## _wp0834 - 1.  Summary Statistics of Main Variables

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---

### Key findings
- Short-run absorption is very low, but absorption increases substantially over time.
- A portion of unabsorbed aid initially exits through increased capital account outflows, which is reversed as aid is absorbed with long lags.
- Spending considerably exceeds absorption in both the short- and long-run.
- Of the aid that is absorbed, less than half goes toward increased investment.
- Public investment financed by aid appears to crowd-out private investment to some extent.
- These results imply long lags in absorption, macroeconomic problems from excess spending over absorption, and potential crowding-out effects—strengthening the case for closer coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities when managing aid.

### Uses of aid — accounting framework and policy scenarios
- Balance of payments identity (as presented):
  - RKABCABΔ=+  (equation label 2.1)
  - RNAKABNACABAΔΔ+Δ−Δ−=Δ  (equation label 2.2)
  - Definitions:
    - A is net aid.
    - NACAB is the non-aid current account balance.
    - NAKAB is the non-aid capital account balance.
- Fiscal identity (as presented):
  - GOBDR    DEA=−+  (equation label 2.3)
  - ()NAGOBDR    DEΔ=Δ−  (equation label 2.4)
  - Definitions:
    - GOB (or fiscal balance), DR (domestic revenue), DE (domestic expenditure).
    - NAGOB is the non-aid fiscal balance.
- Operational definitions used in the analysis:
  - Absorption = the fall in the non-aid current account balance that is attributable to aid.
  - Spending = the fall in the non-aid fiscal balance that is attributable to aid.
- Policy-response matrix (as summarized):
  - Absorbed & Spent:
    - Textbook case: central bank sells aid dollars and fiscal deficit rises as aid is spent.
    - Aid used for public investment and consumption; no change in money supply; risks Dutch disease.
  - Not Absorbed & Spent:
    - Central bank accumulates foreign exchange as reserves; fiscal deficit rises as aid is spent.
    - No real resource transfer.
    - Unsterilized: Money supply rises, risks inflation.
    - Sterilized: Crowding out of private sector; domestic debt accumulates.
  - Absorbed & Not Spent:
    - Central bank sells foreign exchange but fiscal deficit remains unchanged.
    - Helps achieve stabilization; provides resources for private investment.
  - Not Absorbed & Not Spent:
    - Central bank accumulates foreign exchange as reserves; fiscal deficit net of aid unchanged.
    - No real resource transfer; equivalent to saving aid or rejecting aid in long run.

### Data and sample
- Data sources: World Development Indicators (WDI), Global Development Finance (GDF), IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO).
- Sample period: 1970-2004 (annual data).
- Sample composition:
  - 95 countries (Appendix I).
  - 45 from Sub-Saharan Africa.
  - 19 from Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Key summary statistics:
  - Mean aid-to-GDP ratio for the sample: 6.8 percent.
  - Sub-Saharan Africa mean aid-to-GDP ratio: 9.7 percent.
  - On average, countries ran high current and fiscal deficits (net of aid), with Sub-Saharan Africa running the highest deficits.
- Note: No direct summary statistics for absorption and spending as defined, because NACAB and NAGOB change for reasons other than aid.

### Empirical specification and parameters of interest
- Dynamic panel regressions estimated (equations reproduced as in source):
  - it
    K
    k
    kitkititiit
    XAIDNACABNACAB
    1
    1
    11111
    εδβρα++++=
    ∑
    =
    −
    (equation 3.1)
  - it
    K
    k
    kitkititiit
    XAIDNAGOBNAGOB
    2
    1
    22122
    εδβρα++++=
    ∑
    =
    −
    (equation 3.2)
  - Variables measured in percent of GDP: NACAB, NAGOB, AID.
  - i1α and i2α are unobserved country-specific fixed effects.
  - kitX is a vector of control variables of size K.
- Controls:
  - Common controls: variance of aid over the reference period, average per capita income over the period, index of autocracy.
  - Additional controls: terms of trade (in equation (1)), rate of inflation (in equation (2)).
- Interpretation of parameters:
  - Short-run absorption = 1β.
  - Short-run spending = 2β.
  - Persistence in non-aid current account balance = 1ρ.
  - Persistence in non-aid fiscal balance = 2ρ.
  - Long-run absorption = 1 1 1ρ β − (as stated in source).
  - Long-run spending = 2 2 1ρ β − (as stated in source).
- Priors stated in the source (verbatim):
  - 0 1 <β, 0 2 <β, 10 1 <<ρ, and 10 2 <<ρ.
- Estimation strategy:
  - System GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond (1998)) used to address dynamic panel bias and endogeneity.
  - Predetermined and endogenous variables in first differences instrumented with lags of their own levels; predetermined and endogenous variables in levels instrumented with lags of their own first differences.
  - GMM difference estimator and fixed effects estimator also employed for sensitivity checks.

