## _wp1313 - 2.   Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables

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---

### I. INTRODUCTION — context and hypothesis
- The 1997−98 Asian financial crisis was associated with a sharp reduction of economic activity in emerging Asia and investment fell significantly with growth.
- After the crisis, economic growth in the region quickly rebounded to near pre-crisis level; investment has never fully recovered afterwards, but remained at low levels in most countries excluding China and India.
- Credit to the private sector has stagnated, particularly in those economies directly affected by the crisis.
- Observed sectoral asymmetry: the domestically focused nontradable (N) sector was hit more severely, while the externally oriented tradable (T) sector held up relatively well.
- Core hypothesis tested: nontradable sector investment is relatively more financing constrained than tradable sector investment, owing to greater reliance on bank credit and more severe asymmetric information problems.

### II. Stylized facts on credit and investment (ASEAN-3 focus)
- Sample and focus:
  - ASEAN-3: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.
  - Aggregate data period used in macro regressions: 1991 to 2007.
- Key aggregate stylized facts:
  - Average investment in ASEAN-3 has declined by an average of 15 percentage points of GDP from 1990−97 to 2000−10.
  - Country-specific changes in investment (gross capital formation as percent of GDP):
    - Malaysia: from 39 percent to 23 percent.
    - Indonesia: from 30 percent to 24 percent.
    - Thailand: from 40 percent to 26 percent.
  - Credit to private sector as percent of GDP in ASEAN-3: decreased from 94 percent to 79 percent (1990−1997 to 2000−2010).
  - Nontradable sector output as percent of GDP: from 1996 to 2007 dropped 5 percent on average in ASEAN-3.
  - Loans to nontradable sector (share of total loans) changes:
    - ASEAN-3: dropped around 10 percent from 1997−2007.
    - Thailand: from 42 percentage points in 1996 to 35 percentage points of total loans in 2007.
    - Malaysia: from 35 in 1997 to 26 in 2007.
    - Indonesia: from 55 percent in 1996 to 42 percent in 2007.
  - Post-crisis tradable sector: experienced an acceleration of growth after a mild recession; net exports have taken over investment as an important growth driver.

### III. Why did credit slump and why nontradable sector suffered most?
- Channels and contributing factors:
  - Sharp turnaround in bank lending flows (private other investment) drove the precipitous decline in net private capital flows (Figure 8): direct investment, portfolio, and FDI flows remained relatively stable, while bank lending flows collapsed.
  - Bank balance sheet deterioration and increased risk aversion reduced new lending.
  - Stricter prudential regulation: banks forced to recognize nonperforming loans; higher capital adequacy ratios and higher loan-loss provisions constrained lending.
  - Nontradable firms characteristics:
    - Heavily populated by small and medium sized enterprises.
    - More bank-dependent and less able to access international financing.
    - Benefit little from exchange rate depreciation.
    - Pre-crisis nontradable sector borrowing often in foreign currency; exchange rate collapse inflated debt burdens for these firms.
  - Resulting reallocation: short-term bank lending shifted away from nontradable firms toward consumers or large tradable firms.
- Implication: prolonged post-crisis credit slump disproportionately affected nontradable sector investment and production.

### IV. Macro evidence: regression framework and main aggregate results
- Model and variables:
  - Dependent variable: N/Y (nontradable sector’s share in output) — used as proxy for nontradable sector investment.
  - Explanatory variables include lagged GDP growth (gGDP), real interest rate (RealIntRate), real lending rate (LendRate), loans to the nontradable sector (nLoan), real exchange rate (REER), terms of trade (TOT), and uncertainty (3-year standard deviation of output growth).
  - Estimation: pooled annual data from Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, 1991−2007; country and time fixed effects.
  - Estimation equation specified:
    - log(N/Y)it = β0 + β1 log(gGDPit-1) + β2 log(nLoanit-1) + β3 RealIntRateit-1 + β4 LendRateit-1 + β5 log(REERit) + β6 log(TOTit) + β7 Uncertit + αi + αt + εit
- Main macro findings (Table 2 summary):
  - Loans to the nontradable sector are a statistically significant positive determinant of nontradable sector output after the Asian crisis.
  - Coefficients on real interest rate, lending rate, real exchange rate, and terms of trade have expected signs and are significant.
  - Nontradable sector output is negatively related with real GDP growth during 1998−2007, consistent with nontradable sector performance being lackluster despite strong GDP growth.
  - Full sample (1991−2007): effect of loans to nontradable on nontradable output is small and insignificant, reflecting pre-crisis overinvestment driven by external financing.
  - Post-2001 (2001−2007): loans to the nontradable sector became an extremely important source of investment; magnitude on nLoan roughly doubled relative to full period 1998−2007, and loans and uncertainty become the only determinants of output in that shorter sample.

