## _wp08236 - References

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### I. Introduction — Purpose and framework
- Purpose: propose a theoretical framework encompassing arguments about IMF crisis lending and conditionality; map assumptions to policy implications.
- Core assumption: the IMF has a role in crises because it is more effective than uncoordinated private investors in eliciting policy adjustments via a “lending technology” based on tranched lending, close monitoring, and conditionality.
- Conceptual distinction: “conditionally solvent” — IMF instruments (in particular, conditional tranched lending) can re-establish solvency.
- Two crucial questions determining moral hazard/conditionality design:
  - Is IMF ex post conditionality effective in re-establishing solvency?
  - Are objectives of domestic policymakers aligned with global welfare (absence of cross-country externalities or domestic political-economy distortions)?
- High-level policy implications:
  - If both questions are answered positively: IMF lending does not generate moral hazard; conditionality need not extend beyond measures to re-establish solvency ex post.
  - If one or both answers are negative: IMF lending can create moral hazard; ex ante conditionality (pre-qualification) may be justified.
- Empirical view stated: IMF lending to emerging market countries has generally been repaid in full and has not involved substantial transfers; however, cross-country externalities or political-economy distortions can misalign policymakers’ incentives with global welfare.

### II. Historical evolution of IMF conditionality
- 1947–mid-1950s: Fund allowed members to borrow without explicit conditions; borrowing based on need consistent with Article I (v).
- 1952: Creation of “Stand-By Arrangement” (SBA); initially six months; 1954 Peru SBA granted one year with a “prior notice” clause.
- Late 1950s–early 1960s: “Prior notice” clauses replaced by explicit (typically quantitative) fiscal and monetary “performance criteria”; added periodic staff reviews, phased drawings, and waiver/guidelines.
- Institutional outcome: performance criteria created a commitment device minimizing debtor moral hazard vis-à-vis the Fund; evidenced by general full repayment to the Fund.
- Post-Bretton Woods and rise of capital flows: IMF role shifted toward crisis lending; 1999 Contingent Credit Line (CCL) created for strong-policy members but lapsed in 2003.
- Subsequent proposals: condition large-scale lending on IMF surveillance-based scoring.

### III. Literature strands summarized
- Four theoretical strands on IMF role:
  1. IMF as risk sharing among countries: moral hazard via subsidy or aggravating cross-country externalities; ex ante conditionality as solution.
  2. IMF solving coordination problems in international lending: IMF lending helps avoid runs; conditionality often ignored as distinctive comparative advantage.
  3. IMF correcting information and incentive problems: conditionality as screening/commitment device to catalyze foreign capital.
  4. IMF mitigating domestic policy failures: assistance and conditionality may change domestic political-economy equilibria.
- Position of present model: integrates elements of all four strands; core market failure is private sector inability to undertake tranched, conditional lending.

### IV. Theory of the IMF — baseline model setup
- Environment and timing:
  - Large number of small open emerging market economies indexed by i ∈ [0,1].
  - Three periods: t = 0, 1, 2.
  - Representative entrepreneur invests k in period 0 financed by foreign loan; output in period 2 is y = θ k.
  - Foreign lenders grant one-period loans and must roll over in period 1; investors receive a binomial signal in period 1 (good news or bad news).
  - If bad news, investment may be liquidated (period-2 output 0 with probability π > 0 under bad-news rollover).
- Crisis-prevention effort:
  - Government chooses effort e ∈ [e, ē] in period 0 which affects probability p of bad news.
  - p(e, n) = p(e) + λ n, where p(·) is decreasing and convex, p(e) ∈ [0,1], n fraction of economies in crisis, and λ ∈ [0,1] captures systemic contagion.
- Government objective: maximize discounted expected welfare V = E[U] with discounting factor β(z) ≤ 1 capturing domestic political-economy distortions (z ≥ 0; β(0) = 1).
- Two modeled distortions:
  - Cross-country externalities (λ > 0).
  - Domestic political-economy distortion (z > 0).

### V. Equilibrium under laissez-faire (no IMF)
- Lenders’ participation constraint: 1 = r + p r′ (notation: r initial interest; r′ rollover rate), leading to r determined by p in simplified setup.
- Government minimizes net expected loss per unit of capital:
  - L_lf(e) ≡ p(e) θ + g(e), where p(e) θ is expected output loss from crisis and g(e) is direct cost of effort.
- Equilibrium properties (Proposition 1):
  - If λ > 0, laissez-faire equilibrium has crisis prevention effort e inefficiently low and number of crises n inefficiently high.
  - Larger λ implies a larger discrepancy between first-best and laissez-faire values of e and n.
  - Result: interest rate for domestic private borrowing is above first best and capital inflows are below their first-best level.

