## _wp09210

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### I. Introduction — purpose and core hypothesis
- Study uses firm-level panel data and a novel capital controls index (Schindler, 2009) to estimate effects of capital account restrictions on firms’ access to international credit via long-term foreign currency corporate credit ratings.
- Key hypothesis: Effects of capital account liberalization operate through firms’ access to foreign currency; firms in nontradables (NT) sectors have relatively constrained access and thus are more affected by capital account restrictiveness than tradables firms.
- Main empirical strategy: difference-in-difference methodology exploiting cross-firm variation in foreign currency access (tradables vs nontradables) and variation in capital account restrictiveness.
- High-level finding: while aggregate effects are mixed, NT firms experience large, positive and robust gains in credit ratings following capital account liberalization.

### II. Data — scope, measures, and construction
- Sample coverage: period 1995–2004; unbalanced panel of 492 firms in 11 industrial and 15 emerging economies.
- Countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Thailand.
- Dependent variable: firms’ private foreign currency credit ratings from Standard and Poor’s, mapped to 21 numerical values (21 = AAA, 1 = SD/D).
- Capital account restrictiveness measures:
  - KA (Schindler 2009), normalized (1 = least regulated); subindices KA_IN and KA_OUT for inflows and outflows.
  - Alternatives: KAOPEN (Chinn-Ito), CAP100 (Quinn), CAP (binary), SURR (export surrender requirements), INTLCAPITAL (Abiad et al. (2008)).
- Firm-level controls: EBIT/Assets, Retained earnings/Assets, Working capital/Assets, Equity/Capital, EBIT/Interest expense (log), Size (log of total assets in millions of 2000 US$, deflated by CPI).
- Data handling: dropped firm/year observations exceeding sample mean by more than five standard deviations (~1 percent of total sample of 2,128 firm-year observations).
- Key descriptive statistics (Table 3, sample n = 2051 observations unless otherwise stated):
  - Sovereign Rating: Mean 17.66, Std. Dev. 4.15, Min 1, Max 21.
  - Corporate Rating: Mean 13.46, Std. Dev. 3.47, Min 1, Max 21.
  - EBIT/Assets: Mean 7.76, Std. Dev. 5.08, Min 0.02, Max 35.70 (Percent).
  - Retained earnings/Assets: Mean 18.12, Std. Dev. 17.24, Min -70.12, Max 81.45 (Percent).
  - Working Capital/Assets: Mean 6.73, Std. Dev. 14.91, Min -63.73, Max 57.25 (Percent).
  - Equity/Capital: Mean 55.66, Std. Dev. 20.99, Min -37.67, Max 100.00 (Percent).
  - EBIT/Interest expense: Mean 6.05, Std. Dev. 1.34, Min -0.37, Max 12.80 (Percent, log).
  - Size Assets: Mean 3.66, Std. Dev. 1.38, Min -3.84, Max 8.11 (Millions of 2000 US$, log).
  - NT dummy: Mean 0.46, Std. Dev. 0.50 (0/1).
  - KA (Schindler 2009): Mean 0.79, Std. Dev. 0.26, Min 0, Max 1 (Normalized index; 1 = least regulated).
  - KA_IN: Mean 0.78, Std. Dev. 0.27; KA_OUT: Mean 0.81, Std. Dev. 0.30 (Normalized).
  - KAOPEN (Chinn-Ito): Mean 1.86, Std. Dev. 1.14, Min -1.80, Max 2.54 (higher = less restricted).
  - CAP100: Mean 55.95, Std. Dev. 28.72, Min 0, Max 100 (100 = least regulated).
  - CAP (binary): Mean 0.70, Std. Dev. 0.46 (0 = capital account is restricted).
  - SURR: Mean 0.10, Std. Dev. 0.30 (dummy = 1 if surrender requirement in place).

