## 1. Model Parameterizations

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---

### Introduction
- Post-reform labor market outcomes in Italy:
  - Employment and labor force participation rates increased.
  - Unemployment rate dropped to around 6 percent in 2007 (textual statement).
  - Unemployment rate increased to about 6.7 percent in 2008Q3 (OECD statistics).
- Persisting issues:
  - Employment rates remain substantially lower than in most other European countries.
  - Institutional asymmetries: generous safety nets for some groups but virtually nonexistent for most others; substantial variation in employment protection across worker groups; aggregate wage distribution described as "too compressed."
- Consequences:
  - Rising share of workers face high employment risk but little income insurance.
  - Nationally bargained wages less binding in the North but "too high" for the South.
  - Lack of broad social safety net, particularly in the South, limits spatial mobility and slows regional convergence.
- Paper approach:
  - Overview institutional landscape and recent outcomes.
  - Emphasize interactions with reforms in other areas (e.g., product market reform).
  - Simulation exercise using a calibrated labor market matching model to quantify dynamic impacts of alternative reform paths on employment outcomes and fiscal costs.
  - Model highlights:
    - Even modest reform can have a substantial positive impact.
    - Reform dividends do not substantially materialize until about two years from reform initiation.
    - Careful design and pairing of reforms can substantially reduce fiscal costs.

### Recent Developments
- Employment and participation trends (mid-1990s–2007):
  - Cumulative employment growth almost twice that of the labor force; unemployment rate declined sharply, to 6.1 in 2007 (section II statement).
  - Reforms (1997 Treu, 2003 Biagi) increased labor market dualism by focusing reform "at the margin."
- Composition of employment growth (1995–2007):
  - Share of temporary employment increased from 7.2 percent to 12.4 percent.
  - Share of part-time employment increased from 10.5 percent to over 15 percent.
  - Absolute changes:
    - Number of workers in temporary arrangements more than doubled.
    - Permanent employment increased by only 7 percent.
    - Part-time employment increased by 65 percent.
    - Full-time employment cumulative growth was 9 percent.
  - 2004: jump in part-time employment may have raised the share of women in employment by over one percentage point.
- Remaining weaknesses:
  - Employment growth showing signs of slowdown.
  - Employment as a share of the working-age population substantially below most other European countries.
  - Hours worked about the EU average → comparatively low total labor utilization in Italy.
  - Increased temporary and part-time employment (now roughly at the EU average) may have displaced permanent employment growth and contributed to stalling productivity.
- Unemployment duration:
  - Nearly 50 percent of the unemployed have been out of work for more than one year—substantially above the EU average.
- Earnings, productivity, competitiveness:
  - Manufacturing earnings growth: average annual rate of 2.6 percent in Italy over the past decade versus over 3.2 percent in other EU15 countries.
  - Tax wedge: 33.7 percent in Italy versus EU average of 34.2 percent (2007 OECD data for married individuals with two children and average income).
  - Earnings growth outpaced labor productivity over two decades; labor productivity stagnated around 2000 and slightly decreased since then.
  - Unit labor costs grew nearly 28 percent cumulatively during 1995-2007 in Italy versus a European average of just over 20 percent.
  - Conclusion: secular deterioration in relative unit labor costs predominantly a problem of low productivity rather than high earnings growth.
- Measurement caveat:
  - Influx of low-productivity employment may depress measured average productivity even absent changes in underlying competitiveness.

