## 3. Windward Islands: Panel Unit Root Tests

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---

### Introduction and scope
- Windward Islands banana industry historically benefited from EU trade preferences that generated implicit income transfers; recent and planned reforms have eroded these preferences.
- This paper:
  - Measures the value of banana trade preferences and documents a precipitous decline since the early 1990s.
  - Uses panel vector autoregression (panel VAR) analysis to assess macroeconomic impacts of diminishing implicit assistance, focusing on output growth in Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
- Remaining structure (as stated):
  - Section II: historical overview of EU banana regime.
  - Section III: literature review on preference erosion.
  - Section IV: quantification of implicit assistance.
  - Section V: macroeconomic impact evaluation.
  - Section VI: conclusions.

### Historical overview of EU banana preference regimes
- Origins and importance
  - Banana industry established in early 1950s to supply the United Kingdom, replacing sugar.
  - At its peak in the early 1990s banana earnings comprised about 20 percent of Windward Islands GDP; declined to less than 5 percent of GDP in recent years.
  - Banana exports currently account for about 15 percent of merchandise export receipts and remain a key employment source in rural districts.
- Production characteristics
  - Production entirely private; governments provide some support.
  - Yields significantly lower than other Caribbean and Latin American producers; farms typically less than ten acres in difficult terrain, leading to low yields and relatively high production costs (NERA, 2004).
- Evolution of EU regimes and reforms
  - 1993: EU Single Market created a common banana import policy (EU Banana Regime) with ACP quota duty-free and Latin American quota subject to tariff; historically EU banana price averaged some 80 percent more than the world price.
  - Late 2001 pledge to switch to tariff-only system by 2006; WTO waiver authorized tariff preferences under Cotonou until end-2007.
  - January 1, 2006: tariff-only regime implemented with MFN tariff of €176 per tonne for Latin American bananas and a duty-free 0.775 million-tonne quota for ACP countries.
  - January 2008: Economic Partnership Agreement allowed duty-free and quota-free access for Caribbean ACP agricultural exports.
  - 15 December 2009: initialed agreement to cut MFN tariff from €176 to €148 in 2010, with cuts to an MFN tariff floor of €114 per tonne by 2017; agreement included a package of financial assistance to ACP countries.
- EU assistance mechanisms
  - Special Framework of Assistance (1999–2008) aimed to boost productivity, encourage diversification, and provide social protection.
  - STABEX and other export revenue stabilization schemes.
  - Under the SFA, between 1999 and 2008 the EU allocated about €181 million for adjustment assistance to Windward Islands ACP countries; disbursement slow, with about half of the allocated amounts yet to be disbursed as of end-2009.

### Macroeconomic effects of preference erosion — literature review (selected findings)
- Global effects
  - Anderson and Martin (2006): estimated boost to global welfare of about US$300 billion per year by 2015; developing countries’ welfare increase of 1.2 percent versus 0.6 percent for developed countries; number of people in extreme poverty would decline by 32 million by 2015 (5 percent).
  - Stoeckel and Borrell (2001): for EU banana preferences it costs up to US$13 to deliver US$1 of assistance.
- Impact concentrated and uneven
  - Erosion affects a few countries/products (sugar, bananas, textiles); aggregate losses small but concentrated.
  - Alexandraki and Lankes (2004): aggregate loss between 0.5 and 1.2 percent of total exports for middle-income countries.
  - Subramanian (2003): preference erosion would reduce aggregate value of low-income country exports by 1.7 percent.
  - Amiti and Romalis (2006): utilization and rules-of-origin limit effective preferences; identify Dominica and St. Lucia as substantial losers in both EU and U.S. markets.
- Caribbean and Windward Islands vulnerability
  - High production costs mean reduction in preferences to near international prices could wipe out the banana industry (NERA, 2004).
  - Commonwealth Secretariat (2004): under aggressive liberalization, exports fall by 23 percent for St. Lucia, 13 percent for Dominica, and 11 percent for St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
  - NERA (2004): with an EU tariff near €176 per tonne, banana production would decline by between 11-21 percent from end-2005 levels.
  - FAO (2004): no tariff level maintains the status quo; Windward Islands likely net losers at the €176 per tonne tariff-only regime.
  - Anania (2009): reducing EU MFN tariff near €114 per tonne by 2016 would result in ACP exports to the EU falling by 14 percent over 2005-16.

- Selected numerical results from NERA (2004) — Change in Banana Supply (percent) at specified tariff levels:
  - Tariff Level (€) 200: Belize (1.0) -11.3; Dominica (1.0) -11.3; Grenada (1.3) -14.8; St. Lucia (1.0) -11.3; St. Vincent and the Grenadines (0.7) -7.9
  - 175: -16.2; -16.2; -21.0; -16.2; -11.3
  - 100: -30.6; -30.6; -39.6; -30.6; -21.4
  - 75: -35.4; -35.4; -46.0; -35.4; -24.8
- Amiti and Romalis / Alexandraki and Lankes export volume reductions (percent):
  - Amiti and Romalis (supply elasticity = infinity): Belize -4.4; Dominica -21.8; Grenada ........; St. Lucia -37.6; St. Vincent and the Grenadines -5.6
  - Amiti and Romalis (supply elasticity = 1 and 2): Belize -16.1, -19.6; Dominica -10.2, -12.6; St. Lucia -17.2, -20.9; St. Vincent and the Grenadines -6.6, -8.2

### Quantification of implicit assistance — methodology and assumptions
- Price-gap methodology:
  - Preference margin m defined as m = 1 - (PW / Pj) where Pj is average unit price received by preference recipient j and PW is world price.
  - Implicit value of preferences for producer j at time t computed as (Pjt - PWt) * Qjt or equivalently Qt * m * Pt.
- Key assumptions (noted caveats)
  - No product differentiation in quality, size, origin.
  - Perfect competition.
  - All preferential rents accrue to exporters (may exaggerate implicit transfer).
  - World prices unaffected by preferences (may underestimate implicit transfer).
  - WTO considers the price-gap method the most transparent and objective despite these caveats.
- Price comparability
  - Numerator: c.i.f. Caribbean prices = European wholesale prices received for EU exports.
  - Denominator: proxy world price by export unit price, f.o.b., received by Central American and Ecuador suppliers for U.S. exports (duty-free).

