## _wp1081

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### I. Research question and contribution
- Asks whether better compliance with the Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCPs) is associated with bank soundness and whether compliance with different elements of the BCP framework is more closely associated with bank soundness.
- Extends Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Tressel (2008) by using an accounting-based measure of bank soundness (Z-score) to broaden the sample from 200 banks/37 countries to over 3,000 banks/86 countries.
- Motivated by concerns about reliance on ratings and limited samples in prior work.

### II. Data and methodology
- Sample:
  - Over 3,000 banks from 86 countries (total including Japan: 3,702; JAPAN: 721; Total (excluding Japan): 2,981).
  - Bank types include commercial banks, cooperative banks, real estate and mortgage banks, savings banks, and in some specifications investment banks/security houses, medium and long-term credit banks, nonbank credit institutions, specialized government credit institutions.
  - Japanese banks account for 23.4 percent of the sample (721 banks).
- Dependent variable:
  - Bank financial soundness measured by the Z-score (defined as (average return on assets + equity/assets)/(standard deviation of the return on assets) over [t, t-4]).
  - Regressions use ln(1+ Z-score) as the dependent variable.
  - Aggregate/systemic Z-score computed by aggregating profits and equity across banks, computing standard deviation of aggregate profits, then computing aggregate Z-score.
- Main explanatory variable:
  - Country BCP compliance score from IMF and World Bank BCP assessments conducted from 1999 to 2006.
  - Assessors rate 25 principles on a four-point scale mapped numerically 0 to 3; overall index is the sum of numerical ratings standardized to vary between zero and one.
  - Chapter-level compliance indexes computed by summing numerical ratings for principles in each chapter and averaging; chapters correspond to Basel Core Principles (Chapters 1–7 as listed).
- Controls and estimation:
  - Bank-level controls: Size (log of bank assets), overheads/total assets, net loans/total assets, indicator for non-commercial bank, rated-bank dummy.
  - Country-level controls: Index of rule of law (Kaufman, Kraay, Mastruzzi (2003)), GDP per capita (alternative), macro variables in robustness checks (GDP growth, inflation, inflation volatility, exchange rate appreciation, private credit, sovereign rating).
  - Cross-sectional regressions (BCP score available at one point in time); baseline regression:
    - Z_ij = α + β1 X1_j + β2 X2_ij + β3 X3_j + ε_ij
  - Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered by country.
- Sample handling:
  - Right-hand side variables are five-year averages over [t, t-4], where t is year of BCP evaluation (1999–2006).
  - Some banks’ variables averaged over shorter periods when data missing.
  - Observations with negative equity, negative overheads, overhead/asset > 1, or negative net loans/assets were excluded.

### III. Main empirical findings
- No robust positive relationship between overall BCP compliance and bank soundness (Z-scores):
  - Baseline coefficient on BCP overall compliance examples: 0.310 (0.490); -0.188 (0.332); -0.155 (0.333); -0.217 (0.342); -0.389 (0.387) — none statistically significant in baseline specifications.
  - Aggregate/systemic Z-score: BCP overall compliance coefficients are small and statistically imprecise across specifications (examples: 0.075 (0.167); 0.141 (0.315); 0.276 (0.617); 0.069 (0.159); 0.439 (0.970); 0.558 (1.403); -0.256 (-0.463)).
- Subsample and robustness results:
  - Excluding Japan improves model fit (R-squared rises from 0.103 to 0.191 in Table 2) but BCP compliance index remains insignificantly different from zero.
  - Including broader financial institutions (sample up ~25 percent) leaves main results unchanged.
  - Restricting to commercial banks yields results close to baseline.
  - Restricting to Moody’s-rated banks (sample shrinks to just over 300 banks): BCP compliance index becomes positive and significant only at the 10 percent level in one specification (Table 3: 1.295* (0.746)).
  - Testing largest banks (top 10 per country; top 20% of sample): BCP compliance index insignificant.
- Disaggregated chapter-level findings:
  - Compliance scores across chapters are fairly strongly correlated, complicating identification.
  - Robust negative association for Chapter 2 (Licensing and Structure):
    - Index chapter 2 coefficients include -0.512*** (0.134); -0.366** (0.151); -0.549*** (0.123); -0.428*** (0.120); -0.482*** (0.152) in multiple specifications — indicating stronger compliance with Chapter 2 associated with lower bank Z-scores (riskier banks) in many samples.
    - This negative correlation holds in all samples except those including only the largest banks.
  - Chapter 5 (Information Requirements) shows a positive and significant coefficient only in the sample including Japan; contrasts with earlier DDT findings where disclosure/compliance predicted Moody’s ratings.
- Consistent and significant controls:
  - Non-commercial bank dummy is consistently and significantly positive for log Z-score (examples: 0.287*** (0.088); 0.529*** (0.122); 0.548*** (0.124) across tables).
  - Overheads/total assets is consistently and significantly negative (examples: -2.978*** (0.753); -3.625*** (0.740); -2.909** (1.255)).
  - Net loans/total assets typically small positive and often significant (examples: 0.005*** (0.001); 0.006*** (0.001); 0.004*** (0.001)).
  - Total assets (log) often negative and sometimes significant (examples: -0.043 (0.034); -0.060** (0.026); -0.062** (0.025)).
  - Index of rule of law frequently positive and sometimes significant (examples: 0.235*** (0.057); 0.201*** (0.066); 0.190*** (0.057)).
  - Macroeconomic variables enter as expected in many specifications (examples: GDP growth 7.512** (3.673); Inflation -1.582*** (-3.549) in system-wide regressions).
- System-wide (aggregate) results:
  - Aggregate Z-score correlates with macro variables (higher growth, low inflation, low inflation volatility, currency appreciation, favorable sovereign ratings associated with higher aggregate Z-score).
  - BCP compliance index is not a significant determinant of aggregate Z-score in reported specifications.

