## _wp12300

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---

### Introduction and objective
- Focus: resilience of emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) defined as ability to sustain longer and stronger expansions, and to experience shorter and shallower downturns and more rapid recoveries.
- Sample and period: 120 EMDEs between 1960 and 2011.
- Motivation: EMDEs performed strongly in 2003–07, were hit in 2009, rebounded in 2010–11 and now account for virtually all global growth; question is whether this performance will last.

### Definitions and methodology
- Primary variable: GDP per capita (log level).
- Cycle detection: Harding and Pagan (2002) algorithm to detect peaks and troughs in the log level of GDP per capita.
- Minimum cycle length imposed: five years.
- Phase definitions:
  - Expansion: year after a trough through the year of the peak, inclusive.
  - Downturn: year after a peak through the year of the trough, inclusive.
  - Recovery: year after a trough until output per capita reaches or exceeds previous peak’s level; for EMDEs a recovery can span several cycles.
- Identified cycles:
  - AEs: 117 expansions and 105 downturns.
  - EMDEs: 576 expansions and 496 downturns.
- Country group split:
  - Advanced economies (AEs): membership in OECD prior to 1990, with exception of Turkey.
  - EMDEs subdivided into:
    - Low-income countries (LICs): the 51 economies currently eligible for concessional IMF loans.
    - Emerging markets (EMs): the remaining 69 economies.

### Stylized facts and historical trends
- Decadal patterns:
  - 1950s–1960s: “golden decades” for AEs; EMs also did well. Median downturn < 3 percent; took four years for median output per capita to regain or surpass previous peak.
  - 1970s–1980s: sharp deterioration for EMDEs; median downturns much deeper and more protracted—median output per capita often still below previous peak 10 years after the peak.
  - 1990s: improvement for EMDEs with shallower downturns and faster recoveries.
  - 2000s and Great Recession: downturns between 2000 and 2006 were smaller and took two years to recover; through the Great Recession median output per capita recovered to precrisis peak by the third year for both EMs and LICs. Emerging Europe exception: median output per capita has yet to recover to precrisis level.
- Time spent in phases:
  - 1970s and 1980s: EMDEs spent more than a third of their time in downturns.
  - 2000s: EMDEs spent more than 80 percent of their time in expansion.
  - 2000s: AEs were in a downturn more than a fifth of the time.
- Breadth of improvement:
  - Improvements evident for both commodity exporters and non–commodity exporters.
  - Excluding largest EMs (e.g., China and India) does not materially alter the improvement pattern.
- AE trends:
  - Median steady-state growth for AEs now < 2 percent, about half of what it was in the 1950s and 1960s.
  - AEs experienced a decline in growth variability (Great Moderation).
- EMDE drivers:
  - Longer expansions and shorter downturns reflect higher steady-state growth and less variability in growth.

### AR(1) modeling and simulation findings
- AR(1) specification estimated for subperiods: 1950–69, 1970–89, 1990–2007.
  - Model: g_t = α + β g_{t−1} + ε_t with ε_t ~ (0,N 2 σ ).
  - Steady-state growth: (α)/(1−β).
  - Variability of growth: 2 σ /(1−β^2) (reported as 2 1σβ− in source).
- Estimated findings:
  - AR(1) coefficient (β) for EMDEs has not changed significantly over past 40 years.
  - EMs median steady-state growth:
    - fell from 2½ percent in the 1950s and 1960s
    - to 1½ percent in the 1970s and 1980s
    - rose to 3¼ percent in the 1990s and 2000s
  - Growth variability in EMs: standard deviation fell to 3¼ percent from 4¼ percent in the 1970s and 1980s.
- Simulation exercise:
  - 1,000 simulations per period; each simulation 50 years; innovations drawn N(0,σ^2).
  - Simulations replicate stylized facts but:
    - Overestimate increase in time spent in expansion between 1970–89 and 1990–2007.
    - Underestimate median real GDP growth during expansions between those periods.
    - Underestimate amplitude of downturns (median peak-to-trough amplitude).
  - Most gains in resilience between 1970–89 and 1990–2007 stem from:
    - increase in α (constant / steady-state growth)
    - to a lesser extent, lower σ (standard deviation of growth innovations)

### Which shocks end expansions (bivariate and multivariate evidence)
- External shocks associated with higher probability of expansion ending:
  - Sudden stops in capital flows.
  - Advanced economy recessions.
  - Spikes in global uncertainty.
  - Terms-of-trade busts.
- Domestic shocks:
  - Credit booms double the probability that an expansion will shift into a downturn by the following year.
  - Banking crises triple the probability that an expansion will shift into a downturn by the following year.
- Identification choices to limit endogeneity:
  - External shocks: contemporaneous effect examined.
  - Domestic shocks: lagged effects examined (credit booms in previous three years; banking crises in period immediately following crisis).
  - Sudden stops: findings robust to contemporaneous or lagged indicators.

### Duration analysis: empirical approach and key multivariate results
- Estimator and model:
  - Kaplan-Meier survivor function for bivariate comparisons.
  - Accelerated-failure-time model based on Weibull distribution for multivariate analysis; reports exponentiated coefficients as time ratios.
  - Lagged explanatory variables except external shocks.
- Multivariate time-ratio findings (interpretation: time ratio < 1 shortens expected duration; > 1 lengthens expected duration):
  - External/domestic shocks (shorten expansions):
    - Implied S&P 100 Volatility (VXO): time ratio 0.951***.
    - U.S. Ex Ante Real Interest Rate: time ratio 0.956.
    - Sudden Stop indicator: time ratio 0.590***.
    - Advanced Economy Recession indicator: time ratio 0.642***.
    - Credit Boom (past three years): time ratio 0.616***.
    - Banking Crisis indicator: time ratio 0.550***.
  - Policy variables (lengthen expansions):
    - Single-Digit Inflation indicator: time ratio 1.473***.
    - International Reserves to GDP: time ratio 1.009*** (a 10 percent of GDP increase in international reserves lengthens expected duration by about 9 percent as noted in source).
    - Low Public Debt indicator: time ratio 1.009 (not statistically significant for expansions).
  - Structural characteristics:
    - Income Inequality (Gini): time ratio 0.986** (small negative effect).
    - Financial Openness (external assets + liabilities to GDP): time ratio 0.999*** (small negative effect).
    - Trade Openness (exports + imports to GDP): time ratio 0.999 (no significant effect).
- Recoveries (multivariate):
  - Large shocks tend to slow recoveries; global uncertainty consistently significant.
  - Policy space helps hasten recoveries but significance weaker than in bivariate analysis; low public debt significant in multivariate model.
  - Trade Openness: time ratio 0.993** (small hastening effect).
  - Financial Openness: time ratio 1.001** (small slowing effect).
- Subperiod and robustness patterns:
  - Sensitivity to shocks has not lessened over time; global uncertainty and U.S. real interest rates shorten expansions more after 1989.
  - Income inequality and financial openness shortened expansions only before 1989.
  - Robustness checks (frailties, decadal/regional dummies, alternative definitions and distributions) leave core findings broadly unchanged.

