## 1.  Botswana: Fiscal Sustainability Benchmarks

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### Major themes and focus
- Analysis centered on fiscal sustainability benchmarks for Botswana.
- Emphasis on the relationship between mineral revenues, an annuity concept, and asset accumulation as key indicators for sustainability.
- Uses a permanent-income approach to calculate a sustainability benchmark for the non-mineral balance.

### Figures referenced
- Figure 1: Botswana: Mineral Revenues, Annuity, and Asset Accumulation
- Figure 2: Botswana: Sensitivity Analysis for Benchmarked Balances
- Figure 3: Botswana: Mineral Revenues, Annuity, and Asset Accumulation

### Analytical framework (Permanent Income Hypothesis and mathematical representation)
- Government should spend only the “permanent” part of resource revenue and save the rest via an annuity equivalent to the present value of projected mineral revenues.
- Present value expressions used:
  - present value of revenues: ∑_{t=0}^{T} revenues_{t}/(1+r)^{t}
  - present value of annuity: ∑_{t=0}^{T} annuity_{t}/(1+r)^{t}
- Key identities:
  - “Permanent” income (PI) = Annuity (A) + Non-mineral revenues (NMR)
  - Expenditure (Ex) = “Permanent” income (PI)
  - Revenue projection (R) = Mineral revenues (MR) + Non-mineral revenues (NMR)
  - Benchmarked overall balance (BOB) = Revenue projection (R) – Expenditure (Ex)
- Derived benchmark relations:
  - BOB = MR – A
  - Benchmarked non-mineral balance (BNMB) = – A
- Interpretation:
  - Sustainable policy implies saving MR – A each period and that a non-mineral deficit equal to the annuity (A) is sustainable.

### Botswana case — background and fiscal context
- Botswana is a diamond-rich middle-income country facing a likely sharp decline in production of its most valuable resource within a generation.
- Current fiscal structure:
  - diamond exports make up about 75 percent of total exports.
  - revenues from minerals constitute around half of government revenues.
- Expected steep decline in diamond production around 2021 unless new discoveries or technological improvements occur.
- Authorities’ fiscal record (as per National Development Plan 9 mid-term review, ending in 2009):
  - achieved a budget surplus in most years;
  - kept spending below the ceiling of 40 percent of GDP;
  - mostly achieved a surplus in the “non-investment” balance (difference between non-mineral revenues and current spending, excluding health and education).
- Non-investment balance is useful but does not account for replacement and expansion of capital infrastructure when mineral revenues decline.

### Assumptions used for annuity calculation (baseline and sensitivity variants)
- Main assumptions used (to be varied in sensitivity analysis):
  - (i) diamond production will sharply decline around 2021;
  - (ii) US dollar prices for diamonds will stay constant in real terms;
  - (iii) the real return on future savings is 4½ percent;
  - (iv) income from annuitized mineral revenue is spread until 2050;
  - (v) the hypothetical annuity is programmed to stay constant in terms of GDP.
- Programming annuity constant in terms of GDP ensures initial savings are significant while mineral revenues are still high.

### Quantitative outcomes and benchmarked balances
- Example annuity and asset dynamics:
  - An annuity computed at 6⅓ percent of GDP (held constant in terms of GDP).
  - Asset accumulation peaks at close to 90 percent of GDP under this programming and then declines after 2023, with savings consumed by 2050.
- Projected staff figures (summarized from Table 1):
  - Non-mineral primary balance (2007): -17.6 percent of non-mineral GDP
  - Non-mineral primary balance (2015): -16.0 percent of non-mineral GDP
  - Overall balance (2007): 8.0 percent of GDP
  - Overall balance (2015): 0.2 percent of GDP
- Benchmarked ranges for 2007 and 2015 under scenarios:
  - Scenario (a) Conservative assumptions:
    - Non-mineral (2007) -9.0
    - Non-mineral (2015) -7.4
    - Overall (2007) 12.1
    - Overall (2015) 5.6
    - Note: Baseline revenues and conservative interest rate assumption (nominal interest rate ~7¾ percent corresponding to real interest rate of 3 percent).
  - Scenario (b) Less conservative (optimistic interest rate):
    - Non-mineral (2007) -10.3
    - Non-mineral (2015) -8.5
    - Overall (2007) 11.3
    - Overall (2015) 4.8
    - Note: Optimistic interest rate assumption: nominal interest rate ~9¼ percent corresponds to real interest rate about 4½ percent.
  - Scenario (c) Less conservative—back-loaded adjustment (annuity constant in real terms):
    - Non-mineral (2007) -19.1
    - Non-mineral (2015) -10.9
    - Overall (2007) 5.9
    - Overall (2015) 3.0
    - Note: Baseline revenues and optimistic interest rate assumption; annuity constant in real terms.
  - Scenario (d) Optimistic assumptions (higher mineral revenues and optimistic interest):
    - Non-mineral (2007) -14.2
    - Non-mineral (2015) -11.8
    - Overall (2007) 8.9
    - Overall (2015) 5.9