### V. Micro (firm-level) evidence: methodology, data, and results
- Data:
  - Firm-level sample: about 1361 nonfinancial, publicly-traded firms from Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, years 1991−2007 (Worldscope).
  - Sector classification: cyclical services, noncyclical services, utilities and heavy construction = nontradable sector; other nonfinancial industries = tradable sector.
- Key firm-level variables (as defined in Table 3):
  - EQ: Capital stock = Total property, plant and equipment net (WC02501).
  - IV: Investment to capital = Capital Expenditure (WC04601) divided by lagged EQ.
  - TQA: Tobin's Q = Fiscal year end market capitalization (WS08001) plus book value of debt (WS03255), divided by book value of assets (WS02999).
  - CP: Cash to capital = Cash and short-term investments (WC02001) divided by lagged EQ.
  - DP: Debt to capital = Total debt (WC03255) divided by lagged EQ.
  - SP: Sales to capital = Sales (WC01001) divided by lagged EQ.
  - RC: Return on invested capital = Earnings before interest and taxes (WC18191) divided by lagged EQ.
  - TLTA: Total assets to total liabilities = Total assets (WX02999) divided by total liabilities (WC03351).
- Estimation approach:
  - Dynamic panel regressions using Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM (difference GMM, xtabond2).
  - Investment equation specified in levels and first differences, controlling for endogeneity of lagged dependent variable and other regressors.
  - Main test: significance and magnitude of coefficient on CP/K (cash to capital) — evidence of financing constraints; comparison between nontradable and tradable firms.
- Main firm-level results (Table 4 and Table 5 highlights):
  - Across three periods (pre-crisis 1990−1996; post-crisis 1997−2000; post-crisis 2001−2007), cash stocks (CP/K) are the single significant determinant of firm-level investment for both sectors in many specifications.
  - Sensitivity of investment to cash:
    - Pre-crisis: coefficient on CP/K generally less than 0.02.
    - Post-crisis (1997−2000): CP/K around 0.05 (more than tripled relative to pre-crisis).
    - Post-crisis (2001−2007): for nontradable firms, a 1 percentage point increase in CP/K drives up investment ratio by about 1 percent (reported coefficient ~1.0089 *** in one specification), implying very high sensitivity and persistent financial constraint.
  - Tradable firms: coefficients on cash increase after crisis but are much smaller in magnitude than for nontradable firms; coefficients for the two post-crisis segments (1997−2000 and 2001−2007) are not significantly different for tradable firms.
  - Tobin’s Q is frequently not significant and often takes the wrong sign; measurement error or market imperfections may explain weak Q performance.
- Robustness checks (Table 5):
  - Inclusion of additional controls (SP/K, DP/K, TLTA, RC) in post-crisis (2001−2007) nontradable regressions:
    - Sales (SP/K) significantly positive; debt (DP/K) negative but not significant.
    - CP/K remains positive and statistically significant in multiple specifications (Model 3: cash remains significant at 1 percent).
    - Profitability (RC) inclusion does not remove the cash effect; CP/K remains significant at 1 percent in Model 4.
  - Diagnostic statistics reported: Hansen (p), AR(2) (p) values provided in tables.
- Important caveat:
  - Results relate to listed nontradable firms (large corporations by economy-wide standards); unlisted nontradable firms likely face even stronger financing constraints, so the significance of internal funds for investment may be larger for unlisted firms.

### VI. Conclusions and policy recommendations
- Main conclusions:
  - In contrast to rapid GDP recovery after the Asian crisis, credit and investment ratios in most emerging Asian countries remain subdued.
  - Sluggish recovery of investment in post-crisis emerging Asia has partly reflected a disproportionate share of the credit decline for firms in the nontradable sector, which face more asymmetric information problems in securing external finance.
  - Tradable sector recovery benefited from real depreciation and better access to credit; net exports partly substituted for weak investment.
  - Weak nontradable sector investment has implications for productivity convergence, growth rebalancing, employment, and social welfare.
- Policy recommendations:
  - Alleviate information asymmetry in credit markets:
    - Improve and extend coverage of credit registries in credit bureaus to allow banks to lend based on individualized credit analysis rather than blunt limits.
    - Malaysia’s credit bureau cited as an example for comprehensive credit information and SME ratings.
  - Expand financing sources for nontradable firms by further developing capital markets:
    - Improve legal and corporate governance frameworks in corporate bond markets.
    - Change legal frameworks to widen the range of assets usable as collateral.
    - Promote venture capital and other non-bank financing to reduce dependence on bank lending.
  - Improve the business climate and open nontradable sector to foreign capital:
    - Deregulate and reduce restrictions on foreign investment in regional nontradable sectors to increase access to external finance.
- Conditional note:
  - Financial-constraint explanation may not apply uniformly across all emerging Asia (example: Korea’s credit does not decline as in other countries).