### VI. Equilibrium with IMF crisis lending (ex post conditionality)
- Extension: in period 1 government can undertake crisis-resolution effort e1 ∈ {0,1} at consumption cost h(e1,k) to restore productivity θ with certainty.
- Time-consistency/debt overhang: absent commitment, private creditors do not roll over because government may appropriate insufficient share of post-effort benefits.
- IMF comparative advantage: conditional lending (tranched lending, conditionality) enables lending at zero interest rate r′ = 0 conditional on crisis-resolution effort.
- IMF will lend to crisis countries provided their pre-crisis effort is not excessively low — ex post conditionality must be effective to protect IMF resources (Proposition 2).

### VII. Moral hazard with ex post conditionality
- Two opposing effects on prevention effort e:
  - Country moral hazard: IMF lowers crisis cost (via mitigation), reducing marginal benefit of e and thus e.
  - Effort substitution: if h′(e) < 0 (mitigation cost falls with higher pre-crisis effort), countries may increase e to lower future mitigation costs.
- Ambiguity (Proposition 3): net impact of IMF lending on prevention effort is ambiguous—IMF may induce less or more prevention depending on parameters and strength of effort-substitution.
- Welfare implications:
  - If λ = 0: IMF crisis lending with ex post conditionality improves welfare even if it reduces prevention effort (lower crisis frequency and lower cost of resolution).
  - If λ > 0 and sufficiently large: IMF ex post conditionality may reduce welfare because reduced e increases frequency/spillovers of crises (Proposition 4).

### VIII. The case for ex ante conditionality (pre-qualification)
- Definition: ex ante conditionality requires countries to undertake specified prevention effort e_a in exchange for ex post access to IMF crisis lending.
  - e% denotes highest effort country will undertake ex ante to access IMF lending, satisfying L_imf(e%) ≤ L_lf(e%).
  - e* denotes first-best effort in presence of IMF lending.
  - Ex ante conditionality sets e_a = min(e*, e%).
- Main result (Proposition 5):
  - If λ > 0, ex ante conditionality is welfare-enhancing relative to laissez-faire and IMF lending without ex ante conditionality.
  - Ex ante conditionality reduces probability of crisis and cost of ex post conditionality.
- Intuition: ex ante conditionality internalizes cross-country externalities by inducing higher prevention effort; the set of inducible efforts includes laissez-faire effort so it cannot make things worse relative to laissez-faire.

### IX. Discussion and extensions
- Credibility and observability assumptions:
  - Ex ante conditionality assumes IMF can commit credibly and prevention effort is observable.
  - If commitment imperfect or effort partially unobservable: countries may do less prevention ex ante expecting ex post rescue.
  - Even with imperfect commitment, ex ante conditionality weakly improves prevention relative to ex post-only regime.
- Noisy signals and credibility of ex ante conditionality:
  - Noisy signals generate Type I errors (lend to low-effort countries) and Type II errors (deny lending to deserving countries).
  - For Type I errors, ex ante conditionality can never do worse than ex post-only.
  - Ex ante conditionality may worsen welfare via Type II errors; for any required observed effort there exists signal noisiness making ex ante conditionality lower welfare than no ex ante conditions.
  - Mitigation: make ex ante policy more permissive as signal noisiness increases; in the limit of completely uninformative signals e^0 = e^0_ea (optimal ex ante policy coincides with regime without ex ante conditionality).
  - Conclusion: some form of ex ante conditionality likely welfare improving even with limited credibility/noisy signals, but optimal ex ante conditionality should be less stringent with noisier signals or model uncertainty.
- Large versus small countries:
  - If some countries are “small” (no externality), baseline results apply but ex ante conditionality is sensible only for “large” countries.
  - Ex post conditionality remains relevant for all countries as a commitment device.
- Distortions related to domestic political economy:
  - Governments may underinvest in prevention if they discount the future (parameter z ≥ 0).
  - With 0λ = 0 and 0z ≥ 0 variant, crisis probability depends only on government’s actions.
  - Main parallels to baseline:
    - Under laissez-faire, government underinvests in prevention (Proposition 1).
    - IMF provides commitment via tranched lending and conditionality.
    - Effects of IMF on prevention effort remain ambiguous due to moral hazard and effort substitution; relative size of effort substitution effect decreases with political-economy distortion.
    - IMF lending can be welfare reducing if prevention effort falls excessively; ex ante conditionality can raise effort and improve welfare.
  - Selectivity/exclusion based on poor governance is dominated by ex ante conditionality: ex ante conditionality can induce required effort and enable access, whereas exclusion foregoes those gains.
- Practical challenges for ex ante conditionality:
  - Prequalification cannot be purely rules-based; requires discretion via IMF surveillance.
  - Denying loans to countries that failed ex ante conditions poses a time-consistency challenge; high IMF commitment capacity needed—possibly requiring enhanced operational independence and strengthened medium-run accountability.