### Evolution of prices, quantities, and implicit assistance (Appendix I summaries)
- Prices
  - UK green wholesale price rose nearly 270 percent from 1977 to a 1991 peak of US$1,020 per tonne.
  - By 2000 UK price reached about two-thirds of its 1991 peak; since 2001 nominal UK prices recovered, reaching close to US$1,200 per tonne in 2008.
  - International prices rose about 200 percent from 1977 to a 1990s peak of US$560 per tonne.
  - International prices declined from about 70 percent to less than 50 percent of UK prices from 1977 to 1988; through most of the 1990s hovered around 50 percent; since 2006 international prices averaged over 70 percent of UK prices.
- Quantities
  - Windward Islands export volumes rose nearly 270 percent between 1977 and 1990 to peak at about 275,000 tonnes; thereafter steady decline of about 5 percent per year on average.
  - Total volumes exported in 2008 were lower than those of 1977.
  - Grenada exported about 8-12,000 tonnes annually on average and largely stopped meaningful exports from 1996 (some renewal after Hurricane Ivan (2004)).
- Values
  - Total Windward Islands banana export values: about US$25 million (about 12 percent of GDP) in 1977; peaked at over US$140 million (over 14 percent of GDP) in 1990.
  - By 2008 total exports amounted to less than US$40 million (about 1.4 percent of GDP).
  - Dominica: banana export-to-GDP ratio collapsed from about 22 percent in 1988 to about 1.5 percent in 2008.
  - Banana exports accounted for about 40-70 percent of total merchandise exports for Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, depending on the period.

- Estimation approaches (AID)
  - First approach (upper bound): difference between UK/European wholesale prices and U.S. landed prices for ‘dollar’ bananas; assumes full margin accrues to exporters.
  - Second approach (lower bound): compares unit export prices f.o.b. for Windward Islands with Latin American f.o.b. export prices; may underestimate due to transport/insurance differences.
  - Both assume interchangeability of bananas across exporters and markets (Fair Trade label may add about 20-25 percent premium).

- Key quantified results (1995–2008; Table 1 summaries)
  - First method peak implicit assistance-to-GDP ratios (mid-1990s):
    - Dominica: about 6 percent of GDP.
    - St. Lucia: about 8 percent of GDP.
    - St. Vincent and the Grenadines: about 8 percent of GDP.
  - By 2008 implicit assistance comprised about:
    - 1½ percent of GDP for St. Lucia.
    - 1 percent of GDP for Dominica.
  - Comparison of methods (1995–2008 averages):
    - St. Lucia: first method average implicit assistance 3.2 percent of GDP; second method yields 1.5 percent of GDP.
  - Stylized facts from first-approach:
    - Average implicit assistance for Windward Islands (excepting Grenada) about 6 percent of GDP for 1977–2008.
    - Pattern follows bell-shape of export volumes: peaked late-1980s/early-1990s and declined thereafter to below early-period levels by 2008.
    - Level of implicit assistance generally higher than official development assistance; for St. Lucia, preference-based implicit assistance over past three decades about double that received as official development assistance.

- Memorandum unit values (EU vs free market, 1995–2008 sample)
  - EU export unit values (U.S. dollars per tonne): 466, 437, 443, 483, 506, 435, 426, 441, 487, 487, 508, 523, 614, 642, average 493.
  - Free market (fob) unit values (U.S. dollars per tonne) 1/: 276, 281, 310, 287, 267, 243, 260, 266, 262, 252, 266, 293, 281, 332, average 277.
  - EU export unit values as a percent of free market prices: 169, 156, 143, 169, 189, 179, 164, 166, 185, 193, 191, 179, 219, 193, average 178.
    - 1/ Based on Ecuador bananas exported to the U.S.

### Econometric estimation — data, tests, and panel VAR specification
- Data and variables
  - Period: 1977-2008.
  - Countries: Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
  - Variables (real terms, modeled in first differences): implicit assistance (AID), current account balance (CUR), gross official reserves (RES), gross domestic product (GDP), central government revenues (REV).
- Correlation analysis (first differences)
  - Changes in AID positively correlated with changes in all variables except RES for Dominica and Grenada.
  - Correlation with real GDP growth: St. Lucia 0.58; St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.54; Grenada relatively weak; overall Windward Islands 0.41.
  - Approximate standard error of correlation coefficients under null that true coefficient is zero: 0.18 (T=31).
- Panel unit root tests (first differences)
  - Tests used: Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC); Breitung (B); Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS); ADF Fisher chi-square; PP Fisher chi-square.
  - Results: all variables in first differences are I(0) across tests (probability values reported as 0.000 for many tests).
- Panel VAR specification and identification
  - Stacked country vectors y_it = [AID, CUR, RES, GDP, REV].
  - Cholesky ordering: AID first (assumed least endogenous).
  - Lag length: 5 (selected via various criteria; three tests indicated 5, Schwarz indicated 2).
  - Variables in logarithms; first differences interpreted as percentage changes.
  - Analysis focuses on response to a one standard deviation transitory shock to AID.

