## _wp0991

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---

### I. Introduction and Context
- Policymakers identify channels transmitting the 2008 financial crisis to emerging and developing countries:
  - massive losses by banks and heightened risk aversion → contraction in credit;
  - drop in global demand → income losses for exporters;
  - outflow of foreign capital → destabilized private and public finances.
- Concern: the crisis could become a global humanitarian crisis via remittance channels; remittances are falling for the first time in decades.
- Reported and cited estimates:
  - World Bank: remittance flows expected to fall by 5 to 8 percent in 2009.
  - Cali, Massa, and te Verde (2008): remittances to Kenya have dropped by 38%.
  - World Bank estimate: remittances roughly "$283 billion in 2008".
  - Mexico receives "more than $26 billion in remittances each year, primarily from migrants working in the U.S."

### II. Data, Sample, and Empirical Approach
- Sample and periods:
  - Sample: 70 countries, including 16 advanced economies and 54 developing countries.
  - Descriptive statistics period: 1970 – 2004.
  - Panel data description: 1980 -- 2004, averaged over five-year periods (1980–1984, 1985–1989, 1990–1994, 1995–1999, 2000–2004).
  - Figures use five-year averages for periods 1975-79 through 2000-04.
- Key variables:
  - Dependent variable: standard deviation of real per capita GDP growth (average volatility of per capita output growth 1980–2004 = 4.4; median = 3.6).
  - Main explanatory variable: ratio of remittance receipts to GDP; constructed as averages over 1970–2004 except relative income measured in 1970; at least fifteen years of data required.
  - Controls: relative income, relative income squared, terms of trade volatility, trade openness, financial openness, government consumption, institutional quality, indicator of financial sector development, trade concentration ratio, commodity composition of exports.
- Methods:
  - Cross-section OLS regressions.
  - Instrumental variables (IV) estimations using wrrow_i (ratio of remittances to GDP of all other recipient countries, excluding the country in question).
  - Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel regressions (system GMM).

### III. Descriptive Statistics and Stylized Facts
- Workers remittances to GDP (1970–2004, Table 2):
  - mean 1.7
  - median 0.4
  - maximum 19.0
  - minimum 0
  - standard deviation 2.9
- Three largest recipients relative to GDP, 1970–2004:
  - Jordan 19 percent of GDP
  - Egypt 8.2 percent of GDP
  - El Salvador 7 percent of GDP
- Notable industrial-country recipients:
  - Portugal 5.7 percent of GDP
  - Greece 2.1 percent of GDP
  - Cyprus 0.6 percent of GDP
  - Spain 0.5 percent of GDP
- Remittance patterns:
  - inflows rose across regions for 1975 to 2004 (Figure 1).
  - inflows scaled by GDP rose similarly (Figure 2).
  - remittance inflows have been "quite stable as a percent of GDP for most regions" and "a remarkably stable source of income, relative to other private and public flows," often countercyclical.

### IV. Main Empirical Findings
- OLS cross-country results (preferred specification, Table 3, column 3):
  - Workers’ remittances-to-GDP ratio has a negative and statistically significant effect on volatility.
  - Magnitude: an increase in the workers’ remittances-to-GDP ratio of one percentage point leads to a reduction of 0.16 in the standard deviation of GDP growth (preferred regression including Jordan).
  - Selected coefficient evidence (Table 3):
    - Workers remittances to GDP: -0.17
    - Primary commodity export composition: 0.02 *
    - Terms of trade volatility: 0.09 *
    - Trade openness to GDP: 0.02 **
    - Government consumption interaction coefficients reported as -0.06 to -0.07 in various columns
- Robustness:
  - Inclusion of volatility of discretionary fiscal policy weakens many controls but remittance findings remain robust (Table 3, columns 6 and 7).
  - Jordan is an influential outlier; omitting Jordan increases the absolute value of the remittance coefficient (Table 3, column 5).
- IV estimation (Table 3, column 8):
  - IV results confirm OLS: significant negative impact of remittances on output volatility.
  - IV estimates slightly larger in absolute value than OLS.
- GMM dynamic panel estimation (Table 5 and Table 7):
  - GMM system estimates for full sample, excluding Jordan, and developing-country subsample: remittances variable negative and statistically significant in all three regressions.
  - Example GMM-SYS coefficient: Workers remittances to GDP = -0.17**
  - Diagnostics: Hansen and Difference Sargan tests do not reject instrument validity; A-B test AR(1) significant, AR(2) not significant.
  - GMM estimates of remittance effects are much larger in absolute value than OLS.