### Estimation methodology
- System GMM (Blundell and Bond’s system estimator) is used; consistent provided the dependent variable is mean stationary and unobserved country effects are uncorrelated with changes in the error term (0][11 = itiDEεα and 0][22 = itiDEεα).
- AR(1) is expected in first differences; significant AR(2) would indicate invalid instruments. Moment conditions are checked and satisfied in reported regressions.
- Stationarity tests (Table 2) confirm the dependent variables are stationary.
- Extensions: same methodology applied to reserve accumulation and investment via regressions (3.3) and (3.4):
  - (3.3) ΔRit = ρ3 ΔRit-1 + β31 Aidit-? + … + Xkit β3k + εit (notation preserved from source).
    - If some aid bolsters reserves initially expect β3 ≥ 0.
    - Long-run impact on capital account estimated by 31 1ββ+− (as in source).
    - If some aid used to bolster reserves even long-run then 3ρ < 1; delayed absorption implies 3ρ < 0 (textual conditions preserved).
  - (3.4) ΔIit = ρ4 ΔIit-1 + β41 Aidit-? + … + Xkit β4k + εit (notation preserved).
    - Expectation: 14 0ββ≤≤ (i.e., 0 ≤ β41 ≤ 1? preserved as in source).
    - Also run (3.4) including and excluding private investment to test crowding-out.

### Main empirical findings — Absorption and spending
- Short-run absorption: ".30***" (standard deviation .08) — "about 30 cents out of every aid dollar is absorbed" (Table summary; Column 1 of Table 3).
- Long-run absorption: ".83**" (standard deviation .32) — "about 83 cents to the dollar" (Figure 1); time-path: "takes 7-8 years to asymptote".
- Short-run spending: ".56***" (standard deviation .07) — "about 56 cents to the dollar are spent by the fiscal authorities" (Column 1 of Table 4).
- Long-run spending: "1.60***" (standard deviation .27) — "about 160 cents per aid dollar are spent, i.e. spending is considerably greater than 100 percent".
- Key interpretation:
  - Spending exceeds absorption in both short- and long-runs; difference increases over time (point estimates diverge, confidence intervals widen; long-run spending > long-run absorption at an 80 percent confidence level).
  - Delayed absorption consistent with staggered public investment or public consumption out of aid (infrastructure projects disbursed at t but imported inputs used over years).
  - Short-run divergence may reflect incomplete coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities; monetary authority may resist selling aid dollars to avoid currency appreciation.
  - Long-run spending > 100% possibly due to recurrent expenditures generated by aid-financed capital projects (e.g., teachers, maintenance), so total recurrent + initial capital spending may exceed aid amount.
  - Result implies injection of domestic liquidity; absent higher demand for money, would lead to higher inflation and/or higher interest rates via sterilization.

### Reserve accumulation and capital account dynamics
- Impact of aid on reserve accumulation (Table summary, Column 1 of Table 5):
  - Short-run: ".05" (standard deviation (1.24)) — "close to zero and insignificant".
  - Long-run: ".05" (standard deviation (2.40)) — "so is the long-run impact" (insignificant).
- Implication via identity (2.2): in the short-run almost "70 %" of unabsorbed aid exits the country through the capital account (textual statement).
- Dynamics: much initial capital outflow reversed over time to accommodate delayed absorption; pattern consistent with central bank selling aid dollars on disbursement and private agents saving them (portfolio rebalancing to foreign assets), later drawn down to finance imports.
- Conclusion: smoothing behavior is present but implemented by the private sector rather than central bank reserve accumulation.

