## _wp08201 - INTRODUCTION

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---

### A. Overview: demographic challenge and fiscal implications
- Russia’s share of the population older than the retirement age will rise from 20 to about 30 percent.
- Population is expected to shrink at a rate of about 0.5 percent per year until 2050.
- Demographic trends imply a decline in contributions to the pension system while payouts will increase.
- In a no-reform scenario, the replacement rate of the public system is projected to decline to about 17 percent in 2030 (from about 26 percent currently).
- The current replacement rate is about 26 percent (2007) and is widely perceived as inadequate; President Putin called for an increase in the average replacement rate to 40 percent within five years (press reports of November 17, 2007).

### B. Design of the 2002 multi-pillar pension system and shortcomings
- Structure of the 2002 reform:
  - Basic pension: redistributive, independent of contributions; replacement rate provided by the basic pension has gradually declined.
  - Notional defined contribution (NDC) scheme: contributions in individual accounts earning a discretionary average return between wage and CPI growth; benefits paid as annuities.
  - Mandatory funded scheme: investment of 6 percentage points of contributions for younger workers in mutual funds chosen by workers or, by default, by the government.
- Key design shortcomings:
  - Low incentives to work beyond statutory retirement ages (55 for women, 60 for men); benefits not adjusted for changing life expectancy.
  - Notional rate of return is low due to valorization below average wage growth, large allocation to the basic pension, and generous recognition of prior notional capital.
  - Strong incentives for early retirement; many hazardous-occupation privileges remain.
  - Funded pillar limitations:
    - Contribution rate of only up to 6 percent.
    - About 4/5 of workers at end-2007 have not specified an investment manager; by default funds invested in government bonds by the Development Bank.
    - Real returns on these government bonds have been negative for several years; private-managed funds have had highly positive average real returns (though not in 2007).
- The initial combined contribution rate for the three pillars is 20 percent and then declines for higher income brackets.

### C. Replacement rate projections and sensitivity to returns
- Three-pillar replacement rate projection (Gurvich, 2007):
  - about 24 percent in 2007 → 17 percent in 2027 → 22 percent in 2050.
- Assumptions:
  - Labor productivity and real wages assumed to grow at average rates of about 4 and 5 percent, respectively (Gurvich, 2007).
- Baseline and alternative return scenarios:
  - Baseline (“low return”) scenario assumes a real rate of return of 3.7 percent annually on the mandatory funded pillar.
  - A real return of 4.5 percent would raise the replacement rate to 22 percent by 2050, 2 percentage points higher than the baseline.
- International benchmarks:
  - ILO Convention 102 recommends 40 percent as the minimum replacement rate.
  - Most OECD countries have replacement rates around or above 40 percent; Russia’s current replacement rate of about 24 percent (2007) is well below these benchmarks.
- Fiscal implication:
  - To sustain modest expected replacement rates, the budget transfer to the pension fund of 1.6 percent of GDP in 2010 (as envisaged in the 2008–10 budget) must remain in place until 2050 (Gurvich, 2007).

### D. Private saving and voluntary pensions
- Government subsidy (2008): doubles individual contributions between RUB 2,000 and RUB 10,000 a year; estimated budgetary cost RUB 6 billion (0.02 percent of GDP) in 2008.
- Extreme participation fiscal cost:
  - If all workers contribute 3 percent of earnings, average fiscal cost of matching these contributions would amount to about 0.5 percent of GDP per year until 2020 on average.
- Scheme features and coverage:
  - Withdrawals before retirement will be prohibited; no explicit guarantee of capital or minimum return; initial management by the Pension Fund of Russia with investments at least initially in government bonds.
  - Currently, less than 10 percent of workers are covered by private pension funds.
  - Government estimates indicate only up to one tenth of workers are likely to participate in voluntary schemes.
  - Participation likely concentrated among above-average income workers.
- Asset allocation and market depth:
  - More than half of private pension funds are invested in bank deposits and government bonds yielding negative real returns.
  - Free-floating capitalization of the domestic equity market is estimated at about 30 percent of GDP; corporate bond market about 5 percent of GDP.
- Projected contribution of voluntary pillar (Gurvich, 2007):
  - Even if all workers contribute 3 percent compounded at a real rate of 4.5 percent, the voluntary pillar would not be sufficient to increase the average replacement rate to 25 percent until 2040; only in 2050 would the average replacement rate reach 30 percent.
  - If one fifth of workers contribute (double government expectations), the resulting replacement rate would be only 24 percent in 2050.
- Conclusion: voluntary private pensions are unlikely to be sufficient; the pension funding shortfall should be considered a contingent fiscal liability.

