## _wp09243 — 1.  Budgeting as a Game

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---

### Introduction
- Objective: maximize benefits from public spending given available resources.
- Key observations:
  - Budget allocations may not fully reflect current priorities; spending may not necessarily be contained at a sustainable level.
  - Institutions and the division of fiscal powers in preparing and approving the budget matter for how public finances develop over time.
  - Strengthening the top-down character of the budget process can be particularly effective in promoting sound and sustainable policies.
  - Top-down budgeting ensures the total level, and overall allocation, of expenditure are determined before detailed items are negotiated.
  - All budget processes contain both top-down and bottom-up elements; introducing top-down budgeting shifts the balance to ensure aggregate fiscal priorities are reflected at all stages.
  - Top-down budgeting is not a tool for limiting discretionary powers of democratic institutions to propose and approve budgets, nor does it eliminate difficult prioritization choices; it highlights trade-offs and clarifies how prioritization will be resolved.
- Paper structure:
  - Section II outlines concepts.
  - Section III practical implications of top-down.
  - Section IV top-down parliamentary approval.
  - Section V summary and conclusions.

### Top-Down Versus Bottom-Up (Concepts and Expected Outcomes)
- Definition:
  - A top-down budget process: a binding decision on budget aggregates is taken before allocating expenditure within that aggregate.
- Decision cascade:
  - total expenditure level → allocation between main policies/sectors → sectoral ceilings → detailed division within each sector.
  - Allocation at each step is constrained by prior-stage decisions.
- The sequence of budgetary decisions affects outcomes (contrast between bottom-up and top-down approaches).

### A Bottom-Up Process (Characteristics and Problems)
- Typical sequence in an unconstrained or expenditure-driven process:
  - First stage: collection of expenditure proposals from line ministries and spending agencies, typically arguing for increases above current year allocations.
  - Ministry of finance negotiates bilaterally with each main budget entity to try to contain expenditure growth.
  - Total expenditure is consolidated and compared to projected revenue; if deficit is excessive, further negotiations or revenue proposals are required.
  - Total expenditure is determined residually; the process centers on detailed budget items.
- Consequences and dynamics:
  - Without sectoral expenditure limits, discussions focus on expanding programs; proponents of expansion are advantaged.
  - Aggregate expenditure concerns are introduced late, reducing decision makers’ appreciation of fiscal sustainability.
  - Incremental nature makes significant reallocations between or within sectors unlikely.
  - Line ministries have little incentive to identify savings to finance new initiatives; negotiations focus on preserving existing funding and seeking additional resources.
  - Procedural difficulty in translating policy reprioritizations into budget lines without prior sectoral composition decisions.
- Strategic behavior and transparency:
  - In bottom-up processes, line ministries/spending agencies have rational incentives to exaggerate resource needs because proposals will be scrutinized and reduced.
  - Prior to the budget reform in Korea, when the bias toward overbudgeting was reduced, it is estimated that the initial spending proposals on average overestimated resource requirements by some 30 percent.
  - In Finland, publication of initial budget submissions under the Finnish Freedom of Information Act offsets exaggerated requests; large deviations between requested figures and actual outcomes indicate fiscal irresponsibility or lack of political power.
  - High degree of transparency can create incentives for fiscal discipline.