### IV. Selected quantitative results and model fit (examples drawn from reported tables)
- Table 2 (Baseline, selected):
  - Number of observations: 3072; 2351; 2313; 2351; 1867 (columns 1–5).
  - R-squared: 0.103; 0.191; 0.194; 0.194; 0.196.
  - Overheads/total assets: -2.978*** (0.753) (column 1); -3.625*** (0.740) (column 2).
  - Net loans/total assets: 0.003 (0.003) (column 1); 0.005*** (0.001) (column 2).
  - Total assets: -0.043 (0.034) (column 1); -0.060** (0.026) (column 2).
- Table 3 (Alternative samples, selected):
  - Number of observations: 2962; 2019; 318; 663; 532.
  - R-squared: 0.127; 0.103; 0.205; 0.127; 0.318.
  - BCP overall compliance: -0.185 (0.325); -0.289 (0.288); 1.295* (0.746) (only-rated sample); -0.096 (0.396); 0.932 (0.654).
- Table 4 (Chapter-level, selected):
  - Index chapter 2 notable negative coefficients: -0.512*** (0.134); -0.366** (0.151); -0.549*** (0.123); -0.428*** (0.120).
  - Number of observations varies across specifications (examples: 2049; 2770; 2611; 1722; 294; 480; 503).
  - R-squared examples: 0.235; 0.152; 0.164; 0.137; 0.261; 0.170; 0.365.
- Table 5 (System-wide risk):
  - Number of observations: 83; 83; 83; 85; 83; 83; 54.
  - R-squared examples: 0.088; 0.065; 0.055; 0.073; 0.098; 0.123; 0.212.
  - GDP growth significant in several specifications (e.g., 1.909*** (3.651)).
  - BCP overall compliance coefficients small and imprecise (examples listed above).

### V. Caveats and limitations emphasized by the authors
- Insignificant relationships may reflect limits of accounting-based measures (Z-scores), especially for small banks and in low income countries where accounting standards may be poor.
- Assessment quality concerns: BCP compliance assessments may not reflect implementation or may be heterogeneous across countries despite IMF/World Bank review procedures; laws/regulations "on the books" may carry little weight in practice.
- Strong correlation across chapter compliance scores complicates identifying the causal role of particular BCP components.

### VI. Policy implications highlighted
- Primary empirical conclusion: No robust statistical relationship linking better compliance with the Basel Core Principles and improved bank soundness (as measured by Z-scores) at individual or aggregate levels.
- Specific concern: Stronger compliance with BCPs on supervisors’ powers to license and regulate structure (Chapter 2) is associated with riskier banks in most samples (negative correlation with Z-scores), raising questions about the real-world effectiveness of empowering supervisors without ensuring implementation.
- Broader implications:
  - Results call into question the relevance of the Basel Core Principles as currently measured for ensuring supervisory effectiveness in improving bank soundness.
  - Results raise questions about the cost-effectiveness of periodic BCP compliance reviews in IMF/World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Programs if assessments do not predict soundness.
- Authors emphasize caveats regarding measurement and assessment comparability before drawing definitive policy prescriptions.

### VII. Descriptive statistics and cross-correlations (selected)
- BCP compliance (overall index, country-level): Mean 0.646; Median 0.644; s.d. 0.182; Maximum 1; Minimum 0.233; No. of observations 86.
- Bank-level summary (Baseline sample, excluding Japan):
  - z-score: Mean 2.672; Median 2.721; s.d. 1.039; Maximum 6.253; Minimum -1.936; No. of observations 2400.
  - Non-commercial bank dummy: Mean 0.130; s.d. 0.336; No. of observations 2981.
  - Rated banks dummy: Mean 0.130; s.d. 0.337; No. of observations 2981.
  - Net loans/total assets: Mean 49.481; s.d. 22.288; No. of observations 2950.
  - Total assets (logs): Mean 19.487; s.d. 2.059; No. of observations 2981.
  - Overheads/total assets: Mean 0.054; s.d. 0.057; No. of observations 2981.
- Selected country-level descriptives:
  - Index of rule of law: Mean -0.068; Median -0.287; s.d. 0.859; Maximum 1.813; Minimum -1.340; No. of observations 86.
  - GDP growth: Mean 0.044; Median 0.043; s.d. 0.019; No. of observations 86.
  - Inflation: Mean 0.084; Median 0.060; s.d. 0.100; No. of observations 83.
- Cross-correlations (selected):
  - BCP overall compliance with Index of rule of law: 0.654 (p-value 0.000).
  - BCP overall compliance with Private credit: 0.549 (p-value 0.000).
  - Chapter pair correlations are high (examples: Chapter 3 with Chapter 4: 0.828 (p-value 0.000); Chapter 1 with Chapter 7: 0.646 (p-value 0.000)).

*Source: _wp1081 (IMF working paper chapter and references content provided).*

### References .............................................................................................................

### _wp1081 - References

### I. Introduction
- The recent financial crisis exposed significant weaknesses in financial system regulatory and supervisory frameworks worldwide.
- The Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCPs), issued in 1997 by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, have been the embodiment of best practices in supervision and regulation.
- Since 1999, the IMF and the World Bank have conducted evaluations of countries’ compliance with the BCPs, mainly within their joint Financial Sector Assessment program (FSAP).
- The paper asks whether better compliance with BCPs is associated with bank soundness and whether compliance with different elements of the BCP framework is more closely associated with bank soundness.

### II. Research question, prior work, and contribution
- Extends previous work (Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Tressel, 2008: DDT), which found that compliance with BCPs related to information provision was associated with more favorable Moody’s financial strength ratings, while compliance with other principles was not significant.
- Limitations of the previous study: reliance on ratings constrained the sample to larger, internationally active banks and raised concerns about ratings’ credibility after the crisis.
- This paper uses the Z-score (Boyd and Runkle, 1993) as an accounting-based measure of bank soundness to broaden the sample and include a wider range of banks and countries.

### III. Data and sample
- Sample expanded to over 3,000 banks from 86 countries (compared to 200 banks from 37 countries in DDT).
- The richer sample allows exploration of heterogeneity in the relationship between BCP compliance and bank soundness across different types of banks.