### Investment effects and crowding-out
- Short-run impact of aid on gross capital formation (Table 6, Column 1): ".14***" (standard deviation .03) — "an increase of 1 % of GDP in aid leads to an increase in gross capital formation of about .14 % of GDP" (about half of absorbed aid goes toward investment in short run).
- Long-run impact on investment: ".26***" (standard deviation .059) — "gross capital formation due to aid increases slowly to about .26 % of GDP, well under the long-run absorption level".
- Evidence of crowding-out:
  - Regression including private investment as control (Table 6) shows positive significant aid effect.
  - Regression excluding private investment (Table 7) shows the aid impact becomes small and insignificant — consistent with public investment induced by aid crowding-out private investment.
- Quantitative summary (from source summary table):
  - Percentage impact of a 1% increase in Aid:
    - Absorption: Short Run ".30***" (.08), Long Run ".83**" (.32)
    - Spending: Short Run ".56***" (.07), Long Run "1.60***" (.27)
    - Reserves Accumulation: Short Run ".05" (1.24), Long Run ".05" (2.40)
    - Investment: Short Run ".14***" (.03), Long Run ".26***" (.059)
  - Note: standard deviations in parentheses; ** indicates significance at the 5 % level; *** indicates significance at the 1 % level.

### Regional and sample heterogeneity
- Regional patterns (Tables 3–7; 1994–2004 subsample Tables 8–11; major aid recipient Tables 12–15):
  - Absorption: slightly higher than mean for AFR and OC; considerably lower in LAC.
  - Spending: highest in AFR; OC close to full-sample; LAC considerably lower.
  - Reserve accumulation: negligible and insignificant in AFR and full sample; small but significant and apparently permanent effect in LAC and OC.
  - Investment impact: greatest in AFR, considerably lower in OC, negligible and insignificant in LAC.
- Large aid recipients (aid/GDP thresholds):
  - For countries with aid/GDP > 0.02 (49 countries): short-run absorption 34 percent, long-run 87 percent (text summary).
  - aid/GDP > 0.05 (35 countries): short-run 36 percent, long-run 92 percent.
  - aid/GDP > 0.1 (18 countries): short-run 45 percent, long-run 110 percent.
  - Spending for these groups:
    - aid/GDP >0.02: short-run 55 percent, long-run 160 percent.
    - aid/GDP >0.05: short-run 58 percent, long-run 160 percent.
    - aid/GDP >0.1: short-run 68 percent, long-run 180 percent.
  - For major aid recipients, aid has no significant impact on reserve accumulation; investment propensity of aid is between 40 and 50 percent of the absorption rate in the short-run, under a third in the long-run.

### Robustness checks
- Alternative estimators: Difference estimator and Fixed Effects estimator produce qualitatively identical and quantitatively close results to system GMM; main quantitative difference: long-run investment out of aid estimated lower under difference and fixed effects.
- Recent sub-sample (1994–2004): main qualitative conclusions unchanged — absorption incomplete short-run and increases over time; spending > absorption; aid negligible on reserves; aid impact on investment relatively small.
- Restricted samples (large aid recipients): results consistent with baseline.
- Results robust to several changes in lag structure and to using three-year averages (not shown in paper but reported as available).

### Policy implications and recommendations
- More careful coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities in response to aid inflows is needed.
  - Objective: keep spending in line with absorption over a reasonable horizon to avoid unplanned injections of liquidity.
  - Coordinated response could eliminate the need to sterilize aid via domestic channels and may reduce crowding-out of private investment.
- Microeconomic criteria for selecting public projects to be financed through aid (two highlighted criteria):
  - Import content of projects.
  - Complementarities with private investment.
- Further research recommended: investigate links between aid flows and capital account flows given private-sector-driven smoothing behavior.

*Source: _wp0834 - 1.  Summary Statistics of Main Variables, IMF PDF content provided*

### 1.  Summary Statistics of Main Variables ...............................................................................

### _wp0834 - 1.  Summary Statistics of Main Variables

### Key findings (preview)
- Short-run absorption is very low, but absorption increases substantially over time.
- A portion of unabsorbed aid initially exits through increased capital account outflows, which is reversed as aid is absorbed with long lags.
- Spending considerably exceeds absorption in both the short- and long-run.
- Of the aid that is absorbed, less than half goes toward increased investment.
- Public investment financed by aid appears to crowd-out private investment to some extent.
- These results imply long lags in absorption, macroeconomic problems from excess spending over absorption, and potential crowding-out effects—strengthening the case for closer coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities when managing aid.