### E. Options to stabilize the replacement rate: retirement age versus budget financing
- Retirement age reform (first-best):
  - Current retirement ages: 60 for men, 55 for women.
  - Life expectancy at official retirement age: 14 years for men, 23 years for women.
  - Gradually raising the retirement age of women to 60 in 2020 (by 5 months per year) would increase the average replacement rate by 5 percentage points.
  - Gradually raising the retirement age of both genders to 65 in 2040 (by 2 months per year for men and 4 months per year for women) would increase the average replacement rate by 10 percentage points (World Bank, 2002). (Figures adjusted downward for subsequent reduction in contribution rate.)
- Budgetary financing scenarios (Gurvich, 2007):
  - To stabilize the average replacement rate at its 2006 level of 26 percent would require increases in federal transfers by up to 3 percent of GDP until approximately 2030, then gradual decline to about 1.5 percent of GDP in 2050.
  - To stabilize the average replacement rate at its 2003 level of 30 percent would require an increase in transfers by up to more than 4 percent of GDP until approximately 2030, then declining to still 3 percent of GDP in 2050.
- Oil wealth and withdrawals:
  - Legislated annual withdrawal from the oil funds is 3.7 percent of GDP.
  - At oil prices of $80 (2007 prices) the combined oil funds would be depleted by 2030 if withdrawals continue as legislated.
  - Additional withdrawals to finance a replacement rate of 30 percent would deplete the funds by 2020.
  - Even at real oil prices of $100, this strategy would deplete the funds by 2025.
- Privatizations:
  - Estimated value of all state-owned companies is about 20 percent of GDP (Gaidar, 2007); this would cover only about half of the present value of the funding gap relative to the 2006 replacement rate (Gurvich, 2007).

### F. Macroeconomic effects of financing options (GIMF model simulations)
- Simulation setup:
  - Assumption: increase in government transfers sufficient to achieve a replacement rate of 30 percent; additional financing requirement peaks at 4 percent of GDP around 2030. Simulations quarterly until 2050; “HO” denotes Russia.
- Debt financing:
  - Federal gross debt projected to peak at about 60 percent of GDP in the late 2030s.
  - Real interest rates rise (up to 1 percentage point more in 2050).
  - By 2050 relative to baseline: capital stock 10 percent lower; output 3 percent lower; private consumption 6 percent lower.
  - Current account deteriorates; net foreign assets about 30 percentage points of GDP lower than under the baseline in 2050.
  - Debt financing exceeding 1 percent of GDP would require an amendment of the new budget code (borrowing limit).
- Tax-financed transfers:
  - Costs highest for the profit tax and lowest for the VAT; the UST is intermediate.
  - Profit tax reduces capital accumulation; UST reduces labor supply; VAT is less distortionary and also taxes accumulated savings.
  - If the VAT bears the full burden, its rate at the peak in 2030 is more than 9 percentage points higher than the current effective tax rate of 12 percent. (Statutory VAT rate is 18 percent.)
  - If profit tax and UST are raised in lockstep instead of the VAT, both rates would need to reach a peak of 15 points above the baseline around 2030.
  - Output around 2030 would be 20 percent lower than under the baseline if profit tax and UST bear the full burden; output would be only 3 percentage points lower if only the VAT rose.
  - Raising the VAT is particularly suitable in an aging society because its base contracts less than direct tax bases.
- Expenditure-side adjustments:
  - Cutting public investment:
    - Strong adverse effects on consumption and GDP; lower capital stock reduces output by 15 percent relative to baseline after 40 years.
    - If the productivity of public investment is halved, output loss is halved (to 8 percent).
    - Cutting public investment preferable to raising profit tax or UST unless the social rate of return on public investment is significant.
  - Cutting government consumption:
    - Best financing option from a purely macroeconomic perspective in simulations.
    - Replacing government consumption with transfers allows for higher private consumption than baseline.
    - To fully offset higher transfers, government consumption would need to decline gradually by 4 percentage points of GDP until 2030, or about one quarter relative to the current ratio to GDP.
    - Feasibility depends on achieving significant efficiency gains in government; staff estimates suggest current output of public services could be produced with only 2/3 of actual inputs compared with peers (IMF, 2007; Hauner, 2008).
    - Caution: GIMF assumption that government consumption does not enter private sector production may overstate private consumption gains; cuts would require reinforced efficiency-enhancing public sector reforms.

