## _wp09192

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---

### Introduction and study scope
- Estimates long-run demand for M2 in The Gambia using monthly observations for 1988 through June 2007 (1988:1-2007:6; 234 observations).
- Focus: stability and determinants of demand for real M2 to inform monetary policy; Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG) follows a monetary targeting regime using broad money (M2) as intermediate target and reserve money as the operating target.
- Methodology: cointegration and error-correction approaches; evaluates which factors adjust in response to temporary disequilibrium.
- Note: analysis ends June 2007 despite significant exchange rate appreciation during Q3 2007.

### Key findings on money demand
- Long-run relationship for demand for broad money in real terms explained by:
  - real GDP,
  - interest rates on deposits at the commercial banks (DDR),
  - yields on treasury bills (TBRA),
  - expected inflation (INFA).
- Long-run relationship is not stable; using broad money as the intermediate target has limitations in The Gambia.
- Broad money developments can be used as one information variable to help design monetary policy.

### Country characteristics (exact figures)
- Population: about 1.6 million.
- Population growth rate: 2.3 percent (annual).
- Per capita gross national income: $320 in 2007.
- 2007/2008 UN Human Development Index score: 0.502; rank: 155 out of 177 countries and 94 out of 108 developing countries.
- Poverty: nearly 60 percent of the population live in poverty.
- Employment and output structure:
  - About 80 percent of the population depends on agriculture.
  - Agricultural sector contributes about one-fifth of real GDP.
  - Service sector accounts for over 50 percent of real GDP.

### Macroeconomic performance (exact figures)
- Real GDP growth (1988–2007) averaged 4.5 percent.
- Inflation (1988–2007) averaged 6.6 percent a year.
- Historical and program facts:
  - Economic Recovery Program (ERP) implemented in June 1985.
  - Since 1984 The Gambia has been in seven different IMF programs; most recent signed February 2007 for a three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility arrangement of SDR 14 million.
  - December 2007: completion point under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative; expected to receive the equivalent of $514 million in nominal debt relief; country remains at high risk of debt distress.
- Crisis episodes and movements:
  - Severe mid-1980s crisis from unsustainable macroeconomic policies and external shocks.
  - Managed floating exchange rate since January 1986; IMF reclassified to a managed float with no predetermined path effective June 30, 2002.
  - Rapid nominal effective depreciation 2000–03: 55 percent.
  - Inflation surged to 21 percent in August 2003 (from less than 1 percent in 2000); fell to 0.4 percent year-on-year in December 2006.
  - Output grew at an annual average of 6.4 percent for 2003–06.
  - Real GDP declined by 3 percent in 2002 due to very bad weather.

### Financial sector structure and indicators (exact figures)
- As of 2006, financial system consists of:
  - 8 commercial banks (including one Islamic bank),
  - the post office savings bank,
  - 11 insurance companies,
  - 68 savings and credit associations,
  - 38 foreign exchange bureaus,
  - several money transfer agents.
- Commercial banks account for 97 percent of total sector assets.
- Market concentration:
  - Largest two banks (Standard Chartered Bank and Trust Bank Limited) collect 71 percent of deposits, extend 58 percent of loans, and hold 66 percent of assets.
- Foreign participation:
  - Foreign participation is 100 percent for two banks and between 70 percent and 90 percent for three others.
- Currency composition of deposits:
  - Nearly 15 percent of bank deposits are denominated in foreign currency.
- Financial intermediation indicator:
  - Loans-to-deposits ratio is about 40 percent.
- Interest rate policy:
  - Interest rates deregulated since 1985.
- Constraints: high lending rates and other non–interest-rate factors.

### Monetary policy implementation details (exact procedural points)
- Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meets every other month and sets the rediscount rate (rate CBG applies to buy back treasury bills under certain conditions).
- CBG uses sales or retiring of treasury bills as primary tool to keep actual growth of reserve money in line with the target.
- Short-term liquidity forecasting framework determines weekly treasury-bill issuance/maturities.

### Appendix I — Financial sector developments and monetary instruments
- M2/GDP ratio increased from 25 percent in 1986 to 52 percent in 2007; The Gambia ranked sixth among 44 sub-Saharan African countries in 2007 by M2/GDP.
- Drivers of M2 growth since 2000: strong capital inflows; crack-down on informal exchange markets; financial innovation (residents allowed foreign currency deposits); increasing banking sector activity.
- Financial innovation timeline:
  - Banks began to accept foreign-currency deposits in 2002.
  - Automated teller services provided since 2007.
- No stock market; private debt securities uncommon. Small and growing foreign exchange market; parallel market active until 2003.
- Treasury bills:
  - Issued since 1986; since mid-1990s also for government financing.
  - Nearly 50 percent of outstanding treasury bills held by commercial banks (text also states nearly 50 percent held by nonbanks, including many individuals).
  - Individuals allowed to buy treasury bills.
  - CBG will rediscount only those bills that are at 80 percent of maturity (restriction).
  - April 2006: primary dealership system introduced (commercial banks and DataBank Securities).
  - Foreign interest in 2003–04 when yields reached 31 percent; waned as yields fell to 10–15 percent.

### Monetary policy framework and operational procedures (exact points)
- CBG operates under monetary targeting regime:
  - Intermediate target: broad money (M2).
  - Operating target: reserve money.
- Weekly monitoring: net domestic assets (must be kept below a specified ceiling), net foreign assets (must be maintained above a designated floor).
- Primary objective: price stability (CBG Act 2005 and MPC terms of reference).
- Other objectives: (1) exchange stability, (2) sound and vibrant financial system to encourage sustainable development.
- Main instruments: open market operations using treasury bills; others: reserve requirements, rediscount window, purchases/sales of foreign exchange.
- Short-term liquidity forecasting framework: weekly exercise considers government cash flows, issuance/maturing of treasury bills, purchases/sales of foreign exchange, deviation of actual from targeted reserve money to derive liquidity overhang/underhang and decide on treasury-bill issuance/retirement amount and maturities.

### Reserve requirements and rediscount policy (exact figures)
- Reserve requirement: 14 percent as of end-2007.
- Reserve application:
  - Uniform for all types of deposits, including domestic and foreign-currency denominated.
  - Commercial banks required to hold 20 percent of required reserves in cash and 80 percent as dalasi deposits at the CBG.
  - Reserves unremunerated and must be held in dalasis (against both domestic and foreign-currency denominated deposit liabilities).
  - Reserves calculated on a lagged averaging system, with a one-week lag and a one-week maintenance period.
- Rediscount rate history:
  - Until 2004 the CBG rediscount rate was a 3 percent premium over the yield on treasury bills.
  - Since July 2004 the MPC announces the rediscount rate after bimonthly meetings (independent of current TB yields).
  - Rediscount rate was 15 percent as of end-2007.
  - Many banks use the rediscount rate to set prime lending rates.
- CBG has purchases/sales of foreign exchange instrument but lately does not use it solely for influencing exchange rate or liquidity conditions.