### Strengthening Fiscal Discipline Through a Top-Down Process
- Core features of top-down approach:
  - Starts with a decision on total expenditure determined autonomously rather than as a sum of individual decisions.
  - Total expenditure is allocated to key sectors, culminating in sector ceilings.
  - Detailed appropriations are discussed only within established sector ceilings.
  - Institutional separation exists between aggregate/allocation decisions and program-level appropriation decisions.
- Role of the ministry of finance:
  - Focused on establishing and monitoring total expenditure levels rather than negotiating operational details of individual proposals.
  - Line ministers retain substantial freedom to propose within-sector allocation changes provided sector ceilings are not exceeded.
  - Ministry of finance must scrutinize credibility of expenditure projections to prevent circumvention of ex ante restrictions by underestimating expenditure.
- Theoretical benefits:
  - Addresses the common resource pool problem by internalizing aggregate fiscal considerations in sector prioritizations.
  - Reduces the dimensions of initial budget decisions and facilitates coordination of alternatives, helping to avoid sub-optimal outcomes caused by time-constrained, asymmetric-information negotiation among many actors.
  - Alters incentives and preferences of individual ministers/parliamentarians by making the total expenditure level an explicit, collective decision, thereby elevating the prominence of sustainability considerations in budget discussions.
  - Encourages detection of inefficiencies, redundancies, and obsolete programs within sectors because hard sector ceilings make trade-offs immediately obvious and create incentives to reallocate savings within sectors.
- Informational and efficiency considerations:
  - Aggregation in initial stages (allocation to key sectors) helps detach policy issues from technical/operative decisions and reduces information overload.
  - Under hard sector ceilings, line ministries and agencies are incentivized to improve efficiency to fund new policy proposals within the same sector.
  - Complexity is costly: an increase in the number of spending dimensions and less information requires more voting rounds to reach equilibrium.

### Are Top-Down or Bottom-Up Mutually Exclusive?
- Not mutually exclusive; all budget processes involve both elements.
- No government can completely disregard aggregate expenditure levels; conversely, setting total expenditure limits and sector ceilings requires assurance that core functions and urgent reforms receive sufficient funding.
- Challenge: find the right balance to establish firm control over public resources.
- Example: Budget preparation in the Netherlands follows a clear top-down procedure with an overall expenditure ceiling determined at the outset of the government term and sector ceilings set before detailed preparation; the top-down approach is informed by bottom-up analysis.

### Box 2 — Where Top-Down Meets Bottom-Up (Netherlands example)
- Institutional sequence and timing:
  - Government determines a binding four-year ceiling for total central government expenditure expressed in real terms at the outset of the government term.
  - At that time the government makes an indicative distribution of the ceiling to main sectors: (i) the core budget; (ii) health sector; and (iii) the labour and social sectors—and between the some 25 budget chapters under the sectors.
  - The ceiling is translated into a nominal ceiling at the early stages of the budget preparation process each year.
- Annual timetable and interactions:
  - Line ministries submit Policy Letters to the ministry of finance at the beginning of the annual budget process. Policy Letters contain:
    - an updated base-line assessment of expenditure for a continuation of existing policies;
    - a qualitative and quantitative presentation of priorities for the upcoming year;
    - any requests for additional funding for new policy initiatives.
  - The ministry of finance produces an overall expenditure scenario by combining line ministries’ baseline and proposals with an updated evaluation of the expenditure impact of the macroeconomic development, and compares it with the expenditure ceiling and the indicative sector and chapter allocations in the coalition agreement.
  - In the first half of April the minister of finance submits to the cabinet his budget policy proposal in the shape of a Framework Letter; cabinet deliberations over a couple of days in April determine the overall allocation of resources.
  - The cabinet budget meeting culminates in a decision on expenditure ceilings for each of the approximately 25 chapters in the budget.
  - In early-May a Letter of Totals is sent to each line ministry providing the government’s priorities for the respective sector and the chapter ceiling with which the draft budget should comply.
  - Line ministries are allowed to make reallocations within their respective chapter, provided that the ceiling is not exceeded.
  - The draft budget for the respective chapter is submitted to the ministry of finance in the middle of June.
- Analytical illustration: three ministers/parties A, B, C with preferences over two items X, Y:
  - A: (4,6)
  - B: (6,4)
  - C: (4,4)
  - Bottom-up outcome: majority supports 4 units in X (A and C) and 4 units in Y (B and C) → total spending of 8 units.
  - Top-down outcome (aggregate decision then split): leads to total expenditure level of 10 units, supported by a majority of A and B; expenditure profile becomes (5,5).
  - Alternative where C prefers (6,6): top-down generates 10 units while bottom-up yields 12 units.
  - Key point: the outcome depends on preferences; a top-down process can lead to either larger or smaller budgets.