### V. Nonlinear (Threshold) Effects
- Threshold methodology:
  - Interact workers remittances-to-GDP with a dummy for remittance ratios greater than r* percent; search cutoffs in 0.5 percentage-point increments up to sample maximum.
  - Optimal cutoff chosen: 2 percent of GDP.
- OLS and IV nonlinear results (Table 6):
  - For wrgdp <= 2% (α):
    - OLS α = -1.41**
    - OLS excluding Jordan α = -1.51**
    - IV α = -1.34**
  - For wrgdp > 2% (β):
    - OLS β = -0.21**
    - OLS excluding Jordan β = -0.35**
    - IV β = -0.20**
  - F test α = β rejects equality (F test values reported; significance indicated as **).
- GMM nonlinear results (Table 7):
  - wrgdp <= 2%: -1.43**, -1.59**, -1.45** across GMM specifications.
  - wrgdp > 2%: -0.19**, -0.17**, -0.19* across GMM specifications.
- Interpretation:
  - Remittance inflows are stabilizing on average, but the stabilizing effect is much stronger at remittance-to-GDP ratios below 2 percent and weakens substantially once inflows exceed 2 percent of GDP.

### VI. Regional Application — MENA and Examples
- MENA remittance context:
  - For 1975–2004 remittance inflows exceeded 2 percent of GDP throughout the period; nonlinear results imply a lower marginal contribution to volatility reduction relative to countries with lower remittance shares.
- Examples of recent increases (text):
  - Pakistan: from 2 percent of GDP in 2001 to 4 percent of GDP in 2006.
  - Egypt: from 3 percent of GDP in 2001 to 5 percent of GDP in 2006.
  - Applying Table 7 coefficients suggests these increases may have contributed to a reduction in growth volatility by about 0.4 percent for these countries in those years.
- Table 8 selected estimated impacts of remittances on volatility by region (1975–2004, five-year periods):
  - Developing Asia (2000–2004): -0.54
  - Industrial countries (2000–2004): -0.52
  - MENA (2000–2004): -0.86
  - Western Hemisphere (2000–2004): -0.88

### VII. Channels, Theoretical Ambiguities, and Literature Context
- Stabilizing channels:
  - Countercyclical and relatively stable remittances can operate like countercyclical fiscal policy supporting aggregate demand.
  - Remittances may enhance financial development in recipient countries, which tends to be stabilizing.
- Destabilizing channels:
  - If remittances are volatile and exogenous, they may act like terms-of-trade or capital-flow shocks.
  - Supply-side amplification: countercyclical remittances can amplify labor-supply responses and output volatility (Chami, Cosimano, and Gapen, 2006).
  - Institutional effects: reliance on remittance income may "undermine the quality of other domestic economic institutions" and may adversely affect governance (Abdih and others, 2008).
- Broader literature on determinants of growth volatility summarized:
  - Exogenous shocks (terms of trade, civil strife, external transfers) significantly affect decade-average growth volatility.
  - Persistent characteristics (country size, income per capita, sectoral composition, trade openness, government consumption, financial development, institutional quality) play important roles with mixed or context-dependent effects cited across studies.

### VIII. Policy Implications and Recommendations
- Core policy messages:
  - Remittances reduce output volatility on average and provide an insurance channel affecting growth and welfare.
  - Stabilizing effects occur at relatively low remittance-to-GDP ratios and weaken beyond ~2 percent of GDP; very large remittance inflows do not imply proportionately larger macroeconomic stability gains.
- Recommendations for large remittance-recipient countries:
  - Strengthen macroeconomic resilience through complementary measures beyond reliance on remittances.
  - Use remittance resources to expand domestic fiscal capacity, for example via broader-based consumption taxation (an efficient VAT with limited exemptions is suggested) to capture remittance-financed consumption increases.
  - Allocate fiscal resources to boost human capital (health and education), alleviate infrastructure bottlenecks, and improve the business climate to maximize spillovers from remittances.
- In the event of remittance declines due to global turmoil:
  - Expect increased output volatility and adverse welfare effects, with poorest households hit hardest.
  - Policy responses are constrained amid weaker export demand and constrained revenue/borrowing capacity.
  - Policy coordination with remittance-sending countries (fiscal or employment-support measures) could help mitigate declines in remittances and consequent social/financial impacts.

