## 1. U.S. Bank Failures: Past and Present

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### Major findings on the 2007–2009 wave of banking crises
- Updated banking crisis database covers 1970–2009 with: an improved definition of systemic banking crisis, inclusion of crisis ending dates, and broader coverage of crisis management policies.
- Recent crises (2007–2009) exhibit larger economic costs on average than past crises:
  - Median output loss (deviation of actual output from trend): 25 percent of GDP in recent crises, compared to a historical median of 20 percent of GDP.
  - Median increase in public debt (over the three year period following the start of the crisis): 24 percent of GDP in recent crises, compared to a historical median of 16 percent of GDP.
  - Direct fiscal costs to support the financial sector were smaller in the recent crises: 5 percent of GDP, compared to 10 percent of GDP for past crises.
- Policy responses used the same containment and resolution tools as in past crises (liquidity support, guarantees, asset purchases, recapitalizations), but recapitalization measures were implemented more quickly — roughly concurrent with large-scale liquidity support rather than about one year later as in prior episodes.
- Extraordinary measures reduced real impact but increased public debt and fiscal contingent liabilities, raising fiscal sustainability concerns in several countries.

### Causes and propagation mechanisms
- Common origins and amplifiers:
  - Prolonged real estate price boom, pronounced in residential markets.
  - Financial innovation (asset securitization), government homeownership policies, global imbalances, expansionary monetary policy, and weak regulatory oversight.
  - Growth of the shadow banking system: assets moved off-balance sheet into special purpose vehicles funded in wholesale markets, increasing leverage and reliance on short-term funding.
  - Leverage cycles: rising home values reduced measured “value at risk,” enabling increased leverage at financial institutions and higher household borrowing.
  - Explosion of subprime mortgage credit in the United States starting in 2002, peaking around mid-2006.
- Key propagation channel:
  - Financial exposure to the United States: cross-border banking exposure to the US at end-2006 varied from less than 1 percent (Mexico) to 300 percent (Switzerland). Eight out of ten of the most exposed economies meet the systemic or borderline crisis definitions.

### Definition and identification of systemic banking crises (methodology and thresholds)
- A banking crisis is systemic if both conditions are met:
  1) Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (significant bank runs, losses, liquidations).
  2) Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses.
- Policy interventions are significant if at least three of the following six measures were used:
  1) extensive liquidity support (5 percent of deposits and liabilities to nonresidents)
  2) bank restructuring costs (at least 3 percent of GDP)
  3) significant bank nationalizations
  4) significant guarantees put in place
  5) significant asset purchases (at least 5 percent of GDP)
  6) deposit freezes and bank holidays
- Additional operational thresholds:
  - Liquidity support is extensive when the ratio of central bank claims on the financial sector to deposits and foreign liabilities exceeds 5 percent and more than doubles relative to its pre-crisis level. (For Euro-area countries, liquidity support is considered extensive if the increase in this ratio is at least 5 percentage points in a semester.)
  - Direct bank restructuring costs significant if exceeding 3 percent of GDP.
  - Asset purchases significant if exceeding 5 percent of GDP.
  - Significant nationalizations: government takeover or majority stake in systemically important financial institutions.
- Sufficient condition for systemic episode (alternative criteria):
  - Share of nonperforming loans above 20 percent or bank closures of at least 20 percent of banking system assets; or
  - Fiscal restructuring costs exceeding 5 percent of GDP.
- Crisis dating and duration:
  - Crisis start: first year both distress and significant interventions are observed.
  - Crisis end: year before two conditions hold—real GDP growth and real credit growth are positive for at least two consecutive years; if first two years already show positive growth in both, crisis ends same year it starts.
  - Crisis duration truncated at 5 years (beginning with the crisis year).
  - For the recent wave: United Kingdom and United States start year 2007; all other recent cases start in 2008.
  - As of end-2009, none of the recent crises had ended according to this definition.

### Classification of recent cases (2007–2009)
- Systemic cases (13): Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Germany; Iceland; Ireland; Latvia; Luxembourg; Mongolia; Netherlands; Ukraine; United Kingdom; United States.
- Borderline cases (10): France; Greece; Hungary; Kazakhstan; Portugal; Russia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland.
- Non-systemic and pre-emptive responses:
  - Many G-20 countries (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey) did not announce direct financial sector support involving fiscal outlays; some issued or increased guarantees (example: Mexico guarantee on commercial paper up to 50 billion pesos).

### Liquidity support, asset purchases, and guarantees
- Unconventional liquidity measures used more broadly with weaker collateral requirements, including expanded access to discount windows, widened collateral eligibility, purchases of asset-backed securities, and new facilities (examples: Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Facility, Bank of England’s Asset Purchase Facility).
- Median change from pre-crisis level to peak in the ratio of central bank claims against the financial sector to deposits and foreign liabilities: 5.5 percent. This is about half its median in past crisis episodes.
- Examples of country peaks:
  - Germany peak: 9.4 percent.
  - Luxembourg peak: 14.7 percent.
  - Russia peak (2009): 20 percent of deposits and foreign liabilities (liquidity support subsided quickly after reaching this peak).
  - Slovenia: largest increase in treasury-funded liquidity, close to 5 percent of deposits and foreign liabilities.
- Guarantees and asset purchases:
  - Guarantees widely used across crisis countries (exceptions: Ukraine; borderline cases: Kazakhstan, Sweden, Switzerland).
  - Asset guarantees less frequent historically but used in this episode (examples: Belgium, United Kingdom).
  - Germany’s Bad Bank Act (July 2009): allowed private banks to transfer illiquid assets and receive government-guaranteed bonds; direct fiscal costs just above 1 percent of GDP; total guarantees about 6 percent.

### Duration of liquidity support and monetary expansion
- Duration metric: months between peak of liquidity support and month when liquidity support declined to pre-crisis level.
  - Earlier crises: emergency liquidity support withdrawn within 14 months (median).
  - As of end-2009, only Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland had liquidity support returned to pre-crisis levels.
- Monetary expansion metric: change in the monetary base between its peak during the crisis and its level one year before the crisis, expressed in percentage points of GDP.
  - Median monetary expansion in recent crises: about 6 percent.
  - Historical median monetary expansion: about 1 percent.
  - Note: recent median similar to historical median among high-income countries.