### Regulatory Framework
- Apparent disconnect:
  - De jure indicators place Italy mid-field in Europe while outcomes are among the worst in the EU; de jure measures may not capture de facto impacts.
  - World Economic Forum competitiveness survey ranks Italy 49th of 134 countries and near the bottom on most labor-market related indicators.
- Interactions and spillovers:
  - Important to analyze interactions across labor market regulations and between labor and product market regulations.
- Collective wage bargaining:
  - Two-tier structure from 1993 social pact:
    - (1) national (sectoral) bargaining determines terms and basic wage guarantees (minimi tabellari), renegotiated every four years (minimi tabellari renegotiated every two years);
    - (2) optional second-level (regional or firm) bargaining to supplement national contracts.
  - Wages cannot be reduced below the minimi tabellari, limiting effectiveness of second-level bargaining.
  - About 60 percent of Italian workers are covered by collective bargaining agreements; effective coverage even higher.
  - Predominance of nationally negotiated wages limits firm-level wage differentiation, exacerbating regional disparities and constraining wage-productivity links.
- Unemployment insurance (UI):
  - Ordinary UI: net replacement rate initially 60 percent, drops to zero after 8 months (12 months for workers aged over 50).
  - Complex eligibility rules → few unemployed receive UI benefits; in 2005, 2.3 percent of the labor force received UI benefits, about a third the rate in other EU countries.
  - Wage supplementation funds (CIG) can be substantially more generous but are limited to certain contracts and firms (mostly large firms in the North).
  - Lack of broad social safety net inhibits efficient worker reallocation regionally and across skills.
- Employment protection (EPL):
  - Reforms reduced restrictions on fixed-term and part-time employment to about the EU15 average by 2003, while restrictions on regular (permanent) employment remained unchanged.
  - OECD indicators show permanent EPL comparatively low, but perception among market participants and academics is that permanent employment is substantially protected.
  - Specific protections:
    - Art. 18 in Law 300/1970 protects workers against dismissal without narrowly defined just cause.
    - Protection against collective dismissals among the highest in OECD.
  - Asymmetric deregulation tilted incentives toward atypical contracts, increasing employment risk for many and contributing to worsening productivity trends.
- Product market regulation:
  - Italy among the most regulated product markets in Europe in 2003; high score driven by regulations of economic structure and competition.
  - Simple correlations show a strong negative relationship between employment and product market regulation; product market regulations appear important and should be part of comprehensive reform.

### Directions for Reform
- Core diagnostic:
  - Problems arise from insufficient wage differentiation under the bargaining system, creating mismatches between wages and local productivity.
- Reform priorities and considerations:
  - Avoid partial reforms that exacerbate existing inequities; aim for carefully sequenced and combined reforms.
  - Recognize spillovers between labor market and product market regulations.
  - Design UI and social safety nets to reduce regional immobility and enable better worker reallocation.
  - Encourage broader scope for second-level bargaining by addressing the binding nature of minimi tabellari.
  - Address asymmetric employment protection by better balancing restrictions on permanent and temporary contracts to reduce dualism and encourage human capital investment.
  - Implement product market reforms to enhance competition and remove structural constraints to employment growth.
- Simulated policy insights (calibrated matching model):
  - Even modest reforms can produce substantial positive impacts on employment.
  - Employment dividends typically materialize only after about two years.
  - Pairing reforms (e.g., wage bargaining adjustments with social insurance redesign and product market liberalization) can materially reduce fiscal costs.
  - Careful sequencing matters: avoid piecemeal measures that increase inequities; selected reforms should be sequenced and combined appropriately.

### Box 2 — Product Market Regulations and the Labor Market (high-level findings)
- Product market deregulation effects:
  - In monopolistic markets firms set prices above marginal cost → lower equilibrium output; increased competition → lower price, higher output, and (all else equal) higher employment.
- Interaction with labor market institutions:
  - With strong unions, workers appropriate a share of firms’ rents; product market deregulation reduces rents and workers’ wage premium, increasing the scope for employment gains.
  - Empirical studies find product market deregulation is more effective in highly-regulated labor markets.
  - Aggregate outcome per Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003): workers benefit from both higher real wages and higher aggregate employment after product market deregulation.
- Policy implication:
  - Reforming the product market first may have large payoffs and could facilitate subsequent labor market reform.
- Political economy and sequencing:
  - Product market deregulation may face opposition from affected incumbents; combining reform with compensation measures can improve feasibility.
- Lessons for Italy:
  - Product market deregulation should be a top priority given Italy’s high product-market regulation.
  - Deregulation is typically not fiscally costly and can facilitate labor market reform.
  - Avoid piecemeal reforms; implement packages that avoid unintended consequences.
  - Extend second-level bargaining to obtain more flexible and differentiated wages.
  - Reductions in labor taxes should be broad-based and conditional on unions’ commitments to moderate national wage demands.
  - Recent marginal tax reductions and additional CIG funds risk disproportionately benefiting permanent workers and exacerbating inequities.
  - To broaden wage distribution, Boeri and Garibaldi (2008b) propose introducing a statutory minimum wage as a “fair wage” benchmark to allow firms to deviate from collectively negotiated wages.