### Box 3 — Establishing the Total Expenditure Level in Switzerland
- Formula for the maximum expenditure level:
  - fEˆ = fR +  × fpotentialGDP GDP  (formula notation as presented)
- Definitions:
  - fEˆ is the maximum total expenditure level for the fiscal year f,
  - fR is total tax and nontax revenue for the year f,
  - fpotentialGDP GDP is the output gap for the year f,
  -  is a factor that adjusts for a difference between the ex ante expenditure limit—calculated on the basis of forecasted revenue and GDP—an ex post calculation of the maximum expenditure level based on actual revenue and GDP, and an updated assessment of potential GDP.
- Adjustment rule and enforcement:
  - If expenditure exceeds the ex post calculation of the expenditure limit by more than 6 percent, the expenditure levels for the upcoming three-year period have to be reduced by a corresponding amount.
- Key challenges:
  - The total expenditure level should be consistent with revenue, emphasizing the importance of the quality of forecasts.
  - The volatility of some tax items—such as tax on capital income and corporate income—may lead to forecasting errors that lead to deviations from the intended outcome.
  - The adjustment relies on an estimation of potential GDP—which is unobservable both ex ante and ex post.
  - Uncertainties about the potential GDP level is a serious obstacle for making structural adjustments of expenditure ceilings, and may introduce variations in the expenditure ceiling that do not have a cyclical justification.
- Policy-relevant implications:
  - Establishing an expenditure ceiling that is consistent with revenue requires high-quality forecasts, particularly for volatile tax bases.
  - Because potential GDP is unobservable, reliance on its estimate complicates structural adjustments and can produce non-cyclical variations in the expenditure ceiling.
  - The existence of an ex post enforcement mechanism (reduction of upcoming three-year expenditure levels when the limit is exceeded by more than 6 percent) creates a corrective discipline but depends on accurate measurement of the limit components.

### Empirical evidence and limitations
- Cross-country and regional studies finding associations between top-down institutional features and better fiscal outcomes:
  - von Hagen (1992): top-down preparatory and parliamentary decision order correlated with fiscal discipline in 12 EU-member countries.
  - De Haan and Sturm (1994): confirm correlations when controlling for composition and stability of government.
  - Woo (2003): index corresponding to top-down preparation shows strong relationship in an extended sample including nine East Asian countries.
  - Gleich (2003) and Yläoutinen (2004): evidence for Central and Eastern European countries.
  - Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002): index of procedural fragmentation (top-down vs bottom-up) finds association with lower deficit, lower expenditure and lower revenue, but relationship is weak.
  - Ehrhart et al. (2006) laboratory trials:
    - Demonstrate that changing from bottom-up to top-down affects budget size, but there is no general tendency for top-down to produce smaller budgets.
    - Show that complexity (more spending dimensions) increases the number of voting rounds required; thus, top-down approaches can be advantageous when information gathering is costly and deadlines bind.

### Implementation considerations and caveats
- Design trade-offs:
  - Ministry of finance gains influence over aggregate parameters while line ministries cede detail control but may require increased within-sector flexibility.
  - Credibility of top-down constraints is essential: reforms are acceptable only if perceived as binding for all ministries.
  - Accuracy of macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts matters; bias can arise from inadequate techniques or political/institutional incentives (e.g., unwillingness to present bad news).
  - Top-down effectiveness is weakened if significant expenditure is outside the main budget (extrabudgetary funds, net-accounted revenue).
  - Medium-term aggregate expenditure ceilings are supportive of fiscal discipline and should be established well in advance of annual budget preparation.

*Source: _wp09243 - 1.  Budgeting as a Game*

### 1.  Budgeting as a Game ................................................................................................