### G. Policy recommendations and specific measures
- Treat the financing of a reasonable replacement rate as a contingent fiscal liability; private pensions unlikely to fill the gap.
- Gradual increase in the retirement age:
  - Very gradual increase by 2 months per year for men and 4 months per year for women could finance much of the gap to keep the current replacement rate stable.
  - Requires commensurate increases in life expectancy, particularly for men, via higher living standards and improved health care.
- Improve incentives for working longer:
  - Align NDC benefits with actual life expectancy at retirement.
  - Increase deductions for early retirement and premia for working longer.
  - Revisit lists of hazardous occupations eligible for early retirement.
- Oil wealth and privatizations can finance only part of the gap:
  - Oil wealth projected to be exhausted around 2025 under current legislated withdrawals and prices.
  - Additional withdrawals to finance a 26 percent replacement rate would deplete funds by 2020.
  - Privatizations (estimated value 20 percent of GDP) would cover only about half of the financing need for a stable 26 percent replacement rate.
- If fiscal financing is used, favored measures in model simulations:
  - Lower government consumption preferred over borrowing, lower public investment, or higher taxes.
  - Gradual efficiency gains and reductions in government consumption could finance a stable replacement rate of more than 30 percent under optimistic efficiency assumptions.
  - Debt financing, lower public investment, or tax increases entail substantial macroeconomic costs (lower output, investment, consumption, net foreign assets).
- Reform the basic pension:
  - Make the basic pension means-tested and financed from general revenue rather than from payroll contributions.
  - Limit UST revenue to financing the insurance-based NDC pillar; this would allow sustaining a replacement rate of 26 percent approximately until 2013.
- Improve returns on the mandatory funded pillar:
  - Outsource management of mandatory contributions to private sector managers (example: Sweden model with standardized mandates to keep administrative fees low).
  - Consider increasing the ceiling on investment abroad to improve risk-return profiles and diversify into high-growth and net resource-importing emerging economies.
- Develop government debt and financial markets:
  - Gradually increase domestic gross government debt issuance, particularly longer maturities.
  - Fully use borrowing of 1 percent of GDP allowed under the new budget framework, possibly offset by a lower withdrawal from the National Welfare Fund.
  - Aim for very gradual convergence of federal government domestic debt towards 10 percent of GDP.
- Strengthen trust in financial markets through improved regulation and supervision:
  - Improvements in rule of law, property rights, corporate governance (accounting rules, financial disclosure, minority shareholder rights).
  - More decisive action against regulatory infringements that undermine public trust.

*Source: INTRODUCTION (IMF Working Paper, _wp08201)*

### Introduction............................................................................................................

### Introduction

### A. The Case for Pension Reform
- Section present on page 3: "A. The Case for Pension Reform"
- No further content available in the provided unit.

### B. Encouraging Private Saving
- Section present on page 6: "B. Encouraging Private Saving"
- No further content available in the provided unit.

### C. Stabilizing the Replacement Rate of the Public System
- Section present on page 8: "C. Stabilizing the Replacement Rate of the Public System"
- Figure referenced: "1. Replacement Rate of Public System" (listed in Figures)
- No further content available in the provided unit.