### Box 3 — Experiences of Successful Labor Market Reformers (key lessons)
- Complementarities and sequencing:
  - Employment gains from labor market reform are greater with liberal product markets.
  - Initiating product market reforms first can provide substantial employment gains at little to no cost.
  - Examples: Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK combined reforms and reduced government employment as part of packages.
- Role of public employment reduction:
  - Can contribute to wage moderation by increasing private-sector labor supply and lowering the public sector wage floor; may temporarily raise unemployment—mitigated by social safety nets and ALMPs.
- ALMPs:
  - Can accelerate re-employment (e.g., Denmark’s “flexicurity”) though cost-effectiveness is ambiguous and targeting trade-offs exist.
- Equity-efficiency tradeoffs:
  - Successful reforms combined greater flexibility with strong social protection; increased employment risk should be buffered by improved income insurance.
- Policy recommendation on EPL and UI:
  - Further reductions in EPL and equalization across employment types should be combined with UI reform, broadening coverage and lengthening duration.

### Fiscal implications — search-and-matching model (numerical exercise)
- Model framework:
  - Mortensen–Pissarides search-and-matching model with endogenous job creation/destruction and bilateral wage bargaining.
- Policy experiments:
  - Reductions in the tax rate τ from 40% to 37.5% and 33%.
  - Reduction in workers’ bargaining power θ from .6 to .4 in some experiments.
- Definitions and dynamics:
  - Net tax revenues = total tax revenues − outlays on UI benefits.
  - Simulations present dynamics over 40 quarters following policy implementation.
  - Adjustment dynamics: it takes more than eight quarters for labor market variables to broadly converge to new steady-state levels.
  - Net tax revenues partially recover from initial drop due to lower tax rates; they reach and exceed the benchmark equilibrium level only when moderate tax cuts are combined with reduced wage demands.
- Key simulation findings:
  - Medium tax reduction without bargaining changes lowers equilibrium unemployment by over one percentage point but is insufficient to finance fiscal revenue loss from the lower tax rate.
  - Reforms are fully self-financing only when tax cuts are combined with reduced wage demands; stronger employment growth increases the tax base and reduces UI outlays.
  - Tax cuts must translate into increased incentives for job creation, which in the model requires simultaneous reduction in workers’ bargaining power.

### Parameterizations and steady-state outcomes (exact values)
- Experiments and corresponding U_SS (steady-state unemployment rate):
  - Baseline (no change in θ): U_SS = 6.5%
  - Small tax cut (no change in θ): U_SS = 5.4%
  - Large tax cut (no change in θ): U_SS = 4.3%
  - Small tax cut (reduction in θ): U_SS = 3.7%
  - Large tax cut (reduction in θ): U_SS = 2.9%
- Selected preserved parameter values:
  - b_l = .45
  - b_u = .05
  - q = 1
  - α = .2
  - r = .01
  - Ω = .081
  - R = .5
  - c_f = .6
  - β varies across parameterizations: .4, .375, .33
  - Σ (worker share in surplus) varies: .6 (no change in θ) and .4 (reduction in θ)
- Model equations presented (preserved):
  - Dynamic unemployment law:
    U_{t+1} = (1−U_t) μ_F(Π) + U_t (1−λ_w [1−F(Π_0)])
  - Net fiscal revenue:
    Net Fiscal Revenue_t = β ∫ Π y(Π) dG_t(Π) − b_u U_t