### Sensitivity analysis — key results
- Larger remaining mineral deposits reduce required fiscal adjustment.
- More conservative interest-rate assumptions require larger adjustment.
- Lengthening the horizon to 2100 and spreading mineral wealth until then reduces the annuity by 2 percentage points of GDP and requires larger adjustment.
- If the annuity declines over time in terms of GDP, adjustment can be back-loaded (take place later).
- Delaying adjustment increases the needed adjustment; example:
  - if adjustment starts in 2010, the annuitized mineral revenue would decline by 2 percentage points of non-mineral GDP and the benchmarked non-mineral deficit becomes more ambitious at -8 percent of non-mineral GDP instead of -10 percent (under assumptions b).
- Annuity programmed constant in real terms scenario:
  - Initial annuity close to 12 percent of GDP declining to 3½ percent of GDP over time.
  - Asset stock peaks at about 55 percent of GDP.
  - Allows for a back-loaded adjustment and lower initial savings compared with the annuity constant in terms of GDP.

### Policy implications and recommendations for Botswana
- Suggested spending ceiling:
  - Around 30 percent of GDP, derived from:
    - non-mineral revenues assumed to increase from current 22 percent of GDP to around 23½ percent in 2010/11, plus annuitized mineral revenue of about 6⅓ percent of GDP.
  - The suggested 30 percent ceiling is close to the estimated 2006/07 outcome of 31 percent of GDP—implying no immediate need to cut spending but no room to increase spending to the current 40 percent ceiling.
- Specific recommendations:
  - Consider supplementing current fiscal goals with reducing the non-mineral primary deficit in National Development Plan 10.
  - Permanent income calculations indicate the spending ceiling should be reduced to save a substantial portion of mineral revenues for a post-diamond period.
  - The estimated outcome for fiscal year 2006/07 is close to the recommended ceiling, suggesting no need to cut spending but to refrain from increasing spending.
- Communication and operational guidance:
  - Spread income from natural resources over a definite time period to keep the time horizon realistic and to recognize uncertainty about resource discoveries and non-mineral revenue growth.
  - Program the annuity (contribution to spending from mineral revenues) to be flat over time in terms of GDP to ensure significant initial savings when mineral revenues are high.

### Limitations and caveats
- Assumes it is socially optimal to smooth expenditure; optimal level of smoothing is uncertain.
- Uncertainty about Botswana’s potential to develop other natural resources and strengthen non-mineral revenues; policy choices must compare marginal benefit from spending to return on financial assets that could be acquired instead.

*Source: _wp08117*

### 1.  Botswana: Fiscal Sustainability Benchmarks .....................................................................11

### 1.  Botswana: Fiscal Sustainability Benchmarks

### Major themes and focus
- Analysis centered on fiscal sustainability benchmarks for Botswana.
- Emphasis on the relationship between mineral revenues, an annuity concept, and asset accumulation as key indicators for sustainability.

### Figures referenced
- Figure 1: Botswana: Mineral Revenues, Annuity, and Asset Accumulation
- Figure 2: Botswana: Sensitivity Analysis for Benchmarked Balances
- Figure 3: Botswana: Mineral Revenues, Annuity, and Asset Accumulation

### Key elements implied by component titles
- Mineral Revenues: Examination of revenue streams derived from mineral resources.
- Annuity: Use of an annuity framework to convert mineral wealth into a sustainable income flow.
- Asset Accumulation: Assessment of asset buildup over time from mineral revenue saving and investment.
- Sensitivity Analysis: Evaluation of how benchmarked fiscal balances respond to alternative assumptions or shocks.

