## _wp11265

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---

### I. INTRODUCTION — purpose and key mechanisms
- Purpose:
  - Two-fold: (i) use a simple debt renegotiation model to interpret when collective action problems (holdout problem and pure coordination failures) make sovereign debt renegotiations intractable; (ii) study how minimum participation thresholds and defensive “exit consents” (or “exit amendments”) can overcome such problems without new institutions or contract changes.
- Definitions and interpretations:
  - Holdout problem: situation with a unique low participation equilibrium (or multiple equilibria all involving low participation).
  - Pure coordination failures: cases where low participation is an equilibrium but a high participation equilibrium also exists; the problem is coordinating on the “good” high participation equilibrium.
  - Minimum participation thresholds: condition exchanges on a critical level of creditor participation; function as a coordination device removing low-participation equilibria where both high and low participation equilibria exist.
  - Exit consents/exit amendments: changes to non-payment terms (cross-default, listing, acceleration clauses) that impair liquidity and litigation prospects of the old bond and make litigation unattractive.
- Central model prediction:
  - A debt exchange should be expected to “fail” only in two situations:
    - (i) no participation thresholds (so full participation equilibrium might not be picked even if it exists); or
    - (ii) the offer implies a high haircut and there are no exit consents (holding out comparatively attractive).
  - Voluntary exchange offers in which the government promises to honor obligations to holdouts always fail in the model unless they involve a zero haircut.

### II. EMPIRICAL EXPERIENCE, 1998–2010 — observed patterns and interpretation
- Observed facts (1998–2010):
  - Most major bond restructurings achieved creditor participation above 90 percent (exception: Argentina’s 2005 external debt exchange).
  - Average delay of these restructurings: 13 months; comparison: 31 months during bank debt restructurings era (Trebesch, 2010).
  - Few significant litigation episodes (Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2009).
- Explanations consistent with model:
  - Countries could make offers attractive enough to deter litigation (sufficiently low haircut relative to p).
  - Widespread use of minimum participation thresholds eliminated pure coordination failures.
  - Exit consents used in a few exchanges (Ecuador 2000; Uruguay 2003; Dominican Republic 2006) impaired litigation prospects by removing clauses (prohibitions on further restructuring of Brady bonds, cross-default clauses, negative pledge clauses, listing requirements, sovereign immunity waivers).
- Limits and caveats:
  - Exit consents improve bargaining position but cannot be pursued too aggressively:
    - A 50 percent stake in any bond series can block exit consents.
    - Multiple bond series and small creditors concentrated in a series can block exit consents in practice.
  - Successful use of exit consents in practice appears to have been largely defensive (used with offers viewed as reasonable).

### III. MODEL — setup, equilibria, and country optimization
- Baseline setup (static, homogeneous creditors):
  - Each creditor holds a bond with face-value 1.
  - Country can repay at most 1−h̄, where h̄ < 1 denotes minimum haircut required given resources.
  - Country offers 1−h, where h > h̄ is the haircut offered.
  - Share of participating creditors: s. Minimum required share for restoring market access: s_min.
  - Disorderly restructuring (s < s_min): country incurs maximum loss 1−h̄, creditors extract δ(1−h̄) divided pari passu, with δ < 1 capturing inefficiency.
  - Holdouts are repaid in full with probability p; all 1−s holdouts succeed or fail together.
- Equilibrium characterization:
  - Everyone rejecting (s = 0): always an equilibrium.
  - Everyone accepting (s = 1): an equilibrium if p < 1−h.
  - Internal solutions:
    - s > h/h̄: equilibrium where creditors indifferent; not robust.
    - s_min ≤ s < h/h̄: internal solution where p > 1−h; participation s given by s = 1/h − p(1−h)/(1−p)(1−h).
- Comparative-statics and parameter roles:
  - Failure (s = 0) is always an equilibrium (Proposition 1).
  - If h < 1−p then both full participation and failure are equilibria.
  - If 1−p < h < h_smin, internal solution and failure are equilibria.
  - If h > h_smin, failure is the unique equilibrium.
  - Corollary: Given h > 0, sufficiently large p can make failure the unique equilibrium (e.g., p → 1 or voluntary exchange p = 1).
- Country’s objective and endogenous haircut choice:
  - Country maximizes U_Country = 1−h − repayments − l(h) − L, where l(h) reputational cost (l′>0, l″>0) and L is additional loss from disorderly restructuring.
  - Intuition for extremes:
    - p → 0: multiple equilibria; country trades off repayment savings vs reputational cost; optimal l′(h) = 1−π if π is probability of bad equilibrium selection.
    - p → 1: failure becomes unique equilibrium; country offers minimum haircut h̄ to minimize reputational cost.
  - Numerical examples use h̄ = 0.25, δ = 0.5, s_min = 0.5; reputational cost functions varied (l(h) = h^2/2, l(h) = h^2, l(h) = h^2/4) to illustrate responses.