### IV. Main findings
- No support found for the hypothesis that better compliance with BCPs results in sounder banks as measured by Z-scores.
  - This result holds after controlling for the macroeconomic environment, institutional quality, and bank characteristics.
  - No significant relationship found in alternative samples: rated banks only; commercial banks only; samples including only the largest financial institutions.
  - Aggregate Z-scores at the country level (system-wide stability) are also not significantly related to overall BCP compliance.
- Examination of compliance with specific groups of principles yields no evidence that good compliance is related to improved soundness.
  - Some evidence that stronger compliance with principles related to the power of supervisors to license banks and regulate market structure are associated with riskier banks.

### V. Caveats and limitations
- Insignificant results may reflect limitations of accounting-based measures, such as Z-scores, particularly for small banks and in low income countries where accounting standards tend to be poor.
- Results may reflect low quality in the assessment of BCP compliance, especially where laws and regulations on the books carry little weight.
- Potential concerns about comparability of assessments across countries, despite efforts by expert supervisors and internal reviewing teams at the IMF and the World Bank to ensure a uniform methodology and uniform standards.
- If negative results arise because compliance assessments do not reflect reality or are not comparable, this should raise questions about the value of these assessments for ensuring supervision meets global standards.

### VI. Organization of the paper
- The paper proceeds with a review of related literature in the next section.

*Source: _wp1081 - References*

### Section 3 presents the methodology and data. Section 4 contains the results, and Section 5

### _wp1081 - Section 3 presents the methodology and data. Section 4 contains the results, and Section 5

### Literature review
- Prior large-sample cross-country work (Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001, 2004, and 2006)) finds that regulatory approaches that facilitate private sector monitoring (for example, disclosure of reliable, comprehensive and timely information) and strengthen incentives for greater market monitoring (for example by limiting deposit insurance) improve bank performance and stability.
- That research finds that boosting official supervisory oversight and disciplinary powers and tightening capital standards does not lead to banking sector development, nor does it improve bank efficiency, reduce corruption in lending, or lower banking system fragility.
- Survey-based measures (Barth, Caprio, and Levine) mainly capture rules on the books and may miss implementation; BCP assessments incorporate implementation but involve assessor judgment.
- Cihak and Tieman (2008):
  - Use both survey data and BCP assessments.
  - Find regulation and supervision in high-income countries generally of higher quality than in lower income countries.
  - Find correlations between survey data and BCP data tend to be low, always less than 50 percent and in many cases in the 20-30 percent range.
- Studies using BCP assessments:
  - Sundararajan, Marston, and Basu (2001): BCP compliance not a significant determinant of NPLs and loan spreads (sample of 25 countries).
  - Podpiera (2004): Better BCP compliance lowers NPLs (extended country set).
  - Das et al. (2005): Better regulatory governance (BCP compliance plus standards and codes) associated with sounder banks, especially in countries with better institutions.
- This paper uses the Z-score to measure bank soundness, arguing it improves comparability relative to NPLs, loan spreads, interest margins, and capitalization measures; Z-scores do not rely on subjective ratings.

### Methodology and data
- Dependent variable:
  - Bank financial soundness measured by the Z-score.
  - Z-score defined as (average return on assets + equity/assets)/(standard deviation of the return on assets) over [t, t-4].
  - Regressions use ln(1+ Z-score) as the dependent variable to smooth higher values and avoid truncation at zero.
  - Alternative specification: Z-scores computed at the country level (aggregate/systemic Z-score).
- Main explanatory variable:
  - Country BCP compliance score from IMF and World Bank BCP assessments conducted from 1999 to 2006.
  - Assessors rate 25 Basel Core Principles using a four-point scale: non compliant, materially non compliant, largely compliant, and compliant.
  - Numerical mapping: 0 (non-compliant) to 3 (compliant); overall index is the sum of numerical ratings standardized to vary between zero and one.
  - Chapter-level (subgroup) compliance indexes computed by summing numerical ratings for principles in each chapter and averaging.
- Regression framework:
  - Cross-sectional sample because BCP compliance score is available at one point in time.
  - Baseline regression equation:
    - Z_ij = α + β1 X1_j + β2 X2_ij + β3 X3_j + ε_ij  (equation (1) in source)
    - Subscripts: j = country, i = bank; X1_j = BCP compliance score; X2_ij = vector of bank characteristics; X3_j = vector of country characteristics.
  - Right-hand side variables are five-year averages over the period [t, t-4], where t is the year of the BCP compliance evaluation (varies within 1999-2006).
  - Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered by country.
- Bank-level control variables:
  - Size: logarithm of bank assets.
  - Cost efficiency: overhead costs as a ratio of total assets.
  - Illiquidity proxy: ratio of bank loans to total assets.
  - Indicator for whether the bank is a commercial bank.
  - Bank data from Fitch’s Bankscope database.
- Country-level control variables:
  - Institutional quality: rule of law index from Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) (baseline); alternatives include lack of corruption, contract enforcement, average of indexes, or GDP per capita.
  - Macroeconomic variables used in robustness tests: output growth, inflation, inflation volatility, exchange rate depreciation/appreciation, real interest rates, credit expansion; S&P sovereign rating used as a comprehensive indicator.
  - Macroeconomic data mainly from IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
- Sample composition and subsamples:
  - Sample covers 86 countries and over 3,000 banks, including commercial banks, cooperative banks, real estate and mortgage banks, and savings banks.
  - Some large countries missing because BCP assessment not carried out/completed or missing Bankscope data.
  - Subsamples: rated banks (those with a Moody’s rating), commercial banks, and all financial institutions (including investment banks/security houses, medium and long-term credit banks, nonbank credit institutions, specialized government credit institutions).
  - Sample is very unbalanced across countries; Japanese banks account for 23.4 percent of this sample (721 banks).
  - Robustness checks: regressions run with and without Japanese banks; specifications including only top 10 banks in each country and top 20 percent of banks in the sample.
- Data handling notes:
  - For some banks variables are averaged over shorter periods due to missing data.
  - Small number of observations with negative equity, negative overheads, overhead to assets ratios greater than one, and negative net loans/assets were excluded.