### Modeling caveats and policy interpretation
- Limitations:
  - Simple wage-bargaining framework cannot capture complex two-tier bargaining structures; nonetheless highlights importance of firm wage-setting flexibility to realize benefits from tax reductions.
  - Simulations focus on taxes and bargaining; UI generosity and other policy parameters are important additional considerations.
  - Some reforms may be desirable even if not narrowly “self-financing”; financing could come from expenditure cuts elsewhere.
- Policy conclusions:
  - Italy needs a second generation of reforms addressing asymmetries in EPL and social safety nets and enabling wages to better respond to firm- and region-specific conditions.
  - Policy avenues: product market deregulation, more flexible wage bargaining framework, rationalized tax framework, broadened and streamlined UI system.
  - Fiscal constraints imply reforms must be well-designed and sequenced; liberalizing product markets is first-order because it can improve labor market outcomes, induce little to no fiscal cost, and increase political feasibility of subsequent reforms.
  - Avoid piecemeal measures; reform packages combining tax reductions with bargaining-structure reforms and/or unions’ commitment to wage moderation are most promising.

*Source: _wp0947 - 1.  Model Parameterizations*

### 1.  Model Parameterizations ............................................................................................

### 1. Model Parameterizations

### Introduction
- Following significant labor market reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s, labor market outcomes improved substantially in Italy:
  - Employment and labor force participation rates increased.
  - The unemployment rate dropped to around 6 percent in 2007 (textual statement).
  - A later note: the unemployment rate has since increased to about 6.7 percent in 2008Q3 (OECD statistics).
- Despite improvements, employment rates remain substantially lower than in most other European countries.
- Institutional asymmetries exacerbated inequities:
  - A generous social safety net for some worker groups but virtually nonexistent for (most) others.
  - Substantial variation in employment protection across worker groups.
  - Aggregate wage distribution described as "too compressed."
- Consequences of asymmetries:
  - Rising share of workers face high employment risk but little income insurance.
  - Nationally bargained wages are less binding in the North but "too high" for the South.
  - Lack of broad social safety net, particularly in the South, limits spatial mobility and slows reduction of regional disparities.
- Paper approach:
  - Overview of institutional landscape and recent outcomes.
  - Argues for comprehensive view of labor market and recognition of interactions with reforms in other areas (e.g., product market reform).
  - Simulation exercise based on a calibrated labor market matching model quantifies dynamic impacts of reform paths on employment outcomes and fiscal costs.
  - Model highlights:
    - Even modest reform can have a substantial positive impact.
    - Reform dividends do not substantially materialize until about two years from reform initiation.
    - Careful design and pairing of reforms can substantially reduce fiscal costs.

### Recent Developments
- Employment and participation trends since mid-1990s:
  - Cumulative employment growth almost twice that of the labor force; unemployment rate declined sharply, to 6.1 in 2007 (section II statement).
  - Reform efforts such as the 1997 Treu measures and the 2003 Biagi reforms contributed to aggregate employment growth but focused on reform "at the margin," increasing labor market dualism.
- Composition of employment growth (1995–2007):
  - Share of temporary employment increased from 7.2 percent to 12.4 percent.
  - Share of part-time employment increased from 10.5 percent to over 15 percent.
  - In absolute terms:
    - Number of workers in temporary arrangements more than doubled.
    - Permanent employment increased by only 7 percent.
    - Part-time employment increased by 65 percent; full-time employment cumulative growth was 9 percent.
  - The jump in part-time employment in 2004 may have benefited the share of women in employment, which increased by over one percentage point that year.
- Remaining weaknesses:
  - Employment growth starting to show signs of slowdown.
  - Employment as a share of the working-age population is substantially below most other European countries.
  - Hours worked about the EU average, implying comparatively low total labor utilization in Italy.
  - Increased use of temporary and part-time employment (now roughly at the EU average) may have displaced growth in permanent employment and contributed to stalling productivity growth.
- Unemployment duration:
  - Nearly 50 percent of the unemployed have been out of work for more than one year—substantially above the EU average.
- Earnings, productivity, and competitiveness:
  - Manufacturing earnings growth: average annual rate of 2.6 percent in Italy over the past decade, below the average rate of over 3.2 percent in other EU15 countries.
  - Tax wedge: 33.7 percent in Italy (combined employer and employee deductions relative to total labor cost) versus EU average of 34.2 percent (2007 OECD data for married individuals with two children and average income).
  - Earnings growth outpaced labor productivity over two decades; labor productivity stagnated around 2000 and slightly decreased since then.
  - Unit labor costs grew nearly 28 percent cumulatively during 1995-2007 in Italy versus a European average of just over 20 percent during the same period.
  - Conclusion: secular deterioration in relative unit labor costs predominantly a problem of low productivity rather than high earnings growth.
- Measurement caveat:
  - Influx of low-productivity employment may depress measured average productivity even absent changes in underlying competitiveness.

