## 1. Log Subnational Public Health Expenditure per Capita

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---

### I. Introduction — trends and research question
- Government healthcare spending increased between 1980 and 2007 in OECD countries: the share of general government outlays spent on health rose from 10.9 percent to 16.1 percent, on average.
- Healthcare systems have followed a decentralization trend in many OECD economies.
- Subnational health spending is a large part of overall public health spending in some countries:
  - in the United States state and local spending accounts for over half of total public spending;
  - in OECD countries, state and local spending on healthcare accounts, on average, for over one-third of public spending.
- Research question: whether institutions — in particular fiscal decentralization and indicators of soft budget constraints — have contributed to increases in health spending.
- Empirical observation: average annual growth rate of public healthcare spending per capita (real) in OECD countries was 4.3 percent in the period 1998–2007; it was 5.4 percent in countries where healthcare provision is decentralized and subnational dependence on central government transfers is above 50 percent.
- Counterexamples: per capita public health spending growth was 3.6 percent in Sweden and Canada, where public health spending is highly decentralized but dependence on central government financing is relatively low (below 30 percent).

### II. Theory — soft budget constraints and mechanisms
- Core mechanism:
  - When the federal government cannot credibly commit to a non-bailout policy, subnational governments anticipate bailouts, weakening their budget constraints and inducing strategic increases in spending and borrowing.
  - Sequential game depiction (Inman, 2003): federal transfers announced → subnational spending/borrowing decisions made with bailout expectations → federal decision whether to rescue in distress. Time inconsistency arises if federal government later opts to bailout despite prior commitment not to.
- Reasons federal governments may provide bailouts (as cited):
  - (i) negative spillovers on the rest of the economy in the absence of a bailout;
  - (ii) federal governments care about the welfare of the citizens in the jurisdiction facing financial distress;
  - (iii) political benefits associated with providing a bailout;
  - (iv) subnational governments cannot be made fully accountable for their spending decisions;
  - (v) default of one region could raise the cost of borrowing for all other regions in a federation.
- Consequences of soft budget constraints (literature findings cited):
  - Subnational governments select spending and borrowing above efficient levels.
  - Subnational governments facing soft budget constraints tend to overinvest and may undertake nonviable or excessively risky projects.
  - Subnational governments tend to overborrow in expectation of federal bailouts.

### III. Determinants of soft budget constraints (empirical indicators)
- Vertical Fiscal Imbalance (VFI):
  - Defined as the gap between subnational governments’ own revenue sources and their expenditure responsibilities filled by federal transfers; usually measured as the ratio of transfers to total subnational government revenue.
  - Soft budget constraints are more likely when a high share of subnational spending is financed from the common pool of federal resources.
- Subnational borrowing autonomy:
  - The coexistence of a high degree of subnational borrowing autonomy with large VFI undermines market discipline; at low VFI creditors punish indebtedness, but at large VFI subnational governments can shift repayment costs onto others.
  - To limit borrowing autonomy, a range of strategies have been adopted: numerical ceilings, specific purposes, administrative-type controls, or prohibition.
- Discretion versus rules in transfers:
  - Discretionary transfers tend to be allocated to jurisdictions in financial distress, making it hard for central government to commit not to extend supplementary transfers.
  - Rules-based (predetermined formula) approaches are less likely to induce bailout expectations, though formula-based transfers may still trigger bargaining to secure larger shares.

### IV. Bailout expectations and externalities in health spending
- Health-specific features that raise bailout likelihood:
  - Large spillover benefits/public-good aspects of some health services (examples: immunization, mass health information campaigns, communicable disease control, safe drinking water supply, maternal and child health, sanitation).
  - High political visibility of healthcare services relative to other entitlements increases central government incentives to intervene if local provision is threatened.
  - Constitutional or societal expectations of access to basic healthcare raise the likelihood of central intervention.
- Strategic behavior by subnational governments:
  - In financial distress, subnational governments may cut provision of local public goods with high spillover benefits to make federal bailouts more likely.

### V. Empirical focus and main empirical finding (summary)
- Measurement strategy for bailout expectations:
  - The paper considers the degree of subnational borrowing autonomy coupled with subnational dependence on central government transfers as an indication of a soft budget constraint; approach is most closely related to Rodden (2002).
- Main empirical result:
  - The combination of large dependence on central government financing and a high degree of borrowing autonomy leads to higher subnational healthcare spending.
- Cross-country contribution:
  - Prior studies examined soft budget constraints and health at country level; this paper examines the issue at a cross-country level for OECD members.