### Results
- Baseline regression (all countries):
  - Z-score higher (sounder bank) for banks with lower operating costs and in countries with higher GDP per capita.
  - Non-commercial banks tend to have higher Z-scores.
  - Other control variables not significant.
  - Coefficient on BCP compliance index positive but not significant.
- Excluding Japanese banks:
  - Model fit improves: R-squared increases from 10 percent to 19 percent.
  - Coefficients of many regressors change substantially, suggesting different determinants for Japanese banks possibly due to lingering effects of Japan’s prolonged banking crisis.
  - In the sample excluding Japan:
    - Inflation and the rule of law index are significant with expected signs.
    - GDP per capita coefficient remains positive but is not significant.
    - Banks with a higher ratio of net loans to assets have higher Z-scores (possible Basel capital effects).
    - Larger banks have lower Z-scores (likely hold less capital than smaller banks).
  - Despite these changes, BCP compliance index coefficient remains insignificantly different from zero.
  - Adding macro controls (exchange rate appreciation, private credit, sovereign rating) does not change insignificance of BCP index.
- Sample composition exercises (excluding Japan):
  - Including broader set of financial institutions (investment banks/security houses, medium and long-term credit banks, nonbank credit institutions, specialized government credit institutions) increases sample size by 25 percent but main results unchanged: bank soundness not significantly affected by BCP compliance.
  - Restricting to commercial banks (losing about 300 banks) yields results very close to baseline.
  - Restricting to Moody’s-rated banks (sample shrinks to just over 300 banks): BCP compliance index becomes positive and significant, but only at the 10 percent confidence level.
  - Testing whether the rated-bank result is driven by size:
    - Sample of largest 10 percent of banks within each country and sample of largest 20 percent of banks in the entire sample: BCP compliance index insignificant in both samples.
- Disaggregated (chapter-level) compliance analysis:
  - Compliance scores across chapters are fairly strongly correlated, complicating identification.
  - Breaking the index into seven components (Basel Committee chapter grouping) and replicating regressions reveals one robust relationship:
    - Compliance with Chapter 2 (principles about supervisors’ powers to regulate bank licensing and structure) is negatively correlated with bank Z-scores — banks in countries where regulators have better-defined licensing and activity-regulation powers tend to be riskier.
    - This negative correlation holds in all samples except those including only the largest banks.
    - This finding is consistent with prior work suggesting systems that empower supervisors may not work well in practice.
  - Compliance with Chapter 5 (information disclosure) shows a positive and significant coefficient only in the sample including Japan; this contrasts with earlier work (DDT) where information disclosure compliance determined Moody’s financial strength rating robustly.
- Aggregate/systemic Z-score results:
  - Constructed by aggregating profits and equity of all banks in a country, computing standard deviation of aggregate profits, then computing aggregate Z-score (number of standard deviations aggregate profits must fall to exhaust all capital).
  - Aggregate Z-score correlates with macro variables as expected: higher growth, low inflation, low inflation volatility, currency appreciation, and favorable sovereign ratings associated with higher aggregate Z-score.
  - BCP compliance index:
    - Positive but small and not statistically significant determinant of aggregate Z-score in any specification.

### Conclusions and policy implications
- Main empirical finding: No robust statistical relationship linking better compliance with the Basel Core Principles and improved bank soundness (measured by Z-scores), at both individual bank and aggregate/systemic levels.
- Specific finding: Compliance with the subgroup of BCPs related to supervisors’ powers to regulate bank licensing and structure (Chapter 2) is associated with riskier banks (negative correlation with Z-scores), except when analysis is limited to the largest banks.
- Implications highlighted by the authors:
  - Results raise questions about the relevance of the Basel Core Principles and the emphasis on these principles as key to effective supervision.
  - Results also raise questions about the wisdom of carrying out costly periodic compliance reviews of BCP implementation in IMF/World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Programs.
- Caveats noted by authors:
  - Results may reflect difficulty of capturing bank risk using accounting measures.
  - Results may reflect inability of assessors to carry out comparable evaluations across countries.
  - Assessment subjectivity and implementation gaps may limit cross-country comparability.

*Source: Excerpt from provided IMF working paper content.*

### References

### _wp1081 - References

### References
- Acharya, V., Richardson, M., 2009, Restoring Financial Stability, John Wiley & Sons.
- Barth, J.R., Caprio Jr., G., Levine, R., 2001, The Regulation and Supervision of Banks Around the World: A new Database. In: Litan, R.E., Herring, R.J. (Eds.), Integrating Emerging Market Countries into the Global Financial System, Brookings–Wharton Papers in Financial Services. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, pp. 183–240.
- ———, 2004. Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best? J. Finan. Intermediation 13:2, 205–248.
- ———, 2006. Rethinking Bank Supervision and Regulation: Until Angels Govern. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Boyd, J.H., Runkle, D.E., 1993. Size and Performance of Banking Firms. J. Monet. Econ. 31:1, 47–67.
- Brunnermeier, M., Crockett, A., Good hart, C., Persaud, A., Shin, H., 2009. The Fundamental Principals of Financial Regulation: 11th Geneva Report on the World Economy.
- Caprio, G.; Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Kane, E., 2009. The 2007 Meltdown in Structured Securitization: Searching for Lessons not Scapegoats. World Bank mimeo.
- Cihak, M., Tieman, A., 2008. Quality of Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision Around the World. IMF Working Paper 08/190. International Monetary Fund, Washington.
- Das, U.S., Iossifov, P., Podpiera, R., Rozkhov, D., 2005. Quality of Financial Policies and Financial System Stress. IMF Working Paper 05/173. International Monetary Fund, Washington.
- Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Detragiache, E., 1998. Determinants of Banking Crises in Developed and Developing Countries. IMF Staff Papers 45:1. International Monetary Fund, Washington.
- Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Detragiache, E., Tressel, T., 2008. Banking on the Principles: Compliance with Basel Core Principles and Bank Soundness. J. Finan. Intermediation 17, 511-42.
- Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Serven, L. 2009. Are all the Sacred Cows Dead? Implications of the Financial Crisis for Macro and Financial Policies. World Bank mimeo.
- Financial Services Authority, 2009, “The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis”, London (March).
- Financial Stability Forum, 2008, “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience”, Basel (April).
- G-20, 2009, “Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System”, London (April).
- Goodhart, C., 2008a. “The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis”, CESIfo Working Paper 2257.
- Goodhart, C., 2008b. “Central Banks’ Function to Maintain Financial Stability: an Uncompleted Task”, in R. Baldwin and B. Eichengreen (eds.), What G20 Leaders must do to Stabilize our Economy and Fix the Financial System, available at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2543
- Goodhart, C., Persaud,A.  2008. “A Party Pooper's Guide to Financial Stability,” Letter to the Editor, The Financial Times, June 4.
- Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2003. Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996–2002. World Bank, Washington.
- Kashyap, A., Rajan, R., and Stein, J. (2008) “Rethinking Capital Regulation”, unpublished manuscript.
- Laeven, L., Levine, R., 2008. Bank Governance, Regulation, and Risk Taking. Brown University mimeo.
- Podpiera, R., 2004. Does Compliance with Basel Core Principles Bring any Measurable Benefits? IMF Working Paper 04/204. International Monetary Fund, Washington.
- Sundararajan, V., Marston, D., Basu, R., 2001. Financial System Standards and Financial Stability—The case of Basel Core Principles. IMF Working Paper 01/62. International Monetary Fund, Washington.
- U.S. Treasury, 2009, “Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation”, Washington (June).