### III. Empirical analysis and main results
- Baseline specification: OLS with country, sector and year fixed effects; clustering of errors by country and year; dependent variable = firm i’s private credit rating in country c at time t; controls include firm-level financial ratios listed above.
- Baseline findings (Table 4):
  - Firm controls generally in expected directions; Working Capital/Assets coefficient negative.
  - KA has a strong positive effect on firms’ credit ratings.
  - Interaction results (KA with NT dummy):
    - KA coefficient (direct effect for tradables): 1.162*** (standard error 0.441) — a unit increase in KA raises tradables firms’ average credit rating by 1.162 notches.
    - KA x NT coefficient: 2.485*** (standard error 0.431).
    - Total effect for NT firms = 3.647 (sum of 1.162 and 2.485).
  - Interpretation: capital account liberalization raises corporate ratings more for NT firms than for tradables firms; a 3 to 4 notch increase corresponds roughly to a change from BBB to A/A+ and is associated with an interest rate spread reduction on the order of 100 basis points (Table 1 evidence).
- Channel disaggregation (Table 5):
  - KA_IN: 1.626*** (0.449); KA_IN x NT: 0.237 (0.499) — inflows matter for all firms.
  - KA_OUT: -0.332 (0.553); KA_OUT x NT: 2.299*** (0.499) — outflows especially affect NT firms.
  - Interpretation: liberalizing outflows matters more for NT firms (improves NT firms’ foreign currency access and hedging), while liberalizing inflows improves credit access broadly.
- Export surrender requirements (SURR) tests (Tables 6 and 7):
  - Interaction of KA, NT and SURR shows the differential benefit for tradables vs nontradables disappears when SURR = 1.
  - Table 7 total coefficients based on column 1, Table 6:
    - SURR = 0: Tradable 1.28; Nontradable 3.52 — statistically different (yes).
    - SURR = 1: Tradable 3.35; Nontradable 3.70 — statistically different (no).
  - Interpretation: when exporters must surrender proceeds (SURR = 1), exporters lose the foreign-currency access advantage and benefit from liberalization as much as NT firms.
- Sovereign ratings channel (Table 9):
  - Sovereign credit rating residual used to purge sovereign effects correlated with KA; tests using raw sovereign ratings and allowing non-linearity show KA and KA x NT remain significant, implying both direct KA effects and indirect sovereign-channel effects exist.
- Magnitude and stability:
  - Results robust across alternative nontradability measures (binary NT dummy vs actual export shares from GTAP: country-specific, average, US-based — Table 8). Interaction KA x nontradability remains positive and significant across specifications.
  - KA x NT interaction remains highly significant when controlling for other structural reform indicators (domestic finance, trade, current account policies — Table 10) and when including macroeconomic controls (GDP growth, per-capita GDP, GDP volatility, current account balance, inflation — Table 11).
  - Alternative capital account measures (KAOPEN, CAP100, CAP, INTLCAPITAL) yield qualitatively similar findings: all firms tend to benefit from liberalization but NT firms consistently benefit substantially more (Table 12).

### IV. Robustness checks and caveats
- Robustness checks performed:
  - Alternative nontradability measures (sector export shares country-specific, averaged, US-based).
  - Disaggregation of capital controls into inflows/outflows.
  - Inclusion of SURR (export surrender requirements).
  - Use of sovereign rating residuals vs raw sovereign ratings; allowance for sovereign rating non-linearities.
  - Controls for domestic structural reforms and macroeconomic conditions.
  - Alternative capital account indices (Chinn-Ito KAOPEN, CAP100, CAP binary, INTLCAPITAL).
- Caveats and limitations:
  - Binary TR/NT classification imperfect; export-share measures may introduce endogeneity (exporting firms might self-select).
  - Results identify channel affecting firms’ foreign-currency ratings; paper does not quantify aggregate net benefits (growth, investment) or fully assess currency mismatch implications at the macro level.
  - Limited variation in SURR: only 211 out of 2,051 observations report surrender requirements in place.
  - Small number of firms with ratings in apparently highly restrictive regimes (about 0.6 percent of sample), reflecting measurement limits of de jure indices.