### Money definition and demand-side observations (variables used)
- M2 = currency in circulation outside banks + demand, savings, and time deposits at commercial banks (held by the public); includes dalasi and foreign-currency denominated deposits.
- Deposit composition: savings and demand deposits each about 40 percent; time deposits about 20 percent of total deposits.
- Opportunity cost variables and proxies:
  - rDD: interest rates on short-term deposits (own rate).
  - rTB (TBRA): yield on treasury bills (alternative domestic asset).
  - INFA: expected inflation, proxied by actual year-on-year CPI inflation (base 2000 = 100).
  - DEPR / e(xrd): expected rate of depreciation of dalasi against the U.S. dollar (actual spot exchange rates used).
  - rUSTB (USTBR3M): yield on three-month U.S. treasury bills (foreign interest rate).
- Proxy for own rate: yield on short-term deposit account that provides both transactions and store-of-value function.

### Model specification for long-run demand for real M2 (variables and equation)
- Functional form specified:
  - LRBM = ln(real M2) = ln(M2/CPI)
  - LRGDPA = ln(real GDP)
  - DDR = Interest rate on short-term deposits
  - TBRA = Yield on the Gambian treasury bills
  - INFA = Expected inflation
  - DEPR = Expected depreciation of dalasi against the U.S. dollar
  - USTBR = Yield on three-month U.S. treasury bills
- Long-run estimating equation (equation 3):
  - LRBM = a0 + a1 LRGDPA + a2 DDR + a3 TBRA + a4 INFA + a5 DEPR + a6 USTBR + ε

### Expected coefficient signs (theory)
- LRGDPA: positive (scale effect).
- DDR (own rate): expected positive (higher return on money increases incentive to hold money).
- TBRA, USTBR (alternative returns): expected negative.
- INFA (expected inflation): generally expected negative; ambiguity noted.
- DEPR (expected depreciation): generally expected negative (substitution toward foreign money); sign may be empirical.

### Estimation approach and unit-root results
- Approach: cointegration techniques; variables tested for stationarity first using ADF tests with constant and trend, seasonal dummies; started with 12 lagged differences and used AIC.
- Unit-root test results: LRBM, LRGDPA, DDR, TBRA, CPI2000, INFA, DEPR, XRD$, NEER, LIBOR3M, and USTBR3M are nonstationary.
- All listed variables are I(1); first differences are I(0).
- Unit root test extract (selected statistics and significance):
  - LRBM: -1.4391 (Lag dLRBM-1) and -6.5400 **
  - LRGDPA: -2.0531 (dLRGDPA-1) and -4.4500 **
  - DDR: -2.1550 (dDDR-1) and -4.8400 **
  - TBRA: -3.31410 (dTBRA-1) and -9.6850 **
  - CPI2000: -0.4202 (dCPI2000-1) and -12.5700 **
  - INFA: -2.6750 (dINFA-1) and -13.5600 **
  - DEPR: -12.1100 ** (dDEPR-1) and -23.7400 **
  - LIBOR3M: -2.9837 (dLIBOR3M-1) and -10.0400 **
  - USTBR3M: -3.3848 (dUSTBR3M-1) and -9.5620 **
- ** indicates rejection of unit roots at 1 percent significance level.

### Cointegration tests (Johansen-Juselius) — specification and results
- Specification: included trend, constant, seasonal dummies, 12 lags, impulse dummy D200301; AIC used for maximum lag choice.
- Eigenvalues (listed): 0.1760, 0.1186, 0.0621, 0.0272, 0.0226.
- Trace statistics (λ trace 2/):
  - r = 0: 101.6500 **
  - r <= 1: 56.3600
  - r <= 2: 26.8100
  - r <= 3: 11.8100
  - r <= 4: 5.3500
- Trace statistics adjusted for degrees of freedom:
  - r = 0: 97.3000 **
  - r <= 1: 53.9500
  - r <= 2: 25.6700
  - r <= 3: 11.3000
  - r <= 4: 5.1200
- Trace P-values: 0.0090, 0.2580, 0.7560, 0.8530, 0.5870.
- Max-eigenvalue statistics (λ max 2/):
  - r = 0: 45.2800 **
  - r <= 1: 29.5500
  - r <= 2: 15.0000
  - r <= 3: 6.4600
  - r <= 4: 5.3500
- Max-eigenvalue adjusted for degrees of freedom:
  - r = 0: 43.3500 **
  - r <= 1: 28.2900
  - r <= 2: 14.3600
  - r <= 3: 6.1800
  - r <= 4: 5.1200
- Max-eigenvalue P-values: 0.0090, 0.1390, 0.6980, 0.9360, 0.5880.
- Summary: Both trace and maximal eigenvalue tests rejected zero in favor of at least one cointegration vector; results significant at the 1 percent level (including degree-of-freedom–adjusted critical values).

### Weak-exogeneity and adjustment coefficients (exact figures)
- Weak-exogeneity test results (χ2(1) with p-values in brackets):
  - α1 = 0: χ2(1) = 6.4371 [0.0112] *
  - α2 = 0: χ2(1) = 0.97973 [0.3223]
  - α3 = 0: χ2(1) = 0.10742 [0.7431]
  - α4 = 0: χ2(1) = 15.659 [0.0001] **
  - α5 = 0: χ2(1) = 1.2776 [0.2583]
  - Joint: α2 = 0; α3 = 0; α5 = 0: χ2(3) = 2.4117 [0.4915]
- System includes 2 lags for each variable, a constant, trend, seasonal dummies, and the dummy D2003m1.
- Standardized adjustment coefficient (alpha) for LRBM:
  - α (LRBM) = −0.00659.
  - Numerical implication: adjustment toward equilibrium takes place by about 0.7 percent in the first month after disequilibrium.
- Adjustments primarily carried through: LRBM and TBRA. LRGDPA, DDR, INFA, and the trend found weakly exogenous in joint tests.

### Long-run cointegration vector and elasticities (exact coefficients)
- Estimated long-run cointegration relationship:
  - (0.0217 *) LRBM_t = (1.26 *) LRGDPA + (0.40 *) DDR − (0.22 *) TBRA + (0.23 *) INFA
- Reported standard errors (in parentheses): (0.0164) for intercept term, (5.0664) for LRGDPA, (0.1443) for DDR, (0.0412) for TBRA, (0.0357) for INFA.
- Key numeric interpretations:
  - Long-run income elasticity = 1.26.
- Signs:
  - DDR (own rate) positive as expected.
  - TBRA (alternative return) negative as expected.
  - INFA (expected inflation) unexpectedly positive in estimates.

### Diagnostics, stability, and robustness
- Diagnostics:
  - Equations free of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity except for DDR and TBRA.
  - Normality tests rejected for all variables due to handful of large outliers.
  - One-step residuals mostly within ±2 standard errors.
- Outliers and breaks:
  - Shocks to output (LRGDPA) in 1995 and 2002.
  - Drastic changes in DDR in 1988, 1992, 1999, 2003, and 2005.
  - Dramatic increase in TBRA yields in 2002–04 after tight monetary policy.
  - Chow tests show breaks in 1995, 2002, and 2005.
- Attempts to remedy:
  - Introducing dummy variables to account for outliers either changed coefficients significantly or yielded no cointegration relationship.
  - Alternative formulations (LIBOR/USTBR3M, expected depreciation, tourist arrivals, agricultural production) produced multiple cointegrating vectors with implausible coefficients, wrongly signed coefficients, or no interpretable cointegration vector.
- Conclusion on stability:
  - Long-run relationship for demand for real M2 is not stable in The Gambia; therefore a short-run model was not carried out.