### Basel Core Principles—Definitions
- Chapter 1: Preconditions for Effective Banking Supervision
  - Principle 1. Objectives, autonomy, powers, and resources
  - Principle 1(1). There should be clear responsibilities and objectives set by legislations for each supervisory agency
  - Principle 1(2). Each supervisory agency should possess adequate resources to meet the objective set, provided on terms that do not undermine the autonomy, integrity and independence of supervisory agency
  - Principle 1(3). A suitable framework of banking laws, setting bank minimum standard, including provisions related to authorization of banking establishments and their supervision
  - Principle 1(4). The legal framework should provide power to address compliance with laws as well as safety and soundness concerns
  - Principle 1(5). The legal framework should provide protection of supervisors for actions taken in good faith in the course of performing supervisory duties
  - Principle 1(6). There should be arrangements of interagency cooperation, including with foreign supervisors, for sharing information and protecting the confidentiality of such information
- Chapter 2: Licensing and Structure
  - Principle 2. Definition of permissible activities
  - Principle 3. Right to set licensing criteria and reject applications for establishments that do meet the standard sets.
  - Principle 4. Authority to review and reject proposals of significant ownership changes.
  - Principle 5. Authority to establish criteria for reviewing major acquisitions or investments
- Chapter 3: Prudential Regulations and Requirements
  - Principle 6. Prudent and appropriate risk adjusted capital adequacy ratios must be set
  - Principle 7. Supervisors should evaluate banks' credit policies
  - Principle 8. Banks should adhere to adequate loan evaluation and loan-loss provisioning policies
  - Principle 9. Supervisors should set limits to restrict large exposures, and concentration in bank portfolios should be identifiable
  - Principle 10. Supervisors must have in place requirements to mitigate the risks associated with related lending
  - Principle 11. Policies must be in place to identify, monitor and control country risks, and to maintain reserves against such risks
  - Principle 12. Systems must be in place to accurately measure, monitor and adequately control markets risks and supervisors should have powers to impose limits or capital charge on such exposures
  - Principle 13. Banks must have in place a comprehensive risk management process to identify, measure, monitor and control all other material risks and, if needed, hold capital against such risks
  - Principle 14. Banks should have internal control and audit systems in place.
  - Principle 15. Adequate policies, practices and procedures should be in place to promote high ethical and professional standards and prevent the bank being used by criminal elements
- Chapter 4: Methods of On-Going Supervision
  - Principle 16. An effective supervisory system should consist of on-site and off-site supervision
  - Principle 17. Supervisors should have regular contact with bank management
  - Principle 18. Supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing and analyzing prudential reports and statistics returns from banks on a solo and consolidated basis
  - Principle 19. Supervisors must have a means of independent validation of supervisory information either through on-site examinations or use of external auditors
  - Principle 20. Supervisors must have the ability to supervise banking groups on a consolidated basis
- Chapter 5: Information Requirements
  - Principle 21. Each bank must maintain adequate records that enable the supervisor to obtain a true and fair view of the financial condition of the bank of the bank, and must publish on a regular basis financial statements that fairly reflect its condition
- Chapter 6: Formal Powers of Supervisors
  - Principle 22. Adequate supervisory measures must be in place to bring about corrective action when banks fail to meet prudential requirement when there are regulatory violations, or when depositors are threatened in any other way. This should include the ability to revoke the banking license or recommend its revocation.

*Content derived from the PDF chapter titled "References".*

### Chapter 7: Cross-Border Banking

### _wp1081 - Chapter 7: Cross-Border Banking

### Supervisory Principles (from Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Basel Committee, September 1997)
- Principle 23: Supervisors must practice global consolidated supervision over internationally active banks, adequately monitor and apply prudential norms to all aspects of the business conducted by these banks.
- Principle 24: Consolidated supervision should include establishing contact and information exchange with the various supervisors involved, primarily host country supervisory authorities.
- Principle 25: Supervisors must require the local operations of foreign banks to be conducted at the same standards as required of domestic institutions, and must have powers to share information needed by the home country supervisors of those banks.

