## 1. U.S. Bank Risk and the Federal Funds Rate

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---

### I. Introduction — context and objective
- Recent global financial crisis raised debate whether loose monetary policy (low interest rates, abundant liquidity) led financial intermediaries to take excessive risks by fueling asset prices and leverage.
- Paper objective: develop a model linking monetary policy to bank monitoring and portfolio risk, filling a gap where macro models focus on credit quantity and banking literature on risk-taking has largely ignored monetary policy.

### Main findings (three principal results)
- For exogenously fixed bank capital structure:
  - Monetary easing leads highly capitalized banks to monitor less.
  - Monetary easing leads poorly capitalized banks to monitor more.
- When banks can adjust capital holdings (endogenous capital structure):
  - A cut in the policy rate will lead banks to increase their leverage.
- With optimally chosen leverage:
  - A policy rate cut will unambiguously lower bank monitoring and increase risk taking.

### Empirical evidence cited
- Consistency with empirical literature (examples: Maddaloni and Peydró, 2010; Ioannidou et al., 2009).
- Negative relationship illustrated between bank risk and the real policy rate using:
  - U.S. Terms of Business Lending Survey data (weighted average internal risk rating assigned to loans).
  - Real policy rate measured using the nominal federal funds rate adjusted for consumer price inflation.
  - Both series detrended by deducting their linear time trend using quarterly data from the second quarter of 1997 until the fourth quarter of 2008.
- U.S. Terms of Business Lending Survey details:
  - Quarterly survey of a stratified sample of about 400 banks.
  - Asks about terms of all commercial and industrial loans issued during the first full business week of the middle month in every quarter.
  - Loan risk ratings vary from 1 to 5 and are increasing in risk; the weighted average risk rating score aggregated across participating banks is used as the measure of bank risk.
- Effective federal funds rate:
  - Defined as a volume-weighted average of rates on trades arranged by major brokers and calculated daily by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York using data provided by the brokers.
  - Inflation rate used is the three-month average change in the U.S. consumer price index.

### Model architecture and assumptions
- Banks choose monitoring effort q (unobservable) to reduce credit risk; monitoring and pricing of assets/liabilities are endogenous and depend on a benchmark monetary policy rate r̃.
- Two standard assumptions:
  1. Limited liability: banks choose degree of monitoring (equivalently portfolio riskiness); capital structure affects risk-taking.
  2. Monetary policy affects cost of bank liabilities through changes in the risk-free rate.
- Three coexisting forces determine monetary policy effects on bank risk taking:
  - Interest-rate pass-through (asset-side effect).
  - Risk-shifting (liability-side effect).
  - Leverage (capital structure effect).
- Core primitives and setup:
  - Demand for loans: L(rL) assumed linear, L = A − b rL.
  - Monitoring effort q is the probability of repayment; monitoring cost per dollar lent is 1/2 c q^2.
  - Bank liabilities: fraction k is cost-bearing irrespective of profit (capital/equity); fraction 1−k repaid only on bank success (deposits).
  - Deposit rate rD initially fixed at policy rate r̃ (r_D = r̃). Equity yield rE = r̃ + ϵ, with ϵ ≥ 0.
  - Timing: when capital is endogenous, choice of k precedes pricing and monitoring; otherwise two stages: banks choose loan rate rL (stage 1), then monitoring q (stage 2).

### Mechanisms in detail
- Pass-through effect (asset side):
  - Monetary easing reduces policy rate and, depending on pass-through, reduces interest rate on bank loans, lowering gross return conditional on repayment and thus monitoring incentives.
  - Magnitude depends on market structure: minimal for a monopolist with inelastic demand (zero pass-through); maximal under perfect competition (full pass-through).
- Risk-shifting effect (liability side):
  - Monetary easing lowers cost of bank liabilities, increasing expected profit when bank succeeds; limited liability can create incentives to shift risk to capture upside.
  - Effect strength depends on degree of limited liability protection: strongest for fully leveraged banks funded entirely through deposits/debt; weakest for banks fully funded by capital.
- Leverage effect (endogenous capital structure):
  - Holding capital is costly but commits to limit risk taking and reduces cost of debt/deposits.
  - Policy rate cuts reduce the agency benefit of holding capital; in equilibrium lower policy rates are associated with greater leverage.
  - Increased leverage amplifies risk taking; with optimal capital choice, a cut in policy rate leads unambiguously to lower monitoring and higher risk.