### Policies, policy space, and structural characteristics associated with resilience
- Policy frameworks and policy space:
  - Adoption of inflation targeting, countercyclical fiscal policy, and nonpegged exchange rates associated with longer expansions and faster recoveries.
  - Low inflation (below 10 percent) significantly lengthens expansions and hastens recoveries.
  - Fiscal surplus in previous year: significantly longer expansions; no significant impact on speed of recoveries in some specifications.
  - Low public debt (below 50 percent of GDP): economies tend to recover significantly faster; public debt has mixed effects on expansion length in multivariate models.
  - Strong external position (current account surplus, low external debt below 40 percent, high international reserves above sample median) significantly lengthens expansions and hastens recoveries.
- Structural characteristics:
  - Trade openness and diversification have increased and can hasten recoveries but may increase vulnerability to external demand slowdowns.
  - Financial openness increased; composition shifted toward FDI for some EMDEs, which can mitigate volatility.
  - FDI flows and low income inequality are significantly associated with longer expansions in bivariate analysis.
  - Overall, structural characteristics made a negligible contribution to increased resilience in decomposition analysis.

### Quantifying contributors to increased resilience (decomposition)
- Attribution of rise in resilience (from duration-model decomposition):
  - Fewer shocks account for about two-fifths of the improved performance.
  - Greater policy space and better policy frameworks account for the remaining three-fifths.
- Quantified contributions (relative to the 1980s):
  - Decline in domestic shocks improved expected mean duration of expansions by about 5 percent.
  - Reduced external shocks improved expected mean duration by about 10 percent.
  - Improvements in policies increased expected mean duration by about 20 percent over past two decades.
- Regional/subsample findings:
  - Improved policies dominate contribution across EMDE regions and commodity vs non-commodity exporters.
  - Structural characteristics negligible except in emerging and developing Asia where financial openness increased and produced a negative contribution to expected duration.
- Caveat: contributions indicative and sensitive to variable choice; no causal interpretation claimed because exogenous component of policies not identified.

### Trends in shocks, buffers, and recent performance
- Shocks:
  - Some external shocks (sudden stops, spikes in global uncertainty) were more common in the past decade.
  - Banking crises rose in the 1990s but fell during the 2000s; credit booms incidence fell from the 1990s to the 2000s.
  - 2008–09: systemic banking crises in four EMDEs—Latvia, Mongolia, Nigeria, Ukraine.
  - Credit booms during 2008–09 were numerous but fell back during 2010–11; real credit per capita deviations during booms in recent years lower on average than in previous decades.
- Policy buffers and indicators:
  - Median external debt: fell from close to 60 percent of GDP in the 1990s to less than 35 percent of GDP during 2010–11.
  - Median international reserves: rose from less than 8 percent of GDP on average in the 1990s to 18 percent of GDP during 2010–11.
  - Median public debt: fell from over 65 percent of GDP in the 1990s to less than 40 percent of GDP in the past two years (relative to publication); fell from about 45 percent of GDP during 2000–07 to about 35 percent of GDP during 2010–11.
  - Share of EMDEs with fiscal surpluses rose steadily from 1970s to 1990s; by early 2000s more than one-quarter had budget surpluses.
  - Inflation: half of EMDEs had double-digit inflation in the 1970s and 1980s; more than 80 percent now have inflation in the single digits.
  - Exchange rates: fewer hard pegs than in the 1970s and 1980s; more flexible regimes adopted.
- Recent performance:
  - 2000s: EMDEs spent more than 80 percent of time in expansion; 2000s first decade both EMs and LICs spent more time in expansion than AEs.
  - 2010–11: expected mean duration of expansions improved relative to 2000–07.
  - No banking crises in EMDEs in the past two years referenced in the source period.

### Risks, policy implications, and recommendations
- Main conclusion: EMDEs more resilient than in previous decades owing to fewer shocks and improved policymaking; gains predate the most recent decade with notable improvements already in the 1990s.
- Key risks that could reverse gains:
  - Another AE downturn (e.g., U.S. fiscal cliff, sovereign and banking tensions in Europe).
  - Drop in commodity prices (terms-of-trade busts).
  - Spikes in global uncertainty.
  - Sudden stops in capital flows if global risk aversion rises.
- Policy recommendations to guard against adverse scenarios:
  - Rebuild buffers to ensure adequate policy space to respond to shocks.
  - Maintain improvements in policy frameworks, including:
    - greater exchange rate flexibility
    - more countercyclical macroeconomic policies
    - continued pursuit of low inflation and prudent fiscal positions
  - Strengthen external positions (reserves, low external debt) and maintain fiscal prudence (low public debt) to hasten recoveries.

### Data, definitions, and appendix notes
- Subperiods used in analysis: 1950–69, 1970–89, 1990–2007.
- Primary data sources: IMF WEO, IFS, WDI, Laeven and Valencia (2012), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (External Wealth of Nations Mark II), Roger (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Abbas and others (2010), Chinn and Ito (2006), Wacziarg and Welch (2008), Solt (2009).
- Key measurement definitions:
  - Net private capital flows: sum of net FDI, net portfolio, net derivative, and net other investment flows excluding general government and monetary authorities (BPS lines specified in source).
  - Sudden stop: net private capital flows to GDP falls by at least 5 percentage points year-on-year and level is > 1 standard deviation below economy-specific mean.
  - Terms-of-trade busts: worsening in terms of trade of at least 3 percent of GDP.
  - Credit booms: cyclical component of log real private credit per capita ≥ 1.65 standard deviations above mean.
  - Low inflation indicator: inflation < 10 percent.
  - Low external debt indicator: external debt < 40 percent of GDP.
  - Low public debt indicator: public debt < 50 percent of GDP.
- Appendix Table 2: country group lists used in analysis; economies marked * denote primary commodity and/or fuel exporters; all economies in analysis have average population over sample period ≥ 1 million.