### Recapitalizations: size, timing, and implementation
- About 70 percent of fiscal outlays correspond to public sector recapitalizations of financial institutions.
- Timing:
  - Median difference between time to implement public recapitalization programs and time when liquidity support became extensive:
    - Recent crises: zero months.
    - Past crises: 12 months.
- Notes:
  - Only “comprehensive” recapitalization packages using public funds were considered (ad hoc interventions excluded), biasing response-time estimate upward.
  - New crises with recapitalization programs targeting specific banks: Iceland (three largest banks), Luxembourg (Fortis and Dexia), Latvia (Parex). Iceland excluded from some calculations due to limited liquidity support data.

### Government ownership, divestment, and holding periods
- Governments acquire stakes as part of recapitalizations.
- Divestments (or repayments) on average start about one year from the start of the crisis.
- Government participation often exceeded initially envisioned holding periods; in many cases public sector retained participation for over 10 years.
  - Example: Japan — as of end-2008, over 30 percent of capital injected following the 1997 crisis remained to be sold.

### Bank failures, assistance, and loss rates
- Bank failures and assisted institutions were significant in the recent wave:
  - Iceland: failures/interventions represent about 90 percent of total banking assets.
  - Using a conservative failure definition excluding government assistance, largest shares follow: Belgium 53 percent, Kazakhstan 28 percent, United Kingdom 26 percent of system failing.
  - Greece and Belgium: banks that failed or received assistance represent 80 percent or more of banking system assets.
  - Banks receiving government assistance (fraction of total banking assets): Greece 80 percent; France about 70 percent; Ireland about 55 percent.
- United States:
  - With broader definition including assistance, recent wave unprecedented in available historical data since the 1930s: banks holding about one-quarter of the deposit market have failed or received some form of government assistance since 2007.
  - Excluding publicly assisted banks, year 1989 (U.S. savings and loan crisis) remains the worst on record with banks holding over 6% of the deposit market failing.
  - U.S. failure list excludes non-bank entities such as Fannie, Freddie Mac, and AIG even though they meet the broader definition of failure.
- Loss rates to the deposit insurance fund (U.S., data available starting in 1986):
  - Median loss rate on assets of failed banking institutions over examined period: 19 percent.
  - Median loss rates relatively stable and roughly the same during the recent crisis as compared to the savings and loan crisis.
  - Median loss rate peaked in 2008 at 28 percent.
  - Losses to the deposit insurer measured as percent of U.S. GDP: 0.12 percent of U.S. GDP in 2008, compared to the highest loss on record in 1989 of 0.97 percent of U.S. GDP.
  - Overall U.S. finding: failure rate and losses incurred by the government in closing failed banks similar to the 1980s crisis with a median loss rate in bank failures of about 20 percent of bank assets.

### Global re-organization of banking and top-30 market capitalization changes
- At end-2006 the top 30 banks worldwide had total stock market capitalization of about US$ 3.4 trillion, of which:
  - 40 percent belonged to U.S. banks,
  - 12 percent to U.K. banks,
  - 12 percent to Japanese banks.
- Between end-2006 and end-2009:
  - Twelve banks dropped from the top-30 list of 2006, with 3 banks being acquired by other institutions.
  - Overall loss in market capitalization of the top-30 banks between 2006 and 2009 was 52 percent.
  - Largest decline corresponds to Citigroup (excluding banks acquired by other institutions).
  - Country-level largest average decline: Netherlands (including Fortis), followed by Japan.
- As of end-2009:
  - Four countries entered the top-30 list for the first time: Australia, Brazil, China, and Sweden.
  - Netherlands and Belgium (listed together because of Fortis) dropped from the top-30 ranking.
  - The United States fell to only 5 banks in this list, together holding only 21 percent of the market capitalization of the world’s 30 largest banks in 2009 compared to 40 percent in 2006.
  - Banks from Brazil and China together were holding 16 percent of the total market capitalization of top-30 banks worldwide.
  - Australia and Canada largely escaped the US mortgage crisis and were “clear winners” in relative terms.
- Selected market capitalizations (exact values preserved):
  - Citigroup 2006: 286,337; 2009: 17,016
  - Bank of America 2006: 251,872; 2009: 68,660
  - Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 2006: 188,034; 2009: 53,052
  - HSBC Holdings 2006: 172,938; 2009: 199,785
  - JP Morgan Chase 2006: 172,109; 2009: 148,484
  - UBS 2006: 156,455; 2009: 50,242
  - Wachovia Corp 2006: 114,542; 2009: Failed
  - Total (2006): 3,377,767 1,633,871; Total (2009): 2,153,554

### Comparisons of crisis costs (medians and metrics)
- Crisis cost metrics: direct fiscal costs, output losses, increase in public sector debt relative to GDP.
- Summary medians (% of GDP) over 1970-2009 (values preserved exactly):
  - Old crises (1970-2006)
    - Advanced economies: Direct Fiscal Cost 3.7, Increase in Public Debt 36.2, Output Losses 32.9
    - Emerging markets: Direct Fiscal Cost 11.5, Increase in Public Debt 12.7, Output Losses 29.4
    - All: Direct Fiscal Cost 10.0, Increase in Public Debt 16.3, Output Losses 19.5
  - New crises (2007-2009)
    - Advanced economies: Direct Fiscal Cost 5.9, Increase in Public Debt 25.1, Output Losses 24.8
    - Other economies: Direct Fiscal Cost 4.8, Increase in Public Debt 23.9, Output Losses 4.7
    - All: Direct Fiscal Cost 4.9, Increase in Public Debt 23.9, Output Losses 24.5
- Key highlights:
  - Recent crises more costly in output losses and debt increases, but direct fiscal outlays lower than historical median.
  - Median direct fiscal costs for 2007-2009 systemic banking crises: almost 5 percent of GDP, about half historical median of 10 percent.
  - Median debt increase among recent crises: 24 percent of GDP, about 8 percentage points higher than historical median of 16 percent.
  - Median output losses for recent crises: 25 percent of GDP, almost 5 percentage points higher than historical median of 20 percent.
  - Notable outliers: Ireland and Latvia output losses over 100 percent of potential GDP; Iceland fiscal outlays among borderline cases at 13 percent of GDP.