### Main analytical results (propositions and lemmas)
- Proposition 1 (exogenous k, deposit pricing insensitive to risk):
  - There exists a capitalization threshold k̄ (called e_k in text) such that:
    - for k < e_k, bank monitoring decreases with the monetary policy rate: db̂q/dr̃ < 0,
    - for k > e_k, bank monitoring increases with the policy rate: db̂q/dr̃ > 0.
- Proposition 2 (exogenous k, depositors require compensation for risk so rD = r̃ E[q|k]):
  - Parallel result: there exists a capitalization threshold e_e_k such that:
    - for k < e_e_k, db̂q/dr̃ < 0,
    - for k > e_e_k, db̂q/dr̃ > 0.
- Proposition 3 (endogenous capital):
  - Equilibrium bank leverage decreases with the monetary policy rate:
    - d k̂ / dr̃ > 0 (equivalently, a low policy rate induces higher leverage / lower capital k̂).
- Lemma 1:
  - When leverage k, loan rate rL, and monitoring q are optimally chosen with respect to r̃, the optimal loan rate r̂L is increasing in r̃: d r̂L / dr̃ > 0.
- Proposition 4 (endogenous capital → monitoring):
  - When bank leverage is optimally chosen, monitoring always increases with the monetary policy rate:
    - d q̂ / dr̃ > 0.
  - Net effect: monetary tightening leads banks to hold more capital and monitor more (take less risk); monetary easing leads to higher leverage and reduced monitoring.
- Market-structure extensions:
  - Perfect competition (exogenous or endogenous k):
    - Proposition 5 (perfect competition, fixed k): for k ∈ (0,1], db̂q/dr̃ > 0; for k = 0, db̂q/dr̃ = 0.
    - Proposition 6 (perfect competition, endogenous k): equilibrium bank leverage decreases with r̃ (d k̂ / dr̃ > 0) and monitoring increases with r̃ (d q̂ / dr̃ > 0).
    - Intuition: maximum pass-through makes pass-through effect dominate risk-shifting effect.
  - Monopolist facing perfectly inelastic loan demand up to R:
    - If demand is inelastic (rL fixed at R), pass-through is zero; risk-shifting effect dominates when k is exogenous, so raising policy rate reduces monitoring.
    - With endogenous k, equilibrium adjustments in k restore db̂q/dr̃ > 0 even in the inelastic case.

### Numerical example and parameter calibration (Section VI)
- Parameter values used:
  - A = 100
  - b = 8
  - Liability composition: 35 percent of bank liabilities are insured deposits; remainder uninsured and priced for risk.
  - Monitoring cost parameter: c = 9.
  - Equity premium ϵ set to 6 percent.
- Illustrative quantitative findings:
  - With exogenous k, threshold for reversal between db̂q/dr̃ < 0 and > 0 occurs at k ≈ 0.55 in the numerical example.
  - When k is endogenous, equilibrium k̂ increases with r̃ for realistic policy-rate ranges; at extremely low r̃ (below −15 percent in the illustrative plot) k̂ hits corner (fully levered).
  - Equilibrium monitoring q̂ is increasing in r̃ for realistic ranges when k is endogenous; very low r̃ can yield db̂q/dr̃ < 0 if k̂ is at corner.

### Key qualitative implications and testable predictions
- Net effect of monetary policy on bank risk taking depends on three forces: interest-rate pass-through to loan rates, risk-shifting via limited liability, and changes in leverage.
- When banks can adjust k, monetary easing leads to greater leverage and lower monitoring (more risk taking).
- When k is fixed (e.g., regulatory constraint), the sign of the policy-rate → risk-taking relationship depends on bank capitalization and market structure:
  - Well-capitalized banks may decrease monitoring when policy rate is cut;
  - Highly levered banks may increase monitoring when policy rate is cut.
- Market structure matters because pass-through is larger in more competitive markets; with higher pass-through, pass-through effect tends to dominate risk-shifting.
- Testable implications:
  - Negative relationship between the policy rate (real terms) and measures of bank risk when banks can adjust capital.
  - Negative relationship between the policy rate and bank leverage.
  - Attenuation of these relationships for poorly capitalized banks and in less competitive banking markets.