*Source: Excerpted content from _wp12300 (IMF working paper chapter; introduction, Section II, Sections on methodology, simulation, duration analysis, policies, shocks, decomposition, and Appendix Table 2 as provided in the source PDF)._

### References .............................................................................................................

### _wp12300 - References

### Introduction and objective
- Focus: resilience of emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) defined as ability to sustain longer and stronger expansions, and to experience shorter and shallower downturns and more rapid recoveries.
- Sample and period: 120 EMDEs between 1960 and 2011.
- Motivation: EMDEs performed strongly in 2003–07, were hit in 2009, but rebounded in 2010–11 and now account for virtually all global growth; question is whether this performance will last.

### Definitions and methodology
- Primary variable: GDP per capita (log level).
- Cycle detection: Harding and Pagan (2002) algorithm to detect peaks and troughs in the log level of GDP per capita.
- Minimum cycle length imposed: five years.
- Phase definitions:
  - Expansion: year after a trough through the year of the peak, inclusive.
  - Downturn: year after a peak through the year of the trough, inclusive.
  - Recovery: year after a trough until output per capita reaches or exceeds previous peak’s level; for EMDEs a recovery can span several cycles.
- Identified cycles:
  - AEs: 117 expansions and 105 downturns.
  - EMDEs: 576 expansions and 496 downturns.
- Country group split:
  - Advanced economies (AEs): membership in OECD prior to 1990, with exception of Turkey.
  - EMDEs subdivided into:
    - Low-income countries (LICs): the 51 economies currently eligible for concessional IMF loans.
    - Emerging markets (EMs): the remaining 69 economies.

### Stylized facts on resilience and trends over decades
- General pattern:
  - 1950s–1960s: “golden decades” for AEs; EMs also did well. Median downturn during these decades was shallow, less than 3 percent, and it took four years for median output per capita to regain or surpass previous peak.
  - 1970s–1980s: sharp deterioration for EMDEs; median downturns were much deeper and more protracted—median output per capita often still below previous peak 10 years after the peak.
  - 1990s: improvement for EMDEs with shallower downturns and faster recoveries for many regions.
  - 2000s and Great Recession: unprecedented strong performance for many EMDEs; downturns between 2000 and 2006 were smaller and took two years to recover; through the Great Recession median output per capita recovered to precrisis peak by the third year for both EMs and LICs. Emerging Europe was an exception where median output per capita has yet to recover to precrisis level.
- Time spent in expansion vs downturn:
  - In the 1970s and 1980s EMDEs spent more than a third of their time in downturns.
  - In the 2000s EMDEs spent more than 80 percent of their time in expansion.
  - In the 2000s AEs were in a downturn more than a fifth of the time.
- Performance is broad-based:
  - Improvements are evident for both commodity exporters and non–commodity exporters.
  - Isolating the largest EMs (e.g., China and India) does not materially alter the overall improvement pattern.

### Shocks, risks, and correlates of expansion endings
- External shocks associated with higher likelihood that an expansion will end:
  - Sudden stops in capital flows.
  - Advanced economy recessions.
  - Spikes in global uncertainty.
  - Terms-of-trade busts.
- Domestic shocks associated with higher likelihood that an expansion will end:
  - Credit booms double the probability that an expansion will shift into a downturn by the following year.
  - Banking crises triple the probability that an expansion will shift into a downturn by the following year.

### Role of policy space and policy frameworks
- Good policies associated with increased resilience:
  - Greater policy space (measured by low inflation and favorable fiscal and external positions) is associated with longer expansions and faster recoveries.
  - Improved policy frameworks (measured by countercyclical policy, inflation targeting, and flexible exchange rate regimes) are associated with longer expansions and faster recoveries.
- Structural characteristics:
  - No clear relation found between resilience and several structural characteristics (trade patterns, financial openness, composition of capital flows, income distribution); few of these characteristics are robustly associated with expansion duration or recovery speed.

### Quantifying contributors to improved resilience in the past decade
- Attribution of the rise in resilience:
  - Fewer shocks account for about two-fifths of the improved performance.
  - Greater policy space and better policy frameworks account for the remaining three-fifths.
- Frequency of shocks:
  - Some shocks, such as spikes in global uncertainty, have become more frequent in the past decade.
  - Other shocks, such as banking crises and credit booms, have become less frequent.

### Structure of the full analysis (paper outline)
- Section 2: documents how resilience has changed for country groupings and regions and relates these changes to steady-state growth rates and growth variability.
- Section 3: relates duration of expansions and speed of recoveries to external and domestic shocks, policy space and frameworks, and structural characteristics using duration analysis (bivariate and multivariate).
- Section 4: robustness checks.
- Section 5: examines changes in policies, structures, and shocks over time and quantifies their relative contributions to the rise in resilience.
- Section 6: conclusion on prospective resilience of EMDEs.

*Source: Excerpt from the paper’s Introduction and Section II (Resilience: Some Stylized Facts).*

### 1. Commodity Exporters2. Noncommodity

### _wp12300 - 1. Commodity Exporters2. Noncommodity Exporters

### Observed changes in resilience and growth dynamics
- Emerging market and low-income economies have spent more time in expansion during the past two decades relative to the 1970s and 1980s.
- The 2000s was the first decade during which both emerging market and low-income groups spent more time than advanced economies in expansion.
- Median growth in output per capita during expansions has not risen much between earlier decades and the 2000s.
- Downturns have become shallower for emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs).
- In advanced economies (AEs), median steady-state growth is now less than 2 percent, about half of what it was in the 1950s and 1960s; AEs have also experienced a decline in the variability of growth (the Great Moderation).
- For EMDEs, longer expansions and shorter downturns are manifestations of two underlying changes: higher steady-state growth and less variability in growth.