### Appendix Table 1. Sectoral and Size Distributions for Individual Countries
- Sectoral and size counts (World Business Environment Survey, World Bank, 2001):
  - Indonesia82541846
  - Malaysia65403560
  - Thailand61243976
  - 1/ "small" denotes small and medium firms up to 200 employees. "Large" firms have more than 200 employees.
  - Source: World Bank, 2001, World Business Environment Survey.
- Descriptive statistics for key variables (by country and firm size) — selected lines preserved as in source:
  - Indonesia
    - IV1,8700.120.477.343740.170.330.69
    - CP1,9800.208.54348.843810.322.018.08
    - TQA2,2280.901.221.454440.961.221.27
    - SP1,9812.3868.81  2,774.293813.508.8222.75
    - DP1,9960.400.400.284130.370.360.25
    - TLTA2,21056.2263.1151.1344352.6260.1247.53
    - RC1,9417.7911.20161.764057.318.7041.98
  - Malaysia
    - IV5,2900.090.210.621,5450.090.302.49
    - CP5,2990.191.8423.561,5380.292.9443.76
    - TQA6,1570.861.262.251,7470.811.081.24
    - SP5,3101.803.7410.391,5441.765.0314.13
    - DP5,8990.240.280.241,6620.320.340.26
    - TLTA6,15240.0546.0849.151,74650.4553.3636.45
    - RC5,5905.974.2727.351,5925.440.57157.80
  - Thailand
    - IV2,6540.110.210.438010.141.5837.07
    - CP2,6740.110.482.828080.302.1933.85
    - TQA3,0610.861.040.709260.991.321.27
    - SP2,6782.315.5360.828081.997.6464.97
    - DP2,8990.380.370.268630.350.350.28
    - TLTA3,05748.9651.0832.7092552.1254.0744.03
    - RC2,9048.407.8352.038767.785.7545.61
- Sources: Worldscope database; and staff estimates.

*Source: _wp1313 - 2.   Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables*

### References .............................................................................................................

### _wp1313 - References

### Figures
- 1.   Emerging Asia: Investment and GDP Growth .....................................................................3
- 2.   Emerging Asia: Credit to the Private Sector ........................................................................3
- 3.   Emerging Asia: Savings and Investment .............................................................................4
- 4.   ASEAN-3: Gross Capital Formation ...................................................................................5
- 5.   ASEAN-3: Nontradable Sector Output ................................................................................6
- 6.   ASEAN-3: Loans to the Nontradable Sector .......................................................................6
- 7.   ASEAN-3: Net Exports........................................................................................................6
- 8.   ASEAN-3: Private Capital Flows ........................................................................................7

### Tables
- 1.   Classification of Nontradable and Tradable Sector for Graphs and  
   Aggregate Estimation.......................................................................................................10
- 2.   Panel Regression for the Nontradable Sector Output with Time and  
   Country Fixed Effects ......................................................................................................12
- 3.   Variable Definitions for Firms Level Regressions ............................................................14
- 4.   Investment   Equations   .........................................................................................................17
- 5.   Nontradable Firms Investment Equations ..........................................................................19

### Appendices
- 1.   Sectoral and Size Distributions for Individual Countries ..................................................22

*Source: _wp1313 - References*

### 2.   Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables ..........................................................................

### _wp1313 - 2.   Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables ..........................................................................

### I. INTRODUCTION — context and hypothesis
- The 1997−98 Asian financial crisis was associated with a sharp reduction of economic activity in emerging Asia and investment fell significantly with growth.
- After the crisis, economic growth in the region quickly rebounded to near pre-crisis level; investment has never fully recovered afterwards, but remained at low levels in most countries excluding China and India.
- Credit to the private sector has stagnated, particularly in those economies directly affected by the crisis.
- Observed sectoral asymmetry: the domestically focused nontradable (N) sector was hit more severely, while the externally oriented tradable (T) sector held up relatively well.
- Core hypothesis tested: nontradable sector investment is relatively more financing constrained than tradable sector investment, owing to greater reliance on bank credit and more severe asymmetric information problems.