### Panel VAR results — impulse responses and variance decompositions
- Impulse responses (panel, 1977-2008)
  - Positive one standard deviation shock to AID has positive effects on all variables; statistically significant only for real GDP growth.
  - Real GDP growth improves by about 1½ percentage points on impact.
  - The effect on GDP dies out after about one year.
- Country-specific peak impacts (on impact)
  - St. Lucia: current account and reserves growth rates both improve by about seven percentage points; real GDP and revenue growth rates improve by about three and five percentage points, respectively. Effect on current account and reserves dies out after one year; effect on GDP and revenues persists about two years.
  - Impact greatest for St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Dominica; fairly limited for Grenada.
- Variance decompositions
  - For the Windward Islands panel, AID explains a large share of variability of macroeconomic variables.
  - Cumulative impact: AID explains about 25 percent of variance in GDP at certain horizons for the panel.
  - For St. Lucia, AID explains about 45 percent of variance in real GDP; for other variables the peak is about 25 percent.
- Robustness checks
  - Including OECD real GDP growth (GDP_OECD) as a control leaves panel results virtually unchanged.
  - Dropping RES (degrees-of-freedom concerns) or using OECD GDP per capita growth instead of OECD GDP growth does not change results materially.
  - Generalized impulse response functions (ordering-independent) do not lead to significantly different results.

### Concluding remarks, numerical summaries, and policy implications
- Key quantitative conclusions
  - EU trade preferences generated considerable—but declining—implicit transfers to Windward Islands.
  - Implicit assistance peaked at about 13 percent of GDP in the late 1980s and fell to about 1 percent of GDP by 2008.
  - Combined with declines in official development assistance, Windward Islands experienced loss of annual external assistance flows equivalent to about 10 percent of GDP over the last two decades.
  - VAR results indicate shocks to implicit assistance had a significant impact on growth and other macro aggregates.
- Policy recommendations and transition measures
  - Address social effects with well-targeted social safety nets and transition measures, including:
    - income transfers,
    - retraining programs,
    - noncontributory pensions.
  - Preference-dependent countries should:
    - raise efficiency of their banana sectors,
    - orient production toward fair trade and organic bananas,
    - diversify into non-banana agriculture.
  - Long-run strategy: transition toward tourism and financial services by:
    - improving the investment climate,
    - lowering business costs,
    - enhancing labor force skills.

*Source: _wp1059.*

### References .............................................................................................................

### _wp1059 - References

### Figures
- 1. Value of Preferences and Resource Cost .............................................................................. 7
- 2. Windward Islands: Nominal External Assistance ............................................................... 18
- 3. Windward Islands: Impulse Response Functions ................................................................ 25
- 4. Windward Islands: Variance Decomposition ...................................................................... 26

### Tables
- 1. Windward Islands: Implicit Assistance from EU Banana Preferences, 1995-2008 ............ 17
- 2. Windward Islands: Correlation Between Variables ............................................................ 20

*Source: _wp1059 - References .............................................................................................................*

### 3. Windward Islands: Panel Unit Root Tests .......................................................................... 22

### 3. Windward Islands: Panel Unit Root Tests

### Introduction
- The banana industry of the Caribbean has enjoyed significant trade preferences for several decades, providing implicit income transfers through preferential access to protected European markets.
- Reforms to the European Union’s banana regime over the last 15 years have engendered an erosion of trade preferences, and recent reforms will further erode these implicit income transfers.
- The Windward Islands are particularly vulnerable to terms of trade losses from preference erosion because of:
  - a large share of bananas in total exports of goods;
  - the high degree of preferential access granted by the European Union; and
  - dependence on the European Union as an export market.
- This paper complements previous studies by:
  - Measuring the value of banana trade preferences and illustrating that the value of implicit assistance provided through trade preferences has declined precipitously since the early 1990s.
  - Using panel vector autoregression analysis to discuss the macroeconomic impact of the diminution of implicit assistance, particularly on output growth in the preference-dependent Windward Islands.
- Structure of the remainder of the paper:
  - Section II: historical overview of the evolution of the European Union’s banana regime.
  - Section III: brief review of the literature on the impact of preference erosion.
  - Section IV: attempts to quantify the amount of implicit assistance, and how it has evolved over time.
  - Section V: evaluates macroeconomic impact.
  - Section VI: concludes.

### Historical overview of European Union preference regimes
- Origins and importance:
  - Windward Islands’ export banana industry established in the early 1950s to supply the United Kingdom and replace unprofitable sugar production.
  - At its peak in the early 1990s banana industry earnings comprised about 20 percent of Windward Islands GDP; subsequently declined to less than 5 percent of GDP in recent years.
  - Banana exports currently account for about 15 percent of merchandise export receipts and remain a key employment source in rural districts.
- Production characteristics and constraints:
  - Banana production in the Windwards is entirely in private hands; governments provide some financial and other support.
  - Production yields are significantly lower in the Windwards than for other Caribbean and Latin American producers.
  - Banana farms typically less than ten acres, mostly in difficult terrain (steep hillsides and narrow valleys), resulting in low yields per acre and relatively high production costs (NERA, 2004).
- Evolution of EU regimes:
  - Prior to 1993, EU members maintained distinct banana import policies, including preferential regimes for member states’ overseas departments or former colonies.
  - Implementation of the EU Single Market in 1993 introduced a common policy and marketing structure for banana imports—the EU Banana Regime—extending preferential arrangements for ACP bananas across the European Community.
  - Under the EU banana regime:
    - Annual ACP banana quota for duty-free export to the EU, and an annual quota for Latin America (‘dollar’ bananas) subject to a tariff.
    - Licensing system allowed sharing of associated economic rents.
    - The price of bananas in the EU averaged some 80 percent more than the world (free market) price historically.
- WTO rulings and shift to tariff-only regime:
  - Following WTO rulings, in late 2001 the EU pledged to switch to a tariff-only system by the beginning of 2006 and requested a WTO waiver authorizing tariff preferences for ACP countries under the Cotonou Agreement until end-2007, conditional on maintaining total market access for all WTO member suppliers.
  - Beginning January 1, 2006, the EU moved to a tariff-only regime with:
    - a Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff of €176 per tonne for Latin American bananas, and
    - a duty-free 0.775 million-tonne quota for ACP countries.
  - January 2008: implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and Caribbean, whereby all agricultural exports from Caribbean ACP countries (including bananas) are allowed duty-free and quota-free access to the EU.
- Subsequent agreement and assistance:
  - On 15 December 2009, the European Commission, ACP and Latin American countries initialed an agreement to decrease the existing MFN tariff of €176 per tonne to an initial €148 per tonne in 2010; further cuts to reach an MFN tariff floor of €114 per tonne by 2017. The agreement also included a package of financial assistance to ACP countries.
  - European Commission assistance mechanisms:
    - Special Framework of Assistance (1999–2008): designed to boost productivity, encourage diversification, and provide social protection.
    - Export revenue stabilization schemes, such as STABEX.
    - Under the SFA, between 1999 and 2008 the EU allocated about €181 million for adjustment assistance to Windward Islands ACP countries; disbursement slow, with about half of the allocated amounts yet to be disbursed as of end-2009.