### Economic context and additional numeric facts
- Velocity of M2:
  - About 400 percent through the mid-1990s.
  - About 300 percent in the late 1990s.
  - About 200 percent since 2003.
- Banking presence as of end-2007:
  - 41 bank branches plus nearly 70 savings and credit associations.
- Outstanding treasury bills valued at only 27 percent of GDP in 2007.
- Correlation coefficient between yields on treasury bills and rediscount rate = 0.97.
- Correlations:
  - Tourist arrivals and real GDP correlation coefficient = 0.80 for 1988–2006.
  - Total production of agricultural crops and real GDP correlation coefficient = 0.84 for 1988–2006.

### Policy implications and recommendations (explicit guidance)
- Assessment of monetary regimes:
  - Monetary targeting using broad money is clearly suboptimal given unstable demand for broad money and a volatile money multiplier.
  - Interest rate targeting not viable because financial markets are shallow.
  - Exchange rate targeting may not be possible due to uncertainty in foreign exchange flows.
  - Full-fledged inflation targeting not feasible due to lack of well-developed analytical framework and data limitations.
- Recommended pragmatic approach:
  - Follow an eclectic approach: use the monetary target flexibly to achieve an inflation objective.
  - Consider an "inflation targeter lite" transitional regime until a reliable nominal anchor is found.
- Improvements needed to support policy:
  - Enhance analytical framework: develop models for transmission mechanism of monetary policy, money demand, and inflation forecasting; invest in econometric models to forecast inflation and compare with existing simple trend models.
  - Improve data quality and frequency:
    - National accounts: only annual GDP data available (base period 1976/77); new GDP with base 2004 being finalized.
    - Lack of high-frequency indicators of economic activity; develop production or service-sector indices and leading indicators; consider restarting composite index of leading indicators.
    - Commercial bank interest rates: currently only quarterly ranges; compile representative interest rates that reflect typical transaction rates.
  - Continue technical assistance from IMF, World Bank, and other partners to improve national accounts, balance of payments, and external debt statistics.

### Conclusions (summary)
- A long-run relationship relating demand for real M2 to real GDP, interest rates on short-term deposits, yields on treasury bills, and expected inflation is identifiable but not stable.
- Demand for real M2 appears determined by domestic factors alone; foreign interest rates and expected depreciation fail to yield an interpretable cointegration relationship.
- Key contributors to instability:
  - Changing velocity of M2 since the late 1990s.
  - Political and weather-related output shocks.
  - Policy changes affecting money growth and inflation.
  - Lack of good quality data on output, CPI, and interest rates.
- Policy stance:
  - Instability argues against using broad money as the sole intermediate target.
  - An eclectic or “inflation targeter lite” approach, along with enhanced analytics and improved data quality, is recommended to preserve price stability.

*Source: _wp09192*

### References..............................................................................................................

### _wp09192 - References

### Introduction and study scope
- The paper estimates the long-run demand for M2 in The Gambia using monthly observations for 1988 through June 2007.
- Focus is on stability and determinants of demand for real M2 to inform monetary policy; the Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG) has been following a monetary targeting regime using broad money (M2) as the intermediate target and reserve money as the operating target.
- The analysis uses cointegration and error-correction approaches and evaluates which factors adjust in response to temporary disequilibrium.
- Note: The country experienced significant exchange rate appreciation during the third quarter of 2007, but the paper focuses on the analysis up until June 2007.

### Key findings on money demand
- There appears to be a long-run relationship for demand for broad money in real terms explained by:
  - real GDP,
  - interest rates on deposits at the commercial banks,
  - yields on treasury bill,
  - expected inflation.
- The long-run relationship is not stable; therefore, using broad money as the intermediate target has limitations in The Gambia.
- Developments in broad money can be used as one of the information variables to help design monetary policy generally.

### Country characteristics (exact figures preserved)
- Population: about 1.6 million.
- Population growth rate: 2.3 percent (annual).
- Per capita gross national income: $320 in 2007.
- 2007/2008 UN Human Development Index score: 0.502; rank: 155 out of 177 countries and 94 out of 108 developing countries.
- Poverty: nearly 60 percent of the population live in poverty.
- Employment and output structure:
  - About 80 percent of the population depends on agriculture.
  - Agricultural sector contributes about one-fifth of real GDP.
  - Service sector accounts for over 50 percent of real GDP.

### Macroeconomic performance (exact figures preserved)
- Real GDP growth (1988–2007) averaged 4.5 percent.
- Inflation (1988–2007) averaged 6.6 percent a year.
- Historical notes and programs:
  - The Economic Recovery Program (ERP) implemented in June 1985.
  - Since 1984 The Gambia has been in seven different IMF programs; the most recent signed in February 2007 for a three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility arrangement of SDR 14 million.
  - In December 2007, The Gambia reached the completion point under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative; expected to receive the equivalent of $514 million in nominal debt relief from the HIPC and Multilateral Debt Relief initiatives; the country remains at high risk of debt distress.
- Crisis episodes and policy responses:
  - Severe crisis in the mid-1980s due to unsustainable macroeconomic policies, overvalued exchange rate, price controls, overexpansion of the public sector, droughts, and terms of trade deterioration.
  - Exchange rate: managed floating regime since January 1986; IMF reclassified to a managed float with no predetermined path effective June 30, 2002.
  - Exchange rate movements: relative stability in 1988–99; rapid depreciation in 2000–03 (55 percent in nominal effective terms) due to lax fiscal and monetary policies; appreciation since 2004 in response to prudent macroeconomic policies.
  - Inflation surge to 21 percent in August 2003 (from less than 1 percent in 2000); inflation fell to 0.4 percent year-on-year in December 2006.
  - Output grew at an annual average of 6.4 percent for 2003–06.
  - Real GDP declined by 3 percent in 2002 due to very bad weather.

### Financial sector structure and indicators (exact figures preserved)
- As of 2006, the financial system consists of:
  - 8 commercial banks (including one Islamic bank),
  - the post office savings bank,
  - 11 insurance companies,
  - 68 savings and credit associations,
  - 38 foreign exchange bureaus,
  - several money transfer agents.
- Commercial banks account for 97 percent of total sector assets.
- Market concentration:
  - The largest two banks (Standard Chartered Bank and Trust Bank Limited) collect 71 percent of deposits, extend 58 percent of loans, and hold 66 percent of assets.
- Foreign participation:
  - Foreign participation is 100 percent for two banks and between 70 percent and 90 percent for three others.
- Currency composition of deposits:
  - Nearly 15 percent of bank deposits are denominated in foreign currency.
- Financial intermediation indicator:
  - Loans-to-deposits ratio is about 40 percent.
- Interest rate policy:
  - Interest rates have been deregulated since 1985.
- Factors constraining intermediation include high lending rates and other non–interest-rate factors.