### II. Stylized facts on credit and investment (ASEAN-3 focus)
- Sample and focus:
  - ASEAN-3: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.
  - Aggregate data period used in macro regressions: 1991 to 2007.
- Key aggregate stylized facts:
  - Average investment in ASEAN-3 has declined by an average of 15 percentage points of GDP from 1990−97 to 2000−10.
  - Country-specific changes in investment (gross capital formation as percent of GDP):
    - Malaysia: from 39 percent to 23 percent.
    - Indonesia: from 30 percent to 24 percent.
    - Thailand: from 40 percent to 26 percent.
  - Credit to private sector as percent of GDP in ASEAN-3: decreased from 94 percent to 79 percent (1990−1997 to 2000−2010).
  - Nontradable sector output as percent of GDP: from 1996 to 2007 dropped 5 percent on average in ASEAN-3.
  - Loans to nontradable sector (share of total loans) changes:
    - ASEAN-3: dropped around 10 percent from 1997−2007.
    - Thailand: from 42 percentage points in 1996 to 35 percentage points of total loans in 2007.
    - Malaysia: from 35 in 1997 to 26 in 2007.
    - Indonesia: from 55 percent in 1996 to 42 percent in 2007.
  - Post-crisis tradable sector: experienced an acceleration of growth after a mild recession; net exports have taken over investment as an important growth driver.

### III. Why did credit slump and why nontradable sector suffered most?
- Channels and contributing factors:
  - Sharp turnaround in bank lending flows (private other investment) drove the precipitous decline in net private capital flows (Figure 8): direct investment, portfolio, and FDI flows remained relatively stable, while bank lending flows collapsed.
  - Bank balance sheet deterioration and increased risk aversion reduced new lending.
  - Stricter prudential regulation: banks forced to recognize nonperforming loans; higher capital adequacy ratios and higher loan-loss provisions constrained lending.
  - Nontradable firms characteristics:
    - Heavily populated by small and medium sized enterprises.
    - More bank-dependent and less able to access international financing.
    - Benefit little from exchange rate depreciation.
    - Pre-crisis nontradable sector borrowing often in foreign currency; exchange rate collapse inflated debt burdens for these firms.
  - Resulting reallocation: short-term bank lending shifted away from nontradable firms toward consumers or large tradable firms.
- Implication: prolonged post-crisis credit slump disproportionately affected nontradable sector investment and production.

### IV. Macro evidence: regression framework and main aggregate results
- Model and variables:
  - Dependent variable: N/Y (nontradable sector’s share in output) — used as proxy for nontradable sector investment.
  - Explanatory variables include lagged GDP growth (gGDP), real interest rate (RealIntRate), real lending rate (LendRate), loans to the nontradable sector (nLoan), real exchange rate (REER), terms of trade (TOT), and uncertainty (3-year standard deviation of output growth).
  - Estimation: pooled annual data from Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, 1991−2007; country and time fixed effects.
  - Estimation equation (as specified):
    - log(N/Y)it = β0 + β1 log(gGDPit-1) + β2 log(nLoanit-1) + β3 RealIntRateit-1 + β4 LendRateit-1 + β5 log(REERit) + β6 log(TOTit) + β7 Uncertit + αi + αt + εit
- Main macro findings (Table 2 summary):
  - Loans to the nontradable sector are a statistically significant positive determinant of nontradable sector output after the Asian crisis.
  - Coefficients on real interest rate, lending rate, real exchange rate, and terms of trade have expected signs and are significant.
  - Nontradable sector output is negatively related with real GDP growth during 1998−2007, consistent with nontradable sector performance being lackluster despite strong GDP growth.
  - Full sample (1991−2007): effect of loans to nontradable on nontradable output is small and insignificant, reflecting pre-crisis overinvestment driven by external financing.
  - Post-2001 (2001−2007): loans to the nontradable sector became an extremely important source of investment; magnitude on nLoan roughly doubled relative to full period 1998−2007, and loans and uncertainty become the only determinants of output in that shorter sample.