### Macroeconomic effects of preference erosion — literature review
- Global effects of agricultural trade liberalization:
  - Agriculture remains the most protected sector in industrial countries despite its declining role in the world economy; reforms produce winners and losers.
  - Most studies find global trade liberalization (removing preferential trading arrangements) is welfare-enhancing.
  - Key findings from Anderson and Martin (2006):
    - Estimated boost to global welfare of about US$300 billion per year by 2015.
    - Developing countries’ welfare increase of 1.2 percent versus 0.6 percent for developed countries.
    - Reforms in agricultural trade would have the biggest impact on developing countries.
    - Number of people living in extreme poverty (incomes of less than a dollar a day) would decline by 32 million by 2015 (5 percent).
  - Stoeckel and Borrell (2001) estimate that for EU banana preferences it costs up to US$13 to deliver US$1 of assistance, criticizing trade preferences as inefficient.
- Impact of preference erosion on exporting countries:
  - Erosion occurs via more beneficiaries, lowering applied tariffs, or lowering preferential tariffs.
  - Losses concentrated in a few countries and products (sugar, bananas, textiles and clothing); aggregate losses small but concentrated.
  - Alexandraki and Lankes (2004): aggregate loss between 0.5 and 1.2 percent of total exports of middle-income countries; concentrated in a few products.
  - Subramanian (2003): preference erosion would reduce aggregate value of low-income country exports by 1.7 percent.
  - Amiti and Romalis (2006): actual level of preference access is less generous than appears due to rules of origin and limited utilization; they find average product coverage under GSP is 44 percent in the U.S. with utilization about 95 percent; for the EU product coverage nearly 100 percent but utilization about 76 percent for ACP countries and 57 percent for non-ACP countries.
  - Amiti and Romalis identify Dominica and St. Lucia as the only two countries to lose substantially in both the EU and the U.S. markets.
- Impact on Caribbean and Windward Islands:
  - Windward Islands are among the most vulnerable due to inefficiency driven by limited hilly land and high wage levels; many marginal farmers entered banana cultivation under high preferences.
  - A reduction in preferences to near international prices would likely wipe out the banana industry as production costs exceed international prices (NERA, 2004).
  - Estimates of negative impacts:
    - Commonwealth Secretariat (2004): under aggressive trade liberalization, exports of goods would fall by 23 percent for St. Lucia, 13 percent for Dominica, and 11 percent for St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
    - NERA (2004): with an EU tariff near €176 per tonne and country supply elasticities, banana production in Windward Islands would decline by between 11-21 percent from its end-2005 level.
  - FAO (2004): no tariff level maintains the status quo; Windward Islands likely net losers at the €176 per tonne tariff-only regime.
  - Anania (2009): reducing EU MFN tariff near €114 per tonne by 2016 would result in ACP exports to the EU falling by 14 percent over the 2005-16 period.
- Selected numerical results cited:
  - Impact of banana tariff reduction (NERA, 2004) — Change in Banana Supply (in percent) for tariff levels shown:
    - Tariff Level (€):
      - 200: Belize (1.0) -11.3; Dominica (1.0) -11.3; Grenada (1.3) -14.8; St. Lucia (1.0) -11.3; St. Vincent and the Grenadines (0.7) -7.9
      - 175: -16.2; -16.2; -21.0; -16.2; -11.3
      - 100: -30.6; -30.6; -39.6; -30.6; -21.4
      - 75: -35.4; -35.4; -46.0; -35.4; -24.8
  - Amiti and Romalis / Alexandraki and Lankes (export volume reduction, in percent):
    - Amiti and Romalis (supply elasticity = infinity): Belize -4.4; Dominica -21.8; Grenada ........; St. Lucia -37.6; St. Vincent and the Grenadines -5.6
    - Amiti and Romalis (supply elasticity = 1 and 2): Belize -16.1, -19.6; Dominica -10.2, -12.6; St. Lucia -17.2, -20.9; St. Vincent and the Grenadines -6.6, -8.2

### Quantification of implicit assistance from banana trade preferences — Methodological considerations
- Definition and measurement approach:
  - Additional export revenue from preferential access represents an implicit income transfer.
  - The implicit transfer is calculated using a price-gap methodology: the difference between the preferential European market price and the best price obtainable on unrestricted markets (the international market price).
  - Preference margin (m) defined (as in Alexandraki and Lankes (2004)) as the proportion by which the average unit price received by a preference recipient j exceeds that received by an MFN exporter (world price):
    - 1
      W
      j
      P
      P
      m       (1)
      where Pj and PW are the price received by j and the world price, respectively.
  - Implicit value of preferences for producer j at time t computed as the product of the price difference and quantity exported Qjt:
    - t
      W
      t
      j
      t
      QPP)(  or    
      t
      W
      t
      QmP)(   .
- Assumptions and caveats:
  - Assumes no product differentiation in terms of quality, size, and origin.
  - Assumes a perfectly competitive price.
  - Assumes all preferential rents accrue to exporters.
  - If these assumptions do not hold, computed value of preferences is likely somewhat exaggerated, but the price-gap method is considered by the WTO as the most transparent and objective.
- Price comparability challenge:
  - Key challenge is finding comparable prices for numerator and denominator to reflect the value of preferential access per se rather than other differences among exporters or export markets.
  - For bananas, c.i.f. Caribbean prices are the European wholesale prices received for EU exports; the world banana price proxied by the export unit price, f.o.b., received by Central American and Ecuador suppliers for exports to the U.S. (duty-free) market.
- Next steps indicated in the paper:
  - Apply the price-gap methodology to measure the value of preferences for the Windward Islands over a period of almost three decades to understand evolution of implicit assistance over time.