### 1.  Budgeting as a Game

### Introduction
- Budgeting aims to maximize benefits from public spending given available resources.
- Budget allocations may not fully reflect current priorities, and spending may not necessarily be contained at a sustainable level.
- Institutions and the division of fiscal powers in preparing and approving the budget matter for how public finances develop over time.
- Strengthening the top-down character of the budget process can be particularly effective in promoting sound and sustainable policies.
- Top-down budgeting ensures the total level, and overall allocation, of expenditure are determined before detailed items are negotiated.
- All budget processes contain both top-down and bottom-up elements; introducing top-down budgeting shifts the balance to ensure aggregate fiscal priorities are reflected at all stages.
- Top-down budgeting is not a tool for limiting discretionary powers of democratic institutions to propose and approve budgets, nor does it eliminate difficult prioritization choices; it highlights trade-offs and clarifies how prioritization will be resolved.
- Strengthening the budget process is important across low-income, emerging, and high-income countries.
- Paper structure: Section II outlines concepts; Section III practical implications of top-down; Section IV top-down parliamentary approval; Section V summary and conclusions.

### Top-Down Versus Bottom-Up (Concepts and Expected Outcomes)
- A top-down budget process: a binding decision on budget aggregates is taken before allocating expenditure within that aggregate.
  - Decisions cascade: total expenditure level → allocation between main policies/sectors → sectoral ceilings → detailed division within each sector.
  - Allocation at each step is constrained by prior-stage decisions.
- The sequence of budgetary decisions affects outcomes (illustrated by contrast between bottom-up and top-down approaches).

### A Bottom-Up Process (Characteristics and Problems)
- In an unconstrained or expenditure-driven process:
  - First stage: collection of expenditure proposals from line ministries and spending agencies, typically arguing for increases above current year allocations.
  - Ministry of finance negotiates bilaterally with each main budget entity to try to contain expenditure growth.
  - Total expenditure is consolidated and compared to projected revenue; if deficit is excessive, further negotiations or revenue proposals are required.
  - Total expenditure is determined residually; the process centers on detailed budget items.
- Consequences and dynamics:
  - Without sectoral expenditure limits, discussions focus on expanding programs; proponents of expansion are advantaged.
  - Aggregate expenditure concerns are introduced late, reducing decision makers’ appreciation of fiscal sustainability.
  - Incremental nature makes significant reallocations between or within sectors unlikely.
  - Line ministries have little incentive to identify savings to finance new initiatives; negotiations focus on preserving existing funding and seeking additional resources.
- Procedural difficulty in translating policy reprioritizations into budget lines without prior sectoral composition decisions.

### Strengthening Fiscal Discipline Through a Top-Down Process
- Top-down approach:
  - Starts with a decision on total expenditure determined autonomously rather than as a sum of individual decisions.
  - Total expenditure is allocated to key sectors, culminating in sector ceilings.
  - Detailed appropriations are discussed only within established sector ceilings.
  - Institutional separation exists between aggregate/allocation decisions and program-level appropriation decisions.
- Role of the ministry of finance:
  - Focused on establishing and monitoring total expenditure levels rather than negotiating operational details of individual proposals.
  - Line ministers retain substantial freedom to propose within-sector allocation changes provided sector ceilings are not exceeded.
  - Ministry of finance must scrutinize credibility of expenditure projections to prevent circumvention of ex ante restrictions by underestimating expenditure.
- Box 1: Budgeting as a Game — strategic behavior and transparency
  - In bottom-up processes, line ministries/spending agencies have rational incentives to exaggerate resource needs because proposals will be scrutinized and reduced.
  - Prior to the budget reform in Korea, when the bias toward overbudgeting was reduced, it is estimated that the initial spending proposals on average overestimated resource requirements by some 30 percent.
  - In Finland, publication of initial budget submissions under the Finnish Freedom of Information Act offsets exaggerated requests; large deviations between requested figures and actual outcomes indicate fiscal irresponsibility or lack of political power.
  - High degree of transparency can create incentives for fiscal discipline.