### IV. ROLE OF MINIMUM PARTICIPATION THRESHOLDS AND EXIT CONSENTS
- Minimum participation thresholds:
  - If full participation is an equilibrium (h < 1−p), setting s ≥ s_min ensures full participation is the unique equilibrium.
  - Minimum participation can be implemented as pledge or legally binding clause in exchange offer.
  - Caveat: minimum participation thresholds can make creditors worse-off if 1−h < δ(1−h̄).
- Exit consents:
  - Exit consents reduce p̃, the probability of successful holdout; if p̃ ≤ 1−h then full participation can become unique equilibrium under minimum participation s ≥ max(s_min, 1/2).
  - Exit consents implicitly set a minimum participation threshold of 1/2 because they require a majority vote to effect changes in non-payment terms.
  - If exit consents sufficiently impair litigation (p̃ → 0), country constrained mainly by reputational cost l(h) and can seek more aggressive haircuts.
  - Limits to exit consent exploitation:
    - Aggressive expropriatory exit consents can prompt creditors to coordinate to prevent exit consents; easier legal challenges may reduce effectiveness.
    - Blocking exit consents is feasible by acquiring a 50 percent stake in a bond series; multiple series permit blocking across series.
- Comparison with Collective Action Clauses (CACs):
  - CACs allow a majority s_CAC > 1/2 to impose payment-term changes binding on all creditors; exchanges settled through CACs do not involve loss δ.
  - CACs can always achieve a haircut h_CAC that satisfies resource constraint h_CAC ≥ h̄ and induce full participation.
  - CACs are a stronger coordination tool than exit consents that are only modestly destructive of litigation prospects, but weaker than very destructive exit consents.
  - Key difference: refusal under CACs does not mutilate a creditor’s bond, whereas exit consents can impair non-participants’ bonds; exit consents therefore have a prisoner’s dilemma flavor and can coerce acceptance even when collective payoff would be worse.
  - From investors’ perspective, CACs are preferable; any full participation achieved by exit consents but not by CACs benefits the country at investors’ expense.

### V. LARGE PLAYERS, MULTIPLE SERIES, AND LIMITS
- Non-atomistic creditors and blocking:
  - If groups can acquire majority stakes in bond series, they can block exit consents for that series.
  - Suppose a share m of creditors buy entire series and are protected from exit consents; remaining share 1−m vulnerable to exit consents.
  - Feasibility condition for full repayment of such holdouts:
    - m ≤ (1−h̄) − (1−m)(1−h).
  - If m larger than that threshold, country cannot repay holdouts in full and a disorderly restructuring occurs.
  - Holdouts could be collectively better-off by capping m to the threshold but face their own collective action problems.
- Extreme case:
  - If groups can block exit consents across all series (exit consents effectively unusable), and full participation was not an equilibrium originally, exit consents cannot achieve full participation either.
  - CACs face similar limitations because they must be voted separately for each series.