### Policy patterns and interpretation
- Common pattern: containment phase (liquidity support and sometimes guarantees) followed by resolution phase (asset purchases, guarantees, capital injections).
- Distinctive features of 2007–2009 wave:
  - Concentration in advanced economies with large integrated financial systems.
  - Faster intervention and implementation of resolution policies; recapitalization policies implemented sooner, contributing to lower direct fiscal outlays.
  - Broader range of policy measures including unconventional monetary policy, asset purchases and guarantees, and significant fiscal stimulus packages.
- Interpretation of fiscal patterns:
  - Lower short-run direct fiscal costs reflect swift recapitalization, significant indirect support through expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, widespread guarantees, and direct asset purchases.
  - Indirect support and macroeconomic stabilization measures reduced real impact but raised public debt burdens and government contingent liabilities, raising fiscal sustainability concerns.
  - The difference between increase in public debt and direct fiscal costs is positively correlated (about 0.4) with an economy’s level of income; this difference reflects discretionary fiscal policy, automatic stabilizers, and broader measures to support the real sector.
- Caution: crisis still ongoing in several countries as of data cutoff; ultimate impacts may need reassessment.

*Source: _wp10146 (IMF staff analysis, tables and figures as provided).*

### 1. U.S. Bank Failures: Past and Present ................................................................................

### 1. U.S. Bank Failures: Past and Present

### Chapter components (Tables)
- Table 1. Systemic Banking Crises, 2007-2009................................................................9
- Table 2. Banking Crisis Start and End Dates................................................................11
- Table 3. Market Capitalization of Top 30 Banks Worldwide, by Nationality..........................21
- Table 4. Summary of the Cost of Banking Crises..............................................................22
- Table A.1. Systemic Banking Crises Policy Responses....................................................30
- Table A.2. Preemptive Responses in Selected G-20 Countries........................................................32
- Table A.3. Direct Fiscal Outlays, Recoveries to Date, and Asset Guarantees..............................33
- Table A.4. Top 30 Banks in the World By Market Capitalization........................................35

### Chapter components (Figures)
- Figure 1. Foreign Claims by Nationality of Reporting Banks.............................................13
- Figure 2. Emergency Central Bank Liquidity Support......................................................14
- Figure 3. Monetary Expansion...................................................................................16
- Figure 4. Timing of Recapitalization Policies.................................................................17
- Figure 5. Bank Failures and Interventions in Selected Countries...........................................18
- Figure 6. U.S. Bank Failures: Fraction of Failed Banks......................................................19
- Figure 7. U.S. Bank Failures: Market Share of Failed Banks...............................................19

*Source: _wp10146 - 1. U.S. Bank Failures: Past and Present (IMF PDF).*

### 8. U.S. Bank Failures: Loss Rates on Assets of Failed Banks.......................................20

### 8. U.S. Bank Failures: Loss Rates on Assets of Failed Banks

### Major findings on the 2007–2009 wave of banking crises
- The updated banking crisis database covers 1970–2009 and improves on previous work by: an improved definition of systemic banking crisis, inclusion of crisis ending dates, and broader coverage of crisis management policies.  
- Recent crises (2007–2009) exhibit larger economic costs on average than past crises:
  - Median output loss (deviation of actual output from trend): 25 percent of GDP in recent crises, compared to a historical median of 20 percent of GDP.
  - Median increase in public debt (over the three year period following the start of the crisis): 24 percent of GDP in recent crises, compared to a historical median of 16 percent of GDP.
  - Direct fiscal costs to support the financial sector were smaller in the recent crises: 5 percent of GDP, compared to 10 percent of GDP for past crises.
- Policy responses in 2007–2009 used the same types of containment and resolution tools as in past crises (liquidity support, guarantees, asset purchases, recapitalizations), but recapitalization measures were implemented more quickly this time — roughly concurrent with large-scale liquidity support rather than about one year later as in prior episodes.
- While extraordinary measures reduced real impact, they increased public debt and fiscal contingent liabilities, raising fiscal sustainability concerns in several countries.

### Causes and propagation mechanisms highlighted
- Common origins and amplifiers:
  - Prolonged real estate price boom, pronounced in residential markets.
  - Financial innovation (asset securitization), government homeownership policies, global imbalances, expansionary monetary policy, and weak regulatory oversight.
  - Growth of the shadow banking system: assets moved off-balance sheet into special purpose vehicles funded in wholesale markets, increasing leverage and reliance on short-term funding.
  - Leverage cycles: rising home values reduced measured “value at risk,” enabling increased leverage at financial institutions and higher household borrowing.
  - Explosion of subprime mortgage credit in the United States starting in 2002, peaking around mid-2006.
- Key propagation channel: financial exposure to the United States. Cross-border banking exposure to the US at end-2006 varied from less than 1 percent (Mexico) to 300 percent (Switzerland). Eight out of ten of the most exposed economies meet the systemic or borderline crisis definitions.

### Definition and identification of systemic banking crises (methodology and thresholds)
- A banking crisis is considered systemic if both conditions are met:
  1) Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (significant bank runs, losses, liquidations).
  2) Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses.
- Policy interventions are considered significant if at least three of the following six measures were used:
  1) extensive liquidity support (5 percent of deposits and liabilities to nonresidents)
  2) bank restructuring costs (at least 3 percent of GDP)
  3) significant bank nationalizations
  4) significant guarantees put in place
  5) significant asset purchases (at least 5 percent of GDP)
  6) deposit freezes and bank holidays
- Additional operational definitions and thresholds:
  - Liquidity support is extensive when the ratio of central bank claims on the financial sector to deposits and foreign liabilities exceeds 5 percent and more than doubles relative to its pre-crisis level. (For Euro-area countries, liquidity support is considered extensive if the increase in this ratio is at least 5 percentage points in a semester.)
  - Direct bank restructuring costs: gross fiscal outlays directed to restructuring the financial sector (recapitalization), excluding asset purchases and direct liquidity assistance from the treasury; significant if exceeding 3 percent of GDP.
  - Asset purchases considered significant if exceeding 5 percent of GDP.
  - Significant guarantees: full protection of liabilities or guarantees extended to non-deposit liabilities of banks (quantitative threshold not specified, but always significant relative to economy size in cases considered).
  - Significant nationalizations: government takeover or majority stake in systemically important financial institutions.
- Sufficient condition for systemic episode (alternative criteria):
  - Share of nonperforming loans above 20 percent or bank closures of at least 20 percent of banking system assets; or
  - Fiscal restructuring costs exceeding 5 percent of GDP.
- Crisis start and end dating:
  - The first year both distress and significant interventions are observed is the crisis starting year.
  - The end of a crisis is defined as the year before two conditions hold: real GDP growth and real credit growth are positive for at least two consecutive years. If the first two years already show positive growth in both, the crisis is dated to end the same year it starts.
  - Crisis duration is truncated at 5 years (beginning with the crisis year).
  - For the recent wave, the United Kingdom and the United States have start year 2007; all other recent cases start in 2008.
  - As of end-2009, none of the recent crises had ended according to this definition.
- Quantitative caution: thresholds are arbitrary; an additional “borderline cases” list includes countries that almost met the systemic definition.