### IX. Summary Conclusions
- Cross-country OLS, IV, and dynamic panel GMM evidence consistently indicate a negative relationship between workers’ remittances and volatility of GDP growth.
- Quantitative magnitudes:
  - Preferred OLS estimate with Jordan included implies a 0.16 reduction in the standard deviation of GDP growth per one percentage point increase in remittances-to-GDP.
  - GMM and nonlinear estimates indicate much larger stabilizing effects at low remittance ratios (<= 2 percent of GDP) and much weaker effects above that threshold.
- Policy-makers in large remittance-receiving countries should leverage remittance resources to strengthen macroeconomic resilience and social protection, recognizing threshold effects.

*Source: IMF working paper content provided in the supplied PDF content unit.*

### References..............................................................................................................

### _wp0991 - References..............................................................................................................

### Tables and Appendix Listings
- Tables included:
  - 1. Output Volatility and Workers Remittances
  - 2. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 1970 – 2004
  - 3. Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variables Regression Results
  - 4. Panel Data Description, 1980 -- 2004
  - 5. Panel Regression Results
  - 6. Nonlinear Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variables Regression Results
  - 7. Nonlinear GMM System Estimation
  - 8. Estimated Impact of Remittances on Volatility
- Appendixes:
  - Data Appendix
  - Country Coverage

### Figures (Selected)
- Figure 1. Average Workers' Remittances by Region 1/ (in billions of U.S. dollars; averages over 5-year periods)
  - Periods shown: 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04
  - Regions shown: Developing Asia, Industrial countries, MENA, Africa, Western Hemisphere
  - Note: 1/ Excluding transition countries.
- Figure 2. Workers' Remittances to GDP by Region 1/ (in percent; averages over 5-year periods)
  - Periods shown: 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04
  - Percent scale shown: 0.0, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, 8.0
  - Regions shown: Developing Asia, Industrial countries, MENA, Africa, Western Hemisphere
  - Note: 1/ Excluding transition countries.

### I. INTRODUCTION — Key Observations and Context
- Policymakers are identifying channels through which the ongoing financial crisis is spreading and affecting global economies, including:
  - massive losses by banks coupled with heightened risk aversion among investors leading to a contraction in credit;
  - a drop in global demand and its implication for the income of exporters;
  - outflow of foreign capital from emerging and developing countries, destabilizing private and public finances.
- The crisis could become a global humanitarian crisis due to impacts on emerging and developing countries through remittance channels.
- Remittances are described as the cash that migrant workers send to their families back home; signs indicate remittances are falling for the first time in decades.

### Empirical Evidence and Reported Estimates
- Reported estimated changes in remittance flows:
  - A recent World Bank report estimates remittance flows are expected to fall by 5 to 8 percent in 2009.
  - Other studies report that remittances to Philippines, Mexico, the Middle East and Africa have dropped considerably.
  - Cali, Massa, and te Verde (2008) report that remittances to Kenya have dropped by 38%.

### Data Coverage and Periods Referenced
- Time spans explicitly referenced:
  - 1970 – 2004 (for descriptive statistics)
  - 1980 -- 2004 (for panel data description)
  - 1975-79 through 2000-04 (five-year average periods used in Figures 1 and 2)

*Source: _wp0991 - References..............................................................................................................*

### 2008. If this trend continues, which is likely given the depth of the impending recession, the

### _wp0991 - 2008. If this trend continues, which is likely given the depth of the impending recession, the

### Remittances: magnitude, stability, and recent patterns
- World Bank estimate: remittances roughly "$283 billion in 2008".
- Remittances are larger than foreign official aid or private investments for many countries.
- Examples of large recipients: the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Brazil and Egypt.
- Mexico receives "more than $26 billion in remittances each year, primarily from migrants working in the U.S."
- Remittance flows have been on the rise across regions for the period "1975 to 2004" (Figure 1).
- When scaled by the size of recipient economies, remittance inflows show a similar rising pattern (Figure 2).
- Remittance inflows have been "quite stable as a percent of GDP for most regions" (Figure 2).
- Remittances have been "a remarkably stable source of income, relative to other private and public flows" and appear "compensatory in nature, rising when the home country’s economy suffers a downturn."
- The countercyclical behavior of remittances suggests they may be a stabilizing factor for developing nations; this is illustrated by lower output volatility in regions dependent on remittances (Figure 3), with particular importance for the MENA region.