### V. Micro (firm-level) evidence: methodology, data, and results
- Data:
  - Firm-level sample: about 1361 nonfinancial, publicly-traded firms from Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, years 1991−2007 (Worldscope).
  - Sector classification: cyclical services, noncyclical services, utilities and heavy construction = nontradable sector; other nonfinancial industries = tradable sector.
  - Key firm-level variables (Table 3 definitions preserved):
    - EQ: Capital stock = Total property, plant and equipment net (WC02501).
    - IV: Investment to capital = Capital Expenditure (WC04601) divided by lagged EQ.
    - TQA: Tobin's Q = Fiscal year end market capitalization (WS08001) plus book value of debt (WS03255), divided by book value of assets (WS02999).
    - CP: Cash to capital = Cash and short-term investments (WC02001) divided by lagged EQ.
    - DP: Debt to capital = Total debt (WC03255) divided by lagged EQ.
    - SP: Sales to capital = Sales (WC01001) divided by lagged EQ.
    - RC: Return on invested capital = Earnings before interest and taxes (WC18191) divided by lagged EQ.
    - TLTA: Total assets to total liabilities = Total assets (WX02999) divided by total liabilities (WC03351).
- Estimation approach:
  - Dynamic panel regressions using Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM (difference GMM, xtabond2).
  - Investment equation specified in levels and first differences (equations (2) and (3)), controlling for endogeneity of lagged dependent variable and other regressors.
  - Main test: significance and magnitude of coefficient on CP/K (cash to capital) — evidence of financing constraints; comparison between nontradable and tradable firms.
- Main firm-level results (Table 4 and Table 5 highlights):
  - Across three periods (pre-crisis 1990−1996; post-crisis 1997−2000; post-crisis 2001−2007), cash stocks (CP/K) are the single significant determinant of firm-level investment for both sectors in many specifications.
  - Sensitivity of investment to cash:
    - Pre-crisis: coefficient on CP/K generally less than 0.02.
    - Post-crisis (1997−2000): CP/K around 0.05 (more than tripled relative to pre-crisis).
    - Post-crisis (2001−2007): for nontradable firms, a 1 percentage point increase in CP/K drives up investment ratio by about 1 percent (reported coefficient ~1.0089 *** in one specification), implying very high sensitivity and persistent financial constraint.
  - Tradable firms: coefficients on cash increase after crisis but are much smaller in magnitude than for nontradable firms; coefficients for the two post-crisis segments (1997−2000 and 2001−2007) are not significantly different for tradable firms.
  - Tobin’s Q is frequently not significant and often takes the wrong sign; measurement error or market imperfections may explain weak Q performance.
- Robustness checks (Table 5):
  - Inclusion of additional controls (sales SP/K, debt DP/K, TLTA, RC) in post-crisis (2001−2007) nontradable regressions:
    - Sales (SP/K) significantly positive; debt (DP/K) negative but not significant.
    - CP/K remains positive and statistically significant in multiple specifications (Model 3: cash remains significant at 1 percent).
    - Profitability (RC) inclusion does not remove the cash effect; CP/K remains significant at 1 percent in Model 4.
  - Diagnostic statistics reported: Hansen (p), AR(2) (p) values provided in tables.
- Important caveat:
  - Results relate to listed nontradable firms (large corporations by economy-wide standards); unlisted nontradable firms likely face even stronger financing constraints, so the significance of internal funds for investment may be larger for unlisted firms.

### VI. Conclusions and policy recommendations
- Main conclusions:
  - In contrast to rapid GDP recovery after the Asian crisis, credit and investment ratios in most emerging Asian countries remain subdued.
  - Sluggish recovery of investment in post-crisis emerging Asia has partly reflected a disproportionate share of the credit decline for firms in the nontradable sector, which face more asymmetric information problems in securing external finance.
  - Tradable sector recovery benefited from real depreciation and better access to credit; net exports partly substituted for weak investment.
  - Weak nontradable sector investment has implications for productivity convergence, growth rebalancing, employment, and social welfare.
- Policy recommendations (three broad policy areas):
  - Alleviate information asymmetry in credit markets:
    - Improve and extend coverage of credit registries in credit bureaus to allow banks to lend based on individualized credit analysis rather than blunt limits.
    - Malaysia’s credit bureau cited as an example for comprehensive credit information and SME ratings.
  - Expand financing sources for nontradable firms by further developing capital markets:
    - Improve legal and corporate governance frameworks in corporate bond markets.
    - Change legal frameworks to widen the range of assets usable as collateral.
    - Promote venture capital and other non-bank financing to reduce dependence on bank lending.
  - Improve the business climate and open nontradable sector to foreign capital:
    - Deregulate and reduce restrictions on foreign investment in regional nontradable sectors to increase access to external finance.
- Conditional note:
  - Financial-constraint explanation may not apply uniformly across all emerging Asia (example: Korea’s credit does not decline as in other countries).