### Monetary policy implementation details (exact procedural points)
- Monetary policy is signaled by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), which meets every other month and sets the rediscount rate (the rate the CBG applies to buy back treasury bills from holders under certain conditions).
- The CBG uses sales or retiring of treasury bills as the primary tool to keep actual growth of reserve money in line with the target.
- The CBG uses the short-term liquidity forecasting framework to determine how much treasury bills to issue or to mature each week.

*Source: _wp09192 - References*

### Appendix I lists major developments in The Gambian financial sector since the mid-1980s.

### _wp09192 - Appendix I lists major developments in The Gambian financial sector since the mid-1980s

### Financial deepening and banking sector structure
- The ratio of M2/GDP increased from 25 percent in 1986 to 52 percent in 2007.
- Among 44 sub-Saharan African countries, The Gambia ranked sixth in terms of M2/GDP in 2007.
- Growth in M2 since 2000 attributed to: strong capital inflows; a crack-down on informal exchange markets; financial innovation (e.g., allowing residents to have foreign currency deposits); and increasing banking sector activity (numbers of banks and branches).
- Banks listed: Access Bank, Arab Gambia Islamic Bank, First International Bank, Guaranty Trust Bank, International Bank for Commerce and Industry, International Commercial Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, and Trust Bank.
- Financial innovation timeline:
  - Banks began to accept foreign-currency deposits in 2002.
  - Automated teller services provided since 2007.
- Private debt securities are not common; there is no stock market.
- A small and growing foreign exchange market exists; commercial banks and foreign exchange bureaus are the main players.
- An active parallel market existed until 2003; transactions are now few.
- Interbank activity on overnight borrowing and foreign exchange transactions is negligible but growing slowly.

### Government securities market and treasury bills
- The CBG first began issuing treasury bills in 1986 for liquidity management purposes.
- Since the mid-1990s, treasury bills have also been issued to meet government financing requirements.
- Nearly 50 percent of outstanding treasury bills are held by the commercial banks (text also states separately that nearly 50 percent of treasury bills outstanding are held by nonbanks, including many individuals).
- Individuals are allowed to buy treasury bills.
- Treasury bills are reasonably liquid and can be rediscounted by the primary dealers or the CBG.
- For rediscounting, the CBG will accept only those bills that are at 80 percent of maturity (restriction noted).
- Beginning April 2006 a primary dealership system was introduced, through which individuals can purchase treasury bills; it consists of commercial banks and a nonbank named DataBank Securities.
- There was some foreign interest in government securities in 2003–04 when yields reached 31 percent, but outside interest waned as yields fell to 10–15 percent.

### Monetary policy framework and operational procedures
- The CBG operates under a monetary targeting regime:
  - Intermediate target: broad money (M2).
  - Operating target: reserve money.
- The CBG continuously monitors on a weekly basis:
  - Net domestic assets (must be kept below a specified ceiling).
  - Net foreign assets (must be maintained above a designated floor).
- The authorities signal policy stance by announcing the rediscount rate during bimonthly meetings of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).
- The existing framework assumes a stable demand for money and money multiplier.
- Primary objective of monetary policy: price stability (as stipulated in the CBG Act 2005 and the MPC’s terms of reference).
- Other CBG objectives: (1) achieving and maintaining exchange stability, and (2) having a sound and vibrant financial system to encourage and promote sustainable economic development.
- Open market operations using treasury bills are the main policy instrument.
- Other instruments: reserve requirements, rediscount window, purchases/sales of foreign exchange.
- The authorities use a short-term liquidity forecasting framework: weekly exercise considers government cash flows, issuance/maturing of treasury bills, purchases/sales of foreign exchange, and deviation of actual from targeted reserve money to derive liquidity overhang/underhang and decide on treasury-bill issuance/retirement amount and maturities.

### Reserve requirements and rediscount policy
- Reserve requirement: 14 percent as of end-2007.
- Reserve application:
  - Uniform for all types of deposits, including domestic and foreign-currency denominated.
  - Commercial banks required to hold 20 percent of the required reserves in the form of cash and 80 percent as dalasi deposits at the CBG.
  - Reserves are unremunerated and must be held in dalasis (against both domestic and foreign-currency denominated deposit liabilities).
  - Reserves calculated on a lagged averaging system, with a one-week lag and a one-week maintenance period.
- The rediscount rate:
  - Until 2004 the CBG rediscount rate was a 3 percent premium over the yield on treasury bills.
  - Since July 2004 the MPC has been announcing the rediscount rate (independent of current yields on the treasury bills) after its bimonthly meetings to signal the direction of monetary policy.
  - The rediscount rate was 15 percent as of end-2007.
  - Many banks use the rediscount rate to set their prime lending rates.
- The CBG has a purchases/sales of foreign exchange instrument but lately does not use it solely for influencing exchange rate or liquidity conditions.

### Money definition and demand-side observations
- M2 is defined as currency in circulation outside banks plus demand, savings, and time deposits at the commercial banks (held by the public).
- Deposits include both dalasi and foreign-currency denominated.
- In The Gambia banks offer a variety of deposits: savings and demand deposits each account for about 40 percent, and time deposits for about 20 percent of total deposits.
- The yield on the short-term deposit account that provides both transactions and store-of-value function is used as a proxy for the own rate of money.
- Opportunity cost considerations include:
  - rDD: interest rates on short-term deposits (own rate).
  - rTB: yield on treasury bills (alternative domestic asset).
  - e(inf): expected inflation, proxied by actual year-on-year CPI inflation (base 2000 = 100).
  - DEPR / e(xrd): expected rate of depreciation of the dalasi against the U.S. dollar (actual spot exchange rates used to calculate expected depreciation).
  - rUSTB: yield on three-month U.S. treasury bills (foreign interest rate).

### Model specification for long-run demand for real M2
- Functional model specified (in words):
  - M/P = f(S, OC) where M represents M2, P the price level, S scale variable (real GDP), and OC the opportunity cost of holding money.
- Specific functional form used to estimate demand for real M2 (variables listed exactly in the paper):
  - LRBM = ln(real M2) = ln(M2/CPI)
  - LRGDPA = ln(real GDP)
  - DDR = Interest rate on short-term deposits
  - TBRA = Yield on the Gambian treasury bills
  - INFA = Expected inflation
  - DEPR = Expected depreciation of dalasi against the U.S. dollar
  - USTBR = Yield on three-month U.S. treasury bills
- Long-run estimating equation (as presented):
  - LRBM = a0 + a1 LRGDPA + a2 DDR + a3 TBRA + a4 INFA + a5 DEPR + a6 USTBR + ε  (equation 3, coefficients denoted in text as 0–6)

### Expected coefficient signs and theoretical considerations
- Scale variable (LRGDPA): expected positive relationship with demand for money.
- Own rate (DDR): coefficient expected to be positive (higher return on money increases incentive to hold money).
- Alternative returns (TBRA, USTBR): coefficients expected to be negative (higher returns on alternatives reduce money holdings).
- Expected inflation (INFA): generally expected negative effect; ambiguity noted—could be positive in some contexts.
- Expected depreciation (DEPR): generally expected negative effect (increasing expected depreciation induces substitution toward foreign money), but sign may be empirical and potentially ambiguous.