### Regulatory Framework
- Apparent disconnect:
  - Standard de jure labor market indicators (e.g., OECD) place Italy broadly mid-field in Europe; on some dimensions Italy appears less regulated than EU average, yet outcomes are among the worst in the EU.
  - De jure indicators may not capture de facto impact; e.g., World Economic Forum competitiveness survey ranks Italy 49th of 134 countries and near the bottom on most labor-market related indicators.
- Need to analyze interactions and spillovers:
  - Important to consider interactions across labor market regulations and between labor and product market regulations.
- Key institutional features and hindrances:
  - Collective wage bargaining:
    - Two-tier structure from 1993 social pact: (1) national (sectoral) bargaining determines terms and conditions and basic wage guarantees (minimi tabellari), renegotiated every four years (minimi tabellari renegotiated every two years); (2) optional second-level (regional or firm) bargaining to supplement national contracts.
    - Wages cannot be reduced below the minimi tabellari, limiting the effectiveness of second-level bargaining.
    - About 60 percent of Italian workers are covered by collective bargaining agreements; effective coverage even higher.
    - Predominance of nationally negotiated wages limits firm-level wage differentiation, exacerbating regional disparities and constraining wage-productivity links.
  - Unemployment insurance (UI):
    - UI system complex and uneven.
    - Ordinary UI benefits initially relatively high with a net replacement rate of 60 percent, but drop to zero after 8 months (12 months for workers aged over 50).
    - Complex eligibility rules imply few unemployed receive UI benefits; in 2005, 2.3 percent of the labor force received UI benefits, about a third the rate in other EU countries.
    - Wage supplementation funds (cassa integrazione guadagni, CIG) can be substantially more generous in level and duration but are limited to workers on certain contracts and firms (mostly large firms in the North).
    - Lack of broad, well-developed social safety net inhibits efficient worker reallocation regionally and across skills.
  - Employment protection (EPL):
    - Past reforms reduced restrictions on fixed-term and part-time employment from among the highest in Europe in the mid-1980s to about the EU15 average in 2003, while restrictions on regular (permanent) employment remained unchanged.
    - OECD indicators show permanent EPL comparatively low, but market participants and academics perceive permanent employment as substantially protected.
    - Specific protections cited:
      - Art. 18 in Law 300/1970 (statuto dei lavoratori) protects workers against dismissal without narrowly defined just cause, making individual layoffs difficult without risking substantial penalties.
      - Protection against collective dismissals is among the highest in OECD countries.
    - Asymmetric deregulation tilted incentives toward atypical contracts, increasing employment risk for many (particularly those with least access to social insurance) and contributing to worsening productivity trends.
- Product market regulation:
  - Product market regulations are high in Italy and likely affected labor market outcomes.
  - In 2003, Italy ranked among EU countries with the most regulated product markets; high score driven mostly by regulations of economic structure and competition.
  - Simple correlations suggest a strong negative relationship between employment and product market regulation, with Italy at the extreme end.
  - Scatterplots suggest tax wedge and average EPL do not stand out as primary factors keeping employment low; product market regulations appear important and should be part of comprehensive labor market reform measures.

