMBS issues outstanding in the Mexican bond market by seven different Sofoles, two banks and INFONAVIT.
- The strong growth in RMBSs was supported by SHF. Those RMBSs that satisfy the loan origination criteria, which would make them eligible for SHF support through credit enhancements, are commonly referred to as Borhis in the local market.
- Under normal conditions, SHF buys Borhis at a price based on its own cash flow and computed according to a methodology based on certain prepayment and default assumptions; SHF acts as “market maker” and commits to buy Borhis both in the primary and secondary markets.

### Re-openable (“fungible”) RMBS features
- Mexico adopted the Danish technological platform enabling mortgage originators to start issuing RMBSs closer to the Danish ones.
- The important difference is that existing series can be augmented by re-opening it during the first year up to a pre-established maximum and increasing the size of each issue in the market, thereby allowing it to achieve higher liquidity.
- Every fungible Bori structure has reopening periods ranging from one to three years.
- The first re-openable MBSs, so-called “Borhis fungibles”, made their appearance in late 2006.

### Issuers and investors
- As of October 2007, Sofoles accounted for 60 percent of total outstanding RMBS stock of issuances.
- Commercial banks represented around 5 percent of issues.
- INFONAVIT accounted for around 27 percent of the outstanding stock of RMBS issues in the market as of October 2007.
- Local institutional investors dominate the market for structured issues; the bulk of RMBS issues are held by domestic pension funds and insurance companies.
- Reasons for pension fund interest:
  - Mexican MBSs are typically denominated in UDIs and thus generate inflation-linked returns matching pension funds’ liability structures.
  - Credit enhancements, over-collateralization, and junior tranches help achieve investment grade credit ratings.
  - Structured issues carry slightly higher yields than comparable government securities.
  - The underlying loans and collateral allow relatively long duration, matching pension funds’ liabilities.
- Subordinated tranches have had less appeal, though appetite appears to have been growing recently; junior tranches have sometimes been retained by originating institutions.

### Valuation and rating challenges
- There is a high degree of uncertainty surrounding parameters used to model cash flows from RMBSs’ underlying assets: default rates, prepayment rates, recovery rates, and length of the foreclosure process.
- Lack of comprehensive historical data complicates valuation; recent legislative reforms affecting the foreclosure process may have altered the significance of available historical information.
- The lack of historical and market data on housing prices further complicates assessment of loan-to-value ratios and over-collateralization.
- In principle, house values for mortgages in portfolios guaranteed by SHF must be formally appraised; however, most of the time, house prices for loan purposes have been supplied directly by the construction companies.
- Authorities are aware of the need to deter fraudulent appraisals as these would compromise RMBS valuation and investor portfolio integrity.
- Market reports suggest the constant pre-payment rate has been assumed at 5 percent, and an SHF White Paper indicates historical experience with prepayments has been around this level.
- The government bonds denominated in UDIs (Udibonos) used as benchmark bonds for pricing have been illiquid, complicating price discovery for RMBS valuation.
- Currently, the only source of information for RMBS prices in the secondary market are the local price vendors. SHF is working with the price vendors to improve practices. SHF is not required to buy the bonds at the prices announced by the vendors.
- The valuation of RMBSs relies heavily on rating agencies’ review process. High ratings make securities suitable for pension fund portfolios.
- Factors behind high ratings of early Borhis include SHF’s partial financial guarantee, SHF’s incentives to Sofoles to issue loans with conservative loan-to-value ratios, mortgage insurance, and the UDI -VSM swap for all UDI-denominated loans.
- In more recent issues, junior tranches effectively provide an additional buffer for senior tranches so senior tranches have sometimes not needed a financial guarantee to attain an “AAA” rating on the local Mexican scale.
- Some issues with a senior tranche with a total financial guarantee were rated “AAA” on the global ratings scale.
- Because mortgages in most securitizations are covered by mortgage insurance for up to 35 percent of the losses, even the junior tranches still qualified for an “A” rating.
- For initial ratings, rating agencies have tended to rely heavily on SHF’s due diligence on the quality of the loan portfolio to be securitized.
- There have been suggestions that rating agencies should play a more proactive role in rating review of RMBSs, as downgrades reportedly occurred only after irregularities had become readily apparent.