### Modeling approach (AR(1) specification)
- Growth in output per capita is modeled as an AR(1) process and estimated for all countries over three subperiods: 1950–69, 1970–89, and 1990–2007.
- Estimated model (as presented):
  - 1ttt ggαβε
    −
    =
    +
    +
    with
    t
    ε
    ~
    (
    0,N
    2
    σ
    )
  - Steady-state growth reported as: 1αβ−
  - Variability of growth reported as: 2 1σβ−
- The AR(1) coefficient (β) for EMDEs has not changed significantly over the past 40 years (so persistence has been roughly stable).

### Estimation results (median patterns across groups and subperiods)
- There is a striking divergence between AEs and EMDEs in the evolution of steady-state growth and growth variability:
  - AEs: continuous decline in steady-state growth (median steady-state growth < 2 percent); decline in growth variability.
  - EMDEs: higher steady-state growth and lower variability during recent decades relative to earlier decades.
- The combination of higher steady-state growth and reduced variability in EMDEs explains longer expansions and shorter recoveries.

### Simulation findings (calibrated AR(1) model)
- Simulated data are constructed using the median estimated coefficients from Table 1 for each period; growth innovations are drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ^2; 1,000 simulations of growth processes for 50 years each are run per period.
- Simulated series are used to construct indices of GDP per capita in levels and to identify peaks and troughs using the Harding-Pagan algorithm.
- Simulations broadly replicate the stylized facts of resilience in EMDEs, but:
  - Simulated data overestimate the increase in the time spent in expansion between 1970–89 and 1990–2007.
  - Simulated data underestimate the median real GDP growth during expansions between those periods.
  - Simulated data underestimate the amplitude of downturns (median peak-to-trough amplitude).
- Most of the gains in resilience between 1970–89 and 1990–2007 result from:
  - An increase in the constant (α).
  - To a lesser extent, a lower standard deviation of growth innovations (σ).

### Key empirical time periods and group definitions
- Subperiods used in analysis: 1950–69, 1970–89, 1990–2007.
- Economy groups: AE = advanced economy; EM = emerging market economy; EMDE = emerging market and developing economy; LIC = low-income country.
- Peaks and troughs in output per capita are identified using the Harding-Pagan algorithm (Harding and Pagan, 2002).

*Source: Authors' calculations.*

### 5. Median

### 5. Median

### Steady-state growth and growth variability in EMDEs
- Emerging markets (EMs): median steady-state growth
  - fell from 2½ percent in the 1950s and 1960s
  - to 1½ percent in the 1970s and 1980s
  - rose to 3¼ percent in the 1990s and 2000s
- Growth variability in EMs:
  - standard deviation of growth fell to 3¼ percent, from 4¼ percent in the 1970s and 1980s
- Low-Income Countries (LICs):
  - steady-state growth “markedly improved” since the stagnation of the 1970s and 1980s
  - growth variability declined
- Interpretation:
  - Longer expansions, shorter downturns, and faster recoveries in EMDEs reflect both higher steady-state growth and lower growth variability.
  - The increase in steady-state growth and the decline in growth variability are both statistically significant for the emerging market and developing economies.

### Simulation exercise to disentangle drivers of resilience
- Method:
  - Use median coefficients for EMDEs over each subperiod to run 1000 simulations of growth processes of 50 years each.
  - Change each AR(1) coefficient one at a time (α, β, and σ) to assess their importance for resilience.
  - Apply the Harding-Pagan algorithm to identify peaks and troughs in simulated GDP per capita and obtain duration of expansion, average growth during expansion, and depth of downturns.
- Main quantitative findings:
  - The improvement in resilience observed in EMDEs in the last 20 years has been mostly due to an increase in steady state growth, and to a smaller extent to lower output variability (Figure 8, right panel).
- Limitations:
  - The linear AR(1) model is not able to replicate some elements of resilience discussed in the paper, particularly the median real GDP per capita growth during expansion and the amplitude of downturns (Figure 8, left panel).

### Which shocks tend to end expansions?
- External shocks considered:
  - increases in global uncertainty (spikes in global uncertainty)
  - large rise in world interest rates (proxied by the U.S. real interest rate)
  - recessions in AEs (advanced economies)
  - sharp declines in an economy’s terms of trade (terms-of-trade bust)
  - sudden stops in capital inflows (sudden stop in capital flows)
- Domestic shocks considered:
  - credit booms (excessively high credit growth)
  - banking crises
- Empirical findings (effects on the likelihood that an expansion will end):
  - Among external shocks:
    - sudden stops in capital flows and recessions in advanced economies raise the likelihood that an expansion will end by a factor of two
    - spikes in global uncertainty and terms-of-trade busts also significantly increase the likelihood that an expansion will end
  - Among domestic shocks:
    - credit booms double the likelihood that an expansion will shift to a downturn by the following year
    - banking crises triple the likelihood that an expansion will shift to a downturn by the following year
- Identification choices to limit endogeneity:
  - For external shocks (more plausibly exogenous), the contemporaneous effect is examined (probability that the expansion ends in the same year as the shock)
  - For domestic shocks (greater endogeneity concern), the lagged effect is examined:
    - banking crises: likelihood of an expansion ending in the period immediately following a banking crisis
    - credit booms: examined whether an expansion ends in the subsequent period if there has been a credit boom during the previous three years
  - For sudden stops, findings are not sensitive to using contemporaneous or lagged indicators