### Directions for Reform
- Core diagnostic:
  - Problems stem not from excessive average wage growth but from a bargaining system providing insufficient differentiation, leading to mismatch between wages and local productivity conditions.
- Identified reform priorities and considerations (drawing on international experience and model simulations):
  - Avoid partial reforms that exacerbate existing inequities; aim for carefully sequenced and combined reforms.
  - Reform measures should recognize spillovers between labor market and product market regulations.
  - Design UI and social safety nets to reduce regional immobility and enable better worker reallocation.
  - Encourage broader scope for second-level (firm or regional) bargaining by addressing the binding nature of minimi tabellari.
  - Address asymmetric employment protection by bringing restrictions on permanent and temporary contracts into better balance to reduce dualism and encourage human capital investment.
  - Implement product market reforms to enhance competition and remove structural constraints to employment growth.
- Simulated policy insights from calibrated matching model:
  - Even modest reforms can produce substantial positive impacts on employment.
  - Employment dividends of reform are not immediate; they tend to materialize materially only after about two years.
  - Pairing reforms (e.g., combining wage bargaining adjustments with social insurance redesign and product market liberalization) can materially reduce fiscal costs associated with reforms.
  - Careful sequencing matters: successful reformers' experiences suggest avoiding piecemeal measures that increase inequities; not all shortcomings must be solved simultaneously but selected reforms must be sequenced and combined appropriately.

*Source: _wp0947 - 1.  Model Parameterizations*

### Box 2. Product Market Regulations and the Labor Market

### Box 2. Product Market Regulations and the Labor Market

### Product market regulations and employment
- Product market regulations 12 have been shown to be strongly negatively correlated with employment (see, e.g., Boeri et al., 2000, and Figure 5).
- In a monopolistic market structure, firms set prices at a markup over marginal cost, reducing the equilibrium quantity of output.
- Increased competition tends to result in:
  - lower equilibrium price,
  - higher output,
  - and, all else equal, higher employment.

### Interaction with labor market institutions
- The effect of product market deregulation on real wages, and the size of employment gains, depends on labor market institutions:
  - In labor markets with strong unions, wages are elevated over the marginal product of labor because unions extract a share of the (monopolistic) firms’ rents.
  - Product market deregulation reduces firms’ rents and thus workers’ wage premium, increasing the scope for employment effects where unions are strong.
- Empirical support:
  - Fiori et al. (2007), Griffith et al. (2007) and Amable et al. (2007) find product market deregulation is more effective in highly-regulated labor markets.
- Aggregate outcome:
  - Based on Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), in the aggregate workers will benefit from both higher real wages and higher aggregate employment following product market deregulation.13
  - Reductions in total rents reduce incentives of workers to appropriate a share of these rents (e.g., through unionization) and thus are likely to facilitate future labor market reform.
  - Fiori et al. (2007) confirm empirically a positive effect of product market deregulation on employment and on the probability of future labor market reform.
- Policy implication:
  - In the presence of both rigid product and labor markets, reforming the product market first may likely have a large payoff and could also facilitate subsequent labor market reform.14

### Political economy and sequencing considerations
- Complementarities based on political economy:
  - Although workers on the whole benefit from product market reform, some groups (e.g., incumbent firms or sectors particularly affected) may suffer and therefore oppose deregulation.
  - Product market deregulation may be more feasible when combined with measures to help negatively affected groups.
- Experience from successful labor market reformers supports comprehensive reform packages that combine measures across different dimensions of labor market regulation to reduce opposition.

### Lessons for Italy (from case studies)
- Important lessons from successful reformers relevant to Italy:
  - Successful labor market reforms typically also address inefficiencies in product markets.
    - Given that Italy’s product market is among the most regulated in Europe, product market deregulation should be a top priority.
    - Product market deregulation is typically not fiscally costly, and more competitive product markets can facilitate subsequent labor market reform.
  - Successful reforms avoid being piecemeal; reforms should be implemented in packages that avoid unintended consequences.
    - Italy’s reform history contains examples of piecemeal reforms (asymmetric liberalization of temporary employment, partial tax reductions, expansion of the CIG scheme).15
  - Specific measures:
    - Extended use of second-level bargaining is crucial to obtain a more flexible and differentiated wage structure.16
    - Reductions in labor taxes may be necessary to provide additional flexibility, but these should be broad-based, rather than partial, and implemented only with commitments of unions to moderate wage demands at the national level so as to broaden scope for firm-level wage supplements and ensure tax cuts benefit both workers and firms.
    - Recent marginal tax reductions (e.g., taxation on overtime/bonus pay and the tredicessima) affect average costs of employment only marginally, disproportionately benefit those in permanent employment, and have potential to result in substantial fiscal costs; recent government commitments of additional funds to the CIG scheme may exacerbate existing inequities in the social safety net.15
    - To achieve a less compressed wage distribution, Boeri and Garibaldi (2008b) propose introducing a statutory minimum wage as a new “fair wage” benchmark to provide more scope for firms to deviate from collectively negotiated wages.16