### VI. CONCLUSION — implications for policy and financial architecture
- Main conclusions:
  - A simple static coordination game rationalizes fears of intractable renegotiations but also explains why most restructurings since late 1990s achieved high participation: either offers were attractive enough or legal/design tools (minimum participation thresholds, exit consents) discouraged holdouts.
  - Minimum participation thresholds eliminate pure coordination failures; exit consents reduce litigation prospects and can change payoffs to make holding out unattractive.
  - These tools expand the range of haircuts consistent with high participation, but excessive haircuts can prompt creditors to block exit consents or coordinate to hold out, possibly causing disorderly outcomes.
- Implications for international policy:
  - Because collective action problems can be handled ad hoc through debt exchange design, the immediate case for ambitious international insolvency regimes appears weaker than previously thought.
  - Two qualifications where institutional reform may still be relevant:
    - For very large haircuts (deep insolvency), even effective exit consents and participation constraints might not avoid disorderly default because incentives to block or hold-out are too strong.
    - Objectives beyond avoiding disorderly outcomes—such as fairness and predictability—remain unaddressed by ad hoc tools; an international bankruptcy regime could achieve fairer and more predictable outcomes ex ante.
- Practical takeaway:
  - Minimum participation thresholds and exit consents are effective policy tools in many circumstances, but their effectiveness is constrained by bond structure (multiple series), concentration of creditors, and legal enforceability.

### APPENDIX — country optimization and numerical examples
- Country’s maximization problem across three regimes:
  - V1: h < 1−p where full participation and failure are equilibria; solution characterized by l′(h1) = (1−π) with π the probability of bad equilibrium selection.
  - V2: 1−p < h < h_smin where internal solution and failure are equilibria; first-order condition l′(h2) = (1−π)(1−p)s.
  - V3: h > h_smin where failure is unique equilibrium; optimal h* = h_smin if h ≤ h_smin, otherwise h* = h̄.
- Numerical examples and figures:
  - Figures use parameter example h̄ = 0.25, s_min = 0.5, δ = 0.5 and variably l(h) = h^2/2, l(h) = h^2, l(h) = h^2/4; L(s) = 0.1 unless full participation.
  - Assumptions on equilibrium selection differ across figures (sunspot equal probability vs coordination on higher participation equilibrium) to illustrate how removing coordination failure affects country’s chosen haircut.

*IMF working paper content unit _wp11265 - References (page 26) as provided in the source text.*

### References ................................................................................................26

### _wp11265 - References ................................................................................................26

### I. INTRODUCTION — purpose and key mechanisms
- Purpose:
  - Two-fold: (i) use a simple debt renegotiation model to interpret when collective action problems (holdout problem and pure coordination failures) make sovereign debt renegotiations intractable; (ii) study how minimum participation thresholds and defensive “exit consents” (or “exit amendments”) can overcome such problems without new institutions or contract changes.
- Definitions and interpretations:
  - Holdout problem: situation with a unique low participation equilibrium (or multiple equilibria all involving low participation).
  - Pure coordination failures: cases where low participation is an equilibrium but a high participation equilibrium also exists; the problem is coordinating on the “good” high participation equilibrium.
  - Minimum participation thresholds: condition exchanges on a critical level of creditor participation; function as a coordination device removing low-participation equilibria where both high and low participation equilibria exist.
  - Exit consents/exit amendments: changes to non-payment terms (cross-default, listing, acceleration clauses) that impair liquidity and litigation prospects of the old bond and make litigation unattractive.
- Central model prediction:
  - A debt exchange should be expected to “fail” only in two situations:
    - (i) no participation thresholds (so full participation equilibrium might not be picked even if it exists); or
    - (ii) the offer implies a high haircut and there are no exit consents (holding out comparatively attractive).
  - Voluntary exchange offers in which the government promises to honor obligations to holdouts always fail in the model unless they involve a zero haircut.