### Policy discussion and recommendations
- Macroprudential integration:
  - Monetary easing can contribute to higher bank risk taking via leverage — a rationale for macro-prudential tools alongside monetary policy.
  - No unique trade-off between price stability and financial stability: outcome depends on shock type and cycle position.
- Institutional implication:
  - Interaction between banking market conditions, monetary policy, and bank risk-taking supports centralization of macro-prudential responsibilities within the monetary authority, subject to credibility, accountability, and political economy trade-offs.
- Suggested model extensions:
  - Incorporate endogenous monetary policy reaction function.
  - Allow cost of equity rE to depend on leverage.
  - Incorporate liquidity/funding risk on liability side (short-term vs long-term financing choices).

*Source: IMF Working Paper — 1. U.S. Bank Risk and the Federal Funds Rate (chapter/section text).*

### 1. U.S. Bank Risk and the Federal Funds Rate ...................................................................31

### 1. U.S. Bank Risk and the Federal Funds Rate

### I. Introduction — context and objective
- Recent global financial crisis raised debate whether loose monetary policy (low interest rates, abundant liquidity) led financial intermediaries to take excessive risks by fueling asset prices and leverage.
- Existing macroeconomic models largely focus on quantity rather than quality of credit; banking literature on risk-taking has largely ignored monetary policy. This paper fills that gap by developing a model linking monetary policy to bank monitoring and portfolio risk.

### Main findings (three principal results)
- For exogenously fixed bank capital structure:
  - Monetary easing leads highly capitalized banks to monitor less.
  - Monetary easing leads poorly capitalized banks to monitor more.
- When banks can adjust capital holdings (endogenous capital structure):
  - A cut in the policy rate will lead banks to increase their leverage.
- With optimally chosen leverage:
  - A policy rate cut will unambiguously lower bank monitoring and increase risk taking.

### Empirical evidence cited
- Results are consistent with empirical literature documenting effects of monetary policy on risk-taking (examples: Maddaloni and Peydró, 2010; Ioannidou et al., 2009).
- Negative relationship between bank risk and the real policy rate is illustrated using:
  - U.S. Terms of Business Lending Survey data (weighted average internal risk rating assigned to loans).
  - Real policy rate measured using the nominal federal funds rate adjusted for consumer price inflation.
  - Both variables are detrended by deducting their linear time trend using quarterly data from the second quarter of 1997 until the fourth quarter of 2008.
- Description of the U.S. Terms of Business Lending Survey:
  - Quarterly survey of a stratified sample of about 400 banks.
  - Survey asks participating banks about terms of all commercial and industrial loans issued during the first full business week of the middle month in every quarter.
  - Loan risk ratings vary from 1 to 5 and are increasing in risk; the weighted average risk rating score aggregated across participating banks is used as the measure of bank risk.
- Effective federal funds rate:
  - Defined as a volume-weighted average of rates on trades arranged by major brokers and calculated daily by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York using data provided by the brokers.
  - Inflation rate used is the three-month average change in the U.S. consumer price index.

### Model architecture and assumptions
- Banks choose monitoring effort (unobservable) to reduce credit risk in loan portfolios; monitoring and pricing of assets/liabilities are endogenous and depend on a benchmark monetary policy rate.
- Two standard assumptions:
  1. Banks are protected by limited liability and choose degree of monitoring (equivalently portfolio riskiness); capital structure affects risk-taking.
  2. Monetary policy affects cost of bank liabilities through changes in the risk-free rate.
- Three coexisting forces determine how monetary policy changes affect bank risk taking:
  - Interest-rate pass-through (asset-side effect).
  - Risk-shifting (liability-side effect).
  - Leverage (capital structure effect).

### Mechanisms in detail
- Pass-through effect (asset side):
  - Monetary easing reduces the policy rate and, depending on pass-through, reduces interest rate on bank loans.
  - This reduces bank’s gross return conditional on repayment, lowering incentive to monitor (akin to portfolio reallocation effects).
  - Magnitude depends on market structure: minimal for a monopolist with inelastic demand (zero pass-through); maximal under perfect competition (full pass-through).
- Risk-shifting effect (liability side):
  - Monetary easing lowers cost of bank liabilities, increasing expected profit when bank succeeds, which can create an incentive to limit risk taking to capture gains.
  - Effect strength depends on degree of limited liability protection: strongest for fully leveraged banks funded entirely through deposits/debt (no losses in failure), weakest for banks fully funded by capital.
- Leverage effect (when capital structure endogenous):
  - Holding capital is costly, but capital serves as commitment to limit risk taking and reduces cost of debt/deposits.
  - Policy rate cuts reduce the agency problem from limited liability, lowering the benefit of holding capital.
  - In equilibrium, lower policy rates are associated with greater leverage.
  - Increased leverage amplifies risk taking; as banks choose optimal capital, a cut in policy rate leads unambiguously to lower monitoring and higher risk.