### Conclusion — main insights
- Ex post conditionality as commitment: tranched lending and conditionality solve a commitment problem in crisis mitigation, helping avoid or shorten crises and—subject to caveats—improving welfare.
- Moral hazard conditional on context:
  - IMF lending with ex post conditionality can generate moral hazard only under specific conditions.
  - Effect on prevention effort is ambiguous: reductions in effort may be efficient responses absent cross-country externalities or domestic distortions.
  - Large cross-country externalities or significant government–social interest discrepancies can make IMF lending welfare reducing.
- Ex ante conditionality as avoidance of moral hazard:
  - Applying conditionality to prevention effort (ex ante) can avoid moral hazard by requiring either the first-best effort in presence of IMF lending or the highest effort the country will undertake to access IMF lending.
- Operational considerations:
  - Ex ante conditions must be tailored, discretionary, and sensitive to country characteristics and cycle.
  - Time-consistency and credibility require strong IMF commitment capacity and reforms to operational independence/accountability.

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### References..............................................................................................................

### _wp08236 - References

### I. Introduction — Purpose and framework
- Purpose: propose a theoretical framework encompassing arguments about IMF crisis lending and conditionality; map assumptions to policy implications.
- Core assumption: the IMF has a role in crises because it is more effective than uncoordinated private investors in eliciting policy adjustments via a “lending technology” based on tranched lending, close monitoring, and conditionality.
- Key policy questions the framework addresses:
  - Should the IMF lend exclusively to “illiquid but solvent” countries?
  - Does official crisis lending generate moral hazard and through which channels?
  - What should be the main purpose of conditionality (minimize welfare cost of crises, ensure IMF loan repayment, ensure foreign investors are repaid)?
  - Should conditionality be ex post only or also ex ante (pre-qualifying countries for crisis loans)?
- Conceptual distinction: relevant notion is whether a country is “conditionally solvent” — IMF instruments (in particular, conditional tranched lending) can re-establish solvency.
- Two crucial questions determining moral hazard/conditionality design:
  - Is IMF ex post conditionality effective in re-establishing solvency?
  - Are objectives of domestic policymakers aligned with global welfare (i.e., absence of cross-country externalities or domestic political-economy distortions)?
- Main high-level conclusions:
  - If both answers are positive: countries likely produce optimal crisis prevention effort; IMF lending does not generate moral hazard; conditionality need not extend beyond measures to re-establish solvency ex post.
  - If one or both answers are negative: countries likely produce sub-optimal crisis prevention effort; IMF lending creates moral hazard; ex ante conditionality (pre-qualification) may be justified.
- Empirical reading (authors’ view): IMF lending to emerging market countries has generally been repaid in full and has not involved substantial transfers; however, cross-country externalities or political-economy distortions can make policymakers’ incentives inconsistent with global welfare.

*Source: _wp08236 - References..............................................................................................................*

### II. Historical evolution of IMF conditionality
- 1947–mid-1950s: Fund allowed members to borrow without explicit conditions; borrowing based on need consistent with Article I (v).
- 1952: Creation of “Stand-By Arrangement” (SBA) — time window for drawings without a new request.
  - Initially six months; 1954 Peru requested one year SBA granted with a “prior notice” clause (Peru 1954 SBA, paragraph 7).
- Late 1950s–early 1960s: “Prior notice” clauses replaced by explicit (typically quantitative) fiscal and monetary “performance criteria”; additional SBA features added:
  - periodic staff reviews of performance criteria;
  - phased drawings following reviews;
  - guidelines for waiving performance criteria in unforeseen shocks and for negotiating new arrangements.
- Institutional result: unique apparatus for minimizing debtor moral hazard vis-à-vis the Fund — commitment effect of performance criteria evidenced by general full repayment to the Fund.
- Contrast with earlier design: conditionality was originally aimed at safeguarding Fund resources, not at minimizing third-party moral hazard (effects on other countries, private creditors, or citizens).
- Post-Bretton Woods and rise of capital flows:
  - IMF role shifted toward lending often after currency, debt, or banking crises.
  - Critics in the 1980s charged IMF lending could encourage default/rescheduling (Vaubel, 1983) and proposed ex ante exclusion of countries with poor policies (Vaubel, 1988).
- 1999: Contingent Credit Line (CCL) for members with strong policies created but it did not attract borrowers and lapsed in 2003.
- Subsequent proposals: use IMF surveillance to score countries and condition access to large-scale lending on scores (Cordella and Levy Yeyati 2005; Ostry and Zettelmeyer 2005).