### Uses of aid — accounting framework and policy scenarios
- Balance of payments identity (as presented):
  - RKABCABΔ=+  (equation label 2.1)
  - RNAKABNACABAΔΔ+Δ−Δ−=Δ  (equation label 2.2)
  - Definitions:
    - A is net aid.
    - NACAB is the non-aid current account balance.
    - NAKAB is the non-aid capital account balance.
- Fiscal identity (as presented):
  - GOBDR    DEA=−+  (equation label 2.3)
  - ()NAGOBDR    DEΔ=Δ−  (equation label 2.4)
  - Definitions:
    - GOB (or fiscal balance), DR (domestic revenue), DE (domestic expenditure).
    - NAGOB is the non-aid fiscal balance.
- Operational definitions used in the analysis:
  - Absorption = the fall in the non-aid current account balance that is attributable to aid.
  - Spending = the fall in the non-aid fiscal balance that is attributable to aid.
- Policy-response matrix (as summarized in the source):
  - Absorbed & Spent:
    - Textbook case: central bank sells aid dollars and fiscal deficit rises as aid is spent.
    - Aid used for public investment and consumption; no change in money supply; risks Dutch disease.
  - Not Absorbed & Spent:
    - Central bank accumulates foreign exchange as reserves; fiscal deficit rises as aid is spent.
    - No real resource transfer.
    - Unsterilized: Money supply rises, risks inflation.
    - Sterilized: Crowding out of private sector; domestic debt accumulates.
  - Absorbed & Not Spent:
    - Central bank sells foreign exchange but fiscal deficit remains unchanged.
    - Helps achieve stabilization; provides resources for private investment.
  - Not Absorbed & Not Spent:
    - Central bank accumulates foreign exchange as reserves; fiscal deficit net of aid unchanged.
    - No real resource transfer; equivalent to saving aid or rejecting aid in long run.

### Data and sample
- Data sources: World Development Indicators (WDI), Global Development Finance (GDF), IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO).
- Sample period: 1970-2004 (annual data).
- Sample composition:
  - 95 countries (Appendix I).
  - 45 from Sub-Saharan Africa.
  - 19 from Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Key summary statistics:
  - Mean aid-to-GDP ratio for the sample: 6.8 percent.
  - Sub-Saharan Africa mean aid-to-GDP ratio: 9.7 percent.
  - On average, countries ran high current and fiscal deficits (net of aid), with Sub-Saharan Africa running the highest deficits.
- Note: No direct summary statistics for absorption and spending as defined, because NACAB and NAGOB change for reasons other than aid.

### Empirical specification and parameters of interest
- Dynamic panel regressions estimated (equations reproduced as in source):
  - it
    K
    k
    kitkititiit
    XAIDNACABNACAB
    1
    1
    11111
    εδβρα++++=
    ∑
    =
    −
    (equation 3.1)
  - it
    K
    k
    kitkititiit
    XAIDNAGOBNAGOB
    2
    1
    22122
    εδβρα++++=
    ∑
    =
    −
    (equation 3.2)
  - Variables measured in percent of GDP: NACAB, NAGOB, AID.
  - i1α and i2α are unobserved country-specific fixed effects.
  - kitX is a vector of control variables of size K.
- Controls:
  - Common controls: variance of aid over the reference period, average per capita income over the period, index of autocracy.
  - Additional controls: terms of trade (in equation (1)), rate of inflation (in equation (2)).
- Interpretation of parameters:
  - Short-run absorption = 1β.
  - Short-run spending = 2β.
  - Persistence in non-aid current account balance = 1ρ.
  - Persistence in non-aid fiscal balance = 2ρ.
  - Long-run absorption = 1 1 1ρ β − (as stated in source).
  - Long-run spending = 2 2 1ρ β − (as stated in source).
- Priors stated in the source (verbatim):
  - 0 1 <β, 0 2 <β, 10 1 <<ρ, and 10 2 <<ρ.
- Estimation strategy:
  - System GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond (1998)) used to address dynamic panel bias and endogeneity.
  - Predetermined and endogenous variables in first differences instrumented with lags of their own levels; predetermined and endogenous variables in levels instrumented with lags of their own first differences.
  - GMM difference estimator and fixed effects estimator also employed for sensitivity checks.