### Table 2 — BCP Compliance and Bank Z-Scores: Baseline Results (selected coefficients and statistics)
- Dependent variable: log Z-score (implied by table title and column headings).
- Columns reported: (1) All countries, (2) Excluding Japan, (3) Excluding Japan, (4) Excluding Japan, (5) Excluding Japan.
- Selected coefficient estimates (with standard errors in parentheses):
  - BCP overall compliance: 0.310 (0.490); -0.188 (0.332); -0.155 (0.333); -0.217 (0.342); -0.389 (0.387).
  - Non-commercial bank: 0.287*** (0.088); 0.529*** (0.122); 0.529*** (0.120); 0.532*** (0.122); 0.457*** (0.163).
  - Rated banks: 0.071 (0.127); 0.148 (0.111); 0.171 (0.112); 0.154 (0.110); 0.175 (0.108).
  - Net loans/total assets: 0.003 (0.003); 0.005*** (0.001); 0.005*** (0.001); 0.005*** (0.001); 0.005*** (0.001).
  - Total assets: -0.043 (0.034); -0.060** (0.026); -0.067*** (0.025); -0.063** (0.026); -0.066** (0.027).
  - Overheads/total assets: -2.978*** (0.753); -3.625*** (0.740); -3.631*** (0.763); -3.590*** (0.738); -2.648*** (0.873).
  - Index of rule of law: 0.107 (0.092); 0.201*** (0.066); 0.179** (0.072); 0.106 (0.102); -0.149 (0.181).
  - GDP growth: 7.512** (3.673); 1.595 (3.041); 1.315 (2.983); 2.418 (3.303); 4.475 (2.809).
  - Inflation: -0.520 (0.525); -1.000*** (0.245); -0.519 (0.467); -0.773*** (0.263); -0.662** (0.320).
  - Sovereign rating: 0.076** (0.030) — appears in one specification.
- Constants and model fit:
  - Constant: 2.941*** (0.907); 3.825*** (0.610); 3.957*** (0.560); 3.712*** (0.651); 3.125*** (0.712).
  - Number of observations: 3072; 2351; 2313; 2351; 1867.
  - R-squared: 0.103; 0.191; 0.194; 0.194; 0.196.
- Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered by country.

### Table 3 — BCP Compliance and Bank Z-scores: Alternative Samples (selected coefficients)
- Sample variants (columns): (1) Excluding Japan include unregulated, (2) Excluding Japan only commercial, (3) Excluding Japan only rated, (4) Excluding Japan only top 10 banks in each country, (5) Excluding Japan only top 20% largest banks in sample.
- Selected coefficient estimates (with standard errors in parentheses):
  - BCP overall compliance: -0.185 (0.325); -0.289 (0.288); 1.295* (0.746); -0.096 (0.396); 0.932 (0.654).
  - Non-commercial bank: 0.111 (0.075); 0.000 (0.000); 0.565** (0.228); 0.164 (0.193); 0.701*** (0.146).
  - Rated banks: 0.166 (0.106); 0.157 (0.123); 0.000 (0.000); 0.170 (0.112); 0.340*** (0.122).
  - Net loans/total assets: 0.006*** (0.001); 0.004*** (0.001); 0.004 (0.004); 0.004* (0.002); 0.006*** (0.002).
  - Total assets: -0.061** (0.028); -0.070** (0.028); -0.077 (0.057); -0.053 (0.036); -0.070 (0.081).
  - Overheads/total assets: -2.879*** (0.578); -3.451*** (0.842); -7.219** (3.329); -5.887*** (1.734); -6.420*** (1.699).
  - Index of rule of law: 0.190*** (0.057); 0.201*** (0.065); 0.079 (0.169); 0.118 (0.094); -0.014 (0.130).
  - Inflation (where significant): -0.946*** (0.248); -1.006*** (0.222); 0.021 (0.412); -0.170 (0.555); -0.190 (0.464).
- Constants and sample sizes:
  - Constant: 3.709*** (0.636); 4.032*** (0.632); 3.341** (1.406); 3.874*** (0.801); 3.376** (1.662).
  - Number of observations: 2962; 2019; 318; 663; 532.
  - R-squared: 0.127; 0.103; 0.205; 0.127; 0.318.
- Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered by country.

### Table 4 — BCP Compliance — Individual Chapters (selected coefficients across multiple specifications)
- Baseline and alternative sample columns include: Baseline (including Japan), include unregulated, only commercial, only rated, only top 10 banks in each country, only top 20% banks in sample.
- Selected coefficient estimates (with standard errors in parentheses):
  - Non-commercial bank: 0.548*** (0.124); 0.430*** (0.098); 0.119 (0.079); 0.401* (0.213); 0.037 (0.210); 0.668*** (0.164).
  - Rated banks: 0.193* (0.112); 0.069 (0.137); 0.184* (0.106); 0.172 (0.125); 0.183 (0.130); 0.307*** (0.098).
  - Net loans/total assets: 0.005*** (0.001); 0.003 (0.003); 0.006*** (0.001); 0.004*** (0.001); 0.004 (0.003); 0.006** (0.003); 0.007*** (0.002) — coefficients vary by column.
  - Total assets: -0.062** (0.025); -0.022 (0.040); -0.053** (0.026); -0.061** (0.028); -0.077 (0.053); -0.031 (0.038); -0.032 (0.059).
  - Overheads/total assets (selected): -2.909** (1.255); -2.011* (1.150); -2.426*** (0.854); -2.750** (1.279); -5.551** (2.671); -6.473*** (2.099); -4.973** (2.112).
  - Index of rule of law: 0.235*** (0.057); 0.133* (0.076); 0.199*** (0.055); 0.211*** (0.059); 0.116 (0.260); 0.114 (0.110); 0.018 (0.208).
  - Inflation (selected): -0.850** (0.370); -0.652 (0.438); -1.027*** (0.321); -0.939*** (0.337); 0.521 (0.735); -0.444 (0.587); -0.300 (0.595).
  - Index chapter 2 exhibits notable negative coefficients in some specifications: -0.512*** (0.134); -0.366** (0.151); -0.549*** (0.123); -0.428*** (0.120); -0.017 (0.376); -0.482*** (0.152); -0.034 (0.289).
  - Index chapter 6: 0.110** (0.049); -0.044 (0.053); 0.053 (0.048); 0.104 (0.075); 0.073 (0.157); 0.083 (0.071); 0.149 (0.113).
  - Index chapter 7: -0.129 (0.098); -0.143 (0.113); -0.156* (0.087); -0.154* (0.089); -0.092 (0.240); -0.072 (0.108); -0.263 (0.234).
- Constants, observations, and R-squared (selected):
  - Constant examples: 4.116*** (0.527); 2.935*** (0.757); 3.803*** (0.521); 4.046*** (0.588); 3.044* (1.634); 3.787*** (0.872); 2.516* (1.457).
  - Number of observations: 2049; 2770; 2611; 1722; 294; 480; 503.
  - R-squared: 0.235; 0.152; 0.164; 0.137; 0.261; 0.170; 0.365.
- Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered by country.