*Source: _wp08236 - References..............................................................................................................*

### III. Literature strands summarized
- Four main theoretical strands on IMF role:
  1. IMF as risk sharing among countries (Chami, Sharma, Shim 2004; Weithöner 2006): IMF as contract/fund providing loans/transfers; moral hazard via subsidy or aggravating cross-country externalities; ex ante conditionality can be a solution.
  2. IMF solving coordination problems in international lending (Sachs 1984, 1995; Zettelmeyer 2000; Jeanne and Wyplosz 2001; global games: Rochet and Vives 2004; Morris and Shin 2006; Corsetti, Guimarães and Roubini 2006): IMF lending helps avoid runs but these models usually ignore IMF conditionality as a distinctive comparative advantage.
  3. IMF correcting information and incentive problems in international capital markets (Marchesi and Thomas 1999; Federico 2001; Clark and Huang 2001; Tirole 2002; Jeanne and Zettelmeyer 2005): IMF conditionality acts as screening/commitment device, catalyzes foreign capital flows by committing countries to preserve creditor interests.
  4. IMF mitigating domestic policy failures (Vreeland 1999; Drazen 2002; Mayer and Mourmouras 2002–2005; Jeanne and Zettelmeyer 2001a; Jeanne, Ostry and Zettelmeyer 2007): IMF assistance and conditionality may change domestic political-economy equilibria (e.g., strengthen reformers).
- Positioning of present model: straddles all four strands; core market failure justifying IMF is private sector inability to undertake tranched, conditional lending (not size/coordination alone).

*Source: _wp08236 - References..............................................................................................................*

### IV. Theory of the IMF — baseline model setup
- Environment:
  - Large number of small open emerging market economies indexed by i ∈ [0,1].
  - Three periods: t = 0, 1, 2.
  - Representative entrepreneur invests k in period 0 financed by foreign loan; output in period 2 is y = θ k.
  - Foreign lenders grant one-period loans and must roll over in period 1; investors receive a binomial signal in period 1 (good news or bad news).
  - If bad news, investment may be liquidated (period-2 output 0 with probability π > 0 under bad-news rollover).
- Crisis-prevention effort:
  - Government chooses effort e ∈ [e, ē] in period 0 which affects probability p of bad news.
  - p(e, n) = p(e) + λ n, where p(·) is decreasing and convex, p(e) ∈ [0,1], n fraction of economies in crisis, and λ ∈ [0,1] captures systemic contagion.
- Government objective: maximize discounted expected welfare V = E[U] with a possible discounting factor β(z) ≤ 1 capturing domestic political-economy distortions (z ≥ 0; β(0) = 1).
- Two potential distortions modeled:
  - Cross-country externalities (λ > 0) implying crises impose external costs on others.
  - Domestic political-economy distortion (z > 0) implying government discounts the future more than domestic welfare would justify.

*Source: _wp08236 - References..............................................................................................................*

### V. Equilibrium under laissez-faire (no IMF)
- Lenders’ participation constraint: (1) (1) 1 = r + p r′ (notation: r is initial interest; r′ is rollover rate) leading in the simplified setup to r determined by p.
- Government chooses e to minimize the net expected loss per unit of capital:
  - L_lf(e) ≡ p(e) θ + g(e), where p(e) θ is expected output loss from crisis and g(e) is direct cost of effort.
- Equilibrium properties (Proposition 1):
  - If λ > 0 (systemic contagion), laissez-faire equilibrium has crisis prevention effort e inefficiently low and number of crises n inefficiently high.
  - Larger λ implies a larger discrepancy between first-best and laissez-faire values of e and n.
  - Consequences: interest rate at which domestic private sector borrows abroad is above first best and capital inflows are below their first-best level.

*Source: _wp08236 - References..............................................................................................................*

### VI. Equilibrium with IMF crisis lending (ex post conditionality)
- Model extension: in period 1 government can undertake a crisis-resolution effort (discrete e1 ∈ {0,1}) at consumption cost h(e1,k) to restore productivity to θ with certainty.
- Time-consistency/debt overhang problem: absent a commitment device, private creditors do not roll over because government will appropriate insufficient share of the post-effort benefit.
- IMF comparative advantage: IMF can lend conditional on the crisis-resolution effort (traditional ex post conditionality), enabling lending at zero interest rate r′ = 0 conditional on government undertaking crisis-resolution effort.
- IMF conditional lending acceptance condition for the government (informal statement from text):
  - Government accepts IMF offer if net gain from avoiding liquidation exceeds cost of crisis-resolution effort. The model assumes IMF conditionality makes lending essentially risk-free for the IMF because conditionality ensures the post-crisis effort that restores solvency.
- Consequence summarized (Proposition 2): IMF will lend to crisis countries provided their pre-crisis effort is not excessively low (i.e., ex post conditionality must be effective for the IMF to lend without losing resources).