### Policies associated with resilience
- Policy areas and measures analyzed:
  - Monetary policy:
    - whether the central bank has adopted inflation targeting
    - policy space proxied by whether the economy had an inflation rate above or below 10 percent
  - Fiscal policy:
    - whether fiscal policy was countercyclical or procyclical (correlation between cyclical component of real government expenditure and cyclical component of real GDP measured over the previous 10 years)
    - policy space measured by whether the government was running a fiscal surplus or public debt to GDP is below 50 percent of GDP
  - Exchange rate policy:
    - whether the economy had a non-pegged exchange rate regime
    - policy space: whether the economy had a current account surplus, low external debt to GDP (below 40 percent), and high international reserves to GDP (above the sample median)
- Empirical approach:
  - Use Kaplan-Meier survivor function estimator to map analysis time t (time since start of an episode, 0t = 0) into probability that an episode continues beyond each point in analysis time
  - The Kaplan-Meier estimator:
    - S^(t) = Π_j (1 – d_j / n_j), where j indexes observed episode lengths, n_j is number of episodes at risk at time j, and d_j is number of episodes that ended at time j
  - Lagged values of policy variables are used to minimize reverse causality (policy characteristics in the current year related to the likelihood that an expansion or recovery will end in the following year)
- Key findings on policies:
  - Good policy frameworks have helped EMDEs prolong their expansions and hasten their recoveries
  - Figure 10 (summary measures):
    - Expansion duration and speed of recovery are longer/faster in the presence of:
      - Inflation targeting
      - Countercyclical fiscal policy
      - Nonpegged exchange rate
      - Low inflation (below 10 percent)
      - Fiscal surplus
      - Low public debt (below 50 percent)
      - Current account surplus
      - Low external debt (below 40 percent)
      - High reserves (above the sample median)
  - Statistical significance:
    - Differences between estimated survival curves (presence vs. absence of characteristic) assessed with log-rank tests; starred labels denote statistical significance at the 10 percent level
- Robustness notes:
  - Results are robust to choosing a more stringent threshold for low inflation (as noted in Table 3)
  - Cyclicality of fiscal policy measured over previous 10 years; fiscal solvency concerns motivate the 50 percent public debt threshold

### Duration analysis: empirical implementation details
- Mapping calendar time into analysis time t (time since start of episode, 0t = 0)
- Use Kaplan-Meier estimator to compute survivor curve and expected duration for episodes with or without characteristics of interest
- Statistical testing:
  - Log-rank test used to evaluate significance of differences between survival curves
- Treatment of endogeneity:
  - External shocks analyzed contemporaneously
  - Domestic shocks and policy variables analyzed using lagged values to reduce reverse causality

*Source: Authors' calculations. (Content drawn from "5. Median" section of the provided chapter.)*

### 2. Effects of Policies on Recovery Duration

### 2. Effects of Policies on Recovery Duration

### Policy Frameworks and Policy Space
- "Greater policy space (as measured by low inflation and favorable fiscal and external positions) and improved policy frameworks (as measured by countercyclical policy, the adoption of inflation targeting, and more flexible exchange rate regimes) are associated with longer expansions and faster recoveries."
- In terms of policy frameworks:
  - "Inflation targeting and a countercyclical fiscal policy significantly increase the length of expansions and hasten recoveries." (footnote references in source: 19)
  - "Not having a pegged exchange rate tends to lengthen expansions, but has no significant effect on the speed of recoveries."
- In terms of policy space:
  - "Having a low inflation rate significantly lengthens expansions and hastens recoveries."
  - "Having a fiscal surplus in the previous year leads to significantly longer expansions, but there is no significant impact of this variable on the speed of recoveries."
  - "Economies with low levels of public debt tend to recover significantly faster from downturns, but this variable has no significant effect on the length of expansions."
  - "A strong external position (characterized by current account surpluses, low external debt, and high international reserves) significantly lengthens expansions and hastens recoveries." (footnote references in source: 20)
- Reference to figures in source:
  - "Figure 10 shows that having a low inflation rate significantly lengthens expansions and hastens recoveries."
  - The source includes discussion of cross-country evidence during the Great Recession linking external positions and reserves to recovery speed (footnotes 19–20).

### How Structural Characteristics Are Associated with Resilience
- The source focuses on a concise set of structural characteristics and their hypothesized links to resilience in EMDEs:
  - Increased trade openness and diversification:
    - "Trade openness has increased substantially over time as trade regimes have been liberalized and the costs of transportation and communication have fallen."
    - "Greater trade openness helps reduce dependence on domestic demand and vulnerability to domestic shocks, but it may also make economies more vulnerable to slowdowns in external demand."
    - "Greater diversification across trading partners would help reduce these economies’ vulnerability to slowdowns in specific trading partners."
    - "The dramatic increase in trade among EMDEs is thought to have helped them weather the recent advanced economy crisis, although prospectively it may increase their vulnerability to a slowdown in large emerging markets like China."
  - Increased financial openness and changes in the composition of capital flows:
    - "Increased capital account openness can facilitate risk sharing, but it can also leave countries more vulnerable to financial shocks or sudden stops in capital flows."
    - "For some EMDEs, susceptibility to the volatility of capital flows has been mitigated by a change in their composition—toward foreign direct investment (FDI), which is thought to be more stable." (Dell’Ariccia and others, 2008)
  - Income equality:
    - Rodrik (1999) hypothesis: "when social divisions run deep, the effects of external shocks are magnified by the distributional conflicts they trigger."
    - "Adjustment to external shocks often has distributional consequences, and in economies where 'latent social conflict' is high—as measured by proxies such as income inequality, ethnic and linguistic fractionalization, and social mistrust—adjustment tends to be inadequate, prolonging the negative effects of the shock."
    - More recent work: "Berg and Ostry (2011) find that greater income equality enables countries to sustain periods of rapid growth."
- Empirical presentation:
  - Figure 11 in the source displays average durations of expansions and recoveries "in the absence or presence of the given characteristic" for various characteristics (e.g., Trade openness, Trade liberalization, High intra-EMDE exports, High financial integration, High capital account openness, High FDI flows, Low income inequality).
  - Note in source: "The bars show the average duration of expansions and recoveries in the absence or presence of the given characteristic. The average duration is used as a summary measure of the underlying duration distribution conditional on the characteristic. Statistically significant differences at the 10 percent level between the underlying distributions are denoted by starred and bolded labels."

*Source: _wp12300 - 2. Effects of Policies on Recovery Duration*

### 2. Effects of Structural Characteristics on Recovery Duration

### 2. Effects of Structural Characteristics on Recovery Duration

### Key bivariate findings on structural characteristics
- Among structural characteristics, only FDI flows and low income inequality were significantly associated with longer expansions.
- Effects on speed of recovery:
  - Greater trade openness and diversification, lower financial integration, higher capital account openness, and higher FDI are all significantly associated with faster recoveries.
  - Income inequality does not have a significant effect on the speed of recovery.