### Complementarities observed in successful reformers (Box 3 summary)
- Common elements across Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland and the UK:
  - Wage moderation was central, achieved via combinations of:
    1. reduced union power and/or consensus-based agreements with unions;
    2. tightened unemployment insurance systems;
    3. reduced labor taxation;
    4. reduced employment protection legislation;
    5. product market deregulation.
  - Denmark and the Netherlands expanded active labor market policies (ALMPs); Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK reduced the size of government, including government employment.
- Examples of policy complementarities that reduce opposition and increase effectiveness:
  - Labor taxes and union power:
    - Unions’ opposition to wage moderation can be mitigated by trading wage moderation for reductions in labor taxation, helping compensate workers for moderate increases in pre-tax wages and making tax cuts more effective in generating employment gains.17
    - Belgium illustrates a case where strong unions appropriated most tax cuts, resulting in higher take-home pay rather than lower labor costs, limiting employment gains; the Netherlands’ Wassenaar agreement (1982) traded wage restraint for reductions in labor taxation and contributed to substantial employment growth.
  - Employment protection and social safety net:
    - Reducing employment protection increases labor market flexibility but exposes workers to increased employment and income risk; combining reductions in employment protection with improvements in the social safety net (e.g., unemployment insurance) can mitigate income risk and reduce opposition.
    - Careful UI design is crucial: UI benefits should provide income insurance while maintaining incentives for active job search; job search activities should be monitored; and UI benefits should decrease over time.19
  - Note on EPL details:
    - Many European countries relaxed restrictions on fixed-term contracts while leaving restrictions for permanent positions or collective dismissals unchanged, creating, in many cases and notably in Italy, a dual labor market.18

*Source: Box 2. Product Market Regulations and the Labor Market (extracted from provided content).*

### Box 3. Experiences of Successful Labor Market Reformers (continued)

### _wp0947 - Box 3. Experiences of Successful Labor Market Reformers (continued)

### Product-market and labor-market complementarities; sequencing
- Employment gains associated with labor market reform were greater in the presence of liberal product markets (see Annett, 2007).
- Sequencing result: initiating product market reforms first can provide substantial employment gains at little to no cost.
- Country examples: Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK reduced government employment as part of reform packages.
- Role of public employment reduction:
  - Contributes to wage moderation by (1) increasing the labor supply available to the private sector and (2) reducing the extent to which public wages act as a de facto wage floor on private sector wages.
  - May temporarily increase unemployment; an appropriate social safety net, possibly combined with ALMPs, can mitigate opposition.
- ALMPs (active labor market programmes) can help unemployed workers return into employment more quickly (example: Denmark’s “flexicurity” model), but their overall cost-effectiveness is ambiguous and gains for targeted groups may come at the expense of other groups.

### Equity-efficiency tradeoffs; income risk vs. employment risk
- Successful reforms combined labor market flexibility (efficiency) with a high level of social protection (equity), increasing political feasibility and effectiveness.
- Employment risk is a necessary part of a flexible economy; attempts to reduce employment risk per se are unlikely to improve labor market outcomes.
- Policy implication: Increased employment risk from greater flexibility should be buffered by improved income insurance that reduces income risk associated with employment fluctuations.

### Specific policy recommendation on EPL and UI
- A further reduction in EPL, and equalization across employment types, should be combined with a reform of the UI system, including a broadening of coverage and lengthening of duration.
- Stated principle: Increased employment risk should be buffered by improved income insurance.