*Source: _wp08236 - References..............................................................................................................*

### VII. Moral hazard with ex post conditionality
- Two opposing effects of IMF on crisis-prevention effort e:
  - Country moral hazard: IMF reduces the cost of crises (by enabling crisis-resolution effort), lowering marginal benefit of e and hence reducing e.
  - Effort substitution: if post-crisis resolution cost h depends negatively on pre-crisis effort e (h′(e) < 0), countries may increase pre-crisis effort to reduce future post-crisis costs of conditionality.
- Ambiguity (Proposition 3): the net impact of IMF lending on crisis-prevention effort is ambiguous—IMF may induce less or more prevention depending on parameterization and the strength of the effort-substitution effect.
- Welfare implications:
  - If λ = 0 (no systemic contagion): IMF crisis lending with ex post conditionality improves welfare even if it reduces crisis-prevention effort — lower crisis frequency and lower cost of crisis-resolution mean the IMF is welfare-enhancing (this is related to the “Mussa Theorem”).
  - If λ > 0 and sufficiently large: IMF ex post conditionality may reduce welfare because reduced e increases frequency/spillovers of crises; an example in the text shows parameter combinations where IMF decreases welfare when contagion exceeds a threshold (Proposition 4).

*Source: _wp08236 - References..............................................................................................................*

### VIII. The case for ex ante conditionality (pre-qualification)
- Definition: ex ante conditionality requires countries to undertake a specified level of crisis-prevention effort e_a in exchange for ex post access to IMF crisis lending.
  - Let e% denote highest effort a country is willing to undertake ex ante in exchange for access to IMF lending, satisfying the incentive constraint:
    - L_imf(e%) ≤ L_lf(e%)
  - Let e* denote the first-best effort in presence of IMF lending (taking into account external effects).
  - Ex ante conditionality sets e_a = min(e*, e%).
- Main result (Proposition 5):
  - If λ > 0 (positive systemic contagion), ex ante conditionality is welfare-enhancing relative to both laissez-faire and IMF lending without ex ante conditionality.
  - Ex ante conditionality reduces the probability of crisis and the cost of ex post conditionality.
- Intuition:
  - Ex ante conditionality gives the IMF an additional instrument to influence prevention policies and internalize cross-country externalities; the set of efforts inducible under ex ante conditionality includes the laissez-faire effort, so it cannot make things worse relative to laissez-faire.

*Source: _wp08236 - References..............................................................................................................*

### IX. Discussion and extensions
- Assumptions behind ex ante conditionality: IMF can commit credibly to ex ante conditions; crisis-prevention effort is observable.
- If IMF commitment is imperfect or effort is partially unobservable:
  - Countries may undertake less prevention than required ex ante on the expectation that the IMF will rescue them ex post.
  - Even with imperfect commitment, ex ante conditionality cannot make crisis prevention worse than a regime with ex post conditionality only (ex ante conditionality weakly improves prevention relative to ex post-only).
- The paper develops an extension analyzing domestic political-economy distortions (government discounting the future excessively) and finds similar implications for the optimal design of conditionality as with cross-country externalities.

*Source: _wp08236 - References..............................................................................................................*

### conclusion that the regime with ex ante conditionality dominates the regime without hence

### _wp08236 - conclusion that the regime with ex ante conditionality dominates the regime without hence

### Noisy signals and credibility of ex ante conditionality
- Incomplete information about prevention effort (or the effectiveness of a policy effort with respect to crisis prevention) complicates ex ante conditionality because the ex ante rule must be written with respect to a noisy signal of true effort.
- Noisy signals can generate:
  - Type I errors: lend to countries that undertook too little effort.
  - Type II errors: deny lending to countries even though they undertook the required effort.
- Ex ante conditionality versus ex post-only regime:
  - As far as Type I errors are concerned, ex ante conditionality can never do worse than the regime with ex post conditionality only.
  - Ex ante conditionality may do worse by making too many Type II errors (excluding “deserving” countries).
  - For any given level of observed effort required by ex ante conditionality, there exists a degree of signal noisiness such that ex ante conditionality lowers welfare relative to the regime without any ex ante conditionality.
  - This can be mitigated by making the ex ante policy sufficiently “permissive” depending on signal noisiness, i.e. by decreasing e^0_ea relative to its level under complete information.
  - In the limit of completely uninformative signals (that is, for completely uninformative signals) e^0 = e^0_ea, i.e. the optimal ex ante policy coincides with the regime without any ex ante conditionality.
- Conclusion: Some form of ex ante conditionality is likely welfare improving even with limited credibility and noisy signals, but the optimal ex ante conditionality should be less stringent in the presence of noisy signals or model uncertainty.