### V. Conclusions — implications and policy-relevant takeaways
- Capital account liberalization raises firms’ long-term foreign-currency credit ratings, improving access to international credit markets.
- Heterogeneity: firms in nontradables sectors benefit substantially more (total effect for NT firms = 3.647 rating notches in baseline interaction specification).
- Channel evidence supports role of foreign-currency access:
  - Tradables firms have export-based foreign-currency receipts and thus are less sensitive to capital account restrictions unless export proceeds are surrendered.
  - Liberalizing outflows particularly benefits NT firms by easing conversion of domestic to foreign currency and enabling hedging via foreign asset accumulation.
- Policy trade-offs:
  - Liberalization improves credit access and lowers costs (ratings are a key determinant of spreads), potentially supporting investment and growth for constrained firms.
  - Potential vulnerabilities include increased currency mismatch if NT firms expand foreign-currency borrowing; related empirical evidence (Ağca and others, 2008) suggests limited average increases in corporate leverage, but risks warrant monitoring.
- Overall: firm-level heterogeneity is crucial — aggregate analyses may miss substantial firm-level benefits concentrated in sectors with limited foreign-currency access.

*Italic: Source: _wp09210 - References (PDF) — content unit provided.*

### References..............................................................................................................

### _wp09210 - References..............................................................................................................

### I. Introduction — purpose and core hypothesis
- Study uses firm-level panel data and a novel capital controls index (Schindler, 2009) to estimate effects of capital account restrictions on firms’ access to international credit via long-term foreign currency corporate credit ratings.
- Key hypothesis: Effects of capital account liberalization operate through firms’ access to foreign currency; firms in nontradables (NT) sectors have relatively constrained access and thus are more affected by capital account restrictiveness than tradables firms.
- Main empirical strategy: difference-in-difference methodology exploiting cross-firm variation in foreign currency access (tradables vs nontradables) and variation in capital account restrictiveness.
- High-level finding: while aggregate effects are mixed, NT firms experience large, positive and robust gains in credit ratings following capital account liberalization.

### II. Related literature — positioning
- Aggregate literature finds weak/inconclusive growth and volatility effects (references to Kose and others (2009), Edison and others (2004)); some studies find significant effects when using event-study or finer measures (Henry 2000a, 2000b, 2007; Bekaert and Harvey 2000; Bekaert and others 2005; Quinn 1997).
- Microeconomic firm-level literature typically finds substantial costs of capital controls; this paper contributes by documenting the foreign-currency access channel and sectoral heterogeneity (similar logic to Braun and Raddatz (2007)).