### UDI details
- The UDI is a unit of account the value of which is updated daily and reflects the changes in the consumer price index.
- On the 10 and the 26 of each month the Bank of Mexico publishes the UDI’s value for the next fifteen days.
- The UDI had a value of 1 on April 4, 1995 (as of 4/2007 approximately 3.85).

*Source: Box 3. SHF’s Guarantees Program (from the provided IMF content).*

### Box 4. Main Characteristics of Mexican MBS Issues

### Box 4. Main Characteristics of Mexican MBS Issues

### Overview by originating institution
- Sofoles:
  - Issues typically denominated in UDIs and thereby are inflation-linked.
  - Underlying loans are mostly standardized.
  - Carry enhancements purchased through SHF or other insurers.
- INFONAVIT:
  - Underlying loans more diverse in nature, although reportedly all sharing the same duration of the structured paper that was issued.
  - Characteristics of INFONAVIT’s loans depend on borrowers’ income level and the size of the house to be purchased.
  - Issues carry no direct financial guarantees but include over-collateralization as a form of credit enhancement.
  - Perception among investors that these products have an implicit government guarantee because INFONAVIT is a government-sponsored institution.
- Commercial banks:
  - Diversified MBS issues have emerged rapidly.
  - Mostly structured to reflect fixed peso characteristics of the mortgages extended by banks.
  - Not all RMBs carry mortgage insurance and guarantees offered by SHF.
  - Enhancements in a number of commercial bank issues consist of extended liquidity facilities (or total financial guarantees) by large international insurance institutions and tranched structures to support credit ratings.

### Coupon
- Interest rates on MBS issues have averaged between 5 to 6 percent in real terms.
- More recent issues have carried lower coupons reflecting both an easing of real rates in the economy and a compression in MBS spread vis-à-vis their benchmark UDIbono bonds.
- Early issues carried a significantly higher spread (around 120–140 basis points) with respect to the UDIbono yield curve.
- More recent spreads have ranged around 80–90 basis points.
- Issues with a total financial guarantee on the senior notes brought a further decline in issuance spreads to around 40–50 basis points above the UDIbono benchmark.
- Over time spreads for Sofoles-issued MBSs have compressed owing to greater demand and higher liquidity provided by SHF’s secondary market activity and increased use of mezzanine tranches.

### Term
- RMBS term has ranged from 10 to 30 years with most of the most recent issues around 30 years.
- They carry the longest maturities available for a private (and public) sector security on the market.
- Typical term for other types of asset-backed issues in Mexico has been from five to seven years.

### Credit Enhancements
- Most issues by Sofoles structured to comply with requirements to qualify for the SHF partial financial guarantee (GPO).
- Qualification requirements for GPO:
  - Holders of underlying mortgages need to hold a UDIs-VSM swap.
  - Underlying mortgages are covered by the mortgage insurance guarantee (GPI).
  - Loan-to-value ratio requirements: cannot exceed 80 percent for UDI-denominated mortgages and 90 percent for peso-denominated loans.
- Most MBSs have over-collateralization (OC); OC levels have been variable in the order of 0.8 up to 15 percent.
- In more recent deals the initial collateralization has been close to 1.0 percent with the over-collateralization expected to build to a higher target value as the bond principal amortizes.
- Several recent issues featured a total financial guarantee (so called full wrap) covering 100 percent of shortfalls in principal and interest payments; such guarantee is a liquidity guarantee that does not cover against losses due to default but ensures timely payment.
- Issues carrying a full wrap typically had a subordinated structure where the subordinated tranche would be the first to absorb credit losses.