### Economic and social effects documented in literature
- Conclusive evidence: remittances "directly alleviate poverty by providing significant income to some of the poorest members of society."
- Remittances differ from foreign aid or trade because they reach poor households more directly.
- Recent references cited include Chami and others (2003, 2008), IMF (2005), and WB (2006).

### Research question and empirical approach
- Core question: whether remittance flows reduce output growth volatility in remittance-dependent economies.
- Concern: "the adverse effect of high output volatility on economic growth, welfare, and poverty" (Ramey and Ramey, 1995).
- Methods employed:
  - Cross-section OLS regressions.
  - Instrumental variables estimations.
  - Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel regressions.
- Sample: "70 countries, including 16 advanced economies and 54 developing countries."
- Dependent variable: standard deviation of real per capita GDP growth.
- Main explanatory variable of interest: ratio of remittance receipts to GDP.
- Control variables: relative income, relative income squared, terms of trade volatility, trade openness, financial openness, government consumption, institutional quality, indicator of financial sector development, trade concentration ratio, commodity composition of exports.
- Data construction: explanatory variables are constructed as averages over the "1970–2004" period except relative income measured in "1970"; at least fifteen years of data required to calculate an average.

### Key empirical finding
- Robust result: a "statistically significant negative effect of remittance flows on the volatility of real GDP growth" — i.e., remittance inflows have tended to be stabilizing on average.
- Policy relevance: if remittance flows "are expected to slow down due to the ongoing global economic turmoil," then "the most vulnerable and remittance-dependent economies" should be expected to be "significantly affected by the drop in these income flows."

### Theoretical ambiguities and channels
- Stabilizing channel:
  - Remittances behave countercyclically and are relatively stable, so they can act like countercyclical fiscal policy supporting aggregate demand.
  - Remittances may enhance financial development in recipient countries, which tends to be stabilizing.
- Destabilizing channels:
  - If remittances are volatile and exogenous, they may induce volatility similar to terms-of-trade or capital-flow shocks.
  - Supply-side amplification: if fluctuations in growth reflect labor-supply responses to technology shocks, countercyclical remittances can amplify labor-supply responses and thus output volatility (Chami, Cosimano, and Gapen, 2006).
  - Institutional effects: reliance on remittance income may "undermine the quality of other domestic economic institutions" and there is evidence that "reliance on remittance flows may have an adverse effect on the quality of governance in the recipient countries (Abdih and others, 2008)."

### Literature context on determinants of growth volatility (summary)
- Exogenous shocks: low-persistence shocks (terms of trade, civil strife, vulnerability to debt crises, changes in external transfers) significantly affect decade-average growth volatility (Easterly, Kremer, and Summers, 1993; Calderon, Loayza, and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2005).
- Persistent country characteristics:
  - Country size: larger economies tend to be more diversified and less volatile (Furceri and Karras, 2007).
  - Income per capita and sectoral composition: higher income associated with concentration in less risky sectors and reduced country-specific risk (Koren and Tenreyro, 2004).
  - Trade openness: ambiguous effects — may increase exposure to external shocks but stabilize against domestic shocks; role interacts with export concentration and commodity-price volatility (Rodrik, 1998; Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz, 2000).
  - Government consumption: potentially stabilizing in Rodrik’s view, but evidence of procyclicality in many low-income countries suggests possible destabilizing effects (Talvi and Vegh; Montiel and Serven, 2005).
  - Financial development and integration: generally stabilizing effects of domestic financial development; mixed evidence on financial openness with some studies finding stabilization except perhaps at intermediate income levels (Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz, 2000; Cecchetti, Lagunes, and Krause, 2005; Calderon, Loayza, and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2005).
- Institutional environment: quality of institutions (conflict management, democratic rights, quality of government institutions) reduces macroeconomic volatility; weak constraints on politicians can generate volatility even absent exogenous shocks (Rodrik, 1998; Mobarak, 2005; Acemoglu and others, 2003).