### III. Data — scope, measures, and construction
- Sample coverage: period 1995–2004; unbalanced panel of 492 firms in 11 industrial and 15 emerging economies.
- Countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Thailand.
- Dependent variable: firms’ private foreign currency credit ratings from Standard and Poor’s, mapped to 21 numerical values (21 = AAA, 1 = SD/D). (See Table 2 for full mapping.)
- Capital account restrictiveness: primary measure KA from Schindler (2009), normalized (1 = least regulated); subindices KA_IN and KA_OUT for inflows and outflows. Alternative measures used: KAOPEN (Chinn-Ito), CAP100 (Quinn), CAP (binary), SURR (export surrender requirements), INTLCAPITAL (Abiad et al. (2008)).
- Firm-level controls included: EBIT/Assets, Retained earnings/Assets, Working capital/Assets, Equity/Capital, EBIT/Interest expense (log), Size (log of total assets in millions of 2000 US$, deflated by CPI).
- Data handling: dropped firm/year observations exceeding sample mean by more than five standard deviations (~1 percent of total sample of 2,128 firm-year observations).
- Key descriptive statistics (Table 3, sample n = 2051 observations unless otherwise stated):
  - Sovereign Rating: Mean 17.66, Std. Dev. 4.15, Min 1, Max 21.
  - Corporate Rating: Mean 13.46, Std. Dev. 3.47, Min 1, Max 21.
  - EBIT/Assets: Mean 7.76, Std. Dev. 5.08, Min 0.02, Max 35.70 (Percent).
  - Retained earnings/Assets: Mean 18.12, Std. Dev. 17.24, Min -70.12, Max 81.45 (Percent).
  - Working Capital/Assets: Mean 6.73, Std. Dev. 14.91, Min -63.73, Max 57.25 (Percent).
  - Equity/Capital: Mean 55.66, Std. Dev. 20.99, Min -37.67, Max 100.00 (Percent).
  - EBIT/Interest expense: Mean 6.05, Std. Dev. 1.34, Min -0.37, Max 12.80 (Percent, log).
  - Size Assets: Mean 3.66, Std. Dev. 1.38, Min -3.84, Max 8.11 (Millions of 2000 US$, log).
  - NT dummy: Mean 0.46, Std. Dev. 0.50 (0/1).
  - KA (Schindler 2009): Mean 0.79, Std. Dev. 0.26, Min 0, Max 1 (Normalized index; 1 = least regulated).
  - KA_IN: Mean 0.78, Std. Dev. 0.27; KA_OUT: Mean 0.81, Std. Dev. 0.30 (Normalized).
  - KAOPEN (Chinn-Ito): Mean 1.86, Std. Dev. 1.14, Min -1.80, Max 2.54 (higher = less restricted).
  - CAP100: Mean 55.95, Std. Dev. 28.72, Min 0, Max 100 (100 = least regulated).
  - CAP (binary): Mean 0.70, Std. Dev. 0.46 (0 = capital account is restricted).
  - SURR: Mean 0.10, Std. Dev. 0.30 (dummy = 1 if surrender requirement in place).

### IV. Empirical analysis and main results
- Baseline specification: OLS with country, sector and year fixed effects; clustering of errors by country and year; dependent variable = firm i’s private credit rating in country c at time t; controls include firm-level financial ratios as listed above.
- Baseline findings (Table 4):
  - Coefficients on firm controls generally in expected directions; Working Capital/Assets coefficient negative.
  - KA has a strong positive effect on firms’ credit ratings.
  - When interacting KA with NT dummy:
    - KA coefficient (direct effect for tradables): 1.162*** (standard error 0.441) — a unit increase in KA raises tradables firms’ average credit rating by 1.162 notches.
    - KA x NT coefficient: 2.485*** (standard error 0.431).
    - Total effect for NT firms = 3.647 (sum of 1.162 and 2.485).
  - Interpretation: capital account liberalization raises corporate ratings more for NT firms than for tradables firms; a 3 to 4 notch increase corresponds roughly to a change from BBB to A/A+ and is associated with an interest rate spread reduction on the order of 100 basis points (Table 1 evidence).
- Narrowing channels (Table 5):
  - Disaggregation into KA_IN and KA_OUT:
    - KA_IN: 1.626*** (0.449); KA_IN x NT: 0.237 (0.499) — inflows matter for all firms.
    - KA_OUT: -0.332 (0.553); KA_OUT x NT: 2.299*** (0.499) — outflows especially affect NT firms.
  - Interpretation: liberalizing outflows matters more for NT firms (improves NT firms’ foreign currency access and hedging), while liberalizing inflows improves credit access broadly.
- Export surrender requirements (SURR) tests (Tables 6 and 7):
  - Interaction of KA, NT and SURR shows that the differential benefit for tradables vs nontradables disappears when SURR = 1.
  - Table 7 total coefficients based on column 1, Table 6:
    - SURR = 0: Tradable 1.28; Nontradable 3.52 — statistically different (yes).
    - SURR = 1: Tradable 3.35; Nontradable 3.70 — statistically different (no).
  - Interpretation: when exporters must surrender proceeds (SURR = 1), exporters lose the foreign-currency access advantage and benefit from liberalization as much as NT firms.
- Sovereign ratings channel (Table 9):
  - Sovereign credit rating residual used to purge sovereign effects correlated with KA; tests using raw sovereign ratings and allowing non-linearity show KA and KA x NT remain significant, implying both direct KA effects and indirect sovereign-channel effects exist.
- Magnitude and stability:
  - Results are robust across alternative measures of nontradability (binary NT dummy vs actual export shares from GTAP: country-specific, average, US-based — Table 8). Interaction KA x nontradability remains positive and significant across specifications.
  - KA x NT interaction remains highly significant when controlling for other structural reform indicators (domestic finance, trade, current account policies — Table 10) and when including macroeconomic controls (GDP growth, per-capita GDP, GDP volatility, current account balance, inflation — Table 11).
  - Alternative capital account measures (KAOPEN, CAP100, CAP, INTLCAPITAL) yield qualitatively similar findings: all firms tend to benefit from liberalization but NT firms consistently benefit substantially more (Table 12).