*Source: _wp08117 - 1.  Botswana: Fiscal Sustainability Benchmarks .....................................................................11*

### References..............................................................................................................

### References

### I. Introduction
- Resource-rich countries must decide how much to spend now and how much to save of revenues from non-renewable resources.
- Many countries with non-renewable resources have accumulated large pools of savings; some funnel these into Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs).
- Key analytical focus: how countries make decisions to save rather than spend resource revenues and how to calculate a sustainable non-mineral balance as a benchmark for fiscal policy.
- This paper draws on Barnett and Ossowski (2003) and applies a permanent-income approach to calculate a sustainability benchmark for the non-mineral balance in Botswana.
- Practical assumption used: contribution to spending from mineral revenues is phrased in terms of GDP and kept flat.

### II. Fiscal policy in resource-rich countries: international experience
- Norway
  - Government Pension Fund – Global (formerly Petroleum Fund) receives petroleum revenues and transfers to budget amounts needed to finance the non-oil deficit.
  - At end-2006, the fund’s assets were worth 114 percent of GDP.
  - It currently manages around US$350 billion.
  - Guideline: structural non-oil deficit not to exceed 4 percent of the total financial assets of the pension fund; rationale: long-run real return assumed to be 4 percent (annual net real return has been 4½ percent since 1997).
- Chile
  - Fiscal policy anchored by a structural surplus rule aiming at maintaining a cyclically-adjusted surplus of ½ percent of GDP in central government accounts.
  - Government saves copper-related revenues in excess of the revenue level corresponding to a long-term reference price; other revenues are smoothed using potential output estimates.
- Experience elsewhere
  - Some countries deposit predetermined shares of oil or total revenues in funds; some have changed or eliminated rules.
  - Institutional design effectiveness depends on political will and governance.
  - Simple non-oil or non-mining balance is insufficient to assess long-run sustainability; need benchmarked balance that accounts for resource exhaustion timing.

### III. The Permanent Income Hypothesis
- Rationale for smoothing expenditure in resource-rich countries:
  - Abrupt spending adjustments are costly and inefficient.
  - Sustainability and intergenerational equity questions arise when public wealth is derived from exhaustible resources.
- Permanent income approach:
  - Government should spend only the “permanent” part of resource revenue and save the rest.
  - Transform projected stream of mineral revenues into a hypothetical annuity with the same present value as the revenues.
  - Mathematical representation (as given):
    - present value of revenues: ∑_{t=0}^{T} revenues_{t}/(1+r)^{t}
    - present value of annuity: ∑_{t=0}^{T} annuity_{t}/(1+r)^{t}
    - equate present values to derive annuity.

### IV. Mathematical representation of benchmarks
- Definitions and identities:
  - “Permanent” income (PI) = Annuity (A) + Non-mineral revenues (NMR)          (1)
  - Expenditure (Ex) = “Permanent” income (PI)                                (2)
  - Revenue projection (R) = Mineral revenues (MR) + Non-mineral revenues (NMR) (3)
  - Benchmarked overall balance (BOB) = Revenue projection (R) – Expenditure (Ex) (4)
- Derivations:
  - BOB = MR + NMR – (A + NMR) = MR – A
  - Benchmarked non-mineral balance (BNMB) = NMR – Expenditure = NMR – (A + NMR) = – A
- Interpretation:
  - The BOB implies saving the difference between actual mineral revenues (MR) and annuitized mineral revenues (A).
  - The BNMB implies it is sustainable to run a non-mineral deficit equal to the annuity (A).