### Large versus small countries
- Baseline assumption: all countries are “large” in that they impose a crisis externality on others.
- If some countries are “small” and do not impose an externality:
  - All baseline results still apply, except ex ante conditionality is sensible only for “large” countries (because only their prevention effort involves a social cost not fully internalized by the government).
  - Ex post conditionality continues to make sense for all countries, since its rationale—providing commitment—does not depend on cross-country externalities.

### Distortions related to domestic political economy
- Model extension: governments may underinvest in prevention because the government discount factor is smaller than the social discount factor (short political horizons). A domestic distortion parameter z ≥ 0 captures this.
- In this variant, assume 0λ = 0 and 0z ≥ 0 so that crisis probability depends only on the government’s own actions (p(e) = p(e0)), removing the cross-country dimension.
- Redefined loss functions (as presented in the source) include terms with z and β(⋅); the distinction between government and social perspectives now reflects different discount rates rather than external crises.
- Main summarized results (analogous to baseline, with some differences):
  - Under laissez faire, the government underinvests in crisis prevention, producing crisis risk and country borrowing rates too high relative to the first best, and capital flows too low (Proposition 1). Reason: government discounts future crisis costs relative to present prevention costs.
  - Standard IMF lending rationale unchanged: provide commitment to solve a time consistency problem in crisis mitigation; IMF’s tranched lending and conditionality help commit government and can avoid or shorten crises.
  - Effects of IMF lending on prevention effort remain ambiguous due to:
    - Moral hazard: IMF lending reduces crisis costs and can reduce prevention incentives.
    - Effort substitution: higher prevention effort reduces mitigation effort; presence of IMF may induce more prevention if the substitution effect dominates.
    - With domestic political economy distortion, the relative size of the effort substitution effect is decreasing in the distortion (since mitigation costs are discounted more).
    - In contrast, systemic contagion increases crisis probability for a given effort and thus increases incentives to invest in effort.
  - IMF conditionality can be welfare reducing if prevention effort falls excessively. Whether this occurs depends on the size of political economy distortions:
    - If no political economy distortion, reductions in prevention effort may be an efficient response to a safer environment from IMF lending and improve welfare.
    - If distortions exist, the reduction in effort can exceed what is socially justified, making IMF lending welfare reducing.
  - When effort is inefficiently low in the presence of IMF mitigation, ex ante conditionality can raise effort and improve welfare, for the same reasons as in the baseline model (countries exert extra effort to maintain access to IMF lending).
- Selectivity based on country characteristics (excluding countries from IMF lending for poor governance) is dominated in welfare terms by ex ante conditionality: ex ante conditionality can induce poor-governance countries to exercise required prevention effort and hence access lending, whereas exclusion would prevent those gains.

### Conclusion — main insights
- First: Ex post conditionality is a solution to a commitment problem. In sudden stops involving solvency deterioration, crisis resolution requires policy effort and liquidity; creditors will roll over if the government undertakes the effort, but the government then has an incentive to renege. IMF conditionality commits the government via tranched lending and conditionality, helping to avoid or shorten crises and—subject to caveats—improving welfare.
- Second: IMF lending with ex post conditionality can be a source of moral hazard only under specific conditions:
  - Effect on prevention effort is ambiguous: IMF lending reduces crisis cost (reducing incentives) but may increase prevention because higher prevention lowers adjustment costs under IMF programs (effort substitution).
  - If IMF lending reduces prevention effort, this is not necessarily moral hazard if the reduction is an efficient response (no subsidy, debtor governments maximize domestic welfare, no crisis or policy externalities). Under these conditions (or small violations), IMF lending is welfare improving despite lower prevention effort.
  - If there are large cross-country crisis externalities or significant discrepancies between government and social interests, IMF lending could be welfare reducing because governments underinvest relative to the social optimum.
- Third: Moral hazard can be avoided by applying conditionality to crisis prevention effort (quality of economic policies and institutions):
  - Optimal ex ante conditionality asks the country to implement either the first best policy effort in the presence of IMF lending (which may be lower than first best without the IMF) or, if infeasible, the highest effort the country will undertake in exchange for access to IMF lending in a crisis.
- Practical challenges in applying ex ante conditionality:
  - What ex ante conditions should look like: adequate prevention depends on other policy areas, economy characteristics, and the cycle; prequalification cannot be purely rules-based and will require discretion (possibly exercised via IMF surveillance).
  - Time consistency: once a country is in trouble, the optimal action may be to lend whether or not ex ante conditions were met. Denying loans to those who failed ex ante conditions requires high IMF commitment capacity—potentially higher than for conventional programs where denying tranches creates a similar problem. Enhanced operational independence and strengthened medium-run accountability could help address this time-consistency problem.