*Source: _wp1313 - 2.   Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables (PDF chapter content provided).*

### Appendix Table 1. Sectoral and Size Distributions for Individual Countries 1/

### Appendix Table 1. Sectoral and Size Distributions for Individual Countries 1/

### Sectoral and size counts (World Business Environment Survey, World Bank, 2001)
- Indonesia82541846
- Malaysia65403560
- Thailand61243976
- 1/ "small" denotes small and medium firms up to 200 employees. "Large" firms have more than 200 employees.
- Source: World Bank, 2001, World Business Environment Survey.

### Descriptive statistics for key variables (by country and firm size)
- Table header/context: N sector (percent) T sector (percent) — T Firms N Firms
- Indonesia
  - IV1,8700.120.477.343740.170.330.69
  - CP1,9800.208.54348.843810.322.018.08
  - TQA2,2280.901.221.454440.961.221.27
  - SP1,9812.3868.81  2,774.293813.508.8222.75
  - DP1,9960.400.400.284130.370.360.25
  - TLTA2,21056.2263.1151.1344352.6260.1247.53
  - RC1,9417.7911.20161.764057.318.7041.98
- Malaysia
  - IV5,2900.090.210.621,5450.090.302.49
  - CP5,2990.191.8423.561,5380.292.9443.76
  - TQA6,1570.861.262.251,7470.811.081.24
  - SP5,3101.803.7410.391,5441.765.0314.13
  - DP5,8990.240.280.241,6620.320.340.26
  - TLTA6,15240.0546.0849.151,74650.4553.3636.45
  - RC5,5905.974.2727.351,5925.440.57157.80
- Thailand
  - IV2,6540.110.210.438010.141.5837.07
  - CP2,6740.110.482.828080.302.1933.85
  - TQA3,0610.861.040.709260.991.321.27
  - SP2,6782.315.5360.828081.997.6464.97
  - DP2,8990.380.370.268630.350.350.28
  - TLTA3,05748.9651.0832.7092552.1254.0744.03
  - RC2,9048.407.8352.038767.785.7545.61
- Sources: Worldscope database; and staff estimates.

### Appendix Table note
- Appendix Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables (page indicator "21" appears in source layout)

### Selected references cited (as listed in source)
- Agenor, P.R., J. Aizenman, A. Hoffmaister, 2000, “The Credit Crunch in East Asia: What Can Bank Excess Liquid Assets Tell Us?,” NBER Working Paper No. 7951 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- Agung, Juda, and others, 2001, “Credit Crunch in Indonesia in the Aftermath if the Crisis facts, Causes and Policy Implications,” (Jakarta: Directorate of Economic Research and Monetary Policy, Bank of Indonesia).
- Asian Development Bank, 2007, “Ten Years After the Crisis: The Fact About Investment and Growth,” in Asian Development Outlook 2007: Growth Amid Change (Manila).
- Arellano, M., and Bond, S. R., 1991, “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, Issue 2, pp. 277−97.
- Barro, Robert, Jong-Wha Lee, 2003, “Growth and Investment in East Asia Before and After the Financial Crisis,” Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol. 16, Issue 2, pp. 83−118.
- Bernanke, Ben, Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist, 1994. “The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality,” NBER Working Paper No. 4789 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- Blalock, Garrick, Paul J. Gertler, and David I. Levine, 2008, “Financial Constraints on Investment in an Emerging Market Crisis,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 55, Issue 3, pp. 568−591.
- Blinder, A.S., 1988, “Comments and Discussion,” in “Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment,” by S. Fazzari, R. Hubbard, and B. Petersen, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 196−120.
- Borensztein, Eduardo, and Jong-Wha Lee, 2002, “Financial Crisis and Credit Crunch in Korea: Evidence from Firm-Level Data,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 49, Issue 4, pp. 853−875.
- Caballero, Ricardo, and Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2001, “International and Domestic Collateral Constraints in a Model of Emerging Market Crises,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 48, pp. 513−548.
- Calvo, Guillermo A., Alejandro Izquierdo, and Luis-Fernando Mejia, 2004, “On the Empirics of Sudden Stops: The Relevance of Balance-Sheet Effects,” NBER Working Paper No. 10520 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).

*Source: _wp1313 - Appendix Table 1. Sectoral and Size Distributions for Individual Countries 1/*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/_wp1313.pdf_