### VI. Data (scope and construction)
- Dataset includes annual data for twenty-five OECD members between 1990 and (text truncated).
- 2007 data on healthcare spending, transfers, and revenues were collected from the OECD.
- Health expenditure coverage: includes expenses on medical and pharmaceutical products, appliances, and equipment; outpatient services; hospital services; public health services; R&D on health; general administration of health policy, provision of licensing, and dissemination of information. Social security funds excluded.
- Currency and real terms: health expenditure converted from local currency units into real 2007 U.S. dollars.

### Data and descriptive findings
- Growth, 1990–2007: real subnational health expenditure per capita grew at an annual rate of 2½ percent in the sample.
- Comparative growth: general government health spending growth for the same countries was 3.8 percent during this period.
- Share of total health spending (2006): Italy accounts for almost 80 percent of total health spending at the subnational level.
- Share of public health spending (2006): Canada and Italy have the highest ratios of subnational to total public health spending; France, Luxembourg, and Ireland have very small subnational health spending shares.
- VFI definition: vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) = transfers from the central government to subnational governments as a share of total subnational revenues; transfers include both earmarked and non-earmarked transfers.
- Extreme VFI examples (2007 levels): in Finland, Iceland and the Netherlands, all subnational spending was due to transfers from the central government; in Sweden and Austria, transfers accounted for less than 30 percent of subnational spending.

### Borrowing autonomy measurement
- Constructed borrowing index components (six):
  - Domestic borrowing prohibition
  - International borrowing prohibition
  - Limits on government debt
  - Limits on debt service
  - Limits on borrowing for specific purposes
  - Requirements of prior approval from higher levels of government
- Scoring: for each component, value = 1 if the country does not have the rule (i.e., allows freedom) and 0 if the rule is in force. Sum of six components yields 0–6; scaled to range 0–1. Zero = no borrowing autonomy; one = complete autonomy.
- Alternative measure: OECD Fiscal Federalism Network index (eight components).
- Data sources: OECD questionnaires to senior budget and tax officials (1999–2005), Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997).
- Time variation: both borrowing-autonomy measures do not vary over time within countries.
- Index range in sample: 0.33 to 1 (0.33 corresponds to having four of the six constraints; 1 corresponds to having none of the six constraints).

### Empirical approach
- Dependent variable: log of real subnational government health expenditure per capita (y_it).
- Main regressors: VFI_it (vertical fiscal imbalance), Borrow_i (cross-sectional borrowing-autonomy index).
- Model specification: OLS with country fixed effects (µ_i) and year fixed effects (ρ_t); control vector X_it includes GDP per capita, population share over age 65, and tertiary education enrollment rate.
- Interaction of interest: VFI × Borrow (tests whether higher VFI raises health spending more when borrowing autonomy is greater).
- Expectation: coefficient β2 on the interaction predicted positive if higher borrowing autonomy together with greater dependence on transfers softens budget constraint and raises spending.
- Robustness: alternative dummy for high borrowing autonomy (equals 1 if borrowing index ≥ three-quarters of highest possible score; median-based threshold); regressions also run for health share of total subnational spending.

### Key regression results and interpretation
- Main pattern: interaction terms between VFI and borrowing-autonomy measures are generally positive and statistically significant, indicating that an increase in VFI increases health spending more in countries with higher borrowing autonomy.
- Panel A (borrowing-autonomy dummy):
  - nearly all coefficients on VFI × high borrowing autonomy are positive and statistically significant.
  - Illustrative magnitude (Table 1, Panel A, Column 6): a one percentage point increase in the VFI translates into a 4.5 percent greater increase in annual subnational health spending per capita for countries where subnational governments have high borrowing autonomy relative to those with less.
- Panel B (linear borrowing-autonomy index):
  - interaction coefficients have predicted positive sign and are statistically significant.
  - Illustrative magnitude (Table 1, Panel B, Column 6): the point estimate suggests a one percentage point increase in the VFI increases public health spending by 0.04 percent when the borrowing index increases by one percentage point.
  - Using the observed borrowing index range (0.33 to 1): an increase in the borrowing index of 0.66 (equivalent to going from having four constraints to zero) implies that a one percentage point increase in the VFI leads to 2.6 percent higher health spending per capita.
- Statistical significance notation in tables: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t statistics reported in parentheses using robust standard errors. Regressions include country and year effects and a constant.