*Italic: _wp08236 - conclusion that the regime with ex ante conditionality dominates the regime without hence*

### References

### _wp08236 - References

### Lender of Last Resort and Moral Hazard
- Barro, Robert, 1998, “The IMF Doesn’t Put Out Fires, It Starts Them,” Business Week, December 7.
- Calomiris, Charles W. 1998a, “The IMF’s Imprudent Role as Lender of Last Resort,” Cato Journal, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 275–94.
- Corsetti, Giancarlo, Guimaraes, Bernardo and Nouriel Roubini, 2006, “International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF’s Catalytic Finance,” Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 441-471.
- Cohen, Daniel, and Richard Portes, 2004, “Towards a Lender of First Resort,” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4615 (London: Center for Economic Policy Research).
- Jeanne, Olivier, and Charles Wyplosz, 2001, “The International Lender of Last Resort: How Large is Large Enough?” NBER Working Paper No.8381 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- Jeanne, Olivier, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001a, “International Bailouts, Moral Hazard and Conditionality,” CESifo Working Paper No. 563, September.
- Jeanne, Olivier, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001b, “International Bailouts, Moral Hazard and Conditionality,” Economic Policy 33, 409-32.
- Jeanne, Olivier, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2002, “ ‘Original Sin,’ Balance Sheet Crises, and the Roles of International Lending,” IMF Working Paper WP/02/234.
- Jeanne, Olivier, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005, “The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard),” IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 52, Special Issue, pp. 64–84.
- Mussa, Michael, 1999, “Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Limiting Moral Hazard and Containing Real Hazard,” in Capital Flows and the International Financial System, ed. by David Gruen and Luke Gower (Sidney: Reserve Bank of Australia), 216–36.
- Mussa, Michael, 2004, “Reflections on Moral Hazard and Private Sector Involvement in the Resolution of Emerging Market Financial Crises,” in Fixing Financial Crises in the Twenty-first Century, 2004, ed. by Andy Haldane (London: Routledge), pp. 33–51.
- Vaubel, Roland, 1983, “The Moral Hazard of IMF Lending,” The World Economy, pp. 291-304;
- Vreeland, James R., 1999, “The IMF: Lender of Last Resort or Scapegoat?” presented at the International Studies Association Conference, Washington DC.

### IMF Conditionality, Ownership, and Program Implementation
- Drazen, Allen, “Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach,” IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 49, Special Issue, pp. 36-67.
- Erbas, S. Nuri, 2003, “IMF Conditionality and Program Ownership: A Case for Streamlined Conditionality,” IMF Working Paper 03/98.
- Federico, Giulio, 2001, “IMF Conditionality,” Economics Papers 2001-W19, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Horsefield, J. Keith, The International Monetary Fund 1945-1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation, Volume I: Chronicle (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Ivanova, Anna, 2006, “Outcomes-Based Conditionality: Its Role and Optimal Design,” IMF Working Paper 06/128.
- Joyce, Joseph P., "Promises Made, Promises Broken: A Model of IMF Program Implementation". Economics & Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 339-365, November 2006
- Khan, Mohsin S. and Sunil Sharma, 2001, “IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs,” IMF Working Paper 01/142.
- Marchesi, Sylvia, and Jonathan P. Thomas, 1999, “IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device,” Economic Journal, Vol. 109 (March), pp. C111-C125.
- Mayer, Wolfgang and Alex Mourmouras, 2002, “Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of IFI Conditionality,” IMF Working Paper 02/73.
- Mayer, Wolfgang and Alex Mourmouras, 2004, “The Political Economy of Conditional and Unconditional Foreign Assistance: Grants vs. Loan Rollovers,” IMF Working Paper No. 04/38.
- Mayer, Wolfgang and Alex Mourmouras, 2005, “On the Viability of Conditional Assistance Programs,” IMF Working Paper No. 05/121.
- Ostry, Jonathan and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005, “Strengthening IMF Crisis Prevention,” IMF Working Paper 05/206.
- Polak, Jacques J., 1991, “The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality,” Essays in International Finance No. 184 (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