### Are Top-Down or Bottom-Up Mutually Exclusive?
- Conceptually distinct, but not mutually exclusive: all budget processes involve both elements.
- No government can completely disregard aggregate expenditure levels; conversely, setting total expenditure limits and sector ceilings requires assurance that core functions and urgent reforms receive sufficient funding.
- Challenge: find the right balance to establish firm control over public resources.
- Example note: Budget preparation in the Netherlands follows a clear top-down procedure with an overall expenditure ceiling determined at the outset of the government term and sector ceilings set before detailed preparation; the top-down approach is informed by bottom-up analysis.

*Source: _wp09243 - 1.  Budgeting as a Game*

### Box 2. Where Top-Down Meets Bottom-Up

### Box 2. Where Top-Down Meets Bottom-Up

### Netherlands example: institutional sequence and timing
- Government determines a binding four-year ceiling for total central government expenditure expressed in real terms at the outset of the government term.
- At that time the government makes an indicative distribution of the ceiling to main sectors: (i) the core budget; (ii) health sector; and (iii) the labour and social sectors—and between the some 25 budget chapters under the sectors.
- The ceiling is translated into a nominal ceiling at the early stages of the budget preparation process each year.
- Annual budget timetable and interactions:
  - Line ministries submit Policy Letters to the ministry of finance at the beginning of the annual budget process. Policy Letters contain:
    - an updated base-line assessment of expenditure for a continuation of existing policies;
    - a qualitative and quantitative presentation of priorities for the upcoming year;
    - any requests for additional funding for new policy initiatives.
  - The ministry of finance produces an overall expenditure scenario by combining line ministries’ baseline and proposals with an updated evaluation of the expenditure impact of the macroeconomic development, and compares it with the expenditure ceiling and the indicative sector and chapter allocations in the coalition agreement.
  - In the first half of April the minister of finance submits to the cabinet his budget policy proposal in the shape of a Framework Letter; cabinet deliberations over a couple of days in April determine the overall allocation of resources.
  - The cabinet budget meeting culminates in a decision on expenditure ceilings for each of the approximately 25 chapters in the budget.
  - In early-May a Letter of Totals is sent to each line ministry providing the government’s priorities for the respective sector and the chapter ceiling with which the draft budget should comply.
  - Line ministries are allowed to make reallocations within their respective chapter, provided that the ceiling is not exceeded.
  - The draft budget for the respective chapter is submitted to the ministry of finance in the middle of June.

*Source: Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands.*

### Analytical illustration: how decision sequence affects aggregate expenditure
- Stylized example with three equally strong ministers/coalition partners or three equally sized parties A, B, and C; budget with two expenditure items (X,Y); stated preferences:
  - A: (4,6)
  - B: (6,4)
  - C: (4,4)
- Bottom-up outcome:
  - Majority supports 4 units in X (A and C) and 4 units in Y (B and C) → total spending of 8 units.
- Top-down outcome (aggregate decision then split):
  - Leads to total expenditure level of 10 units, supported by a majority of A and B; expenditure profile becomes (5,5).
- Alternative where C prefers (6,6):
  - Top-down generates 10 units while bottom-up yields 12 units.
- Key point: the outcome depends on preferences; a top-down process can lead to either larger or smaller budgets.

### Theoretical mechanisms by which top-down budgeting can improve fiscal sustainability
- Addresses the common resource pool problem by internalizing aggregate fiscal considerations in sector prioritizations.
- Reduces the dimensions of initial budget decisions and facilitates coordination of alternatives, helping to avoid sub-optimal outcomes caused by time-constrained, asymmetric-information negotiation among many actors.
- Alters incentives and preferences of individual ministers/parliamentarians by making the total expenditure level an explicit, collective decision, thereby elevating the prominence of sustainability considerations in budget discussions.
- Encourages detection of inefficiencies, redundancies, and obsolete programs within sectors because hard sector ceilings make trade-offs immediately obvious and create incentives to reallocate savings within sectors.