### Estimation approach and unit-root results
- Estimation approach: cointegration techniques for the long-run relationship; variables tested for stationarity first.
- PcGive 10 used for analysis.
- Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests conducted including constant and trend, seasonal dummies used; began with 12 lagged difference terms and used AIC to choose maximum lags.
- Unit-root test results: the variables LRBM, LRGDPA, DDR, TBRA, CPI2000, INFA, DEPR, XRD$, NEER, LIBOR3M, and USTBR3M are nonstationary.
- All listed variables are integrated of order 1, that is I(1); first differences of these variables are I(0).

*Source: _wp09192 - Appendix I lists major developments in The Gambian financial sector since the mid-1980s*

### Appendix IV shows the graphs of the variables used.

### _wp09192 - Appendix IV shows the graphs of the variables used.

### Unit root tests and sample
- Unit root test results (extract):
  - LRBM: -1.4391 (Lag dLRBM-1) and -6.5400 **
  - LRGDPA: -2.0531 (dLRGDPA-1) and -4.4500 **
  - DDR: -2.1550 (dDDR-1) and -4.8400 **
  - TBRA: -3.31410 (dTBRA-1) and -9.6850 **
  - CPI2000: -0.4202 (dCPI2000-1) and -12.5700 **
  - INFA: -2.6750 (dINFA-1) and -13.5600 **
  - XRD$: -2.1408 (dXRD$-1) and -11.4700 **
  - DEPR: -12.1100 ** (dDEPR-1) and -23.7400 **
  - NEER: -1.4194 (dNEER-1) and -10.9800 **
  - LIBOR3M: -2.9837 (dLIBOR3M-1) and -10.0400 **
  - USTBR3M: -3.3848 (dUSTBR3M-1) and -9.5620 **
- Note: ** indicates the rejection of unit roots at 1 percent significance level.
- Estimation period: 1988:1-2007:6 (234 observations).

### Cointegration tests (Johansen-Juselius) — specification and results
- Model specification:
  - Included trend, constant, seasonal dummies, 12 lags, and impulse dummy D200301.
  - AIC used to choose maximum lag length.
- Eigenvalues (listed): 0.1760, 0.1186, 0.0621, 0.0272, 0.0226
- Trace statistics (λ trace 2/):
  - r = 0: 101.6500 **
  - r <= 1: 56.3600
  - r <= 2: 26.8100
  - r <= 3: 11.8100
  - r <= 4: 5.3500
- Trace statistics adjusted for degrees of freedom:
  - r = 0: 97.3000 **
  - r <= 1: 53.9500
  - r <= 2: 25.6700
  - r <= 3: 11.3000
  - r <= 4: 5.1200
- Trace P-values: 0.0090, 0.2580, 0.7560, 0.8530, 0.5870
- Max-eigenvalue statistics (λ max 2/):
  - r = 0: 45.2800 **
  - r <= 1: 29.5500
  - r <= 2: 15.0000
  - r <= 3: 6.4600
  - r <= 4: 5.3500
- Max-eigenvalue adjusted for degrees of freedom:
  - r = 0: 43.3500 **
  - r <= 1: 28.2900
  - r <= 2: 14.3600
  - r <= 3: 6.1800
  - r <= 4: 5.1200
- Max-eigenvalue P-values: 0.0090, 0.1390, 0.6980, 0.9360, 0.5880
- Summary: Both trace and maximal eigenvalue tests rejected zero in favor of at least one cointegration vector; results significant at the 1 percent level (including degree-of-freedom–adjusted critical values).

### Weak-exogeneity and adjustment coefficients
- Weak-exogeneity test results (χ2(1) with p-values in brackets):
  - α1 = 0: χ2(1) = 6.4371 [0.0112] *
  - α2 = 0: χ2(1) = 0.97973 [0.3223]
  - α3 = 0: χ2(1) = 0.10742 [0.7431]
  - α4 = 0: χ2(1) = 15.659 [0.0001] **
  - α5 = 0: χ2(1) = 1.2776 [0.2583]
  - Joint: α2 = 0; α3 = 0; α5 = 0: χ2(3) = 2.4117 [0.4915]
- Notes: The system includes 2 lags for each variable, a constant, trend, seasonal dummies, and the dummy variable D2003m1.
- Standardized adjustment coefficient (alpha) for LRBM:
  - α (LRBM) = −0.00659
  - Numerical implication: adjustment toward equilibrium takes place by about 0.7 percent in the first month after disequilibrium.
- Adjustments primarily carried through: LRBM and TBRA. LRGDPA, DDR, INFA, and the trend found weakly exogenous in joint tests.

### Long-run cointegration vector and elasticities
- Estimated long-run cointegration relationship (interpretable as demand for real M2):
  - (0.0217 *) LRBM_t = (1.26 *) LRGDPA + (0.40 *) DDR − (0.22 *) TBRA + (0.23 *) INFA
  - Reported standard errors (in parentheses): (0.0164) for intercept term, (5.0664) for LRGDPA, (0.1443) for DDR, (0.0412) for TBRA, (0.0357) for INFA
- Key numeric interpretations:
  - Long-run income elasticity = 1.26
  - Most coefficients except LRGDPA reported as significant (standard errors shown).
- Interpretation:
  - Own rate of money (DDR) carries expected positive sign.
  - Alternative return (TBRA) carries expected negative sign.
  - Expected inflation (INFA) turns out positively related to demand for real M2.

### Diagnostics, stability, and robustness
- Diagnostics:
  - Equations free of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity except for DDR and TBRA.
  - Normality tests rejected for all variables due to handful of large outliers.
  - One-step residuals mostly within ±2 standard errors.
- Outliers and breaks:
  - Outliers associated with shocks affecting output (LRGDPA) during 1995 and 2002.
  - Drastic changes in own rate of money (DDR) at points in 1988, 1992, 1999, 2003, and 2005.
  - Dramatic increase in yields on TBRA in 2002–04 after tight monetary policy.
  - Chow tests show breaks in 1995, 2002, and 2005.
- Attempts to remedy:
  - Introducing dummy variables to account for outliers changed coefficients significantly or yielded no cointegration relationship.
  - Using alternative formulations (foreign interest rates LIBOR/USTBR3M, expected depreciation, tourist arrivals or agricultural production as proxies) produced either multiple cointegrating vectors with implausible coefficients, wrongly signed coefficients, or no interpretable cointegration vector.
- Conclusion on stability:
  - The long-run relationship for demand for real M2 is not stable in The Gambia; therefore a short-run model was not carried out.