### Multivariate analysis approach
- Model: accelerated-failure-time model based on the Weibull distribution (eq. (3)), reporting exponentiated coefficients as time ratios (factor by which expected duration is multiplied).
- Explanatory variables (lagged except external shocks):
  - External shocks: global uncertainty, the U.S. real interest rate, terms-of-trade busts, sudden stops in capital inflows, advanced economy recessions.
  - Domestic shocks: credit booms, systemic banking crises.
  - Domestic policies: single-digit inflation indicator, low public debt (below 50 percent of GDP), international reserves to GDP.
  - Structural characteristics: trade openness, financial openness, income equality.

### What ends expansions? (Multivariate time ratios and interpretation)
- External and domestic shocks tend to shorten expansions (time ratio < 1):
  - Implied S&P 100 Volatility (VXO): time ratio 0.951*** (reduces expected duration by about 5 percent because baseline is multiplied by 0.951).
  - U.S. Ex Ante Real Interest Rate: time ratio 0.956 (similar effect, not always statistically significant).
  - Sudden Stop (capital inflows) Indicator: time ratio 0.590***.
  - Advanced Economy Recession Indicator: time ratio 0.642***.
  - Credit Boom during Past Three Years: time ratio 0.616***.
  - Banking Crisis Indicator: time ratio 0.550***.
- Policy-related variables tend to lengthen expansions (time ratio > 1), significance varies:
  - Single-Digit Inflation Indicator: time ratio 1.473*** (lengthens expansion by about 47 percent).
  - International Reserves to GDP: time ratio 1.009*** (a 10 percent of GDP increase in international reserves lengthens it by about 9 percent, as noted in the source).
  - Low Public Debt to GDP Indicator: not statistically significant in the multivariate model for expansions (time ratio 1.009).
- Structural characteristics in multivariate model:
  - Income Inequality (Gini coefficient): time ratio 0.986** (statistically significant; reduces expected expansion duration, magnitude small).
  - Financial Openness (external assets plus liabilities to GDP): time ratio 0.999*** (statistically significant; reduces expected expansion duration, magnitude small).
  - Trade Openness (exports plus imports to GDP): time ratio 0.999 (no significant effect on expansion duration).

- Subperiod findings (before and after 1989):
  - Sensitivity of expansion duration to shocks has not lessened over time; global uncertainty and U.S. real interest rates shorten expansions more after 1989.
  - Income inequality and financial openness shorten expansions only before 1989; after 1989 they have no statistically significant effect.

### What hastens recoveries? (Multivariate)
- Recoveries subject to large shocks tend to be slower (time ratio > 1), but only global uncertainty is consistently statistically significant.
- Policy space helps hasten recoveries; statistical significance is weaker than in bivariate analysis:
  - Low inflation, low public debt, and high reserves tend to hasten recoveries, but only low public debt has a statistically significant effect in the multivariate model.
  - Trade Openness: time ratio 0.993** (significantly hastens recoveries, effect small).
  - Financial Openness: time ratio 1.001** (significantly slows recoveries, effect small).
- Subperiod differences:
  - Terms-of-trade busts slow recoveries and are statistically significant only after 1989.
  - Low public debt dramatically hastens recoveries after 1989 (roughly halving the expected duration), but had no significant effect before 1989.
  - Greater trade openness tended to hasten recoveries more before 1989 than after.

### Robustness checks and alternative specifications
- Unobserved heterogeneity (country frailties): allowing for frailties has almost no effect on coefficients or significance levels.
- Adding decadal and regional dummies: estimated coefficients on core covariates remain virtually unchanged.
- Alternative definitions:
  - Sudden stops redefined as “systemic sudden stops”: results very similar.
  - Low inflation cutoff changed from 10 percent to 5 percent: results virtually unchanged.
  - Using continuous versions of some indicator variables (inflation rate, level of public debt, terms-of-trade change, rate of credit growth): robustness checked (results available upon request in source).
- Alternative expansion definitions:
  - Defining expansions from log real GDP (Harding-Pagan algorithm): similar results.
  - Growth expansions (detrended real GDP with 4 percent linear trend removed): broadly aligned with level expansions; statistical significance reduced due to smaller sample.
- Alternative distributional assumption:
  - Generalized gamma distribution (nests Weibull): coefficient estimates and significances similar to Weibull baseline; likelihood ratio test fails to reject Weibull at the 1% level.

### Synthesis: What has contributed to increased resilience?
- Possible explanations considered:
  1. Shocks (credit boom-bust cycles, sudden stops, financial crises) have become less frequent and/or less severe.
  2. Effects of shocks on expansions and recoveries have decreased over time (evidence does not support this: effects of shocks have not lessened since 1989).
  3. EMDEs have built bigger cushions—improved policy frameworks and policy space, or more diversified production/trade patterns—that increase resilience.
- Evidence on shocks and policy improvements:
  - Domestic shocks: banking crises rose in the 1990s but fell during the 2000s; credit booms incidence fell from the 1990s to the 2000s.
  - During 2008–09 systemic banking crises occurred in four EMDEs: Latvia, Mongolia, Nigeria, Ukraine.
  - Credit booms during 2008–09 were numerous but fell back during 2010–11; the deviation from trend of real credit per capita during booms in recent years has been lower on average than in previous decades.
  - External shocks: sudden stops and spikes in global uncertainty were more common in the past decade; terms-of-trade busts and AE recessions declined in frequency between the 1980s and 2000–07 but reemerged in 2008–09 and subsided in the two years after.
  - Policy frameworks have improved:
    - Inflation has fallen: although half of EMDEs had double-digit inflation in the 1970s and 1980s, more than 80 percent now have inflation in the single digits.
    - Exchange rate regimes have become more flexible (fewer hard pegs than in the 1970s and 1980s).

*Source: _wp12300 - 2. Effects of Structural Characteristics on Recovery Duration*

### 1. Banking Crises

### 1. Banking Crises

### Policy Frameworks and Policy Space in Emerging Market and Developing Economies
- Policy frameworks improved in the 2000s as more EMDEs adopted nonpegged exchange rates, inflation targeting, and countercyclical fiscal policy.
- Policy space expanded: more economies achieved single-digit inflation, current account and fiscal surpluses, lower external and public debt, and higher international reserves.
- Key statistics and indicators (as reported in figures and text):
  - Median external debt fell from close to 60 percent of GDP in the 1990s to less than 35 percent of GDP during 2010–11.
  - Median international reserves rose from less than 8 percent of GDP on average in the 1990s to 18 percent of GDP during 2010–11.
  - Median public debt fell from over 65 percent of GDP in the 1990s to less than 40 percent of GDP in the past two years (text notes “past two years” relative to publication).
  - Median public debt fell from about 45 percent of GDP during 2000–07 to about 35 percent of GDP during 2010–11.
  - The share of EMDEs with fiscal surpluses rose steadily from the 1970s to the 1990s; by the early 2000s more than one-quarter had budget surpluses (more than one-quarter is the phrasing used in the source).