*Source: IMF working paper section titled "3. Windward Islands: Panel Unit Root Tests" (selected excerpts).*

### Appendix I for additional details.

### Appendix I for additional details

### Methodology note
- Assumes that the entire rent from trade preference accrues to the exporting country (which tends to overestimate the implicit transfer).
- Assumes that world (international) prices are not affected by preferences (which tends to underestimate the implicit transfer).

### Evolution of banana export prices, quantities and values

Prices
- UK green wholesale price (relevant for the Windward Islands) rose nearly 270 percent from 1977 to its 1990s peak of US$1,020 per tonne in 1991.
- Beginning in the late 1990s the UK price declined slowly, in 2000 reaching about two-thirds of its 1991 peak.
- Since 2001 nominal UK prices recovered, reaching close to US$1,200 per tonne in 2008.
- International prices rose about 200 percent from 1977 to a 1990s peak of US$560 per tonne.
- During the 1990s international prices generally remained flat; since 2003 international prices have risen sharply (largely due to weather-related supply shortfalls).
- Real UK prices generally remained steady through the early 1990s and declined thereafter.
- Real international prices show a less pronounced downward trend and have remained broadly unchanged during the 2000s.
- International prices declined from about 70 percent to less than 50 percent of UK prices from 1977 to 1988; through most of the 1990s they hovered around 50 percent; since 2006 international prices have averaged over 70 percent of UK prices.

Quantities
- Windward Islands export volumes rose by nearly 270 percent between 1977 and 1990 to peak at about 275,000 tonnes.
- Thereafter there was a steady decline in export volumes of about 5 percent per year on average.
- Total volumes exported in 2008 were lower than those of 1977.
- Grenada’s export level was always small (about 8-12,000 tonnes annually on average) and the country stopped exporting any meaningful quantities from 1996. (Note: situation changed somewhat after Hurricane Ivan (2004), leading to some renewed banana exports.)

Values
- Total Windward Islands banana export values: about US$25 million (about 12 percent of GDP) in 1977; peaked at over US$140 million (over 14 percent of GDP) in 1990.
- By 2008 total exports amounted to less than US$40 million (about 1.4 percent of GDP).
- Dominica: banana export-to-GDP ratio collapsed from a peak of about 22 percent in 1988 to about 1.5 percent in 2008.
- Banana exports accounted for about 40-70 percent of total merchandise exports for Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, depending on the period.

### Estimation of implicit assistance

Approaches to compute implicit assistance (AID)
- First approach: difference between United Kingdom wholesale prices for Windward Islands banana exports and international (U.S.) landed prices for ‘dollar’ banana exports (used by WTO and available throughout 1977-2008).
  - Represents an upper bound to the true implicit assistance because it assumes the full margin accrues to exporters.
- Second approach: compares unit export prices for Windward Islands banana exporters with unit export prices for Latin American ‘dollar’ banana exporters (f.o.b. prices).
  - Probably closer to a lower bound; uses f.o.b. price at point of export and may underestimate true price gap due to transport/insurance differences.
- Both methods assume bananas are interchangeable across exporters and markets, which may not hold (example: Fair Trade label can have a price premium of about 20-25 percent).

Key quantified results (1995–2008; Table 1 summaries)
- Using the first method (European wholesale and U.S. landed prices), implicit assistance-to-GDP ratios peaked in the mid-1990s:
  - Dominica: about 6 percent of GDP (peak mid-1990s).
  - St. Lucia: about 8 percent of GDP (peak mid-1990s).
  - St. Vincent and the Grenadines: about 8 percent of GDP (peak mid-1990s).
- Decline thereafter; in 2008 implicit assistance still comprised about:
  - 1½ percent of GDP for St. Lucia.
  - 1 percent of GDP for Dominica.
- Comparison of methods (1995–2008 averages):
  - St. Lucia: first method average implicit assistance 3.2 percent of GDP; second method yields 1.5 percent of GDP.
- Stylized facts from first-approach calculations:
  - Average implicit assistance for Windward Islands (excepting Grenada) about 6 percent of GDP for 1977–2008.
  - Pattern of implicit assistance follows bell-shape of export volumes: peaked late-1980s/early-1990s and declined thereafter to below early-period levels by 2008.
  - Level of implicit assistance for Windward Islands generally higher than official development assistance; for St. Lucia, preference-based implicit assistance over past three decades is about double that received as official development assistance.

Memorandum items (unit values)
- Average banana unit values for EU exports (U.S. dollars per tonne), 1995–2008 sample shown (selected values): 466, 437, 443, 483, 506, 435, 426, 441, 487, 487, 508, 523, 614, 642, average 493.
- Free market (fob) unit value (U.S. dollars per tonne) 1/: 276, 281, 310, 287, 267, 243, 260, 266, 262, 252, 266, 293, 281, 332, average 277.
- EU export unit values (as a percent of free market prices): 169, 156, 143, 169, 189, 179, 164, 166, 185, 193, 191, 179, 219, 193, average 178.
  - 1/ Based on Ecuador bananas exported to the U.S.

### Econometric estimation of macroeconomic impact of implicit assistance

Data and variables
- Period: 1977-2008.
- Countries: four Windward Islands (Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines).
- Variables (real terms, modeled in first differences): implicit assistance (AID), current account balance (CUR), gross official reserves (RES), gross domestic product (GDP), central government revenues (REV).