### Analytical conclusions
- Evidence supports the soft-budget-constraint hypothesis for subnational health spending: higher reliance on central transfers (VFI) combined with greater borrowing autonomy at the subnational level is associated with larger increases in subnational health spending.
- When borrowing autonomy is low, restrictions can prevent subnational deficit financing even when dependence on central transfers is high, reducing fiscal indiscipline in health spending.
- Potential endogeneity caveat: if higher health spending leads to restrictions on subnational borrowing, estimated effects would be biased downward; authors note this would make reported estimates a lower bound of the true impact of soft budget constraints.
- Robustness: results are robust to dropping any single country from regressions; authors also compare effects across spending areas by estimating models with the health expenditure share of total subnational spending as the dependent variable.

### Key findings (summary and magnitudes)
- Soft budget constraints—defined as the expectation of central government bailouts—are associated with higher subnational health spending when large vertical fiscal imbalances (VFI) combine with high subnational borrowing autonomy.
- Empirical estimate: a one percentage point increase in the vertical fiscal imbalance translates into a 4.5 percent greater increase in annual subnational health spending per capita for countries where subnational governments have high borrowing autonomy relative to those with less.
- Magnitude illustration:
  - A 5 percentage point increase in VFI (roughly moving from Norway’s level to Portugal’s level in 2007) implies, based on the coefficient estimate of the interaction of VFI and borrowing autonomy from Table 1, Column 6, Panel A:
    - 22.5 percent increase in subnational public health spending in high borrowing autonomy countries relative to low borrowing autonomy countries (4.49 multiplied by 5 is roughly 22.5).
    - If average subnational health spending is 2 percent of GDP, this represents an increase of over 0.4 percent of GDP.
  - Per-capita framing:
    - Average public subnational health spending in the sample is $875 per capita.
    - Average within-country standard deviation is $354.
    - The coefficient estimate of 4.49 on the VFI×borrowing autonomy interaction implies an increase of 0.11 standard deviations in public health spending (since $39 or 4.49 percent of average subnational health spending amounts to 11 percent of the within-country standard deviation of $354).
- Table 2 (Subnational Public Health Expenditure as Percent of Total Subnational Expenditure), Panel A, Column 6:
  - A 10 percentage point increase in VFI translates into a 1.9 percentage point increase in the health share of total public spending in countries with a high degree of borrowing autonomy relative to others.
- Appendix results (local spending per capita and local health share) show qualitatively similar findings: coefficient estimates on the interaction of VFI and borrowing autonomy are generally positive and statistically significant.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Reforms aimed at containing government health spending growth in highly decentralized systems should be accompanied by tightening budget constraints. This concerns both:
  - Fiscal transfers among levels of government (vertical fiscal relationships), and
  - Subnational borrowing autonomy (restrictions on subnational borrowing).
- Caution is advised on the pace of decentralization reforms where healthcare provision is highly decentralized, given the link between soft budget constraints and rapid health spending growth.

### Research gaps and future work
- Additional research is required to assess welfare effects of rapid spending increases associated with decentralization.
- Current results indicate health spending is lower when subnational governments face harder budget constraints, but do not determine whether the reduced expenditures are welfare enhancing or welfare reducing.
- Important future research tasks:
  - Determine which areas of health spending are cut when budget constraints tighten.
  - Measure the productivity of different components of health spending.

*Source: IMF Working Paper content unit — 1. Log Subnational Public Health Expenditure per Capita.*

### 1. Log Subnational Public Health Expenditure per Capita ......................................................15

### 1. Log Subnational Public Health Expenditure per Capita ......................................................15

### I. Introduction — trends and research question
- Government healthcare spending increased between 1980 and 2007 in OECD countries: the share of general government outlays spent on health rose from 10.9 percent to 16.1 percent, on average.
- Healthcare systems have followed a decentralization trend in many OECD economies.
- Subnational health spending is a large part of overall public health spending in some countries: in the United States state and local spending accounts for over half of total public spending; in OECD countries, state and local spending on healthcare accounts, on average, for over one-third of public spending.
- The paper investigates whether institutions — in particular fiscal decentralization and indicators of soft budget constraints — have contributed to increases in health spending.
- Empirical observation: average annual growth rate of public healthcare spending per capita (real) in OECD countries was 4.3 percent in the period 1998–2007; it was 5.4 percent in countries where healthcare provision is decentralized and subnational dependence on central government transfers is above 50 percent.
- Counterexamples: per capita public health spending growth was 3.6 percent in Sweden and Canada, where public health spending is highly decentralized but dependence on central government financing is relatively low (below 30 percent).