### Fiscal implications of labor market reform — numerical exercise (search-and-matching model)
- The simulations use a Mortensen–Pissarides search-and-matching framework with endogenous job creation and destruction and bilateral wage bargaining.
- Policy experiments involve:
  - Reductions in the tax rate τ from 40% to 37.5% and 33%, respectively.
  - A reduction in workers’ bargaining power θ from .6 to .4 in some experiments.
- Net tax revenues are defined as total tax revenues minus outlays on UI benefits.
- Key model equations (presentation preserved):
  - Dynamic unemployment law:
    U_{t+1} = (1−U_t) μ_F(Π) + U_t (1−λ_w [1−F(Π_0)])
  - Net fiscal revenue:
    Net Fiscal Revenue_t = β ∫ Π y(Π) dG_t(Π) − b_u U_t
- Calibration notes:
  - Baseline calibration chosen to generate an unemployment rate of 6.5 percent and 50 percent long-term unemployment (i.e., in the baseline steady state, 50 percent of the unemployed have been in unemployment for four quarters or more), broadly in line with Italy’s recent outcomes.
  - Simulations present dynamics over 40 quarters following policy implementation.
- Simulation findings:
  - Adjustment dynamics: it takes more than eight quarters for labor market variables to broadly converge to new steady-state levels.
  - Net tax revenues partially recover from the initial drop due to lower tax rates; they reach and exceed the benchmark equilibrium level only in the scenario where moderate tax cuts are combined with reduced wage demands.
  - Even a medium tax reduction without changes to the bargaining framework lowers equilibrium unemployment by over one percentage point, but employment gains alone are insufficient to finance the loss in fiscal revenues from the lower tax rate.
  - Reforms are fully self-financing only in the case where tax cuts are combined with reduced wage demands, because stronger employment growth increases the tax base and reduces UI outlays.
  - To trigger sufficiently strong employment growth from tax cuts, the tax cuts must translate into increased incentives for job creation, which in the model requires a simultaneous reduction in workers’ bargaining power.

### Parameterizations and steady-state outcomes (exact values from Appendix Table 1)
- Experiments and corresponding U_SS (steady-state unemployment rate):
  - Baseline (no change in θ): U_SS = 6.5%
  - Small tax cut (no change in θ): U_SS = 5.4%
  - Large tax cut (no change in θ): U_SS = 4.3%
  - Small tax cut (reduction in θ): U_SS = 3.7%
  - Large tax cut (reduction in θ): U_SS = 2.9%
- Other preserved parameter values shown in the table (selected):
  - b_l = .45; b_u = .05; q = 1; α = .2; r = .01; Ω = .081; R = .5; c_f = .6.
  - β varies across parameterizations: .4, .375, .33.
  - Σ (worker share in surplus) varies: .6 (no change in θ) and .4 (reduction in θ).

### Modeling caveats and policy interpretation
- The simple wage-bargaining framework cannot capture more complex two-tier bargaining structures; the results nonetheless convey the importance of providing firms with sufficient flexibility in wage setting so they benefit from tax reductions.
- The simulations focus on taxes and bargaining; other elements, such as the level of UI generosity, are important additional policy parameters.
- Some reforms may be desirable from an aggregate perspective even if not “self-financing” in a narrow sense; financing could come from expenditure cuts in other areas.

### Conclusions and policy implications (summary)
- Italy’s labor market needs a second generation of reforms addressing asymmetries in employment protection legislation and social safety nets and helping wages better respond to firm- and region-specific conditions.
- Policy avenues highlighted: product market deregulation, a more flexible wage bargaining framework, rationalization of the tax framework, and a broadened and streamlined UI system.
- Fiscal constraints imply that reforms should be well-designed and sequenced; liberalizing product markets is of first-order importance because it can improve labor market outcomes, induce little to no fiscal cost, and increase political feasibility of subsequent reforms.
- Avoid piecemeal measures; reform packages combining tax reductions with reforms of the bargaining structure and/or unions’ commitment to wage moderation are the most promising.

*Source: _wp0947 - Box 3. Experiences of Successful Labor Market Reformers (continued).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/_wp0947.pdf_