Correlation analysis (first differences)
- Changes in AID are positively correlated with changes in all variables, except reserves (RES) for Dominica and Grenada.
- Correlation with real GDP growth:
  - St. Lucia: 0.58
  - St. Vincent and the Grenadines: 0.54
  - Grenada: relatively weak
  - Overall Windward Islands: 0.41
- Overall correlation weakest with changes in reserves.
- Approximate standard error of the correlation coefficients (under null that true coefficient is zero) is 0.18 (T=31).

Panel unit root tests (variables in first differences)
- Tests used: Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC); Breitung (B); Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS); ADF Fisher chi-square; PP Fisher chi-square.
- Results: all variables in first differences are I(0) across tests (probability values reported as 0.000 for many tests).

VAR analysis: specification and identification
- Panel VAR modeled with stacked country vectors y_it = [AID, CUR, RES, GDP, REV] (Cholesky ordering: AID first as least endogenous).
- Lag length: 5 (selected via various criteria; three tests indicated 5, Schwarz indicated 2).
- Variables are in logarithms; first differences interpreted as percentage changes.
- Analysis focuses on response to a one standard deviation transitory shock to AID.

VAR results — impulse responses (panel of Windward Islands, 1977-2008)
- A positive one standard deviation shock to AID has positive effects on all variables; statistically significant only for real GDP growth.
- Real GDP growth improves by about 1½ percentage points on impact.
- The effect on GDP dies out after about one year.
- Country-specific results (summarized):
  - St. Lucia: on impact, current account and reserves growth rates both improve by about seven percentage points; real GDP and revenue growth rates improve by about three and five percentage points, respectively. Effect on current account and reserves dies out after one year; effect on GDP and revenues persists about two years.
  - Impact greatest for St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Dominica; fairly limited for Grenada.

Variance decompositions
- For the Windward Islands panel, AID explains a large share of variability of macroeconomic variables.
- Cumulative impact: AID explains about 25 percent of variance in GDP at certain horizons for the panel.
- For St. Lucia, AID explains about 45 percent of variance in real GDP; for other variables the peak is about 25 percent.

Robustness checks
- Including OECD real GDP growth (GDP_OECD) as a control leaves panel results virtually unchanged.
- RES may be dropped in some robustness tests due to degrees-of-freedom concerns; using OECD GDP per capita growth instead of OECD GDP growth does not change results materially.
- Generalized impulse response functions (ordering-independent) do not lead to significantly different results.

### Concluding remarks and policy implications

Key conclusions
- EU trade preferences for banana exports generated considerable—but declining—implicit transfers to the Windward Islands.
- Implicit assistance peaked at about 13 percent of GDP in the late 1980s and fell to about 1 percent of GDP by 2008.
- Combined with declines in official development assistance, Windward Islands have experienced loss of annual external assistance flows equivalent to about 10 percent of GDP over the last two decades.
- VAR results indicate that shocks to implicit assistance have had a significant impact on economic growth and other macroeconomic aggregates in the Windward Islands.

Policy recommendations and transition measures
- Address social effects: well-targeted social safety nets and transition measures are important, including:
  - income transfers,
  - retraining programs,
  - noncontributory pensions.
- Preference-dependent countries should:
  - raise efficiency of their banana sectors,
  - orient production toward fair trade and organic bananas,
  - diversify into non-banana agriculture.
- Long-run strategy: transition away from agriculture toward tourism and financial services by:
  - improving the investment climate,
  - lowering business costs,
  - enhancing labor force skills.

*Source: _wp1059 - Appendix I for additional details.*

### Appendix I: Data Sources and Issues

### Appendix I: Data Sources and Issues

### Banana Prices — overview of computation approach
- Computations of implicit assistance contained in this paper are based on price differences between protected market prices (United Kingdom/European Union) and free market international prices—the preference margin from exporting to protected European markets.
- Two approaches for calculating preference margins are used:
  - Based on wholesale (free-on-truck) prices.
  - Based on unit export values (international unit prices).

### Wholesale (free-on-truck) price proxies and issues
- Unit wholesale prices for the United Kingdom market are proxied by:
  - For the period 1975–1996: The unit price for banana exports received by the Windward Islands in the United Kingdom. This is the c.i.f. (cost, insurance and freight) price at the port after offloading and loading on a truck, that is including the port-handling charges. Prices are available until 1999.
  - For the period 1997–2008: World Bank unit prices for European Union banana imports (originally sourced from Sopisco News, Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Bank’s own estimates). Specifically, these are the prices of Central and South American bananas—major brands (mainly Dole and Del Monte)—c.i.f. Hamburg. Prices also include European Community import taxes. The first year such prices are available is 1997.
- Expected discontinuity in the series in 1997 due to:
  - Differences in discharge costs between Hamburg and London.
  - Possible differences in rents captured from bananas between Caribbean ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries and from Latin American banana exporters such as Ecuador, Honduras and Costa Rica.
- Unit U.S. landed price of ‘dollar’ bananas:
  - Is proxied by the U.S. import price of bananas from Central America and Ecuador, f.o.b. (free on board) U.S. ports, and includes upload charges to truck or rail.
  - This data is available from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database.