### Economic context and additional numeric facts
- Velocity of M2 trend in The Gambia:
  - About 400 percent through the mid-1990s.
  - About 300 percent in the late 1990s.
  - About 200 percent since 2003.
- Financial market context:
  - Banking presence as of end-2007: 41 bank branches plus nearly 70 savings and credit associations in the entire country.
  - Outstanding treasury bills valued at only 27 percent of GDP in 2007.
  - Correlation coefficient between yields on treasury bills and rediscount rate = 0.97.
- Correlations considered:
  - Tourist arrivals and real GDP correlation coefficient = 0.80 for 1988–2006.
  - Total production of agricultural crops and real GDP correlation coefficient = 0.84 for 1988–2006.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Monetary policy regime assessment:
  - Monetary targeting using broad money is clearly suboptimal given unstable demand for broad money and a volatile money multiplier.
  - Interest rate targeting not viable because financial markets are shallow.
  - Exchange rate targeting may not be possible due to uncertainty in foreign exchange flows.
  - Full-fledged inflation targeting not feasible due to lack of well-developed analytical framework and data limitations.
- Recommended pragmatic approach:
  - Follow an eclectic approach: use the monetary target flexibly to achieve an inflation objective.
  - Consider an "inflation targeter lite" transitional regime until a reliable nominal anchor is found.
- Improvements needed to support policy:
  - Enhance analytical framework: develop models for transmission mechanism of monetary policy, money demand, and inflation forecasting; invest in econometric models to forecast inflation and compare with existing simple trend models.
  - Improve data quality and frequency:
    - National accounts: only annual GDP data available (base period 1976/77); new GDP with base 2004 being finalized.
    - Lack of high-frequency indicators of economic activity; develop production or service-sector indices and leading indicators; consider restarting composite index of leading indicators.
    - Commercial bank interest rates: currently only quarterly ranges; compile representative interest rates that reflect typical transaction rates.
  - Continue technical assistance efforts from IMF, World Bank, and other partners to improve national accounts, balance of payments, and external debt statistics.

### Conclusions (summary)
- A long-run relationship relating demand for real M2 to real GDP, interest rates on short-term deposits, yields on treasury bills, and expected inflation is identifiable but not stable.
- Demand for real M2 appears determined by domestic factors alone; foreign interest rates and expected depreciation fail to yield an interpretable cointegration relationship.
- Key contributors to instability:
  - Changing velocity of M2 since the late 1990s.
  - Political and weather-related output shocks.
  - Policy changes affecting money growth and inflation.
  - Lack of good quality data on output, CPI, and interest rates.
- Policy stance:
  - The instability argues against using broad money as the sole intermediate target.
  - An eclectic or “inflation targeter lite” approach, along with enhanced analytics and improved data quality, is recommended to preserve price stability.

*Source: _wp09192 - Appendix IV shows the graphs of the variables used.*

### REFERENCES

### _wp09192 - REFERENCES

### Major references cited
- Arize, Augustine C., 1992, “Impact of Foreign Monetary Developments on Demand for Money: Partial Adjustment and Error Correction Model Estimates,” International Journal of Finance, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn), pp. 344–61.
- Bank for International Settlements, 1998, The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy in Emerging Market Economies, BIS Policy Papers No. 3 (Basel, Switzerland).
- Bakhouche, A., 2006, “Money Demand in Algeria,” Savings and Development, Vol. 3, No. 30, pp. 221–46.
- Central Bank of The Gambia, 2004, “Terms of Reference for the Monetary Policy Committee” (Banjul: The Gambia).
- Ericsson, Neil R., 1998, “Empirical Modeling of Money Demand,” Empirical Economics, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 295–315.
- Ericsson, Neil R., and Sunil Sharma, 1996, “Broad Money Demand and Financial Liberalization in Greece,” IMF Working Paper No. WP/96/62 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Honohan, Patrick, 1994, “Inflation and the Demand for Money in Developing Countries,” World Development, Vol. 22, No. 2 (February), pp. 215–23.
- International Monetary Fund, 2004, “Monetary Policy Implementation at Different Stages of Market Development,” available via the Internet: www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/2004/eng/102604.htm
- International Monetary Fund, 2007a, “Exchange Arrangements and Monetary Policy Anchors, as of end–July 2007” (Washington).
- International Monetary Fund, 2007b, The Gambia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No. 07/126 (Washington, March).
- International Monetary Fund, 2007c, Global Financial Stability Report: Market Developments and Issues, World Economic and Financial Surveys (Washington, October), p. 139.
- Jarju, Ismaila, 2007, “Monetary Transmission Mechanism in The Gambia,” Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Vanderbilt University in Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Economics (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University).
- Johansen, Søren, 1988, “Statistical Analysis of Cointegration Vectors,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 12, No. 2/3, pp. 231–54.
- Johansen, Søren, and Katarina Juselius, 1990, “Maximum Likelihood Estimation and Inference on Cointegration—With Applications to the Demand for Money,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 52, No. 2 (May), pp. 169–210.
- Judd, John P., and John L. Scadding, 1982, “The Search for a Stable Money Demand Function: A Survey of the Post-1973 Literature,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 20 (September), pp. 993–1023.
- Klein, Benjamin, 1977, “The Demand for Quality-Adjusted Cash Balances: Price Uncertainty in the U.S. Demand for Money Function,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 85, No. 4 (August), pp. 691–715.
- Knell, Markus, and Helmut Stix, 2004, “Three Decades of Money Demand Studies: Some Differences and Remarkable Similarities,” Austrian Central Bank Working Paper No. 88 (Vienna, Austria).
- Laidler, David E.W., 1993, The Demand for Money: Theories, Evidence, and Problems (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 4th ed.)
- Osterwald-Lenum, Michael, 1992, “A note with Quantiles of the Asymptotic Distribution of the Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Rank Test Statistics: Four Cases,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 54, No. 3 (August), pp. 461–72.
- Rudebusch, Glenn D., and Lars E.O. Svensson, 2002, “Eurosystem Monetary Targeting: Lessons from U.S. Data,” European Economic Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 (March), pp. 417–42.
- Schaechter, Andrea, Mark Stone, and Mark Zelmer, 2000, Adopting Inflation Targeting: Practical Issues for Emerging Market Countries (Washington, International Monetary Fund).
- Sriram, Subramanian S., 1999, “Survey of Literature on Demand for Money: Theoretical and Empirical Work with Reference to Error-Correction Models,” IMF Working Paper No. 99/64 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Sriram, Subramanian S., 2001, “A Survey of Recent Empirical Money Demand Studies,” IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 334–65.
- Stone, Mark, 2003, “Inflation Targeting Lite,” IMF Working Paper No. WP/03/12 (Washington, International Monetary Fund, January).
- Tseng, Wanda, and Robert Corker, 1991, Financial Liberalization, Money Demand, and Monetary Policy in Asian Countries, IMF Occasional Paper 84 (Washington: International Monetary Fund, July).
- United Nations Development Programme, 2007, Human Development Report 2007/2008—Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World (New York).
- World Bank, 2003, The Gambia: Development Policy Review (Washington).
- World Bank, 2005, World Development Indicators (Washington).
- Worrell, DeLisle, Bozena Radzewicz-Bak, and George Iden, 2008, “The Gambia: Monetary Policy Implementation,” Monetary and Capital Markets Development Technical Assistance Report (Washington: International Monetary Fund, February).
- Sriram, Subramanian S., 2008, “Monetary Policy Challenges in The Gambia,” draft background paper prepared for the Article IV Consultation and 3rd PRGF Review Mission to The Gambia (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