*Source: _wp0834 - 1.  Summary Statistics of Main Variables, IMF PDF content provided*

### Section V.

### Section V.

### Estimation methodology
- System GMM (Blundell and Bond’s system estimator) is used; consistent provided the dependent variable is mean stationary and unobserved country effects are uncorrelated with changes in the error term (0][11 = itiDEεα and 0][22 = itiDEεα).
- AR(1) is expected in first differences; significant AR(2) would indicate invalid instruments. Moment conditions are checked and satisfied in reported regressions.
- Stationarity tests (Table 2) confirm the dependent variables are stationary.
- Extensions: same methodology applied to reserve accumulation and investment via regressions (3.3) and (3.4):
  - (3.3) ΔRit = ρ3 ΔRit-1 + β31 Aidit-? + … + Xkit β3k + εit (notation preserved from source).
    - If some aid bolsters reserves initially expect β3 ≥ 0.
    - Long-run impact on capital account estimated by 31 1ββ+− (as in source).
    - If some aid used to bolster reserves even long-run then 3ρ < 1; delayed absorption implies 3ρ < 0 (textual conditions preserved).
  - (3.4) ΔIit = ρ4 ΔIit-1 + β41 Aidit-? + … + Xkit β4k + εit (notation preserved).
    - Expectation: 14 0ββ≤≤ (i.e., 0 ≤ β41 ≤ 1? preserved as in source).
    - Also run (3.4) including and excluding private investment to test crowding-out.

### Main empirical findings — Absorption and spending
- Short-run absorption: ".30***" (standard deviation .08) — "about 30 cents out of every aid dollar is absorbed" (Table summary; Column 1 of Table 3).
- Long-run absorption: ".83**" (standard deviation .32) — "about 83 cents to the dollar" (Figure 1); time-path: "takes 7-8 years to asymptote".
- Short-run spending: ".56***" (standard deviation .07) — "about 56 cents to the dollar are spent by the fiscal authorities" (Column 1 of Table 4).
- Long-run spending: "1.60***" (standard deviation .27) — "about 160 cents per aid dollar are spent, i.e. spending is considerably greater than 100 percent".
- Key interpretation: spending exceeds absorption in both short- and long-runs; difference increases over time (point estimates diverge, confidence intervals widen; long-run spending > long-run absorption at an 80 percent confidence level).
- Mechanisms and implications:
  - Delayed absorption consistent with staggered public investment or public consumption out of aid (infrastructure projects disbursed at t but imported inputs used over years).
  - Short-run divergence may reflect incomplete coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities; monetary authority may resist selling aid dollars to avoid currency appreciation.
  - Long-run spending > 100% possibly due to recurrent expenditures generated by aid-financed capital projects (e.g., teachers, maintenance), so total recurrent + initial capital spending may exceed aid amount.
  - Result implies injection of domestic liquidity; absent higher demand for money, would lead to higher inflation and/or higher interest rates via sterilization.

### Reserve accumulation and capital account dynamics
- Impact of aid on reserve accumulation (Table summary, Column 1 of Table 5):
  - Short-run: ".05" (standard deviation (1.24)) — "close to zero and insignificant".
  - Long-run: ".05" (standard deviation (2.40)) — "so is the long-run impact" (insignificant).
- Implication via identity (2.2): in the short-run almost "70 %" of unabsorbed aid exits the country through the capital account (textual statement).
- Dynamics: much initial capital outflow reversed over time to accommodate delayed absorption; pattern consistent with central bank selling aid dollars on disbursement and private agents saving them (portfolio rebalancing to foreign assets), later drawn down to finance imports.
- Conclusion: smoothing behavior is present but implemented by the private sector rather than central bank reserve accumulation.

### Investment effects and crowding-out
- Short-run impact of aid on gross capital formation (Table 6, Column 1): ".14***" (standard deviation .03) — "an increase of 1 % of GDP in aid leads to an increase in gross capital formation of about .14 % of GDP" (about half of absorbed aid goes toward investment in short run).
- Long-run impact on investment: ".26***" (standard deviation .059) — "gross capital formation due to aid increases slowly to about .26 % of GDP, well under the long-run absorption level".
- Evidence of crowding-out:
  - Regression including private investment as control (Table 6) shows positive significant aid effect.
  - Regression excluding private investment (Table 7) shows the aid impact becomes small and insignificant — consistent with public investment induced by aid crowding-out private investment.
- Quantitative summary (from source summary table):
  - Percentage impact of a 1% increase in Aid:
    - Absorption: Short Run ".30***" (.08), Long Run ".83**" (.32)
    - Spending: Short Run ".56***" (.07), Long Run "1.60***" (.27)
    - Reserves Accumulation: Short Run ".05" (1.24), Long Run ".05" (2.40)
    - Investment: Short Run ".14***" (.03), Long Run ".26***" (.059)
  - Note: standard deviations in parentheses; ** indicates significance at the 5 % level; *** indicates significance at the 1 % level.