### Table 5 — BCP Compliance and System-Wide Risk (selected coefficients)
- Columns (1)–(7) report alternative specifications; dependent variable is a system-wide risk measure (table title).
- Selected coefficient estimates (with t-statistics or standard errors in parentheses where provided):
  - BCP overall compliance: 0.075 (0.167); 0.141 (0.315); 0.276 (0.617); 0.069 (0.159); 0.439 (0.970); 0.558 (1.403); -0.256 (-0.463).
  - Index of rule of law: 0.017 (0.165); 0.019 (0.183); -0.008 (-0.076); 0.024 (0.237).
  - GDP growth: 1.909*** (3.651); 2.023*** (3.647); 2.185*** (3.772); 1.573** (2.508).
  - Inflation: -1.582*** (-3.549) in one specification.
  - Standard deviation of inflation: -2.408** (-2.012) in one specification.
  - Exchange rate appreciation: 2.289*** (3.665) in a specific column.
  - Private credit: -0.005** (-2.205) in a specific column.
  - Index of sovereign rating: 0.055* (1.890) in one specification.
- Constants and model fit:
  - Constant: 1.509*** (4.690); 1.501*** (4.664); 1.386*** (4.473); 1.586*** (5.049); 1.344*** (4.623); 1.395*** (5.348); 1.113*** (2.899).
  - Number of observations: 83; 83; 83; 85; 83; 83; 54.
  - R-squared: 0.088; 0.065; 0.055; 0.073; 0.098; 0.123; 0.212.
- Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

### Appendix — Sample composition and summary statistics
- Baseline sample (country and number of banks; totals):
  - Total (excluding Japan): 2,981.
  - JAPAN: 721.
  - Total: 3,702.
- Selected country counts (excerpt):
  - AUSTRALIA 68; BRAZIL 160; FRANCE 322; INDIA 76; INDONESIA 67; RUSSIAN FEDERATION 226; UNITED KINGDOM 149; SWEDEN 106; UNITED STATES not listed in excerpt.
  - Many countries listed with counts ranging from 4 to 322 as shown in the appendix table.
- Table A.2 — Summary Statistics (Baseline Sample, excluding Japan) — bank-level and country-level variables:
  - z-score: Mean 2.672; Median 2.721; s.d. 1.039; Maximum 6.253; Minimum -1.936; No. of observations 2400.
  - Non-commercial bank dummy: Mean 0.130; Median 0; s.d. 0.336; Maximum 1; Minimum 0; No. of observations 2981.
  - Rated banks dummy: Mean 0.130; Median 0; s.d. 0.337; Maximum 1; Minimum 0; No. of observations 2981.
  - Net loans/total assets: Mean 49.481; Median 50.301; s.d. 22.288; Maximum 100; Minimum 0; No. of observations 2950.
  - Total assets (logs): Mean 19.487; Median 19.306; s.d. 2.059; Maximum 27.388; Minimum 13.315; No. of observations 2981.
  - Overheads/total assets: Mean 0.054; Median 0.040; s.d. 0.057; Maximum 0.907; Minimum 0; No. of observations 2981.
  - BCP compliance: Overall index (country-level): Mean 0.646; Median 0.644; s.d. 0.182; Maximum 1; Minimum 0.233; No. of observations 86.

### Substantive implications and observed patterns (based strictly on reported estimates)
- BCP overall compliance shows mixed associations with bank-level log Z-scores across specifications: coefficients range from 1.295* to -0.389 across tables and samples.
- Non-commercial bank status is consistently and significantly positively associated with higher log Z-scores in many specifications (examples: 0.287***; 0.529***; 0.548***).
- Overheads/total assets is consistently negatively and significantly associated with bank log Z-scores across specifications (examples: -2.978***; -3.625***; -2.909**).
- Net loans/total assets generally displays a small positive and often significant association with log Z-score (examples: 0.005***; 0.006***; 0.004***).
- Total assets (log) often shows a negative association with log Z-score in several specifications (examples: -0.062**; -0.061**; -0.060**).
- Index of rule of law frequently shows positive and sometimes significant associations with bank Z-scores (examples: 0.235***; 0.201***; 0.190***), but with variability across samples.
- Macroeconomic variables: GDP growth and inflation enter significantly in several specifications (examples: GDP growth 7.512**; GDP growth 1.909*** in system-wide regressions; Inflation -1.582*** in system-wide regressions).
- At the system-wide level, BCP overall compliance coefficients are small and statistically imprecise in the reported specifications (examples: 0.075; 0.141; 0.276; 0.069; 0.439; 0.558; -0.256).