### Classification of recent cases (2007–2009)
- Systemic cases (13): Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Germany; Iceland; Ireland; Latvia; Luxembourg; Mongolia; Netherlands; Ukraine; United Kingdom; United States.
- Borderline cases (10): France; Greece; Hungary; Kazakhstan; Portugal; Russia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland.
- Most policy packages in non-systemic countries were pre-emptive; many G-20 countries (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey) did not announce direct financial sector support involving fiscal outlays, though some issued or increased guarantees (example: Mexico guarantee on commercial paper up to 50 billion pesos).

### Liquidity support and fiscal measures in the recent crises
- Liquidity support:
  - Unconventional liquidity measures were used more broadly and with weaker collateral requirements, including expanded access to discount windows, widened collateral eligibility, purchases of asset-backed securities, and new facilities (e.g., Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Facility, Bank of England’s Asset Purchase Facility).
  - Median change from pre-crisis level to peak in the ratio of central bank claims against the financial sector to deposits and foreign liabilities: 5.5 percent. This is about half its median in past crisis episodes.
  - Examples: Germany and Luxembourg reached peaks of 9.4 and 14.7 percent respectively (increments appear small relative to high pre-crisis levels due to large pre-crisis balances).
  - Liquidity provided directly by the treasury: Slovenia shows the largest increase in treasury-funded liquidity, amounting to close to 5 percent of deposits and foreign liabilities. Government deposits at Parex Bank in Latvia were an important source of liquidity for that bank.
- Asset purchases and guarantees:
  - Asset purchases and guarantees were widely used; asset purchases also provide liquidity and are counted in total liquidity injected.
  - Examples of schemes included the UK Special Liquidity Scheme (185 bn pounds sterling) and Norway’s Bond Exchange Scheme (230 bn kronas) as noted in the underlying dataset discussion.
- Timing of recapitalization:
  - Recapitalization measures were implemented around the same time liquidity support became extensive, differing from previous crises where recapitalizations typically came about one year after extensive liquidity support.

### Additional methodological and data notes
- Output losses are computed as the cumulative difference between actual and trend real GDP, expressed as a percentage of trend real GDP for the period [T, T+3] where T is the starting year of the crisis. Trend real GDP is computed by applying an HP filter (λ=100) to the GDP series over [T-20, T-1].
- Credit series and GDP sources used in dating end dates: bank credit to the private sector (IFS line 22d) and CPI and GDP from WEO; when credit data are unavailable, end dates are based on GDP growth alone.
- Historical median comparisons sometimes focus on high-income previous episodes because most recent crises occurred in high-income economies; only 5 historical (pre-2007) crisis episodes in the sample are among high-income countries.

*Source: Authors’ calculations.*

### 2009. In Russia, liquidity support subsided quickly after reaching a peak of 20 percent of

### _wp10146 - 2009. In Russia, liquidity support subsided quickly after reaching a peak of 20 percent of

### Liquidity support and guarantees
- Russia: liquidity support subsided quickly after reaching a peak of 20 percent of deposits and foreign liabilities in 2009.
- Guarantees on bank liabilities were widely used across crisis countries (exceptions noted: Ukraine; borderline cases: Kazakhstan, Sweden, and Switzerland).
- Coverage of guarantees varied widely across countries.
- Asset guarantees were less frequent historically but were used in some cases during this episode (examples cited: Belgium, United Kingdom).
- Germany’s Bad Bank Act (July 2009) allowed private banks to transfer illiquid assets to a special entity and receive government-guaranteed bonds in exchange.
  - Direct fiscal costs for Germany: just above 1 percent of GDP.
  - Total guarantees for Germany (including Bad Bank and financial institutions debt): about 6 percent.

### Duration of liquidity support and crisis length
- Measure used: number of months between peak of liquidity support and the month when liquidity support declined to its pre-crisis level.
- Earlier crises: emergency liquidity support was withdrawn within 14 months (median).
- As of end-2009, only Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland had liquidity support returned to pre-crisis levels, indicating prolonged liquidity issues in recent crises.

### Monetary expansion
- Metric: change in the monetary base between its peak during the crisis and its level one year before the crisis, expressed in percentage points of GDP.
- Median monetary expansion in recent crises: about 6 percent.
- Historical median monetary expansion: about 1 percent.
- Note: the recent median is not that different from the historical median among high-income countries; larger financial systems and credibility of monetary policy in high-income economies may explain the difference.
- Data on reserve money source: IFS. For Euro-area countries, reserve money corresponds to the aggregation of currency issued and liabilities to depository corporations, divided by Euro area GDP.

### Recapitalizations: size, timing, and implementation
- About 70 percent of fiscal outlays correspond to public sector recapitalizations of financial institutions.
- Bank recapitalizations were implemented much faster in recent crises than in past crises.
  - Median difference between time to implement public recapitalization programs and time when liquidity support became extensive (liquidity support exceeded 5 percent):
    - Recent crises: zero months.
    - Past crises: 12 months.
- Observations:
  - Addressing solvency problems with public money often requires political consensus and legislation, making it complex and lengthy.
  - Policymakers often prolonged use of liquidity support and guarantees in hopes banking sector problems would subside.
  - In this episode, policymakers acted relatively quickly in some countries.
- Notes on measurement: only “comprehensive” recapitalization packages using public funds were considered (ad hoc interventions excluded), which biases the response-time estimate upward.
  - New crises with recapitalization programs targeting specific banks: Iceland (three largest banks), Luxembourg (Fortis and Dexia), Latvia (Parex). Iceland excluded from some calculations due to limited liquidity support data.