### Paper structure (as presented)
- Section II: overview of literature on determinants of growth volatility to identify controls.
- Section III: cross-section OLS estimates.
- Sections IV and V: instrumental variables and GMM estimations to address endogeneity of remittance flows.
- Section VI: tests for nonlinear effects of remittance flows on GDP growth stability.
- Final section: summary and conclusions.
- Paper contains a data appendix with sources and variable definitions.

*Source: IMF working paper text contained in the supplied content unit.*

### 1.7 percent of GDP compared with a median remittances flow of 0.4 percent of GDP. The

### _wp0991 - 1.7 percent of GDP compared with a median remittances flow of 0.4 percent of GDP. The

### Descriptive statistics and stylized facts
- Workers remittances to GDP: mean 1.7, median 0.4, maximum 19.0, minimum 0, standard deviation 2.9 (Table 2).
- Average volatility of per capita output growth (1980–2004): 4.4; median 3.6 (Table 1 and Table 2).
- Three largest recipients of remittances relative to GDP, 1970–2004: Jordan 19 percent of GDP, Egypt 8.2 percent of GDP, El Salvador 7 percent of GDP.
- Notable industrial-country remittance recipients: Portugal 5.7 percent of GDP, Greece 2.1 percent of GDP, Cyprus 0.6 percent of GDP, Spain 0.5 percent of GDP.
- Trade- and fiscal-related controls identified as key correlates of output volatility: share of primary commodities in exports, degree of trade openness, and terms of trade volatility.

### OLS cross-country regression results (1970–2004)
- Preferred OLS specification (Table 3, column 3) finds the workers’ remittances-to-GDP ratio has a negative and statistically significant effect on volatility.
- When allowing government consumption effects to differ between industrial and developing countries (Table 3, column 2), the remittance coefficient is statistically significant at the 95 percent level.
- Magnitude: an increase in the workers’ remittances-to-GDP ratio of one percentage point leads to a reduction of 0.16 in the standard deviation of GDP growth (preferred regression including Jordan).
- Selected coefficient evidence from Table 3 (preserve exact figures as reported):
  - Workers remittances to GDP: -0.17 (columns reported; significance markers shown in Table 3).
  - Primary commodity export composition: 0.02 * (standard errors reported in Table 3).
  - Terms of trade volatility: 0.09 * (Table 3).
  - Trade openness to GDP: 0.02 ** (Table 3).
  - Government consumption to GDP (and interaction with industrial dummy) included in preferred specifications; interaction coefficient reported as -0.06 to -0.07 in various columns (Table 3).

### Robustness to fiscal volatility and outliers
- Inclusion of volatility of discretionary fiscal policy (standard deviation of cyclically adjusted government spending) weakens many explanatory variables but remittance findings remain robust (Table 3, columns 6 and 7).
- Jordan is an influential outlier: omitting Jordan (Table 3, column 5) increases the absolute value of the remittance coefficient in the full sample.

### Instrumental variables (IV) estimation
- Instrument used: ratio of remittances to GDP of all other recipient countries (wrrow_i), excluding the country in question (text description).
- IV results (Table 3, column 8) confirm OLS: significant negative impact of remittances on output volatility.
- Magnitude: IV estimates are slightly larger in absolute value than OLS, consistent with some endogeneity bias in OLS.

### Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimation
- Data: panel of 70 countries, 1980–2004, averaged over five-year periods (1980–1984, 1985–1989, 1990–1994, 1995–1999, 2000–2004) (Table 4).
- Estimator: system GMM (Arellano-Bond extended with Blundell-Bond system) to address endogeneity and weak instruments.
- Panel results (Table 5 and Table 7):
  - GMM system estimates (full sample, excluding Jordan, and developing-country subsample) report remittances variable negative and statistically significant in all three regressions.
  - Table 5 GMM-SYS coefficient examples: Workers remittances to GDP = -0.17** (one reported specification).
  - Diagnostic tests: Hansen and Difference Sargan tests do not reject instrument validity; A-B test for AR(1) significant, AR(2) not significant (Table 5).
- Magnitude: GMM estimates of remittance effects are much larger in absolute value than OLS and within-group regressions (text and Table 5).