### Unit export values (international unit prices) — proxies
- International unit prices are proxied by:
  - IMF data on banana exports, f.o.b., for the four Windward Islands. It is assumed that all banana exports are destined for the United Kingdom (and later the European Union) market. Data on export values and volume are taken from the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) and the Windward Islands Banana Development and Exporting Company (WIBDECO), and are available for the period 1970–2008.
  - Unit export price data, f.o.b., for ‘dollar’ bananas is proxied by the export unit price received by Central and South American banana suppliers (weighted average) for their banana exports to the (duty-free) U.S. market, as reported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

### Banana volumes and calculation of implicit assistance
- To calculate the value of implicit assistance (in terms of additional export revenues received by Windward Islands ACP countries), the preference margin for each year is multiplied by the annual volume of exports (in tonnes) for each country.
- Data on export volumes for the Windward Islands (Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines) are taken from the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank and the Windward Islands Banana Development and Exporting Company (WIBDECO).
- In the correlation and VAR analyses of Section V, the value of implicit assistance (AID) is derived using the preference margin (calculated using the first approach of Section IV.C—that is, as the difference between European wholesale prices for Windward Islands banana exports and international (U.S.) landed prices for ‘dollar’ banana exports), scaled up by the volume of banana exports of each Windward Islands country.

### Macroeconomic data used in VAR analysis
- All macroeconomic data (used in the VAR analysis) on gross domestic product (GDP), current account (CUR)26, international reserves (RES), central government revenues (REV) and real OECD GDP (GDP_OECD) are from IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook databases, completed by data from the country authorities.
- For the Windward Islands:
  - To obtain real domestic variables, all nominal variables are deflated by the national consumer price index (CPI), which is taken from the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank.
  - Exception: nominal GDP is deflated by the GDP deflator (base 1990=100) and is taken from the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank.
- Data on international variables expressed in U.S. dollars (such as international prices and exports) are deflated by the U.S. CPI.
- Note on CUR: In order to avoid logs of negative numbers, to compute the variable CUR we use the approximation ln(1+current account/GDP).

*Source: _wp1059 - Appendix I: Data Sources and Issues*

### References

### _wp1059 - References

### Journal articles and econometric methods
- Agénor, P., C.J. McDermott, and E. Prasad, 2000, “Macroeconomic Fluctuations in Developing Countries: Some Stylized Facts,” World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 14, pp. 251–85.
- Baldwin, R.E., and T. Murray, 1977, “MFN Tariff Reductions and Developing Country Benefits under the GSP,” Economic Journal, Vol. 87, pp. 30-46.
- Calderón, C., and K. Schimidt-Hebbel, 2003, “Macroeconomic Policies and Performance in Latin America,” Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 22, pp. 895-923.
- Deaton A.S., and R.I. Miller, 1995, “International Commodity Prices, Macroeconomic Performance, and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Princeton Studies in International Finance, No. 79.
- Edwards, S., 2003, “Financial Instability in Latin America,” Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 22, pp. 1095-1106.
- Engel R.F., and C.W.J. Granger, 1987, “Cointegration and Error-Correction Representation, Estimation and Testing,” Econometrica, Vol. 55, pp. 251–76.
- Ho, M.S., and B.E. Sorensen, 1996, “Finding Cointegration Rank in High Dimensional Systems Using Johansen Test: An Illustration Using Data-Based Monte Carlo Simulations,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 78, pp. 726-32.
- Holtz-Eakin, D., W. Newey, and H.S. Rosen, 1988, “Estimating Vector Autoregressions with Panel Data,” Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 6, pp. 1371-95.
- Williams, O., W. Sandiford, and A. Phipps, 1999, “Banana Price Shocks and Adjustment within a Unified Currency Area,” Applied Economics, Vol. 31, pp. 1455-66.
- Yang, Y., and M. Mlachila, 2007, “The End of Textile Quotas: A Case Study of the Impact on Bangladesh,” Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 43, pp. 675-99.

### IMF working papers, country reports, and chapters
- Alexandraki, K., and H. Peter Lankes, 2004, “The Impact of Preference Erosion on Middle-Income Developing Countries,” IMF Working Paper 04/169 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund).
- Amiti, M. and J. Romalis, 2006, “Will the Doha Round Lead to Preference Erosion?” IMF Working Paper 06/10 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund).
- Cashin, P., 2004, “Caribbean Business Cycles,” IMF Working Paper 04/136 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund).
- Cashin, P., 2006, “Key Features of Caribbean Business Cycles,” in The Caribbean: From Vulnerability to Sustained Growth, edited by R. Sahay, D.O. Robinson, and P. Cashin (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund), pp. 83–121.
- International Monetary Fund, 2002, “The Restructuring of the Banana Industry in St. Lucia and the Windward Islands,” in St. Lucia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No. 02/14, pp. 6–23 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund).
- International Monetary Fund, 2008, Eastern Caribbean Currency Union: 2007 Discussion on Common Policies of Member Countries, IMF Country Report No. 08/94 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund).
- International Monetary Fund, 2009, Eastern Caribbean Currency Union: 2009 Discussion on Common Policies of Member Countries, IMF Country Report No. 09/175 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund).
- Mlachila M., and P. Cashin, 2007, “The Macroeconomic Impact of Trade Preference Erosion on the Windward Islands,” in Eastern Caribbean Currency Union: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 07/97, pp. 18–48 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund).
- Mlachila, M., W. Samuel, and P. Njoroge, 2006, “Integration and Growth in the Eastern Caribbean,” in Sahay, R., D.O. Robinson, and P. Cashin (Eds.), The Caribbean: From Vulnerability to Sustained Growth, (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund), pp. 307-48.
- Roache, S., 2007, “Public Investment and Growth in the Eastern Caribbean,” IMF Working Paper 04/124, (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund).
- Sahay, R., D.O. Robinson, and P. Cashin, 2006, The Caribbean: From Vulnerability to Sustained Growth, (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund).

### Books, book chapters, and edited volumes
- Aksoy, M.A., and J.C. Beghin (Editors), 2005, Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries, (Washington DC: The World Bank).
- Anderson, K., and W. Martin, 2006, Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda, (Washington DC: The World Bank and New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Ingco, M.D., and J.D. Nash (Editors), 2004, Agriculture and the WTO: Creating a Trading System for Development, (Washington DC: The World Bank and Oxford University Press).
- Ingco, M.D., and A. Winters (Editors), 2004, Agricultural Trade in a New Trade Round: Perspectives of Developing Countries and Transition Economies, (Washington DC: The World Bank).
- Cashin, P., 2006, “Key Features of Caribbean Business Cycles,” in The Caribbean: From Vulnerability to Sustained Growth, edited by R. Sahay, D.O. Robinson, and P. Cashin (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund), pp. 83–121.
- Myers, G., 2004, Banana Wars: the Price of Free Tradea Caribbean Perspective, (London: Zed Books).
- Sandiford, W., 2000, On the Brink of Decline: Bananas in the Windward Islands, (St. George’s: Cedon Books).