### II. Theory — soft budget constraints and mechanisms
- Core mechanism:
  - When the federal government cannot credibly commit to a non-bailout policy, subnational governments anticipate bailouts, weakening their budget constraints and inducing strategic increases in spending and borrowing.
  - Sequential game depiction (Inman, 2003): federal transfers announced → subnational spending/borrowing decisions made with bailout expectations → federal decision whether to rescue in distress. Time inconsistency arises if federal government later opts to bailout despite prior commitment not to.
- Reasons federal governments may provide bailouts (as cited):
  - (i) negative spillovers on the rest of the economy in the absence of a bailout;
  - (ii) federal governments care about the welfare of the citizens in the jurisdiction facing financial distress;
  - (iii) political benefits associated with providing a bailout;
  - (iv) subnational governments cannot be made fully accountable for their spending decisions;
  - (v) default of one region could raise the cost of borrowing for all other regions in a federation.
- Consequences of soft budget constraints (literature findings cited):
  - Subnational governments select spending and borrowing above efficient levels.
  - Subnational governments facing soft budget constraints tend to overinvest and may undertake nonviable or excessively risky projects.
  - Subnational governments tend to overborrow in expectation of federal bailouts.

### III. Determinants of soft budget constraints (empirical indicators)
- Vertical Fiscal Imbalance (VFI):
  - Defined as the gap between subnational governments’ own revenue sources and their expenditure responsibilities filled by federal transfers; usually measured as the ratio of transfers to total subnational government revenue.
  - Soft budget constraints are more likely when a high share of subnational spending is financed from the common pool of federal resources.
- Subnational borrowing autonomy:
  - The coexistence of a high degree of subnational borrowing autonomy with large VFI undermines market discipline; at low VFI creditors punish indebtedness, but at large VFI subnational governments can shift repayment costs onto others.
  - To limit borrowing autonomy, a range of strategies have been adopted: numerical ceilings, specific purposes, administrative-type controls, or prohibition.
- Discretion versus rules in transfers:
  - Discretionary transfers tend to be allocated to jurisdictions in financial distress, making it hard for central government to commit not to extend supplementary transfers.
  - Rules-based (predetermined formula) approaches are less likely to induce bailout expectations, though formula-based transfers may still trigger bargaining to secure larger shares.

### IV. Bailout expectations and externalities in health spending
- Health-specific features that raise bailout likelihood:
  - Large spillover benefits/public-good aspects of some health services (examples: immunization, mass health information campaigns, communicable disease control, safe drinking water supply, maternal and child health, sanitation).
  - High political visibility of healthcare services relative to other entitlements increases central government incentives to intervene if local provision is threatened.
  - Constitutional or societal expectations of access to basic healthcare raise the likelihood of central intervention.
- Strategic behavior by subnational governments:
  - In financial distress, subnational governments may cut provision of local public goods with high spillover benefits to make federal bailouts more likely.

### V. Empirical focus and main empirical finding (summary)
- Measurement strategy for bailout expectations:
  - The paper considers the degree of subnational borrowing autonomy coupled with subnational dependence on central government transfers as an indication of a soft budget constraint; approach is most closely related to Rodden (2002).
- Main empirical result (as stated):
  - The combination of large dependence on central government financing and a high degree of borrowing autonomy leads to higher subnational healthcare spending.
- Cross-country contribution:
  - Prior studies examined soft budget constraints and health at country level; this paper examines the issue at a cross-country level for OECD members.

### VI. Data (scope)
- The dataset includes annual data for twenty-five OECD members between 1990 and (text truncated at this point).

*Source: IMF Working Paper content unit — 1. Log Subnational Public Health Expenditure per Capita.*