### II. EMPIRICAL EXPERIENCE, 1998–2010 — observed patterns and interpretation
- Observed facts (1998–2010):
  - Most major bond restructurings achieved creditor participation above 90 percent (exception: Argentina’s 2005 external debt exchange).
  - Average delay of these restructurings: 13 months; comparison: 31 months during bank debt restructurings era (Trebesch, 2010).
  - Few significant litigation episodes (Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2009).
- Explanations consistent with model:
  - Countries could make offers attractive enough to deter litigation (sufficiently low haircut relative to p).
  - Widespread use of minimum participation thresholds eliminated pure coordination failures.
  - Exit consents used in a few exchanges (Ecuador 2000; Uruguay 2003; Dominican Republic 2006) impaired litigation prospects by removing clauses (prohibitions on further restructuring of Brady bonds, cross-default clauses, negative pledge clauses, listing requirements, sovereign immunity waivers).
- Limits and caveats noted:
  - Exit consents improve bargaining position but cannot be pursued too aggressively:
    - A 50 percent stake in any bond series can block exit consents.
    - Multiple bond series and small creditors concentrated in a series can block exit consents in practice.
  - Successful use of exit consents in practice appears to have been largely defensive (used with offers viewed as reasonable).

### III. MODEL — setup, equilibria, and country optimization
- Baseline setup (static, homogeneous creditors):
  - Each creditor holds a bond with face-value 1.
  - Country can repay at most 1−h̄, where h̄ < 1 denotes minimum haircut required given resources.
  - Country offers 1−h, where h > h̄ is the haircut offered.
  - Share of participating creditors: s. Minimum required share for restoring market access: s_min.
  - Disorderly restructuring (s < s_min): country incurs maximum loss 1−h̄, creditors extract δ(1−h̄) divided pari passu, with δ < 1 capturing inefficiency.
  - Holdouts are repaid in full with probability p (reflects litigation success or ex-post repayment probability); all 1−s holdouts succeed or fail together.
- Equilibrium types (Nash equilibria focus):
  - Everyone rejecting (s = 0): always an equilibrium because if everyone expects rejection, accepting worsens payoff in disorderly outcome.
  - Everyone accepting (s = 1): an equilibrium if p < 1−h.
  - Internal solutions:
    - s > h/h̄: an equilibrium where creditors indifferent; not robust (can be eliminated by infinitesimal reduction in h).
    - s_min ≤ s < h/h̄: internal solution where p > 1−h; participation s given by s = 1/h − p(1−h)/(1−p)(1−h) (equation (4) in text).
- Comparative-statics and parameter roles:
  - Equilibria depend on p, h, h̄, and δ.
  - Failure (s = 0) is always an equilibrium (Proposition 1).
  - If h < 1−p then both full participation and failure are equilibria.
  - If 1−p < h < h_smin (defined in text), internal solution and failure are equilibria.
  - If h > h_smin, failure is the unique equilibrium.
  - Corollary: Given h > 0, sufficiently large p can make failure the unique equilibrium (e.g., p → 1 or voluntary exchange p = 1).
- Country’s objective and endogenous haircut choice:
  - Country maximizes U_Country = 1−h − repayments − l(h) − L, where l(h) reputational cost (l′>0, l″>0) and L is additional loss from disorderly restructuring.
  - Intuition for extremes:
    - p → 0: multiple equilibria; country trades off repayment savings vs reputational cost; optimal l′(h) = 1−π if π is probability of bad equilibrium selection.
    - p → 1: failure becomes unique equilibrium; country offers minimum haircut h̄ to minimize reputational cost.
  - Numerical examples (Figures 1–3 settings): example parameterization uses h̄ = 0.25, δ = 0.5, s_min = 0.5; reputational cost functions varied (l(h) = h^2/2, l(h) = h^2, l(h) = h^2/4) to illustrate how optimal h responds to p and coordination assumptions.
  - Removing coordination failures (creditors coordinate on higher participation equilibrium) can lead the country to offer a more aggressive haircut.