### V. Robustness and caveats
- Robustness checks performed:
  - Alternative nontradability measures (sector export shares country-specific, averaged, US-based).
  - Disaggregation of capital controls into inflows/outflows.
  - Inclusion of SURR (export surrender requirements).
  - Use of sovereign rating residuals vs raw sovereign ratings; allowance for sovereign rating non-linearities.
  - Controls for domestic structural reforms and macroeconomic conditions.
  - Alternative capital account indices (Chinn-Ito KAOPEN, CAP100, CAP binary, INTLCAPITAL).
- Caveats and limitations highlighted:
  - Binary TR/NT classification imperfect; export-share measures may introduce endogeneity (exporting firms might self-select).
  - Results identify channel affecting firms’ foreign-currency ratings; paper does not quantify aggregate net benefits (growth, investment) or fully assess currency mismatch implications at the macro level.
  - Limited variation in SURR: only 211 out of 2,051 observations report surrender requirements in place.
  - The sample includes a small number of firms with ratings in apparently highly restrictive regimes (about 0.6 percent of sample), reflecting measurement limits of de jure indices.

### VI. Conclusions — implications and policy-relevant takeaways
- Capital account liberalization raises firms’ long-term foreign-currency credit ratings, improving access to international credit markets.
- The effect is heterogenous: firms in nontradables sectors benefit substantially more (total effect for NT firms = 3.647 rating notches in baseline interaction specification).
- Channel identification supports the role of foreign-currency access:
  - Tradables firms have export-based foreign-currency receipts and thus are less sensitive to capital account restrictions unless export proceeds are surrendered.
  - Liberalizing outflows particularly benefits NT firms by easing conversion of domestic to foreign currency and enabling hedging via foreign asset accumulation.
- Policy trade-offs:
  - Liberalization improves credit access and lowers costs (ratings are a key determinant of spreads), potentially supporting investment and growth for constrained firms.
  - Potential vulnerabilities include increased currency mismatch if NT firms expand foreign-currency borrowing; related empirical evidence (Ağca and others, 2008) suggests limited average increases in corporate leverage, but risks warrant monitoring.
- Overall: firm-level heterogeneity is crucial — aggregate analyses may miss substantial firm-level benefits concentrated in sectors with limited foreign-currency access.