### Structural Characteristics of EMDEs
- Structural factors have mostly moved in the right direction:
  - Trade openness and diversification across trading partners increased, with a marked increase in intra-EMDE trade.
  - Financial integration increased, with a larger share of cross-border flows taking the form of FDI.
  - Income inequality declined modestly: the median Gini coefficient among EMDEs fell from 42 in the 1990s to under 40 in 2008–09.
- The paper notes the small and often statistically insignificant effects of these structural characteristics, suggesting limited explanatory power for increased resilience.

### Shocks, Policies, and Structure: Relative Contributions to Increased Resilience
- Decomposition results (from the duration model) indicate:
  - Improved policies account for about three-fifths of EMDE increased resilience between the 1980s and 2000–07.
  - Fewer shocks account for the remaining two-fifths.
  - Structural characteristics made a negligible contribution overall.
- Quantified contributions cited in the text:
  - Decline in domestic shocks improved the expected mean duration of expansions by about 5 percent relative to the 1980s.
  - Reduced external shocks improved the expected mean duration of expansions by about 10 percent relative to the 1980s.
  - Improvements in policies increased the expected mean duration of expansions by about 20 percent over the past two decades.
- Caveat: contributions are indicative, sensitive to variable choice, and should not be given a causal interpretation because the exogenous component of policies is not identified.

### Regional and Subsample Findings
- The dominance of improved policies as the main contributor to increased expected duration of expansions holds across EMDE regions and across commodity and non-commodity exporters.
- Structural characteristics had negligible contribution in almost all subsamples, except:
  - Emerging and developing Asia: financial openness almost doubled between the 1980s and 2000s, producing a negative contribution to expected duration of expansions.

### Trends in Shocks and Episodes
- Noted declines and patterns:
  - Decline in frequency of banking crises and credit booms between 1980 and 2000–07.
  - During 2008–09 a precipitous drop in expected mean duration of expansions occurred, driven by a spike in external shocks from advanced economies (the Great Recession).
  - The period 2010–11 saw improvements relative to 2000–07 in expected mean duration of expansions, particularly from fewer external shocks.
- External shock measures and definitions used:
  - Global uncertainty measured by Chicago Board of Exchange S&P 100 volatility index (VXO); spikes are periods with VXO above its 75th percentile.
  - Advanced economies’ recessions defined as in Chapter 1 of the October 2010 IMF WEO: five recessions in the sample period—1974–75, 1980–83, 1991–93, 2001 and 2008–09.
  - U.S. ex ante real interest rate: interest rate on three-month Treasury bills minus projected inflation (projected inflation = percent change in forecast GDP price index from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia). Large increases defined as greater than 1.27 percentage points.

### Conclusion and Policy Implications
- Main conclusion: EMDEs are more resilient than in previous decades due to fewer shocks and improved policymaking; the improvement predates the most recent decade, with notable gains already in the 1990s.
- Recent performance:
  - For the first time, EMDEs have done better than AEs in terms of time spent in expansion (text statement).
  - The past two years (2010–11) were even better than 2000–07 in expected mean duration of expansions.
  - No banking crises in EMDEs in the past two years (period referenced in the source).
- Risks and recommendations:
  - Significant risk of another AE downturn (so-called fiscal cliff in the United States, sovereign and banking tensions in Europe) could reverse gains.
  - Potential triggers for EMDE setbacks include a drop in commodity prices (terms-of-trade busts), spikes in global uncertainty, and sudden stops in capital flows if risk aversion rises.
  - Policy recommendations to guard against adverse scenarios:
    - Rebuild buffers to ensure adequate policy space to respond to shocks.
    - Maintain improvements in policy frameworks, including greater exchange rate flexibility and more countercyclical macroeconomic policies, to better weather potential shocks.

### Data and Measurement Notes (selected)
- Primary data sources: IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), International Financial Statistics (IFS), World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI).
- Specific data series and sources cited:
  - Bank credit to private sector: International Financial Statistics Database.
  - Banking crisis indicators: Laeven and Valencia (2012).
  - External debt to GDP and reserves to GDP: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database updated to 2010.
  - Net private capital flows: IMF, Balance of Payment Statistics.
  - Inflation-targeting indicator: Roger (2010).
  - Global uncertainty: Bloom (2009) and Chicago Board of Exchange S&P100 volatility index (VXO).
  - U.S. projected inflation: Survey of Professional Forecasters, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  - U.S. 3-month Treasury bill interest rate: Global Financial Database.

*Source: _wp12300 - 1. Banking Crises (IMF working paper chapter; figures, tables, and text as provided in the source PDF).*