### Catalytic Finance, Crisis Lending, and Market Access Instruments
- Chami, Ralph, Sharma, Sunil and Ilhyock Shim, 2004, “A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement,” IMF Working Paper 04/219.
- Cordella, Tito, and Eduardo Levy Yeyati, “A (New) Country Insurance Facility,” IMF Working Paper 05/23 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Corsetti, Giancarlo, Guimaraes, Bernardo and Nouriel Roubini, 2006, “International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF’s Catalytic Finance,” Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 441-471.
- Gale, Douglas, and Xavier Vives, 2002 “Dollarization, Bailouts, and the Stability of the Banking System,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (May), pp. 467-502.
- Mody, Ashoka, and Diego Saravia, 2003, Catalyzing Capital Flows: Do IMF-Supported Programs Work as Commitment Devices? IMF Working Paper No. 03/100.
- Morris, Steve, and Hyun Song Shin, 2006, “Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work?” Journal of International Economics 70, 161-177.
- Penalver, Adrian, 2004, “How can the IMF Catalyse Private Capital Flows? A Model,” Bank of England Working Paper No. 215.
- IMF, 2006, Consideration of a New Liquidity Instrument for Market Access Countries, available online at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/080306.pdf
- IMF, 2007a, Further Consideration of a New Liquidity Instrument for Market Access Countries—Design Issues, available online at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2007/021307.pdf

### Crisis Prevention, Sovereign Liquidity, and Debt Restructuring
- Haldane, Andrew G., and Mark Kruger, 2001, “The Resolution of International Financial Crises: Private Finance and Public Funds,” Bank of England Financial Stability Review, November.
- Jeanne, Olivier, Jonathan Ostry, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2007, “Crisis Lending, Moral Hazard, and Conditionality,” (paper presented at CREI/CEPR conference on “Financial Crises: Past, Theory and Future,” Barcelona, June 2007).
- Miller, Marcus, and Lei Zhang, 2000, “Sovereign Liquidity Crises: The Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill,” Economic Journal, Vol. 110 (January). pp. 335–62.
- Rieffel, Lex, 2003, Restructuring Sovereign Debt. The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (Washington: Brookings Institution).
- Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2000, “Can Official Crisis Lending be Counterproductive in the Short Run?”, Economic Notes Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 13-29.
- Zettelmeyer, Jeromin and Priyadarshani Joshi, 2005, “Implicit Transfers in IMF Lending,” International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/05/8.
- IMF, 2007b, Factsheet—The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), available online at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/mdri.htm

### International Financial Architecture, Governance, and Reform
- Boughton, J.M, 2001, The Silent Revolution. The International Monetary Fund, 1979-1989 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund).
- Council on Foreign Relations Task Force (1999). “Safeguarding Prosperity in a Global Financial System: The Future International Financial Architecture”, Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
- de Gregorio, José, Barry Eichengreen, Takatoshi Ito and Charles Wyplosz, An Independent and Accountable IMF, Geneva Reports on the World Economy Report 1, Centre for Economic Policy Research, September 2000.
- International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, 2000, “Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission’, Allan H. Meltzer, Chairman, Washington DC, March (also referred to above as the “Meltzer Report”).
- Kenen, Peter, 2001, The International Financial Architecture: What’s New? What’s Missing? (Washington: Institute for International Economics).
- Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Xavier Vives, 2004, “Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?,” Journal of the European Economic Association 2 (6), pp. 1116-1147.
- Sachs, Jeffrey, 1984, “Theoretical Issues in International Borrowing,” Princeton Studies in International Finance 54 (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Sachs, Jeffrey, 1995, “Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort?” Frank D. Graham Lecture at Princeton University, Vol. 8, April 20.
- Tirole, Jean, 2002, Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Weithöner, Thomas, 2006, “How can IMF policy eliminate country moral hazard and account for externalities?” Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 25, No. 8, Pages 1257-1276.

### Foundational, Historical, and Institutional Works
- Fleming, J. Marcus, 1964, The International Monetary Fund: Its Form and Functions (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Spitzer, Emil G., 1969, “Stand-By Arrangements: Purposes and Form, in J. Keith Horsefield, The International Monetary Fund 1945-1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation, Volume II: Analysis (Washington: International Monetary Fund), pp. 468-491.
- Polak, Jacques J., 1991, “The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality,” Essays in Interantional Finance No. 184 (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Rieffel, Lex, 2003, Restructuring Sovereign Debt. The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (Washington: Brookings Institution).
- Vreeland, James R., 2003, The IMF and Economic Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Frech, Tim, Internationale Verschuldungskrisen, die Kreditvergabepolitik des IWF und Schuldner-Moral-Hazard: Eine Analyse aus vertragstheoretischer Sicht (Bern: Studienzentrum Gerzensee).

*References list from _wp08236 - References.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/_wp08236.pdf_