### Government ownership, divestment, and holding periods
- Governments typically acquire stakes in the banking sector as part of recapitalizations.
- Divestments (or repayments) on average start about one year from the start of the crisis.
- Government participation often exceeded initially envisioned holding periods; in many cases the public sector retained participation for over 10 years.
  - Example: Japan — as of end-2008, over 30 percent of capital injected in financial institutions following the crisis in 1997 remained to be sold.
- Divestment methods: by tender, sales of entire institutions to foreign investors or large domestic banks, or gradual sales through markets.

### Bank failures and government-assisted interventions
- Bank failures (broadly defined to include institutions that received government assistance) were significant in the recent wave of crises.
- Iceland:
  - Bank failures/interventions represent about 90 percent of total banking assets (largest by far).
  - Using a more conservative failure definition that excludes government assistance, Iceland is followed by Belgium, Kazakhstan, and the United Kingdom with banks representing 53 percent, 28 percent, and 26 percent, respectively, of the system failing.
- Greece and Belgium:
  - Banks that failed or received government assistance represent 80 percent or more of banking system assets in each of these countries.
- Banks receiving government assistance (as a fraction of total banking assets):
  - Greece: 80 percent.
  - France: about 70 percent.
  - Ireland: about 55 percent.
- United States:
  - With broader definition including assistance, recent wave is unprecedented in available historical data since the 1930s: banks holding about one-quarter of the deposit market have failed or received some form of government assistance since 2007.
  - Excluding publicly assisted banks, year 1989 (U.S. savings and loan crisis) remains the worst on record with banks holding over 6% of the deposit market failing.
  - Note: the U.S. failure list excludes non-bank entities such as Fannie, Freddie Mac, and AIG even though they meet the broader definition of failure, potentially underestimating financial distress.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/_wp10146.pdf*

### Box 1. U.S. Bank Failures: Past and Present

### Box 1. U.S. Bank Failures: Past and Present

### Historical waves and frequency
- U.S. bank failures since the 1930s have come in three waves: the Great Depression era of the 1930s, the savings and loans crisis of the 1980s, and the recent mortgage crisis of the late 2000s.
- Number of bank failures peaked in the years 1937, 1989, and 2009, respectively.
- 2005 and 2006 were the only two years since 1934 that reported no bank failures.
- Over the period 1934 to 2010 (2010 includes data up to April), figures include all failures and assistance transactions across 50 U.S. states and Washington DC, as percent of total number of institutions. Source: FDIC.

### Scale and market share of failed institutions
- Consolidation following financial deregulation starting in the 1980s led to substantial growth in average U.S. bank size; after accounting for this, recent failures look larger by market share.
- Failed U.S. banks during the current crisis hold about 26 percent of the deposit market when including banks that did not fail but received government assistance (e.g., Citigroup and Bank of America).
- Using the definition that includes assisted institutions, 2009 is by far the worst on record in terms of deposit market share of failed/assisted institutions.
- When excluding banks that received public assistance, the year 1989 is the worst year on record.

### Loss rates to the deposit insurance fund
- Median loss rate to the deposit insurance fund on assets of failed banking institutions over the examined period (data available starting in 1986) is 19 percent.
- Median loss rates are relatively stable and roughly the same during the recent crisis as compared to the savings and loan crisis.
- The median loss rate peaked in 2008 at 28 percent.
- In terms of losses to the deposit insurer measured as percent of U.S. GDP: losses were 0.12 percent of U.S. GDP in 2008, compared to the highest loss on record in 1989 of 0.97 percent of U.S. GDP.
- Overall finding for the United States in this crisis: the failure rate of banks and losses incurred by the government in closing failed banks is similar compared to the U.S. banking crisis of the 1980’s with a median loss rate in bank failures of about 20 percent of bank assets.

### Global re-organization of banking and top-30 market capitalization changes
- Bank failures and crisis dynamics led to a re-organization of the global financial map, with large players becoming significantly smaller and opening space for new players, particularly from emerging markets.
- At end-2006 the top 30 banks worldwide had a total stock market capitalization of about US$ 3.4 trillion, of which:
  - 40 percent belonged to U.S. banks,
  - 12 percent to U.K. banks,
  - 12 percent to Japanese banks.
- Countries with a systemic banking crisis in 2007-2009 dominated the banking arena in 2006 with a share of close to 60 percent of the total.
- Between end-2006 and end-2009:
  - Twelve banks dropped from the top-30 list of 2006, with 3 banks being acquired by other institutions.
  - The overall loss in market capitalization of the top-30 banks between 2006 and 2009 was 52 percent (this figure already includes a significant stock market recovery during 2009).
  - The largest decline in market capitalization corresponds to Citigroup (excluding banks acquired by other institutions).
  - At the country level, the Netherlands (including Fortis) experienced the largest average decline, followed by Japan.
- As of end-2009:
  - Four countries entered the top-30 list for the first time: Australia, Brazil, China, and Sweden.
  - Netherlands and Belgium (listed together because of Fortis) dropped from the top-30 ranking.
  - The United States fell to only 5 banks in this list, together holding only 21 percent of the market capitalization of the world’s 30 largest banks in 2009 compared to 40 percent in 2006.
  - Banks from Brazil and China together were holding 16 percent of the total market capitalization of top-30 banks worldwide.
  - Australia and Canada were clear winners whose large banks mostly escaped the US mortgage crisis.