*Italic: Source: _wp09210 - References (PDF) — content unit provided.*

### References

### References

### Financial globalization and liberalization
- Bekaert, Geert, Campbell R. Harvey and Christian Lundblad, 2005, Does Financial Liberalization Spur Growth?, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 77, pp. 3–55.
- Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni, Julian di Giovanni, André Faria, Ayhan Kose, Paolo Mauro, Jonathan Ostry, Martin Schindler, and Marco Terrones, 2008, Reaping the Benefits of Financial Globalization, IMF Occasional Paper, 264, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
- Edison,   Hali,   Michael   Klein,   Luca   Ricci,   and   Torsten   Sløk,   2004,   Capital   Account   Liberalization  and  Economic  Performance:  Survey  and  Synthesis,  IMF  Staff  Papers 51, pp. 220–56.
- Forbes, Kristin J., 2007, The Microeconomic Evidence on Capital Controls: No Free Lunch, in   Sebastian   Edwards,   ed.,   Capital   Controls   and   Capital   Flows   in   Emerging   Economics:  Policies,  Practices,  and  Consequences,  Chicago:  The  University  of  Chicago Press, pp. 171–199.
- Henry, Peter Blair, 2000a, Do Stock Market Liberalizations Cause Investment Booms?, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58, pp. 301–34.
- Henry, Peter Blair, 2000b, Stock Market Liberalization, Economic Reform, and Emerging Market Equity Prices, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, pp. 529–64.
- Henry, Peter Blair, 2003, Capital Account Liberalization, the Cost of Capital, and Economic Growth, American Economic Review, Vol. 93, pp. 91–6.
- Henry, Peter Blair, 2007, Capital Account Liberalization: Theory, Evidence, and Speculation, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 45, 887–935.
- Kose, M. Ayhan, Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff and Shang-Jin Wei, 2009, Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal, IMF Staff Papers, 56, pp. 8–62.
- Mody, Ashoka, and Antu Panini Murshid, 2005, Growing Up With Capital Flows, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 65, pp. 249–66.
- Quinn, Dennis P., 1997, The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation, American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, pp. 531–51.
- Desai, Mihir, C. Fritz Foley, and James Hines, 2006, Capital Controls, Liberalizations, and Foreign Direct Investment, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 19, pp. 1399–431.
- Chinn, Menzie D., and Hiro Ito, 2007, A New Measure of Financial Openness, mimeo. Downloaded from http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/research.html

### Sovereign and corporate credit ratings; bond markets and spreads
- Alfonso, António, Pedro Gomes and Philipp Rother, 2007, What ‘Hides’ Behind Sovereign Debt Ratings?, ECB Working Paper No. 711.
- Altman, Edward, and Herbert Rijken, 2004, How Rating Agencies Achieve Rating Stability, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 28, pp. 2679–714.
- Borensztein, Eduardo, Kevin Cowan and Patricio Valenzuela, 2007, Sovereign Ceilings ‘Lite’? The Impact of Sovereign Ratings on Corporate Ratings in Emerging Markets Economies, IMF Working Paper 07/75.
- Cantor, Richard and Frank Packer, 1996, Determinants and Impact of Sovereign Credit Ratings, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review (October), pp. 1–15.
- Durbin, Erik and David Ng, 2005, The Sovereign Ceiling and Emerging Market Corporate Bond Spreads, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 24, pp. 631–49.
- Ederington, Louis H., Jess B. Yawitz and Brian Roberts , 1987, The Informational Content of Bond Ratings, Journal of Financial Research Vol. 10, 211–226.
- Kisgen, Darren J., 2006, Credit Ratings and Capital Structure, Journal of Finance, Vol. 61, pp. 1035–72.
- Löffler, Gunter, 2004, An Anatomy of Rating Through the Cycle, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 28, 695–720.
- Nickell Pamela, William Perraudin and Simone Varotto, 2000, Stability of Rating Transitions, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 24, pp. 203–27.
- Reinhart, Carmen, 2002, Sovereign Credit Ratings Before and After Financial Crises, Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System, New York: Stern School of Business, New York University.
- Standard & Poor’s, 2001, Rating Methodology: Evaluating the Issuer. Downloaded from http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/methodology.pdf
- West, Richard R., 1973, Bond Ratings, Bond Yields and Financial Regulation: Some Findings, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 16, 159–68.
- Altman, Edward, and Herbert Rijken, 2004, How Rating Agencies Achieve Rating Stability, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 28, pp. 2679–714.