### Regional and sample heterogeneity
- Regional patterns (Tables 3–7; 1994–2004 subsample Tables 8–11; major aid recipient Tables 12–15):
  - Absorption: slightly higher than mean for AFR and OC; considerably lower in LAC.
  - Spending: highest in AFR; OC close to full-sample; LAC considerably lower.
  - Reserve accumulation: negligible and insignificant in AFR and full sample; small but significant and apparently permanent effect in LAC and OC.
  - Investment impact: greatest in AFR, considerably lower in OC, negligible and insignificant in LAC.
- Large aid recipients (aid/GDP thresholds):
  - For countries with aid/GDP > 0.02 (49 countries): short-run absorption 34 percent, long-run 87 percent (text summary).
  - aid/GDP > 0.05 (35 countries): short-run 36 percent, long-run 92 percent.
  - aid/GDP > 0.1 (18 countries): short-run 45 percent, long-run 110 percent.
  - Spending for these groups: (aid/GDP >0.02) short-run 55 percent long-run 160 percent; (aid/GDP >0.05) 58 percent and 160 percent; (aid/GDP >0.1) 68 percent and 180 percent.
  - For major aid recipients, aid has no significant impact on reserve accumulation; investment propensity of aid is between 40 and 50 percent of the absorption rate in the short-run, under a third in the long-run.

### Robustness checks
- Alternative estimators: Difference estimator and Fixed Effects estimator produce qualitatively identical and quantitatively close results to system GMM; main quantitative difference: long-run investment out of aid estimated lower under difference and fixed effects.
- Recent sub-sample (1994–2004): main qualitative conclusions unchanged — absorption incomplete short-run and increases over time; spending > absorption; aid negligible on reserves; aid impact on investment relatively small.
- Restricted samples (large aid recipients): results consistent with baseline.
- Results robust to several changes in lag structure and to using three-year averages (not shown in paper but reported as available).

### Policy implications and recommendations (as stated)
- More careful coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities in response to aid inflows is needed.
  - Objective: keep spending in line with absorption over a reasonable horizon to avoid unplanned injections of liquidity.
  - Coordinated response could eliminate the need to sterilize aid via domestic channels and may reduce crowding-out of private investment.
- Microeconomic criteria for selecting public projects to be financed through aid (two highlighted criteria):
  - Import content of projects.
  - Complementarities with private investment.
- Further research recommended: investigate links between aid flows and capital account flows given private-sector-driven smoothing behavior.

*Source: _wp0834 - Section V.*

### References

### _wp0834 - References

### Cited literature: themes and representative citations
- Core themes covered by the references list:
  - Aid and macroeconomic effects, including Dutch Disease and aid absorption (e.g., Adam, Christopher S. and David L. Bevan, 2003, “Aid, Public Expenditure and Dutch Disease”; Bevan, David L., 2005, “An Analytic Overview of Aid Absorption: Recognizing and Avoiding Macroeconomic Hazards”).
  - Macroeconomic management of scaling-up aid (e.g., Aiyar, Shekhar, Andrew Berg and Mumtaz Hussain, "The Macroeconomic Challenge of More Aid"; Berg, Andrew, et al., 2007, “The Macroeconomics of Scaling-Up Aid: Lessons From Recent Experience”, IMF Occasional Paper (forthcoming)).
  - Empirical relationships between aid, growth, savings, and investment (e.g., Burnside, Craig and David Dollar, "Aid, Policies and Growth", American Economic Review, Vol 90 (4), September 2000; Dalgaard, Carl-Johan, Henrik Hansen and Finn Tarp, 2004, “On the Empirics of Foreign Aid and Growth”, Economic Journal, vol. 114(496)).
  - Methodological guidance for panel and dynamic macroeconometric work (e.g., Bond, Stephen, 2002, “Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide to Micro Data Methods and Practice”; Judson, Ruth, and Ann Owen, 1999, “Estimating Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide for Macroeconomists”, Economics Letters, 65: 9-15).
  - Critiques and reexaminations of aid-growth literature and data (e.g., Easterly, William, Ross Levin, and David Roodman, 2003, “New Data, New Doubts: A Comment on Burnside’s and Dollar’s ‘Aid, Policies and Growth’,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, No. 9846 (July); Roodman, David, 2004, “The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development and Cross-Country Empirics”).
  - Policy-oriented work and practitioner checklists on managing aid inflows (e.g., Gupta, Sanjeev, Robert Powell, and Yongzheng Yang, 2006, Macroeconomic Challenges of Scaling Up Aid to Africa: A Checklist for Practitioners; International Monetary Fund, 2005, “The Macroeconomics of Managing Aid Inflows: Experiences of Low-Income Countries and Policy Implications” (Washington, August 8)).
- Representative specific entries (preserving original titles and details as listed):
  - Adam, Christopher S. and David L. Bevan, 2003, “Aid, Public Expenditure and Dutch Disease,” Center for the Study of African Economies Working Paper, Working Paper No. 2003-02 (February).
  - Alesina, Alberto, and Beatrice Weder, 2002, “Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?”, American Economic Review 92(4).
  - Boone, Peter, 1994, “The Impact of Aid on Savings and Growth”, Centre for Economic Performance Working Paper No. 677, London School of Economics.
  - Clemens, Michael, Steven Radelet, and Rikhil Bhavnani, 2004, “Counting Chickens When they Hatch: The Short-Term Effect of Aid on Growth,” Working Paper 4,(Washington: Center for Global Development).
  - Rajan, R, and A. Subramanian, 2005, “Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?” IMF Working Paper, 05/127 (June), (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
  - Svensson, Jacob, 2003, “Why Conditional Aid Doesn’t Work and What Can Be Done About It”, Journal of Development Economics, 70(2).
  - Isard, Peter, Leslie Lipschitz, Alexandros Mormouras and Boriana Yontcheva (eds), 2006, The Macroeconomic Management of Foreign Aid: Opportunities and Pitfalls (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