### Comparisons of crisis costs (metrics and medians)
- The study estimates crisis cost using three metrics: direct fiscal costs, output losses, and increase in public sector debt relative to GDP.
  - Direct fiscal costs include fiscal outlays committed to the financial sector from the start of the crisis up to end-2009.
  - Output losses are computed as deviations of actual GDP from its trend over the four-year period beginning with the crisis year.
  - Increase in public debt is measured as the change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio over the four-year period beginning with the crisis year.
- Summary medians (% of GDP) over 1970-2009:
  - Old crises (1970-2006)
    - Advanced economies: Direct Fiscal Cost 3.7, Increase in Public Debt 36.2, Output Losses 32.9
    - Emerging markets: Direct Fiscal Cost 11.5, Increase in Public Debt 12.7, Output Losses 29.4
    - All: Direct Fiscal Cost 10.0, Increase in Public Debt 16.3, Output Losses 19.5
  - New crises (2007-2009)
    - Advanced economies: Direct Fiscal Cost 5.9, Increase in Public Debt 25.1, Output Losses 24.8
    - Other economies: Direct Fiscal Cost 4.8, Increase in Public Debt 23.9, Output Losses 4.7
    - All: Direct Fiscal Cost 4.9, Increase in Public Debt 23.9, Output Losses 24.5
- Key cost comparisons and highlights:
  - The recent crises are overall more costly in terms of output losses and increases in debt, but less so in terms of direct fiscal outlays compared to the average crisis of the past.
  - Limiting comparison to high-income countries: output losses are similar to the past, increases in public debt somewhat lower, but direct fiscal outlays higher.
  - The median direct fiscal costs associated with financial sector restructuring for the 2007-2009 systemic banking crises amounts to almost 5 percent of GDP, about half its historical median of 10 percent.
  - Iceland shows the highest fiscal outlays among borderline cases at 13 percent of GDP.
  - The median debt increase among recent crises is 24 percent of GDP, about 8 percentage points higher than its historical median of 16 percent.
  - Median output losses for the recent crises are estimated at 25 percent of GDP, almost 5 percentage points higher than the historical median of 20 percent.
  - Output losses vary widely; Ireland and Latvia stand out at over 100 percent of potential GDP. Losses among borderline cases notable for Hungary, Portugal, and Spain.
- Measurement notes:
  - Output losses are cumulative percent difference between actual and trend real GDP over the 4-year period starting with the crisis year; trend GDP is computed applying an HP filter to the real GDP series over the 20-year period prior to the crisis. For new crises, spring 2010 WEO projections are used for post-crisis GDP.
  - Increase in public debt for 2007-2009 crises uses fall WEO debt projections from the year before the crisis as pre-crisis debt figures and Spring WEO 2010 debt projections for post-crisis figures.

### Policy measures, patterns, and interpretation
- Commonalities across crises:
  - All crises share a containment phase (liquidity support and sometimes guarantees on bank liabilities) followed by a resolution phase (restructuring measures such as asset purchases, guarantees, capital injections to encourage bank lending).
  - These common patterns echo earlier findings summarized in Honohan and Laeven (2005) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
- Distinctive features of the recent wave (2007-2009):
  - Concentration in advanced economies, particularly those with large and integrated financial systems, unlike many past episodes which centered on emerging markets.
  - Speed of intervention and implementation of resolution policies was faster than in past crises, partly because most affected countries are high-income with strong institutions; recapitalization policies were implemented much sooner, contributing to lower direct fiscal outlays.
  - Use of a broader range of policy measures compared to past episodes, including unconventional monetary policy measures, asset purchases and guarantees, and significant fiscal stimulus packages.
  - Preliminary estimates indicate the recent crises are higher in overall economic costs (output losses and increases in public debt) compared to past crises, though fiscal costs associated with direct financial sector interventions are lower.
- Interpretation of fiscal patterns:
  - Lower short-run direct fiscal costs reflect swift recapitalization measures and significant indirect support through expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, widespread guarantees on liabilities, and direct asset purchases that sustained asset prices.
  - Indirect support and macroeconomic stabilization measures reduced the real impact of the crises and lifted the burden on traditional crisis management policies, keeping direct fiscal costs lower than they otherwise would have been.
  - Over the medium term, indirect support measures significantly increased public debt burdens and government contingent liabilities, raising concerns about fiscal sustainability in a number of countries.
  - The difference between increase in public debt and direct fiscal costs is positively correlated (about 0.4) with an economy’s level of income; this difference reflects discretionary fiscal policy, automatic stabilizers, and broader measures to support the real sector.
- Caution:
  - The crisis was still ongoing in several countries as of the data cutoff; ultimate impacts may need reassessment and it may be premature to declare recent crisis management as more successful than past efforts.

*Source: IMF staff analysis based on FDIC, Bankscope, Laeven and Valencia (2008), WEO, and authors’ calculations (content as provided).*

### References

### _wp10146 - References

### Key bibliographic references
- Acharya, Viral, and Matthew Richardson, 2009, Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System, John Wiley and Sons Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey.
- Adrian, Tobias, and Hyun Shin, 2008, “Financial Intermediaries, Financial Stability, and Monetary Policy,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 346.
- Blanchard, Olivier J., Carlo Cottarelli, and José Viñals, 2010, “Exiting from Crisis Intervention Policies,” IMF Policy Paper SM/10/10, Washington, DC.
- Brunnermeier, Markus, 2009, “Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 23, pp. 77–100.
- Caprio, Gerard, Daniela Klingebiel, Luc Laeven, and Guillermo Noguera, 2005, “Banking Crisis Database,” in Patrick Honohan and Luc Laeven (eds.), Systemic Financial Crises: Containment and Resolution. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- Cheasty, Adrienne, and Udaibir Das, 2009, “Crisis-Related Measures in the Financial System and Sovereign Balance Sheet Risks,” IMF Policy Paper SM/09/91, Washington, DC.
- Claessens, Stijn, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan, and Luc Laeven, 2010, “Cross-Country Experiences and Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis,” Economic Policy, Vol. 62, pp. 267–93.
- Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni, Luc Laeven, and Deniz Igan, 2008, “Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market,” IMF Working Paper 08/106, Washington, DC.
- Gorton, Gary, 2008, “The Panic of 2007,” NBER Working Paper No. 14358.
- Honohan, Patrick, and Luc Laeven (eds.), 2005, Systemic Financial Crises: Containment and Resolution. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- Keys, Benjamin, Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig, 2010, “Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence From Subprime Loans,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 125, pp. 307–62.
- Laeven, Luc, and Fabian Valencia, 2008, “Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database,” IMF Working Paper No. 08/224, Washington, DC.
- Mian, Atif, and Amir Sufi, 2009, “House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and the U.S. Household Leverage Crisis,” American Economic Review, forthcoming.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff, 2009, “Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products of Common Causes,” Unpublished manuscript.
- Taylor, John, 2009, Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis, Hoover Press.
- Reinhart, Carmen, and Kenneth Rogoff, 2009, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press.