### D. Macroeconomic Effects of Financing Options
- Section present on page 11: "D. Macroeconomic Effects of Financing Options"
- Figures referenced in the Figures list relevant to this section:
  - "2. Additional Funding Need under Two Scenarios, Percent of GDP"
  - "3. Oil Stabilization and National Welfare Funds in Percent of GDP"
  - "4. Debt-Financed Increase in Transfers (Deviations from Initial Steady State in Percent of GDP)"
  - "5. Tax-Financed Increase in Transfers"
  - "6. Expenditure-Financed Increase in Transfers"
- No further content available in the provided unit.

### E. Policy Recommendations
- Section present on page 16: "E. Policy Recommendations"
- No further content available in the provided unit.

### References
- "References" section noted on page 22.
- No bibliographic details provided in this content unit.

### Figures (listed in the content unit)
- 1. Replacement Rate of Public System
- 2. Additional Funding Need under Two Scenarios, Percent of GDP
- 3. Oil Stabilization and National Welfare Funds in Percent of GDP
- 4. Debt-Financed Increase in Transfers (Deviations from Initial Steady State in Percent of GDP)
- 5. Tax-Financed Increase in Transfers
- 6. Expenditure-Financed Increase in Transfers

### Appendixes
- Appendix: Model and Calibration (listed; page indicated as part of appendixes)

*Source: _wp08201 - Introduction (IMF PDF), pages and section headings as provided in the supplied content unit.*

### INTRODUCTION

### _wp08201 - INTRODUCTION

### A. Overview: demographic challenge and fiscal implications
- Russia’s share of the population older than the retirement age will rise from 20 to about 30 percent.
- Population is expected to shrink at a rate of about 0.5 percent per year until 2050.
- Demographic trends imply a decline in contributions to the pension system while payouts will increase.
- In a no-reform scenario, the replacement rate of the public system is projected to decline to about 17 percent in 2030 (from about 26 percent currently).
- The current replacement rate is about 26 percent (2007) and is widely perceived as inadequate; President Putin called for an increase in the average replacement rate to 40 percent within five years (press reports of November 17, 2007).

### B. Design of the 2002 multi-pillar pension system and shortcomings
- The 2002 reform introduced three pillars:
  - Basic pension: redistributive, independent of contributions, intended to provide a minimum standard of living. The replacement rate provided by the basic pension has gradually declined.
  - Notional defined contribution (NDC) scheme: contributions in individual accounts earning a discretionary average return between wage and CPI growth; benefits paid as annuities.
  - Mandatory funded scheme: investment of 6 percentage points of contributions for younger workers in mutual funds chosen by workers or, by default, by the government.
- Key design shortcomings:
  - Low incentives to work beyond the low statutory retirement ages (55 for women, 60 for men); benefits not adjusted for changing life expectancy.
  - Notional rate of return is low due to valorization below average wage growth, large allocation to the basic pension, and generous recognition of prior notional capital.
  - Strong incentives for early retirement; many hazardous-occupation privileges remain despite improved working conditions.
  - Funded pillar limitations:
    - Contribution rate of only up to 6 percent is low in international comparison.
    - About 4/5 of workers at end-2007 have not specified an investment manager; by default funds invested in government bonds by the Development Bank.
    - Real returns on these government bonds have been negative for several years; private-managed funds have had highly positive average real returns (though not in 2007).
- The initial combined contribution rate for the three pillars is 20 percent and then declines for higher income brackets.

### C. Replacement rate projections and sensitivity to returns
- Three-pillar replacement rate projection: about 24 percent in 2007 → 17 percent in 2027 → 22 percent in 2050 (Gurvich, 2007).
  - Labor productivity and real wages are assumed to grow at average rates of about 4 and 5 percent, respectively (Gurvich, 2007).
- Baseline (“low return”) scenario assumes a real rate of return of 3.7 percent annually on the mandatory funded pillar.
- A real return of 4.5 percent would raise the replacement rate to 22 percent by 2050, 2 percentage points higher than the baseline.
- International benchmarks:
  - ILO Convention 102 recommends 40 percent as the minimum replacement rate.
  - Most OECD countries have replacement rates around or above 40 percent; Russia’s current replacement rate of about 24 percent (2007) is well below these benchmarks.
- To sustain even modest expected replacement rates, the budget transfer to the pension fund of 1.6 percent of GDP in 2010 (as envisaged in the 2008–10 budget) must remain in place until 2050 (Gurvich, 2007).