### Tests for nonlinear (threshold) effects
- Method: interact workers remittances-to-GDP with a dummy for remittance ratios greater than r* percent; search cutoff values in 0.5 percentage-point increments up to the sample maximum; optimal cutoff chosen by RSS under OLS/IV and by minimizing Hansen statistic under GMM system.
- Optimal cutoff found: 2 percent of GDP.
- OLS and IV nonlinear results (Table 6):
  - Workers remittances to GDP * dummy = 1 if wrgdp <= 2% (α): OLS α = -1.41**, OLS excluding Jordan α = -1.51**, IV α = -1.34** (standard errors reported in Table 6).
  - Workers remittances to GDP * dummy = 1 if wrgdp > 2% (β): OLS β = -0.21**, OLS excluding Jordan β = -0.35**, IV β = -0.20** (standard errors in Table 6).
  - F test α = β rejects equality (F test values reported; significance indicated as **).
- GMM nonlinear results (Table 7):
  - Workers remittances to GDP * dummy <= 2%: -1.43**, -1.59**, -1.45** across GMM specifications (standard errors in Table 7).
  - Workers remittances to GDP * dummy > 2%: -0.19**, -0.17**, -0.19* across GMM specifications (standard errors in Table 7).
- Interpretation: remittance inflows are stabilizing on average, but the stabilizing effect is much stronger at remittance-to-GDP ratios below 2 percent and weakens substantially once inflows exceed 2 percent of GDP.

### Application: Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
- MENA remittance context: for 1975–2004 remittance inflows exceeded 2 percent of GDP throughout the period; thus, the nonlinearity implies a lower contribution to volatility reduction relative to countries with lower remittance shares (text and Table 8).
- Recent large increases in remittances from high oil-price periods: Pakistan from 2 percent of GDP in 2001 to 4 percent of GDP in 2006; Egypt from 3 percent of GDP in 2001 to 5 percent of GDP in 2006 (text).
  - Applying relevant coefficient from Table 7 suggests the increase in remittances may have contributed to a reduction in growth volatility by about 0.4 percent for these countries in those years (text).
- Table 8: estimated impacts of remittances on volatility by region and five-year periods (1975–2004) — selected entries:
  - Developing Asia (2000–2004): -0.54
  - Industrial countries (2000–2004): -0.52
  - MENA (2000–2004): -0.86
  - Western Hemisphere (2000–2004): -0.88
  - (Full Table 8 entries preserved in source.)

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Remittances reduce output volatility on average, providing an insurance channel that can affect growth and welfare.
- Stability-enhancing effects are achieved quickly (at relatively low remittance-to-GDP ratios) and weaken beyond the ~2 percent threshold; therefore, very large remittance inflows do not imply proportionately larger macroeconomic stability gains.
- Policy recommendations for large remittance-recipient countries:
  - Strengthen macroeconomic resilience through complementary measures beyond reliance on remittances.
  - Use remittance resources to expand domestic fiscal capacity, for example via broader-based consumption taxation (an efficient VAT with limited exemptions is suggested) to capture remittance-financed consumption increases.
  - Allocate fiscal resources to boost human capital (health and education), alleviate infrastructure bottlenecks, and improve the business climate to maximize spillovers from remittances.
- In the context of potential global remittance declines (global economic turmoil):
  - Expect increased output volatility and adverse welfare effects in recipient countries.
  - The poorest households are likely to be hit hardest due to reliance on remittances for consumption and informal social insurance.
  - Policy responses are constrained: scaling up fiscal social insurance is challenging amid weaker export demand and constrained revenue/borrowing capacity.
  - Policy coordination with remittance-sending countries (fiscal or employment-support measures) could help mitigate declines in remittances and consequent social/financial impacts.