### FAO and other international organization reports and technical notes
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 2004, “Bananas: Is There a Tariff-Only Equivalent to the EU Tariff Rate Quota Regime? Insights from Economic Analysis,” FAO Trade Policy Technical Notes No. 3 (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization).
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 2005, “Small Island Developing Countries: Agricultural Production and Trade, Preferences and Policy,” FAO Technical Paper No. 7 (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization).
- Anania, G., 2009, “How Would a WTO Agreement on Bananas Affect Exporting and Importing Countries?,” ICTSD Programme on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (Geneva: Switzerland).
- Guyomard, H., and C. Le Mouel, 2002, “The New Banana Import Regime in the European Union: A Quantitative Assessement,” Institut National de le Recherche Agronomique, INRA Working Paper 04-04.
- Guyomard, H., Le Mouël, C., Levert, F., and J. Lombana, 2004, “Will the Banana Trade War Ever End?” paper presented for FAO Informal Expert Consultation on Banana Trade Policies, Rome, October 28–29.
- Vanzetti, D., S. Fernandez de Córdoba, and V. Chau, 2004, “Banana Split: How EU Policies Divide Global Producers,” Paper presented for FAO Informal Expert Consultation on Banana Trade Policies, Rome, October.

### Policy papers, reports, and commissioned studies (bananas and preference erosion)
- Alexandraki, K., and H. Peter Lankes, 2004, “The Impact of Preference Erosion on Middle-Income Developing Countries,” IMF Working Paper 04/169 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund).
- Amiti, M. and J. Romalis, 2006, “Will the Doha Round Lead to Preference Erosion?” IMF Working Paper 06/10 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund).
- Anania, G., 2009, “How Would a WTO Agreement on Bananas Affect Exporting and Importing Countries?,” ICTSD Programme on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (Geneva: Switzerland).
- Borrell, B., 1999, “Bananas: Straightening Out Bent Ideas on Trade as Aid,” Centre for International Economics, (Canberra and Sydney: Centre for International Economics).
- Borrell, B., and M. Bauer, 2004, “EU Banana Drama: Not Yet OverNew Distortions from a High Tariff-Only Policy,” (Canberra and Sydney: Centre for International Economics), March.
- Clegg, P., 2003, The Caribbean Banana Trade (London: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, “Preference-Dependent Economies and Multilateral Liberalization: Impacts and Options,” Commonwealth Secretariat, (London: Commonwealth Secretariat).
- De Arce, R., G. Escribano, and R. Mahía, 2004, “Estimation of a Tariff Only Level to Replace the Current European Protection System for the Banana Market,” mimeo, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.
- Dickson, A.K., 2003, “The EU Banana Regime: History and Interests”, Commissioned by Banana Link for EUROBAN, May.
  - http://www.bananalink.org.uk/documents/EU_Regime_History_by_Anna_Dickson_commissioned_by_Banana_Link+EUROBAN.PDF
- FAO Trade Policy Technical Notes and papers listed above.
- François, J., B. Hoekman, and M. Manchin, 2005, “Preference Erosion and Multilateral Trade Liberalization,” Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper Series, No. 5153.
- National Economic Research Associates (NERA), and Oxford Policy Management, 2004, “Addressing the Impact of Preference Erosion in Bananas on Caribbean Countries,” Report Prepared for Department for International Development, London.
- National Economic Research Associates (NERA), 2003, “Banana Exports from the Caribbean since 1992,” Preliminary Report Prepared for the Caribbean Banana Exporters Association.
- Sanchez, J., 2004, “Obtaining the Tariff Equivalent to the Current Banana Regime in the European Union (25), According to the Attachment to Annex 5 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture,” mimeo (Madrid: World Trade Organization).
- Stoeckel, A., and B. Borrell, 2001, “Preferential Trade and Developing Countries: Bad Aid, Bad Trade,” Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation, Publication No. 01/116 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service).
- Subramanian, A., 2003, “Financing of Losses from Trade Preference Erosion,” Paper Prepared for the World Trade Organization, WT/TF/COH/14, February.
- Vanzetti, D., S. Fernandez de Córdoba, and V. Chau, 2004, “Banana Split: How EU Policies Divide Global Producers,” Paper presented for FAO Informal Expert Consultation on Banana Trade Policies, Rome, October.

### Regional studies, memos, and unpublished materials
- Atoyan, R., 2006, “The Impact of EU Trade Preference Erosion on Belize,” Belize: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 06/370, pp. 5–18 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund).
- De Arce, R., G. Escribano, and R. Mahía, 2004, “Estimation of a Tariff Only Level to Replace the Current European Protection System for the Banana Market,” mimeo, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.
- Dickson, A.K., 2003, “The EU Banana Regime: History and Interests”, Commissioned by Banana Link for EUROBAN, May. (See URL listed above in this references list.)
- Mandle, J.R, 1999, “The Crisis in and the Future of the Windward Islands Banana Industry,” mimeo, Colgate University.
- Williams, O., and R. Darius, 1998, “Bananas, the WTO and Adjustment Initiatives in the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Area,” (unpublished; Basseterre, St. Kitts and Nevis: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank).
- St. Lucia, 1999, Country Strategy Paper for the Banana Industry, Agricultural Diversification, and the Social Recovery of Rural Communities, (Castries: Government of St. Lucia).

*Source: _wp1059 - References*

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