### D. Private saving and voluntary pensions
- Government subsidy (2008): doubles individual contributions between RUB 2,000 and RUB 10,000 a year; estimated budgetary cost RUB 6 billion (0.02 percent of GDP) in 2008.
- Under an extreme assumption that all workers contribute 3 percent of their earnings to the scheme, the average fiscal cost of matching these contributions would amount to about 0.5 percent of GDP per year until 2020 on average.
- Withdrawals before retirement will be prohibited; no explicit guarantee of capital or minimum return; initial management by the Pension Fund of Russia with investments at least initially in government bonds.
- Current coverage and likely participation:
  - Currently, less than 10 percent of workers are covered by private pension funds.
  - Government estimates indicate only up to one tenth of workers are likely to participate in voluntary schemes.
  - Participation is likely concentrated among above-average income workers, leaving those most at risk of old-age poverty without benefit.
- Asset allocation constraints and market depth:
  - More than half of private pension funds are invested in bank deposits and government bonds yielding negative real returns.
  - Free-floating capitalization of the domestic equity market is estimated at about 30 percent of GDP; corporate bond market about 5 percent of GDP.
  - Speeding up development of equity markets through improved corporate governance is underscored as necessary.
- Projected contribution of voluntary pillar:
  - Even assuming all workers contribute 3 percent compounded at a real rate of 4.5 percent, the voluntary pillar would not be sufficient to increase the average replacement rate to 25 percent until 2040; only in 2050 would the average replacement rate reach 30 percent (Gurvich, 2007).
  - If one fifth of workers contribute (double government expectations), the resulting replacement rate would be only 24 percent in 2050.
- Conclusion: voluntary private pensions are unlikely to be sufficient; the pension funding shortfall should be considered a contingent fiscal liability.

### E. Options to stabilize the replacement rate: retirement age versus budget financing
- First-best policy: gradual increase in the retirement age.
  - Current retirement ages: 60 for men, 55 for women.
  - Life expectancy at official retirement age: 14 years for men, 23 years for women.
  - Gradually raising the retirement age of women to 60 in 2020 (by 5 months per year) would increase the average replacement rate by 5 percentage points.
  - Gradually raising the retirement age of both genders to 65 in 2040 (by 2 months per year for men and 4 months per year for women) would increase the average replacement rate by 10 percentage points (World Bank, 2002). (Figures adjusted downward to account for subsequent reduction in contribution rate.)
- Budgetary financing scenarios (Gurvich, 2007):
  - To stabilize the average replacement rate at its 2006 level of 26 percent would require increases in federal transfers by up to 3 percent of GDP until approximately 2030, then gradual decline to about 1.5 percent of GDP in 2050.
  - To stabilize the average replacement rate at its 2003 level of 30 percent would require an increase in transfers by up to more than 4 percent of GDP until approximately 2030, then declining to still 3 percent of GDP in 2050.
- Oil wealth and withdrawals:
  - Legislated annual withdrawal from the oil funds is 3.7 percent of GDP.
  - Under the current outlook for oil prices, at oil prices of $80 (2007 prices) the combined oil funds would be depleted by 2030 if withdrawals continue as legislated.
  - Additional withdrawals to finance a replacement rate of 30 percent would deplete the funds by 2020 (earlier than the peak financing need around 2030).
  - Even at real oil prices of $100, this strategy would deplete the funds by 2025.
- Privatizations:
  - Estimated value of all state-owned companies is about 20 percent of GDP (Gaidar, 2007); this would cover only about half of the present value of the funding gap relative to the 2006 replacement rate (Gurvich, 2007).