### Sectoral efficiency and informational considerations
- Aggregation in initial stages (allocation to key sectors) helps detach policy issues from technical/operative decisions and reduces information overload.
- Under hard sector ceilings:
  - Line ministries and agencies are incentivized to improve efficiency to fund new policy proposals within the same sector.
  - Contrasts with bottom-up processes where proposing reductions is unattractive because savings do not free resources for the proposing unit.
- Complexity is costly: an increase in the number of spending dimensions and less information requires more voting rounds to reach equilibrium.

### Empirical evidence and limitations
- Cross-country and regional studies finding associations between top-down institutional features and better fiscal outcomes:
  - von Hagen (1992): top-down preparatory and parliamentary decision order correlated with fiscal discipline in 12 EU-member countries.
  - De Haan and Sturm (1994): confirm correlations when controlling for composition and stability of government.
  - Woo (2003): index corresponding to top-down preparation shows strong relationship in an extended sample including nine East Asian countries.
  - Gleich (2003) and Yläoutinen (2004): evidence for Central and Eastern European countries.
- Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002): index of procedural fragmentation (top-down vs bottom-up) finds association with lower deficit, lower expenditure and lower revenue, but relationship is weak.
- Ehrhart et al. (2006) laboratory trials:
  - Demonstrate that changing from bottom-up to top-down affects budget size, but there is no general tendency for top-down to produce smaller budgets.
  - Show that complexity (more spending dimensions) increases the number of voting rounds required; thus, top-down approaches can be advantageous when information gathering is costly and deadlines bind.

### Implementation considerations and caveats
- Design of top-down reforms must balance redistribution of influence: ministry of finance gains over aggregate parameters while line ministries cede detail control but may require increased within-sector flexibility.
- Credibility of top-down constraints is essential: reforms are acceptable only if perceived as binding for all ministries.
- Accuracy of macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts matters; bias can arise from inadequate techniques or political/institutional incentives (e.g., unwillingness to present bad news).
- Top-down effectiveness is weakened if significant expenditure is outside the main budget (extrabudgetary funds, net-accounted revenue).
- Medium-term aggregate expenditure ceilings are supportive of fiscal discipline and should be established well in advance of annual budget preparation.

*Source: Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands.*

### Box 3. Establishing the Total Expenditure Level in Switzerland

### Box 3. Establishing the Total Expenditure Level in Switzerland

### Formula for the maximum expenditure level
- The formula for calculating the maximum expenditure level in Switzerland is given by:

  
  f
  potential
  ff
  GDP
  GDP
  RE
  ˆ

### Definitions used in the formula
- fEˆ is the maximum total expenditure level for the fiscal year f,
- fR is total tax and nontax revenue for the year f,
- fpotentialGDP GDP is the output gap for the year f,
-  is a factor that adjusts for a difference between the ex ante expenditure limit—calculated on the basis of forecasted revenue and GDP—an ex post calculation of the maximum expenditure level based on actual revenue and GDP, and an updated assessment of potential GDP.

### Adjustment rule and enforcement
- If expenditure exceeds the ex post calculation of the expenditure limit by more than 6 percent, the expenditure levels for the upcoming three-year period have to be reduced by a corresponding amount.

### Key challenges highlighted
- The total expenditure level should be consistent with revenue, emphasizing the importance of the quality of forecasts.
- The volatility of some tax items—such as tax on capital income and corporate income—may lead to forecasting errors that lead to deviations from the intended outcome.
- The adjustment relies on an estimation of potential GDP—which is unobservable both ex ante and ex post.
- Uncertainties about the potential GDP level is a serious obstacle for making structural adjustments of expenditure ceilings, and may introduce variations in the expenditure ceiling that do not have a cyclical justification.