### IV. ROLE OF MINIMUM PARTICIPATION THRESHOLDS AND EXIT CONSENTS
- Minimum participation thresholds:
  - If full participation is an equilibrium (h < 1−p), setting s ≥ s_min ensures full participation is the unique equilibrium (proof in text).
  - Minimum participation can be implemented as pledge or legally binding clause in exchange offer.
  - Caveat: minimum participation thresholds can make creditors worse-off if 1−h < δ(1−h̄) (i.e., orderly exchange gives less than disorderly outcome).
- Exit consents:
  - Exit consents reduce p̃, the probability of successful holdout; if p̃ ≤ 1−h then full participation can become unique equilibrium under minimum participation s ≥ max(s_min, 1/2).
  - Exit consents implicitly set a minimum participation threshold of 1/2 because they require a majority vote to effect changes in non-payment terms.
  - If exit consents sufficiently impair litigation (p̃ → 0), country constrained mainly by reputational cost l(h) and can seek more aggressive haircuts.
  - Limits to exit consent exploitation:
    - Aggressive expropriatory exit consents can prompt creditors to coordinate to prevent exit consents; easier legal challenges may reduce effectiveness.
    - Blocking exit consents is feasible by acquiring a 50 percent stake in a bond series; multiple series permit blocking across series.
- Comparison with Collective Action Clauses (CACs):
  - CACs allow a majority s_CAC > 1/2 to impose payment-term changes binding on all creditors; exchanges settled through CACs do not involve loss δ.
  - Proposition: CACs can always achieve a haircut h_CAC that satisfies resource constraint h_CAC ≥ h̄ and induce full participation.
  - CACs are a stronger coordination tool than exit consents that are only modestly destructive of litigation prospects, but weaker than very destructive exit consents.
  - Key difference: refusal under CACs does not mutilate a creditor’s bond (refuser still collects 1−h_CAC if CAC passes), whereas exit consents can leave non-participants with impaired bonds; exit consents therefore have a prisoner’s dilemma flavor and can coerce acceptance even when collective payoff would be worse.
  - From investors’ perspective, CACs are preferable; any full participation achieved by exit consents but not by CACs benefits the country at investors’ expense.

### V. LARGE PLAYERS, MULTIPLE SERIES, AND LIMITS
- Non-atomistic creditors and blocking:
  - If groups can acquire majority stakes in bond series, they can block exit consents for that series.
  - Suppose a share m of creditors buy entire series and are protected from exit consents; remaining share 1−m vulnerable to exit consents.
  - Feasibility condition for full repayment of such holdouts:
    - m ≤ (1−h̄) − (1−m)(1−h)  (equation (9) in text).
  - If m larger than that threshold, country cannot repay holdouts in full and a disorderly restructuring occurs.
  - Holdouts could be collectively better-off by capping m to the threshold but face their own collective action problems.
- Extreme case:
  - If groups can block exit consents across all series (exit consents effectively unusable), and full participation was not an equilibrium originally, exit consents cannot achieve full participation either (Proposition in text).
  - CACs face similar limitations because they must be voted separately for each series.

### VI. CONCLUSION — implications for policy and financial architecture
- Main conclusions:
  - A simple static coordination game rationalizes fears of intractable renegotiations but also explains why most restructurings since late 1990s achieved high participation: either offers were attractive enough or legal/design tools (minimum participation thresholds, exit consents) discouraged holdouts.
  - Minimum participation thresholds eliminate pure coordination failures; exit consents reduce litigation prospects and can change payoffs to make holding out unattractive.
  - These tools expand the range of haircuts consistent with high participation, but excessive haircuts can prompt creditors to block exit consents or coordinate to hold out, possibly causing disorderly outcomes.
- Implications for international policy:
  - Because collective action problems can be handled ad hoc through debt exchange design, the immediate case for ambitious international insolvency regimes appears weaker than previously thought.
  - Two qualifications where institutional reform may still be relevant:
    - For very large haircuts (deep insolvency), even effective exit consents and participation constraints might not avoid disorderly default because incentives to block or hold-out are too strong.
    - Objectives beyond avoiding disorderly outcomes—such as fairness and predictability—remain unaddressed by ad hoc tools; an international bankruptcy regime could achieve fairer and more predictable outcomes ex ante.
- Practical takeaway:
  - Minimum participation thresholds and exit consents are effective policy tools in many circumstances, but their effectiveness is constrained by bond structure (multiple series), concentration of creditors, and legal enforceability.