### Structure
- Early issues were single-tranched with credit enhancements provided by SHF in the form of mortgage insurance (GPI) and a financial guarantee (GPO).
  - A small equity position, typically around 4 percent, was retained and fully provisioned for by the originator.
- More recent issues have senior and subordinated (or junior) tranche structures and a broader variety of credit enhancements.
  - Receipts are distributed by tranche seniority (senior tranches receive first); losses are distributed inversely.
  - Mortgages in these securitizations generally have mortgage insurance for the first 35 percent of the losses, enabling junior tranches to typically still qualify for an A rating on a local scale.
  - The junior tranche (mezzanine) provides an additional buffer for the senior tranches; as a result, senior tranches do not need a financial guarantee to attain a AAA local rating.
  - Some senior tranches with a total financial guarantee (100 percent full wrap) qualified for a AAA global rating.
- Tranche portfolio composition and originator retention:
  - Senior tranches have represented about 80 percent of the portfolios.
  - Junior or “mezzanine” tranches have ranged between 3 to 12 percent.
  - Equity positions between 4 and 8 percent have been retained by the originating institution.

### Policy observations, market infrastructure, and risks
- Market foundations and recent evolution:
  - Rapid growth in housing finance through private mortgages is grounded on more solid primary and secondary markets than in the past.
  - Most new mortgages are inflation-indexed or have fixed-peso rates, and the bulk of origination has taken place through non-deposit taking institutions.
  - Standardization of mortgage issuance and SHF’s strict origination practices facilitated access to local funding at relatively low rates.
  - Development of the mortgage bond market with pass-through securities enabled financial institutions to reduce on-balance sheet risk and transfer credit, market, and maturity mismatch risks to securitizing vehicles.
- Infrastructure gaps and data limitations:
  - Public property registries remain paper based and not systematized, raising the cost of collateral verification.
  - Role of auditors and credit rating agencies needs strengthening to increase credibility; auditors reportedly able to check only 5 to 10 percent of the titles of a portfolio pool in many instances.
  - Need to consider standards for inclusion of due diligence firms to review loan files making up collateral pools.
  - MBS valuation methodology must be adapted to Mexican situation due to lack of mortgage prepayment and default history; SHF has sought to develop centralized prepayment and default databases, but these are not yet fully operational.
- Concentration of risk and market distortions:
  - Absence of a market for lower-rated securities means mezzanine/junior tranches are retained by originators, reducing the risk-diversification value of securitization and limiting capital relief.
  - SHF’s role as liquidity provider (market-maker) and explicit commitment to buy Borhis in primary and secondary markets may represent a contingent fiscal liability under stress events; no explicit limit has been set on total Borhis SHF could buy.
  - SHF would benefit from stress test analysis to periodically reassess its level of liquidity.
- Incentive risks:
  - Guarantee programs for construction companies may relieve lenders of market risk associated with construction activity, creating an incentive to relax quality standards and potentially encourage substandard house construction.
- Market pricing and crowding out:
  - Large securitizations by INFONAVIT with very compressed spreads relative to benchmark government bonds may reflect perceived implicit public guarantees, potentially crowding out private sector issuers and obscuring market pricing; such guarantees constitute a contingent liability for the government.
- Comparisons with recent U.S. events and model vulnerabilities:
  - Significant differences exist between Mexican and U.S. markets: private mortgage pick-up in Mexico came from a low level; RMBS remains a very small share of the domestic mortgage market; complex securities such as CDOs are practically non-existent in Mexico.
  - Nonetheless, recent U.S. troubles highlight vulnerabilities in the securitization model:
    - RMBS valuation is intrinsically complex and compounded in Mexico by limited historical data.
    - Concerns that rating agencies have been slow in reviewing ratings for entities facing financial difficulties.
    - Securitization relies heavily on loan origination and servicing standards; transferring loans off-balance sheet can weaken borrower-lender relationships.
    - In liquidity stress or rising defaults, originators may have to buy back loans, repurchasing credit risk.
    - Fideicomisos common in Latin America may be more vulnerable than SPVs because they do not have their own capital.

*Source: _wp08105 - Box 4. Main Characteristics of Mexican MBS Issues*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/_wp08105.pdf_