### 2007. Data on healthcare spending, transfers, and revenues were collected from the OECD

### Subnational Health Spending, Transfers, and Borrowing Autonomy (excerpt)

### Data and descriptive findings
- Health expenditure coverage: includes expenses on medical and pharmaceutical products, appliances, and equipment; outpatient services; hospital services; public health services; R&D on health; general administration of health policy, provision of licensing, and dissemination of information. Social security funds excluded.
- Currency and real terms: health expenditure converted from local currency units into real 2007 U.S. dollars.
- Growth, 1990–2007: real subnational health expenditure per capita grew at an annual rate of 2½ percent in the sample.
- Comparative growth: general government health spending growth for the same countries was 3.8 percent during this period.
- Share of total health spending (2006): Italy accounts for almost 80 percent of total health spending at the subnational level.
- Share of public health spending (2006): Canada and Italy have the highest ratios of subnational to total public health spending; France, Luxembourg, and Ireland have very small subnational health spending shares.
- VFI definition: vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) = transfers from the central government to subnational governments as a share of total subnational revenues; transfers include both earmarked and non-earmarked transfers.
- Extreme VFI examples (2007 levels): in Finland, Iceland and the Netherlands, all subnational spending was due to transfers from the central government; in Sweden and Austria, transfers accounted for less than 30 percent of subnational spending.

### Borrowing autonomy measurement
- Constructed borrowing index components (six): 
  - Domestic borrowing prohibition
  - International borrowing prohibition
  - Limits on government debt
  - Limits on debt service
  - Limits on borrowing for specific purposes
  - Requirements of prior approval from higher levels of government
- Scoring: for each component, value = 1 if the country does not have the rule (i.e., allows freedom) and 0 if the rule is in force. Sum of six components yields 0–6; scaled to range 0–1. Zero = no borrowing autonomy; one = complete autonomy.
- Alternative measure: OECD Fiscal Federalism Network index (eight components), used as second borrowing-autonomy measure.
- Data sources: OECD questionnaires to senior budget and tax officials (1999–2005), Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997).
- Time variation: both borrowing-autonomy measures do not vary over time within countries.
- Index range in sample: 0.33 to 1 (0.33 corresponds to having four of the six constraints; 1 corresponds to having none of the six constraints).

### Empirical approach
- Dependent variable: log of real subnational government health expenditure per capita (y_it).
- Main regressors: VFI_it (vertical fiscal imbalance), Borrow_i (cross-sectional borrowing-autonomy index).
- Model specification: OLS with country fixed effects (µ_i) and year fixed effects (ρ_t); control vector X_it includes GDP per capita, population share over age 65, and tertiary education enrollment rate.
- Interaction of interest: VFI × Borrow (tests whether higher VFI raises health spending more when borrowing autonomy is greater).
- Expectation: coefficient β2 on the interaction predicted positive if higher borrowing autonomy together with greater dependence on transfers softens budget constraint and raises spending.
- Robustness: alternative dummy for high borrowing autonomy (equals 1 if borrowing index ≥ three-quarters of highest possible score; median-based threshold); regressions also run for health share of total subnational spending.

### Key regression results and interpretation
- Main pattern: interaction terms between VFI and borrowing-autonomy measures are generally positive and statistically significant, indicating that an increase in VFI increases health spending more in countries with higher borrowing autonomy.
- Panel A (borrowing-autonomy dummy): nearly all coefficients on VFI × high borrowing autonomy are positive and statistically significant.
  - Illustrative magnitude (Table 1, Panel A, Column 6): a one percentage point increase in the VFI translates into a 4.5 percent greater increase in annual subnational health spending per capita for countries where subnational governments have high borrowing autonomy relative to those with less.
- Panel B (linear borrowing-autonomy index): interaction coefficients have predicted positive sign and are statistically significant.
  - Illustrative magnitude (Table 1, Panel B, Column 6): the point estimate suggests a one percentage point increase in the VFI increases public health spending by 0.04 percent when the borrowing index increases by one percentage point.
  - Using the observed borrowing index range (0.33 to 1): an increase in the borrowing index of 0.66 (equivalent to going from having four constraints to zero) implies that a one percentage point increase in the VFI leads to 2.6 percent higher health spending per capita.
- Statistical significance notation in tables: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. t statistics reported in parentheses using robust standard errors. Regressions include country and year effects and a constant.

### Analytical conclusions
- Evidence supports the soft-budget-constraint hypothesis for subnational health spending: higher reliance on central transfers (VFI) combined with greater borrowing autonomy at the subnational level is associated with larger increases in subnational health spending.
- When borrowing autonomy is low, restrictions can prevent subnational deficit financing even when dependence on central transfers is high, reducing fiscal indiscipline in health spending.
- Potential endogeneity caveat: if higher health spending leads to restrictions on subnational borrowing, estimated effects would be biased downward; authors note this would make reported estimates a lower bound of the true impact of soft budget constraints.
- Robustness: results are robust to dropping any single country from regressions; authors also compare effects across spending areas by estimating models with the health expenditure share of total subnational spending as the dependent variable.