### APPENDIX — country optimization and numerical examples
- Country’s maximization problem described across three regimes:
  - V1: h < 1−p where full participation and failure are equilibria; solution characterized by l′(h1) = (1−π) with π the probability of bad equilibrium selection.
  - V2: 1−p < h < h_smin where internal solution and failure are equilibria; first-order condition l′(h2) = (1−π)(1−p)s.
  - V3: h > h_smin where failure is unique equilibrium; optimal h* = h_smin if h ≤ h_smin, otherwise h* = h̄.
- Numerical examples and figures:
  - Figures use parameter example h̄ = 0.25, s_min = 0.5, δ = 0.5 and variably l(h) = h^2/2, l(h) = h^2, l(h) = h^2/4; L(s) = 0.1 unless full participation.
  - Assumptions on equilibrium selection differ across figures (sunspot equal probability vs coordination on higher participation equilibrium) to illustrate how removing coordination failure affects country’s chosen haircut.

*Italic line: IMF working paper content unit _wp11265 - References (page 26) as provided in the source text.*

### REFERENCES

### _wp11265 - REFERENCES

### Sovereign debt restructuring theory and empirical studies
- Arteta, Carlos, and Galina Hale, 2008, ―Sovereign Debt Crises and Credit to the Private Sector,‖ Journal of International Economics, 74(1): 53–69.
- Bemjamin, David and Mark Wright, 2008, ―Recovery Before Redemption: A Theory of Delays in Sovereign Debt Renegotiations,‖ mimeo.
- Bi, Ran, 2008, ―Beneficial Delays in Debt Restructuring Negotiations,‖ IMF Working Paper No. 08/38.
- Bolton, Patrick, and Olivier Jeanne, 2007, ―Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of a Bankruptcy Regime,‖ Journal or Political Economy 115(6), pp. 901--924.
- Borensztein, Eduardo and Ugo Panizza, 2009, ―The Costs of Sovereign Default,‖ IMF Staff Papers 56 (4), pp. 683--741.
- Cruces, Juan, and Christoph Trebesch, 2011, ―Pricing Haircuts: Do Markets Punish Low Recovery Values in Sovereign Restructurings?‖ unpublished, Hertie School of Governance.
- Daniels, Kenneth, and Gabriel G. Ramirez, 2007, ―Debt restucturings, holdouts, and exit consents,‖ Journal of Financial Stability 3, 2007, pp. 1–17.
- Engelen, Christian, and Johann Graf Lambsdorff, 2009, ―Hares and stags in Argentinean debt restructuring,‖ Journal of International Economics, 78, pp.141--148.
- Fuentes, Miguel, and Diego Saravia, 2006, ―Sovereign Defaulters: Do International Capital Markets Punish Them?‖ Pontificia Universidad Cat ́olica de Chile, Instituto de Econom ́ıa, Documentos de Trabajo 314.
- Haldane, Andrew G., Adrian Penalver, Victoria Saporta, and Hyun Song Shin, 2005, ―Analytics of Sovereign Debt Restructuring,‖ Journal of International Economics, 65(2): 315–33.
- Jea nne, Olivier, 2009, ―Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture,‖ American Economic Review 99(5), pp. 2135—48.
- Kletzer, Kenneth, 2003, ―Sovereign Bond Restructuring: Collective Action Clauses and Official Crisis Intervention,‖ IMF Working Paper No. 03/134.
- Panizza, Ugo, Federico Sturzenegger and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2009, ―The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default,‖ Journal of Economic Literature, 47(3), pp. 651--698.
- Pitchford, Rohan, and Mark L. J. Wright, 2011, ―Holdout Creditors in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment,‖ (forthcoming in the Review of Economic Studies).
- Rogoff, Kenneth, and J. Zettelmeyer, 2002, ―Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas: 1976-2001,‖ IMF Staff Papers, 49(3), pp. 470--507.
- Sturzenegger, Federico and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2007. Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press.
- Sturzenegger, Federico, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2008, ―Haircuts: Estimating Investor Losses in Sovereign Debt Restructurings, 1998–2005,‖ Journal of International Money and Finance, 27(5): 780–805.
- Trebesch, Christoph, 2008, ―Delays in Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Should We Really Blame the Creditors?‖ mimeo.
- Trebesch, Christoph, 2009, ―The Cost of Aggressive Sovereign Debt Policies: How Much is the Private Sector Affected?‖ IMF Working Paper WP/09/29.