### F. Macroeconomic effects of financing options (GIMF model simulations)
- Simulation assumption: increase in government transfers sufficient to achieve a replacement rate of 30 percent; additional financing requirement peaks at 4 percent of GDP around 2030. Simulations quarterly until 2050; “HO” denotes Russia.
- Debt financing:
  - Federal gross debt projected to peak at about 60 percent of GDP in the late 2030s.
  - Real interest rates rise (up to 1 percentage point more in 2050).
  - Consequences by 2050 relative to baseline: capital stock 10 percent lower; output 3 percent lower; private consumption 6 percent lower.
  - Current account deteriorates; net foreign assets about 30 percentage points of GDP lower than under the baseline in 2050.
  - Debt financing exceeding 1 percent of GDP would require an amendment of the new budget code (borrowing limit).
- Tax-financed transfers:
  - If transfers are fully tax-financed, costs are highest for the profit tax and lowest for the VAT; the UST (United Social Tax) is in the middle.
  - Profit tax reduces capital accumulation; UST reduces labor supply; VAT is less distortionary due to broader base (also taxes accumulated savings).
  - If the VAT bears the full burden, its rate at the peak in 2030 is more than 9 percentage points higher than the current effective tax rate of 12 percent. (Statutory VAT rate is 18 percent.)
  - If profit tax and UST are raised in lockstep instead of the VAT, both rates would need to reach a peak of 15 points above the baseline around 2030.
  - Output around 2030 would be 20 percent lower than under the baseline if profit tax and UST bear the full burden; output would be only 3 percentage points lower if only the VAT rose.
  - Raising the VAT is particularly suitable in an aging society because its base contracts less than direct tax bases.
- Expenditure-side adjustments:
  - Cutting public investment:
    - Strong adverse effects on consumption and GDP; lower capital stock reduces output by 15 percent relative to baseline after 40 years.
    - If the productivity of public investment is halved, output loss is halved (to 8 percent).
    - Cutting public investment preferable to raising profit tax or UST unless the social rate of return on public investment is significant.
  - Cutting government consumption:
    - Best financing option from a purely macroeconomic perspective in simulations.
    - Replacing government consumption with transfers allows for higher private consumption than baseline.
    - To fully offset higher transfers, government consumption would need to decline gradually by 4 percentage points of GDP until 2030, or about one quarter relative to the current ratio to GDP.
    - Feasibility depends on achieving significant efficiency gains in government; staff estimates suggest current output of public services could be produced with only 2/3 of actual inputs compared with peers (IMF, 2007; Hauner, 2008).
    - Caution: GIMF assumption that government consumption does not enter private sector production may overstate private consumption gains; cuts would require reinforced efficiency-enhancing public sector reforms.

### G. Policy recommendations and specific measures
- Treat the financing of a reasonable replacement rate as a contingent fiscal liability; private pensions unlikely to fill the gap.
- Gradual increase in the retirement age should be considered:
  - Very gradual increase by 2 months per year for men and 4 months per year for women could finance much of the gap to keep the current replacement rate stable.
  - Requires commensurate increases in life expectancy, particularly for men, via higher living standards and improved health care.
- Improve incentives for working longer:
  - Align NDC benefits with actual life expectancy at retirement.
  - Increase deductions for early retirement and premia for working longer.
  - Revisit lists of hazardous occupations eligible for early retirement.
- Oil wealth and privatizations can finance only part of the gap:
  - Oil wealth projected to be exhausted around 2025 under current legislated withdrawals and prices.
  - Additional withdrawals to finance a 26 percent replacement rate would deplete funds by 2020.
  - Privatizations (estimated value 20 percent of GDP) would cover only about half of the financing need for a stable 26 percent replacement rate.
- If fiscal financing is used, the model favors lower government consumption over borrowing, lower public investment, or higher taxes:
  - Gradual efficiency gains and reductions in government consumption could finance a stable replacement rate of more than 30 percent under optimistic efficiency assumptions.
  - Debt financing, lower public investment, or tax increases entail substantial macroeconomic costs (lower output, investment, consumption, net foreign assets).
- Reform the basic pension:
  - The basic pension should be means-tested and financed from general revenue rather than from payroll contributions.
  - UST revenue could be limited to financing the insurance-based NDC pillar; this would allow sustaining a replacement rate of 26 percent approximately until 2013.
- Improve returns on the mandatory funded pillar:
  - Outsource management of mandatory contributions to private sector managers (example: Sweden model with standardized mandates to keep administrative fees low).
  - Consider increasing the ceiling on investment abroad to improve risk-return profiles and diversify into high-growth and net resource-importing emerging economies.
- Gradually increase domestic gross government debt issuance to support financial market development:
  - Greater issuance of government debt, particularly longer maturities, advisable; the borrowing of 1 percent of GDP allowed under the new budget framework should be fully used, possibly offset by a lower withdrawal from the National Welfare Fund.
  - This would lead to a very gradual convergence of federal government domestic debt towards 10 percent of GDP.
- Strengthen trust in financial markets through improved regulation and supervision:
  - Improvements in rule of law, property rights, corporate governance (accounting rules, financial disclosure, minority shareholder rights) required.
  - More decisive action against regulatory infringements that undermine public trust, critical for the success of the subsidized private pension savings scheme.