*Source: _wp1081 - Chapter 7: Cross-Border Banking (PDF chapter).*

### Chapter 1 2.074 2.167 0.578 3 0.667 86

### _wp1081 - Chapter 1 2.074 2.167 0.578 3 0.667 86

### Key descriptive statistics (selected items)
- Chapter 1: 2.074 2.167 0.578 3 0.667 86
- Chapter 2: 2.230 2.250 0.559 3 0.750 86
- Chapter 3: 1.776 1.800 0.680 3 0.400 76
- Chapter 4: 2.018 2.100 0.645 3 0.600 80
- Chapter 5: 2.012 2 0.759 3 1 86
- Chapter 6: 1.733 2 0.832 3 0 86
- Chapter 7: 1.928 2 0.809 3 0.333 65
- Index of rule of law: -0.068 -0.287 0.859 1.813 -1.340 86
- GDP growth: 0.044 0.043 0.019 0.106 0.002 86
- Inflation: 0.084 0.060 0.100 0.741 -0.030 83
- Standard deviation of inflation: 0.044 0.026 0.060 0.364 0.002 83
- Exchange rate appreciation: -0.054 -0.052 0.074 0.081 -0.405 85
- Private credit: 39.325 26.218 33.104 151.209 4.238 86
- Sovereign rating: 10.791 10.333 4.133 20 4.200 55

### Cross-correlations: Country-Level Variables (selected coefficients and p-values)
- BCP overall compliance index with:
  - Inflation: -0.255 (p-value 0.020)
  - Exchange rate appreciation: 0.273 (p-value 0.012)
  - Index of rule of law: 0.654 (p-value 0.000)
  - Standard deviation of inflation: -0.214 (p-value 0.052)
  - S&P sovereign rating: 0.598 (p-value 0.000)
  - Private credit: 0.549 (p-value 0.000)
  - GDP growth: -0.045 (p-value 0.681)
- Inflation correlations:
  - Exchange rate appreciation: -0.725 (p-value 0.000)
  - Standard deviation of inflation: 0.664 (p-value 0.000)
  - S&P sovereign rating: -0.447 (p-value 0.001)
- Index of rule of law correlations:
  - S&P sovereign rating: 0.865 (p-value 0.000)
  - Private credit: 0.770 (p-value 0.000)
- Standard deviation of inflation correlations:
  - Exchange rate appreciation: -0.361 (p-value 0.001)
  - S&P sovereign rating: -0.463 (p-value 0.000)
- Private credit with S&P sovereign rating: 0.669 (p-value 0.000)
- GDP growth correlations (p-values listed): 0.681 0.711 0.674 0.364 0.264 0.794 0.072

### Cross-correlations: Bank-Level Variables (selected coefficients and p-values)
- Z-score correlations:
  - Non-commercial bank dummy: 0.120 (p-value 0.000)
  - Rated banks dummy: -0.003 (p-value 0.832)
  - Net loans/total assets: 0.142 (p-value 0.000)
  - Total assets: 0.007 (p-value 0.680)
  - Overheads/total assets: -0.069 (p-value 0.000)
- Non-commercial bank dummy correlations:
  - Rated banks dummy: -0.194 (p-value 0.000)
  - Net loans/total assets: 0.082 (p-value 0.000)
  - Total assets: 0.097 (p-value 0.000)
  - Overheads/total assets: 0.018 (p-value 0.206)
- Rated banks dummy with:
  - Net loans/total assets: 0.006 (p-value 0.704)
  - Total assets: 0.268 (p-value 0.000)
  - Overheads/total assets: -0.006 (p-value 0.697)
- Net loans/total assets with:
  - Total assets: 0.088 (p-value 0.000)
  - Overheads/total assets: -0.026 (p-value 0.077)
- Total assets with Overheads/total assets: -0.027 (p-value 0.063)

### Cross-correlations: Individual BCP Chapters (pairwise coefficients and p-values)
- Chapter 1 with:
  - Chapter 2: 0.594 (p-value 0.000)
  - Chapter 3: 0.622 (p-value 0.000)
  - Chapter 4: 0.609 (p-value 0.000)
  - Chapter 5: 0.579 (p-value 0.000)
  - Chapter 6: 0.596 (p-value 0.000)
  - Chapter 7: 0.646 (p-value 0.000)
- Chapter 2 with:
  - Chapter 3: 0.679 (p-value 0.000)
  - Chapter 4: 0.688 (p-value 0.000)
  - Chapter 5: 0.597 (p-value 0.000)
  - Chapter 6: 0.393 (p-value 0.000)
  - Chapter 7: 0.653 (p-value 0.000)
- Chapter 3 with:
  - Chapter 4: 0.828 (p-value 0.000)
  - Chapter 5: 0.621 (p-value 0.000)
  - Chapter 6: 0.504 (p-value 0.000)
  - Chapter 7: 0.627 (p-value 0.000)
- Chapter 4 with:
  - Chapter 5: 0.680 (p-value 0.000)
  - Chapter 6: 0.434 (p-value 0.000)
  - Chapter 7: 0.669 (p-value 0.000)
- Chapter 5 with:
  - Chapter 6: 0.489 (p-value 0.000)
  - Chapter 7: 0.572 (p-value 0.000)
- Chapter 6 with Chapter 7: 0.497 (p-value 0.000)

### Sample size and composition
- Rated banks (Includes all banks with Moody's rating): Number of Banks (excluding Japan) 423; Number of Banks (including Japan) 461
- Commercial banks (Includes all commercial banks): 2,594; 2,760
- Regulated banks (Includes commercial banks, cooperative banks, real estate and mortgage banks, and savings banks): 2,981; 3,823
- All banks (Includes regulated banks and investment banks/securities houses, medium and long-term credit banks, nonbank credit institutions, specialized government credit institutions): 3,974; 4,906
- Source: Bankscope Database.

### Variable definitions and sources (selected)
- Z-score: Log of ((Return on equity-equity/assets)/s.d. return on equity ) — Bankscope
- Net loans/total assets: Net loans, in percent of total assets — Bankscope
- LogTA: Log of total bank assets — Bankscope
- Overheads: Overhead costs/assets — Bankscope
- Index of Rule of Law: Average 1996-2002 of Index of Rule of Law — Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003)
- Inflation: Average annual inflation rate over the previous 5 years — World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI)
- Standard deviation of inflation: Standard deviation of inflation over the previous 5 years — World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI)
- Real GDP growth: Average annual real GDP growth over the previous 5 years — World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI)
- Appreciation: Average annual appreciation of the nominal exchange over the previous 5 years — World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI)
- Private credit: Ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP — World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI)
- Index of sovereign rating: Moody's country sovereign rating — S&P's RatingDirect

*Source: _wp1081 - Chapter 1 2.074 2.167 0.578 3 0.667 86*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/_wp1081.pdf_