### Policy-relevant implications and considerations
- Establishing an expenditure ceiling that is consistent with revenue requires high-quality forecasts, particularly for volatile tax bases.
- Because potential GDP is unobservable, reliance on its estimate complicates structural adjustments and can produce non-cyclical variations in the expenditure ceiling.
- The existence of an ex post enforcement mechanism (reduction of upcoming three-year expenditure levels when the limit is exceeded by more than 6 percent) creates a corrective discipline but depends on accurate measurement of the limit components.

*Source: Box 3. Establishing the Total Expenditure Level in Switzerland (excerpt).*

### REFERENCES

### REFERENCES

### Budget institutions and fiscal performance
- Alesina, Alberto, Ricardo Hausmann, Rudolf Hommes, and Ernesto Stein, 1999, “Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America,” Journal of Development Economics Vol. 59, pp. 253–73.
- Gleich, Holger, 2003, “Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Central and Eastern European Countries,” European Central Bank Working Paper No. 215.
- Stein, Ernesto, Ernesto Talvi, and Alejandro Grisanti, 1999, “Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance: The Latin American Experience,” in James M. Poterba and Jürgen von Hagen (eds.) Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press).
- von Hagen, Jürgen, 1992, ”Budgeting Procedures and Fiscal Performance in the EC,” Economic Papers, DG-II (Brussels: European Commission).

### Fiscal rules, fiscal agencies, and fiscal institutions
- Debrun, Xavier, Laurent Moulin, Alessandro Turrini, Joaquim Ayuso-i-Casals and Mammohan S. Kumar, 2008, “Tied to the Mast? National Fiscal Rules in the European Union,” Economic Policy, April, pp. 297–362.
- ———, Hauner David, and Manmohan S. Kumar (2009), “Independent Fiscal Agencies,” Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 44–81.
- European Commission, 2006, ”Numerical Fiscal Rules and Institutions for Sound Public Finances,” Public Finances in EMU 2006, pp. 149–68 (Brussels: European Commission).
- Ljungman, Gösta, 2008, “Expenditure Ceilings—A Survey,” IMF Working Paper 08/282 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Jonung Lars and Martin Larch, 2006, ”Improving Fiscal Policy in the EU: The Case for Independent Forecasts,” Economic Policy Vol. 21 No. 47, pp. 491–534.
- Yläoutinen, Sami, 2004, “Fiscal Frameworks in the Central and Eastern European Countries,” Ministry of Finance, Finland, Discussion Paper No. 72.

### Budget process, sequencing, and control
- Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, Roy Gardner, Jürgen von Hagen, and Claudia Keser, 2006, “Budget Process: Theory and Experimental Evidence,” Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research Working Paper 2006–09 (Indiana: Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research).
- Hallerberg, Mark and Jürgen von Hagen, 1997, “Sequencing and the Size of the Budget: A Reconsideration,” Centre for Economic Policy Research Working Paper No. 1589 (London: CEPR).
- Hendrick, Rebecca, 1992, “Budgetary Tradeoffs Under Top-Down and Bottom-Up Budgeting,” Public Budgeting and Financial Management 4(2), pp. 327–58.
- Kim, John M. and Chung-Keun Park, 2006, ”Top-Down Budgeting as a Tool for Central Resource Management,” OECD Journal on Budgeting, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Paris: OECD).
- Blöndal, Jón R., Jens Kronmann, and Michael Ruffner, 2002, ”Budgeting in Finland,” OECD Journal on Budgeting, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Paris: OECD).
- Ellwood, John W., 1983, “Budget Control in a Redistributive Environment,” in Allen Schick (ed.) Making Economic Policy in Congress (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute).
- Bozeman, Barry and Jeffery D. Straussman, 1982, “Shrinking Budgets and Shrinkage of Budget Theory,” Public Administration Review, November/December 1982, pp. 509–15.
- McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz, 1985, “The Politics of Flatland,” Public Choice 46, pp. 45–60.