### Table A.1 — Systemic Banking Crises Policy Responses (2007–2009)
- Columns: Liquidity (percentage points increase in central bank claims on financial institutions over deposits and foreign liabilities), Gross Restructuring Costs (recapitalization and other restructuring costs, excluding liquidity and asset purchases, in percent of GDP), Asset Purchases and Guarantees (funded by treasury and central bank, in percent of GDP), Guarantees on Liabilities, Nationalizations (year in brackets).
- Selected country entries (values preserved exactly as in source):
  - Austria: Liquidity 8.2; Gross Restructuring Costs 2.1; Guarantees: 0.6; Unlimited coverage to depositors. Bank and non-bank bond issues. Hypo Group Alpe Adria (2009)
  - Belgium: Liquidity 14.0; Gross Restructuring Costs 5.0; Guarantees: 7.7; DI raised from €20,000 to €100,000. Deposit-like insurance instruments. Interbank loans and short-term debt Specific guarantees on Dexia Fortis (2008)
  - Denmark: Liquidity 10.5; Gross Restructuring Costs 2.8; Deposits and unsecured claims of PCA banks Fionia Bank (2009)
  - Germany: Liquidity 2.8; Gross Restructuring Costs 1.2; Purchases: 0.2; Unlimited coverage of household deposits. Interbank loans and bank debt (capped at €400 billion). Hypo Real Estate (2008)
  - Iceland: Liquidity 2.4; Gross Restructuring Costs 13.0; Unlimited coverage to domestic deposits. Kaupthing, Landsbanki, Glitnir, Straumur-Burdaras, SPRON and Sparisjódabankinn (all 2008)
  - Ireland: Liquidity 13.3; Gross Restructuring Costs 7.6; Unlimited coverage until 9/29/10 to most liabilities of 10 banks. Anglo Irish Bank (2009)
  - Latvia: Liquidity 3.3; Gross Restructuring Costs 2.5; DI raised to €50,000. Guarantee on Parex syndicated loans Parex Bank (2008)
  - Luxembourg: Liquidity 4.3; Gross Restructuring Costs 7.7; DI raised from €20,000 to €100,000. €4.5 billion guarantee on Dexia’s debt. Fortis and Dexia’s subsidiaries (2008)
  - Mongolia: Liquidity 9.4; Gross Restructuring Costs 3.0; Unlimited coverage to all deposits. Zoos Bank (2009)
  - Netherlands: Liquidity 3.3; Gross Restructuring Costs 6.5; Guarantees: 3.3; DI raised to €100,000. Interbank loans of solvent banks. Fortis bonds (€5 bn) and ING bonds (€10 bn). ABN-AMRO/Fortis (2008)
  - Ukraine: Liquidity 14.6; Gross Restructuring Costs 4.8; DI raised from UAH 50,000 to 150,000 until 1/1/11. Prominvest (2008), Nadra, Inprom, Volodimrski, Dialog, Rodovid, Kiev, Ukrgaz (all 2009)
  - United Kingdom: Liquidity 5.5; Gross Restructuring Costs 5.1; Purchases: 13.4 Guarantees: 14.5; DI raised from ￡35,000 to 50,000. Guarantee on short- to medium-term debt (capped at ￡250 billion). Blanket guarantee on Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley wholesale deposits. Northern Rock (2008); RBS (2008).
  - United States: Liquidity 4.6; Gross Restructuring Costs 3.5; Purchases: 9.0; DI raised from $100,000 to $250,000 (until end-2009). Money market funds (capped at 50 billion). Full guarantee on transaction deposits. Newly issued senior unsecured debt. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG (all 2008).
- Borderline cases (selected):
  - France: Liquidity 6.4; DI already higher than EU new limit. €360 billion in guarantees for refinancing credit institutions. €55 billions Dexia’s debt
  - Greece: Liquidity 18.3; Gross Restructuring Costs 1.7; DI raised from €20,000 to €100,000. Funding guarantees up to €15 billion.
  - Hungary: Liquidity 1.3; Gross Restructuring Costs 0.1; Unlimited protection to depositors of small banks.
  - Russia: Liquidity 22.2; Gross Restructuring Costs 1.0; DI raised from R400,000 to R700,000. Interbank lending for qualifying banks.
  - Sweden: Liquidity 13.1; Gross Restructuring Costs 0.7; DI raised from SEK 250,000 to SEK 500,000. Medium-term debt of banks and mortgage institutions (up to SEK 1.5 trillion).
  - Switzerland: Liquidity 2.8; Gross Restructuring Costs 1.1; Purchases: 6.7; DI raised from SFr 30,000 to SFr 100,000 until 12/31/11.

Source: IMF Staff Reports, Mayer Brown, Official websites, and IFS (as listed in the table).

### Table A.2 — Preemptive Crisis Responses in Selected G-20 Countries (2007–2009)
- Columns: Liquidity (Percentage points increase in central bank claims on financial institutions over deposits and foreign liabilities, relative to pre-crisis level), Gross Restructuring Costs (recapitalization and other restructuring costs, excluding liquidity and asset purchases, in percent of GDP), Asset Purchases and Guarantees (Funded by treasury and central bank, in percent of GDP), Guarantees on Liabilities, Nationalizations.
- Selected country entries (values preserved exactly as in source):
  - Australia: Liquidity n/a; Unlimited coverage to deposits (if above 1 million, only those with maturity<5 years).
  - Canada: Liquidity 1.8; Purchases: 4.4; Temporary insurance on the wholesale term borrowing of deposit-taking institutions. Increased deposit insurance in some provinces.
  - Italy: Liquidity 2.5; Gross Restructuring Costs 0.8
  - Japan: Liquidity 1.1; Gross Restructuring Costs <0.1; Purchases: 1.1 Guarantees: 2.6 (SME’s)
  - Korea: Liquidity 2.1; Gross Restructuring Costs 0.8; Purchases: <0.1 Guarantees: 1.8 (SME’s). Payment guarantees to Korean banks' external debt ($100 billion cap).

Source: IMF Staff Reports, Mayer Brown, Official websites, and IFS.