### Implications and contribution
- Provides a model isolating monetary policy’s effect on bank risk taking, abstracting from other macro channels (asset values, liquidity).
- Offers micro-foundation for empirical regularities: inverse relationship between monetary conditions and leverage; banks loading up on risk during extended loose monetary policy.
- Helps reconcile predictions from literature on flight to quality and on risk shifting linked to limited liability.
- Contributes to policy debate on whether macroprudential tools should complement monetary policy to safeguard macrofinancial stability (discussed further in concluding section).

### Paper roadmap (structure)
- Section II: brief survey of related theoretical and empirical work.
- Section III: model and equilibrium with exogenous bank capital structure.
- Section IV: endogenous capital structure case.
- Section V: role of market structure.
- Section VI: numerical examples.

*Source: IMF Working Paper — 1. U.S. Bank Risk and the Federal Funds Rate (chapter/section text).*

### Section VII concludes. Proofs are mostly relegated to the appendix.

### _wp10276 - Section VII concludes. Proofs are mostly relegated to the appendix.

### Related literature and motivation
- Links the paper to three strands:
  - Financial accelerator literature: monetary tightening depresses borrowers’ net worth and produces flight to quality (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bernanke et al., 1996).
  - Search-for-yield / limited liability channels: monetary easing can induce financial institutions to switch to riskier assets (Rajan, 2005; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006a).
  - Limited liability, leverage, and deposit competition: competition for deposits (higher deposit rates) exacerbates limited-liability agency problems and can increase bank risk taking (Matutes and Vives, 2000; Hellmann et al., 2000; Cordella and Levy-Yeyati, 2000; Chiesa, 2001; Repullo, 2004; Boyd and De Nicolo’, 2005).
- Distinguishing contribution: integrates monetary policy stance, deposit pricing, and endogenous capital choice to show how interest-rate changes affect bank monitoring (inverse of risk taking) via pass-through, risk-shifting, and leverage channels.

### Model setup and core mechanisms
- Demand for loans: L(rL) assumed linear, L = A − b rL (section III).
- Monitoring effort q is the probability of repayment; monitoring cost per dollar lent is 1/2 c q^2.
- Bank liabilities: fraction k is cost-bearing irrespective of profit (capital/equity); fraction 1−k repaid only on bank success (deposits). Initially treat k as exogenous; later endogenize k.
- Deposit rate rD initially fixed at policy rate r̃ (r_D = r̃). Equity yield rE = r̃ + ϵ, with ϵ ≥ 0 (equity premium).
- Two stages: banks choose loan rate rL (stage 1), then monitoring q (stage 2). When capital is endogenous, choice of k precedes pricing and monitoring.

### Main analytical results (propositions and lemmas)
- Proposition 1 (exogenous k, deposit pricing insensitive to risk):
  - There exists a capitalization threshold k̄ (called e_k in text) such that:
    - for k < e_k, bank monitoring decreases with the monetary policy rate: db̂q/dr̃ < 0,
    - for k > e_k, bank monitoring increases with the policy rate: db̂q/dr̃ > 0.
  - Intuition: tightening raises both loan rates (incentivizing monitoring) and deposit costs (risk-shifting effect). Net sign depends on k.

- Proposition 2 (exogenous k, depositors require compensation for risk so rD = r̃ E[q|k]):
  - Parallel result: there exists a capitalization threshold e_e_k such that:
    - for k < e_e_k, db̂q/dr̃ < 0,
    - for k > e_e_k, db̂q/dr̃ > 0.

- Proposition 3 (endogenous capital):
  - Equilibrium bank leverage decreases with the monetary policy rate:
    - d k̂ / dr̃ > 0 (equivalently, a low policy rate induces higher leverage / lower capital k̂).