### V. The case of Botswana
#### A. Background
- Botswana is a diamond-rich middle-income country facing a likely sharp decline in production of its most valuable resource within a generation.
- Currently:
  - diamond exports make up about 75 percent of total exports.
  - revenues from minerals constitute around half of government revenues.
- Expected steep decline in diamond production around 2021—unless new discoveries or technological improvements occur.
- Authorities have met three fiscal objectives in policy documents (mid-term review of National Development Plan 9, ending in 2009):
  - achieved a budget surplus in most years;
  - kept spending below the ceiling of 40 percent of GDP;
  - mostly achieved a surplus in the “non-investment” balance (difference between non-mineral revenues and current spending, excluding health and education).
- Non-investment balance: useful indicator but does not account for the need to replace and expand capital infrastructure when mineral revenues decline.

#### B. Calculating sustainable non-mineral balances for Botswana
- Main assumptions used for annuity calculation (to be varied in sensitivity analysis):
  - (i) diamond production will sharply decline around 2021;
  - (ii) US dollar prices for diamonds will stay constant in real terms;
  - (iii) the real return on future savings is 4½ percent;
  - (iv) income from annuitized mineral revenue is spread until 2050;
  - (v) the hypothetical annuity is programmed to stay constant in terms of GDP.
- Programming annuity constant in terms of GDP ensures initial savings are significant while mineral revenues are still high.
- Example quantitative outcomes (from Figure 1 and text):
  - An annuity computed at 6⅓ percent of GDP (held constant in terms of GDP).
  - Asset accumulation peaks at close to 90 percent of GDP under this programming and then declines after 2023, with savings consumed by 2050.
- Sustainability benchmark results (Table 1 summarized):
  - Projected staff figures:
    - Non-mineral primary balance (2007): -17.6 percent of non-mineral GDP
    - Non-mineral primary balance (2015): -16.0 percent of non-mineral GDP
    - Overall balance (2007): 8.0 percent of GDP
    - Overall balance (2015): 0.2 percent of GDP
  - Benchmarked ranges for 2007 and 2015 under scenarios:
    - (a) Conservative assumptions: Non-mineral (2007) -9.0; (2015) -7.4; Overall (2007) 12.1; (2015) 5.6
      - Baseline revenues and conservative interest rate assumption (nominal interest rate ~7¾ percent corresponding to real interest rate of 3 percent).
    - (b) Less conservative (optimistic interest rate): Non-mineral (2007) -10.3; (2015) -8.5; Overall (2007) 11.3; (2015) 4.8
      - Optimistic interest rate assumption: nominal interest rate ~9¼ percent corresponds to real interest rate about 4½ percent.
    - (c) Less conservative—back-loaded adjustment (annuity constant in real terms): Non-mineral (2007) -19.1; (2015) -10.9; Overall (2007) 5.9; (2015) 3.0
      - Baseline revenues and optimistic interest rate assumption; annuity constant in real terms.
    - (d) Optimistic assumptions (higher mineral revenues and optimistic interest): Non-mineral (2007) -14.2; (2015) -11.8; Overall (2007) 8.9; (2015) 5.9
- Policy implication from calculations:
  - Suggested spending ceiling around 30 percent of GDP, derived from:
    - non-mineral revenues assumed to increase from current 22 percent of GDP to around 23½ percent in 2010/11, plus annuitized mineral revenue of about 6⅓ percent of GDP.
  - The suggested 30 percent ceiling is close to the estimated 2006/07 outcome of 31 percent of GDP—implying no immediate need to cut spending but no room to increase spending to the current 40 percent ceiling.

#### C. Sensitivity analysis
- Key sensitivities affecting benchmarked balances:
  - Larger remaining mineral deposits reduce required fiscal adjustment.
  - More conservative interest-rate assumptions require larger adjustment.
  - Lengthening the horizon to 2100 and spreading mineral wealth until then reduces the annuity by 2 percentage points of GDP and requires larger adjustment.
  - If the annuity declines over time in terms of GDP, adjustment can be back-loaded (take place later).
  - Delaying adjustment increases the needed adjustment: e.g., if adjustment starts in 2010, the annuitized mineral revenue would decline by 2 percentage points of non-mineral GDP and the benchmarked non-mineral deficit becomes more ambitious at -8 percent of non-mineral GDP instead of -10 percent (under assumptions b).
- Annuity programmed constant in real terms:
  - Initial annuity close to 12 percent of GDP declining to 3½ percent of GDP over time.
  - Asset stock peaks at about 55 percent of GDP.
  - This scenario allows for a back-loaded adjustment and lower initial savings compared with the annuity constant in terms of GDP.