### Appendix I. The Gambia: Financial Sector Developments, 1985–June 2007 (chronology of measures)
- Sept. 1985: Elimination of all interest rate controls, including subsidized lending rates for crop financing.
- Sept. 1985: Introduction of an auction system for the issuance of treasury bills.
- Sept. 1985: Introduction of an indirect system of monetary controls and determination of interest rates through open market operations.
- Sept. 1985: Elimination of all credit ceilings following the adoption of open market operations.
- Jan. 1986: Adoption of floating exchange rate regime (until January 20, 1986, dalasi was pegged to the pound sterling at a rate of D5 = £1).
- Jan. 1990: The Groundnut Producers’ Marketing Board (GPMB)’s groundnut export monopoly was eliminated, after which a liberal trade system was maintained that was free of import quotas and other trade restrictions.
- 1990: The CBG began to issue its own securities (CBG bills), with the same features and using the same auction system as for the government securities.
- Dec. 31, 1992: Enactment of the Central Bank of The Gambia Act 1992.
- 1993: Enactment of Financial Institutions Act 1993.
- 1994: Military coup (Mr. Yahya Jammeh deposed the elected president Mr. Dawda Jawara).
- 1996: Mr. Yahya Jammeh wins in the Presidential election for the first five-year term.
- 1998: Agreement with the Fund on a three-year arrangement under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), which was subsequently converted into a Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) arrangement.
- Oct. 2001: Mr. Yahya Jammeh wins in the Presidential election for the second five-year term.
- 2001: Enactment of The Gambia Free Zones Act 2001.
- 2001: Enactment of The Gambia Investment Promotion Act 2001.
- 2001: Enactment of Insurance Bill 2001.
- Jan. 2002: The ruling party, Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC), wins a majority in the legislative election, which is boycotted by the main opposition parties in protest at electoral irregularities.
- 2002: Enactment of Anti-Terrorism Act 2002.
- Jul. 2002: Approval by the Fund Executive Board on a successor three-year PRGF arrangement.
- Early 2002: Commercial banks are allowed to hold accounts in foreign currencies.
- 2003: Money laundering and insurance bills were passed into law.
- Jan. 2003: Foreign currency deposits of the commercial banks are subject to reserve requirements at the same rate as for the dalasi deposits and the reserves be held in dalasis.
- Jan. 2003: The CBG begins to conduct treasury bill auctions on a weekly basis (until then, the auctions took place on a biweekly basis).
- Mar. 2003: Increase in reserve requirements of commercial banks’ deposits from 14 percent to 16 percent.
- Jun. 2003: Increase in reserve requirements of commercial banks’ deposits from 16 percent to 18 percent.
- Jun. 2003: The National Assembly passed the Money Laundering Bill, which is intended to improve the regulation and monitoring of financial businesses.
- Sept. 2003: The standing order of automatic transfer from sterilization account to treasury main account is discontinued.
- Oct. 2003: Mr. Jammeh launches “operational no compromise,” a clampdown on corruption. Initial arrests include leading figures within the administration, such as Baba Jobe, the parliamentary leader of the APRC, and Yankuba Touray, the minister for culture and tourism.
- Dec. 2003: Continental Bank failed.
- 2004: The CBG announced an increase in the minimum capital requirement for commercial banks. All new banks will be required to meet the minimum capital requirement of D600 million (about $2 million) immediately. The existing banks are given time until March 2006 to meet the requirement.
- Mar. 2004: The IMF announces that it is seeking the repayment of two disbursements made in July and December 2001, totaling $10 million because of the misreporting of foreign exchange reserves.
- Jul. 26, 2004: First meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee.
- Oct. 2004: The Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG) reduced the rediscount rate by 1 percentage point from 34 percent to 33 percent.
- Dec. 2004: The CBG reduced the rediscount rate by 2 percentage points from 33 percent to 31 percent.
- Jan. 2005: A memorandum of understanding for the formation of an opposition coalition, the National Alliance for Democracy and Development (NADD), is signed in Banjul.
- 2005: Enactment of Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2005.
- Feb. 2005: The CBG further reduced the rediscount rate by 2 percentage points from 31 percent to 29 percent.
- Mar. 2005: A report by the Gambia’s anti-corruption commission is presented to the president, which is followed by the arrest of a number of high-ranking officials and the dismissal of two senior cabinet ministers.
- Jul. 2005: The CBG further reduced the rediscount rate by 4 percentage points from 29 percent to 25 percent.
- Aug. 2005: The CBG further reduced the rediscount rate by 4 percentage points from 25 percent to 21 percent.
- Sep. 2005: The CBG upgraded the electronic book-entry system to improve the efficiency of the treasury bill market.
- Oct. 2005: The CBG further reduced the rediscount rate by 2 percentage points from 21 percent to 19 percent.
- Feb. 2006: Following an inability to agree on a single coalition presidential candidate, the NADD opposition coalition begins to unravel. The UDP and NRP announce that they are leaving the coalition.
- Mar. 2006: The CBG further reduced the rediscount rate by 2 percentage points from 19 percent to 17 percent.
- Mar. 2006: All the banks met the minimum capital requirement of D60 million.
- Apr. 2006: The CBG introduced a primary dealership system and shortened the settlement period from five days to one day after the treasury bill auction date.
- May 2006: The CBG further reduced the rediscount rate by 2 percentage points from 17 percent to 15 percent.
- Oct. 2006: Rediscount rate was reduced by 1 percentage point from 15 percent to 14 percent.
- Oct. 2006: Reserve requirements of commercial banks on their deposits were reduced by 2 percentage point from 18 percent to 16 percent.
- 2006: Mr. Yahya Jammeh wins in the Presidential election for the third five-year term.
- Jun. 2007: The rediscount rate was increased by 1 percentage point from 14 percent to 15 percent.