*Source: INTRODUCTION (IMF Working Paper, _wp08201)*

### REFERENCES

### REFERENCES

### Journal articles and book chapters
- Becker, Charles M., and Dina S. Urzhumova, 1998, “Pension Burdens and Labor Force Participation in Kazakhstan,” World Development 26, pp. 2087–103.
- Blanchard, Olivier J., 1985, “Debt, Deficits, and Finite Horizons,” Journal of Political Economy 93, pp. 223–247.
- Gajdar, Yegor, 2007, “Russian’s Finances: What Is at the Horizon?” Economic Policy No. 1/2007.
- Gurvich, Evsey, 2007, “Prospects for the Russian Pension System,” Voprosy Economiki No. 9/2007.
- Selden, Mark, and Laiyin You, 1997, “The Reform of Social Welfare in China,” World Development 25, 1657–68.
- Wang, Yan, Dianqing Xu, Zhi Wang, and Fan Zhai, 2004, “Options and Impact of China’s Pension Reform: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis,” Journal of Comparative Economics 32, pp. 105–127.
- Willmore, Larry, 2007, “Universal Pensions for Developing Countries,” World Development 35, pp. 24–51.
- Hauner, David, 2008, “Explaining Differences in Public Sector Efficiency: Evidence from Russia’s Regions,” forthcoming in World Development.

### IMF, World Bank, and other institutional reports
- Holzmann, Robert, Indermit Gill, Richard Hinz, Gregorio Impavido, Alberto R. Musalem, Michael Rutkowski, and Anita Schwarz, 2004, Old Age Income Support in the 21st Century: The World Bank’s Perspective on Pension Systems and Reform (Washington: World Bank).
- IMF, 2006, “Managing Russia’s Oil Wealth: An Assessment of Sustainable Expenditure Paths,” in Russian Federations—Selected Issues (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- IMF, 2007, “Benchmarking the Efficiency of Public Expenditure in the Russian Federation,” in Russian Federations—Selected Issues (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- IMF and World Bank, 2003, Guidelines for Public Debt Management (Washington: International Monetary Fund and World Bank).
- World Bank, 2002, Pension Reform in Russia: Design and Implementation (Washington: World Bank).

### Working papers, discussion papers, and memos
- Botman, Dennis, and Dora Iakova, 2007, “Policy Challenges of Population Aging in Ireland,” IMF Working Paper No. 07/247 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Kumhof, Michael, and Douglas Laxton, 2007, “A Party without a Hangover? On the Effects of U.S. Government Deficits,” IMF Working Paper No. 07/202 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Leigh, Daniel, 2007, “Achieving a Soft Landing: The Role of Fiscal Policy,” forthcoming IMF Working Paper (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- IET (Institute for the Economy in Transition), 2007, “Proposals on the Use of Incomes from the Investment of Working Capital for the Future Generations Fund,” mimeo, Moscow.
- Sinyavskaya, Oxana, 2005, “Pension Reform in Russia: A Challenge of Low Pension Age,” Discussion Paper, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Japan.

*References list as provided in the source PDF._wp08201 - REFERENCES*

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