### Table A.3 — Direct Fiscal Outlays, Recoveries to Date, and Asset Guarantees (2007–2009)
- Notes and selected country fiscal entries (values preserved exactly):
  - Austria: Capital Injection Program Recapitalizations 2.1; Asset Purchases impaired assets and liquidity 2.0; Total Fiscal Outlays 4.1; Asset guarantee program 0.6
  - Belgium: Recapitalization Ethias, Fortis, KBC, and Dexia 4.7; Other Capital for Fortis SPV 0.2; Total Fiscal Outlays 5.0; Asset Guarantees: Asset relief facility 6.0; Fortis SPV 1.3; Fortis portfolio 0.4; Total Asset Guarantees 7.7
  - Denmark: Capital Assistance Program 2.7; Capital injection in Fionia Bank 0.1; Loan to Fionia Bank 0.3; Total Fiscal Outlays 3.1
  - France: Recapitalization SPPE acquisition of subordinated bonds 0.5; Second stage recapitalization (BNP, SG, Dexia) 0.5; Total Fiscal Outlays 1.0; Asset Guarantees Financial Security Assurance Inc. 0.3
  - Germany: Capital Injection Program 1.2; Asset purchase program 0.2; Total Fiscal Outlays 1.4; Asset Guarantees Bad Bank Act 6.1
  - Greece: Capital injection package 1.7; Liquidity 1.9; Total Fiscal Outlays 3.6
  - Iceland: Recapitalization Landsbanki, Kaupthing, and Islandsbanki 13.0
  - Ireland: Recapitalization Bank of Ireland, Allied Irish Bank, and Anglo Irish 7.6
  - Kazakhstan: Recapitalization BTA, Halyk, Alliance, and KKB 2.4; Other Liquidity through deposits of the development agency 1.3; Total Fiscal Outlays 3.8
  - Latvia: Recapitalization Parex and MLBN 2.5; Other Liquidity 2.5; Total Fiscal Outlays 4.9
  - Luxembourg: Recapitalization Fortis and Dexia 7.7
  - Netherlands: Recapitalization Fortis, ING, SNS, and AEGON 6.5; Other Loans to Icesave and Icelandic Deposit Insurance 0.2; Loan to Fortis 5.9; Total Fiscal Outlays 12.7 (presented also as 5.9 6.8 in the table formatting)
    - Asset Guarantees: ABN AMRO/Fortis Mortgage portfolio 6.0; ING Alt-A RMBS portfolio 4.8; Total Asset Guarantees 10.8
  - Portugal: Recapitalization 0 0 (as printed)
  - Russia: State Mortgage Agency, VTB, Rosselhozbank, Rosagroleasing, VEB 1.0; Subordinated loans from VEB 0.9; Liquidity through government deposits in commercial banks 0.4; Total Fiscal Outlays 2.3
  - Slovenia: Liquidity Public sector deposits in banks (proceed from bond issue) 2.8
  - Spain: Purchase of high-quality securities from credit institutions 1.8
  - Sweden: Recapitalization package 0.2; Initial contribution to stabilization fund 0.5; Total Fiscal Outlays 0.7
  - Switzerland: Mandatory convertible notes UBS 1.1 1.5-0.4 (as printed)
  - Ukraine: Public Recapitalization program 4.8
  - United Kingdom: Recapitalization RBS, Lloyds, LBG, and Northern Rock 5.0; Dunfermline Building Society takeover 0.1; Deposit compensation 1.8; Loans to Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley 1.9; Total Fiscal Outlays 8.7 1.0 7.7 (values as printed); Asset Guarantees Pool of RBS assets and CoCo's 14.5
  - United States: Capital Purchase Program (CPP) Recapitalization 1.4; AIG 0.5; Targeted Investment Program 0.3; Support to GMAC 0.1; Support to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 0.8; Other Home Affordable Modification Program 0.2; Credit Union Homeowners Affordability Relief Program 0.1; Asset Purchases MBS purchase 1.4; Public-Private Investment Program 0.2; Total Fiscal Outlays 4.9 0. 64.3 (values as printed)
- Notes in table:
  - 1/ It includes repayments up to end-2009 of capital support as well as interest and fees generated from loans and guarantee programs for the cases where the data was available.
  - 2/ Includes total guarantees issued by the Stabilization Fund, which includes items related to the Bad Bank Act as well as debt issued by financial institutions.
  - 3/ In our baseline case we do not include the increase in debt that would result from the Icesave crisis as part of the fiscal costs. Most disbursements took place at end-2008 and the first half of 2009, so we use 2009 nominal GDP (from WEO) to express the figures as percentage points of GDP.
- Source: IMF staff reports, official websites, and Mayer Brown.

### Table A.4 — Top 30 Banks in the World by Market Capitalization (end of year 2006 and 2009)
- Columns: Rank (2006 and 2009), Bank name, Country, Market Capitalization (millions of US$) for 2006 and 2009.
- Selected ranked entries and exact market capitalizations (values preserved exactly):
  - 2006 Rank 1: Citigroup USA 286,337 (2006); 2009: 17,016
  - 2006 Rank 2: Bank of America USA 251,872 (2006); 2009: 68,660
  - 2006 Rank 3: Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Japan 188,034 (2006); 2009: 53,052
  - 2006 Rank 4: HSBC Holdings UK 172,938 (2006); 2009: 199,785
  - 2006 Rank 5: JP Morgan Chase USA 172,109 (2006); 2009: 148,484
  - 2006 Rank 6: UBS Switzerland 156,455 (2006); 2009: 50,242
  - 2006 Rank 7: Banco Santander Spain 127,400 (2006); 2009: 136,918
  - 2006 Rank 8: Wells Fargo & Co USA 122,056 (2006); 2009: 112,251
  - 2006 Rank 9: Wachovia Corp USA 114,542 (2006); 2009: Failed
  - 2006 Rank 10: Mizuho Financial Group Japan 114,249 (2006); 2009: 21,423
  - 2009 Rank 1: HSBC Holdings UK 199,785
  - 2009 Rank 2: China Construction Bank China 193,240
  - 2009 Rank 3: JP Morgan Chase USA 148,484
  - 2009 Rank 4: Banco Santander Spain 136,918
  - 2009 Rank 5: Wells Fargo & Co USA 112,251
  - 2009 Rank 6: BNP Paribas France 95,359
  - 2009 Rank 7: Goldman Sachs USA 69,454
  - 2009 Rank 8: Ind’l & Commercial Bank of China China 68,968
  - 2009 Rank 9: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Spain 68,733
  - 2009 Rank 10: Bank of America USA 68,660
- Other selected entries and notable statuses (values preserved as printed):
  - Wachovia Corp (2009): Failed
  - Merrill Lynch & Co (2009): Failed
  - ABN Amro Holdings (2009): Failed
  - Fortis 2006: 60,674; 2009: 8,886
- Totals (values preserved exactly as in table):
  - Total (2006) 3,377,767 1,633,871
  - Total 2,153,554
- Note printed in table: Shaded ranking positions on left list indicate banks no longer among the top thirty in 2009, while shaded ranking positions on right list indicate banks that entered the top 30 list in 2009.
- Source: Bankscope.

*Italic: Source PDF filename: _wp10146 - References*

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