### Appendix I: Sample Countries (country — region)
- Albania — OC
- Algeria — AFR
- Armenia — OC
- Bangladesh — OC
- Belize — LAC
- Benin — AFR
- Bhutan — OC
- Bolivia — LAC
- Botswana — AFR
- Brazil — LAC
- Burkina Faso — AFR
- Burundi — AFR
- Cameroon — AFR
- Cape Verde — AFR
- Central African Rep. — AFR
- Chad — AFR
- Chile — LAC
- China,P.R.: Mainland — OC
- Colombia — LAC
- Comoros — AFR
- Congo, Republic of — AFR
- Costa Rica — LAC
- Côte d'Ivoire — AFR
- Djibouti — AFR
- Dominica — OC
- Dominican Republic — LAC
- Ecuador — LAC
- Egypt — OC
- El Salvador — LAC
- Equatorial Guinea — AFR
- Ethiopia — AFR
- Fiji — OC
- Gabon — AFR
- Gambia, The — AFR
- Ghana — AFR
- Grenada — OC
- Guatemala — LAC
- Guinea — AFR
- Guinea-Bissau — AFR
- Guyana — OC
- Haiti — LAC
- Honduras — LAC
- Hungary — OC
- India — OC
- Indonesia — OC
- Iran, I.R. of — OC
- Jamaica — LAC
- Jordan — OC
- Kenya — AFR
- Lebanon — OC
- Lesotho — AFR
- Madagascar — AFR
- Malawi — AFR
- Malaysia — OC
- Maldives — OC
- Mali — AFR
- Mauritania — AFR
- Mauritius — AFR
- Mexico — LAC
- Morocco — AFR
- Mozambique — AFR
- Nepal — OC
- Niger — AFR
- Nigeria — AFR
- Pakistan — OC
- Panama — LAC
- Papua New Guinea — OC
- Paraguay — LAC
- Philippines — OC
- Romania — OC
- Rwanda — AFR
- Senegal — AFR
- Seychelles — AFR
- Sierra Leone — AFR
- South Africa — AFR
- Sri Lanka — OC
- St. Lucia — OC
- St. Vincent & Grens. — OC
- Sudan — AFR
- Swaziland — AFR
- Syrian Arab Republic — OC
- São Tomé & Príncipe — AFR
- Tanzania — AFR
- Thailand — OC
- Togo — AFR
- Tonga — OC
- Trinidad and Tobago — LAC
- Tunisia — AFR
- Turkey — OC
- Uganda — AFR
- Uruguay — LAC
- Venezuela, Rep. Bol. — LAC
- Vietnam — OC
- Zambia — AFR
- Zimbabwe — AFR

*Source: _wp0834 - References*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/_wp0834.pdf_