### VI. Conclusions
- Main conclusions supported by the analysis:
  - (i) Taking the non-mineral primary balance into account helps clarify desirable fiscal policies in resource-rich countries.
  - (ii) Calculating benchmarked balances based on permanent income can contribute to medium- to long-term fiscal policy choices.
- Communication and operational assumptions emphasized:
  - (i) Spread income from natural resources over a definite time period to keep the time horizon realistic and to recognize uncertainty about resource discoveries and non-mineral revenue growth.
  - (ii) Program the annuity (contribution to spending from mineral revenues) to be flat over time in terms of GDP to ensure significant initial savings when mineral revenues are high.
- Specific recommendations for Botswana:
  - (i) Consider supplementing current fiscal goals with reducing the non-mineral primary deficit in National Development Plan 10.
  - (ii) Permanent income calculations indicate the spending ceiling should be reduced to save a substantial portion of mineral revenues for a post-diamond period.
  - (iii) The estimated outcome for fiscal year 2006/07 is close to the recommended ceiling, suggesting no need to cut spending but to refrain from increasing spending.
- Limitations noted:
  - (i) Assumes it is socially optimal to smooth expenditure; optimal level of smoothing is uncertain.
  - (ii) Uncertainty about Botswana’s potential to develop other natural resources and strengthen non-mineral revenues; must compare marginal benefit from spending to return on financial assets that could be acquired instead.

*Source: content unit _wp08117 - References*

### References

### References

### Fiscal policy and operational aspects in resource-producing countries
- Barnett, Steven and Rolando Ossowski, 2003, “Operational Aspects of Fiscal Policy in Oil-Producing Countries,” in Davis, Jeffrey, Rolando Ossowski, and Annalisa Fedelino (eds.), Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (Washington: International Monetary Fund), pp. 45–81.
- Olters, Jan-Peter, 2007, “Old Curses, New Approaches? Fiscal Benchmarks for Oil-Producing Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,” IMF Working Paper No. 07/107 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Takizawa, Hajime, Edward H. Gardner, and Kenichi Ueda, 2004, “Are Developing Countries Better Off Spending Their Oil Wealth Upfront?” IMF Working Paper No. 04/141 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Carcillo, Stéphane, Daniel Leigh, and Mauricio Villafuerte, 2007, “Catch-Up Growth, Habits, Oil Depletion, and Fiscal Policy: Lessons from the Republic of Congo,” IMF Working Paper No. 07/80 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

### Country case studies and country-specific fiscal rules
- Basdevant, Olivier, 2007, “Are Diamonds Forever? Using a Lifecycle Approach to Analyze Botswana’s Reliance on Diamond Revenues,” IMF Country Report No. 07/228, pp. 4–19 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Iimi, Atsushi, 2006, “Did Botswana Escape from the Resource Curse?” IMF Working Paper No. 06/138 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Deléchat, Corinne and Matthew Gaertner, 2008, “ Exchange Rate and External Stability Assessment in a Resource-Dependent Economy: The Case of Botswana” forthcoming IMF Working Paper (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Jafarov, Etibar and Daniel Leigh, 2007, “Alternative Fiscal Rules for Norway,” IMF Country Report No. 07/197, pp. 17–43 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Kumhof, Michael and Douglas Laxton, 2007, “Chile’s Structural Fiscal Surplus Rule: A Model-based Evaluation,” IMF Country Report 07/332 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- International Monetary Fund, 2007, “Chile: 2007 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report, Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Chile,” IMF Country Report No. 07/333 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

### Sovereign wealth funds, asset management, and performance reporting
- Economist, 2008, “Sovereign-wealth Funds—Asset-backed Insecurity,” The Economist, January 19, pp. 78–80.
- Norges Bank, 2007, Norges Bank Investment Management: Quarterly Performance Report, Second Quarter 2007 (Oslo: Norges Bank).

### Theoretical foundations and historical literature
- Hotelling, Harold, 1931, “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 39, pp. 137–75.

*Source: _wp08117 - References*

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