### Capital flows, asset composition, and micro evidence
- Bekaert, Geert, and Campbell R. Harvey, 2000, Foreign Speculators and Emerging Equity Markets, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, 565–613.
- Binici, Mahir, Michael Hutchison and Martin Schindler, 2009, Controlling Capital? Legal Restrictions and the Asset Composition of International Financial Flows, IMF Working Paper, forthcoming. Also forthcoming in Journal of International Money and Finance.
- Braun, Matías, and Claudio Raddatz, 2007, Trade Liberalization, Capital Account Liberalization and the Real Effects of Financial Development, Journal of International Money and Finance Vol. 26, pp. 730–61.
- Chari, Anusha and Peter Blair Henry, 2004, Risk Sharing and Asset Prices: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, Journal of Finance, Vol. 59, pp. 1295–324.
- Desai, Mihir, C. Fritz Foley, and James Hines, 2006, Capital Controls, Liberalizations, and Foreign Direct Investment, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 19, pp. 1399–431.
- Mody, Ashoka, and Antu Panini Murshid, 2005, Growing Up With Capital Flows, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 65, pp. 249–66.
- Petersen, Mitchell, 2005, Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches, NBER Working Paper No. 11280.

### Financial integration, measurement, and macro-financial links
- Lane, Philip R., and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 2007, The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 73, pp. 223–50.
- Ludvigson, Sydney C., and Serena Ng, 2005, Macro Factors in Bond Risk Premia, NBER Working Paper No. 11703.
- Mendoza, Enrique G., 1993, The Robustness of Macroeconomic Indicators of Capital Mobility, in Capital Mobility: The Impact on Consumption, Investment and Growth, ed. by L. Leiderman & Assaf Razin, Cambridge University Press, pp. 83–111.
- Mendoza, Enrique G., Vincenzo Quadrini and José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, 2008, Financial Integration, Financial Deepness and Global Imbalances, Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming.
- Schindler, Martin, 2009, Measuring Financial Integration: A New Data Set, IMF Staff Papers Vol. 56, 222–38.
- Bekaert, Geert, Campbell R. Harvey and Christian Lundblad, 2005, Does Financial Liberalization Spur Growth?, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 77, pp. 3–55.

### Trade, exporters, and firm-level evidence
- Bernard, Andrew B., and J. Bradford Jensen, 1999, Exceptional Exporter Performance: Cause, Effect, or Both?, Journal of International Economics, Vol. pp. 1–5.
- Clerides, Sofronis, Saul Lach, and James Tybout, 1998, Is Learning by Exporting Important? Micro-Dynamic Evidence from Columbia, Mexico and Morocco, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, pp. 903–48.
- Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales, 1998, Financial Dependence and Growth, American Economic Review, Vol. 88, 559–86.
- Braun, Matías, and Claudio Raddatz, 2007, Trade Liberalization, Capital Account Liberalization and the Real Effects of Financial Development, Journal of International Money and Finance Vol. 26, pp. 730–61.

### Methodology, corporate risk, and microstructure
- Carling, Kenneth, Tor Jacobson, Jesper Lindé, and Kasper Roszbach, 2007, Corporate Credit Risk Modeling and the Macroeconomy, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 31, pp. 845–68.
- Ederington, Louis H., Jess B. Yawitz and Brian Roberts , 1987, The Informational Content of Bond Ratings, Journal of Financial Research Vol. 10, 211–226.
- Kisgen, Darren J., 2006, Credit Ratings and Capital Structure, Journal of Finance, Vol. 61, pp. 1035–72.
- Nickell Pamela, William Perraudin and Simone Varotto, 2000, Stability of Rating Transitions, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 24, pp. 203–27.
- Petersen, Mitchell, 2005, Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches, NBER Working Paper No. 11280.

*References list from _wp09210 - References*

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