- Lemma 1:
  - When leverage k, loan rate rL, and monitoring q are optimally chosen with respect to r̃, the optimal loan rate r̂L is increasing in r̃: d r̂L / dr̃ > 0.

- Proposition 4 (endogenous capital → monitoring):
  - When bank leverage is optimally chosen, monitoring always increases with the monetary policy rate:
    - d q̂ / dr̃ > 0.
  - Net effect: monetary tightening leads banks to hold more capital and monitor more (take less risk); monetary easing leads to higher leverage and reduced monitoring.

- Market-structure extensions:
  - Perfect competition (exogenous or endogenous k):
    - Proposition 5 (perfect competition, fixed k): for k ∈ (0,1], db̂q/dr̃ > 0; for k = 0, db̂q/dr̃ = 0.
    - Proposition 6 (perfect competition, endogenous k): equilibrium bank leverage decreases with r̃ (d k̂ / dr̃ > 0) and monitoring increases with r̃ (d q̂ / dr̃ > 0).
    - Intuition: maximum pass-through of r̃ to loan rates makes pass-through effect dominate risk-shifting effect.
  - Monopolist facing perfectly inelastic loan demand up to R:
    - If demand is inelastic (rL fixed at R), pass-through is zero; risk-shifting effect dominates when k is exogenous, so raising policy rate reduces monitoring.
    - With endogenous k, even in the inelastic case, equilibrium adjustments in k restore db̂q/dr̃ > 0.

### Numerical example and parameter calibration (Section VI)
- Linear demand parameters used: A = 100 and b = 8.
- Liability composition: 35 percent of bank liabilities are insured deposits; remainder uninsured and priced for risk.
- Monitoring cost parameter: c = 9.
- Equity premium ϵ set to 6 percent.
- Illustrative findings:
  - With exogenous k, threshold for reversal between db̂q/dr̃ < 0 and > 0 occurs at k ≈ 0.55 in the numerical example.
  - When k is endogenous, equilibrium k̂ increases with r̃ for realistic policy-rate ranges; at extremely low r̃ (below −15 percent in the illustrative plot) k̂ hits corner (fully levered).
  - Equilibrium monitoring q̂ is increasing in r̃ for realistic ranges when k is endogenous; very low r̃ can yield db̂q/dr̃ < 0 if k̂ is at corner.

### Key qualitative implications and testable predictions
- Net effect of monetary policy on bank risk taking depends on three forces: interest-rate pass-through to loan rates, risk-shifting via limited liability, and changes in leverage (capital structure).
- When banks can adjust k (i.e., are unconstrained), monetary easing leads to greater leverage and lower monitoring (more risk taking).
- When k is fixed (e.g., regulatory constraint), the sign of the policy-rate → risk-taking relationship depends on bank capitalization and market structure:
  - Well-capitalized banks may decrease monitoring when policy rate is cut;
  - Highly levered banks may increase monitoring (take more risk) when policy rate is cut.
- Market structure matters because pass-through is larger in more competitive markets; with higher pass-through, the pass-through effect tends to dominate risk-shifting.
- Testable implications:
  - Negative relationship between the policy rate (real terms) and measures of bank risk when banks can adjust capital.
  - Negative relationship between the policy rate and bank leverage.
  - Attenuation of these relationships for poorly capitalized banks and in less competitive banking markets.

### Policy discussion and recommendations
- Integration of macro-prudential regulation into monetary policy:
  - Monetary easing can contribute to higher bank risk taking via leverage — a rationale for macro-prudential tools alongside monetary policy.
  - No unique trade-off between price stability and financial stability: depends on shock type and cycle position (e.g., near cycle peak tightening can reduce both price pressures and bank risk).
- Institutional implication:
  - The interaction between banking market conditions, monetary policy, and bank risk-taking supports centralization of macro-prudential responsibilities within the monetary authority, subject to consideration of credibility, accountability, and political economy trade-offs.
- Suggested model extensions (not implemented here):
  - Incorporate endogenous monetary policy reaction function (interaction with the real cycle).
  - Allow cost of equity rE to depend on leverage.
  - Incorporate liquidity/funding risk on liability side (short-term vs long-term financing choices).

*Source: _wp10276 - Section VII concludes. Proofs are mostly relegated to the appendix.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/_wp10276.pdf_