### Appendix Table 2. Economy Groups

### _wp12300 - Appendix Table 2. Economy Groups

### Economy groups and country listings
- The appendix provides country lists used in the analysis. Countries marked with * denote a primary commodity and/or fuel exporter.
- Countries are listed in multiple columns (preserving order and * markers as in source):
  - Australia
  - Austria
  - China
  - Argentina
  - Afghanistan
  - Belgium
  - Hong Kong SAR
  - Brazil
  - Bangladesh
  - Canada
  - India
  - Chile*
  - Cambodia
  - Denmark
  - Indonesia
  - Colombia
  - Lao P.D.R.
  - Finland
  - Korea
  - Costa Rica
  - Myanmar
  - France
  - Malaysia
  - Dominican Republic
  - Nepal
  - Germany
  - Pakistan
  - Ecuador*
  - Papua New Guinea*
  - Greece
  - Philippines
  - El Salvador
  - Timor-Leste*
  - Ireland
  - Singapore
  - Guatemala
  - Vietnam
  - Italy
  - Sri Lanka
  - Jamaica
  - Japan
  - Taiwan Province of China
  - Mexico
  - Netherlands
  - Thailand
  - Panama
  - Armenia
  - New Zealand
  - Paraguay
  - Georgia
  - Norway
  - Peru*
  - Kyrgyz Republic
  - Portugal
  - Azerbaijan*
  - Trinidad and Tobago*
  - Moldova
  - Spain
  - Belarus
  - Uruguay
  - Mongolia*
  - Sweden
  - Kazakhstan*
  - Venezuela*
  - Switzerland
  - Russia*
  - Bolivia*
  - United Kingdom
  - Ukraine
  - Haiti
  - United States
  - Algeria*
  - Honduras
  - Albania
  - Egypt
  - Nicaragua
  - Bosnia and Herzegovina
  - Iran*
  - Bosnia and Herzegovina (note: duplicated in source ordering)
  - Iraq*
  - Bulgaria
  - Israel
  - Mauritania*
  - Croatia
  - Jordan
  - Sudan*
  - Czech Republic
  - Estonia
  - Kuwait*
  - Yemen*
  - Hungary
  - Lebanon
  - Latvia
  - Libya*
  - Benin
  - Lithuania
  - Morocco
  - Burkina Faso*
  - Macedonia
  - Oman*
  - Burundi*
  - Poland
  - Saudi Arabia*
  - Cameroon
  - Romania
  - Syria
  - Central African Republic*
  - Serbia
  - Tunisia
  - Chad*
  - Slovak Republic
  - United Arab Emirates*
  - Democratic Republic of the Congo*
  - Slovenia
  - Republic of Congo*
  - Turkey
  - Angola*
  - Côte d'Ivoire
  - Botswana
  - Eritrea
  - Namibia
  - Ethiopia
  - South Africa
  - Ghana
  - Guinea*
  - Kenya
  - Lesotho
  - Liberia
  - Madagascar
  - Malawi*
  - Mali*
  - Mozambique*
  - Niger
  - Nigeria*
  - Rwanda
  - Senegal
  - Sierra Leone*
  - Tanzania
  - Togo
  - Uganda
  - Zambia*
  - Zimbabwe*
- The appendix also groups countries into regional/analytical categories, including:
  - Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
  - Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
  - Latin America
  - Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
  - Europe
  - Advanced Economies (AEs)
  - Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs)
  - Emerging Market Economies (EMs)
  - Low-Income Countries (LICs)
  - Asia
  - Latin America
  - Asia
- Note: "All economies in the analysis have an average population over the sample period of 1 million inhabitants or more."  
- Note: "Some economies currently classified as advanced by the WEO are classified as emerging markets in this chapter, because over the past 60 years these economies were more like emerging markets than advanced economies and because their experience—especially their ability to grow sufficiently to attain advanced economy status—provides valuable lessons."

### Data sources and definitions for empirical measures
- Data sources referenced:
  - IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (BPS) database
  - WEO database
  - WDI database
  - Laeven and Valencia (2012) banking crisis indicator
  - IFS database
  - Roger (2010) for dates when countries adopted inflation targeting
  - Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) for de facto exchange rate regime data
  - Abbas and others (2010) for public debt data
  - External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007)
  - Direction of Trade Statistics database
  - Wacziarg and Welch (2008) trade liberalization index
  - Chinn and Ito (2006) capital account openness
  - Solt (2009) Gini coefficient (SWIID Version 3.1, December 2011)

- Net private capital flows:
  - Defined as the sum of net foreign direct investment (FDI) flows (line 4500), net portfolio flows (line 4600), net derivative flows (line 4910), and net other investment flows (line 4700), excluding other investment flows to the general government and monetary authorities.
  - Data on net private capital flows are from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (BPS) database.
  - Net foreign direct investment flows as a share of GDP are also obtained from the BPS database.

- Sudden stop in capital flows:
  - Occurs when the ratio of net private capital flows to GDP falls by at least 5 percentage points from the previous year, and when the level of net private flows is more than 1 standard deviation below its economy-specific mean.

- Trade-weighted terms of trade:
  - Constructed using the deflators of exports and imports of goods and services and the series of GDP, exports, and imports of goods and services in nominal terms from the WEO and WDI databases.
  - Terms of trade series calculated as: the percentage change in the export price deflator times the share of exports in GDP in the previous period minus the percent change in the import price deflator times the share of imports in GDP in the previous period.
  - Terms-of-trade busts are defined as a worsening in the terms of trade of at least 3 percent of GDP.

- Domestic shocks and financial indicators:
  - Banking crisis indicator is from Laeven and Valencia (2012).
  - Bank credit to the private nonfinancial sector is taken from the IFS database; breaks identified using the IFS Country Notes and data are growth-spliced at these points.
  - Credit booms defined following Mendoza and Terrones (2008): periods in which the cyclical component of log real private credit per capita is at least 1.65 times its standard deviation above its mean.

- Policy frameworks and policy space:
  - Dates when countries adopted inflation targeting are from Roger (2010).
  - De facto exchange rate regime data are from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
  - Cyclicality of fiscal policy measured as the correlation between the cyclical component of real government primary expenditure (WEO) and the cyclical component of real GDP (Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh, 2004).
    - A negative correlation corresponds to countercyclical fiscal policy.
    - A positive correlation corresponds to procyclical fiscal policy.
  - Fiscal balance calculated as the change in the ratio of public debt to GDP, corrected for nominal GDP growth.
  - Fiscal surplus indicator: equals 1 if the fiscal balance is positive.
  - Data on public debt from Abbas and others (2010).
  - Ratios of external debt to GDP, reserves to GDP, and financial integration are constructed using the External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007).
    - Financial integration is defined as the sum of foreign assets and foreign liabilities divided by GDP.
  - Low external debt indicator equals 1 if external debt is less than 40 percent of GDP.
  - Current account balance and consumer price inflation are taken from the WEO database.
  - Low inflation indicator equals 1 if inflation is below 10 percent.

- Structural characteristics:
  - Trade openness measured as the sum of imports and exports over GDP.
  - Trade liberalization index from Wacziarg and Welch (2008).
  - Capital account openness from Chinn and Ito (2006).
  - Bilateral imports and exports from Direction of Trade Statistics database used to construct the share of exports to EMDEs.
  - Inequality (Gini coefficient of household disposable income) from Solt (2009).

*Italic line: Appendix Table 2. Economy Groups (source PDF content)._

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/_wp12300.pdf_