### Summary conclusions
- Cross-country OLS, IV, and dynamic panel GMM evidence consistently indicate a negative relationship between workers’ remittances and volatility of GDP growth.
- An increase in remittances-to-GDP generally reduces the standard deviation of GDP growth; quantitative magnitudes vary by estimator but the preferred OLS estimate with Jordan included implies a 0.16 reduction in the standard deviation per one percentage point increase in remittances-to-GDP.
- Nonlinear threshold effects are present: substantial stabilizing effects occur at remittance ratios below 2 percent of GDP and weaken markedly above that threshold.
- Policy-makers in large remittance-receiving countries should leverage remittance resources to strengthen macroeconomic resilience and social protection, recognizing that very large remittance inflows do not proportionately increase macro stability.

*Source: IMF working paper content provided in the supplied PDF content unit.*

### References

### References

### Remittances and migration
- Abdih, Yasser, Ralph Chami, Jihad Dagher, and Peter Montiel, 2008, “Remittances and Institutions: Are Remittances a Curse?” IMF Working Papers 08/29  (Washington: International Monetary Fund).  
- Cali, Massimiliano, Isabella Massa, and Dirk Wellem te Verde, 2008, “The Global Financial Crisis: Financial Flows Into Developing Countries Set to Fall by One Quarter,” Overseas Development Institute.  
- Chami, R., A. Barajas, T. Cosimano, C. Fullenkamp, M. Gapen, and P. Montiel 2008, “Macroeconomic Consequences of Remittances”, IMF Occasional Paper No 259 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).  
- Chami, R., T.F. Cosimano, and M.Gapen, 2006, “Beware of Emigrants Bearing Gifts: Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in the Presence of Remittances,” IMF Working Paper 06/61 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).  
- Chami, R., C. Fullenkamp, and S. Jahjah, 2003, "Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development?" IMF Working Papers 03/189 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).  
- Ratha, Dilip and Sanket Mohapatra, 2009, Migration and Development Brief, No. 9.  
- World Bank, 2006, Global Economic Prospects: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration (Washington: The World Bank).

### Macroeconomic volatility, growth, and policy
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson, and Yunyong Thaicharoen, 2003, “Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises, and Growth,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 50:1, pp. 49 – 123.  
- Bekaert, Geert, Campbell Harvey, and Christian Lundblad, 2006, “Growth Volatility and Financial Liberalization,” Journal of International Money and Finance, 25, pp. 370 – 403.  
- Caballero, Ricardo, 2000, “Macroeconomic Volatility in Latin America: A Conceptual Framework and Three Case Studies,” Economia, (Fall), pp. 31 – 107.  
- Easterly, William, Michael Kremer, and Lawrence H. Summers, 1993, “Good Policy or Good Luck? Country Growth Performance and Temporary Shocks,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 32, pp. 459 – 483.  
- Easterly, Williams, Roumeen Islam, and Joseph Stiglitz, 2000, “Explaining Growth Volatility,” World Bank, mimeo.  
- Fatás, Antonio, and Ilian Mihov, 2003, “The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 4, pp. 1419 – 48.  
- Furceri, Davide, and Georgios Karras, 2007, “Country Size and Business Cycle Volatility: Scale Really Matters,” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 21, pp. 424 – 434.  
- Hakura, Dalia, 2007, “Output Volatility and Large Output Drops in Emerging Market and Developing Countries,” IMF Working Paper 07/114 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).  
- Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq, 2005, “Determinants of Volatility and Implications for Economic Development,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 87, pp. 347 – 361.  
- Rodrik, Dani, 1998, “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 5, pp. 997 – 1032.

### Financial integration, globalization, and diversification
- Calderon, Cesar, Normal Loayza, and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2005, “Openness, Vulnerability, and Growth,” mimeo (April), (Washington: World Bank).  
- International Monetary Fund, 2005, World Economic Outlook, April 2005: Globalization and External Imbalances, World Economic and Financial Surveys (Washington).  
- Koren, Miklos, and Sylvia Tenreyro, 2004, “Diversification and Development,” mimeo.  
- Kose, M. Ayhan, Eswar Prasad, and Marco Terrones, 2003, “Financial Integration and Macroeconomic Volatility,” IMF Working Paper 03/50 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).  
- Kose, M. Ayhan, Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, and Shang-Jin Wei 2006, “Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal,” IMF Working Paper 06/189 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

*Content based on the "References" section of the source PDF.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/_wp0991.pdf_