*Source: Authors’ calculations and OECD/World Bank data as presented in the chapter.*

### 4.5 percent spending increase from Panel A, which suggests that the interaction effect of

### _wp10147 - 4.5 percent spending increase from Panel A, which suggests that the interaction effect of

### Key findings
- Soft budget constraints—defined as the expectation of central government bailouts—are associated with higher subnational health spending when large vertical fiscal imbalances (VFI) combine with high subnational borrowing autonomy.
- Empirical estimate: a one percentage point increase in the vertical fiscal imbalance translates into a 4.5 percent greater increase in annual subnational health spending per capita for countries where subnational governments have high borrowing autonomy relative to those with less (text, VI. CONCLUSIONS).
- Interaction effects are non-linear: spending increases proportionally more for countries that give subnational governments greater borrowing authority (opening paragraph).

### Magnitude illustrations and examples
- A 5 percentage point increase in VFI (roughly moving from Norway’s level to Portugal’s level in 2007) implies, based on the coefficient estimate of the interaction of VFI and borrowing autonomy from Table 1, Column 6, Panel A:
  - 22.5 percent increase in subnational public health spending in high borrowing autonomy countries relative to low borrowing autonomy countries (4.49 multiplied by 5 is roughly 22.5).
  - If average subnational health spending is 2 percent of GDP, this represents an increase of over 0.4 percent of GDP.
- Per-capita framing:
  - Average public subnational health spending in the sample is $875 per capita.
  - Average within-country standard deviation is $354.
  - The coefficient estimate of 4.49 on the VFI×borrowing autonomy interaction implies an increase of 0.11 standard deviations in public health spending (since $39 or 4.49 percent of average subnational health spending amounts to 11 percent of the within-country standard deviation of $354).

### Table-based quantitative results (selected)
- Table 2 (Subnational Public Health Expenditure as Percent of Total Subnational Expenditure), Panel A, Column 6:
  - A 10 percentage point increase in VFI translates into a 1.9 percentage point increase in the health share of total public spending in countries with a high degree of borrowing autonomy relative to others.
- Appendix results (local spending per capita and local health share) show qualitatively similar findings: coefficient estimates on the interaction of VFI and borrowing autonomy are generally positive and statistically significant (Appendix Tables 2–3).

### Robustness and specification notes
- The coefficient estimates of VFI and the soft budget constraint variable in Table 1, Panel A, Column 6 are jointly significant at the 1 percent level.
- Results are qualitatively similar using the OECD borrowing autonomy measure, though magnitudes are slightly smaller.
- Alternative specifications including levels and interactions of the timing of the Maastricht treaty were experimented with; the soft budget constraint coefficient remained stable while results on the effect of Maastricht were inconclusive.
- In Panel B of Table 2 the effect using the linear borrowing-autonomy index is less robust, but estimated VFI×borrowing autonomy coefficients retain the predicted positive sign, reinforcing evidence of non-linearity in the borrowing-index effect.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Reforms aimed at containing government health spending growth in highly decentralized systems should be accompanied by tightening budget constraints. This concerns both:
  - Fiscal transfers among levels of government (vertical fiscal relationships), and
  - Subnational borrowing autonomy (restrictions on subnational borrowing).
- Caution is advised on the pace of decentralization reforms where healthcare provision is highly decentralized, given the link between soft budget constraints and rapid health spending growth.

### Research gaps and future work
- Additional research is required to assess welfare effects of rapid spending increases associated with decentralization.
- Current results indicate health spending is lower when subnational governments face harder budget constraints, but do not determine whether the reduced expenditures are welfare enhancing or welfare reducing.
- Important future research tasks:
  - Determine which areas of health spending are cut when budget constraints tighten.
  - Measure the productivity of different components of health spending.