### Legal frameworks, contractual devices, and procedural proposals
- Buchheit, Lee, 1991, ―Advisory Committees: What’s in a Name?‖ International Financial Law Review, 10(1), pp. 9--10.
- Buchheit, Lee, 1998, ―Changing Bond Documentation: The Sharing Clause,‖ International Financial Law Review, 17(1), pp. 9--11.
- Buchheit, Lee, 2000, ―How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond Trap,‖ International Financial Law Review, 19(12), pp. 17--20.
- Buchheit, Lee, and Mitu Gulati, 2000, ―Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges,‖ UCLA Law Review, 48(October), pp. 59--84.
- Chun, John H., 1996, ―Post-Modern Sovereign Debt Crisis: Did Mexico Need an International Bankruptcy Forum?‖ Fordham Law Review, Vol. 64 (May), pp. 2647.
- Hagan, Sean, 2005, ―Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt,‖ Georgetown Journal of International Law 36, no.2, pp. 299--403.
- Macmillan, Rory, 1995, ―Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-Out System,‖ Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 57--75.
- Schwarcz, Steven L., 2000, ―Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach.‖ Cornell Law Review 85: 101--187.
- Haldane, Andrew G., Adrian Penalver, Victoria Saporta, and Hyun Song Shin, 2005, ―Analytics of Sovereign Debt Restructuring,‖ Journal of International Economics, 65(2): 315–33.

### IMF and policy-oriented reports
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) 1995. Note on an International Debt Adjustment Facility for Sovereign Debtors. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2002. The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism–Further Considerations. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2003a. Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2003b. Reviewing the Process for Sovereign Debt Restructuring within the Existing Legal Framework. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2003c. ―Uruguay 2003 Article IV Consultation and Third Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement ,‖ available via the internet: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03247.pdf.
- Krueger, Anne O. 2001, ―International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring,‖ Address given at the National Economists’ Club Annual Members’ Dinner, November. American Enterprise Institute, Washington, November.
- Taylor, John, 2002, ―Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective,‖ Remarks at the conference ―Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards?‖ Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC.

### Historical perspectives, moral hazard, and institutional proposals
- Eichengreen, Barry, 2000, ―Can the Moral Hazard Caused by IMF Bailouts Be Reduced?‖ Geneva Reports on the World Economy Special Report 1. London: Center for Economic Policy Research.
- Eichengreen, Barry, Kenneth Kletzer, and Ashoka Mody, 2003, ‖Crisis Resolution: Next Steps,‖ in Brookings Trade Forum 2003, ed. Susan Collins and Dani Rodrik, pp. 279--337. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Eichengreen, Barry and Richard Portes, 1995, ―Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors,‖ London: Center for Economic Policy Research.
- Enderlein, Henrik, Christoph Trebesch, and Laura von Daniels, 2010, ―Sovereign Debt Disputes,‖ unpublished, Hertie School of Governance.
- Sachs, Jeffrey, 1995, ―Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort?‖ Frank D. Graham Lecture, Princeton, NJ, April. Unpublished paper: Available online at http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu
- Inter-American Development Bank, 2006, Living With Debt: How to Limit the Risks of Sovereign Finance. Coordinated by Eduardo Borensztein, Eduardo Levy Yeyati, and Ugo Panizza. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 2007 Report.

*References list from _wp11265 - REFERENCES*

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