### Fiscal policy effectiveness, stabilization, and crisis response
- Andersen, Torben M., 2005, “Is there a Role for an Active Fiscal Stabilization Policy?” CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 51, No. 4/2005, pp. 511–47.
- Blinder, Alan S., 2006, “The Case Against the Case Against Discretionary Fiscal Policy,” in The Macroeconomics of Fiscal Policy, ed. By Richard W. Kopcke, Geoffery M.B. Tootell, and Robert K. Triest (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press).
- Hemming, Richard, Michael Kell, and Selma Mahfouz, 2002, “The Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy in Stimulating Economic Activity—A Review of the Literature,” IMF Working Paper 02/08 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Spilimbergo, Antonio, Steve Symansky, Olivier Blanchard, and Carlo Cottarelli, 2008, “Fiscal Policy for the Crisis,” IMF Staff Position Note SPN/08/01 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- International Monetary Fund, 2008, World Economic Outlook: Financial Stress, Downturns and Recoveries, October 2008 (Washington).
- _____, 2009, The State of Public Finances: Outlook and Medium-Term Policies after the 2008 Crisis, http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/030609.pdf (Washington).

### Political economy, institutions, and redistributive politics
- Grilli, V., D. Masciandaro, and G. Tabellini, 1991, ”Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries,” Economic Policy 13, pp. 343–92.
- de Haan, Jakob and Jan-Egbert Sturm, 1994, “Political and Institutional Determinants of Fiscal Policy in the European Community,” Public Choice 80, pp. 157–72.
- ———, 1997, ”Political and Institutional Determinants of OECD Budget Deficits and Government Expenditures: A Reinvestigation,” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 13, pp. 739–50.
- Woo, Jaejoon, 2003, ”Economic, Political, and Institutional Determinants of Public Deficits,” Journal of Public Economics, No. 87, pp. 387–426.
- Poterba, James M., 1993, “State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics, NBER Working Paper 4375.
- Weingast, B., K. Shepsle, and C. Johnson, 1981, “The Political Economy Aspects of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Redistributive Politics,” Journal of Political Economy 89.
- Wildavsky, Aron, 1992, The New Politics of Budgetary Processes (New York: Harper Collins).
- Lijphart, A., 1999, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press).

### Fragmentation, tradeoffs, and budget size
- Ferehohn, John, Keith Krehbiel, 1987, “The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget,” American Journal of Political Science 31, pp. 296-320.
- Hallerberg, Mark and Jürgen von Hagen, 1997, “Sequencing and the Size of the Budget: A Reconsideration,” Centre for Economic Policy Research Working Paper No. 1589 (London: CEPR).
- Perotti, Roberto and Yianos Kontopoulos, 2002, “Fragmented Fiscal Policy,” Journal of Public Economics, No. 86, pp. 191–222.
- Molander, Per, 1999, “Reforming Budgetary Institutions: Swedish Experiences,” in R.R. Strauch and J. von Hagen (eds.) Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers).

### Methodology, theory, and surveys
- Bozeman, Barry and Jeffery D. Straussman, 1982, “Shrinking Budgets and Shrinkage of Budget Theory,” Public Administration Review, November/December 1982, pp. 509–15.
- Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, Roy Gardner, Jürgen von Hagen, and Claudia Keser, 2006, “Budget Process: Theory and Experimental Evidence,” Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research Working Paper 2006–09 (Indiana: Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research).
- Hemming, Richard, Michael Kell, and Selma Mahfouz, 2002, “The Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy in Stimulating Economic Activity—A Review of the Literature,” IMF Working Paper 02/08 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Ljungman, Gösta, 2008, “Expenditure Ceilings—A Survey,” IMF Working Paper 08/282 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

*Source: _wp09243 - REFERENCES*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/_wp09243.pdf_