*Source: Authors’ calculations.*

### References

### _wp10147 - References

### Soft budget constraints, bailouts, and fiscal discipline
- Aizenman, J., 1992, “Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seignorage,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 24: pp. 61–71.
- Aizenman, J., 1998, “Fiscal Discipline in a Union,” in Sturzenegger, F. and M. Tomassi (eds.), The Political Economy of Reform (Boston: MIT Press).
- Besfamille, M., and B. Lockwood, 2008, “Bailouts in Federations: Is A Hard Budget Constraint Always Best?,” International Economic Review, Vol. 49 (May), pp. 577–93.
- Bordignon, M., and G. Turati, 2009, “Bailing Out Expectations and Public Health Expenditure,” Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 28, pp. 305–21.
- Buttner, T., and D. Wildasin, 2006, “The Dynamics of Municipal Fiscal Adjustment,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 90, 1115–32.
- Crivelli, E., and K. Staal, 2006, “Size, Spillovers, and Soft Budget Constraints,” CESifo Working Paper 1858.
- Dahlberg, M., and P. Petterson-Lidbom, 2003, “An Empirical Approach for Evaluating Soft Budget Constraints,” Working Paper 28, Uppsala University.
- Dewatripont, M., and E. Maskin, 1995, “Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 62, pp. 541–55.
- Fink, A., and T. Stratmann, 2009, “Institutionalized Bailouts and Fiscal Policy: The Consequences of Soft Budget Constraints,” CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2827, Muenchen.
- Goodspeed, T., 2002, “Bailouts in a Federation,“ International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 9, pp. 409–21.
- Inman, R., 2003, “Transfers and Bailouts: Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline with Lessons from US Federalism,” in Rodden, J., G. Eskelund and J. Litvack (eds.), Fiscal Descentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press).
- Kornai, J., 1979, “Resource-Constrained Versus Demand-Constrained Systems,” Econometrica, Vol.47, pp. 801–19.
- Kornai, J., E. Maskin, and G. Roland, 2003, “Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 41(December): pp. 1095–136.
- Kornai, J., 2009, “The Soft Budget Constraint Syndrome in the Hospital Sector,” International Journal of Health Care Finance Economics, Vol. 9, pp. 117–35.
- Maskin, E., 1999, “Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget Constraint,” American Economic Review, Vol. 89 (March), pp. 421–25.
- Pisauro, G., 2001, “Intergovernmental Relations and Fiscal Discipline: Between Commons and Soft Budget Constraints,” IMF Working Paper 01/65 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Qian, Y., and G. Roland, 1998, “Federalism and the soft Budget Constraint,” American Economic Review, Vol. 88 (December), pp. 1141–62.
- Rodden, J., 2000, “Breaking the Golden Rule: Fiscal Behavior with Rational Bailout Expectations in the German States,” mimeo, MIT.
- Rodden, J., G. Eskeland, and J. Litvack, eds., 2003, Fiscal Descentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press).
- Rodden, J., 2005, “Achieving Fiscal Discipline in Federations,” in Wierts, P. (ed.), Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe (Cheltenham, U.K., Edward Elgar).
- Sanguinetti, P., and M. Tommasi, 2004, “Intergovernmental Transfers and Fiscal Behavior: Insurance versus Aggregate Discipline,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 62 (January), pp. 149–70.
- Ter-Minassian, T., and J. Craig, 1997, “Control of Subnational Borrowing,” in Ter-Minassian, T. (ed.), Fiscal Federalism in Theory and Practice (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Ter-Minassian, T., 2007, “Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments: Can They Promote Fiscal Discipline?” OECD Journal on Budgeting 6 (March).
- von Hagen, J., Dahlberg, M., 2002, “Swedish Local Government: Is There A Bailout Problem?” Prepared fort he project on Fiscal Federalism in Sweden, Center for Business and Policy Studies.
- von Hagen, J., and others, 2000, “Subnational Government Bailouts in OECD Countries: Four Case Studies,” Inter-American Development Bank, Research Network Working Paper R-399.
- Wildasin, D., 1997, “Externalities and Bailouts: Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations,” mimeo, Vanderbilt University.