### Appendix II. Reserve requirements in various countries, 2008 (selected entries)
- Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of: 8%
- Albania: 10%
- Algeria: 8%
- Armenia: 8% (Armenian drams) and 12% (foreign currency)
- Azerbaijan: 10%
- Belarus: 4.5% (liabilities of individuals in Byelorussian ruble) and 8% (other liabilities)
- Belize: 10%
- Bhutan: 15%
- Botswana: 5%
- Brazil: 45% (demand deposits); 15% (time deposits); 20% (savings deposits); and up to 25% (interbank loans for leasing companies). Additional requirements: levying base—8% (demand deposits); 10% (savings deposits); and 8% (time deposits)
- Bulgaria: 12%
- Burundi: 3%
- Cambodia: 8%
- Cape Verde: 14%
- Chile: 9% (demand deposits) and 3.6% (time deposits)
- China: 16% (domestic currency) and 5% (foreign currency)
- Costa Rica: 15%
- Croatia: 17%
- Czech Republic: 2%
- Dominican Republic: Local currency liabilities: 20% (commercial banks), 15% (mortgage banks), and 10% (other financial institutions). Foreign currency liabilities: 20% in U.S. dollars.
- Eastern Caribbean Central Bank: 6% of average deposit liabilities over a four-week period
- Fiji: 6%
- Ghana: 9%
- Guyana: 12%
- Haiti: Gourde deposits: 30% (commercial banks) and 18.5% (savings and mortgage banks). Foreign currency deposits: 31% (commercial banks) and 19.5% (savings and mortgage banks)
- Hungary: 5%
- Iceland: 2%
- India: 8.25% (net demand and time liabilities)
- Indonesia: Domestic currency: 5% + ratio depends on nominal third party fund and loan to deposit ratio. Foreign currency: 3%
- Iran, Islamic Republic of: 17% (commercial banks) and 10% (specialized banks)
- Israel: 6% (up to one week), 3% (for one week to one year), and 0% (for more than one year).
- Jamaica: 9.0% (commercial banks and FIAs), 1.0% (for building societies which hold residential mortgages = 40.0% of prescribed liabilities), and 9.0% otherwise.
- Jordan: 8% (for both domestic and foreign currency deposits)
- Kazakhstan: 1.5% (domestic liabilities) and 2.5% (other liabilities)
- Kenya: 6%
- Kyrgyz Republic: 10%
- Lao P.D.R.: Domestic currency deposits: 5%. Foreign currency deposits: 10%
- Lebanon: Domestic currency deposits: 15% (on term deposits) and 25% (on sight deposits). Foreign currency deposits: 15%
- Lesotho: 3%
- Liberia: 22%
- Macedonia, FYR: 10%
- Madagascar: 15%
- Malawi: 15.5%
- Malaysia: 4%
- Maldives: 25% (of the average local and foreign currency demand and time liabilities of the commercial bank)
- Mauritius: 4%
- Mongolia: 5.5%
- Mozambique: 9%
- Nepal: 5%
- Oman: 5% (total demand, time, and savings deposits)
- Papua New Guinea: 3%
- Philippines: 10%
- Poland: 3.5% or 0%
- Qatar: 4.75%
- Romania: 20% (for RON-denominated liabilities with residual maturity of up to 2 years and for RON-denominated liabilities with residual maturity of over 2 years with an early repayment clause); 0 % for RON liabilities with residual maturity of over 2 years, without an early repayment clause: and 40% (for FX-denominated liabilities irrespective of residual maturity and early repayment clauses)
- Russia: 5.5% (liability to banks nonresidents in foreign currency), 4.5% (liability to households in rubles), and 5% (liability to other residents in rubles and foreign currency)
- Rwanda: 5%
- Samoa: 4.5%
- Saudi Arabia: 13% (demand deposits) and 4% (savings and time deposits)
- Serbia: Domestic currency deposits: 10%, 5%, 45%. Foreign currency deposits: 45%, 40%, 20%, 100%
- Seychelles: 13%
- Singapore: 3% (qualifying liabilities denominated in domestic currency)
- South Africa: 2.5%
- Sri Lanka: 10%
- Suriname: 25% (domestic currency) and 33.3% (foreign currency)
- Syria: 5%
- Tajikistan: 9% (domestic currency) and 11% (foreign currency)
- Tanzania: 10%
- Thailand: The Bank of Thailand (BOT) does not completely separate reserve requirements and liquidity reserve requirement, but BOT requires banks to maintain the liquidity reserve ratio of no less than 6% of the sum of the total deposit, short-term foreign borrowing, and borrowing with embedded derivatives. The reserves compose of (1) current account deposits with BOT greater than equal to 0.8%; (2) cash at the central cash centers of the banks less than equal to 0.2%, and (1)+(2) greater than equal to 1%; (3) cash in hand + cash at the central cash centers of the banks for the amount in excess of (2) < 2.5%; and (4) eligible securities stipulated by BOT.
- The Bahamas: 5%
- The Gambia: 14%
- Timor-Leste: 13%
- Tunisia: 7.5% (sight deposits, deposit liabilities of less than 3 months, and deduced insufficiency in respecting the liquidity ratio), 1% (deposit liabilities with maturity between 3 months and 24 months, and 0% (deposit liabilities with maturities longer than 24 months)
- Turkey: 6% (domestic currency) and 11% (foreign currency liabilities)
- Uganda: 9.5%
- United States: Marginal ratios of 0%, 3%, and 10%. Refer to http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm
- Uzbekistan: 13%
- Vanuatu: 10%
- Vietnam: Domestic currency deposits: 3% (less than 12 months) and 1% (12 months and over); U.S. dollar deposits: 7% (less than 12 months) and 3% (12 months and over)
- Yemen: 7% (for domestic currency) and 20% (for foreign currency)

*Source: IMF, Monetary and Capital Markets Department.*

### APPENDIX III. DATA SPECIFICATIONS AND DATA SOURCES

### APPENDIX III. DATA SPECIFICATIONS AND DATA SOURCES

### Monetary aggregates
- M1:
  - Definition: currency outside banks plus demand deposits at commercial banks.
  - Data sources: the CBG (as published in various issues of Bulletin as well as directly obtained from the authorities) and International Financial Statistics (IFS) (line 34).
- M2 (Broad money):
  - Definition: M1 money plus quasi money, where quasi money includes savings deposits and time deposits; broad money also includes deposits held by the residents in foreign currencies.
  - Data sources: the CBG (as published in various issues of Bulletin as well as directly obtained from the authorities) and IFS (lines 34 plus 35).

### Real GDP
- Data source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database.
- Measurement: data are in 2000 prices.
- Note: Data presented in WEO are IMF estimates.

### Consumer price index (CPI)
- Series construction:
  - Derived by splicing the old CPI (until August 2004) and the new CPI (from September 2004 onward) with the base of 2000 = 100.
- Data sources: The Gambian Bureau of Statistics (GBoS), transformed into an autonomous agency since June 2006 from then the national statistics agency of the Central Statistics Department (CSD).
- Old CPI:
  - Coverage: measured price developments in the low-income population of the greater Banjul area (Banjul and Kombo St. Mary area).
  - Weights/base: 1976/77 weights with the base year of 1974 = 100.
- New CPI:
  - Publication: GBoS began to publish a new nationwide CPI since January 2007 (based on the weights derived from the results of the integrated household survey conducted in 2003).
  - Data availability: with data from August 2004 onward.
  - Base period: 2004 = 100.
  - Coverage: measures price developments throughout the country.

### Yields on treasury bills
- Instruments: CBG issues treasury bills of maturity 91-, 182-, and 364-days.
- Auction frequency:
  - Until November 2002: auctioned on a biweekly basis.
  - Since December 2002: auctioned on a weekly basis.
- Yield data construction:
  - Data until end-2001: represent yield on 91-day maturity bills issued during the last auction of a given month.
  - January 2002–December 2004: simple averages of yields on three maturities during the last auction of each month.
  - From January 2005 onward: weighted average yields on different maturities issued throughout a given month.
- Unit: yields are expressed in terms of percent per year.
- Data source: the CBG.

### Interest rates on short-term deposits
- Data source: the CBG (as published in various issues of Bulletin as well as directly obtained from the authorities).
- Frequency and format:
  - Available on a quarterly basis as a range of minimum to maximum offered by the banks.
  - Reported on a quarterly basis.
- Processing for analysis:
  - Data used are the mid rates of the range with the quarterly data repeated for the months within that quarter.

### Exchange rates
- Nominal exchange rate:
  - Definition: the official bilateral exchange rate of dalasi against the U.S. dollar at the end of each month.
  - Data sources: IFS and the CBG.
- Nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) index:
  - Base: year 2000 = 100.
  - Series source: IFS.

### Foreign interest rates
- Primary measure: yield on three-month generic U.S. treasury bills is used as the foreign interest rates.
- Alternative measure: three-month U.S. dollar London Interbank Offered Rates is also employed.

*Source: APPENDIX III. DATA SPECIFICATIONS AND DATA SOURCES*

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