### Decentralization, fiscal federalism, and political economy
- Akin, J., P. Hutchinson, and K. Strumpf, 2001, “Decentralization and Government Provision of Public Goods: The Public Health Sector in Uganda,” Measure Evaluation, Working Paper 01/35, pp. 1–35.
- Azfar, O., S. Kähkönen, and P. Meagher, 2001, “Conditions for Effective Decentralized Governance: a Synthesis of Research Findings,” IRIS Center Working Paper, University of Maryland.
- Careaga, M., and B. Weingast, 2000, “The Fiscal Pact with the Devil: A Positive Approach to Fiscal Federalism, Revenue Sharing, and Good Governance,” Working Paper, Stanford University.
- Dewatripont, M., and E. Maskin, 1995, “Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 62, pp. 541–55.
- Letelier, L., 2005, “Explaining fiscal decentralization,” Public Finance Review 33, pp. 155–183.
- Mondino, G., F. Sturzenegger, and M. Tommasi, 1996, “Recurrent High Inflation and Stabilization: a Dynamic Game,” International Economic Review, Vol. 37, pp. 981–96.
- Oates, W., 1999, “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37 (September), p. 1120-49.
- Persson, T., and G. Tabellini, 1994, “Does Centralization Increase the Size of Government?” European Economic Review, Vol. 38, pp. 765–73.
- Persson, T., and G. Tabellini, 1999, “Political Economics and Public Finance,” in Auerbach, A. and M. Feldstein (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, Vol. III., (Amsterdam: North-Holland).
- Pierson, P., 1996, “The New Politics of the Welfare State,” World Politics, Vol. 48 (January), pp. 143.
- Rodden, J., 2002, “The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46 (July), pp. 670–87.
- Rodden, J., G. Eskeland, and J. Litvack, eds., 2003, Fiscal Descentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press).
- Rodden, J., 2005, “Achieving Fiscal Discipline in Federations,” in Wierts, P. (ed.), Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe (Cheltenham, U.K., Edward Elgar).
- Sutherland, D., R. Price, and I. Joumard, 2005, “Fiscal Rules for Sub-central Governments: Design and Impact,” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 465. Paris.
- Ter-Minassian, T., and J. Craig, 1997, “Control of Subnational Borrowing,” in Ter-Minassian, T. (ed.), Fiscal Federalism in Theory and Practice (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Velasco, A., 1999, “A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms,” in Poterba, J. and J. von Hagen (eds.), Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

### Decentralization and health care expenditure, organization, and governance
- Bankauskaite, V., and R. Saltman, 2007, “Central Issues in the Decentralization Debate,” in Saltman, R., V. Bankauskaite, and K. Vrangbaek (eds.), Decentralization in Health Care: Strategies and Outcomes (Berkshire, U.K., Open University Press), pp. 9–21.
- Gerdtham, U-G., and B. Jonsson, 2000, “International Comparisons of Health Expenditure: Theory, Data, and Econometric Analysis,” in Culyer, A. and J. Newhouse, Handbook of Health Economics (Amsterdam: Elsevier).
- Levaggi, R., and R. Zanola, 2003, “Flypaper Effect and Sluggishness: Evidence from Regional Health Expenditures in Italy,” International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 10, pp. 535–47.
- Mosca, I., 2007, “Decentralization as a determinant of Health Care Expenditure: Empirical Analysis for OECD countries,” Applied Economic Letters, Vol. 14 (June), pp. 515–55.
- Smith, S., J. Newhouse, and M. Freeland, 2009, “Income, Insurance, and Technology: Why Does Health Spending Outpace Economic Growth?” Health Affairs 28 (October), pp. 1276–84.
- Tediosi, F., S. Gabriele, and F. Longo, 2009, “Governing Decentralization in Health Care under Tough Budget Constraint: What Can We Learn from the Italian Experience?” Health Policy 90 (May), pp. 303–12.
- Vrangbaek, K., 2007, “Towards a Typology for Decentralization in Health Care,” in Saltman, R, V. Bankauskaite, and K. Vrangbaek (eds.), 2007, Decentralization in Health Care (Maidenhead: MacGraw-Hill), pp.44–62.
- Kornai, J., 2009, “The Soft Budget Constraint Syndrome in the Hospital Sector,” International Journal of Health Care Finance Economics, Vol. 9, pp. 117–35.

### Theoretical and empirical methods relevant to fiscal and intergovernmental studies
- Bordignon, M., P. Manasse, and G. Tabellini, 2001, “Optimal Regional Redistribution under Asymmetric Information,” American Economic Review, Vol. 91 (June), pp.709–23.
- Crivelli, E., and K. Staal, 2006, “Size, Spillovers, and Soft Budget Constraints,” CESifo Working Paper 1858.
- Dewatripont, M., and E. Maskin, 1995, “Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 62, pp. 541–55.
- Mondino, G., F. Sturzenegger, and M. Tommasi, 1996, “Recurrent High Inflation and Stabilization: a Dynamic Game,” International Economic Review, Vol. 37, pp. 981–96.
- Sanguinetti, P., and M. Tommasi, 2004, “Intergovernmental Transfers and Fiscal Behavior: Insurance versus Aggregate Discipline,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 62 (January), pp. 149–70.
- von Hagen, J., and others, 2000, “Subnational Government Bailouts in OECD Countries: Four Case Studies,” Inter-American Development Bank, Research Network Working Paper R-399.

*Source: _wp10147 - References*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/_wp10147.pdf_
